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Art. I.—THE MODERN THEORY OF FORCES.

II.

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IN a former article, we examined the modern theory of forces in the light of its own definitions, its consequences, and its confessions. We found the definitions to be confused and contradictory; we cited, from Spencer and Bastian and others, confessions of inconclusiveness and invalidity, and pursued the theory to some of its inevitable consequences of materialism and fatalism. In the present article, we purpose to consider this theory in reference to life and mind, and examine it in the light of consciousness, reason, and revelation. First, in reference to mind.

In this higher field of observation the subject is *psychical*, not physical, else it were the same field still, language itself were false, consciousness itself deceptive, and the term correlation meaningless, and all measurement impracticable (for matter cannot measure itself), and all knowledge impossible, for there would be nothing that could know, perhaps nothing that could be known. Who, at least, could say that there would be anything that could be known? This alternative would prove more disastrous to the supporters of this theory than to admit the existence of mind. In this higher field, then, the subject is

Art. II—REASON AND REDEMPTION.*

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WE have elsewhere called the attention of our readers to this excellent volume, which deserves the praise of being among the best of comparatively recent works on the evidences. The main idea of the treatise is, that Redemption, taking the term in a somewhat large sense, is the necessary *complement* of Reason. This idea is not, indeed, absolutely new, and is elaborated to some extent in other works of the same general character. It is the peculiarity of Dr. White's argument that it makes this idea the pivot of the whole discussion. The book makes no obtrusive pretensions to the highest order of originality, but is characterized by modest independence and by a certain freshness and fascination of statement. No slight acquaintance is evinced with the literature of the subject proper, with the methods and issues of ancient and modern psychology and metaphysics, with many of the results of physical science, and with the pages of the British classics. The author seems to have been largely influenced by the writings of Sir James McIntosh and Sir W. Hamilton, and, while retaining a manly self-respect, has yielded himself up to the wholesome guidance of Bishop Butler. The diction of the book is, for the most part, unexceptionable, resembling, in some things, that of the older masters of English divinity and apologetics, and is uniformly marked by perspicuity, and a species of childlike simplicity is often noticeable for its unconscious beauty, and occasionally rises to a strain of pleasing animation. The ordinary tone of the discussion is calm and unimpassioned; leaving the impression upon the reader that the author is seeking the ends of a philosopher and not those of a special pleader, and that his aim is, accordingly, not so much to silence adversaries, as to satisfy the minds of those who are already not unfavorably pre-

* *Reason and Redemption; or, the Gospel as it Attests Itself.* By Robert Baker White, D.D. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott & Co.

disposed to his conclusions. The mode of treatment is at once popular and thoughtful, and the severity of logical analysis is frequently relieved by picturesque description and happy illustration. Dr. White agrees with the great body of sober-minded apologists in conceding that the supernatural doctrines which lie at the basis of our holy religion would have remained unknown, had they not been suggested *ab extrâ* and by supernatural revelation; but maintains that, when once thus suggested, they present in themselves and their "environment" a problem which finds its solution only in the truth of the inspired oracles and the consequent divine origin of Christianity.

While meditating on the title of this book we have fallen on a train of thought wholly disconnected from the particular argument unfolded in "Reason and Redemption," and which we now proceed to lay before our readers. What we shall attempt will be to show that the denial of Redemption involves in rigor of logic a total surrender of the claims of Reason. It is hardly necessary to set out with the statement that the facts and doctrines of Redemption may be said to constitute the core and essence of the Christian system. We have thus undertaken to point out that it is only by a renunciation of the claims of reason that the so-called rationalism of infidelity can reject or question the scheme of Christian Theism.

We presume it will be admitted on all hands that the body of the Christian evidences furnishes a mass of proof as cogent as any that can be adduced in support of any other proposition, or series of propositions, whatever; *unless* we accept or establish the truth of certain fundamental assumptions, of which the logical effect would be to impair or destroy the validity of the whole apologetic argument. It follows, that if these assumptions are untenable, the apologetic argument stands upon a secure foundation. The investigation of this one point is more and more attracting the keenest interest and taxing the best intellect of the present age.

It may be regarded, as a corollary of the proposition awhile ago laid down, that none of the rival religions of mankind can ever come into successful competition with Christianity. The consideration of these may, therefore, be omitted in the discussion. The notorious exclusiveness of the claims of Christianity makes it evident, too, that those claims are not compati-

ble with the pretensions of that eclectic system which goes under the name of absolute religion.

Leaving out, then, the systems of the false religions, there remain only these three heads of erroneous opinion or sentiment : traditionalism, mysticism, rationalism. These terms are all ambiguous, and admit of being used in a good as well as in a bad sense. It is obvious that traditionalism and mysticism do not necessarily oppose the claim of Christianity to be a revelation from God. In so far as they do so, they fall under the head of rationalism in the broad sense. By rationalism we do not intend the scheme of Paulus alone, or the schools of the German Historical Criticism, but the infidelity of all kinds and degrees which makes its final appeal to natural reason.

As will be remembered, it was stated that rationalism may be understood in a good as well as in a bad sense. In the good sense, every man is a rationalist who undertakes to defend the truth of revelation upon grounds of reason. Now, could we for a moment forbear the claims of usage, it is apparent that the only cardinal differences between the good and bad rationalism would be these, viz., that the good rationalism would be one which affirms, and the bad rationalism one which denies or questions the same propositions on the common ground of human reason ;* and that the good rationalism would be right, and the bad rationalism wrong, in so doing. This is then the point about which the fight thickens. If we may be allowed for the nonce to use the term—*in mediam partem*, we make bold to say that we do not quarrel with the rationalist because he *is* a rationalist, using his reason to ascertain and test religious truth. We rejoice that he is doing just that. It is precisely here that we can both join hands across the gulf that separates us. Our quarrel with him is simply because, in our judgment, his *soi-disant* rationalism is, when properly regarded, no rationalism at all in any worthy sense of that name ; that is to say, is a system which can never be maintained or vindicated on his own vaunted principle of unassisted human reason. Thus the issue is fairly made up between us. If the position of rationalism (meaning now this *pseudo* rationalism) be defensible, then is Christianity, indeed, a failure, and Redemption a pathetic de-

* See *Mansel's Definition of Rationalism ; Limits of Religious Thought*, p. 47.

lusion; but, on the contrary, if it can be shown that the ground assumed by the self-styled rationalist is untenable, then the triumph of Redemption is complete and final.

We are willing to go a step further in the way of concession. Not only are we ready to occupy, with the self-styled rationalist, the common ground of natural and human reason, as distinguished from supernatural and divine inspiration, we consent, also, to occupy with him the common ground of human reason, as distinguished, on the one hand, from any merely inward light, supposed or not supposed to be from God, whether of mere sensibility or of mistaken intuition, and, on the other hand, from any mere human tradition. Nay, we not only consent to this, we insist upon it. Let us not attempt to stand upon the treacherous foothold of mere prescription, no matter how time-honored, or upon the edge of whimsical conceit or individual* emotion or ecstatic sentiment; but let us plant ourselves side by side on the solid basis of good sense and sound judgment and reasoning.

There is yet another concession which we are tempted to make to the rationalist. We do not care to draw a hard and fast line between reason and faith, or, with Kant and his disciples, between the pure and the practical reason, or between knowledge and belief. On the contrary, we hold, with Jacobi, that these peremptory distinctions often betray an imperfect analysis. We stand ready to defend faith in the forum of reason.

Having thus cleared the ground, it is now our purpose to take up the different rationalistic systems for a somewhat more special examination. Of course, we do not intend anything beyond an outline sketch in chalk or crayons. These systems may be at once set down as no more than five; Deism, Pantheism, Positivism, Atheism, and Pyrrhonism; and it will be our object in what remains to make good the assertion, that, in so far as these five systems oppose any arguments to Christianity, they may, by further analysis, be reduced in number to but one, and that one a system which denies the possibility of system, and a form of rationalism in which reason commits *felo de se*.

* For the *individualism* that inheres in the very notion of a mediæval mystic—see *Living Age*, No. 1589, p. 473. *Per contra*, it should be noted that, in one acceptance of the term mystic, every pantheist is a mystic, although in pantheism individuality is merged in totality.

We need make but short work with Deism. It has already been disposed of in the statement that Christianity and redemption must stand unless certain counter assumptions can be maintained by the adversary, for none of these assumptions are competent to the deist. There is not a single objection that the deist ever has raised, or ever can raise, to the supernatural truth and divine origin of the Scriptures, that can logically be made good on the principles that are peculiarly deistical. The direct attack upon the evidences of revealed religion (as has already been noticed) has been rebutted with superfluity of proof. The only method left in which to meet the force of the Christian evidence was to assail its foundations. The *coup de main*, the approach by parallels, the lengthened siege, having all resulted in disaster, nothing remained but to mine. This last attempt has also turned out a signal failure. Were every one of the Christian answers to perish in some conflagration, except the immortal argument of Bishop Butler, Christianity would be safe so far as the efforts of the deist are concerned. If there was any spasmodic activity in the dead body of Deism after Bishop Butler's blows, it must have been set at rest by Mr. Henry Roger's "Eclipse of Faith." All the objections of the deist naturally resolve themselves into the objections of the atheist or the skeptic. Granted (for the sake of argument) that they are valid as against the religion of the Bible, then atheism or skepticism is true ground, but certainly not Deism. This is now become so notorious that the system of the deist is, to-day, almost universally abandoned except among the grossly ignorant.

We have presented the system of Deism first in order, because it concedes the divine personality, and thus, *pro tanto*, comes nearest to the system of the Christian Scriptures. Proceeding in the same direction, we next encounter the system of Pantheism; inasmuch as this system, though it denies the personality, yet admits (in theory at least) the being of a God. This scheme not only embraces that crude form of Pantheism which allows no difference between God and the world, but those subtler forms of it which make the world the manifold phenomenon of which God is the only substance. Under this definition all forms of Monism are pantheistic; and, also, certain forms of what often passes for Dualism.

There is something about this hoary and gigantic speculation that is singularly imposing. It has always exercised a subtle and predominating fascination over men illustrious for their perspicacity and genius. The human mind, in its highest efforts to construct a theory of the world unaided by the Scriptures, has found repose in this system. In its sway over the religious feelings, though not as a finished and coherent philosophy, it is peculiarly a system of the Orient. From a remote antiquity the theosophic tenets of Buddhism have held in bondage the populations of a vast section of the eastern hemisphere, and, as is well known, the esoteric principles of Buddhism are essentially the same with those of Pantheism. So far as we are enabled to pronounce on a much-disputed question, the *Nirvāna*, after which every Buddhist sighs, very closely resembles the state in which the intellectual intuition of the German idealist has reached transcendental perfection. Upwards of a thousand years before Christ, it is believed that the astute Aryan intellect of India had anticipated the most startling deductions of Spinoza and Schelling. The only difference, as it would appear, between the Brahmanic and the modern form of Pantheism, is that according to the older opinion (to borrow the favorite terms of Mr. Herbert Spencer), the period of evolution was preceded and succeeded by long periods of equilibrium. In other words, the oriental pantheist regards the period of evolution as finite, whereas the occidental pantheist conceives of the period of evolution as infinite, and, therefore, coëternal with God.*

As a strictly methodized system, however, we must go for the beginnings as well as the highest developments of philosophy to the Greeks. Albeit she got her philosophy, as her letters, from the east, it is important to bear in mind that, in her metaphysics no less than in her literature, Greece was a profoundly

* Compare Dr. Hodge's *Theology*, vol. i, p. 312. It is curious to notice that Mr. Spencer's own theory of the universe (which, in its logical tendencies, is apparently after all only a species of subtle realistic Pantheism) agrees more nearly as to this last point with the Asiatic than with German Aristotalian type. See *First Principles*, p. 537, where, however, the author is merely indulging himself in a train of purely speculative surmises as to the probable future of the material universe, and is inclined to anticipate a process of eternal alternation between states of movement and repose.

original worker, and a narrow scrutiny would seem to reveal the fact that, with the sole exception of the Atomists (whose teaching was directly or indirectly atheistic), the controlling and almost the total philosophy of Hellas leaned towards Pantheism. This is incontestably true if the term be taken so broadly as to include the Grecian forms of Dualism. The position of the dualist was that there are two coëternal principles, distinct and yet (in spite of certain strenuous protests on the part of the dualists themselves) in various degrees mutually dependent. The two chief forms of Grecian Dualism were the Hylozoism of the Stoics,* and the somewhat kindred doctrine of Aristotle. The view of the Stoics was, that the world was in some sense an organism—in fact, a sort of huge animal.

The two ultimate principles which they recognized are matter and force,† which last they identify with the reason and God. As in an animal, so in the world, “matter is endued with life.”‡ As the animal has an anima and may have a *soul*, in a still higher sense so has the world. This is admitted to be a very inadequate image. The soul of the world is “an all-pervading breath,” “an artistically creative force,”§ in short, its plastic principle, the inward source of all its organizations and activities.”¶ There were, therefore, “two constituent principles in the universe,” an active and a passive, inert matter and formative mind. With them, all that is real is material. They held (with the Buddhist), that after a certain cosmical period all things are reabsorbed into the deity, as all originally emanated from the deity, but that then there begins a new cycle of evolution, and so on *ad infinitum*. There were, also, according to the Stoics, three aspects in which the universe may be contemplated, viz. : as *natura naturans*, as *natura naturata* (“the living kosmos”), and as the identity of the two in one whole. In this last statement the superficial dualism of the Stoics obviously

* See Dr. Hodge's *Theol.* vol. i, pp. 245 and 246. Another and less influential form of Hylozoism does not differ from materialistic atheism.

† See Ueberweg, *Hist. Philosophy*, vol. i, pp. 194 and 195.

‡ This is the system on the whole favored by Cicero in the *De Natura Deorum*, c. g., see chap. xv, lib ii, p. 64; Tauchin, 1828. Compare Horace's *Divinæ Particulam Auræ*, Ser. ii, 79.

§ Virg. *Æn.* iv, p. 4, and *Georg.* iv, p. 220.

¶ See Dr. Hodge, *Theol.* i, p. 245.

resolves itself into Monism. At last the distinction sought to be drawn between the *natura naturata* and the *natura naturans* is phenomenal, not substantial. Hence, the world considered as the identity of the two, was logically regarded as the perfect and necessary product of the laws of reason.

Almost as evidently as does the Eleatic Parmenides,* this system anticipates the German doctrine of identity, and prepares not only the thought, but much of the very phraseology, which were afterwards wrought up by Spinoza and Schelling.†

Aristotle followed Plato in holding to the existence of a universal intelligence or reason, which he called God, but one devoid of power or will, and unconscious of all existence but its own. In one sense, God and the world are both eternal; in another, God only. In one sense, too, God, though utterly passive, and conscious only of himself, is nevertheless the cause of the world—acting on it somewhat as a magnet acts on iron. With the Stagyrite, the principles of being are these four, viz: Form or Essence; Matter or Substratum; Moving or Efficient Cause; End or Final Cause. The organizations of the kosmos are determined by inherent “forms.” The soul is the “form” of the man, and is contemporaneous in its being with the body, and so related to it, that neither is anything apart from the other. The consequence is unavoidable, that the soul is no more immortal than the life of a plant. With Aristotle, “matter” (substratum) in itself is only potential, and finds its realization and attains to actuality only in “form.” The *tertium quid* is God—the immaterial and eternal Form, the pure Actuality, the self-thinking Reason, the absolute Spirit.‡ All that is distinctively human is transitory. Only the Divine Reason is immortal.§ The world, however, considered as the totality of graduated existence,¶ is an eternal product, and will

* See Chalybæus's *Hist. Speculative Philosophy*, and Grote's *Plato*.

† See Spinoza's *Ethogoe*, *Première Parte*, “De Dieu,” Proposition xxix; Paris, Charpentier, 1842. P. 31. Both Schelling and Spinoza have much to say, and in much the same manner, concerning *natura naturans*, *natura naturata*, God, necessity, virtue, and the infinite reason. This last expression is common to philosophers of all schools, but especially to such thinkers as Heracleitus, Aristotle, Fichte, Hegel, and Spinoza. For a résumé of Aristotle's system, see Dr. Hodge, pp. 326, 327.

‡ See Ueberweg, *History of Philosophy*.

§ *The Gentile and Jew* (Döllinger), as quoted in Dr. Hodge's *Theology*, p. 327.

¶ Compare Ueberweg, p. 162.

never perish. "God is the eternal *prius* of all development."* Memory belongs to and does not survive the sensitive soul, and individual thought perishes with the passive *nous*; consequently, all human self-consciousness ceases at death.† So that the so-called dualism of Aristotle ends, logically, like that of the Stoics, in the all-absorbing vortex of pantheistic Monism.

The same is probably true of that obscure, if not restlessly Protean, system that goes under the name of Platonism. It is difficult to say what Plato himself believed, and his true beliefs, doubtless, underwent important changes.‡ He asserts the existence of the principles, matter and God, which gave the world a beginning and an organization, having previously to that event generated its soul.§ It is, perhaps, still undecided, whether Plato ever conceived of any of his archetypal "ideas" as personal existences.¶ The most interesting inquiry, however, is, did he ever go so far in this personification as to identify the highest of these "ideas" with the most high God? Some affirm, others deny. If he did, it was nearly always, or absolutely, in a pantheistic sense.∥ Says Cousin (and apparently with justice), of the Platonic "ideas" and their relation to the Platonic deity: "En dernière analyse il les place dans la raison divine; c'est là qu'elles existent substantiellement."*** The dualism of Plato, like that of his great pupil, disappears on a closer examination; for matter (though

* *Ibid.*, p. 163. See, too, on this and other points, Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, lib. xi (xii), cap. vii, p. 250; Tauchnitz, 1832.

† Dollinger, *The Gentile and Jew*.

‡ Grote's *Plato*, London, Murray, 1867; vol. i, p. 218.

§ See Ueberweg, vol. i, p. 123, and for Cicero's testimony, *Tusc. Disput.* i, xxviii, vol. 8, p. 215; Tauchnitz.

¶ According to Plotinus, the "ideas" of Timæus are strictly personal; Ueberweg, however, takes the language figuratively.

∥ If Plato ever had a glimpse of *the one* personal God, it must have been a very transient one. Even at that, this were the highest (though but momentary) attainment of antiquity. Grote's opinion is, that Plato's mental attitude was, at times at least, that of the Nihilists. See, however, the words he puts into the mouth of Timæus. Plato, *Timæus*, v. i, pp. 332 and 334; Trübner, 1856.

*** Dollinger denies that Plato was a pantheist, inasmuch as he distinguishes between matter and God; but admits that he had a pantheistic leaning or "bias." The quotation from Cousin is from *Histoire Generale*. See Dr. Hodge, p. 324.

conceived as coëxistent with God), had with Plato as shadowy a being as it had with Kant. Nay, with Plato, matter was more a shadow than with Kant; for with Plato, matter was not only not corporeal, but was "something not yet entity." The same conclusion will be come at, if we observe that Plato has expressly included all his "ideas" in "the all-comprehensive idea" of God; and as these were the only existent beings, so God must be the only existent being or substance—which amounted, of course, to an ideal pantheism.* It must be admitted that the subject is involved in much obscurity.

Without pausing now to determine how far the Neo-Platonism of Alexandria was pantheistic, and merely suggesting the same query in regard to much of the mediæval† Realism and Mysticism (and, therefore, much of the mediæval scholasticism), we forego as well all attempts to trace the academic and peripatetic tendencies in the Greek and Latin churches, or to describe and analyze the gnostic and Manichæan development of the Oriental doctrines of duality and emanation, and arrive *per saltum* at the period of Spinoza. It is of the remarkable thinker of Amsterdam, himself, that we have now to speak. The attention of our readers has already been directed to the fact, that pantheism, like the date-palm, is a congenial product of the East. It is, notwithstanding, true that, unlike the date-palm, it will bear transplanting into a more frigid climate. It is curious to remember, in connection with this, that Spinoza (or Espinoza) was by descent a Portuguese Jew; that he received a strictly Jewish education, and was largely influenced in his opinions and methods of speculation by the Cabala, by Maimonides, "the Eagle of Cordova," and by Aben Eyra;‡ that he was thus—by blood and ancestral traditions, as well as by the special direction of his studies, if not also by the inheritance of genius—a true Oriental. Pursuing the course marked out for

* Compare Hegel, as quoted and answered in Grote's *Plato*, vol. ii, p. 191, note.

† See *British Quarterly Review*. Article—"The Mystics of the Fourteenth Century."

‡ See *Spinoza; his Life, Correspondence, and Ethics*, by R. Willis, M.D.; p. 18. London: 1870.

Spinoza was of the stock of the Peninsular or Spanish Jews, settled in the Low Countries; whether he was influenced directly by the Neo-Platonists, or only through Giordano Bruno, is doubted. *Ueberweg*, ii, p. 62.

him by a few unguarded statements of Descartes, and by the bearings of one whole side of the Cartesian system, Spinoza managed to smuggle into the body of western thought what, under a totally novel form, was, nevertheless, in its essential characters, the complete system of Hellenic and Asiatic pantheism. The process is not at all that of the Orient, but altogether that of Greece. Spinoza has been aptly styled the Euclid of Metaphysics. By definitions, by axioms, by propositions with their demonstrations, corollaries, scholia, and lemmas, and by the exact method of positive and negative reasoning adopted by the Greek geometrician—he attempted to build up a fabric that should be unassailable by human logic. And, in point of fact, it is one of the most beautifully clear and rigid systems that has ever been constructed. It is, so to speak, the union of mathematics, philosophy, and rhetorical no less than dialectical art. It is, besides, perhaps, the finest exhibition ever made of pantheism, pure and simple. It is, at the same time, perhaps, the best example in existence of what in Germany is meant by the word metaphysics. As a mental tonic the book proved invaluable, at one period of his life, to Goethe. As an intellectual gymnastic it is still almost unrivaled. The radical vice of the procedure is in the fundamental postulates. The definitions and axioms are skillfully framed so as seemingly to lead on with inevitable rigor to the conclusions. These primary averments of Spinoza manifestly beg the whole question in debate, and are in several instances plainly erroneous.* “The ontological paralogism” of the Cartesians, by which they tried to prove the being of God, holds an important place in the system of Spinoza. This and other assumptions are continually recurring. Some of the things assumed remind one of the sophistical assumptions of Socrates in certain of the Platonic dialogues. The fallacy in Spinoza’s reasoning is commonly, though not always, in the early steps. According to Spinoza, a substance is that which exists in itself and can be conceived by itself. There is but one substance, the absolutely infinite being, viz., God; having an infinite multitude of attri-

* See Ueberweg’s *Hist. Phil.* vol. i, for a singularly painstaking and acute exposure of the fallacies involved in the reasoning of Spinoza in his principal work, the *Ethica*.

butes, each infinite, "*sui generis*." Of this multitude of divine attributes, man can know only two—thought and extension. He defines *attribute* as that which expresses the essence of the substance, and *mode* as an affection (or accident) of the substance which expresses an attribute. Only the infinite mind has an all-embracing intelligence. God is free, but only as being absolute, and thus exempt from coercion *ab extrâ*. Man is "fast bound in fate." Sin is mere privation, and altogether relative to human thought. Virtue is utility. The existence of God and his power are the same.

With Spinoza, in the last analysis, nothing has reality in the strictest sense (*i. e.*, substantial entity) but the one infinite substance. The attributes are distinguishable from this substance only in human thought; and reciprocally from one another only as the properties of smoothness and whiteness are distinct in the same plane surface. All *but* substance is mere accident or mode, and thus involves no addition to the sum of being; involves, indeed, its limitation. Consequently, what is not substance is pure phenomenon.* *Ergo*, there is nothing real† (nonmenal) but God. The absolute infinite is all that *is*; and of *it* nothing definite can be predicated on the principle "omnis determinatio est negatio."

Having already stated that the whole system of Spinoza is founded on the *petitio principii* that lurks in some of the axioms and definitions, and lies *perdue* in the recesses of nearly every demonstration, it is unnecessary to follow that branch of the research further. Let us be content with a single example. As Morell has shrewdly asked, why should Spinoza have con-

* In a brilliant essay on Spinoza, Mr. Froude says it is as though the same thought might be expressed in an infinite variety of languages, as well as in action, in painting, sculpture, music, in short, in any conceivable or possible mode of spiritual embodiment. See Froude's *Short Studies on Great Subjects*, Scribner, 1868, p. 301.

† But notice *Chalybæus*, on p. 253. The term "reality" and "being" are used synonymously in *Ethics*, Part i, Prop. ix, and the terms "entity" and "substance" in a letter to an unknown correspondent. See *Willis*, p. 322. Compare the expressions in the corollary and letters addressed to Oldenburg: See *Willis*, pp. 226 and 228. Ueberweg (ii, p. 55) characterizes Spinoza's "modes" or accidents (including individual existence) as "unessential changing forms." He regards Spinoza's "substance", as a mere "abstractum" to which independent existence is attributed in the manner of mediæval realists. *Ibid*, ii, p. 66.

finer the term *substance* to *being per se*, and not have made it include *being per alium*? In the judgment of this acute and subtle critic, who will not be suspected of undue partiality, "if this be admissible, the pantheistic basis crumbles beneath his feet; the old stand-point is regained, that God is the efficient *cause* of all things, not the *essence* of which all things consist."*

Spinoza would probably have said, in reply, that he had the right to give the word "substance" what meaning he pleased, in his own definition. If this be granted, it yet cannot be conceded that he had the right to use the term equivocally in the course of his argument.

But it is to the conclusion rather than the premises, or the reasonings, of the system, to which we now desire to call attention, and to the following important testimony of the English critic: "It may be more correct to term the philosophy of Spinoza a pantheism than an atheism; but if we take the common idea or definition of Deity as valid, then assuredly we must conclude that the God of Spinoza is no God, and that his pantheism is only a more imposing form of atheism."†

This significant language might well have been extended to *all* the forms of pantheism, and not have been confined to but one of them. Of pantheism in general, it may be asserted, without fear of contradiction, that if not the same with atheism, it is something even worse than atheism. Atheism is frank and haughty. Atheism doggedly refuses to deify anything. Pantheism stands alone in deifying misery, and even sin. This trait (or inevitable consequence) of Spinoza's system is thus felicitously referred to at the close of a luminous and trenchant *résumé* of his tenets, by one of the most learned and gifted of his many celebrated contemporaries: "Voilà une hypothèse qui surpasse l'entassement de toutes ces extravagances qui se paissent dire, . . . Les poètes n'attribuaient

* *Historical and Critical View*, p. 128. To illustrate the difficulty of fairly representing Spinoza, we may add that the author of the *Ethics* does, in terms at least, acknowledge that God is, *though* the essence, yet also the efficient cause of all things. See *Ethics*, P. i, p. xvi, Cor. 1.

† In one place Spinoza identifies "Nature" and "God." In another, he speaks of "men," and other things, as "parts" of nature. Elsewhere he repudiates the doctrine that substance (being infinite) is composed of parts. See Willis' *Spinoza*, pp. 223, 245, 260, 282, 283. In *Ethics*, P. i, p. xv, Scholism, he teaches that nature, viewed as modalitic, is made up of parts, but not as viewed realitic.

point aux dieux tous les crimes qui se commettent et toutes les infirmités du monde ; mais, selon Spinoza, il n'y a point d'autre agent et d'autre patient que dieu, par rapport à tout ce qu'on nomme mal de peine et mal de culpé, mal physique et mal moral."*

It now behooves us to say something of the pantheistic systems of Germany. In the speculative laboratory of Kant, all of the outward world, except its bare existence, had evaporated. It was the task of his pupil, Fichte, to destroy the small residuum. The recoil from the subjective idealism of Fichte resulted in the objective idealism of Schelling. The recoil was begun, however, in the first instance, by Fichte himself. It is a fine distinction between the "Absolute Ego" of the one philosopher and the "Infinite Subject" of the other. The difference was, that the "Ich" was the *prius* with the one philosopher, the Infinite with the other.† This last form of pantheism has been pronounced almost identical with that of Spinoza.‡ On the surface this is not very plausible; as the leading pantheists of Germany have commonly protested that the "Absolute" is not a "Substance."§ Yet, under Spinoza's definition, the German "Absolute" is plainly nothing else than Spinoza's "God." Morell's language might mislead an uninitiated reader, where he calls Schelling's Absolute a "spirit." Schelling, himself, commonly speaks of it as a principle of activity, as a source of *life*, as a mighty *power*, working under a law of necessity.¶ This is certainly very near Spinoza. At the first blush there is a difference between the two in this: with

*Bayle, *Dictionnaire Histoire et Critique*, t. iii, i. v, "Spinoza," Paris, Desoeris, 1820. For a vindication of this judgment, compare Spinoza's Letters, numbered 33 and 34.

† See G. H. Lewes' *Biographical History of Philosophy*. Compare Morell, p. 434, and Cousin's *Cours de Philosophie*, 1828, p. 437, and Young, p. 37.

‡ Dr. John Young, *Province of Reason*, p. 42.

§ See Chalybæus, *History of Speculative Philosophy*. Hegel, however, admits the term in his *Philosophy of History*; Bohn, p. 9. Trendelenburg, (*Ueb.* ii, p. 59) regards Spinoza as identifying thought and blind force. This Ueberweg disputes. Dr. Willis (p. 201) views Hegelianism, purged of its extra vagueness, as the legitimate expansion of Spinoza's ethics.

¶ Chalybæus, *Schelling*. See, too, *Frederich Wilhelm Joseph von Schelling; Sammtliche Werke*. Stuttgart, 1858. * The Absolute, with Schelling, sometimes resolves itself into pure *volition*.

Schelling, the whole phenomenal manifestation of the Absolute is in the way of thought and extension, subject and object; whereas, with Spinoza, thought and extension are but two out of an infinitude of ways in which the Absolute could alone completely express itself. As, however, the Absolute, according to Spinoza, does express itself in two attributes only, the two theories are harmonious.

Fichte and Schelling both pursued the skeptical course that had been insisted on in the speculative part of Kant's philosophy. Fichte resolved the two-fold universe into the Ego, and the Ego into mere subjective *activity*. Schelling restored the Non-Ego, and found a common resting place for both in the Absolute. As the magnet has two poles, a positive and a negative, so the finite world of reality and thought has two poles, matter and mind, or, as he called them, nature and spirit. These are both mere phases of the Absolute or Infinite.

Schelling never obtained the thanks of his old preceptor, but he always claimed (and apparently with cause) to have simply carried out the views of Fichte to their legitimate and desirable issue. Then the remorseless logic of Hegel swept the improved system into the limbo of Atheistic Nihilism.

Hegel resolved the universe into a process of thought, the Absolute into an Idea, God into humanity, existence into thinking, Being into non-being, and everything into nothing. With him the *prius* is the Absolute Reason, which passes through successive stages of self-development, from pure Being into the Absolute Idea, and then into Nature, and finally, into Spirit.* The Idea (or unfolding Reason) having first necessarily gone out of itself in the world of matter, struggles back again in a renovated form in the world of mind and consciousness. Hegel wrought out his monotonous system of trines by the law of contradiction. For example, the union of non-being and being, results in the becoming (*das werden*). The universe is, with him, an eternal evolution out of absolute non-existence into ideal (which is the only) existence. The process is one of dialectical logic. Thought and existence are one and the same. The entire kosmos, inorganic, organic, rational, is but a chain of ideas linked together by a law of fate. This law

* See *Ueberweg*, vol. ii, p. 231.

is now one of thesis, now of antithesis, and now of synthesis. In "the infinite regress" (or remove backward), the whole is reducible to zero. According to this *schema*, the Absolute comes to consciousness in humanity. Creation and Providence are but chapters in the philosophy of history. Individual souls differ from one another, only as the leaves of the forest or the waves of the sea—and the leaves and the waves are not true entities, but only thoughts, that alike have their ground in the Absolute Reason.

It is important to observe here that the three German philosophers were alike in identifying the subject and the object, the ideal and the real, thought and existence.* The only difference between them in this particular was in the central point of view, in the stress with which they insisted on this identification, and the logical audacity and coherence with which they pushed the argument to its ultimate issue.

As Schelling claimed to do no more than carry out the inevitable tendencies of Fichte, so Hegel pretended at first to nothing higher than a formal and logical elaboration of the tenets of Schelling, settling them upon a purely rational basis, as opposed to a partially mystical basis, proving Schelling's improved assumptions on grounds of dialectical reasoning, and urging the logical inferences to the point of Absolute Idealism, to which the mind was necessarily conducted, but to which Schelling himself was unwilling to go. At a late period, it is true, Hegel's tone toward his former guide became more hostile. Hegel's attempted proof of the proposition, that thought and being are equivalents, is sophistical and nugatory. It is none the less certain, that the entire fabric of German pantheism involves this assumption, and that Hegelianism is the only form in which the assumption can be logically maintained. By consequence, Hegel has unconsciously administered the *coup de grace* to the whole system of German Idealism, by reducing it to Nihilism, and, *a fortiori*, to Atheism.

There is, in fact, no system of Pantheism whatever—whether European or Asiatic—whether naturalistic or subjective—that can escape the wrath of Hegel's dialectic; inasmuch as every

* For Fichte, see *Morell*, p. 413; for Schelling, *Ibid.*, p. 438; for both, *Ibid.*, p. 413 and p. 424.

system of Pantheism either avows or involves the German doctrine of Identity. For example, the Jewish mathematician of Holland having explicitly identified the substance and its attributes, and having (with every monist) resolved all other being into the substance, has also virtually (with Schelling) identified thought and extension in the Absolute. But, according to Spinoza, space or extension is but one of the innumerable phases of the substance—*i. e.*, of the one ultimate existence. *Ergo*, thought and existence are identical.

The logical sameness of Pantheism and Atheism might be shown in a variety of other ways. *Ex uno disce omnes*. Pantheism must either admit or deny the finite. But the admission of the finite, on the postulates of this system, rigorously involves the limitation (and consequent destruction) of the infinite:—which is Atheism. On the other hand, the denial of the finite as rigorously carries with it the rejection of the very *datum* of consciousness—the suicide of the utter Pyrrhonist. But, in point of fact, every pantheistic system, as every philosophic system, whatsoever, accepts the first alternative.

If it be replied that all arguments which are drawn from the nature of the infinite are void, then, by their own confession, the arguments of the pantheists (being themselves drawn from the nature of the infinite) are invalid.

From the course of this discussion it is evident, therefore, that the pantheist is (in the eye of the reason) as helpless as the deist when confronted with the Christian Evidences. He cannot logically oppose them on grounds which are peculiar to pantheism. The assumptions which underlie the objections of the deist and the pantheist alike have been shown to be essentially and distinctively atheistic.

We are thus led up to the last of the Anti-Christian schemes, or systems, which do not, *ex professo*, stultify the human reason itself. These are dogmatic Atheism and Positivism. Agreeably to the order hitherto pursued, Atheism would have to be considered first. For convenience's sake, we reverse this arrangement. We do this in order that we may have a clear field before us. The notorious fact is, that dogmatic Atheism has long ago been abandoned as an inadequate and untenable hypothesis, as one that shocks the natural instincts of man.*

* See the eloquent passage of Aristotle on this subject in Ueberweg. For the

Even in antiquity, the number of avowed atheists was small ; as Bacon has it, "a Diagoras, a Bion, and perhaps a Lucian." The theory of the atomists was unquestionably atheistic in its tendencies, but not a whit more so than that of several of the so-called modern "Scientists." There were many followers of the Baron D'Holbach in the days of the Encyclopædia, but their reign was as short and disastrous as the Reign of Terror. If the Mills (father and son) were indeed "contemplative," or "conscientious" atheists, admitting always the possibility of such, it is gratifying to remember that they concealed their true opinions to the last moment of their lives. It is equally pleasant to watch the struggles of Mr. Darwin, Professor Huxley, Dr. Tyndall, and their confrères, to shake themselves free from what they regard as so opprobrious an imputation. The admirers of Comte have been in haste to repair the theological blunder of their master in his "Système de Politique Positive,"* and Mr. Richard Congreve has added few adherents to the "Religion of Humanity." The temerity of the dogmatic atheist was alluded to by Pascal, and has been eloquently shown up by John Foster and Dr. Chalmers. But, considered as a mere hypothesis, which may possibly be verified, or possessing, it may be, a certain measure of likelihood, the converse of Bacon's dictum stands true, and Atheism is commonly rejected now-a-days "in the lip," even where it is retained and cherished "in the heart." Mr. Fitz James Stephen is said to think the probabilities lean decidedly toward the existence of a God, but one of limited benevolence ; *per contra*, the late Mr. Mill, in his posthumous *Essays on Religion*, presents the attitude of one who sadly hopes that the balance may incline tremblingly toward one of finite power.†

rarity of dogmatic atheists and nihilists, see Hamilton, *Metaphysics*, Edinb., vol. i, p. 294.

Even Hume often expresses himself as a theist.

See *Natural History of Religion*, sec. 6, ii, and *Blackwood's Magazine*, Nov. 1874, p. 524.

* See, especially, John Stuart Mill, *Auguste Comte and Positivism*, Trubner, p. 125, *seq.*

† In one place Mr. Mill makes still further and very remarkable hypothetical concessions. See his posthumous *Essays on Nature, the Utility of Religion, and Theism*.

Yet, the charge of downright Atheism is unquestionably the *bête noir* of contemporary infidelity. Comte himself, though "avowedly" a disbeliever in a Creator and Supreme Governor of the World, and though seeing nothing in the heavens but the glory of Galileo, Kepler, and Laplace, expressly disclaims "dogmatic Atheism," and in one of his later works admits that "the hypothesis of design has greater verisimilitude than a blind mechanism."*

We are thus led up to the last of the anti-Christian systems which do not, *ex professo*, stultify the human reason itself. We may call it, speaking broadly, Positivism; or, perhaps, more exactly (borrowing a happy term of Dr. Littledale†) Agnosticism. There are several modern thinkers who are popularly classed as positivists, and who, nevertheless, disclaim the title, and are unwilling to be called disciples of Comte.‡ But, as has lately been set forth in the pages of this REVIEW, § "the label" has continued to "stick" to those who, however they might differ among themselves, or from M. Comte, on other points, have agreed with him (or gone beyond him) in his doctrine of the invalidity of all knowledge but that derived from experience, as to ultimate causes,¶ whether final or efficient, and as to the Unknowable. This last is practically the differentiating mark. The founder of this whole school of thought was David Hume.∥ The school itself, is an outgrowth of that sensualistic philosophy which had its beginnings with John Locke, and was carried forward by Hartley and Condillac, and reached its climax in the French Encyclopedia. It is also of importance to mention, that before the appearance of the *Essay on the Human Understanding*, another English writer of celebrity, Hobbes, (working, as he conceived, upon the principles of

* *Comte and Positivism*, p. 14.

† In the *Contemporary Review*.

‡ This is eminently the case with Huxley and Spencer.

§ April, 1874, *Modern Skepticism*, p. 239. See, also, Dr. McCosh, *Christianity and Positivism*.

¶ Hume and Brown resolved the notion of causality into that of invariable antecedence. Mill adds the element of unconditionality. Comte and his immediate school admit that there may be more in the cause itself, but hold that both the fact and nature of such potency are inscrutable to us.

∥ This is amply shown by Mill, and still more fully, in the November number of *Blackwood's Magazine*.

Bacon),* had anticipated the fundamental article of the sensationalism of France.

It now becomes necessary for us to pay attention to the principles of that branch of the empirical school which regards the nature, if not the being, of God as lying beyond the boundaries of human knowledge. There are three, and only three, positions as to the Divine Existence, which can be taken by those who maintain that the nature and operation of the first cause are wholly inscrutable. The first, is to deny that existence. The second, is to affirm it. The third, is to be non-committal about it. Those of this school who deny the existence of a God are, *ex vi termini*, atheists, and are only to be very loosely classed with those who advocate the doctrine of the Unknowable. They are to be so classed at all only because that which *is* not, plainly cannot be *known* to be; and because in other particulars they fall into rank with the general body of empirical materialists. Those, again, of this school who are non-committal on the point of the Divine existence are Positivists, in the more limited sense. It is, therefore, evident, that those of this fraternity who *affirm* the being of a God, must be either theists, deists, or pantheists. But it is equally certain that they cannot be theists—for the theist asserts the Divine personality; or deists—for the deist insists upon the Divine independence. It follows, that they are pantheists; belonging then, it is true, to a school of pantheism that repudiates any such thing as a philosophy of the Absolute.

In the parlance of the day, we have denominated this whole school one of empirical Materialism. It is here obvious to remark that, although there have been isolated instances of theistic materialists,† materialism in the old fashioned acceptance of that term is only another description of Atheism. But several distinct and novel species of Materialism have grown up in our time. The contemporary school of modern scientific infidels have probably all embraced some one of the many ramifica-

*Morell justly attributes the first impulse of this whole movement to the author of the *Instauratio Scientiarum*, but as justly defends that great thinker from the charge of having done so with deliberate foresight of the consequences. See *History of Modern Philosophy*, pp. 70, 71.

† For example, Priestley.

tions of "Scientific Materialism"—as it is the mode to style it. In certain cases the writers or lecturers in question are atheists ; in certain other cases, positivists—in the narrowest sense of those terms. In yet other cases they might, with great propriety, be classed as materialistic or realistic Pantheists. Between the indifference-point of Positivism at the centre, and the extremes of Pantheism and Atheism at the poles, there is every imaginable shade of intermediate opinion. We have recorded the fact that both Professor Huxley and Mr. Tyndall have strenuously rebutted the charge of Atheism. We are not aware that either of them has explicitly denied the softer impeachment, that of Pantheism. It is more than likely, we dare say, that neither of them would admit the justice of such an imputation. The accomplished lecturer on light, as is well known, has left many in darkness as to his own private views regarding the genesis of the universe and the relations of matter and spirit. While he expressly disavows the grossest kinds of Materialism, and pretends to hold the even balance between the disciple of Butler and the pupil of Lucretius, he yet admits that he is a materialist in some sense, and that he sees "in matter the promise and potency of every form of terrestrial life."* At the same time (and this is remarkable) he reconstructs in modern phraseology the idealistic argument of Berkeley, declares the material world to be a mere "symbol" of an unknown reality, and discourses enigmatically of a certain "cosmical life," which has "unsearchable roots" (which may be matter, if one choose to give that name to force), and which he seems to represent as the basis of all mental as well as vital and physical phenomena.

The brilliant author of *Lay Sermons* utters himself still more paradoxically at first but less equivocally in the sequel. In his essay on Descartes' *Art of Thinking* he rigidly analyses all phenomena into so many phases of matter, and yet winds up the same article as a thorough-going idealist. The escape from self-contradiction is found only by a recourse to the skepticism of Hume. Plainly, Mr. Huxley is either an objective pantheist or a universal skeptic.

* We believe, but are not sure, that this is the last amended form of the famous sentence in the Inaugural Address at Belfast.

But the man who, if we except the author of the *Natural History of Religion*, and the author of *Inductive Logic*, has done the greater part of the original thinking of a purely speculative kind, for this entire school of thought, is, undoubtedly, Mr. Herbert Spencer. The late President of the British Association, after all his caveats, and with all his variations of "mood," seems to have a hankering after the materialistic physics of Democritus and the Atomists, and prefers, in any event, to give to the primal substance the name, if not the properties of "matter." Yet, we shrewdly suspect that the main source, the true explanation, and the best defence, of the views both of Dr. Tyndall and of Mr. Huxley may be found on the last page of Mr. Spencer's initial volume.*

It is there that he uses the following significant language :
 " . . . The interpretation of all phenomena, in terms of Matter, Motion, and Force, is nothing more than the reduction of our complex *symbols* of thought to the simplest symbols ; and when the equation has been brought to its lowest terms, the symbols remain symbols still. Hence, the reasonings concerned in the foregoing pages afford no support to either of the antagonist hypotheses respecting the ultimate nature of things. Their implications are no more materialistic than they are spiritualistic ; and no more spiritualistic than they are materialistic. Any argument which is apparently furnished to either hypothesis, is neutralized by as good an argument furnished to the other. The materialist . . . may consider it . . . demonstrated that the phenomena of consciousness are material phenomena. But the spiritualist, setting out with the same data, may argue with equal cogency, that . . . the forces of matter, . . . when existing out of consciousness, are of the same intrinsic nature as when existing in consciousness ; and that so is justified the spiritualistic conception of the external world, as consisting of something essentially identical with what we call mind. Manifestly, the establishment of correlation and equivalence between the forces of the outer and the inner worlds, may be used to assimilate either to the other, according as we set out with one or other term. But he who

* Those who recall Professor Tyndall's quotations from Goethe, in his *Fragments of Science*, and the eloquent chapter at the end of his work on *Heat*, will be the most likely to believe this.

rightly interprets the doctrine contained in this work, will see that *neither of these terms can be taken as ultimate*. He will see that, *though the relation of subject and object renders necessary to us these antithetical conceptions of Spirit and Matter; the one is no less than the other to be regarded as but a sign of the Unknown Reality, which underlies both.*"*

It will be observed that this singularly exact writer does not here employ the word "each" or "either," but the word "both." His meaning, therefore, plainly is, not merely that the intimate nature of matter and mind is unknown and undiscoverable, but that the *substantia* of mind and of matter (whatever it be) is one and the same. This inference is confirmed by the fact, that Mr. Spencer elsewhere argues to prove the unity of the great primal Force or Power. Now, if we have not here (under whatever partial disguise) either an old, or else a new, form of Pantheism, we confess ourselves incapable of framing a judgment in the premises. We go farther. We affirm confidently that, logically regarded, this is fundamentally no "new," but a very ancient, "philosophy." According to this authoritative expression of the so-called "Scientific Materialism," matter and mind, the subject and the object, the *Ich* and the *Nicht Ich*, the *myself* and the *not myself*, are purely phenomenal; the only "reality" (or *noumenon*) "underlies," but is distinct from "both." This is certainly unadulterated Pantheism. It is not precisely, if you please, the Pantheism of the Orientals or the Greeks, nor that of Spinoza—which, on some accounts, it most resembles; not that of Fichte, or of Schelling, or of Hegel, Marheineke, Strauss, Bruno, and Feyerbach. Yet, it is Pantheism; a Pantheism, too, as unmitigated and indefensible as any of its forerunners. If these positions of ours are well taken, then it follows, from preceding arguments, that the "New Philosophy" of Mr. Spencer is already judged. While this decision is inevitable without reference to the details of the system, it will be greatly fortified, if it can be further shown that the ground occupied by the English thinker and his school, as to "the Unknowable," is

* *First Principles of a New System of Philosophy*, pp. 558, 559; Appleton, 1871. We have taken the liberty to place some of Mr. Spencer's words and sentences in italics.

one which cannot be held on the principles of consistent rationalism. This last point, is indeed, the *crux* of the whole controversy with the Agnostics. In the meanwhile, it is curious to notice how in the rhythmical oscillations of Unbelief extremes are constantly found meeting. The past and present, the East and West, the object and the subject, Materialism and Idealism, Positivism and Pantheism; thus obtain an unlooked for reconciliation. But, if we are not greatly in error, it is a reconciliation on the verge of a common and irretrievable ruin.

Having now seen where Mr. Spencer's conclusion carries us, it would be easy to show, by an independent examination, that his premises are equally unwarrantable. For this there is not room within the limits of the present article. No one can open *First Principles*, however, and especially the first five chapters, *ad aperturam libri*, without discovering that the whole doctrine of the Unknowable (which underlies the system of the so-called Positivism, in all its forms) is based upon the reasonings of three other thinkers. Comte, on his first page, assumed the doctrine, without proof, as one of his fundamental postulates.* Mr. Spencer, on his part, accepts the doctrine on the proof furnished him by the late Mr. Mansel,† and by Sir W. Hamilton; and they got it, as all the world knows, from the *Critique of Pure Reason*.‡ If the Kantian structure, then, is unsound, so of necessity is the Spencerian, which is the substratum of the greater part of the current Agnosticism. Now, nothing is plainer than that Mr. Spencer himself, in his effort to establish his own realistic scheme, has virtually receded from the ground taken by Kant and Hamilton,§ and thus abjured the very principle of the argumentation, by which alone he has ventured to defend his own position, as to the inscrutable nature of the Power manifested in the world; of the ultimate Reality; of that mysterious Existence which has symbolized itself in matter and mind. Mr.

* See Comte, *Positive Philosophy*, chapter i; Bohn.

† See *First Principles*, pp. 108-110; 47, 49, 50, 53, 58, 59, 60, 63, 65, 66, 67, 43, 46. See, too, especially, pp. 39-42 and p. 551.

‡ See, for instance, Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, p. 311; Bohn.

§ *First Principles*, pp. 87-89.

Spencer is thus at the mercy of any observant adversary. Either his attempted "qualification"* of the argument of Mansel is admissible, or not. If not, then, inasmuch as Mr. Spencer rejects the validity of the Kantian distinction between faith and knowledge, and of the Hamiltonian Theism that is based on that distinction, the whole fabric of the Spencerian Agnosticism is reduced to a Nihilism as blank as that of Hegel or Gorgias.† If, on the other hand, the "qualification" is admissible, it involves unquestionably‡ the logical destruction of the Hamiltonian (which are also the Spencerian) premises of the argument which is relied on to establish the doctrine of the Unknowable.

We are, therefore, relieved of the necessity of a protracted discussion in the case of the third form in which that doctrine may be held, namely, that one in which the mental attitude, in reference to the existence of a God, is that of non-committal. This is Positivism in the narrower meaning of the term. Positivism, strictly so-called, is the system laid down in the *Cours de Philosophie Positive* of Auguste Comte. The most authoritative living exponent of the system is M. Littré. Individually, Comte himself, if not an avowed atheist, was certainly a determined opponent of any other worship than that of the creature. Yet the theory has been embraced (nominally, at least) by those who were undoubted theists—notably by the late Horace Binney Wallace,§ of Philadelphia. Its ablest English advocate at present is Mr. George Henry Lewes, who also differs in some important respects from the French teacher. The main points of Comte's structure are, the three states of the human understanding, the hierarchy of the sciences, and the hopelessness of all inquiries into ultimate and final causes. The position as to the successive stages of human progress is pronounced by Mill (who himself accepts it, with a

* *Ibid*, pp. 87-89.

† See Sir William Hamilton's *Lectures on Metaphysics*, vol. 1, p. 294; Edinb. 1859.

‡ This is almost by the confession of Mr. Spencer himself. *Ibid*, pp. 87-89.

§ *Art, Scenery, and Philosophy in Europe*, p. 31; Phila. 1855; article "Comte's Philosophy." For an ingenious defense of the possibility of a theistic Positivism, see Mill, *Comte and Positivism*, p. 15.

few reservations) "the backbone of the whole system." The scientific pretensions of Comte have not been affected by such almost unavoidable errors as the one recently exposed by the Rev. Professor Jellett, in his opening address before the mathematicians at Belfast,* but have been seriously shaken, if not demolished, by the strictures of Mill, those of Mr. Huxley (in his *Lay Sermons*), and those of Mr. Herbert Spencer,† and other competent critics. The three successive states of human progress, though acquiesced in by the historian Grote, and under other names by Mill, have been repudiated by Huxley and others of that school; and Comte's hierarchy of the sciences has given place in high quarters to new and better adjustments.

It is extremely difficult to know where to place Mr. J. S. Mill. He expresses himself as "agreeing in the opinion that what we know of *Noumena*, or things in themselves, is the bare fact of their existence."‡ Yet we find him also holding language like this: "If things have an inmost nature, apart not only from the impressions which they produce, but from all those which they are fitted to produce, on any sentient being, this inmost nature is unknowable, inscrutable, and inconceivable, not to us merely, but to every other creature. To say that even the Creator could know it, is to use language which has no meaning, because we have no faculties by which to apprehend that there is anything for him to know." The only "things in themselves," therefore, which Mill acknowledged, were (as he elsewhere puts it) "permanent possibilities of sensations,"§ and "permanent possibilities of feelings."¶

* See *Nature*, for August 20, 1874, p. 323: Address before the "Mathematical and Physical Section."

† For the criticisms of Mill and Spencer, see *Comte and Positivism*. For Comte's absurd views, as to binary combinations in Chemistry, see the proof given on p. 60, and for some of his strange notions on Light, Psychology, and Phrenology, pp. 62, 63, and 65.

‡ See *Examination of Sir W. Hamilton*; London, Third Edition, p. 11.

§ *Ibid*, chap. xi. He means objective certainties (respecting future sensations), that are not absolutely, but conditionally, such. The illustration from the Island of Madagascar makes this plain.

¶ *Ibid*, chap. xi, and especially p. 242. Prof. Masson styles Mill's scheme one of "Empirical Cogitationism," or of "Empirical Idealism." See *Recent British Philosophy*, p. 405, etc.

We grant that he expresses himself very doubtfully on the last point. The only sense in which Mill inclines in the least to the rational tenability of the dogma that there is a God existing absolutely, is in the sense that there may be permanent possibilities of Divine thoughts and feelings. He denies all substratum, in the usual meaning of the term. His language is, "supposing me to believe that the Divine mind is simply the series of thoughts and feelings prolonged through eternity, that would be, at any rate, believing God's existence to be as real as my own."* It will be observed that he does not commit himself so far as to admit a God, himself, even in this shadowy or unsubstantial sense; and to the extent that he does not, he is on this point clearly a positivist of the strictest sect. But even if he were a nominal theist, it would be a Theism in name only, being but a subtle form of Nihilistic Atheism. In any view of the case, Mill's decided leanings were toward a speculative Nihilism.† A permanent possibility has nothing in common with a permanent reality. This eminent man is generally understood as avowing Atheism in his autobiography. The only true worship he seems ever to have engaged in, was that of his deceased wife. In his posthumous essays, again, it would appear that (like Hume and Tyndall) Mill, for the most part, confined religion to the region of mere sentiment, and gave to its great object a merely subjective being. Unlike Mr. H. Spencer, he accepted the doctrine of relativity, not only in its widest, but also in its most *unqualified* sense, and lived in Hume's world of dreams and phantasies, of "impressions and ideas." Mill's system, therefore, like Mr. Spencer's, falls with the Kantian and Hamiltonian doctrine of the Unconditioned; or, without that, on the concession of Sir William's saving clauses.‡

The non-committalists (whether calling themselves positivists or not) can vindicate their non-committalism, if at all, only on

* *Ibid*, p. 239.

† For the connections between Mill's and previous and contemporary opinions, see *Comte and Positivism*, pp. 5-8.

‡ For a thorough dissection of this whole theory, and of Mill's *particular* system, see Dr. McCosh's admirable *Defense of Fundamental Truth*, and also his *Christianity and Positivism*.

the ground of the experience doctrine;* that doctrine involving the postulate as to nescience. But the experience doctrine, when tracked out, leads inevitably to a committal in favor of Pantheism or Nihilism, and thus of Atheism. Reject the experience doctrine, and you have, *ipso facto*, reinstated "the fundamental laws of thought;" the true Intuitionism — of which the false, philosophic Mysticism is but a seductive counterfeit. Then is reestablished the law of causation as a law of objective existence, no less than as a law of thought. This again involves the confutation of the empirical skepticism of Hume and the French and English schools of scientific positivists, as well as of the transcendental skepticism of Kant and the German idealists, naturalists, and absolutists. The inconsistent Realism of Kant sinks under the same blow (to wit, the proof of self-contradiction) which demolishes the utterly different, but equally inconsistent, Realism of Spencer. With the restoration of final and efficient causes, even in the ultimate sense, return in all their ancient force, the cosmological, teleological, historical, moral, and religious arguments for the being and attributes of God. There follow in due sequence not only the possibility, but certainty, of the supernatural, the fact of miracles and prophecy, and the indissoluble concord of Reason and Redemption.

Look at it as we may, therefore, the "Scientific Materialism" of the Agnostic type, no less than that of which the hostility to Revealed Religion is even more pronounced, comes back at last to one of the varied forms of Atheism. So far as we are able to judge, the modern advocate of iconoclastic nescience is like one who, having discovered at the dawn a baffling riddle graven in the eternal rock, should lie down at night in despair of a solution, and arise in the morning to find that solution in his own undoing.† We have attempted in this article to show that the several assumptions, on which alone the counter-argument of the infidel is tenable, are alike without foundation in reason. We have been led to conclude that Deism, Pantheism,

* The doctrine (with all its varieties) held in common by Hobbes, Locke, Berkeley, Hume, Bentham, the Mills, Comte, Bain, Spencer, Lewes, etc.

† We are indebted for this image (though not for its application) to Hegel, who applies it very differently to Jacobi. See *Morell*, p. 602; and for the authorship, *Chalzybæus*, p. 66, Andover, 1854.

and Positivism are so many disguised forms of Atheism. The grand assumption which underlies them all, is that one which Dr. McCosh has so justly styled "the *πρῶτον ψεῦδος*" of the romantic legendary whimsy of Rénan, viz., the intrinsic impossibility of the supernatural.* These false postulates removed, and the argument for Christian Theism stands intact and impregnable. The philosophy of the Intuitions, or primordial *à priori* judgments, becomes the sheet anchor of apologetics; and stark Pyrrhonism, the final upshot of modern infidelity.† The surrender of Redemption is, therefore, the suicide of Reason.

* See Butler's *Analogy*, part ii, chap. ii.

† *Ibid*, part ii, conclusion. See, too, *Morell*, p. 224, for a fine argument of Mackintosh against Hume. Descartes's argument against the Pyrrhonist is beautifully elucidated by Cousin in his *Cours* for 1828, p. 23. Compare *Pensées de Pascal*, Paris, Didot, 1847, pp. 145, 146, 147. Cousin shows, incontestably, that there is no stopping-place with Hume, in admitting the *datum* but denying the *veracity* of consciousness. The Cartesian doctrine of the supremacy of consciousness is taken for granted, even in the arguments that oppose it.