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ARTICLE I.

WALNUT STREET CHURCH DECISION IN THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT.

Wallace's Reports. Vol. XIII., pp. 650, 8vo.

Presbyterian Church Case. Presbyterian Board of Publication,
Philadelphia.

McMillan vs. The Free Church of Scotland. Court of
Sessions, 1859.

*Opinion of the Supreme Court of Appeals of Kentucky on the
Walnut Street Church Case.* Kentucky Reports, 1868.

*Argument of Mr. Bullitt, Counsel for Watson and Others,
before Supreme Court of Kentucky.*

The Walnut Street or Third Presbyterian church of Louisville, Kentucky, dates from 1842. In the spring of 1861 it had the Rev. Mr. McElroy as stated supply, Messrs. Watson, Gault, and Avery as elders, and a board of trustees elected biennially by the congregation; who, by a law of Kentucky, were a corporation to hold their house of worship. The attempts of the General Assembly, Old School, to legislate abolition and centralising politics into Christ's kingdom, by a usurped spiritual authority, of course produced many divisions in this border church. Messrs. McElroy, Watson, and Gault, with half of the congregation, sympathised with the invaded spiritual rights of the people; Mr. Avery and the rest, with the aggressive party. These divisions

ture in the affections of his people, this sovereign refused to make any concessions that would sacrifice the honor or nationality of his country. He died peacefully, September 20th, 1415. The title to the Principality on his death reverted to Owen Tudor.

"In the union of all the qualifications of a patriot, a general, a true knight in the field, and an accomplished gentleman in the hall, Glendore must be acknowledged the most interesting and polished celebrity of the fifteenth century. Between the setting sun of Llewelyn and the rising one of Tudor, he sheds a splendor on the intervening expanse of the Cambrian sky, which has equally excited the imagination of the poet and challenged the more sober admiration of the historian."*

Henry V., now on the English throne, was the rival prince to Glyndore, being descended from Nest ap Traherne, and born at Monmouth. Having declared war against Charles VI., King of France, and set sail with his forces, his campaign was terminated by the celebrated battle of Agincourt, in which he was victorious.

ARTICLE IV.

SOCIAL SCIENCE UNDER A CHRISTIAN ASPECT.

Principia or Basis of Social Science: Being a Survey of the Subject from the Moral and Theological, yet Liberal and Progressive Stand-point. By R. J. WRIGHT. Second Edition. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott & Co. 1876. Pp. 524, 8vo.

The intricate questions growing out of a consideration of social phenomena have always had a fascination for the higher order of minds. The two most famous thinkers of antiquity agreed in expending much of their thought on these topics. The great orator and statesman of the Roman Commonwealth, the great lawyers of the Roman Empire, have given to the world the results of their reflection in this obscure department of intellectual inquiry. The modern world has not lagged behind the ancient

*Cambrian History, page 214.

in the effort to explore this *terra incognita*; to fix its boundaries and ascertain the marks that distinguish its character. Such names as those of Grotius, of Machiavelli, of Montesquieu, of Burke, of Puffendorf, and of De Tocqueville, have, from time to time, illustrated the annals and signalised the exploits of those who have engaged in these strange adventures. The jurists, historians, and philosophers of England and Scotland, and the fathers of American politics, have entered with alacrity into the same spirit of discovery which has animated the publicists and metaphysicians of the European continent. The atheistic and deistical writers who preceded the first Revolution in France, and their successors who have been themselves the *avant-coureurs* of the subsequent outbreaks, have devoted themselves largely—in some cases have devoted themselves almost exclusively—to the same perilous yet alluring investigations. The same tendency is somewhat noticeable also in the German school of idealistic Pantheists; eminently so in the case of Hegel and his immediate followers. This general subject has latterly received a vast augmentation of interest for a certain class of minds, from the impulse given to its further study by the appearance of the *Philosophie Positive* of Auguste Comte, and the much more recent lucubrations of Mr. Herbert Spencer. And lo! now there comes to the front Mr. R. J. Wright, whose formidable title stands at the head of this review, and whose portly octavo has already passed to its second edition. A brief notice of this work has already appeared in these pages, but it is worthy of further consideration.

The occasion is an auspicious one for the author; for although the work has been already some time before the public, it challenges new attention since the events that have grown out of the late *emeute* at Martinsburg. This would indeed be a favorable time to take a thorough-going view of *Communism*, from its earliest beginnings to its latest frantic ebullition. Such a view would require that the thoughtful critic should dwell upon the infidelity of Hobbes in the seventeenth century, which was the parent of his own uncouth “Leviathan,” and in part, also, the parent of that still more offensive infidelity that, after a baleful

sojourn in England during the greater portion of the eighteenth century, crossed the channel to the main land of Europe, and gave birth, in due course of nature, to all the horrors of the Bastille and the Reign of Terror. Such a *résumé* as we have indicated would next carry us over the history of the various socialistic communities which have either perished from inanition, or else have contrived to eke out a forlorn existence under peaceful conditions.*

The ominous *motif* of the prelude which had now and then been audible in the perplexed chords that make up the body of the dreadful symphony, would at length be heard rolling like harsh thunder amidst the crashing dissonances of the *finale*. The vaticinations of Prud'hon, Ledro-Rollin, Louis Blanc, Victor Hugo, and George Sand, as respects the golden future of the Commune and "*Le Droit du Travail*," would be confounded by the Red Republican orgies of '48, as well as by the blazing *façade* of the Hotel de Ville and the Tuileries, and the hunger-bitten faces of the populace who gazed upon the execution of Rossel. Such an examination would call for a searching analysis of the principles underlying the schemes of the French Socialists and English Chartists, and which furnish a lame apology for the Trades-Unions and the Workingmen's Associations of the type of the International. Such a task we may, peradventure, take in hand on another day; we shall certainly not do so now. The whole matter is exhausted in the debates of L'Assemblée Nationale, which were published in Paris in the year 1848. Both Thiers and De Tocqueville were active members of the Assembly.

The "Principia" of Mr. Wright invites us to perform a very different, and in some particulars a far more agreeable, duty. Our author, whilst owning to a desire for the realisation of certain dreams of his, as to what he styles "Limited Communism," has no sympathy with the excesses, whether in theory or in practice, which have made the very name of Communist a title

* There is an admirable conspectus of the various Communistic experiments in the United States, under the head of "Statistics," occupying the whole of subdivision III. of the fourth main division of Mr. Wright's Fifth Book. See "Principia," pp. 516-523.

of reproach not less among enlightened worldings than among well-instructed Christians. He declares himself a hearty believer in the truth of the Scriptures, and his most earnest aim to be the preservation of the interests of true religion. It would be very ungracious to suspect the honesty of this declaration, which is indeed confirmed by the tone and manifest object of the whole volume. It is quite another matter whether Mr. Wright can be set down as an orthodox believer. We have been altogether puzzled to know where to place him as regards the attitude in which he stands towards the Churches and the different religious opinions. He seems to have strong leanings in the direction of the symbolism of numbers and Swedenborg's doctrine of Correspondences, (see page 59 *et passim*), as well as of the Episcopal liturgy, and to have faith in the reality of supernatural grace and of the inspiration of the Scriptures; albeit he throws in a good word here and there for the Quakers, for the Mennonites, and other harmless and non-combative sects, and even for certain practices of the Romanists. There are decided tendencies betrayed throughout the book, in the direction of religious mysticism, and towards the end they culminate in a sort of Broad Church Quietism. He might be understood as holding the doctrine of unconditional decrees, though his remarks on this point are purely hypothetical. There is proof that he believes in the future punishment of the wicked, and yet it is possible he would not so readily grant that that punishment is to be eternal. After some characteristic statements in reference to La Grange's Calculus of Variations, in connexion with "spontaneous powers of reaction," and "the self-counterbalancing of evils and opinions," there occurs the following curious passage, in which his view is enforced by a singular piece of scriptural exegesis :

"There are limits, probably, even to the distance that lost souls can make, of separation from the race. The Psalmist says, although he 'make his bed in hell, God is there.' (Psalm cxxxix. 8.) And *vice versa*, what concerns us more to know—there may be limits to the distance the saved can rise above the lost."*

* Principia, p. 70.

Elsewhere, after mildly chastising Spencer for his figment as to the spontaneous disappearance of evils, our author says :

“ . . . Revealed religion alone can save society. . . : To ignore God, even in the spontaneous disappearance of evils, is to put stops to the working of the *Cause* of the spontaneous disappearance, and, therefore, stops to the disappearance itself. The spontaneous elimination and evanescence of evils, is only of *WEAK* evils ; unless on that *ETERNAL* and infinite plane, unknown to mortals, where evil itself may be shown to be weakness.”*

He accepts, with an important modification, Paley's Expediency doctrine, and makes it one of his foundation-stones. The modification is that no doctrine of expediency can be received, altogether regardless of the moral instincts, nor can these be taken without the other. Right and expediency, he holds, always go together, and can never swerve from “the great foundations of morality, namely, the sanction of God and the equality of the rights of men under the same circumstances.”†

The author of “*Principia*” refers so often, and nearly always so kindly, to writers of opposite opinions, that little can be gathered from the excerpts he makes from others on particular points as to the general point of view he occupies himself. This he describes on his title-page as one that is, “moral and theological, yet liberal and progressive.” It will be heeded that he does not say his standing-point is “Christian.” He appears to be in religion, what he certainly is in philosophy and politics, an independent eclectic. He swears by no master absolutely, and is not only a *beau sabreur*, but a free lance, from the beginning to the end of his long combat. His views as to the relation which theology bears to social science are (like his views on most other subjects) exceedingly peculiar. He thinks those who have actually done most to aid the science, are Socrates, (or Plato,) Fourier, Comte, and Herbert Spencer, whom he pronounces “the most profound scientific generalists of all time.”‡ Yet he believes a more likely class than either the ordinary statesman or the ordinary “physicists” to keep the cause, would be the true scientific theologians, if these could only spare the time for the

**Ibid*, p. 62.

†*Ibid*, p. 41.

‡*Ibid*, p. 36.

investigation. Theologians, he argues, are, by their training, the men best fitted for universal or general study, and quotes "Wells, whose occupation is the examination of heads," as saying that, as a class, theologians have the best heads in the world. (*Query*, Is our author himself a "theologian?") He finds evidence of the correctness of his preference for theologians as the men for this business, in what he calls "the success" of their communities. Nearly all who have succeeded in these attempts have been theologians, even if uneducated or renegade theologians. He also argues from the fact that ministers of religion alone can proclaim to kings (or rulers) the precise truths of which they stand in need, and corroborates his view by the marginal renderings* of Isaiah iii. 12, and ix. 16. Nor does he omit to mention "the brave and devoted missionaries, scattered over heathen countries," . . . who are making continual and valuable contributions to the science, gathered from their personal observation and experience. Mr. Wright also borrows a hint from a Dr. Craig, that clergymen (and physicians too) COULD be of great service, by collecting statistics of such a private and moral nature as are not to be got at in any other way.†

The following interesting extract might seem to disclose the fact that the writer is a Protestant—perchance a Presbyterian or Congregationalist. It is nevertheless certain that at least on his mystical side he has sympathies broad enough to include Mahometans and Pagans:‡

"The study of theology is the scientific study of religion, and therefore calls into exercise all the higher faculties of the mind. Hence it is one of the best preparations for earnest original study in any of the sciences. The success of the German and Scotch metaphysicians is chiefly owing to this cause. And even of the pre-eminent mathematical and physical scientists, Candolle's statistics show, as to the professions of their sires, that Protestant clergymen are more numerous than any other profession. And of the eminent men of the Christian world, a far larger portion of them are found to be the children of clergymen than of any other professionals. [*Sic.*]

"The *peculiar* fitness of the studies of the theologians, as discipline

* The volume contains several new interpretations of the Greek.

† *Ibid.*, pp. 36, 37.

‡ *Ibid.*, p. 455.

and preparation for political philosophy, is further proved by the fact that at various times they have become the best and foremost political statesmen of the world. Ximenes, Wolsey, Richelieu, Cranmer, Talleyrand, and others, may be mentioned. And then, also, the fact that the statesmanship of Rome, which is conducted entirely by clergymen, is acknowledged to be the most far-reaching in the world. Remember, also, those old Puritan statesmen of Cromwell's day, who knew their Bibles and Catechisms even better than their laws—how readily they were turned into generals and statesmen, whom all the world wondered at, and who out-generalled and out-witted even the Romans themselves.”*

In his Preface, the author professes to have aimed to produce a book that could be safely recommended to students of divinity who thirst for knowledge and for real usefulness, and declares that in this spirit he offers the volume to his readers, “in the humble but earnest desire of being able to contribute his mite towards the Christianisation of politics, the promotion of real freedom and progress, and the improvement of society; firmly believing that the promotion of freedom and progress in this world is aid to salvation in the next world.”† Thus the author would seem to be a sort of Broad Church mystic;‡ but with very definite and often singular opinions on certain tenets in theology.

But if we have been puzzled to know what is Mr. Wright's religious status, we were at first quite nonplussed in the endeavor to find out exactly where he stands on the question of sectional politics. He speaks somewhere of the “great rebellion,” but elsewhere he expresses himself as follows: “Whenever the forms of government become so perverted that they essentially hinder the real *objects*, then rebellion becomes justifiable, if it is expedient.” (P. 247.) Furthermore, he commonly describes the contest between the North and South as the “internal war.” He might even seem to be a sort of State Rights man.¶ He avows a belief in the sovereignty of “precincts,” and (as we shall see) he defines his “precincts” as “very small and REFORMED ‘States.’” (P. 125.) In his view, “there is the certainty that

* *Ibid.*, p. 31.

† *Ibid.*, vii.

‡ Like other Communists, he lays great stress on what he calls “the higher life,” “the interior life,” etc., but understands these terms in a rather peculiar sense. See p. 455.

¶ See p. 143.

the greater a nation becomes, the less willing its rulers are to have it severed, and the greater is their power of evil, and the more severe they are apt to be towards dissenters or rebels. . . ." He holds that so long as human nature continues depraved, "nations cannot happily attain their maximum theoretical size previous to division; charity must make allowances for the imperfections of both sides." (P. 248.) He certainly maintains the justifiableness of revolutionary changes involving the permanent separation of the body politic, whenever the amount of grievances and the power of the persons or parties aggrieved have reached a kind of joint maximum. He even appears to admit, *in thesi*, a right on the part of "precincts" to "secede," but guards his theory from any dangers supposed to result from this concession, by the statement that the practical right to secede has been settled adversely by war. He, however, contends for a reduction of the "states" into his sovereign "precincts," and argues that "the arrangement into small States," such as he proposes, would have prevented anything like secession on a large scale; and that the organisation of the present "United States" into very much smaller States, "would make even the IDEA of 'State Right Secession' quite preposterous," and preposterous in an inverse ratio to the magnitude of the new States. Notwithstanding all this, he assigns extraordinary powers to the "nation," considered as a fundamental element in every system of government; and maintains that it would be competent to the nation to interpose in the case of "slave precincts," though only in time of peace. The defence our author makes of this position seems to grow naturally out of his novel social theory, and may not be at all due to "political" bias. The language he uses is somewhat ambiguous: "The real justification for interference by the nation, with the affairs of the slave precincts, is that these latter totally ignored the rights of the colored race either to precincts or to corporations. I mean this would be justification in time of peace." It may perhaps be inferred from this that Mr. Wright is a negrophilist, in the offensive sense of that term. There are passages which might appear to support such a construction.*

* Compare with this, Principia, p. 229, etc.

One of the strongest of these passages, however, contains a sentence with a bearing so equivocal as to throw all in doubt again as to his full meaning. The remark is made, that in human nature there are sympathies for the injured and down-trodden that will sooner or later bring about relief. Even if such a class are so far sunk in the social and moral scale as to furnish to the observer few specimens of the better points of human nature—"if they are so low that FACTS can say but little in their favor, then FICTION will take up their cause, and fancy will imagine and paint specimens of their imaginary heroes in unknown circumstances." In the same context there is an explicit reference to a work of Mrs. H. B. Stowe, in which (we may be allowed to say, in passing,) the authoress has notoriously relied on her imagination for her facts.

The new "Principia" fully recognise the mixture of motives that urged on the crusade against the Southern slave-holder, and places "interest" (covetousness) high in the list of those motives. "Animosity against the 'owners of cheap labor,' had as much to do with the cry for Union and Abolition, as sympathy for the colored race."*

On the whole, we regard the author as a theoretical dreamer, rather than as a sectional partisan. He expressly affirms the unassailable truth that "nothing is clearer than that the whole subject of the internal government of each of the States is, by the Constitution, left to the government of the State itself."† He admits that if the State, after secession, remains a State in the old sense of that term, the Carolina argument is perfect. He is, however, driven to deny that the State continues to be a State, or that "rebellion" (as he calls it) can take a State out of the Union. Yet he maintains that "rebellion" does take the political Constitution of the "rebellious" State out of the Constitution of the United States, and argues that the former "State" is now remanded to the condition of a "territory," in the sense of the law. Under this view, he holds that the rights of "loyal" individuals, as individuals, remain unimpaired; but that "their political State rights are gone." This would certainly be "hard

* *Principia*, p. 77.

† *Ibid*, p. 154.

lines" for the "scalawag" of our Southern provinces. So far, his theory corresponds exactly with that of the extreme wing of the Radical party; and his whole argument on this point is a nut for the so-called "war Democrats" to crack. Here, however, he parts company with the Stevens school, in the following remarkable paragraph:

"Nothing in this argument, however, is to be so construed as to deny the *right* of precincts to rebel, upon *sufficient* cause. The conflict of arms results in general from the uncompromised conflicts of opinion, and which are useless to discuss any further. It is a resort to which every living thing which believes in fighting has a natural right, upon just occasion. But after the resort to arms has been made and concluded in conquest, the rights of the conquerors are limited only by the laws of nations and by Christian morality. But the *expediencies* are a different question." (P. 155.)

There are many admirable things in this book. All manner of subjects are discussed, and usually with ability. We have here the *principia* of nearly all the sciences, both physical and moral, and many of their last results. The book abounds in shrewd and pithy observations and criticisms, and in valuable apothegms, which often show a large experience and much sagacity and reflection. But it would extend the limits of this article unduly to sustain this judgment by quotations. The remainder of our space must be reserved for a consideration of our author's peculiar scheme of social organisation. But in leaving this branch of the subject, we can appreciate and almost endorse the words of one of Mr. Wright's reviewers, when he says:

"In the fulness of its table of contents, . . . in the encyclopædic range of its topics, embracing 'high politics,' theology, metaphysics, moral philosophy, political economy, the science of government, the science of physical man, and miscellaneous topics relating to the development and progress of the race; in the minuteness of its sub-divisions, . . . in the originality of its punctuation-marks, . . . in the singularity of its syntax, . . . this 'Principia' is not merely an imposing and curious, but a ponderous and unique, book. As an illustration of a peculiar method of literary work, . . . it is the most extraordinary volume we have ever encountered."*

"Principia" is divided into five Books, of which the first con-

* The *Christian Era*, of Boston.

tains a Summary Introduction to Social Science ; the second, a discussion of the Precinct ; the third, of the Nation ; the fourth, of Corporation ; and the fifth, of Limited Communism. Every Book and the whole work proceeds from generals to particulars. The first Book is abstruse, from the condensation and the novelty of the views merely broached. It is, however, one of the most striking portions of the whole volume. It is sub-divided into two parts. The first part is on the principles of the study, and the second on the principles of the science itself. The first of these parts is very interesting, and presents little occasion for hostile criticism. The second part includes within itself the core of the author's general system. Much of the matter of this portion of the Book is recapitulated, explained, and extended in Book IV. (See p. 358.) The subject is far too complicated a one for a detailed consideration in the present article. Differing from Ballou* and other Socialists, in working from the Roman idea of *Centralism*, *i. e.*, of government descending from the greater to the less, Mr. Wright founds his plan on the rights of individuals, families, and precincts ; proceeding on the Greek and German (and he might have added Hebrew) idea of natural and artificial *federation* ; *i. e.*, of government ascending from the less to the greater. The sentence just concluded is a digest in our own language of whole chapters of the "Principia." Our author fancies he has discovered the fundamental constitutive elements of human society. These are seven. Of these seven, all but one are what he calls "the six units." These six units are units or measures of governmental right or power. They are also "moral personalities," inherent in the constitution of society. Their names are familiar ones. They are these: Individual, Family, Social Circle, Precinct, Nation, and Mankind. Each of these units is "*typical*" of all above it, and *vice versa*. Thus, no one unit has greater authority over the unit next below it, than the unit next below it has over its own immediate inferior, and so on. The two extremes in the series are perhaps to be excepted from

* The author of "Christian Socialism," a work which requires, as one of the principles "fundamental to the constitution of society," what Mr. Wright styles "such a subtlety" as the dogma of universal salvation.

the absolute generality of this statement—Mankind and Individual: Mankind, as the whole and absolutely superior; the Individual, as the social atom, and incapable of social sub-division. It follows, that nationality cannot absorb the rights of precincts, or family government absorb the rights of individuals, or indeed any one unit absorb the rights of any other unit. Our ingenious analyst insists that it is therefore wrong to treat precincts as if they were mere corporations, and to single out the nation as the only unit having real and original governmental power. Precincts are "free and equal" *in their sphere*, as individuals in their sphere, or as nations in their sphere. The authority of a nation over its precincts, is of the same *kind* (he holds) as that which would be exercised by a coalition of nations, a confederacy, or empire, over the included nationalities. In both cases, Mr. Wright would make the sovereignty to consist in the vast difference of DEGREE in the scale of power betwixt the governor and the governed. These coalitions and empires are themselves foreshadowings and intimations of the largest unit, Mankind; and our author puts the question whether the time will ever arrive when mankind shall be embraced under one confederated or imperial government. This event, he supposes, must be deferred till the coming of "that Great Man 'who is Lord of the whole earth.'" The fundamental analogy is the family. This conception should also determine the relation of counties and townships to provinces, of provinces to states, and of states to nations.

One family occupies a locality, several families make up a neighborhood, several neighborhoods a township, and so on until we have arrived at the nation.

The interior principle regulating the definition and arrangement of the units is that of the tribe. The notion of the precinct or neighborhood is a modern enlargement of the tribe idea. And, according to the author of "*Principia*," the tribe idea is originally the essence of the State. This he exemplifies in the Scottish clans, each subservient to its chief and all subservient to their king.

But in addition to the six units, there is a *seventh* fundamental

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or analytical element of human society: it is that of corporation. This seventh element, however, is generically different from the other six. The six are instinctive, the seventh deliberative; the six are successive and mutually exclusive; the seventh may be placed indifferently either at the top or bottom of the series, and may either coincide in boundary with one or more of the larger units, or else may intersect and overlap them, and intersect them and overlap them in every imaginable way. The corporation is fancifully spoken of as a sort of *Sabbath* to the other fundamental elements.

The subject of corporations is treated of in an exceedingly learned and a really able manner; and this portion of "Principia" is the true vestibule to the most erratic and objectionable part of the whole volume, and no doubt the favorite part with the author, namely, the part on limited communism. Mr. Wright claims to have discovered the alleged fact, and certainly a remarkable one, that the ancient tribe idea has not disappeared from modern society, but is resolved into the three forms of social circle, precinct, and corporation.*

It is not necessary that we should go extensively either into the consideration of the precise nature of the six units, or into the examination of the argument by which the exact number of the units is determined, by which they are ascertained to be just what they are, and are contradistinguished the one from the other. Much that is said about them in this volume is true and important, much true and unimportant, much mere guess-work, much untrue or fanciful. As regarded by the author of "Principia," these fundamental units, though successive in the order of power, are contemporaneous at any given time; and though mutually exclusive as to their boundary lines, are only so in the same sense in which the statement holds good of a system of concentric circles. His idea of his seventh analytical element, corporation, would seem to be that of one or more circles, if you please, of an indefinite number of circles, of variable radii, laid over the area swept by the concentric circles, and laid over this area in such a manner that no reference is commonly had to the

**Ibid.*, p. 359.

coincidence of the superimposed curves with the curves previously described.

But it is not of corporation, but of the six units we are now to speak. Of these the first, the individual, is the atom of which all the others are composed; since mankind is made up of nations, and nations of precincts, and precincts of social circles, and social circles of families, and families of individuals. Few would be disposed to deny that society may be resolved into some such elements, but it certainly requires proof that the analytical units are just these six,—*no more, no less*. That the six are the very six given in this volume, and that the character of each is just what this volume says it is, is argued with a show at least of cogency. The writer's usual good sense appears to have deserted him where he tries to confirm his selection of the number *six* by a variety of fantastic analogies, although he is no where more curious and ingenious than in this very effort. Thus he finds the *hexagon* to be the best mathematical figure for purposes like those of the honey bee. He also finds six great classes of society; six principal crimes or vices; six main divisions in Roget's "Thesaurus of English Words;" six "infinities" in Ballou's "Christian Socialism;" six divisions in Paley's Moral and Political Philosophy; six lines of progress, and six universal data, according to Herbert Spencer; six astronomical systems; six systems of crystallisation; six organs of sense; six eras in religious society; six sciences according to Plato; six states of the human mind; six mental faculties; six divisions of the universe, suggested by the classification of Oken; six sciences according to Hegel; six sciences according to Comte. More to the purpose is what Mr. Wright says about the combinations of the six units. These are combinations in concatenation and combinations in solution. Under the head of combinations in concatenation, he points out that the individual knows himself only by coming to the family; and both individual and family know themselves only by coming into the social circle, or into the local organisation or precinct; and all these again know themselves only through connexion with the nation, and the nation knows itself only by means of its relations to mankind. Similarly, going downwards, the nation can

appreciate itself only by appreciating precinct, social circle, and individual. So, too, of precinct in relation to social circle and individual, and of social circle in relation to individual. "Thus it is," he argues, "that the very principle which runs through the development of all human society, has only to be viewed from the opposite side to be seen to confirm the great doctrine of the right of some government influence being vested in all the units of society severally." (P. 88.)

Under the head of combinations in solution, which are described as of a more complex and versatile kind, our author favors us with a series of observations, the truth of which is in every case obvious, but the effect on the mind of the reader often surprising. Thus, three of the units, viz., precinct, nation, and mankind, involve the idea of location; whereas the other three are purely personal, viz., the individual, the family, and the social circle. Again: the six naturally divide themselves into three pairs, in each of which pair one unit is a part and the other a whole, viz., individual and family, precinct and nation, social circle and mankind; one pair, moreover, being personal, one political, and one voluntary or moral. Once more: by a different combination we arrive at three pairs, in all of which the units of each pair are connected by metaphysical and moral relations,—viz., individual and mankind, family and nation, social circle and precinct.* The author also finds three dualities, and points out certain whimsical analogies in chemistry and geography. (P. 89.) He also calls attention to an analogy of peculiarities, a solitary unit at the two extremes, and two connected pairs of units in the middle. As to the two extremes, one (individual) is a *no* society, a kind of zero, and the other (mankind) is the indefinitely remote ideal that is never completely realised. The other four make up the connected pairs, family with social circle, and precinct with nation. (Pp. 90 and 91.) It is impossible not to admire the patience and cleverness that are bestowed on these seemingly idle comparisons, no less than on the weightier matters that come more regularly under discussion. The condition prerequisite to a happy state of things among a people, is what our author calls

*See Principia, p. 89.

the balance of the units. It is the duty of society to find and keep this balance by giving to each unit its due proportion of influence.

The following sentence, with certain important qualifications, expresses the whole theory in a nutshell: “. . . , Every unit . . . has its own rights, which are inalienable, indefeasible, and indivisible. Therefore, in general, we may say, the sovereignty of the nation over the precincts within, and over relationships to other nations and mankind outward, IS LIMITED BOTH BY THE ETERNAL NATURE AND BY THE INALIENABLE RIGHTS OF THE UNITS.”* This, however, is modified and practically neutralised by the singular statement, that in cases where there is conflict of authority or opinion, the lesser unit must perforce (though not of abstract right) yield to the greater. “Our doctrine,” he says, “as to the rights of a nation may be summed up thus: the sovereignty of the nation consists, as to precincts, corporations, individuals, and families, not in superior rights, but in superior power; but with the right of judging in doubtful cases of jurisdiction; and on the other hand,—in reference to the unit above it, viz., mankind,—the nation has only its rights as one of the essential units, all being subject to their *peculiar* conditions of *position* and *locality*.” (P. 226.) Of the six units, four, viz., individual, family, social circle, and mankind, are so commonly understood in the same way, that they need no further description; another, precinct, has already been sufficiently described; the remaining unit, nation, calls for a word or two of additional explanation. Mr. Wright, after giving the definitions of Scipio, Cicero, Augustine, Grotius, Comte, Mill, Wheaton, and Mulford, gives his own. This is, that “a nation is one of the spontaneous, natural elements or units of human society—a governmental union of individuals and precincts,” having most, if not quite all, of eight characteristics which he specifies. The seventh and eighth characteristics would, in the judgment of experts, be missing, not only in the case of the Southern Confederacy, but of the American Union.† Yet it should be noticed that Mr. Wright contends for the universal presence, not of all, but of *nearly* all

**Ibid.*, p. 225.

†*Ibid.*, p. 247.

the criteria, and holds that the missing element will be different in different cases. "The *tout ensemble*," he says, "remains a 'constant,' yes, so constant as not even to disappear in 'differentiation.'" He does not, however, appear to allow the absence of two of the criteria. Mr. Wright would, of course, deny that our view is the correct one of the American Constitution; which having been formed not by a spontaneous impulse, but by voluntary agreement, would then lack only the seventh characteristic.

According to Mr. Wright, every precinct or small neighborhood possesses by nature, and should have granted to it by law, the same rights for the most part that the Constitution grants to its States severally.* The diminished size of his proposed States (precincts) would make necessary a number of alterations in "the State-rights granted by the Constitution." The mass of American "State-rights" should be divided between the nation and the precincts. Some of the powers of the individual State would be assigned to the precinct, or to its amalgam with its surrounding precincts; other of these powers would be assigned to the nation. On the other hand, some of the powers of the nation would be assigned to the individual precinct, or to its amalgam (league) with its surrounding precincts. (P. 143.) The States are throughout treated of by this writer as if they were the creatures, instead of being, as they demonstrably are, the creators, of the Constitution.

The author of this treatise holds some peculiar views in respect to his third unit, the social circle. It is impossible for us to take notice of them now. He admits that his whole scheme is in large measure a play of the imagination, a sort of phantasmal republic like that of Plato, or Utopia like that of More. The whole thing strikes us as being a fair but colossal delusion; and the procession of elaborated arguments passes before the mind's-eye like "an insubstantial pageant," or the dissolving views of a magic lantern. Great reliance is reposed on the general method of Comte and Spencer, who are continually quoted as high authorities in this volume. It is true the attempt is made to purge the method of its virtual Atheism. Yet, how can this be done without a sur-

**Ibid*, p. 143.

render of its fundamental principles? The corner-stone of Positivism is its doctrine respecting ultimate *causes*, whether efficient or final, that they can never be discovered, or if an ultimate efficient can be discovered that it is forever inscrutable. The sociological hypothesis of Spencer is of a piece with his psychological, "biological," and physical, and these are parts of a grand comprehensive hypothesis of evolution of everything in matter, in mind, and in history, "from homogeneity to heterogeneity;" an evolution hypothesis that is essentially the same with that of Wallace and Darwin—the same, though immeasurably expanded; but in comparison with which Darwinism itself is sobriety and caution. We are advocates of the theory that there is a progressive order in nature, and a historical development in the unfoldings of Providence. What we dispute is that these movements are due to an evolution of natural force. It may be conceded, too, that Comte and Spencer have made some valuable suggestions, of which Mr. Wright, so far as his judgment has been a safe guide, has been eager to avail himself. The inalienable rights of the social circle, of the precinct, and of the nation, are to a great extent imaginary. The so-called "science" of the Socialists is not yet worthy of the name. The elements of the problem are too refined, too numerous, too variable and transitory for the subtlest powers of analysis that have ever yet grappled with them. This, indeed, is fully admitted by our author, who grants that his whole work is tentative and experimental. His scheme of "limited communism" is in principle analogous to that of Fourier, but differs from all other proposed systems in many important particulars. It is far from our intention to open so large a subject in the present number of the REVIEW. Like all kindred schemes, if ever brought to the tests of theory or practice, it will be "found wanting." It is but fair, however, to say that Mr. Wright agrees with those sociologists who go in for a community of incomes, *not* of capital, and who are the friends of marriage; and that he founds his system not on principles of *justice*, but of *benevolence*,—in the form of the brotherly kindness enjoined in the New Testament. (See p. 444.) Coöperation and joint stock companies, he thinks, can furnish all that is de-

manded by simple justice. The final cause of the whole enterprise in which Mr. Wright is engaged, would seem to be to foster a species of perfectionism. He acknowledges that a commune is not likely to succeed which abounds in "*Bibliolaters*," who would settle everything irrespective of history, experience, science, or natural religion. He admits that one of his communes would be a shell to hold and receive life from a church of interiorists and saints. He admits that a commune, and by its very definition, aims at the identification of Church and State, in the love and choice of every individual. The scheme is perhaps the best communistic scheme ever proposed; but, like the rest, is visionary and chimerical, is founded upon false premises, is defended by invalid arguments, is beset with difficulties in practice, and is destructive in its influence on the Church and on society.

ARTICLE V.

PRESBYTERIANISM IN CENTRAL NEW YORK.

1. *Historical Sketch of Presbyterianism within the bounds of the Synod of Central New York.* By P. H. FOWLER, D. D.
2. *The Presbyterian Element in the National Life and History.* By Prof. J. W. MEARS, D. D. Utica, N. Y. 1877.

The first named work covers 755 pages, 12mo. The other is a pamphlet of 31 pages, bound with the first. There seems to be no special connection in these two productions, except that they may be said to be eulogistic of the Presbyterianism of Central New York specially, and of Presbyterianism as a system of doctrine and order, generally. The binding, paper, and print are neat specimens of such parts of a material book, and compare favorably with a fair proportion of the issues from the presses of our larger cities.

I. Dr. Fowler's work is one of a kind which we always welcome. Of course, the welcome must be modified by considerations