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ART. I.—*A Residence of twenty-one years in the Sandwich Islands; or the Civil, Religious and Political History of those Islands; comprising a particular view of the Missionary operations connected with the introduction and progress of Christianity and Civilization among the Hawaiian people.* By Hiram Bingham, A. M., Member of the American Oriental Society, and late Missionary of the American Board. Hartford and New York. 1847. pp. 616.

It is possible that among the readers of Mr. Bingham's volume are some who read, at the time of its appearance, the history of that voyage of Captain Cook, Clerke and Gore, which gave to the world the first information of the existence of the Sandwich Islands. To much younger persons, however, as well as to these, the two works must appear in wonderful contrast, even when superficially consulted. Between the times of King Terreeboo, when to be publicly invested with a linen shirt was a high mark of royalty; when the solemn offering of swine, in the successive stages of the living, strangled and baked animal, was the most distinguished honour that could be returned to the foreign "Orono," and that too as a religious sacrifice—and the times of the

the enterprize, and their prayers for its continuance, yet it should not be concluded that the Sandwich Islands constitute a paradise, in comparison with all the rest of the world. Degradation, sin, hypocrisy, back-sliding, are to be found there, as elsewhere, even among professed Christians. Few of the pious natives have been found suitable for ordination as preachers, and none, as yet, for the pastoral office. Education has not yet had time for its full development among a people whose intellectual strength had degenerated before the counteracting remedy had been applied. The nation is not yet strong enough to stand alone either in its religious or civil concerns. Let not the Missionary Board grow weary of their work in helping them on, nor Christians in sustaining the Board.

Wm. A. Alexander

ART. II.—*Sketches of Moral and Mental Philosophy. Their Connexion with each other, and their bearings on Doctrinal and Practical Christianity.* By Thomas Chalmers, D.D. and LL.D., Professor of Theology in the University of Edinburgh, and Corresponding Member of the Royal Institute of France. New York: Robert Carter, 58 Canal Street and Pittsburg, 56 Market Street.

SOME persons entertain the idea that there is very little benefit derived from the study of mental and moral science. They are of opinion, that plain common sense and the Bible, are our surest guides; and that the speculations of philosophers have tended rather to perplex than elucidate the great practical principles which should be the guide of our lives. No doubt there is some truth in these opinions. Men who are governed by the plain principles of common sense, without further inquiry seldom err widely from the truth; while speculative men, misled by their own reasonings, on metaphysical subjects, arrive at conclusions contradictory to evident, intuitive truths. But this very thing evinces the necessity of paying diligent attention to these subjects; in order that the errors of speculative men may be refuted, and that truth—which always has evidence and right reason on its side—may be established, on its true founda-

tion. We admit that the Bible contains the purest and most perfect system of moral duties; but the Bible assumes as true the radical principles of morality; such as that man is a free, accountable, moral agent; that man cannot be under obligations to perform what is naturally impossible; and that all actions which possess a moral character must be in some sense voluntary, &c. Now, in regard to these assumed principles, there may be a diversity of opinion, and errors may be maintained and propagated which tend to subvert the whole system of morality. These errors should certainly be met, and the reasoning by which they are maintained, shown to be sophistical or inconclusive.

Dr. Chalmers, who, like Paul was set for the defence of the gospel, was fully aware of the close connexion which exists between science and religion; and in most of his writings has exerted his mighty mind in opposing the inroads and assaults of error and infidelity, from whatever quarter they might arise. In his Preface to this volume he says, "There seems a special necessity, in the present times, for laying open to the light of day, every possible connexion, which might be fancied or alleged, between Theology and the other sciences. All must be aware of a certain rampant infidelity that is now abroad, which, if neither so cultivated, nor so profound as in the days of our forefathers, is still unquelled and as resolute as ever; and is now making fearful havoc, both among the disciples of the other learned professions, and among the half educated classes of British society." It would be difficult to estimate too highly the labours of this great man in defence of the fundamental truths of morality and religion. He was undoubtedly raised up by Providence to do an important work, for his own and future generations; for his writings will continue to be read, as long as the English language is in use; and when read will produce a salutary effect on the minds of men. As he is now taken from the world, there can be no impropriety in expressing the opinion, that he was the most important author who flourished in the first part of the nineteenth century. Dr. Chalmers made free use of his pen, and his published works are numerous and very important; and none more so than those on Natural Theology, and in defence of Christianity. For some years, he was professor of Moral Philosophy in the University

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of St. Andrews, which led him of course to pay particular attention to mental and moral science. He was well acquainted with the writings of his distinguished countrymen in this department of knowledge; and although he was a great admirer of Dr. Brown as a metaphysician, he was not blind to the defects of his system, as appears by his animadversions on some of his theories, contained in the volume, at the head of this article.

The principal object of Dr. Chalmers, in the work now before us, seems to have been to establish a few leading principles, and to correct some popular errors, on the subject of morals. Indeed, nearly the whole book relates to those mental exercises, which he denominates *emotions*; by which he understands all our feelings, except volitions. Dr. Brown used the word with still greater latitude. Under this term, he included also volitions, which in his theory are not different from desires. But we have been accustomed to use the word *emotions*, in a much more restricted sense; as meaning those feelings which terminate in the mind, and which, though they have a cause have no object; such as joy, sorrow, surprise, the feelings of exhilaration and depression, and such like. We have, therefore, been in the habit of distinguishing, not only between volition and emotion, which is done by Dr. Chalmers; but also between emotion and desire, which are confounded by him. The word *sensibilities* has come into frequent use, as a generic term, intended to comprehend all feelings except volitions; and this term is often used by Dr. Chalmers, in this work. But, in our opinion, there are strong objections to this term, as intended to express our desires; and especially those which have no close connexion with the body. The old division of the faculties of the mind into understanding, will, and affections, pleases us better than any of the more modern divisions; only we would place the affections before the will, as being first in the order of operation. Dr. Chalmers observes, somewhere in this work, that the word *affections*, properly signifies an exercise of mind which have persons for their object. Thus we speak of benevolent and malevolent affections. It is true, that the word is often used in this restricted sense; but it is also employed with much greater latitude, and is often applied to express the condition even of bodies. All words in common use, when introduced as techni-

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cal terms in any science, acquire a more precise signification than they have in popular discourse. We prefer the word affections to sensibilities, first because it is the old term, with which even common readers are well acquainted; and again, it does not suggest, as the other term does to us, some agitation originating in the body.

In regard to volition, Dr. Chalmers adopts the definition of Locke and Reid, confining the term to the determination of the mind to act, or not act. A general purpose to perform certain acts, differs from a volition. A general purpose never produces action: a volition is required for every voluntary act. A man determines to go to a certain place to-morrow; this purpose will not have the effect of bringing him there; unless at the time, he puts forth successive volitions to communicate to his body the necessary locomotion. Yet Dr. Chalmers admits, that much of morality and of moral character consists in these general purposes of the mind. They are, in fact, what are commonly denominated *principles*.

One main object of the distinguished author of this work is, to prove that no action or mental exercise can possess any moral quality, unless it be voluntary. This, as a general proposition, will be admitted by all persons capable of thinking on the subject. It is a truism; or rather a moral maxim, which is evident to every mind as soon as proposed. But although this is an intuitive truth, and one which no man in his senses ever denied, yet there may exist enormous errors, in relation to its meaning; and in the application of it. And we are of opinion that while Dr. Chalmers adopts a sound principle, and reasons cogently from it, he has inadvertently fallen into a mistake, which has involved him in much perplexity in his discussions on moral subjects. He uses the word *voluntary*, in the strictest sense, to mean an act or exercise consequent on volition. According to his views, no emotion, that is no desire or affection, can be conceived to possess a moral character, unless, directly or indirectly, immediately or remotely, it be the result of a volition. Now as our affections or feelings are not subject to our volitions, in any other way than as by the power of attention we can bring the objects suited to excite these affections, the difficulty is to see how our emotions acquire a moral quality. The Doctor attempts to explain this difficulty, but in our judg-

C. Edwards ✓

ment, he does not succeed in removing it. But we will permit Dr. Chalmers to give his own views in his own words.

“It is well that, amid all the difficulties attendant on the physiological inquiry, there should be such a degree of clearness and uniformity in the moral judgments of men—inasmuch that the peasant can with a just and prompt discernment, equal to that of the philosopher, seize on the real moral characteristics of any action submitted to his notice, and pronounce on the merit or demerit of him who has performed it. It is in attending to these popular, or rather universal decisions, that we learn the real principles of Moral Science.

“4. And the first certainly of these popular, or rather universal decisions, is that nothing is moral or immoral that is not voluntary. A murderer may be conceived, instead of striking with the dagger in his own hand, to force it by an act of refined cruelty, into the hand of him, who is the dearest relative or friend of his devoted victim; and by his superior strength to compel the struggling and the reluctant instrument to its grasp. He may thus confine it to the hand, and give impulse to the arm of one, who recoils in utmost horror from that perpetration, of which he has been made as it were the material engine; and could matters be so contrived, as that the real murderer should be invisible, while the arm and the hand that enclosed the weapon and the movements of the ostensible one should alone be patent to the eye of the senses—then he, and not the other, would be held by the bystander as chargeable with the guilt. But so soon as the real nature of the transaction came to be understood, this imputation would be wholly and instantly transferred. The distinction would at once be recognized between the willing agent in this deed of horror, and the unwilling instrument. There would no more of moral blame be attached to the latter than to the weapon which inflicted the mortal blow; and on the former exclusively, the whole burden of the crime and its condemnation would be laid. And the simple difference which gives rise to the whole of this moral distinction in the estimate between them is, that with the one the act was with the will; with the other it was against it.

“5. This fixes a point of deepest interest, even that step in the process that leads to an emotion, at which the character of right or wrong comes to be applicable. It is not at that point, when the appetites or affections of our nature solicit from the will a particular movement; neither is it at that point when either a rational self-love or a sense of duty remonstrates against it. It is not at that point when the consent of the will is pleaded for, on the one side or other—but, all-important to be borne in mind, it is at that point when the consent is given. When we characterize a court at law for some one of its deeds—it is not upon the urgency of the argument on one side of the question, or of the reply upon the other, that we found our estimate; but wholly upon the decision of the bench, which decision is carried into effect by a certain order given out to the officers who execute it. And so, in characterizing an individual for some one of his doings, we found our estimate not upon the desires of appetite that may have instigated him or

the one hand, or upon the dictates of conscience that may have withstood these upon the other—not upon the elements that conflicted in the struggle but on the determination that put an end to it—even that determination of the will which is carried into effect by those volitions, on the issuing of which, the hands, and the feet, and the other instruments of action are put into instant subserviency.

And again, "That an action then be the rightful object either of moral censure or approval, it must have had the consent of the will to go along with it. It must be the fruit of a volition—else it is utterly beyond the scope, either of praise for its virtuousness, or of blame for its criminality. If an action be involuntary, it is as unfit a subject for any moral reckoning as are the pulsations of the wrist. Something ludicrous might occur which all of a sudden sets one irresistibly on the action of laughing; or a tale of distress might be told, which whether he wills or not, forces from him the tears of sympathy, and sets him as irresistibly on the action of weeping; or, on the appearance of a ferocious animal he might struggle with all his power for a serene and manly firmness, yet struggle in vain against the action of trembling; or if, instead of a formidable, a loathsome animal was presented to his notice, he might no more help the action of a violent recoil perhaps antipathy against it, than he can help any of the organic necessities of that constitution which has been given to him; or even upon the observation of what is disgusting in the habit or countenance of a fellow-man, he may be overpowered into a sudden and sensitive aversion; and lastly, should some gross and grievous transgression against the decencies of civilized life be practised before him, he might no more be able to stop that rush of blood to the complexion which marks the inward workings of an outraged and offended delicacy, than he is able to alter or suspend the law of its circulation. In each of these cases the action is involuntary; and precisely because it is so, the epithet neither of morally good nor of morally evil can be applied to it. And so of every action that comes, thus to speak, of its own accord; and not at the will or bidding of the agent. It may be painful to himself. It may also be painful to others. But if it have not had the consent of his will, even that consent without which no action that is done can be called voluntary, it is his misfortune and not his choice; and though not indifferent in regard to its consequences on the happiness of man, yet, merely because disjoined from the will, it in point of moral estimation is an act of the purest indifference."

From these extracts it is manifest, that the theory of Dr. Chalmers is, that no emotion, affection, or desire of the mind is stamped with a moral quality, unless it is the result of a volition producing it, either immediately or remotely.

To this doctrine we cannot give our assent. So far is it from being true, that every emotion or affection of the mind derives its morality from a preceding volition, on which it depends, that the very reverse is the truth. In our opinion, the morality of

an act of volition is, in all cases, derived from the motive which determines it. When an inquiry is made in a court of justice respecting the criminality of an action, the object is to ascertain the motive which influenced the volition. Suppose the external action be the killing of a man, it is evident that the volition producing the motion of the hand which inflicted the deadly wound, is the same, whatever may have been the motive. The volition to raise the hand and strike, is the same, whether it be done in the execution of law, in self defence, or through malice. Hence, it is manifest that the volition is not that which stamps the moral character of the action, but the motive which governs the volition. In the case just stated, if it be ascertained that the stroke by which life was taken, was in obedience to law, no blame attaches to the executioner. He has performed a duty—and a very painful one. Again, if it be proved that the mortal wound was inflicted on a violent assailant, purely in self-defence, and that the agent had no other way of preserving his own life, but by taking that of the assailant, we exonerate him from blame. But if it appear, on evidence, that the person committing the act was actuated by malice, and that he had long sought an opportunity of taking away the life of his fellow creature, we at once pronounce it a crime of the greatest enormity which a man can commit. Why this wide difference in our judgment, when the external act is in each case the same? Not because the volition was different in each case, for the volition required to give a certain motion to the muscles is the same, whatever be the moral nature of the act. The difference, according to the impartial judgment of all men, arises entirely from the motive from which it was done; and that, in all cases, is some affection or emotion of the mind, which precedes volition and produces it.

Dr. Chalmers was led into the doctrine which he maintains on the subject of the morality of our emotions, by a desire to correct an error which is common in the world; namely, that the mere emotions of sympathy, or other sensibilities arising instinctively from our animal constitution, are virtuous in their nature. Thus many on the sight of objects of suffering, feel at once a lively compassion, and also a tender sympathy. These emotions, whether produced by real or fictitious cases, they persuade themselves are virtuous feelings; whereas, they are

the mere sensibilities of our constitution, which in themselves possess no moral character.

Thus far, his opinions were correct, and the object at which he aimed was important. But, in our judgment, he erred in considering all our emotions as equally destitute of a moral character as these instinctive sensibilities, which have been mentioned. Indeed, he finds fault with Dr. Brown for distinguishing our emotions into such as involve the idea of morality and such as do not. "We think," says he, (pp. 176) "that Dr. Brown has made a wrong discrimination, when he speaks of certain emotions which involve in them a moral feeling, and certain others of them which do not. There is no moral designation applicable to any of the emotions, viewed nakedly in themselves. They are our volitions, and our volitions only, which admit of being thus characterized; and emotions are no further virtuous or vicious than as volitions are blended with them, and blended with them so far as to have given them either their direction or their birth." According to our judgment, Dr. Brown was altogether right in the distinction which he made between two classes of our emotions; and the distinction is very important in an accurate moral system. And Dr. Chalmers, by repudiating this distinction, and confining a moral character to volitions only, has involved his system in difficulties from which it cannot be extricated.

Our venerable author (in pp. 166) undertakes to fix the point at which an act of the mind begins to partake of a moral nature, and, agreeably to his theory, denies that it can possess anything of this character, prior to the volition of the will, consenting to the temptation by which it has been solicited. Now, in the case of the solicitation or impulse from mere appetites, or animal sensibilities, this doctrine is true; but the error as it relates to emotions in their very nature moral, will be manifest from an impartial consideration of a few examples. A man entertains envious and malign feelings towards his neighbour, but though he would be glad to injure him, yet is restrained by the power of an enlightened conscience, from coming to any determination to inflict any injury on him; the question is, are the feelings of envy and malice, which, though they were not strong enough to induce him to form a volition to do wrong to his neighbor, free from culpability? Every one sees, at once, that every degree

of envy and ill-will is sinful, whether it produces a volition or not. So, on the other hand, if we entertain benevolent feelings to our fellow creatures, although it may not be in our power to do them any good, it is evident that these feelings are virtuous, notwithstanding they owe neither their birth nor direction to a volition. Indeed, as we have before said, the virtue or vice of volitions is, in all cases, owing to the emotions or affections by which they are produced. We can conceive of a moral agent remaining long in a state of perfect holiness, without the exercise of volition. Suppose the case of a man or angel, formed in the image of God, possessing the knowledge of God; the love of such a being to the Creator would be perfect, prior to all volition, and this state of contemplation, accompanied by supreme love, might continue for an indefinite time, without any occasion for any act of volition. And, surely, no one can doubt that the supreme love of God is a virtuous affection. It is, truly, the sum of all virtue, the essence of holiness, as it is the obedience which the moral law requires.

We admit, what our venerable author teaches respecting *attention* as a mental operation, depending on the will; but this does by no means remove the difficulty in which his theory is involved. In the feelings of envy and malice, no volition is necessary to their existence; they are, in the order of nature, prior to volition; and so also in the case of love to God, and benevolence to men. Beside, the mere turning the attention to an object does not uniformly produce the affection which corresponds with the qualities of the object. The mind may be in a depraved state, so that it may not be susceptible of the emotions which would be produced in a rightly constituted heart. A man strongly prejudiced is not capable of viewing an object in its true light: his ideas are jaundiced by the existing state of his feelings. Much more will settled hatred prevent us from viewing the character of the object of our malice in an impartial manner, however much we may direct our attention to the object. The views which wicked men take of the character of God produce enmity instead of love, because they are incapable of perceiving the beauty and glory of his moral character; and the knowledge which they possess of the justice and purity of his nature, leads them to the conclusion, that these attributes are arrayed against them, and they therefore cannot but conclude, that He is angry

with them, and disposed to punish them for their sins; on which account, their hearts are filled with enmity toward their Creator and Sovereign. It is evident, therefore, that the power which the will has over the attention, or the direction of the thoughts to a particular object, will only produce the right affection or emotion, when the heart is in a state of purity; or, is in that state in which it is capable of taking correct views of the proper objects of affection, and susceptible of the right emotions under these views.

It may be asked, then, how we dispose of the maxim on which Dr. Chalmers founds his doctrine, and which we have admitted is universally received; namely, that an action to be of a moral nature, must be voluntary? This is a very proper and reasonable inquiry, and deserves a deliberate answer; for we cannot dispute the truth of the maxim; which is, indeed, self-evident. And if Dr. Chalmers has given the true meaning, and made the proper application of the aforesaid maxim, the question is settled. But we are of opinion, that the distinguished author has fallen into a common mistake, both in regard to the meaning and application of this universally admitted maxim. The word *voluntary* is ambiguous; or rather it is used in a more comprehensive, and in a more restricted sense. According to the first, it includes all the exercises of the mind which are spontaneous. As for example, when we divide the powers of the mind into two great classes, the understanding and will; under the latter we include all the desires, affections, emotions and volitions. According to this definition, our desires and affections are voluntary exercises, not because they are produced or directed by volition; but in their own nature, because they are spontaneous. We are as free in the exercise of affection as volition. Every man is conscious that his strongest affections are spontaneous, without referring to any previous volitions. Now in this comprehensive meaning of the word *voluntary* the maxim in question is universally true; but not in the restricted sense in which the word is employed by Dr. Chalmers. If men are accountable for anything, it is for their motives, and these are nothing else but their desires and affections; or as they are called in the new nomenclature, *emotions*. Here we have the true source of moral action and accountability. No volition possesses any moral quality which is not derived from the character of the

motives which produced it, and by which the will was governed. A man wills to turn his attention to the contemplation of the works of God in the universe, the volition by which he determines to perform this act is either morally good or evil, according to the motive which produced it. Suppose the motive was to try to find some such defects in the arrangement or laws of the universe, as would furnish an argument in favour of atheism. or against divine providence. This being an evil motive, stamps the volition with the same moral character. But if the motive be a desire to glorify God by adoring his perfections as displayed in his works, the motive is pious and good, and its character is given to the volition which is the consequence of it. Yet, in both cases, the naked act of volition is precisely the same. Take another example, a man is observed to give a sum of money to a beggar. The volition to perform the outward act of giving is the same, whatever be the motive; but to ascertain the true moral character of the act, we must know the motive from which it was done. If from vain glory, it is morally evil; if from benevolence to a suffering fellow-creature, it is good. But, in our opinion, there is prevalent not only a common mistake respecting the true import of the maxim, that every moral action must be voluntary, but also an error in the application of the maxim. As it is an admitted primary, or self-evident truth, it applies to actions consequent on volition, but not to emotions and dispositions which precede volition. And in this restricted application of the maxim, we may admit the correctness of its meaning, as employed by Dr. Chalmers. Properly speaking, every action of man is voluntary; because nothing, in strict accuracy, is an action of our own, which is not the consequence of a volition. To say then, that every moral action must be voluntary, is intuitively true; because, if not voluntary, it would not be our own; since all our own actions whether moral or not, are voluntary; for man can act in no other way than through the will. In this use of the word, emotions and desires would not be considered *as actions*; an action is always the result of volition. A great part of the disputes which exist on this and kindred subjects, arises from the ambiguity or want of precision in terms. The mistakes into which many fall, respecting human ability, have a near affinity with the errors

of which we have been speaking. It is a maxim, which cannot be contradicted, that no one can be bound to do what is out of his power; or, in other words, that obligation and ability are of equal extent. Now this maxim is strictly true, when properly applied; that is, to actions consequent on the will; but when applied to the affections or dispositions of the heart, the maxim is found to be utterly false; for the more inveterate and deep-rooted a malevolent affection, the less is it under the control of the will; and, yet, the more criminal it is in proportion to its strength. By a misapplication of an evident maxim, a doctrine evidently false has been zealously maintained, in our day; namely, that the most depraved sinner possesses the ability to render instantly all the obedience, which the law of God requires. And from a state of absolute enmity, has power to change his heart to a state of perfect love to God; otherwise perfect love to God would not be an incumbent duty. And according to this, every sinner, however depraved his dispositions or inveterate his evil habits, can divest himself of all sin, and become perfect in holiness, at any moment. Now, these monstrous errors, which contradict the common sense and experience of all men, arise very logically from applying a maxim, which is true only in relation to actions which depend on the will, to emotions and affections of the heart; to which it has no proper application. It would be utterly unjust to require a man to do a work or perform an act, for which he possesses no physical ability, if he willed it ever so sincerely. As for example, to raise the dead, or to lift up a mountain. But, suppose the same man, on account of long indulgence in sin, to be incapable of exercising love to God or his neighbour, his inability to put forth these right affections is no excuse; it is his fault. And there is no injustice in requiring of man the exercise of right affections. It would be a false and dangerous rule, to measure a man's moral obligation by his ability to render complete obedience to the law. The more inveterate and malign a wicked man's hatred of his neighbour, the less ability has he to love him as himself; but the want of such ability, arising from depravity of heart, does not, in the least, lessen his obligation to obedience. If a son have conceived a mortal hatred to his father, so that he cannot think of him without malice; his duty, nevertheless, is to honour him. This, however, is a digression from our

proper subject. Dr. Chalmers entertained no such opinions, as those last mentioned. And, indeed, except in the particular on which we have ventured to animadvert, we have scarcely met with anything in the voluminous writings of this extraordinary man, with which we do not fully concur. And our discussion of this point, has not arisen from any desire to be found arraying our opinions and reasonings against one, with whom it would be the height of arrogance to compare ourselves, *sed humanum est errare*. The greatest men are liable to errors; and their mistakes may be of such a nature that unless corrected and refuted, they will do injury to the cause of truth; and the greater injury in proportion to the eminence of the writer from whom they have proceeded. No man was more ready to correct and retract his errors than Dr. Chalmers; of which some remarkable instances could be given.

Although the volume under review, is principally occupied with the discussion respecting our emotions, and their relation to the will; yet it contains some interesting matter on other subjects.

In the IX. chapter, we have a discriminating discussion "On the Phenomena of Anger and Gratitude, and the Moral Theory founded on them." The remarks of the venerable author on these points are intended to point out the defects of Dr. Adam Smith's "Theory of the Moral Sentiments." While he gives due praise to that distinguished writer for ingenuity and felicitous illustration, he shows very convincingly, the radical unsoundness of his popular theory. The reader will, we doubt not, be gratified with a short extract from this chapter.

"The controversy upon this subject is—whether it is the sympathy which originates our moral judgment, or our moral judgment which regulates and determines the sympathy. Dr. Smith conceived that the sympathy took the antecedency of our moral judgments; and this principle has been conceived by the great majority of our writers on morals, and we think justly conceived, to be erroneous. It is a theory exceedingly well illustrated by himself, and exceedingly well appreciated by Dr. Thomas Brown. In spite of its fundamental error, the book is worthy of most attentive perusal—abounding, as it does, in the most felicitous illustrations of human life, and in shrewd and successful fetches among the mysteries of the human character.

"It is not because we sympathize with the resentment that we hold the action in question to be the proper and approved object of this feeling; but because we hold it to be the proper and approved object of resentment, that we sympathize. And we do so, not on the impulse of principles that are

originated by sympathy; but on the impulse of principles which, original in themselves, originate the sympathy that we feel. When we see an unoffending individual subjected in his person to the wanton insult of a blow, or in his property to the inroad of some ruthless depredation—we do not need to witness the resentment of his bosom, ere a like or a kindred feeling shall arise as by infection in our own; nor mentally to place ourselves in his situation, and thus to ascertain how we should feel aggrieved or affronted by the treatment that we see him to experience. The circumstance of not being the sufferer myself may give a greater authority to my judgment—because a judgment unwarped by the passions or the partialities of selfishness: but still it is a judgment that comes forth without that process of internal manufacture, of which Dr. Smith conceives it to be the resulting commodity. We judge as immediately and directly on a question of equity between one man and another, as we can on a question of equality between one line and another: And when that equity is violated, there is as instantaneous an emotion awakened in the heart of me the spectator, as there is in the heart of him the sufferer. With him it is anger. With me it is denominated indignation—the one being the resentment of him who simply feels, that he has been disturbed or encroached upon the enjoyment of that which he hath habitually regarded to be his own; the other a resentment felt on perceiving a like encroachment on that which might equitably or rightfully be regarded as his own.”

The X. chapter on “Perfect and Imperfect Obligation,” is properly a continuance of the same subject, and contains a number of original and discriminating remarks, worthy the attention of the reader.

ART. III.—*Duelling—Code of Honour.*

A duel is a combat with deadly weapons between two persons agreeably to previous arrangements. It differs from a boxing match because in it no weapons are used. It differs from a rencounter, because that is a sudden combat without pre-meditation. The boxing match and rencounter may be as immoral and as fatal in their consequences as the duel, but neither of them is a duel, neither of them, in our country at least, is regulated by the code of honour.

There have been four kinds of duels in the world. The first was where two hostile armies agreed to select each a champion to meet and fight. Thus David and Goliath fought. Thus Diomedes and Æneas fought. The combat between the 'Ho-