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ART. I.—*The Doctrine of Perception, as held by Doctor Arnauld, Doctor Reid, and Sir William Hamilton.*

It is our purpose in this article to offer a monograph upon one of the most limited questions in psychology. But inasmuch as the interest of the discussion must turn very much upon a particular controversy, and even on the opinions of an individual, we think it advisable to place at the beginning all that we have to say of a historical nature, in order that no details of fact may be left to embarrass us in recording the series of philosophical determinations. Working in a somewhat unfrequented field, we hope to be able to show, that in regard to the true doctrine of Immediate Perception, the great Jansenist was not only a successful co-worker, but that he approached singularly near a solution of the problem.

It is not quite ten years since we asked the attention of our readers to a special article on the Family of ARNAULD.* Our purpose at that time was not so much philosophical as theological and religious. But the good and ascetic recluses of Port-Royal des Champs also entertained themselves in spare moments with questions of metaphysic; and one of these now concerns us.

Let memory be refreshed by the statement, that Descartes was born in 1596, and died in 1650; that Arnauld was born in

* Princeton Review, 1849, pp. 467—502.

1612, and died in 1694; and that Malebranche was born in 1638, and died in 1715. ANTONY ARNAULD, Doctor of the Sorbonne, was the scourge of Jesuitism. He was condemned by the Faculty of Theology in 1656. About the same time appeared the Provincial Letters, in several of which he assisted Pascal. The Jesuits denounced him as a Calvinist and a Huguenot. We have in another place recorded the eulogies uttered concerning him by both Racine and Boileau. The more masculine style of French writing had not yet passed away. It was no mean era, when, if we may use the words of M. Cousin, "Descartes shared the esteem of the public with Corneille and Condé; when Madame de Grignan studied his works with passionate vivacity; when Bossuet and Arnauld, Fénelon and Malebranche boldly declared themselves his disciples."* Two schools divide the seventeenth century, in regard to French literature; that of Louis XIII. and the Regency, represented by Corneille and Pascal, and that which was created by Louis XIV., and exemplified by Racine and Fénelon. One has a negligent greatness, the other a bewitching art. It is to the former of these that Arnauld belongs.

The earliest philosophical writing of Arnauld is a mere thesis, prepared in 1641, for one of his pupils at the College of Mans. His next attempt was a series of bold strictures upon the system of Descartes. These raised his reputation, even among the Cartesians; but he was soon drawn off into the hotter conflicts of theology. Before the persecutions which drove him from his native land in 1679, he lived at Port-Royal des Champs, in constant intercourse with Nicole, Sacy, and the Duke de Luynes, who translated the Meditations of Descartes. It was then that, in connection with Nicole, he produced the Port-Royal Logic, or *Art de Penser*, which still lives, and of which Crousaz says, that it contributed more than either the Organon of Bacon, or the *Methode* of Descartes, to improve the established modes of academical education on the Continent.† But our principal concern is with his attack upon the universally received doctrine of Ideas, as set forth by Malebranche.

* Mad. de Longueville, Paris, 1855, p. ix.

† Preface to Crousaz's Logic, Gen. 1724.

It is well known that Malebranche maintained the doctrine that we see all things in God, and subordinately to this, that the immediate object of our perception can be nothing but those representative entities which are called ideas. Arnauld, who was preëminently a theologian, came to this debate by a theological route. Malebranche had written a treatise on 'Nature and Grace'; the principles of which seemed to the Jansenist to impugn the grand foundations of the Augustinian system. It was while preparing to combat these errors, that, ten years after its first appearance, Arnauld set himself to examine the famous *Recherche de la Vérité*; and, being arrested by the portentous dogma of our seeing all things in God, he instituted labours which resulted in the work on *True and False Ideas*, which appeared in 1683.* Arnauld wrote on his copy of Malebranche these words: *Pulchra, nova, falsa*. He is said to have been stirred up to the controversy by Bossuet, who for some years threatened to engage in it personally; on hearing this, Malebranche said he would be proud of such an adversary. In this discussion every thing turns upon the question whether ideas have any separate existence. After settling this to his own satisfaction in the negative, he proceeds to the particular system of Malebranche, which he denominates "the most ill-contrived and unintelligible of all hypotheses." He shows that his opponent leaves altogether undetermined the important inquiry, what it is precisely that we see in God. At first, he seems to say, it is all things. A little further on, he excepts our notion of the mind itself acquired by a direct internal consciousness, and the knowledge of other minds which we derive from analogy. Presently he represents the divine ideas as representing to us only space, number, and the essences of things; afterwards all the works of God. Equally vague is Malebranche when he undertakes to explain the nature and mode of this imaginary vision. He seems at first to have believed that each individual object has its individual idea in the Divine Mind. But he afterwards adopted the opinion, that the different objects of the universe are represented all together in an *intelligible and infinite space* which God comprises,

* *Des Vraies et des Fausses Idées, etc.* Cologne, Nicolas Schouten, 1683. 12mo. pp. 338.

and in which the mind beholds them.* How little the matter is helped by this, will be apparent from a lively apologue of Arnauld, in which he reminds us of the greatest writers of his age.

“An excellent painter,” says he, “who had been well educated, and who was also skilled in sculpture, had so great a love for St. Augustine, that in a conversation with one of his friends he avowed to him that one of his most ardent wishes was to know how this great saint looked: ‘For you know,’ said he, ‘that we painters have a passionate desire to have to the life the countenances of those whom we love.’ The friend thought this a laudable curiosity, and promised to seek for some way of gratifying it. And so, either for diversion or with some other design, he had a great block of marble carried the next day into the studio of the painter, together with a large mass of the best wax, and a piece of canvas; for as to pencils and a palette of colours, he expected to find them there of course. The painter, very much surprised, asked what could be the intention of bringing all these things to his house. ‘It is,’ replied he, ‘that I may satisfy your wish to know the personal appearance of St. Augustine; in this way I put you in the way of knowing it.’ ‘And how so?’ asked the painter. ‘Why thus,’ answered the friend; ‘the exact countenance of the holy father is certainly in this block of marble, and also in this piece of wax. All that you have to do is to take away from around it what is superfluous; what remains will give you a head of St. Augustine to the very life, and you can easily transfer it to your canvas.’ ‘You are jesting with me,’ said the painter; ‘I admit that the exact image of St. Augustine is in this block of marble and this mass of wax, but so are the images of a thousand others. In cutting this marble then, or moulding this wax, how do you mean that the face which I shall hit upon shall be that of this saint, any more than of a thousand others, equally contained in the marble and the wax? And, even granting that by chance I should light on it—which indeed is morally impossible—I should be no nearer the mark; for not knowing how St. Augustine looked, I should never be able to tell whether I had found him or not. It is just so, also,

* Introduction of Jourdain, p. xxii.

with the face you would have me put upon this canvas. The means that you give me therefore, for knowing precisely how St. Augustine looked, is amusing indeed; because it presupposes that I know it already.'

"The friend seems to have had nothing to reply to this. But as our painter was a very inquisitive man, he asked if he owned Malebranche's *Inquiry after Truth*. He happened to have it, went to look for it, and put it into his friend's hands, who opening at page 547 resumed his discourse in the following terms: 'You seem astonished at the method which I give you for getting St. Augustine's face true to the life. I have done only what the author of this book does, in order to give us knowledge of material things, which he alleges we cannot know in themselves, but only in God; and the manner in which he says we know them in God, is by means of an *infinite intelligible extension* which God comprises. Now, I do not see that the method which he gives me of seeing in this extension a figure which I may only have heard named, but never known, differs at all from that which I have suggested to you in regard to St. Augustine. He says that as my mind can perceive one part of this intelligible extension which God comprises, it can perceive in God all figures, since every finite intelligible extension necessarily has an intelligible figure. And this is just what I have been telling you, that there is no face of man which may not be found in this block of marble, if only you cut it aright. But is it less necessary to know this figure (which I have supposed I could not know) in order to take a portion of intelligible extension, and circumscribe it by my mind as I must, in order that this figure should be its term, than as you most justly believe it is necessary to know the true face of St. Augustine, in order to the perception of it in this marble or this wax, where it is not less hidden than every figure in this intelligible extension?'"*

But it is not our intention to analyze the work. It was the rudest brush which the subtle and elegant Malebranche had encountered; and he replied with mingled loftiness and chagrin.† He urged that Arnauld's coming out in reply to a

* V. et F. *Idées*, p. 132—134.

† 'Réponse au livre Des vraies et des fausses Idées.'

book which had been before the public ten years could be accounted for only by his spite against the more recent work on Nature and Grace; and he charges on him the *odium theologicum* and a spirit of party; alleging that he had purposely singled out one of the most difficult and abstruse of scholastic questions, in order to bring his adversary into discredit with the vulgar. When he complained that the Jansenist doctor did not understand him, Boileau said, "Whom then, my father, do you expect to understand you?"* Malebranche passes slightly over Arnauld's heaviest arguments, and closes haughtily with these words: "If I have not given particular answers to all his reasonings, it is not because I have no reply, but because they deserved none." Such however was not the method of Doctor Arnauld, who in due time appeared against Malebranche in an answer of six hundred pages. The tone in this work, of which we have seen only a part, is said to be much more indignant than in the original strictures. Malebranche deemed it necessary to set himself right, in regard to intelligible extension, by which term he protested that he always understood knowledge of extension, without supposing in God any material element; but as to other points he declared that he was unwilling to spend his life in useless disputations.† The controversy broke out afresh, in a small way, some years later, on the occasion of Malebranche's striking at Arnauld in reviewing another writer. Arnauld, "nothing loath," appeared in four letters; Malebranche rejoined in two several publications; when the death of his great adversary seemed to close the warfare. It is painful however to be obliged to add, that five years after this event, Malebranche issued a pamphlet, on Prejudice, in which he attempts to prove that Arnauld could not have been really the author of the works which go under his name, if he possessed the ordinary qualities of uprightness for which his friends give him credit.‡

* Oeuvres de Malebranche, ed. Simon. Introd.

† 'Trois lettres du P. Malebranche touchant la Défense de M. Arnauld.'

‡ Introduction of M. Jourdain. The titles of these publications are, 'Quatre lettres de M. Arnauld au P. Malebranche sur deux de ses plus insoutenables opinions,' 1694.—'Lettres du P. Malebranche à M. Arnauld,' 1694. 'Réponse, par le P. Malebranche, à la troisième lettre de M. Arnauld,' 1699.—'Ecrit contre la Prévention,' 1699.

The casual relations of great men to each other are sometimes striking; as an instance, take the only interview which ever occurred between Malebranche and Berkeley. "The conversation turned on the non-existence of matter. Malebranche, who had an inflammation in his lungs, and whom Berkeley found preparing a medicine in his cell, and cooking it in a small pipkin, exerted his voice so violently in the heat of their dispute, that he increased his disorder, which carried him off in a few days after."*

Having thus despatched the historical part of our task, we proceed to consider the teachings of Arnauld in regard to the cardinal point of Perception, with or without ideas. And in this inquiry we shall derive our information chiefly from his own writings, and particularly from his treatise on *True and False Ideas*, mentioned above.

The ingenious account given by Arnauld of the manner in which philosophers came to admit the necessity of ideas as objects of perception is alluded to by Reid. Accustomed from childhood to believe that the presence of the object of sense is necessary in order to perception, and finding that they had knowledge of things not visible or tangible, they readily came to think that the mind sees such objects, not in themselves, but by means of certain images. The representative entities are called ideas; and it is to disprove the existence of these, which he denominates chimeras, that Arnauld lays out his strength in this controversy. It is our purpose to consider only those parts of it which bear upon the question of immediate perception.

The great Sorbonnist, a man of war from his youth, as indeed his opponent urges in more than one deprecatory passage, goes to work in all the forms, opening with certain definitions, which are altogether too important to be omitted, when our inquiry is into his precise standing as to this cardinal question.

The definitions of Arnauld are these:

"1. I call soul or mind the substance which thinks.

"2. To think, to know, to perceive, are one and the same thing.

* Biographia Britann. Art. Berkeley.

“3. I also take in the same sense the *idea* of an object and the *perception* of an object. I waive the question, whether there are other things which may be called ideas. But it is certain that there are ideas, taken in this sense, and that these ideas are either attributes or modifications of our mind.

“4. I say that an object is present to our mind when our mind perceives and knows it. I do not consider the question, whether there is any other presence of the object, previous to knowledge, and which is necessary that it may be in a state to be known. But it is certain that the manner in which I say that an object is present to the mind, when the mind knows it, is incontestable; being that which causes us to say of a person whom we love that he is often present to our minds, because we often think of him.

“5. I say that a thing is *objectively* present, in my mind when I conceive it. When I have conception of the sun, a square, a sound; the sun, the square and the sound are objectively in my mind, and this whether they are or are not external to my mind.

“6. I have said that I took for the same thing *perception* and *idea*. It must nevertheless be remarked, that this, though one, has a twofold relation: one to the mind which it modifies, the other to the thing perceived, so far as this is objectively in the mind; and further that the word *perception* more directly denotes the former relation, and the word *idea* the latter. Thus the *perception* of a square denotes more directly my mind as perceiving a square, and the *idea* of a square denotes more directly the square. So far forth as it is *objectively* in my mind. This remark is very important for the solving of many difficulties, arising solely from neglecting to consider that there are not two entities, but an identical modification of our mind, which involves essentially these two relations; since I cannot have a perception which is not at one and the same time the perception of my spirit as perceiving, and the perception of something as perceived; and since nothing can be objectively in my mind, (what I call *idea*) which my mind does not perceive.

“7. By *representative existences*, so far as I oppose them as superfluous, I design such only as are imagined to be really

distinct from ideas taken as perceptions; for I do not care to oppose every sort of representative existences or modalities; inasmuch as I maintain it to be clear to every one who reflects on what passes in his own mind, that all our perceptions are modalities essentially *representative*.

“8. When I say that our ideas and our perceptions (by which I mean the same thing) represent to us the things which we conceive, and are their images, it is in a sense quite different from that in which we say that pictures represent their originals, and are their images, or that words pronounced or written are images of our thoughts; for in regard to ideas the meaning is that the things which we conceive are *objectively* in our mind and thought. Now this *manner of being objectively in the mind* is so peculiar to mind and thought, as constituting their very nature, that the search would be vain for any thing similar in whatsoever is not mind and thought. And, as I have already remarked, it is this which has so much involved this matter of *ideas*, because the attempt has been made, by means of comparisons from corporeal things, to explain the manner in which objects are represented by our ideas, although in this respect there can be no true relation between bodies and minds.

“9. When I say that an *idea* is the same as a *perception*; I understand by perception every thing that my mind conceives, whether it be by the primary apprehension which it has of things, or by the judgments which it forms of them, or by what it discovers of them from reasoning. Thus, though there is an infinity of figures of which I know the nature by long reasonings, I nevertheless, having made these reasonings, have as veritable an idea of these figures as of a circle or a triangle, which I can conceive at once. And though perhaps it is only by reasoning that I am entirely assured that there truly exists an external earth, sun or stars, the idea which represents the earth, sun and stars as truly existing outside of my mind, deserves the name of idea no less than if I had acquired it without the aid of reasoning.

“10. There is still an ambiguity to be removed; namely, that we must not confound the *idea of an object*, with this same *object conceived*, unless we add, *so far as it is objectively in the*

mind; for *to be conceived*, in regard to the sun which is in the heavens is only an extrinsical denomination, which is nothing more than a relation to the perception which I have of it. Now this is not what we ought to understand when it is said that 'the idea of the sun is the sun itself so far as it is objectively in my mind'; and what we call being objectively in the mind is not merely being the object on which my thought terminates, but also being in my mind *intelligibly*, as it is customary for objects to be there; and the idea of the sun is 'the sun so far as he is in my mind,' not formally as he is in the heavens, but *objectively*, that is to say, after the manner in which objects are in our thoughts; a manner of being, which is far less perfect than that whereby the sun is really existing, but which nevertheless we cannot assert to be nothing or to have no need of a cause.

"11. If I should say that the mind does this or that, and that it has the faculty of doing this or that, I understand by the word *does* the perception which it has of objects, which is one of its modifications; nor do I give myself any trouble about the efficient cause of this modification, that is to say, whether God gives it to the mind, or the mind gives it to itself; for this does not concern the nature of ideas, but only their origin, which is a very different question.

"12. By *faculty* I mean the power which I certainly know that any thing spiritual or corporeal possesses, either of acting or suffering, or of existing in such or such a manner, in other words, of having such or such a modification.

"13. And since such *faculty* is certainly a property of the nature of the thing supposed, I then say, that it holds this of the Author of its nature, who can be no other than God."*

The axioms and postulates which follow have a mathematical formality usual in the scholastic encounters of that day. Arnauld then goes on to examine the locutions everywhere prevalent in the schools, that we do not see things immediately; that what we see is the ideas of the things; and that it is in the idea of any thing that we see its properties. It is in treat-

* Oeuvres philosophiques de Antoine Arnauld. Ed. Simon. Paris, 1843. pp. 51—54.

ing of this *ex professo* in his sixth chapter that he lays himself open to the strictures of Reid and Hamilton, by seeming to admit no less than his opponents, certain representative *manières d'être* distinguishable from both the real existence and the percipient act, with this peculiarity that these are not separate, intermediate entities, but modifications of the mind. We shall see that every thing turns upon the acceptance of this phrase, 'modification of the mind.'

Without rejecting, as perhaps he ought to have done, these consecrated expressions, he goes on to protest against their being taken to imply any thing like 'representative entities as distinguished from perceptions.' He then recalls the law, often neglected then and since, that 'our *thought* or *perception*,' a pregnant exgetical phrase, 'is essentially reflective upon itself,' or as the Latin has it more felicitously *est sui conscia*. "For," adds he, "I never think, without at the same time knowing that I think; I never have knowledge of a square, without knowing that I have such knowledge; I never see the sun (or to cut off all debate, I never imagine that I see the sun) without being certain that I so imagine. I may not be able, some time after, to remember that I had such or such a conception; but during the time of my conceiving it, I know that I conceive it."* This reflection he calls *virtual*, as distinguished from that turning of the mind to its own acts which he denominates *express*. The passage in which his language most vacillates, and where he seems too ready to use the terms of the other side, is this:

Now adding to this what we have said in the third, sixth, and seventh definitions, it follows that every perception is essentially representative of something, and being hence named *idea*, it cannot essentially be reflective on itself, without having for its immediate object this *idea*, that is to say, the *objective reality* of what my mind is said to perceive; so that if I think of the sun, the objective reality of the sun, present to my mind, is the immediate object of this perception; and the possible or existing sun, which is exterior to my mind, is, so to speak, its

* The acute observation of Hamilton is worthy of comparison here, not to the discredit of the great Frenchman.

mediate object. And thus, it will be perceived, that without having recourse to any *representative entities*, distinguished from perceptions, it is quite true in this sense, as well generally of all things as of those in particular which are material, that it is our ideas which we see *immediately*, and which are *the immediate object of our thought*; which however does not prevent its being likewise true that by means of these ideas we see the object which formally contains what is only *objectively* in the idea; for example, it is still true, that I conceive the formal essence of a square, which is *objectively* in the idea or perception which I have of the square."* In all this he clings to the phraseology of Descartes, whose words are: "Per realitatem objectivam ideæ intelligo entitatem rei repræsentatæ per ideam quatenus est in idea, eodemque modo dici potest *perfectio objectiva, artificium objectivum*, etc. Nam, quæcunque percipimus tanquam in idearum objectis, ea sunt in ipsis ideis objectivè." But in all these places, it is indispensable to remark the deflection of meaning which has since the scholastic age befallen the terms, 'subject,' 'object,' 'subjective,' 'objective;' so that in the writings of German philosophers the relation of the two is almost inverted; and we have come to take subject and object, respectively, as equivalent to the *Ich* and the *Nicht-ich*.

But the true acceptance of this definition is apparent from what Arnauld subjoins, namely, that what Descartes calls an idea "is not really distinguished from our thought or perception, but is our thought itself, so far as it contains *objectively* that which is in the object formally."

As our purpose is simply to report this great philosopher upon the one point of immediate perception, we shall, except so far as necessary to this end, omit any account of his ingenious and masterly demonstrations. These are five in number. The proposition which he first sets out to prove is this: Our mind has no need, in order to know material things, of certain *representative beings*, distinguished from perceptions, such as it is pretended are necessary to supply the absence of all that which cannot of itself be intimately united to our mind." In the second demonstration there is some pleasant raillery, quite

* Page 59, *op. cit.*

in the manner of his friend and fellow-sufferer Pascal, upon Malebranche's arguing for ideal entities, from this, that the mind could not leave the body, and go travelling into the heavenly spaces in order to see the sun: "It is all in vain for men to say that they see the sun; we have proved to them that they only dream, and that it is impossible they should see it. The argument would be conclusive; our mind can see only those objects which are present to it; this is indubitable. Now the sun is separated from our mind by more than thirty millions of leagues, according to M. Cassini; in order therefore to be visible, the mind must go to him, or he must go to the mind. Now you have no belief that your mind leaves your body in order to find the sun, nor that the sun leaves the heavens in order to unite himself intimately with your mind; you dote then when you say that you see the sun. But be not uneasy; we are going to extricate you from this embarrassment, and give you a means of seeing. Instead of the sun, who would not be likely to leave his place so often, which would be very troublesome, we have very ingeniously found out a certain *être représentatif*, which takes his place, and which shall make up for his absence by joining himself closely to our minds. And it is to this being representative of the sun (whatsoever it be, and whencesoever it came, for we are not agreed about this) that we have given the name of *idea* or species."*

Upon this extract, we beg leave to submit to the attentive and candid reader, whether the whole argument of Arnauld, thus veiled in fine irony, does not imply a seeing of the sun, as distinguished from seeing an idea of the sun. Great injustice would be done to this most acute writer, if we should transfer to the phenomenon of primary perception, those things which he predicates of our subsequent recalling of such perception; or, if we should forget his declaration, that our cognizance of the perception is necessary and simultaneous, and, as he calls it, *virtual*. The assertion of Malebranche and all the schools is that what I see, in a primary perception, is not the real, but the ideal, or intelligible sun; the assertion of Arnauld is, that what I see, in a primary perception, is the real sun, though by means of a mental change, or modification. "For," says he,

* *Op. cit.* pp. 71, 72.

“though I see immediately this *intelligible* sun by the virtual reflection which I make of my own perception, I do not stop at this, but this very perception, in which I see this *intelligible* sun, *makes me see at the same time the material sun which God has created.*”* We regard this as a key to the whole hypothesis of perception, held by Arnauld.

In Dr. Reid’s *Essays on the Intellectual Powers*, where he gives a historical statement concerning the theories of perception, there is an account of Arnauld’s speculations. We shall abridge some of Reid’s passages, though without otherwise altering his perspicuous language. “The most formidable antagonist Malebranche met with was in his own country,—Antony Arnauld, doctor of the Sorbonne, one of the acutest writers the Jansenists have to boast of, though that sect has produced many. Those who choose to see this system attacked on the one hand, and defended on the other, with subtilty of argument and elegance of expression, and on the part of Arnauld with much wit and humour, may find satisfaction by reading Malebranche’s *Inquiry after Truth*, Arnauld’s book of *True and False Ideas*, Malebranche’s *Defence*, and some subsequent replies and defences.” These are just remarks, and they are followed by an account of Arnauld’s scheme, then little known in Great Britain. It might have been expected that the Scotch philosopher should have bestowed high applause, and exulted in the utterance, a hundred years before his day, of a doctrine concerning perception which so closely approached his own, and which has given direction to all following systems in England and America. And he certainly says all that a very observant reader needs in order to make this inference; yet in such a way as to draw undue attention to some of Arnauld’s nomenclature, which savoured of a former system. “Arnauld,” says he, “has employed the whole of his sixth chapter to show that those ways of speaking, common among philosophers, to wit, ‘that we perceive not things immediately; that it is their ideas that are the immediate objects of our thoughts; that it is in the idea of every thing that we perceive its properties’; are not to be rejected, but are true when rightly understood. He labours to reconcile these expressions

* *Op. cit.* p. 92.

to his own definition of ideas, by observing, that every perception and every thought is necessarily conscious of itself and reflects upon itself; and that by this consciousness and reflection, it is its own immediate object. Whence he infers, that the idea—that is, the perception—is the immediate object of perception.”* We shall not interrupt our recital any further than to say, what the definitions above will substantiate, that this is a very insufficient and unguarded representation of Arnauld’s theory. Sir William Hamilton, in his annotations, to a certain extent confirms the censure of Reid. “Arnauld,” says he, “did not allow that perceptions and ideas are *really* or *numerically* distinguished,—i. e. as one thing from another thing; not even that they are *modally* distinguished, i. e. as a thing from its mode. He maintained that they are *really* identical, and only *rationaly* discriminated as viewed in different relations; the indivisible mental modification being called a *perception*, by reference to the mind or thinking subject,—an *idea*, by reference to the mediate object or thing thought.” We have given enough from Arnauld himself to show that it is only the latter half of this statement, which adequately represents him. He everywhere declares perception, thinking, cognizance and idea, to indicate one and the same function of the subject. Other judgments of Sir William are the following: “Arnauld’s was indeed the opinion which latterly prevailed in the Cartesian schools. Leibnitz, like Arnauld, regarded *ideas*, *notions*, *representations*, as mere modifications of the mind, (what by his disciples were called *material* ideas, like the cerebral ideas of Descartes, are out of the question,) and no cruder opinion than this has ever subsequently found a footing in any of the German systems.” And elsewhere: “Reid’s discontent with Arnauld’s opinion—an opinion which is stated with great perspicuity by its author—may be used as an argument to show that his own doctrine is, however ambiguous, that of intuitive or immediate perception. Arnauld’s theory is identical with the finer form of representative or mediate perception, and the difficulties of that doctrine were not overlooked by his great antagonist.” Stewart, with a more liberal construction of his author, says: “Anthony Arnauld farther held,

* Reid’s Essays, chap. v. § 5.

that 'Material things are perceived *immediately* by the mind, without the intervention of ideas.' In this respect his doctrine coincided exactly with that of Reid."*

The strictures of Reid and Hamilton have not escaped the notice of French metaphysicians, who have stood up for the honour of their countrymen. Among these we may cite M. Jourdain: "Notwithstanding the inexhaustible resources," says he, "of an argumentation always subtile and sometimes eloquent, Malebranche did not succeed in proving that between objects and the mind there are interposed any distinct images of our perceptions, and the contrary thesis was established by his antagonist with conclusive evidence; so that about a century before the publication of Thomas Reid's Inquiry, Arnauld had not only suspected, but developed, sustained and invincibly demonstrated the very theory which has caused the success and glory of the Scottish school. For what is it that the Scotch say, from Reid to Hamilton? That we take cognizance of bodies immediately and in themselves. And what ground do they take in support of this opinion? That in the fact of external perception, we have no consciousness, in addition to the very notion of material reality, of any intermediate notion which could have representative species for its object. Now both conclusion and argument belong to the *Traité des Idées*. Others have reproduced the analyses of the French philosopher, but without surpassing them, and his doctrine, perhaps clothed in less severe forms, has been on the whole quite faithfully exhibited. It is for this reason that we have never been able to comprehend how the leader of the Scottish school, with Arnauld's book under his eyes, could ever have written the following lines: 'Malebranche and Arnauld both professed the universally received doctrine, that we do not perceive material things immediately; that only the ideas of these are the immediate objects of our thoughts, and that it is in the idea of a thing that we perceive its properties.' And again: 'It would be wrong to conclude from the preceding remarks, that Arnauld denied without restriction the existence of ideas, and unreservedly adopted the opinion of the vulgar, which recognizes no object of perception but the external object. He

* Encyclopædia Britannica, vol. i. p. 80.

does not leave the beaten road at this point, and what he tears down with one hand, he builds up with the other. In these two passages," continues M. Jourdain, "Reid takes the reverse of truth. We do not question his good faith; but does not his own countryman Thomas Brown find reason to censure his grave errors in history, and his disposition to raise phantoms that he may have the pleasure of contending with them?" "It is just to say that M. Hamilton has relieved Reid from a part of the reproaches which Brown bestows on him in this regard."*

But something was needed more exact and searching than these assertions on one side and denials on the other; this is supposed to be afforded by Sir William Hamilton in that memorable article of the *Edinburgh Review* in which he gave the *coup de grace* to Brown. But there have prevailed such ignorance in some, and such indifference in others, in regard to Arnauld's opinions, that this abstruse passage in one of the subtlest writers of our day has perhaps awakened less attention in its original position than it will do in an extract. It will be remembered that he is there engaged upon the philosophy of perception, in treating of which he ascribes to Reid an error of omission in not discriminating intuitive from representative knowledge. In justifying this judgment, he begins by generalizing the possible forms, under which the hypothesis of a representative perception can be realized, and reduces these to three: "1. The representative object not a modification of mind. 2. The representative object a modification of mind, dependent for its apprehension, but not for its existence, on the act of consciousness. 3. The representative object a modification of mind, non-existent out of consciousness;—the idea and its perception only different relations of an act (state) really identical." The third of these will arrest attention, as that which applies to Arnauld. The passage which relates particularly to this point is too curious and instructive to be omitted here. "In regard to ARNAULD," says Sir William, "the question is not, as in relation to the others, whether Reid conceives him to maintain a form of the ideal theory, which he

* *Logique de Port Royal*, Ed. Jourdain, Paris, 1846, pp. xxx. sqq.

rejects, but whether *Reid admits Arnauld's opinion on perception and his own to be identical*. 'To these authors,' says Dr. Brown, 'whose opinions on the subject of perception Dr. Reid has misconceived, I may add one, whom *even he himself allows to have shaken off the ideal system*, and to have considered the idea and the perception as not distinct but the same, a modification of the mind and nothing more. I allude to the celebrated Jansenist writer, Arnauld, who maintains *this doctrine as expressly as Dr. Reid himself*, and makes it the foundation of his argument in his controversy with Malebranche.' (Lecture xxvii. p. 173.) If this statement be not untrue, then is Dr. Brown's interpretation of Reid himself correct. A representative perception, under its *third* and simplest modification, is held by Arnauld as by Brown; and his exposition is so clear and articulate, that all essential misconception of his doctrine is precluded. In these circumstances, if Reid avows the identity of Arnauld's opinion and his own, this avowal is tantamount to a declaration that his peculiar doctrine of perception is a scheme of representation; whereas, on the contrary, if he signalize the contrast of their two opinions, he clearly evinces the radical antithesis—and his sense of the radical antithesis—of the doctrine of *intuition*, to every, even the simplest form of the hypothesis of *representation*. And this last he does.

"It cannot be maintained, that Reid admits a philosopher to hold an opinion convertible with his, whom he states:—'To profess the doctrine, *universally received*, that *we perceive not material things immediately—that it is their ideas which are the immediate objects of our thoughts—and that it is in the idea of every thing that we perceive its properties*.' This fundamental contrast being established, we may safely allow, that the radical misconception, which caused Reid to overlook the difference of our presentative and representative faculties, caused him likewise to believe, that Arnauld had attempted to unite two contradictory theories of perception. Not aware, that it was possible to maintain a doctrine of perception, in which the idea was not really distinguished from its cognition, and yet to hold that the mind had no immediate knowledge of external things: Reid supposes, in the *first* place, that Arnauld,

in rejecting the hypothesis of ideas as representative entities really distinct from the contemplative act of perception, coincided with himself in viewing the material reality as the immediate object of that act; and, in the *second*, that Arnauld again deserted that opinion, when, with the philosophers, he maintained that the idea or act of the mind representing the external reality, and not the external reality itself, was the immediate object of perception. But Arnauld's theory is one and indivisible; and, as such, no part of it is identical with Reid's. Reid's confusion, here and elsewhere, is explained by the circumstance, that he had never speculatively conceived the possibility of the simplest modification of the representative hypothesis. He saw no medium between rejecting ideas as something different from thought, and the doctrine of an immediate knowledge of the material object. Neither does Arnauld, as Reid supposes, ever assert against Malebranche, 'that we perceive external things immediately,' that is, in themselves. Maintaining *that all our perceptions are modifications essentially representative*, Arnauld every where avows, that he denies ideas, *only as existences distinct from the act itself of perception.*"

"Reid was therefore wrong, and did Arnauld less than justice, in viewing his theory 'as a weak attempt to reconcile two inconsistent doctrines;' and he was wrong, and did Arnauld more than justice, in supposing that one of these doctrines is not incompatible with his own. The detection, however, of this error only tends to manifest more clearly, how just, even when under its influence, was Reid's appreciation of the contrast subsisting between his own and Arnauld's opinion, considered *as a whole*; and exposes more glaringly Brown's general misconception of Reid's philosophy, and his present gross misrepresentation, in affirming that the doctrines of the two philosophers were identical, and by Reid admitted to be the same."*

We have been induced to give this long extract, not only from our reverence for Hamilton, and our admiration of the characteristic acumen evinced by this particular criticism, but

* Edinburgh Review, Oct. 1830. The italics are the author's.

because it affords us a fit occasion to hazard a few explanatory remarks upon the nomenclature of Descartes and his immediate successors. It is observed by Hamilton himself that Descartes, Malebranche, Arnauld, Locke, and philosophers in general before Reid, employ the term *Perception* as co-extensive with *Consciousness*. It hence appears the more readily how any thing before the mind, or in its consciousness, came to be denominated a modification of the mind. This must be carefully regarded, lest we judge Arnauld too harshly. A statement in the history of philosophy which, though negative, is equally important, is that the writers of that day rarely predicated activity of the mind's contemplative perceptions; so that we do not find certain phrases which meet us on every page of modern works, such as 'the active powers,' 'the operations of the mind,' or its 'acts' or 'activities.' The question was thus left open, whether the subject or the object be active, or whether the action be reciprocal. And hence the class of phrases came to be, often harshly, substituted, which have given occasion to most of this controversy. Among these none is more common than 'modification of the mind.' If any one is tempted to ask, 'Why did not Arnauld cut off all debate, by declaring outright, that between the *percipient act* and the *real object*, there is nothing interposed?' we can only reply that such was not the way of speaking in that day, and that this would have presupposed the exactness, not merely of Reid, but of Hamilton. The writer last named has well said, in his notes to Reid, that "*modes or modifications of mind*, in the Cartesian school, mean merely what some recent philosophers express by *states of mind*, and include both the *active* and *passive* phenomena of the conscious subject." This is deserving of special note. Where we should speak of an act, an exercise, an operation of the mind, they, in the spirit of their vaunted philosophical skepticism spoke of the *môde*, modality or modification of the mind, often expressed by the mind's *manière d'être*; and this included perception, thought, feeling and volition.* To take a single instance out of many, from Arnauld's rejoinder: "When a thing or a substance, remaining substantially the same, is sometimes after

* See Malebranche, *Recherche de la Verité*; l. iij. p. ii. chap. 1.

one manner and sometimes after another, we call that which determines it to be after one manner, rather than another, *manière d'être*, modality, or modification; for these three terms signify one and the same thing. This will be better comprehended by an example. I have a bit of wax in my hand, which I make sometimes round, sometimes square, or of any other shape: now though this bit of wax remains still the same bit of wax, I call its being round, being square, or being of any other shape, a *manière d'être*, a modality, or a modification of this bit of wax. Now my mind remaining the same thinks sometimes of a number; at other times of a square, or of its own body, or of God. It follows, that this thinking of a number, a square, one's own body, or God, are so many modes of being, modalities, or modifications of the mind. To think of a number or a square, to take notice of a number or a square, to have perception of a number or a square, are all one and the same thing, differently expressed. Since then to think of a number or a square is a modification of our mind, it clearly follows that perception of a number or a square is also a modification of our mind; and consequently, no one can doubt of my first position, namely, that all our perceptions, as is the perception of a number or a square, are modifications of our mind." And he adds: "When I think of a square, my mind is modified by this thought, and *the square is the object of that modification of my mind which is the thought of a square.*"*

This is certainly a nearer approach to the doctrine of Reid, Hamilton and Mansell, than can be found in any writer of the seventeenth century; an approach which, in spite of unsteady language, will appear still more striking, when we examine certain other modes of expression occurring in these works. We have seen how much importance the incomparable Scottish critic attributes to the distinction between presentative and representative perception, and how he connects with the latter his most serious charge against Arnauld. Is there not a possibility that we may urge too far inferences from the term *representation*, and thus fix upon the word as used in French a signification more distinct than it ought to bear. *Representa-*

* Defense, pp. 412, 413.

tive, as applied to perceptions, is ambiguous. It may mean first, that it puts the object before the mind, or secondly that it is vicarious of the object; in other words, a perception may be declared to objectify external nature in reference to the thinking subject, or it may further and more questionably be declared to be a modality which stands in the room of the external object before the mind. It is a question whether by representative modality Arnauld means more than what the Germans denote by *Vorstellung*; a term the most general of all those which indicate the presence of any thing in consciousness; and which is put as well for the *Act des Vorstellens*, as for *das Vorgestellte selbst*. Let us observe Arnauld's use of the term. Malebranche denied that "the perceptions which our minds have of objects are essentially representative of those objects."* In his view perception had no objectifying virtue, and required an intermediate entity or idea. He further charged, that according to Arnauld, *we do not see bodies, but only ourselves*. "Can any one imagine me to teach," replies Arnauld, "that we do not see bodies, and that we see ourselves only, or that we see only the modalities of the mind, when I actually teach that these modalities of our mind, that is the perceptions which we have of bodies, are essentially *representative of bodies*; [which he now expounds thus] that it is these *whereby our mind perceives bodies*; that they are the formal cause which makes our mind perceive bodies, knowing at the same time that it perceives them, because it is the property of the intelligent being to be *conscia suæ operationis*."† This representation, however awkward the term may be, agrees with the definition of the schoolmen: *Conceptus sunt signa formalia rerum*. And this presentation is distinguished from proper representation, in the following passage from a writer whom he does not name: "Siquidem ideæ rerum formaliter sunt earum perceptiones, nec per intuitum ab idea diversum res ut in hac expressa videtur, sed per imaginem, seu ideam, *formaliter res ipsa percipitur*: quamvis idea reflexè cognosci, et ita *perceptionis perceptio* dari possit."‡

Immediate perception of the external object is not asserted

* Defense, p. 409.

† *Op. cit.* p. 421.

‡ *Op. cit.* 415.

by Arnauld, in that unembarrassed and unequivocal manner which satisfies Hamilton; but neither is it so asserted by Reid; for Hamilton speaks of "the vacillating doctrine of perception held by Reid himself." Let us however give the great Sorbonnist all the credit of an approximation, which remained unique, until the days of Reid.* Let the following remarkable passage be considered, which relates to the dictum that when I look at the sun, it is the intelligible, and not the real sun, which I perceive: "As we may say that whatsoever is in our mind objectively is there *intelligibly*, we may in the same sense say that what I see *immediately*, when I turn my eyes towards the sun, is the *sol intelligibilis*, provided we intend by this no more than my idea of the sun, *which is not at all distinguished from my perception*, and if we are careful not to add, that I see nothing but the intelligible sun; for though I see immediately this *intelligible* sun by the virtual reflection which I have of my perception, I do not stop at this; but this same perception, in which I see the intelligible sun, *makes me at the same time see the material sun which God created.*"†

The incidental statement, in one of these extracts, that consciousness accompanies mental acts, brings to our remembrance Sir William Hamilton's arch remark, that the Greeks were happy in not having the term; and also his discontent with Reid, for "discriminating consciousness as a special faculty." Arnauld, as a quasi Cartesian, could not deviate on that side. As we have quoted before, "It is the property of the intelligent being, to be *conscia suæ operationis*." And more fully: "There is reason to believe that in creating the human soul God gave it the idea of itself, and that it is perhaps this thought of itself which constitutes its essence; for, as I have said elsewhere, nothing seems more essential to mind than that consciousness, or internal sentiment of itself, which the Latins more felicitously call *esse sui consciam*."‡ Amidst all the infelicities of nomenclature which Arnauld borrowed from the reigning school, he sometimes expresses himself in such a way as to fix in us the belief, that when he speaks of the modifica-

* Buffier.

† *Vraies et Fausses Idées*, p. 92; partly quoted *antea*.‡ *V. et F. Idées*, p. 246.

tion of mind called Perception as in any sense itself the object of thought, he means little more than that we are conscious of the perceiving act. This opinion, which we express with hesitation, derives colour from the following passage: "—Whatever it be that I know—I *know that I know*, by a certain *virtual reflection* which accompanies all my thoughts—I therefore know myself in knowing all other things. And in fact, it is herein principally, as it seems to me, that we have to distinguish intelligent beings from those which are not such, that the former *sunt conscia sui et suæ operationis*, and the latter are not."*

After this tedious investigation, we beg leave to sum up the result in a series of particulars. We seem to have discovered, then,

1. That, according to Arnauld, there are no representative entities, distinct from the external thing, such as are called ideas.

2. That he held the only ideas of external objects to be our perceptions of them.

3. That then, as against the prevalent tenet of the schools, Arnauld is an assertor of the great truth now universally believed.

4. That in Arnauld's opinion the mind takes cognizance of every perception, at the instant of its occurrence; and this by the very constitution of its nature.

5. That Arnauld considers the mind's perception to have for its direct object the external reality; but that this perception is itself at the same time the object of cognition, by what we should now call Consciousness, but what he calls Virtual Reflection.

6. That the language of Arnauld, if strictly interpreted, often does injustice to his opinion, causing him to appear more remote from the truth than he really is; and that this is especially true in regard to his constantly calling Perception a modification, and not an act, of the mind.

7. That, omitting lesser points in which they differ, there is remarkable consent between the three great masters, Arnauld, Reid and Hamilton.

* V. et F. *Idées*, p. 34.

8. That if to Hamilton belongs the honour of having given philosophical precision and completeness to the true doctrine of Perception, the praise is no less due to Arnauld of having first given it enunciation.

Having thus put it within the power of the reader to judge from Arnauld's own statements what was his doctrine as to sensible perception, and how far he deserves to be named among the precursors of Reid and Hamilton, we desire to spend a short time in examining the subsequent progress of analysis in this direction, and the bearing of certain fundamental discoveries upon the progress of philosophy in general.

The unpopularity of the religious party to which Arnauld belonged forbade his being frequently named in high circles as an authority, even when his reasonings were producing their effect upon certain leading minds. He was a Jansenist, indeed he was their theological champion; and hence Buffier, while borrowing his opinions, allows jesuitical prejudice to betray him into condemnation "with faint praise." To Buffier is ascribed by Stewart* the earliest exact enunciation of a distinction which he then quotes in the very words of Arnauld.† "It affords," says Stewart himself, "a remarkable illustration of the force of prejudice, that Buffier, a learned and most able Jesuit, should have been so far influenced by the hatred of his order to the Jansenists, as to distinguish the *Port-Royal Logic* with the cold approbation of being 'a judicious compilation from former works on the same subject.'"‡ Doctor Reid was therefore warranted in citing Arnauld, to the neglect of the other, though it is matter of record that Buffier was translated for the very purpose of annoying Reid, and was thus brought into undue prominence before the British public. His work on *First Truths* is of high value, as a real contribution to the great question of our age. Voltaire was not wrong in declaring him to be the only Jesuit who ever put a reasonable philosophy into his works. How indistinct have been the views of French writers generally upon the connection of the several great masters, may be seen in the remark of Professor Bouillier of

* Elements, Note to Part I. chap. iv. § 2.

† See Hamilton's Notes to Reid, chap. v.

‡ First Preliminary Dissertation, p. 81.

Lyons, upon the passage indicated above as borrowed from Arnauld: "Most scholastic philosophers, and even the Cartesians, had considered ideas as something intermediate between the mind which knows and the object known. Locke fell into the same error. Reid claims it as his principal merit, to have refuted this theory, and shown that ideas are nothing distinguishable from the knowing mind. Father Buffier had already acquired this merit, by defining ideas to be simple modifications of the mind. How is it then that Reid does not cite him along with Arnauld among philosophers who before himself attacked the legitimacy of what is called the ideal theory?"* This question has been already answered.

The services of Reid, in applying the principles of Bacon to the phenomena of thought, are only beginning to be esteemed at their due value. Omitting intermediate names, we would mark the great points of advancement by those of ARNAULD, REID and HAMILTON. The moments of Reid's discovery have not been noted in a more masterly manner by any than by Samuel Tyler, LL.D., in his *Discourse on the Baconian Philosophy*; in which he shows that his merit resides in his having made it clear, that, from his very constitution, man cannot but believe in the reality of whatever is clearly attested by the senses; as well as whatever is distinctly remembered;—that, further, he cannot but believe that like causes will produce like effects, and that the future will be as the past.† And in another treatise the same acute and perspicuous philosopher, in regard to our topic of Perception, has expressed the relation of Hamilton to Reid in terms equally comprehensive and exact. "In the act of sensible perception," says Dr. Tyler, "we are, equally and at the same time, and in the same indivisible act of consciousness, cognizant of ourselves as a perceiving subject and of an external reality as the object perceived, which are apprehended as a synthesis inseparable in the cognition, but contrasted to each other in the concept as two distinct existences. All this is incontestably the deliverance of consciousness in the act of sensible perception. This all

* *Oeuvres de Buffier*, ed. 1843, p. 187.

† *Discourse of the Baconian Philosophy*. By Samuel Tyler, LL.D., pp. 261, ff.

philosophers without exception admit as a *fact*. But then all, until Reid, deny the *truth* of the deliverance. They maintain that we only perceive representations within ourselves, and by a perpetual illusion we mistake these representations for the external realities. And Reid did not fully extricate himself from the trammels of this opinion. For while he repudiated the notion, that we perceive representations distinct from the mind though within the mind, he fell into the error, that we are only conscious of certain changes in ourselves which suggest the external reality. But Sir William Hamilton has, by the most masterly subtlety of analysis, incontestably shown, that we are directly conscious of the external objects themselves, according to the belief universal in the common sense of mankind." With our ample citations before him, the reader will judge whether Arnauld is very far behind Reid, in their common inferiority to Hamilton.

Although at the present time no great constructive genius is making himself felt in shaping the opinions of the philosophical world, there are tendencies propagated by past investigations, which awaken hope of something more healthful. Instead of the leaning towards skeptical idealism, we observe everywhere an increasing disposition to settle upon those conclusions of which mankind, even in its unlettered portions, has had a catholic faith. Such is the manifest bearing of all inquiries like those of Reid and Hamilton. Such is the significance likewise of all those studies which have to do with truths of intuition. There is thus opened a prospect into a wide field of inquiry as to those cognitions which are universal, immediate and necessary; a description which will include not merely our knowledge of the external world, but all such knowledge as is primary and underived from ratiocination, or any other intermediate process. The degree of limitation given to this field of immediate knowledge will always go far towards defining the ground of any philosopher or school. While the adventurous skepticism of the seventeenth century narrowed first-truths to the very smallest number, the equally adventurous rationalism of the nineteenth has led the German schools, even when disagreeing on other points, to enlarge the scope of Reason, in its higher designation. Philological causes, themselves consequent

on original peculiarities of notion, sometimes in turn react powerfully upon psychology. To this we have often been disposed to ascribe the tenacity with which all sects of thinking in Germany cling to the radical distinction between Understanding and Reason. These terms do not bring up to the English mind the same associations which a German has with *Verstand* and *Vernunft*. For example, the latter of these words has no kindred with trains of ratiocination, as has the English verb *to reason*. Reason, in the recent philosophy, imports the highest, deepest, widest intuition. Just at this point of certainty, immediateness, and necessity, this connects itself with all other kinds of knowledge which are founded on neither experience nor reasoning. There can be little question, we think, that Coleridge, in the *Biographia*, the 'Friend,' and the 'Aids to Reflection,' first drew the English and American mind to consider this distinction; the acceptance or rejection of which, as the grand basis of philosophy, serves to mark the line between the two conflicting hosts. Well do we remember the zeal and enthusiasm with which, many years ago, we heard Mr. Marsh, afterwards President Marsh, of Vermont, expound and vindicate these views, then so novel. Coleridge, following Jacobi and Hermskerhuis, defined Reason as "an organ bearing the same relation to spiritual objects, the Universal, the Eternal, and the Necessary, as the eye bears to material and contingent phenomena."* This falls in well with our collation of Perception, with Intuition, whether narrowly or widely taken.

The relation of truth to mind is sublime, and is indicated by the scriptural figure of Light. In the last resort, all our knowledge must be immediate; for any truth clearly presented to an intelligent mind is self-evident; no foreign evidence is required. Suppose the given truth is not clearly before the mind; it may be so presented by ratiocination, that is, by the suggestion of intermediate propositions; but when once so presented it shines by its own light. At this point, therefore, our cognizance of the truth is *immediate*, and herein differs nothing from intuition or from sensible perception. In other words, (as we were taught by the wisest of our masters in youth,) the evidence

* Aids to Reflection, ed. Marsh, p. 308.

of all truth, when clearly presented to the judgment, is in itself, and the use of proof or foreign evidence is to bring it fairly before the mind. To a mind capable of comprehending a truth in all its relations, that truth must be self-evident; and therefore to the Supreme Reason all truths are self-evident. There are certain principles however which neither require nor brook the allegation of proof. These fall within the range of immediate vision. The wholesome tendency of these simple doctrines is to encourage our constitutional confidence in our own faculties. We may conceive of a being so constituted that his faculties should uniformly deceive him; but, by the very hypothesis, such a being could never detect the flaw in his own constitution; and nothing can be conceived more unreasonable than the existence of such a being. Before we erect into a new faculty that energy of the mind which accepts truth instantaneously and necessarily, we must consider well whether its actings in view of truth are not identical with those which terminate our trains of ratiocination. What is reasoning, but a distinct noticing of the relations which subsist between certain truths? Of certain truths our knowledge is immediate; we believe them as soon as they are presented to the mind. But there are other truths, which seem not clearly such, until viewed in connection with truths already known; but which, thus viewed, shine by their own light no less than the others. The only difference between the intuitive and the ratiocinative judgment is, that in the one we perceive a truth at once, and in the other we do not perceive it till other truths are presented; when this is done, the determination is as direct and necessary as the other.

The same may be made apparent in the logical process. In any valid syllogism, the major and minor being admitted, the conclusion follows, and that instanter. Nothing can be interposed, or conceived to be interposed. Only let the terms be comprehended, and the formula be just as to mood and figure, and the conclusion is immediate and inevitable. There is no distinction appreciable at this point between ratiocinative judgment and intuition. Suppose, after having gone thus far, you should be challenged to make the case plainer, and to show why you so concluded; it would be impossible for you to reply

in any but one of these two ways, either to make the terms more intelligible, or to justify the logical process. But this last is not different from a bare re-assertion of this apodeictic judgment of the understanding—may we not say, the Reason? Hence my assent to the conclusion of a syllogism is as immediate, nay, when thus insulated, as unreasoning, as my acquiescence in the external reality of a material world. We are not quite sure that this was in the mind of Kant, when he wrote thus, in his section on ‘Pure Reason as the Seat of the Transcendental Illusory Appearance:’ “In every syllogism I first cogitate a *rule* (*the major*) by means of the *understanding*. In the next place I subsume a cognition under the condition of the rule (and this is the *minor*) by means of the *judgment*. And finally, I determine my cognition by means of the predicate of the rule (this is *conclusio*), consequently I determine it *a priori* by means of the *reason*.”* The point to be observed is, how remarkably an extended inquiry into the law of cognition, reduces the varieties of knowing and strengthens the confidence which we repose in our own faculties. Inasmuch as all trains of ratiocination may be arrayed and verified in the shape of syllogisms, it follows that all the conclusive determinations of reasoning are equally immediate and necessary as the assertions of consciousness. Neither Intuitive nor Ratiocinative Reason (*sit venia verbo*) can vaunt, one against the other. The immediateness and absolute necessity of successive determinations in reasoning go to reduce them to the same condition with pure intuitions. That is to say, in the ultimate tribunal, when the judgment, as by a flash, gives forth decree, the probative force of argumentation results from a clear, instant, unavoidable, assertory conclusion: the premises being so and so—the conclusion is so and so—immediately and irresistibly. And we crave to know, why (as Kant seems to admit) this is not a determination of Reason; in which case, one of the chief grounds of distinction between the Understanding and the Reason is taken away.

* Kant's Critique of Pure Reason; Meiklejohn's transl., p. 215.