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ART. I.—*Life of Joseph Brant Thayendanega: including the Border Wars of the American Revolution, and Sketches of the Indian Campaigns of Generals Harmer, St. Clair, and Wayne, and other matters connected with the Indian Relations of the United States and Great Britain, from the Peace of 1783 to the Indian Peace of 1795.* By William L. Stone. 2 vols. 8vo. Dearborn: New York. 1838. *Archibald Stevenson*

IT was a matter of surprise to us, at first, to find two ponderous volumes occupied with the life of an Indian chief; but upon perusal, we found that the hero of the history takes up a small space in the body of the work. He is, it is true, a prominent actor in the transactions recorded in these volumes; but if they contained nothing more than the events in which Joseph Brant was personally concerned, they would be of small value compared with that which they intrinsically possess. The fact is, that the American public are indebted to Col. Stone, for an entirely new history of the war of the revolution. This history is not only new as being composed in a lively style, and as containing much graphic description of interesting scenes by an original writer; but by means of new sources of information, and authentic documents, not possessed by any former historian, the author has presented

accompanying every effort with unceasing prayer with them, and for them, that the Holy Spirit may accompany and crown with success all the means employed for their benefit.

Such must be among the means unceasingly employed, if we wish our church to be built up in knowledge, in purity and in peace; if we wish harmony and orthodoxy to reign in all our borders; if we desire our children to take the place of their fathers when we are sleeping in the dust, and to bear forward the ark of God to victory and glory in the future contests with error and sin, when we shall have resigned to them our armour. He who expects the church to gain such blessings without the use of such means, may just as well hope to "gather grapes of thorns, or figs of thistles." Without the faithful use of such means, if the church were to-day perfectly pure and united, we might expect to find her, in a few years, torn by divisions, forsaken of her children, and her best interests given to the winds.

*J. W. Alexander & Prop. 1838*

- ART. III.—1. *Elements of Psychology, included in a Critical Examination of Locke's Essay on the Human Understanding, with Additional Pieces.* By Victor Cousin, Peer of France, Member of the Royal Council of Public Instruction, Member of the Institute, and Professor of the History of Ancient Philosophy in the Faculty of Literature. Translated from the French, with an Introduction and Notes, by the Rev. C. S. Henry, D.D. Second Edition, prepared for the use of Colleges. New York: Gould and Newman. 1838. pp. 423. 12mo.
2. *Introduction to the History of Philosophy.* By Victor Cousin, Professor of Philosophy of the Faculty of Literature at Paris. Translated from the French, by Henning Gottfried Linberg. Boston. 1832. pp. 458. 8vo.
3. *An Address delivered before the Senior Class in Divinity College, Cambridge, Sunday, 15th July, 1838.* By Ralph Waldo Emerson. Boston. pp. 31. 8vo.

It is we think undeniable, that since the death of Doctor Thomas Brown of Edinburgh, metaphysical research has been at a stand in Great Britain. In the southern part of the island this had been the case for a much longer period, but the sharp and sceptical enterprise of the Scotch kept

*part reviewing Cousin belongs to Prof. Dod*

philosophical debate in motion for a time, so that a sect was formed, and we speak as familiarly of the Scotch school as we do of the Pythagorean or the Eleatic. But that line seems to have reached its term, and the few who publish at this time are either the lowliest compilers from Stewart and Brown, or, as is more frequently the case, such as have gone off in a direction altogether different, in search of a profounder philosophy. Of the latter sort, there are some among ourselves, and we have it now in view to point out some of the causes which may account for the essays to introduce a modified transcendentalism.

In America, the earliest school of metaphysics was founded by the followers of Locke; and with the clew of this great inquirer in his hand, Jonathan Edwards ventured into a labyrinth from which no English theologian had ever come out safe. By the just influence of his eminently patient, and discriminating, and conclusive research, this greatest of modern Christian metaphysicians put his contemporaries and their descendants upon a sort of discourse which will perhaps characterise New England Calvinism as long as there is a fibre of it left. In speaking of Edwards, we distinctly avow our conviction that he stands immeasurably above many who have followed in his steps, and attempted his methods. If the species of reasoning which he introduced into American theology is susceptible of easy abuse, and if, in fact, it has been abused to disastrous ends, we rejoice to acquit this great and holy man of willingly giving origin to the evil. And in what we shall cursorily remark concerning New England theology, we explicitly premise that we do not intend our Congregational brethren indiscriminately, but a defined portion of them, well known for many years as daring speculators. The theology of this school has always been, in a high degree, metaphysical; but the metaphysics is of a Hyperborean sort, exceedingly cold and fruitless. In the conduct of a feeble or even an ordinary mind, the wire-drawing processes of New England theologizing become jejune and revolting. Taught to consider mere ratiocination as the grand, and almost sole function of the human mind, the school-boy, the youth, and the professor, pen in hand, go on, day after day, in spinning out a thread of attenuated reasoning, often ingenious, and sometimes legitimately deduced, but in a majority of instances a concatenation of unimportant propositions. It has too often been forgotten by the disciples of this school, that a man may search in useless mines, and

that it is not every thing which is worth being proved. Hence the barrenness and frigidity of the sermons which were heard from the pulpits of New England during the latter half of the last century. Many of these and many of the dissertations and treatises which poured from the press were proofs of remarkable subtilty, and patience of investigation, and showed how easy it is to draw forth an endless line from the stores of a single mind. For, in this operation, it was remarkable, that the preacher or philosopher relied almost exclusively on his own stores. There was little continued unfolding of scriptural argument, and little citation of the great reasonings of ancient or modern philosophy. Each metaphysician spun by himself and from his own bowels. The web of philosophical argument was dashed with no strong woof from natural science, embroidered with no flowers of literature. Where this metaphysics was plied by a strong hand, as was that of President Edwards, it was noble indeed; deriving strength and honour from its very independence and self-sufficiency. In the hands of his son Dr. Edwards, there was equal patience, equal exactness, equal subtilty, but no new results: still there were undeniable marks of genius; as there were also in the controversy which then began to be waged among the dwindled progeny of the giants, on the great questions of liberty and necessity, moral agency, and the nature of virtue.

But when the same products were sought in a colder climate, and from the hands of common and unrefined men; when every schoolmaster or parish clergyman found himself under a necessity of arguing upon the nature of the soul, the nature of virtue, and the nature of agency; when with some this became the great matter of education, to the neglect of all science and beautiful letters, then the consequences were disastrous; and a winter reigned in the theology of the land, second only to that of the scholastic age, and like that dispersed only by the return of the sun of vital religion.

In the hands of a subtile errorist, such as Emmons, these metaphysical researches led to gross absurdities, some of which still survive. We believe a few of the elder and less sophisticated preachers of New England are to this day teaching, and that their staring auditors are to this day trying to believe, that the soul is a series of exercises; that God is the author of sin; and that, in order to escape damnation, one must be willing to be damned. Others, running away with an error less innocent because lying nearer the source of

moral reasoning, and less alarming in its guise, reasoned themselves and their hearers into the opinion, that all sin is selfishness, and that all holiness is the love of being in general. Taking the premises of the great Edwards, they deduced a system of false theology, which under its first phase as Hopkinsianism, and under its second phase as Taylorism, has been to our church the *fons et origo malorum*, and which, in union with the Epicureanism of the Paley school, has assumed the name of Calvinism to betray it to its enemies.

It is only great wisdom which can avoid one extreme without rushing to the other. The golden mean, so much ridiculed by zealots, is precisely that which imbecility could never maintain. In philosophy, as well as in common life and religion, we find individuals and bodies of men acting on the fallacy that the reverse of wrong, as such, is right. Human nature could not be expected to endure such a metaphysics as that of New England. It was not merely that it was false, and that it set itself up against our consciousness and our constitutional principle of self-love; but it was cheerless, it was arctic, it was intolerable: a man might as well carry frozen mercury in his bosom, as this in his soul. In a word, it had nothing cordial in it, and it left the heart in collapse. If it had remained in the cells of speculative adepts it might have been tolerated; but it was carried to the sacred desk, and doled forth to a hungry people under the species of bread and wine. No wonder nature revolted against such a dynasty. No wonder that, in disgust at such a pabulum, men cast about for a substitute, and sought it in tame Arminianism or genteel Deism.

The calculating people of our country, in certain portions of it, have long been enamoured of a system of ethics which is reducible to the rules of Loss and Gain. It is much more level to the apprehensions of such to say that two and two make four, or that prodigality makes poor, or that doing good makes profit, or that gain is godliness, or that virtue is utility, than to plead for an imperative law of conscience, or for an eternal distinction between right and wrong. The former systems came home to the business and bosoms of the calculator. Though he had learned to speak evil of Epicurus, yet he clasped Paley to his bosom; and as all men admitted that this philosopher and divine was a mighty reasoner, and a fascinating writer, so the calculator went further, and adopted his ethical heresy as the basis of all morals. Some, who could not take the system in its gross form, re-

ceived it under that modification, which appears in the theology of President Dwight. Long, therefore, before the mask was completely cast away by Bentham, Mill, and the Utilitarians of England, there were hundreds of young men who had imbibed the quintessence of the poison, through their college text-books, or through the introduction of the same principles into the received authorities of law-schools and courts of justice. We think it possible to show, that the prevalence of this degrading view of the nature of holiness, namely, the view which allows to virtue no essence but its tendency to happiness, has directly led to a laxity in private morals, to a subtlety of covert dishonesty, to an easy construction of church symbols and of other contracts, and to that measurement of all things divine and human by the scale of profit, which is falsely charged upon our whole nation by our foreign enemies. We think it possible to show that such is the tendency of Utilitarianism. And such being its tendency, we should despair of ever seeing any return from this garden of Hesperides, with its golden apples, were it not for a safe-guard in the human soul itself, placed there by all-wise Providence. For the system runs counter to nature. Reason about it as you will, the soul cannot let so monstrous an error lie next to itself; the heart will throb forth its innate tendency, and conscience will assert its prerogative. Nor will men believe concerning *virtue*, any more than concerning *truth*, that it has no foundation but its tendency to happiness; even though such tendency be as justly predicable of the one as of the other. The very consideration of what is involved in the monosyllable *ought*, is sufficient to bring before any man's consciousness the sense of a distinction between virtue and utility, between that which it is prudent to do, and that which it is right to do. In process of time, as more adventurous and reckless minds sailed out further upon this sea of thought, especially when some theologians went so boldly to work as to declare, that in turning to God, we regard the Supreme Being in no other light than as an infinite occasion of personal happiness to ourselves; when this began to be vented, thoughtful men were taken aback. They queried whither they were going. They remembered that their religious emotions had included other elements. They reconsidered the grounds of the adhesion they had given in, to Paley, to Epicurus, and to self. They paused in their rapid career and looked at the system of general consequences. And in a good number of

instances, they were ashamed of the way in which they had been trepanned out of their original ideas, and sought for something to put in the place of the idol they were indignantly throwing down. We know such men; we know that they will read these pages; men who have gone down after their guides into the vaults of the earth-born philosophy, hoping to see treasures, and gain rest to the cravings of their importunate inquirings, but who have come up again, lamenting their error, and mortified that they had been abused. These things we have said concerning the Utilitarian ethics, now prevailing under different forms in America, and chiefly in the northern and eastern states, as furnishing an additional reason for the eager search that undeniably exists, after a more spiritual, elevating, and *moral* philosophy.

In tracing the irresistible progress of thought and opinion, as it regards philosophy, we have seen two sources of that dissatisfaction which for several years has prevailed, with respect to hitherto reigning metaphysics; namely, a disrelish for the coldness, heartlessness, and fruitlessness of the New England methods, and a dread of the doctrine of Utilitarianism. It might have been happy for us, if the proposal for a change had come *ab intra*, if one of our own productive minds had been led to forsake the beaten track, and point out a higher path. But such has not been the case. It has so happened, that no great native philosophical leader has as yet arisen to draw away one scholar from the common routine. This has been very unfortunate. If we are to make experiment of a new system, we would fain have it fully and fairly before our eyes, which can never be the case so long as we receive our *philosophemata* by a double transportation, from Germany via France, in parcels to suit the importers; as fast as the French forwarding philosopher gets it from Germany, and as fast as the American consignee can get it from France. There is a great inconvenience in the reception of philosophical theories by instalments: and if our cisatlantic metaphysicians import the German article, we are sometimes forced to wait until they have learned the language well enough to hold a decent colloquy in it. Such, however, is precisely the disadvantage under which the young philosophers of America now labour. We hear much of German philosophy and of the revelations which have been made to its adepts; much very adroit use of certain disparaging terms, easily learned by heart, and applied to the old system, as "flat," "unspiritual," "empirical," and "sensuous;" we hear

much of the progress made in ontological and psychological discovery, in the foreign universities. But, if we hear truth, the hierophants of the new system among us are not so much more intimate with the source of this great light than some of their silent readers, as to give them any exclusive right to speak *ex cathedra* about transcendental points. Some of them are busily learning French, in order to read in that language any *rifacimento* of Teutonic metaphysics which may come into their hands. Some are learning German; others have actually learnt it. He who cannot do either, strives to gather into one the Sibylline oracles and abortive scraps of the gifted but indolent Coleridge, and his gaping imitators; or in default of all this, sits at the urn of dilute wisdom, and sips the thrice-drawn infusion of English from French and French from German.

It might have been happy for us, we say, if the reformation in our philosophy had some root of its own in our own soil. But what is this vaunted German philosophy, of which our young men have learned the jargon? We shall endeavour to give an intelligible answer to so reasonable an inquiry. In attempting to offer a few satisfactory paragraphs on this, it is far from our purpose to profess to be adepts. We have seen a little, heard a little, and read a little, respecting it. We have even during the last fifteen years turned over one or two volumes of German metaphysics, and understood perhaps almost as much as some who have become masters; yet we disclaim a full comprehension of the several systems. The Anglo-Saxon *dummheit*, with which Germans charge the English, reigns we fear in us, after an inveterate sort. We have tried the experiment, and proved ourselves unable to see in a fog. Our night-glasses do not reach the transcendental. In a word we are born without the *Anschauungsvermögen*: and this defect, we are persuaded, will 'stick to our last sand.' We once said to a German friend, speaking of Schleiermacher, 'But we do not understand his book.' 'Understand it!' cried the other, with amazement, 'what then? but do not you *feel* it?' We deem ourselves competent, nevertheless, to give the plain reader some notices of the progress of Transcendental Philosophy.

The German Philosophers whose names are most frequently heard in this country, and who indeed mark the regular succession of masters, are Kant, Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel. It would be easy to multiply names, but these are the



men who have carried forward the torch, from hand to hand. Though there were German metaphysicians before Kant, it is needless to name them, as he borrowed nothing from them, and certainly has the merit of standing forth to propagate a system altogether undervived from his countrymen. Perhaps the best way to put our readers in possession of the peculiar tenets of Kant, would be to direct them to an able syllabus of his system by Professor Stapfer, already inserted in the Biblical Repertory for the year 1828. But to maintain the connexion of our remarks, we shall furnish further information; and if we enter somewhat more into detail here than in what follows, it is because the transition to Kant from his predecessors is more abrupt than from this philosopher to any who succeeded him. In order to get a glimpse of what he taught, we must as far as possible lay aside all the prepossessions of the British school. We must not only cease to attribute all our knowledge to sensation and reflection, as our fathers were taught to do, but we must lay aside as unsatisfactory all the explanations of Reid and his followers respecting first truths and intuitive principles. We must no longer regard philosophy as a science of observation and induction, and must dismiss all our juvenile objections to a purely a priori scheme of metaphysics. It is the first purpose of Kant, in his own terms, to inquire "how synthetical judgments a priori are possible, with respect to objects of experience:" as, for example, how the idea of necessary causal connexion arises, when it is conceded that nothing is given by experience but the mere succession of events.\* Indeed it was Hume's speculations on Cause and Effect which, as Kant tells us, first "broke his dogmatic slumbers." Proceeding from this to all the other instances in which we arrive at absolute, necessary, universal, or intuitive truths, he proves that these are not the result of experience. No induction, however broad, can ever produce the irresistible conviction with which we yield ourselves to the belief of necessary truth. "Experience (and this is the concession of Reid himself) gives us no information of what is necessary, or of what ought to exist."† In such propositions as the following, "A straight line is the shortest between two points: There is a God: The soul is immortal," &c. there is an amal-

\* Kritik d. reinen Vernunft. Leipzig, 1818, p. 15.

† Essay on the Active Powers, Edinb. quarto, 1788. p. 31, p. 279, also Intellectual Powers, Essay vi. c. 6.

gamation (*synthesis*) of a subject with an attribute, which is furnished neither by the idea of the subject, nor by experience. These synthetical judgments therefore are a priori, or independent of experience; that is, there is something in them beyond what experience gives. There is therefore a function of the soul prior to all experience, and to investigate this function of the soul, is the purpose of the Critique of Pure Reason. "Let us," says Stapfer, in a happy illustration, "imagine a mirror endued with perception, or sensible that external objects are reflected from its surface; let us suppose it reflecting on the phenomena which it offers to a spectator and to itself. If it come to discover the properties which render it capable of producing these phenomena, it would find itself in possession of two kinds of ideas, perfectly distinct. It would have a knowledge of the images which it reflects, and of the properties which it must have possessed previous to the production of these images. The former would be its *a posteriori* knowledge; whilst in saying to itself, 'my surface is plain, it is polished, I am impenetrable to the rays of light,' it would show itself possessed of *a priori* notions, since these properties, which it would recognise as inherent in its structure, are more ancient than any image reflected from its surface, and are the conditions to which are attached the faculty of forming images, with which it would know itself endowed. Let us push this extravagant fiction a little further. Let us imagine, that the mirror represented to itself, that external objects are entirely destitute of depth, that they are all placed upon the same plane, that they traverse each other, as the images do upon its surface, &c., and we shall have an example of objective reality attributed to modifications purely subjective. And, if we can figure to ourselves the mirror as analysing and combining, in various ways, the properties with which it perceived itself invested; (but of which it should have contented itself, to establish the existence and examine the use;) drawing from these combinations conclusions relative to the organization, design, and origin of the objects which paint themselves on its surface; founding, it may be, entire systems upon the conjectures which the analysis of its properties might suggest, and which it might suppose itself capable of applying to an use entirely estranged from their nature and design; we should have some idea of the grounds and tendency of the reproaches which the author of the critical philosophy addresses to human reason, when forgetting the ve-

ritable destination of its laws and of those of the other intellectual faculties;—a destination which is limited to the acquisition and perfecting of experience, it employs these laws to the investigation of objects beyond the domain of experience, and assumes the right of affirming on their existence, of examining their qualities, and determining their relations to man.”

Instead therefore of examining the nature of things, the objective world without us, Kant set himself to scrutinize the microcosm, to learn the nature of the cognitive subject. In pursuing this inquiry he finds, not that the mind is moulded by its objects, but that the objects are moulded by the mind. The external world is in our thoughts such as it is, simply because our thoughts are necessarily such as they are. The moulds, so to speak, are within us. We see things only under certain conditions: certain laws restrain and limit all our functions. We conceive of a given event as occurring in time and in space. But this time and this space are not objective realities, existing whether we think about them or not: they are the mere *forms a priori*. Our minds refuse to conceive of sensible objects, except under these forms. Time and space therefore are not the results of experience, neither are they abstract ideas: for all particular times and spaces are possible, only by reason of this original constitution of the mind.\*

According to this system, all that of which we can be cognizant is either necessary or contingent. That which is necessary is *a priori*, and belongs to the province of pure reason. That which is contingent is *a posteriori*, and belongs to the province of experience. The former he calls *pure*, the latter *empirical*: and it is the circle of knowledge contained in the former which constitutes the far-famed Transcendental Philosophy.†

Every English and American reader must fail to penetrate even the husk of German and mock-German philosophy, unless he has accepted the distinction between the reason and the understanding. We are not aware that the distinction ever obtained any footing in our modern English science, until the time of Coleridge, who in several of his works has striven *pugnīs et calcibus* to instal it into our philosophical terminology. “The understanding,” says Kant, “is the faculty judging according to sense.” “Reason,” says

\* Krüger: d. R. V. p. 28—p. 43.

† Ib. p. 19.

Coleridge, "is the power of universal and necessary convictions, the source and substance of truths above sense, and having their evidence in themselves."\* Resuming, then, the thread which we have dropped, the Prussian philosopher dissected the cognitive subject or soul into three distinct faculties; viz. 1st. Sense, or Sensibility. 2d. Understanding. 3d. Reason.

Sense receives and works up the multiform material, and brings it to consciousness. This it accomplishes partly as a mere 'receptivity,' passively accepting sensations, and partly as an active power or spontaneity. The Understanding is a step higher than sense. What sense has apprehended, the understanding takes up, and by its synthetizing activity (*die synthetisirende Thätigkeit*;) presents under certain forms or conditions, which, by a term borrowed from logic, are called Categories. These are twelve, classified under the heads of Quantity, Quality, Relation, and Modality. Of Quantity: 1. *Unity*. 2. *Plurality*. 3. *Totality*. Of Quality: 4. *Affirmation*, or *Reality*. 5. *Negation*, or *Privation*. 6. *Limitation*. Of Relation: 7. *Substance* and *Accident*. 8. *Cause* and *Effect*. 9. *Action* and *Reaction*. Of Modality: 10. *Possibility* and *Impossibility*. 11. *Existence* and *Non-Existence*. 12. *Necessity* and *Contingency*.† Whatsoever now the understanding takes cognizance of, it knows under some of these forms; and every intellection receives the object as connected with at least four of these categories at once, from the four different classes. Kant attributed to the understanding the function of reducing multiplicity to unity. The result of this reduction to unity, in our consciousness, is a Conception (*Begriff*). All possible conceptions are produced under the twelve categories as their necessary forms. These are therefore the conditions of all thought; yet they afford no knowledge of the objects *per se*; and have not the slightest significancy independent of time and space. Time and space are the ways or forms under which objects are made sensible; and the categories are the ways or forms under which the same objects are understood (*begriffen*.)

The Reason, finally, is the sublime of human spontaneity. It takes cognizance of that which is self-evident, necessary,

\* Even in German, this distinction between *Verstand* and *Vernunft* was not always recognised. See a philological analysis of the latter term, in Herder's *Metakritik*, vol. II. p. 11. See *Kritik d. R. V. Elementari*. II. Th. II. Abth. I. Buch.

† *Kritik der reinen V.* p. 78.

absolute, infinite, eternal. Its objects are beyond the sphere, not merely of time and space, but of all ratiocination: and it is among these objects, "above the stir and smoke of this dim spot, which men call earth," that the transcendental philosophers have most successfully expatiated. While the understanding is discursive, and collects proof, and deduces judgments, referring to other faculties as its authority, the reason is self-sufficient, intuitive, immediate and infallible in all its dictates. In the pure reason, there reside, a priori, three ideas, viz. 1. Of that which is absolute and of itself, whether subjective or objective; the former being the theme of psychology, the latter of ontology. 2. Of a supreme and independent real cause of all that is; namely, of God: this being the object of theology. 3. Of an absolute totality of all phenomena; namely, the universe, τὸ πᾶν; being the object of cosmology.

The eagerness of the philosophical public to discover how these principles might legitimately affect the interests of ethics and theology, led Kant to publish, in 1787, his Critique of Practical Reason. In this, as in several other similar works indicated in our volume for 1828, he declared himself, to a certain extent; still leaving it a matter of dispute among his adherents whether he was a Deist or a Christian. His adversaries assert, that his argument for the being of a God is inconsistent with his system, and unworthy of being admitted: and even his friends admit that he never gave his assent to the supernatural origin of Christianity. Nothing, however, in the whole system is more striking than the foundation which it gives to morals; for here, and no where else, Kant forsakes the character of a mere critic, and lays down absolute and final dictates of reason. There is, he teaches, an original and invariable law, residing in the depths of human consciousness, and commanding what is right. This he calls the *categorical imperative*. It urges man to act virtuously, *even at the expense of happiness*. Translated into words, it runs thus: "Act in such a manner, that the maxim of your will may be valid in all circumstances, as a principle of universal legislation."\* Proceeding from this he builds his natural theology on his ethics; argues the necessity of another life and an almighty and omniscient Judge. The three

\* Handle so dass die Maxime deines Willes jederzeit zugleich als Princip einer allgemeinen Gesetzgebung gelten koenne. Kritik der Practischen Vernunft. 5te Aufl. Leipz. 1818. p. 54.

“postulates of the Practical Reason,” are God, Freedom, and Immortality.\* It is now, we believe, generally conceded, that these moral and theological speculations, are an after-thought, a supplement to the main structure, and scarcely worthy of reverence for their consistency, however interesting as proofs of the strong leaning of their author towards the faith of his childhood. It was the desire of Kant to appear favourable to Christianity. At his day Infidelity had not grown so bold as it has since done; and it is especially worthy of consideration, that whenever Kant speaks of the Divine Being, he distinctly conveys the idea of a personal God, objectively existing, separate from nature, and independent of the cognizance of finite spirits.†

It deserves to be noticed that Kant, in pursuance of his vocation as a *critical* rather than a constructive philosopher, did not attribute to Reason those divine and active powers which later philosophers have assumed, and which are claimed for her by some of our American imitators, who, we would gladly believe, are ignorant of the apotheosis of reason which they thus subserve. The genuine Kantians have always maintained that in what their master delivered concerning the absolute and the infinite, he simply meant to attribute to pure reason the power of directing the cognitive energy beyond its nearer objects, and to extend its research indefinitely; but by no means to challenge for this power the direct intuition of the absolute, as the veritable object of infallible insight.

The chief objection which was made to the Critique of Pure Reason, and to the other works of the same author, was that they were purposely obscure; and it cannot be denied, that in addition to the inherent intricacy of the subject, the reader is greatly perplexed by a multiplicity of new-coined words, and still more by an arbitrary wresting of familiar terms to meanings remote from their common acceptation. It is partly for this reason, that Kant, like another great innovator of the age, Jeremy Bentham, has been best represented by the pens of his disciples: and that

\* Kritik d. P. V. p. 213. ff.

† Those who choose to pursue this subject further, will find satisfaction in the following works, viz. Kant's Religion innerhalb der Ideen d. Mensch. Vernunft. 2te Aufl. 1792. and the reply to it, by Sartorius. Die Religion ausserhalb der Grenzen der bloßen Vernunft, u. s. w. Marburg. 1822. In this work, (p. 62) he quotes from Vincent, the following observation, which is not here out of place; ‘Who can refrain from a smile, at beholding Christ and his apostles, brought into the train of philosophy, and made successively Wolfians, Crusians, Kantians, Fichteans, and Schellingians!’

aid which Bentham owed to Dumont, was afforded to Kant by Schulze, a chaplain of the king of Prussia.\* This writer acknowledges however that at the time when he wrote, that is in 1791, the diction of his master still remained a hieroglyphic to the public.† In 1798, when Coleridge was in Germany, he heard much the same statement from the venerable Klopstock. "He said the works of Kant were to him utterly incomprehensible; that he had often been pestered by the Kantians, but was rarely in the practice of arguing with them. His custom was to produce the book, open it, and point to a passage, and beg they would explain it. This they ordinarily attempted to do, by substituting their own ideas. I do not want, I say, an explanation of your own ideas, but of the passage which is before us. In this way I generally bring the dispute to an immediate conclusion."‡ Coleridge, however, declares that in that very year almost all the professors in Germany were either Kantians, or disciples of Fichte, whose system is built on the Kantian: and in the twelfth chapter of the work just cited, he vindicates Kant from the charge of needless obscurity. At the same time he tells us that the disciples, during their master's life time, quarrelled about the meaning of his dicta, and that the old philosopher used to reply to their appeals, 'I meant what I said, and at the age of near four score, I have something else and more important to do, than to write a commentary on my own works.'

In spite of this obscurity, however, the Critical Philosophy assumed the empire in the German universities; but not without opposition from the highest sources. The celebrated John George Haman, uttered a touching caveat against the irreligious tendency of Kant's system. He declared, in his letters to Jacobi, and elsewhere, that the new philosophy owed many of its deductions to a mere play on words, and perplexed its readers in a maze of unwonted expressions; that the Kantian τὸ ὄν was a mere conception, of which the objective existence or non-existence could not be determined by reason. He warned the student of philosophy against a system of delusion, in which man is made every thing and God is made nothing: a warning infinitely more appropriate as applied to the systems which have succeeded Kant, and

\* Erläuterungen ueber des Herrn Professor Kant Kritik der reinen Vernunft: von Johann Schulze, u. s. w. Koenigsberg, 1791.

† Schulze, p. 6.

‡ Biographia Literaria, Vol. ii. p 160. N. Y. edition.

which are proffered to the credulous complaisance of the American public.\* In 1799 the still more celebrated Herder, entered the field as an antagonist, in his *Metakritik*.† Like Haman he brings the charge of perplexed language, and the misunderstanding and abuse of abstractions. He characterises the Critique of Pure Reason in general, as *transcendental mist* (transcendentalen Dunst), a *fog of fine-spun verbiage* (nebelichtes Wortgespinnst), calculated by means of dialectical sorcery to confound the very implement of reason, namely, language. The attention of the reader is the rather called to this judgment, as it is common to attribute the obscurity of our philosopher to some accidents of his vernacular tongue, rather than to his own phraseology; but here is the verdict of a German, a scholar, a philosopher, and a pupil of his own. If space were allowed, we might go much further, and dilate upon the denunciation of the Kantian idealism, by a number of eminent men, such as Garve, Eberhard, Tiedemann, Tittel, Nicolai, and Jacobi: of whom the first two were formally answered by Kant, while the last is the sole representative of a system which founds all philosophy in an affectionate religious faith, independent of revelation.‡

But it is time we should leave Kant, and consider his great successor. John Theophilus Fichte, who was born in 1762, and died in 1814, is thought by the initiated to have carried philosophy forward from its critical towards its scientific condition. He was familiar with Kant, and wrote in his manner, so that his first important work, published in 1792, was attributed to the great master. Kant had set out with a critical analysis of Understanding, Reason, and Judgment. Some of his followers, especially Reinhold, had started with the phenomenon of consciousness. Fichte simplified a step further, and began, not with a thing, or a faculty, but an act. Fichte, say his admirers, leaves us at the apex of the pyramid.§ True enough, but then the pyramid is upside down: the apex and support being the monosyllable I. The

\* Jacobi's Schriften, Vol. I. 1781. pp. 371—390. Vol. IV. p. 31. Goethe's Dichtung und Wahrheit: Werke Vol. 26.

† Verstand und Erfahrung: eine Metakritik zur Kritik d. r. Vernunft; von J. G. Herder, Leipzig, 1799.

‡ See Jacobi von den Göttlichen Dingen und ihrer Offenbarung. 2te Aufl. Leipzig. 1822: see also Rixner's Handbuch d. Geschichte d. Philosophie; Sulzbach, 1829, Vol. iii. § 143. § 144.

§ See a similar expression, in Mr. Linberg's note to Cousin's Introduction, p. 455.



notion of a thought which is its own object, and the notion of I, are identical. The *Ego* looks at itself; and thus we have the idea of *Ego* as knowing, and *Ego* as known, the intelligent and the existent I. This *Ego*, absolute and free, has regard to an object, or *Non-Ego*: it creates this *Non-Ego* by its own activity: in a word, it creates objective nature.\* The whole of the Fichtean philosophy is a following out of this track. It creates the world out of the mind's act: and it regards the outward universe as nothing but a limit of our being on which thought operates; a limit, moreover, springing from the mind's creative power.† In such a system as this, what place is found for the Great Author of the Universe? Fichte replies, that the being of the Godhead, (which he holds to be identical with the active and moral *ordo mundi*) is an object not of theoretical knowledge, but of rational faith; and that this faith is purely moral. On a certain occasion, we are told by Madame de Staël, he said to his auditors that in the following lecture he would proceed to create God; an expression in perfect harmony with his principle, but one which gave just offence to the public. "According to Fichte," says Cousin in his Introduction to the History of Philosophy, "God is nothing but the subject of thought conceived as absolute; he is therefore still the I. But as it is repugnant to human thought, that the I of man, which might indeed be transferred into nature should be imposed upon God, Fichte distinguishes between a twofold I, the one phenomenal, namely, the I which each of us represents; the other is itself the substance of the I, namely, God himself. God is the absolute I."‡ Even Coleridge, who regarded Fichte as giving the first idea of a system truly metaphysical, admits that it "degenerated into a crude egoismus, a boastful and

\* That our syntax, as well as our philosophy, is becoming a new affair, may be seen from the following specimen of Dr. Henry's English: "The fundamental fact of consciousness is a complex phenomenon, composed of three terms: first, the *me* and the *not me*, &c." Introd. page xx. Now if we must have nonsense, we feel that it is our privilege as descendants of Englishmen, to have it in good grammar. Apropos of this, we find some of our contemporaries quoting Plato in Cousin's version: surely our scholarship must be near its ebb! If the Greek is absolutely unintelligible, and if we have neither Sydenham nor Taylor, let us get a friend to English it for us. It is quite in the style of the French pulpit, when we find Dr. Henry citing the Vulgate, (page xxii.) "It is the *Logos*, the *Word* of St. John, which 'lighteth every man that cometh into the world:' *illuminat omnem hominem venientem in hunc mundum.*" The reader must be left to divine why Dr. Henry here quotes Latin.

† Biographie Universelle, Vol. XIV. p. 486.—Rixner, Vol. iii. p. 337. ff

‡ Linberg's Translation, page 398.

hyperstoic hostility to NATURE, as lifeless, godless, and altogether unholy: while his *religion* consisted in the assumption of a mere ORDO ORDINANS, which we were permitted *exoterice* to call God.”\*

In a seeming ecstasy of admiration, the translator of Cousin's Introduction says of this system: “Fichte has, in arriving at this point, indeed reached the very summit of the pyramid of human science; and if the man lives, or has lived, who has as yet discovered a flaw in the chain of reasoning that leads to this point, I am ignorant of the fact.”† It may be observed of many of the systems with which it is sought to render our youth gradually familiar, that at the first approach they have a horrid aspect of atheism; but that the adepts have the most ingenious method imaginable of correcting this impression. There is probably not a Pantheist in America who will own the name; nor is there a greater certainty concerning things future, than that the free ingress of transcendentalism will smooth the way for the denial of all that we adore and love in the august idea of God. Fichte was at first reputed to be an atheist; and one of his works was instantly confiscated with rigour throughout all Saxony. As is usual in such cases, he and his abettors wrote appeals and apologies. Herder, then vice-president of the Weimar consistory, took part against him. All Germany rang with the quarrel. It was at this memorable crisis that Schelling arose in opposition to Fichte, in behalf of a system still more transcendental; of which more hereafter. He became the fashionable philosopher of Jena, for there are fashions in philosophy, especially in Germany. Poor Fichte fought as he could, but the public having tasted a more intoxicating beverage could never return to a flatter metaphysics. Fichte is supposed to have advanced in his later years to a more consistent idealism. He always declared that the Kantians did not comprehend their master's system: we believe as much ourselves: but, he added, that in the new system of idealism he was only giving consistent development to the principles of Kant.

It was reserved for other hands to complete the structure; or if we acknowledge that the pyramid was now complete, it afforded a test for the flight of more consistent, or more adventurous minds, into the transcendental empyrean. It

\* *Biographia Literaria*, vol i. p. 95.

† Cousin's Introduction, by Linberg. Boston, 1832. p. 454-5.

was Frederick William Joseph Schelling, who, to use the phrases of his admirers, brought philosophy to its perfection, as the science of the Absolute. Kant had scrutinized the cognitive subject, and determined, except in regard to the moral imperative, that absolute knowledge is unattainable. Fichte followed him, and out of the productive *Ego*, created the objective world, still giving countenance however to the figment of a seeming dualism, and discriminating between the thinker and that which is thought. But Schelling, with a boldness unequalled in every previous attempt, merged all in one, and declared as the great discovery of the age, and first truth of absolute wisdom, that subject and object are one, that the *Ego* and the *Non-Ego* are identical. Knowledge and Being are no longer different. His system was therefore expressively called the system of identity, or the philosophy of the absolute.\*

Here, as in a former case, we ask, what place is left for the Most High? Schelling is at no loss for an answer. God is in truth the very object of all philosophy; but it is God revealing himself in the universe. The divine being, once hidden, has a perpetual tendency to self-revelation; a process of evolution which is for ever going onward, and producing the world, or nature. It is this development which we see and feel and of which we are a part. The universe therefore becomes as important a portion of the philosophy of Schelling, as of that of the ancient Gnostics, or of Spinoza.† We do not wish to be understood as comprehending this profane modification of atheism, for we almost tremble while we write, we will not say the notions, but the expressions of men who treat of the genesis of divinity, as coolly as Hesiod

\* Rixner, Vol. III. § 167.

† In the new philosophy, there is little reference had to the distinction between matter and spirit; in this respect the grand error of the ancient Greeks reappears, and the inevitable result is an inextricable tangle of physics with metaphysics. Material images are always dangerous aids in the philosophy of the mind; but the Germans are so far from being aware of this, that a large part of their statements are merely transformation of sensible images into expressions of pure thought. By running away with analogies, a puerile imagination may see resemblances between material and immaterial objects, which a puerile judgment may stamp as verities. Hence, in the system of Schelling, galvanism, electricity and magnetism have place in the very midst of psychology. Hence, in the system of Cousin, expansion and concentration become elements of mental analysis. Hence, also, England being an island, her philosophers cannot be transcendental. The ridiculous passage in which this truly French statement is conveyed, is too striking to be omitted: "England, gentlemen," says M. Cousin, "is a very considerable island; in England *every thing stops at certain limits, nothing is there developed on a great scale.*" Introduction, p. 380.

of the birth of gods: yet we will proceed. In the absolute philosophy, God is a principle, not personal, but tending to personality, becoming personal (*eine werdende Personlichkeit*); a tendency manifested in, and producing, the phenomena of the universe. This eternal development is a mighty effort towards self-consciousness; and the consciousness of human reason is indeed the consciousness of God; a state in which the absolute spirit views itself.\*

This, we need scarcely say, is a highly flattering illusion to the soaring mind. The infinite chasm between heaven and earth is no more. Human action is the action of the infinite. Man can know the infinite by immediate insight, because he is himself infinite. God is all things, and all things are God: we are ourselves in God and God in us. And here the happy language of a writer in the *Edinburgh Review* for 1829, whose article on Cousin is highly praised and largely quoted by Dr. Henry, may be cited by us, though with an intention very different from that of the latter. "In this act of knowledge, which, after Fichte, Schelling calls the Intellectual Intuition, there exists no distinction of subject and object—no contrast of knowledge and existence,—all difference is lost in absolute indifference,—all plurality in absolute unity. The intuition itself—reason—and the absolute—are identical. The absolute exists only as known by reason, and reason knows only as being itself the absolute."† As a natural consequence, this direct cognition of the absolute, the unconditioned, and the infinite, implies the annihilation of consciousness; for it is of the very essence of consciousness to conceive of the object of thought as separate from its subject. It is a further consequence that there can be no personal immortality of the soul; the hope of which he characterises as a vain solace (*eitle Freude*):‡ in return for which fond illusion, Schelling cheers us with an immortality in which the qualities of the soul re-enter into the universal mass: "an immortality," says Madame de Staël, "which terribly resembles death: since physical death itself is nothing but universal nature reclaiming the gifts she had made to the individual."§

Such is the philosophy which up to this very hour is taught

\* See Bretschneider, *Ueber die Grundansichten der theologischen Systeme der Prof. Schleiermacher und Marheineke*. Leipzig, 1828. p. 5.

† *Edinburgh Review*, Oct. 1829, Art. XI. p. 208.

‡ Bretschneider, *ubi supra*, p. 12.

§ *De l'Allemagne*, t. iii. p. 114, ed. Paris, 1814.

in several of the German universities, by Protestant teachers of religion, and to which, more alarming still, a goodly number among our neophytes in metaphysics are endeavouring to attain. But M. Cousin somewhat sneers at our apprehension of the "bugbear" Pantheism, and we may yet be called upon by American clergymen to abandon all belief in a personal God, or any Deity but the universe. It is very true, as we shall see, that M. Cousin does not avow himself to be a disciple of Schelling. It is further true, that he diverges from him in important particulars, and earnestly, though, as we think, vainly endeavours to wrest his own system into a conformity with revelation; yet his whole scheme is a conduit from the stream of German transcendentalism at the most corrupt part of its current; and his works abound with expressions which savour too strongly of doctrines more *prononcées* than those which he has avowed. In the following sentences we know not to what school he can allude, if not to that of Schelling, Oken, or Hegel:\* "Fichte died in 1815, and even before his death a new philosophy, unable to stop at the system of absolute subjectivity, and the summit of the pyramid of the me, has redescended to the earth, and returned to nearer views of actual reality. The contemporaneous German philosophy, which now exerts as great an influence, and possesses as high an authority in Germany, as ever did that of Kant or Fichte, bears the title of the philosophy of nature. The title alone indicates some return towards reality."†

We have sometimes been strongly tempted to suspect that many of the enthusiastic admirers of Coleridge's prose works are entirely unaware of the extremes to which their master's principles of philosophizing would legitimately lead them. None can be more open than ourselves to impressions from the great genius and inimitable diction of this philosopher and poet: we have felt its fascinations, and in hanging over his pages, and especially his noble denunciations of the utilitarian Ethics, we have almost forgotten how indeterminate and fruitless are most of his reasonings, and how rotten the foundation of his scheme. After our declaration that the system of Schelling is a system of Pantheism, or that sort of Atheism which denies the personality of God, many will be startled when we assure them that Coleridge maintained the great principles of this very school. We dis-

\* Cousin's *Introduct. to Hist. of Philosophy*, page 427. Boston.

† The title of one of Schelling's works, *Ideen zur Naturphilosophie*; 1797.

claim indeed the intention of representing this learned man as having coincided with the German pantheist in all the remote consequences of his theory, however legitimate. But that the system of Coleridge and the system of Schelling are the same in their leading principles will be denied by no one who is familiar with both. Nay, we have Coleridge himself making the most ample avowal of this coincidence, for the purpose, as it should seem, of escaping the charge of plagiarism from the German philosopher. Let us hear himself; "In Schelling's 'NATUR-PHILOSOPHIE,' and the 'SYSTEM DES TRANSCENDENTALEN IDEALISMUS,' I first found a genial coincidence with much that I had toiled out for myself and a powerful assistance in what I had yet to do." And then, as if to account for the somewhat singular fact that the dissertation in the *Biographia Literaria*, on the reciprocal relations of the *esse* and the *cogitare* is a literal translation from the Introduction to a work of Schelling, he proceeds to say: \* "We had studied in the same school; been disciplined by the same preparatory philosophy, namely, that of Kant; we had both equal obligations to the polar logic and dynamic philosophy of Giordano Bruno," &c. &c. And again: "To me it will be happiness and honour enough, should I succeed in rendering the system itself intelligible to my countrymen, and in the application of it to the most awful of subjects for the most important of purposes."† After reading these avowals, and after having learned the ravages of this very philosophy among the present generation of clergymen in Germany, we are heartily thankful that Coleridge never summoned sufficient energy to give us any thing more than fragments; while we are filled with amazement at the sight of Christian ministers among ourselves, men of education and piety, either subscribing to statements which they do not comprehend, or giving the weight of their authority to the

\* This seeming plagiarism is set in the best light of which the facts admit, in the preface to the 'Specimens of the Table Talk,' New York, 1835, p. xxv. ff. But the whole vindictory argument is singular in the history of literary borrowing. See, on the same topic, the British Magazine, for January, 1835.

† *Biographia Literaria*, Vol. I. p. 95, 97. The reader, in order to do justice, at once, to us in bringing so grave a charge, and to the memory of Coleridge, should not fail to consult the work here cited. On p. 169, will be found this pregnant declaration. "We begin with the I KNOW MYSELF in order to end with the absolute I AM. We proceed from the SELF, in order to lose and find all self in God." See also *The Friend*, Essay xiii. p. 76, note; likewise p. 451, ed. Burlington, 1831; likewise *Aids to Reflection*, note 50, p. 284, ed. 1829.

conclusions which by the best theologians even of Germany are denounced as incompatible with the fundamentals, we say not of Christianity, but of natural religion. Let our young metaphysicians learn from Coleridge and Cousin to tolerate and admire Schelling, and they will soon learn from Schelling himself that God is every thing.\*

We almost shrink from the attempt to conduct our readers any lower down in the circling vaults of German wisdom; we have not yet reached the end, for in the lowest deep a lower deep still opens wide, in the system of Hegel and his followers.† When we speak of this professor, we shall not be scrupulous in distinguishing between his own opinions and those of his immediate and acknowledged followers; and, this being premised, it may be said that his was the system prevailing in Germany on the arrival of the last steamer.

George Frederick William Hegel was born in 1770, and died within the last three or four years. He was professor, first at Jena, and afterwards at Heidelberg and at Berlin; in the last of which chairs he succeeded Fichte, in 1818. His system purported to be an improvement on that of Schelling. It is said by the Hegelians, that in contradistinction from that of Fichte, which was a subjective idealism, and from that of Schelling, which was an objective idealism, the scheme of Hegel takes the true position as an absolute idealism.‡ Hegel, no less than Schelling, maintained universal identity, or that all things are the same: but while the former postulated this, as an intellectual intuition, the latter proceeded to prove it by a scientific process.§ Both teach, but with the same difference as to the origin of the dogma, that thought and being are identical. In his earliest work, Hegel undertook to show how the I, through manifold and multi-form self-evolutions, comes to be, first Consciousness, then Self-Consciousness, then Reason, and, finally, Self-Comprehending and Religious Spirit.||

\* In all that we have written about Schelling, we have had reference to his published systems. What changes have taken place in his way of thinking within the last ten years, we have not been in a situation to know. It is, however, said that he has abandoned some of his anti-christian notions.

† Io sono al *terzo cerchio* della piovra  
Eterna, maladetta, fredda, e greve.

*Dante. Inferno, Canto VI.*

‡ Conversations-Lexikon, Art. Hegel.

§ Rixner, Vol. III. p. 437. Marhcineke : Dogmatik. §§ 1—68.

|| Die Phaenomenologie des Geistes : Bamberg, 1807.

All philosophy, according to Hegel, is but an attempt to answer a simple question, viz. *Quid est?* And the answer to this involves all Truth, all Reason: for whatever is, is Reason. All reality is reasonable, all that is reasonable is real. Hence the only real existence is the ideas of Reason. All reality (*Wirklichkeit*) being thoroughly rational, is also divine; yea is God revealing himself or developing himself. Nature is God coming to self-consciousness.\* God reveals himself in creation, or in the universe, by a series of eternal unfoldings, some in matter, some in mind; and thus the Deity is in a perpetual effort towards self-realization.† The history of Physics is therefore the necessary career of divine self-evolution: indeed God thinks worlds, just as the mind thinks thoughts.

In order to philosophize aright, we must lose our own personality in God, who is chiefly revealed in the acts of the human mind. In the infinite developments of divinity, and the infinite progress towards self-consciousness, the greatest success is reached in the exertions of human reason. In men's minds therefore is the highest manifestation of God. God recognises himself best in human reason, which is a consciousness of God (*Gottesbewusstseyn*). And it is by human reason that the world, (hitherto without thought, and so without existence, mere negation) comes into consciousness: thus God is revealed in the world.‡

God is the Idea of all Ideas, or the absolute Idea: hence our ideal thought is divine thought, and this is no other than reason.§ “The doctrine of the being of God, is no other than that of the revelation of himself in the Idea of him.”|| “God *exists* only as knowledge (*Wissen*): in this knowledge, and as such, he knows himself, and it is this very knowledge *which is his existence*.”¶ We may therefore say with truth *God exists as an Idea*.\*\*

\* Baur: *Christl. Gnosis*. p. 672.

† Rixner, p. 444.

‡ Marheineke, *Dogmatik*. § 229. ff. Bretschneider, u. s. p. 49.

§ Bretschneider, u. s. p. 40.

|| Marheineke, § 147. p. 87.

¶ Marheineke, § 153, as cited by Bretschneider; but in our edition, the 3d, these words do not occur, but we read “Das Seyn Gottes also ist selbst noch etwas anders, als dessen Bestimmtheit selber oder das Wissen.” It will not seem strange to any one familiar with the present condition of philosophy, that we cite Marheineke as an authentic expounder of Hegel; it is just so to regard him, and we may presume that those points of the system which are anti-christian will, to say the least, not be exaggerated by a theological professor.

\*\* Marheineke, *Dogmatik*. § 174, *apud* Bretschneider's *Grandansichten*, p. 43.



After thus arriving at an ideal God, we learn that Philosophy and Religion draw us away from our little selves, so that our separate consciousness is dissolved in that of God. Philosophy is Religion; and "true Religion frees man from all that is low, and from himself, from clinging to *I-hood* (Ichheit) and subjectivity, and helps him to life in God, as the Truth, and thereby to true life."\* In this oblation of personal identity, we must not claim property even in our own thoughts. By a step beyond Emmonism, Hegel teaches that it is God who thinks in us; nay that it is precisely that which thinks in us, which is God. Marheineke himself manifests tokens of alarm, when he states this doctrine.† The pure and primal *substance* manifests itself as the subject; and "true knowledge of the absolute is the absolute itself." There is but a step to take, and we arrive at the tenet, that the universe and God are one.‡ The Hegelians attempt to distinguish this from the doctrine of Spinoza, but their distinctions are inappreciable; 'tis the same rope at either end they twist: their scheme is Pantheism. And as God is revealed by all the phenomena of the world's history, he is partly revealed by moral action, and consequently by sin, no less than by holiness. Sin is therefore a part of the necessary evolution of the divine principle; or rather, in any sense which can affect the conscience, there is no evil in sin—there is no sin. This is a part of the philosophy of Hegel which has given great pain to pious men in Germany, who have repeatedly complained of it as subverting the first principles of morality, not merely in theory but in practice; and begetting a fatalism which threatens alike the foundations of religion and of state. A late pantheistic poet teaches us that all which we regard as sin, is necessary, and therefore good, and may, to other intelligences, justly appear most lovely!§ But there are conclusions of the new philosophy still more surprising, for which our inchoate metaphysicians should be getting ready. It is well said by an acute writer already quoted, that when according to the demands of Schelling we annihilate first the object and then the subject, the remainder

\* Bretschneider, p. 45. Marheineke, p. 83. See also Hegel's *Encyclopædie*, p. 593. ff. Baur's *Gnosis*: p. 672.

† *Dogmatik*, p. 67.

‡ Bretschneider, *Grundansichten*, p. 50. Rixner, himself a devotee to this German Buddhism cites what follows: "The knowledge of the absolute identity of God and the Universe (des Alls) is *Reason*: the crown and perfection of self-recognising and self-comprehending Reason is philosophy." Vol. iii. p. 392.

§ Schefer.

is zero.\* Though Schelling is not known to have admitted this, his critics were not slow to perceive it. Schulze, in particular, declared that according to this system *Every thing is Nothing, and Nothing is Everything*;† and Köppen called this the philosophy of Absolute Nothing. It was reserved for Hegel to abandon all the scruples of six thousand years, and publish the discovery—certainly the most wonderful in the history of human research—that *Something and Nothing are the same!* In declaring it, he almost apologizes, for he says, that this proposition appears so paradoxical, that it may readily be supposed that it is not seriously maintained.‡ Yet he is far from being ambiguous. Something and Nothing are the same. The Absolute of which so much is vaunted is nothing.§ But the conclusion which is perhaps already anticipated by the reader's mind, and which leaves us incapacitated for comment, is this—we shudder while we record it—that after the exhaustive abstraction is carried to infinity in search of God, we arrive at nothing.|| *God himself is nothing!*

The German philosophy was first made known to the French by the *Allemagne* of Madame de Staël. It attracted some attention as an extravaganza of the German mind, but it made few proselytes until it was taken up by M. Cousin. It was in the year 1816 that he first commenced the importation of the German metaphysics. He had been at that time recently appointed assistant Professor of Philosophy in the Faculty of Literature at Paris. He continued to lecture until 1820, when he incurred the disapprobation of the French government, and his lectures were suspended. In 1827 he was restored to the exercise of his functions as a Professor of the Faculty of Literature, and continued to lecture until 1832, when he was made a Peer of France.¶

\* Edinb. Rev. Oct. 1829. p. 208.

† Schulze's Aphorismen. p. 141 of Rixner.

‡ Hegel's Encyclopaedie, 3te Ausg. p. 103. "Seyn und Nichts ist dasselbe."

§ Ib. p. 101.

|| Ib. p. 102. ff. The same is expressly taught by Marheineke, Dogmatik, § 125, and as our allegation is too important to be left without evidence, here are his words: "In dieser Unbestimmtheit ist Gott das Gedankenlose, die noch in sich selbst beharrende, unmittelbare Einheit des Seyns und Nichtseyns und kann Alles, was von Gott bejaht wird, ebenso sehr verneint werden."

¶ Dr Henry, who seems anxious to give his readers an exalted idea of the philosophic temperament of M. Cousin, says, that "he rarely speaks in the Chamber of Peers—that he takes part in the discussions of that body only where some question relating to public instruction is before the Chamber; or on extremely rare occasions, when no good citizen should keep silence." Dr Hen-

The principal original works which M. Cousin has published are his Introduction to the History of Philosophy, comprising the course of Lectures delivered by him in 1828; and the History of Philosophy of the 18th Century, containing his Lectures for 1829. His other contributions to philosophy have been given in the form of prefaces and notes to various translations which he has published. The first of the above named works has been translated for us by Mr. Linberg; and Dr. Henry has translated and published, under the title of Elements of Psychology, that part of the other which contains M. Cousin's criticisms upon the philosophy of Locke.

It would be difficult to define precisely how far the philosophical system which Dr. Henry is seeking to domiciliate among us, agrees with the mis-shapen phantasies which we have brought before the notice of our readers. When language has ceased to be the representative of ideas, it is not easy to tell what are intended to be equivalent forms of speech. M. Cousin moreover professes to discard the phraseology of Kant, even where he adopts his ideas, and deprives us thus far of the means of recognition. But unhappily we do not find that the "way in which men express themselves in France" is any more intelligible than the dialect of "Königsberg." Even Mr. Linberg, "the accomplished translator" and admirer of Cousin, finds it difficult occasionally to understand what M. Cousin precisely means,\* and M. Cousin himself now and then betrays an obscure consciousness of having "reached a height, where he is, as it were, out of sight of land."†

We are farther embarrassed in the interpretation of his system, by the material consideration that no full exposition of it has as yet been given to the world. Though it is now twenty-three years since he "first faltered the name of Eclecticism," and entered upon the establishment of a new school in philosophy, we are still left to gather its principles as they lie scattered in Fragments, Prefaces, Programmes of Lectures, and Historical Criticisms. While the system has only this

ry calculates rather largely upon the ignorance of his readers as to the transactions and debates of the French Chamber of Peers. We need only refer, in illustration of the philosophic elevation of M. Cousin, to one of the most disgraceful scenes that ever occurred in any legislative body, in which this gentleman, in the course of a debate upon the question of Spanish intervention, gave the *lie direct* to Count Molé, one of the ministry.

\* Cousin's Introd. p. 450.

† Cousin's Introd. p. 123.

fragmentary existence, it is too early to pronounce of it, as Dr. Henry does, "that it is a distinct scientific theory, having its method, its principle, and its consequences."\* We do not feel ourselves competent to decide upon the coherency and completeness of a system of philosophy, which has as yet received only a partial development "in its applications, by history and criticism;" nor are we willing to defer in this matter to the judgment of Dr. Henry, unless some of the letters of M. Cousin "to the present translator" contain a more full and systematic exposition of the principles of eclecticism, than is to be found in his published writings. There seems to be evidence that the translator has gained light from some quarter during the interval between the two editions of his work. In the first, when he had received no letters from M. Cousin, he says, "we come now to an important point—the *fundamental peculiarity* of M. Cousin's system; this is the two-fold development of reason." He then proceeds to explain the distinction between the spontaneous and reflective reason, which he again tells us, "constitutes and determines the peculiar system of M. Cousin."† But in his second edition we are told that it is "M. Cousin's attempt to fix the infinite as a positive in knowledge, which constitutes the chief and fundamental peculiarity of his system."‡ And again he says, "the position taken by Cousin upon this subject (the positive idea of the infinite) constitutes the chief pretension and systematic peculiarity of his philosophy."§

The applications of M. Cousin's philosophy are to us however more valuable than the scientific exposition of his principles. The formulas of transcendentalism are, in most cases, as Berkeley styled the vanishing ratios of the modern mathematical analysis, "the mere ghosts of departed quantities;" but when the truths which they are supposed to contain are applied to morals and religion, they assume a more substantial form. Here at least we can try the spirits by the test of what we already know to be true. Our only elements for a judgment upon the trackless path of German philosophy are afforded by its line of direction while within the scope of our vision.

\* Dr. Henry may have sources of information that are not open to the public. He has taken care not to leave his readers ignorant that he is in correspondence with M. Cousin. It was hardly necessary to inform the public that he was "indebted to M. Cousin himself for a copy" of the highly eulogistic memoir from which he has compiled his biographical notices of this philosopher.

† Elements of Psychology, 1st Ed. p. XXI and XXII.

‡ Elements of Psychology, p. XXXI.

§ Elements of Psychology, p. 110.

✓ We class M. Cousin with the German school, because the chief part of his philosophy, as far as he has developed it incidentally in its applications to history and criticism, is evidently derived from that source. In a passage already cited by us, he avows his sympathy with a particular contemporary school in Germany, in terms which draw all regards to his personal friend Hegel, and to those of his followers who have attempted to bridge over the gulf between transcendental chaos and the world we live in; and every page of his works shows that he has been "plunged in the womb of unoriginal Night and Chaos wild." But mindful of the famous saying of Fontenelle, he has opened just as many fingers of his handful of truth as he finds convenient. He glories in the name of Eclectic, and claims to be the founder of a new school which is to comprehend and supersede all others. "Our philosophy, he says, is not a gloomy and fanatical philosophy, which being prepossessed with a few exclusive ideas, undertakes to reform all others upon the same model: it is a philosophy essentially optimistical, whose only end is to comprehend all, and which therefore accepts and reconciles all."\* It is a fundamental position with M. Cousin that every form of belief that has existed contains within it some truth, and he seems to be equally strong in the faith, that in his philosophical alembic every creed will part with its error. He finds in the 18th century four philosophical schools which he designates as the Sensual, the Ideal, the Sceptical, and the Mystical. Each of these schools has existed, and therefore truth is to be found in each, and can only be entirely obtained by effecting a composition between them all. But where are we to find the test that will separate the elements of truth and error combined in each of these systems? And where the principle of unity which is to group together the particular truths disengaged from each? These can only be found in a new system. But this system, according to M. Cousin's reasoning, as it exists in common with many others, can contain only a portion of truth, and the skimming process must be applied to this in common with the rest. We see no end to this method of exhaustions. M. Cousin's philosophy has in truth no better claim to the name and character of eclectic than any other system. It accepts what agrees with its own principles, and rejects what does not, and this is precisely what every other system does.

\* *Introd. to Hist. of Phil.* p. 416.

If further evidence were wanting of the affectation and charlatany of this title, it might be abundantly found in the additional reasons which M. Cousin assigns for assuming it. One of these is that consciousness demands eclecticism. And the case is thus made out. "Being, the me, and the not-me, are the three indestructible elements of consciousness: not only do we find them in the actual development of consciousness, but we find them in the first facts of consciousness as in the last; and so intimately are they combined with each other, that if you destroy but one of these three elements you destroy all the rest. There you behold *eclecticism* within the limits of consciousness, in its elements, which are all equally real, but which to form a psychological theory, need all to be combined with each other.\* Another reason is that "even logic demands eclecticism," for all systems of logic turn either upon the idea of cause, or that of substance; and from the alternate neglect of one or the other of these ideas, we have the "two great systems which at the present day are distinguished by the names of theism and pantheism." Of these systems, the author adds, that "both the one and the other are equally exclusive and false."† Hence even logic demands eclecticism. But the most amusing argument which M. Cousin urges in behalf of eclecticism is that which he draws from the spirit and tendencies of the age. We cannot follow him through it as it is spread over seventeen octavo pages. He rejects from consideration England and Scotland, on the ground of their lack of philosophy, and pronounces Germany and France to be the only two nations worthy of notice. He passes in review the general state of philosophy and of society in these two nations, declaims upon the French monarchy, the revolution and the Charte‡—and at length arrives at this conclusion; "If all around us is mixed, complex, and mingled, is it possible that philosophy should be exempt from the influence of

\* Introd. to Hist. of Phil. p. 418.

† Ib. p. 419.

‡ The following passage which occurs in this connexion, will give our readers some idea of M. Cousin's method of applying his philosophy to history. "You know that it is not the masses of population which appear upon fields of battle, but the ideas, the causes for which they combat. Thus at Leipzig and Waterloo the ideas which encountered each other were those of paternal monarchy and military democracy. Which prevailed, gentlemen? Neither the one, nor the other. Which was the conqueror? Which was the vanquished at Waterloo? Gentlemen, none was vanquished. No! I protest that none was vanquished; the only conquerors were European Civilization, and the Charte." We assure our readers that this is a fair average sample.

the general spirit? I ask whether philosophy can avoid being eclectic when all that is around it is so; and whether consequently the philosophical reformation which I undertook in 1816, in spite of every obstacle, does not necessarily proceed from the general movement of society throughout Europe, and particularly in France?"\* There is something in all this that is either above or below our comprehension. We can readily conceive that they who see and feel its force, would find no impediment to glorying in the fancied possession of the culled wisdom of all other sects.

Before dismissing this point, it is right that we should hear Dr. Henry's account of the boastful title of the new school in philosophy. "Its *eclectic* character consists precisely in the pretension of applying its own distinctive principles to the criticism of all other systems, discriminating in each its part of truth and its part of error—and combining the part of truth found in every partial, exclusive, and therefore erroneous system, into a higher, comprehensive system."† If we rightly apprehend the writer's meaning here, it involves a strange confusion of ideas. Eclecticism, he maintains, is a distinct, scientific theory, possessing its own method and principles, and of course reduced to a system. And yet its method and principles are applied to all existing systems to gather from them the materials for a higher and comprehensive system which is to embrace the whole. The test to be applied implies the existence of a philosophical creed, and yet this creed is still to be formed from the parts of truth extracted, by the application of itself, to all others! The system of M. Cousin has, in truth, no more claim to the title of Eclectic, than any other that has ever existed. It is quite as Procrustean in its character as others, stretching or lopping off to suit its own dimensions, and differing from them, in this respect, only in its catholic pretensions.

We cannot for reasons already given undertake to put our readers in possession of M. Cousin's complete system. But one of its chief peculiarities, in the judgment of Cousin himself, and of his translator, is to be found in the distinction which he draws between the spontaneous and the reflective reason, and this we will endeavour to explain. The fundamental fact of consciousness, according to M. Cousin, is a complex phenomenon, composed of three terms, namely, the *me*, and

\* Int. to Hist. of Phil. 440.

† Elem. of Psychology, p. xxx.

the *not me*, limited, bounded, finite; then the idea of something different from these, of the infinite, of unity, &c.; and again the relation of the *me* and the *not me*, that is, of the finite to the infinite, which contains and unfolds it: these are therefore the three terms of which the fundamental fact of consciousness is composed. Every man who bends his thoughts inwards, and penetrates only his own consciousness, will find there each of these three elements. If one of these terms is given, the others are given also, nor is it in the power of any man to deny any one of them. Such is now the case, but was it always thus? The distinguishing characteristic of every phenomenon, as now manifested in the consciousness, is the conviction of having tried to deny its truth, and the discovery of an inability to do so. But intelligence could not originally commence with such a denial, seeing that every denial supposes an affirmation of denying. Nor do we commence with reflection, since reflection supposes an operation anterior to itself, and cannot add any terms to those which are given by that operation. Reflection adds itself to that which was, it throws light upon that which is, but it creates nothing. There must have been therefore an instinctive development of intelligence, a perception of truth prior to reflection, and independent of the will, a pure affirmation not yet mingled with any negation. This primitive intuition contains all that will at a later period be contained in reflection:—the *me* and the *not me*,\* the infinite and the finite, unity and variety, substance and phenomenon, are contained, though obscurely, in the first flashing forth of spontaneity. This is the spontaneous reason as distinguished from the reflective. The spontaneous reason seizes upon truth at first sight; comprehends and receives it, without asking why it does so. It is independent of the will, and therefore impersonal. It does not belong to us: though in us, it is not of us, it is not ours. It is absolute, and gives pure truth, and in all men the same truth. But in the reflective reason, our own voluntary activity is concerned, and here is found the source of difference and error.†

\* We quote M. Cousin's description of a man's finding himself. "We do not commence with seeking ourselves, for this would imply that we already know that we exist; but, on a certain day, at a certain hour, at a certain moment,—a moment, solemn in existence!—without having sought ourselves, we find ourselves:—thought, in its instinctive development, discloses to us that we are; we affirm our existence with profound assurance,—with an assurance, unmingled with any negation whatever."—*Int. to Hist. of Phil.* p. 164.

† The preceding account of the two-fold development of reason is drawn chiefly from the sixth Lecture of the Introduction to the History of Philosophy:



Such is substantially M. Cousin's account of the distinction between the spontaneous and the reflective reason. He claims it as a discovery of his own, which he lighted upon "in the recesses of consciousness, and at a depth to which Kant did not penetrate." Kant paused at the apparent relativity and subjectivity of the laws of thought, but by diving deeper M. Cousin "detected and unfolded the fact, instantaneous but real, of the spontaneous perception of truth—a perception which not reflecting itself immediately, passes without notice in the interior consciousness, but is the actual basis of that which, at a subsequent period, in a logical form, and in the hands of reflection, becomes a necessary conception."

We can now show the reader the ground which M. Cousin's philosophy affords him for a belief in the objective existence of the world, and God. The system of Kant led to scepticism, inasmuch as it taught that all the laws of thought are altogether subjective, and the evil consequence was remedied only by assigning an illogical office to the Practical Reason. But M. Cousin has gained the same end, and saved his logic. "All subjectivity expires in the spontaneity of perception. Reason, it is true, becomes subjective by its relation to the free and voluntary *me*, the seat and type of all subjectivity; but in itself it is impersonal; it belongs to no one individual rather than another, within the compass of humanity: it belongs not even to humanity itself." Reason therefore being impersonal, it follows that it is absolute, and that the truths it gives are absolute truths. Here is the only resting-place given us for our belief in the objective existence of the finite or the infinite—the spontaneity, hence the impersonality, and hence the absolute character of reason. He who does not "possess the strength to penetrate deeply into the recesses of his own mind, to pierce through reflection, (we know not with what instrument) in order to arrive at the basis of all reflection," or who, when he has arrived at this deep place, is not fortunate enough to find there "a pure affirmation, not yet mingled with any negation, and containing in it all that has subsequently been given by reflection," has no proper evidence for the spontaneity of reason upon which this solution of the problem of the objective rests. It is to this pure affirmation, sometimes represented as "so pure that it escapes notice,"

it is perhaps a work of supererogation to say that it is given in the author's own phraseology, though abridged, since we are sure our readers will acquit us of the ability to construct it ourselves.

so bright that we can not see it, that the appeal is made in proof of what is styled, the spontaneous reason. We must therefore find this "pure affirmation" in our consciousness, or we must admit in deference to M. Cousin's logic, that it exists there, though so brightly that we cannot see it, before we can believe in any objective existence. That is, unless we have strength enough to make the discovery in the recesses of our own minds, a task to which M. Cousin acknowledges that but few men are equal, we must admit that there exists in our consciousness something of which we are nevertheless not conscious, in order to be satisfied of the objective existence of either the world or God; and we regard this as so uncertain a path for arriving at certainty, that we believe few on this side of the Atlantic will trust their feet in it:

Whom shall we find  
Sufficient? who shall tempt with wandering feet  
The dark unbottom'd infinite abyss,  
And through the palpable obscure find out  
His uncouth way?

There are some other results of the non-subjectivity of the spontaneous reason which are more startling. It is the pure affirmation, the spontaneous perception of the reason, which gives us the finite and the infinite. Whence comes this reason which enlightens us, but does not belong to us? "This principle, M. Cousin says, is God, the first and the last principle of all things." Human reason therefore "becomes divine in its own eyes." "Reason is literally a revelation, a necessary and universal revelation which is wanting to no man, and which enlightens every man on his coming into the world. Reason is the necessary mediator between God and man, the Logos of Pythagoras and Plato, the Word made flesh, which serves as the interpreter of God and the teacher of man, divine and human at the same time." There is no hesitation on the part of M. Cousin in drawing from this the conclusion that "humanity is inspired,—the divine breath which is in it, always and every where, reveals to it all truths under one form or another according to the place and the time." "Every man thinks, every man therefore thinks God, if we may so express it." "Every where present, he (God) returns as it were to himself in the consciousness of man, of which he indirectly constitutes the mechanism and phenomenal triplicity by the reflection of his own nature and of the substantial triplicity of which he is the absolute identity."\*

\* *Elem. of Psychol.* p. 400. See Marheineke *Dogm.* §§ 229. ff. *Bretschneider, ubi supr.* p. 49.

In human reason there are found three ideas, a triplicity in unity; the infinite, the finite, and the relation which subsists between them;—the passage from these ideas to God, says M. Cousin, is not difficult; “for these ideas are God himself.” We earnestly call attention to this as one of the most hideous heads of the pantheistic hydra. The dogmatic theologians of this sect have put it in the place of the incarnation, and the poets of ‘young Germany’ are teaching the intoxicated youth to regard themselves as sublime realizations of the divine reason. So Schefer, in his passionate verses, designates man as *the Son of God*, as *godlike*, nay, as the *God-man*; and in a phrensy of self-apotheosis proceeds to call the human head the *city of the gods!*

But to resume our thread, as in human consciousness there are found only two ideas and their connexion, forming three elements, so in nature, two corresponding laws and their connexion govern the material universe. We find in the world the same triplicity in unity as in ourselves. “The world accordingly is of the same stuff with ourselves, and nature is the sister of man.” And here we find in God, man, and the world, the triplicity in unity again, which figures so largely in the Eclectic philosophy. The unity of the three is not obscurely taught in the following passage. “The interior movement of the energies of the world, in the necessary progress of their development from degree to degree, from kingdom to kingdom, produces that wondrous being whose fundamental attribute is consciousness, and in this consciousness we have met with precisely the same elements which, subject to different conditions, we had already found to exist in nature:—the same elements which we had recognised in God himself.”\* M. Cousin has not permitted the shadow of a doubt to rest upon the pantheistical tendency of his philosophy. “God, he tells us, is at once true and real, at once substance and cause, always substance and always cause, being substance only in so far as he is cause, and cause only in so far as he is substance, that is to say, being absolute cause, one and many, eternity and time, space and number, essence and life, indivisibility and totality, principle, end and centre, at the summit of being, and at its lowest degree, infinite and finite together, triple in a word, that is to say, at the same time God, nature and human-

\* Introd. to Hist. of Phil. p. 158.

ity. In fact, if God be not every thing, he is nothing, if he be absolutely indivisible in himself, he is inaccessible; and consequently he is incomprehensible, and his incomprehensibility is for us the same as his destruction.”\* M. Cousin has attempted to forestall the charge of pantheism, by pronouncing it the bugbear of feeble imaginations. This is a very common, and not a very creditable artifice. But we trust that there is, in our country at least, enough of this feebleness of imagination to be affrighted by the bugbear, and to shrink back with horror from such a philosophical aliment as is offered by an infidel philosophy; and the more so when we see in every new arrival of European journals, that there is scarcely a doctrine of orthodox Christianity, on which these harpies have not descended, claiming it as their own, and so defiling it by impious misuse as to give us poison under the shape of food.

No sincere and earnest inquirer after truth, humble and reverent in his self-distrust, as he must needs be, can fail to take offence at the bold and confident tone in which M. Cousin settles all questions; and especially will the pious mind recoil from his unhallowed intrusions upon the nature and essence of the Deity. He professes indeed to believe and teach the existence of God. He professes too, sad omen at the outset, thoroughly to comprehend his nature and essence. He does not pretend to deny, he pleads guilty to, the accusation of seeking “to penetrate into the depths of the Divine Essence, which common opinion declares to be incomprehensible.† “So little is God incomprehensible, that his *nature* is constituted by ideas—by *those* ideas whose nature it is to be intelligible.” “The measure of the comprehensibility of God is the measure of human faith.” They who falter and draw back from this rushing in of fools, where angels dare not tread, are reproached with “pusillanimous mysticism.” He admits that God “is incomprehensible as a formula, and in the schools,” but we should consider that “mysticism is the necessary form of all religion”—“the symbolical and mystical form is inherent in religion”—and “to speak plainly, the religious form and the philosophical form are different from each other.” Though religion therefore must of necessity present truths under a mysterious and incomprehensible form, it is the right of philosophy to pene-

\* Elem. of Psychol. p. 399.

† Introd. to Hist. of Phil. p. 132.

trate this form, and disengage the ideas; it is its duty "to comprehend nothing and to admit nothing but in so far as it is true in itself, and in the form of ideas." God exists only so far as we comprehend him. His nature is constituted by ideas, and those ideas are wholly within the stretch and compass of our reason. "I will speak," says our author, "plainly and unequivocally upon this point. Mystery is a word which belongs not to the vocabulary of philosophy, but to that of religion."\*

With this for his point of departure, it is not surprising that M. Cousin should be led to reject entirely the God of the Scriptures, and substitute in his stead a shadowy abstraction. In place of the mysterious and incomprehensible Jehovah, whose infinite perfections will be the study and delight of an eternity, we have a God whose nature and essence we can now, while seeing through a glass darkly, thoroughly comprehend, and to whom faith is not permitted to attribute any thing of excellence or glory beyond what the human intellect can clearly discern. In place of the God

quoted by  
P. Austin

\* *Introd. to Hist. of Phil.* p. 134. There is an admirable contrast between the pert self-sufficiency of M. Cousin, and the humble truth-loving spirit of the illustrious Descartes, who is honoured and lauded as the author of the Psychological Method, and the founder of the Ideal School of Philosophy. Cousin calls himself one of the sons of Descartes. Degenerate son of a noble sire! Compare the modest caution of the one with the all-embracing arrogance of the other. "Quod ut satis tuto et sine errandi periculo aggrediamur, cā nobis cautelā est utendum, ut semper quam maxime recordemur, et Deum auctorem rerum esse infinitum, et nos omnino finitos. Ita si forte nobis Deus de se ipso, vel aliis aliquid revelet, quod naturales ingenii nostri vires excedat, qualia jam sunt mysteria Incarnationis et Trinitatis, non recusabimus illa credere, quamvis non clare intelligamus; Nec ullo modo mirabimur multa esse, tum in immensa ejus natura, tum etiam in rebus ab eo creatis, quae captum nostrum excedant."—*Princ. Phil.* § xxv.

Another truly great man, of the same age, in urging the use of reason in theology, addresses to those who employ this noble talent in all other matters, but hide it under a bushel when they come to the study of God and of his word, the expostulation, "Cave, cave, ne quondam a te rigide satis rationes exigantur tam male collocati tui talenti." But he immediately adds, "Scio quam maxime, nec opus est ut monear, plurima esse, quae Deus in verbo suo nobis revelavit, captum nostrum infinities superantia, qualia sunt momentosissima fidei capita de S. S. Trinitate, de eterna generatione filii, de ejus incarnatione, de resurrectione mortuorum,—haec sane credidi, credo, et per gratiam Dei semper credam, quia ea revelare mihi dignatus est."—*Joh. Bernoulli, Opera*, Vol. I. p. 196.

We could quote much to the same effect from Leibnitz, to whom M. Cousin does homage "as the greatest authority among modern philosophers." These were men who were seeking, with passionate earnestness, after truth: they were not founding new schools in philosophy. They were men of large powers and large attainments, and could afford to confess ignorance, where it is folly to be wise.

critique

note: Role of Reason

of Abraham, of Isaac, and of Jacob, the God to whom his people, in all ages, have fled for refuge, crying, do *Thou* deliver me and save me, we are presented with a vague personification of abstract principles, with a God who is described as the reason; thought, with its fundamental momenta; space, time, and number; the substance of the *me*, or the free personality, and of the fatal *not me* or nature; who returns to himself in the consciousness of man; of whose divine essence all the momenta pass into the world, and return into the consciousness of man; who is every thing, and it might, with equal significancy, be added nothing.

With this notion of God no one will contradict the position frequently assumed by M. Cousin, that Atheism is impossible. Who can deny the existence of reason, of thought, of the world? And if he cannot deny these he cannot deny God, for these are God. It is substantially upon this ground that M. Cousin rests the impossibility of Atheism. "Every man believes in his own existence, every man therefore believes in the existence of the world and God. Every man thinks, every man therefore thinks God. Every human proposition contains God: every man who speaks, speaks of God, and every word is an act of faith and a hymn. Every assertion, even though negative, is a judgment which contains the idea of being, and consequently, *God in his fullness.*"\* To the same effect we are told "that all thought implies a spontaneous faith in God, and natural Atheism has no existence." Every man who believes that he exists, believes all that is necessary. "If he believes this, I am satisfied; for if he believes that he exists, he then believes that his thought,—that he believes his existence—is worthy of faith; he therefore places faith in the principle of his thought;—now, *there is God.*"† Even the sceptic who doubts every thing, is not to be brought as an objection to this doctrine. For does he deny that he denies? Does he doubt that he doubts? If he only affirms that he doubts, in that affirmation there is included faith in himself and in God. Behold then all men converted into believers—respect humanity, for all its members acknowledge the same God;—impute atheism to no man, for every man speaks, and each word is an act of faith in God; every man believes his own consciousness, and it is in human consciousness that God returns to himself; "human consciousness is like the divine essence which it

\* Elem. of Psych. p. 401, 402.

† Introd. to Hist. of Phil. p. 174.

manifests." Such is the practical conclusion of this philosophy. And we admit its justness. It is logically connected with the premises. With the notion of God given us by M. Cousin, atheism is indeed impossible. And so is it impossible under any scheme of idolatry which assumes an object in the existence of which all men must of necessity believe, as its God. The African, having established that his *fetish* is God, will have no difficulty in proving that all men, or as many at least as believe in the evidence of their senses, believe in God. Atheism is a term that bears relation to the true God revealed in the Bible, to the God that is found under the "venerable form of religion," and the philosophy that approaches this form to disengage the idea of God, and change it to a new one, though it comes with many expressions of "profound respect and veneration," and with all the deferential and smirking politeness of a French *petit maitre*, is essentially atheistic in its character, and as such should be held in equal abhorrence with the open and frontless denial of God. M. Cousin, to do him justice, never fails in polite respect towards religion: he even refers, with evident approbation, to the pious politeness "of the octogenary author of the *Systeme du Monde*, (*an Atheist*), who bowed and uncovered his head, whenever God was named," But when a man robs us of our God, it is but little matter whether he does it with an open and rude violence, or with a smooth and complaisant legerdemain.

The idea of creation is of necessity modified by the idea of God. What is it to create? After stating and repudiating the "vulgar definition, which is, to make something out of nothing," M. Cousin proceeds to seek the true conception of this act among the facts of consciousness. "To create," he says, "is a thing which it is not difficult to conceive, for it is a thing which we do at every moment; in fact we create whenever we perform a free action.—Here is the type of a creation. The divine creation is the same in its nature. God, if he is a cause, can create; and if he is an absolute cause, he cannot but create; and in creating the universe he does not draw it forth from nothingness but from himself. God therefore creates, he creates by virtue of his creative power; he draws forth the world not from nothingness, which is not, but from him who is absolute existence. An absolute creative force, which cannot but pass into act, being eminently his characteristic, it follows, not that creation is possible but that it is necessary: it follows that

God is creating without cessation and infinitely, and that creation is inexhaustible, and sustains itself constantly.”\* M. Cousin, on one occasion, intimates that he knows “he is speaking in 1828, and not in 1850,” and we presume a decent regard for the prejudices of the age in which his lot is cast, prevented him from stating an immediate inference from the principles here laid down. If it be the most eminent characteristic of God that he is an absolute creative force that cannot but pass into act, we are driven to believe in the eternal creation of the world, or rather in the eternal co-existence and oneness of God, and the universe. The possibility of a creation, in the strict and proper sense of the term, is denied by M. Cousin at the outset. He says that “Leucippus, Epicurus, Bayle, and Spinoza, and indeed all others whose powers of thought are somewhat exercised, demonstrate, that out of nothing, nothing can be drawn forth; that out of nothing, nothing can come forth; whence it follows that creation is impossible. Yet by pursuing a different route our investigations arrive at this very different result, viz, that creation is, I do not say, possible, but necessary.” And what is this different route which conducts from the same premises to so opposite a conclusion? It is, as we have seen, by changing the meaning of the word. It is by narrowing the term to signify only what we every moment do, what every cause, now in action, does. By confounding creation with causation, and defining God to be a creative force that could not but pass into act, either Leucippus or Spinoza might have proved as clearly as M. Cousin has done, that creation, so far from being impossible, is both possible and necessary. That they did not arrive at this “different result,” should be imputed perhaps rather to their candour, than to their want of penetration.

If the maxima “*nihil posse creari de nihilo*” be received as universally true, and applied in limitation of the Divine power, as well as human, creation is of course impossible. Creation is the making of something out of nothing, and if this cannot be done there can be no creation. We find matter now in existence. Unless it has existed eternally, there was a time when it did not exist. It must then have been formed either of something already existing, which by hypothesis is not matter, that is, of spirit, or it must have been formed of nothing. But matter cannot be a modified form

\* *Introd. to Hist. of Phil.* p. 136—142.



of spiritual existence, and according to M. Cousin, it cannot be drawn forth from nothing. The only legitimate conclusion to which we can arrive from these premises is, that matter does not now exist, or that it has had an independent existence from eternity, or that it is an emanation from the Deity. The latter opinion seems to be the one held by M. Cousin. The material universe, he teaches us, was not formed out of nothing;—God drew it forth from himself. “We may, he says, go further. The creations of God are from himself; therefore he creates with all the characteristics which we have recognised in him, and which pass *necessarily* into his creation.”\* We find too the following passage in his preface to the second edition of the Philosophical Fragments, translated by Dr. Henry, and appended to the Elements of Psychology. “God exists for us only in the relation of cause; without this, reason would not refer to him either humanity or the world. He is absolute substance only inasmuch as he is absolute cause; and his *essence* consists precisely in his creative power.”† M. Cousin’s theory of Cosmogony is now quite plain. The essence of God is his creative power. He is an absolute force, subjected to a necessity of acting, and of developing in its effects those characteristics and those alone which are found in itself. God is made the mere living force, the *vis viva*, of the universe, and all things are but the radiations and effluxes of this primary and interior energy. This is the theory taught, if we may credit the Hermetic Fragments, by the ancient Egyptians, and which is at this day held both by the Brahmins and Buddhists of the East. Among all the ancients, unless the Tuscans be an exception, the creation of something out of nothing was held to be a palpable absurdity. It was a common article in all the different creeds of Grecian and Roman philosophy that “*gigni de nihilo nil, in nihilum nil posse reverti.*” This led to two different theories of the origin of the visible universe, either of them exclusive of a creation properly so called. The one, that of most of the Greek schools, which taught the eternity, and independent existence of matter. The other, that of the oriental systems, which represented the universe as an emanation from within the Deity. Thus in the Yajur Veid, as translated by Du Perron, it is said: “The whole universe is the Creator, proceeds from the Creator, exists in him, and returns to him.

\* Introd. p. 142.

† Elem. of Psych. p. 408.

The ignorant assert that the universe, in the beginning, did not exist in its author, and that it was created out of nothing. Oh, ye whose hearts are pure, how could something be made out of nothing? This first Being alone, and without likeness, was the *all* in the beginning: he could multiply himself under different forms; he created fire from his essence, which is light, &c." This doctrine was early carried into Greece, and adopted by many of their philosophers. It is found in the Orphic remains, especially in the poem *de Mundo*, as quoted by Aristotle and Proclus, in Aeschylus, and in most of the Greek poets. It seems to have special affinities for poetry. In modern times it has made its reappearance in the polished periods of Pope's *Essay on Man*, and it runs through the wild and impious imaginations of Shelley.\* Under the poetic dress this system is more tolerable, because we can ordinarily make such deductions for poetic imagery as will bring it within the compass of truth. But when in the grave language of didactic philosophy we are told that the very essence of God is his creative power; that he is a force that was compelled to act and to pass with all his characteristics into the visible world; and that nothing now exists which has not from eternity existed in God; we are concerned, we are alarmed. This necessary transfusion of God into the universe destroys our very idea of God.† He is made the substratum, the substance of all existence; and we are only bubbles thrown up upon the bosom of the mighty ALL, to reflect the rainbow colours, in our brief phenomenal existence, and then be absorbed again into the ocean from which we came.‡

It will have been already anticipated from the exposition we have given, that M. Cousin's philosophy makes sad havoc with Christianity. He is indeed studiously polite to Christianity as well as to natural religion. "He knows that he is speaking in 1828, and not in 1850." This knowledge it is,

\* Wordsworth occasionally borders on the very extreme of poetic license upon this subject. The philosophical principles of the *Essay on Man* were dictated by Bolingbroke, and it is supposed that Pope was not himself sufficiently aware of their tendency.

† If La Place had only personified under the name of God, the forces with which the attenuated matter of his *nebular* hypothesis was supposed to be endowed, he might, with as much justice as M. Cousin, have escaped the imputation of Atheism.

‡ The fittest symbolical form that has ever been given to this creed is that of an oriental sect, who represent the Deity as an immense spider seated at the centre of the universe, and spinning forth all things from his own body.

doubtless, that draws from him his kind and forbearing indulgence towards Christianity,—his patience, with its slowness of movement,—nay, his condescending patronage. “Christianity is the philosophy of the people. He who now addresses you sprang from the people, and from Christianity; and I trust you will always recognise this, in my profound and tender respect for all that is of the people and of Christianity. Philosophy is patient; she knows what was the course of events in former generations, and she is full of confidence in the future; happy in seeing the great bulk of mankind in the arms of Christianity, she offers, with modest kindness, to assist her in ascending to a yet loftier elevation.”\* And again, he says, “I believe that in Christianity all truths are contained; but these eternal truths may and ought to be approached, disengaged, and illustrated by philosophy. Truth has but one foundation; but truth assumes two forms, mystery, and scientific exposition; I revere the one, I am the organ and interpreter of the other.”† Infidelity has, in most cases, assumed this guise of philosophical explanation of the truths of Christianity. Hume proposed only to place faith upon its proper foundation; and even Voltaire and the French Encyclopedists professed to be rendering true service to Christianity, while they were seeking to sap its foundations and overwhelm it with utter ruin. But unless it be to blind the eyes, and evade the arm of the ecclesiastical power, which in Catholic countries holds watch over the press, we see not what good purpose can be effected by so thin a disguise as that assumed by M. Cousin.‡ He surely cannot imagine that the most ordinary intelligence could fail to penetrate the flimsy hypocrisy. He comes down from the heights of philosophy, to meet Christianity in her helplessness and aid her in ascending to a loftier elevation! Though tolerant of her past slowness, yet knowing that she must move more rapidly to meet the wants of the future, he comes, with modest kindness, to disburden her of her mys-

\* Introd. to Hist. of Phil. p. 57.

† Introd. to Hist of Phil. p. 442.

‡ Among those whom we look to as readers of such articles as this there are some who are turning their steps to the enchanted ground of German literature, either in its primitive or its secondary and Gallicized division. Let us with all the earnestness of disinterested dread caution the young American. Under the disguises of romance and poesy, he will learn to tolerate the hell-born dogmas of the *young Germany*; the mingled lust and blasphemy of Heine, Pückler Muskau, and Schefer; or, if he wander in these domains as a theologian, the Iscariot Christianity of the disciples of Schelling, Hegel, and Daub.

teries, and quicken her steps! He presents himself as an interpreter, in scientific exposition, of a revelation from God, and the canon which he brings in his hand and openly exposes, is to admit nothing which this revelation contains as truth, unless by falling back upon our own pure reason we find it to be true in itself and in the form of ideas! In his solution of the mystery of the Incarnation, in which Reason is declared to be the Word made flesh, we have both proof and warning of the kind of assistance which Christianity may expect at his hands. All the sacred mysteries of revelation dwindle, in like manner, under his profane touch, into the stale truths of our own consciousness. Locke encounters the sneers of M. Cousin because he had not discovered this mode of making Christianity easy. Speaking of the appeals made by Locke to Christianity, to revelation, and to faith, he says, "By faith however and by revelation, he does not understand a philosophical faith and revelation. This interpretation did not exist in the age of Locke. He understands faith and revelation, in the proper orthodox, theological sense."\* If we have a just idea of the temper of Locke, he would have scorned to avail himself of this slippery and deceptive interpretation. It is an ungracious task to be alarmists, and we should shun the office if only some specialties of this or that sect were at stake, and not, as we believe, the very basis of all religion and morals. Socinianism is evangelical when compared with the newest theology of Germany.

M. Cousin's patronage of Christianity becomes sometimes ludicrous. He declares, with gravity, that "it is the best of all religions, and it is the most accomplished of all." He assigns a reason for its accomplishments. It is this, "that the Christian religion is that which of all other religions came last; and it is unreasonable to suppose that the religion which came last should not be better than all others, should not embrace and resume them all."† The perfectibility of the human species is a cardinal doctrine with M. Cousin. Humanity is ever in the right; and its progress is steadily onward and upward. Each age is an improvement on its predecessor, and every new system is superior to all that have gone before it. The inferiority of Christianity will therefore be demonstrated, should the general apostacy which some predict take place after its universal prevalence.

We need not seek in the remote deductions and results of

\* *Elem. of Psych.* p. 213.

† *Introd. to Hist. of Phil.* p. 339.

M. Cousin's philosophy for evidence of its irreconcilable hostility to Christianity. In its first principles it overthrows the foundation of divine revelation. The spontaneous reason, we are told by M. Cousin, is God, and the truths given by it are "literally a revelation from God." And since this reason is found in all men, "humanity is inspired." The original fact of affirmation, which is found by M. Cousin in human consciousness, beneath reflection, and anterior to all negation, and upon which he relies for proof of the existence of the spontaneous reason, "this fact it is, which the human race have agreed to call inspiration." This inspiration is attended always by enthusiasm. "It is the spirit of God with us: it is immediate intuition, as opposed to induction and demonstration: it is the primitive spontaneity opposed to the ulterior development of reflection."\* As neither the senses or the will are concerned in this primitive act of pure apperception, we cannot refer it to ourselves. Therefore, "when man is conscious of the wondrous fact of inspiration and enthusiasm, feeling himself unable to refer it to himself, he refers it to God; and gives to this original and pure affirmation the name of revelation. Is the human race wrong?† When man, conscious of his feeble intervention in the fact of inspiration, refers to God the truths which he has not made, and which rule over him, does he deceive himself? No, certainly not; for what is God? I have told you; he is thought in itself, with its fundamental momenta; he is eternal reason, the substance and the cause of the truths which man perceives. When man therefore refers to God that truth which he cannot refer either to this world, or to his own personality, he refers it to him to whom he ought to refer it; and this absolute affirmation of truth, without reflection,—this inspiration,—enthusiasm,—is veritable revelation."‡ All men are inspired, and all are inspired in an equal degree. This spontaneity of reason, which is to all men a veritable revelation from God, "does not admit of essential differences." It gives pure truth, and in all men the same truth. "Every where, in its instinctive and spontaneous form, reason is equal to itself, in all the genera-

\* *Elem. of Psych.* p. 301.

† The deification of collective humanity is regarded by many in Germany as the regenerative principle of our age. The fashionable pantheism of Berlin teaches that 'whatever is (in politics) is right;' a blessed creed for the courtiers of an absolute monarch; and which when applied to morals, forbids us, as does a living poet, to dim our mind's eye with any tears of penitence; for all hatred is only love seen on the wrong side!

‡ *Introd. to Hist. of Phil.* p. 165, 166.

tions of humanity, and in all the individuals of which these different generations are composed."\* It is too plain for argument, that these principles destroy all that is peculiar and valuable in the Sacred Scriptures. The distinctive claim which they put forth, of containing a revelation from God, is set aside by a similar claim on behalf of every man. Humanity is inspired in all its members, and revelations of truth are made to all men in nearly equal degree. When holy men of God spake of old, as they were moved by the Holy Ghost, they were but giving utterance to the visions of the spontaneous reason, and the truths declared by Christ and his Apostles were from God only in the same sense in which all our own intuitions of truth are from God. The Koran is of equal authority with the Bible; all pretended revelations have one and the same authority, that is, the self-evidence of the truths which they contain. The Gospel of Christ is thus stripped of its high prerogative as a special message from God; and holy prophets and apostles, nay our Saviour too, were deceived in supposing that they had any other kind of communication with God, than that which every man enjoys. No special revelation could, according to this philosophy, be accredited to the world. No messenger or interpreter could be furnished for a divine mission among men. The truths revealed to any one man through the operations of his instinctive reason, and by him proclaimed to others, cannot be received except by such as find the same truths in their own spontaneity of reason. And the only way therefore by which God could make known his will, and give it authority among men, would be by enlarging the spontaneous reason of every man. At precisely this point the extremes of flat Rationalism, and the philosophy of the Absolute come together. Their osculation is seen in Strauss's "Life of Jesus," which has almost convulsed the religious world in Germany. Marheineke and Röhr, like Herod and Pilate, agree only when the Son of God is to be crucified. Would to God that our fellow Christians in America, before abandoning as shallow the philosophy of the great English fathers, would take the trouble to examine the issues of the paths on which they are entering! Let us have any philosophy however shallow, that leaves us in quiet possession of the Gospel, rather than the dark and hopeless bewilderment into which we are thrown by the deep metaphysics of M. Cousin. We say to

\* Introd. p. 174.

him and to Dr. Henry, in the language of Edmund Burke, "If our religious tenets should ever want a further elucidation, we shall not call on infidelity to explain them. We shall not light up our temple from that unhallowed fire. It will be illuminated with other lights. It will be perfumed with other incense, than the infectious stuff which is imported by the smugglers of adulterated metaphysics."

They who are accustomed to look to the sanctions of religion for the chief support of morality, will naturally surmise that M. Cousin is not unduly strict in his ethical code. When God is made to be thought, reason, space, time and number, there is not much room left for the commission of any serious offences against him. If humanity is inspired, there is no reason to doubt that humanity will always be in the right. We accordingly find that under the cheerful philosophy of M. Cousin it is a crime to "blaspheme humanity." Forms of government or of religion which have extensively prevailed could not have subsisted without the consent of humanity, and though it is our privilege to criticise, we are taught that it would be wrong to condemn them. The spirit of each particular age, the temper of each system of philosophy, in short, every thing which has existed through the concurrence of humanity, is right; "it has its apology in its existence." We are warned not to "accuse humanity," by condemning religious or political laws which have had the confidence and sympathy of the masses of mankind. "To imprecate power (long and lasting power), we are told, is to blaspheme humanity; to bring accusations against glory, is nothing less than to bring accusations against humanity, by which it is decreed. What is glory, gentlemen? It is the judgment of humanity upon its members; and humanity is always in the right."\* No appeal can be taken from the judgment of humanity, for "its judgment is infallible."†

We are thus led to a conclusion which M. Cousin does not scruple to avow and apply, that success is the criterion of moral excellence. He sets it down as "the peculiar characteristic of a great man, that he succeeds." He proves that in every battle which has ever taken place, "the vanquished party deserved to be vanquished—that the victorious party was the better, the more moral party; and that therefore it was victorious."‡ This singular demonstration may be

\* *Intro.* p. 309.† *Intro.* p. 310.‡ *Intro.* p. 282.

summed up in a single sentence, which we extract. "Courage is a virtue which has a right to the recompense of victory,—weakness is a vice, and, inasmuch as it is so, it is always punished and beaten."\* Examination and reflection, we are told, will convince us, in every case, that "the vanquished ought to have been vanquished," and that our sympathy and applause should be "on the side of the victor, for his is the better cause."

We have never seen the odious maxim, Whatever is, is right, pressed to a more insane extent, than is given to it in M. Cousin's philosophy. It is this abominable principle which breathes into his system the cheerful inspiration upon which he so much loves to dwell. We may indeed thus learn to be cheerful under any aspect of affairs, we may bow the knee to any religion, we may cordially embrace any form of government, we may shout in the procession of any conqueror, we may rejoice with the successful oppressor, and insult the oppressed with the truth that he deserves to suffer,—but at what expense do we purchase this easy and cheerful temper! What a sacrifice of the tender charities of our nature, what a dreadful perversion of truth and conscience does it involve! We must first learn to believe what M. Cousin indeed distinctly teaches, that prudence, courage and strength, though united with ambition, revenge, cruelty and rapacity, constitute a moral excellence that deserves to triumph over imprudence and weakness, though associated with the greatest mildness, forbearance, and benevolence. We would rather weep sometimes with those that weep, than have our tears thus stayed.

There is to us a dark and dreary fatalism pervading M. Cousin's system, of which symptoms have already appeared in the extracts we have given. He does not indeed teach what is commonly meant by fatalism. He is a strenuous advocate for the freedom of the will, and talks much of our free personality. But then this freedom itself is but one of the products of a deeper fatalism which pervades the universe, and works out its results in all things. The mechanical theory of the French atheists, which was the product of the philosophy of sensation, and the ideal theory of the Transcendentalists arrive, in this respect, though by different

\* *Intro.* p. 283.



routes, at much the same conclusion. And though each brings with it somewhat of the dust of the road by which it has come, there is not much to choose between them. The one is indeed more refined and *spiritual* than the other. We hear less of the working and grinding of the machinery. It is an abstract and ideal mechanism to which it subjects us, but still a mechanism. All things are moved on by a resistless destiny. Even God is represented as a creative force, which could not but pass into act. And again, we are told, "God could not remain in a state of absolute unity; that absolute unity, that eternal substance, being a creative force, could not but create.\*" Cousin teaches us that every man who exists is but the exponent of some pre-existing necessity; that every book that is written is but the realization of an idea that must needs take this form, and that every thing which occurs represents an idea which could not but be represented at that precise time, and in that very manner. After a full exposition of the *a priori* demand for a Universal History, he concludes, "hence the necessity of Bossuet." The idea had been ripening for some time, and at length there was an imperative necessity for it to put on a concrete form, and it immediately assumed it in the person of the Bishop of Meaux. Nor is this all. It was not only necessary that Bossuet should come into existence at this precise moment, and that he should write a Universal History, but his plan also was subject to necessity. After a full account of the *a priori* urgency of an idea upon this subject, we are told, "hence, gentlemen, the necessity of Bossuet's plan." We have then an account of the necessity which called into being and set at work in their respective functions, Vico, Herder, Tenneman, and others. It would seem as if there had been some difficulty in finding concrete habitation for the abstract necessities of the Cartesian philosophy. Descartes himself was the product of a necessity which grew out of the dependence and subjection of the scholastic systems. It was necessary that there should be a revolution, in which reason might shake off the shackles of authority and enter upon the true method of philosophizing. And Descartes came to represent this idea. But then Descartes was a gentleman and a soldier; Malebranche was a monk, Berkeley an eminent bishop, Spinoza a recluse, and Leibnitz

\* Introd. to Hist. of Phil. p. 303.

a statesman. There was therefore a necessity, in the Cartesian philosophy, for a great professor: "this was the place and destiny of Wolf."\*

There is a wider domain, and a stricter rule given by M. Cousin, to this destiny, than is conceded by most even of fatalists. Not only do all men, and especially great men, represent ideas which it was necessary should find their representation in them, but "every place represents an idea." There is nothing in the world which has not its necessity for existing, and which does not therefore represent an idea. "Yes! gentlemen, says our author, give me the map of any country, its configuration, its climate, its waters, its winds, and the whole of its physical geography; give me its natural productions, its flora, its zoology, &c. and I pledge myself to tell you, *a priori*, what will be the quality of man in that country, and what part its inhabitants will act in history,—not accidentally but necessarily, not at any particular epoch, but in all: in short—what idea he is called to represent." The philosophy which denies that "all things hold and bind each other together, which emancipates man in any degree from the laws of brass and iron which work so effectually upon him even through nature, that "the existence of a particular country determines the existence of a particular people," is branded as a "sentimental and pusillanimous spiritualism, which, though well enough adapted to the minds of children and of women, would not be less fatal to science than materialism itself."†

M. Cousin has a reason, aside from the principles of his philosophy, for being a fatalist. "All great men, he says, have been fatalists." And as he has provided the way, in all other respects, for his being a great man, it would hardly answer for him to fail here. "A great man, he informs us, is a general idea, concentrated in a strong individuality, so that its generality may appear without suppressing his individuality." From this definition of a great man he infers that no priest, prophet, or pontiff, can be great, since their existence consists in their relation to the God whom they announce: with them "God is every thing, and man is noth-

\* Introd. p. 240. The inference is obvious: there still remained a necessity in the philosophy of the age for a "peer of France;" Quere: Does the same principle of necessary emanation from the age and circumstances hold in the case of translations? Or could M. Cousin, by an inverse method, declare the horoscope of his admirers?

† Introd. p. 242.

ing;" "sacerdotal castes destroy individuality, for in them nothing appears but the name of the caste, and the name of the caste is the name of its God." Therefore it appears that no priest, and by parity of reason, no religious man, in whom the idea of the infinite prevails over the finite, and to whom "God is every thing, and man nothing," can be a great man. War and philosophy are the only two lines of life which are favourable to the development of great men. "Who are they, he asks, who have left the greatest names among men? They are those who have done their countrymen the greatest good, who have served them most effectually; that is, who have made the greatest conquests, for the ideas which in their century were called to dominion, and which then represented the destinies of civilization; that is, *who have gained the most battles.*"\* But M. Cousin is not a warrior, except in the bloodless conflict of ideas, and it would not do to limit greatness to war. We have, in consequence, another demonstration, concluding, "therefore the great philosopher is, in his time and in his country, the ultimate perfection of all other great men, and together with the great captain he is the most complete representation of the people to whom he belongs."† The way is therefore open to M. Cousin. But it is "the peculiar mark of a great man that he succeeds." And M. Cousin has succeeded: for the "name of eclecticism, whether chosen well or ill, begins for some time since to be somewhat spread abroad, and to resound in France, and elsewhere."‡ Does not all the world, too, know that M. Cousin has been made a Peer of France. Without doubt, he has succeeded. What is further necessary? Why "all great men have in a greater or less degree been fatalists."§ And he has given sufficient proof that he labours under no lack of this qualification.

Let us again pause for a little season, and looking back upon our dreary way, take in at one retrospective survey so much of the field as may include the German, the French, and the mongrel philosophies. They are districts of the same kingdom; alike in arrogance, in nonsense, and in impiety.

Campbell has a chapter in his philosophy of Rhetoric, intended to point out the cause of the fact that nonsense so often escapes being detected, both by the writer and by the reader; but he did not live to see what we have seen. Grosser absurdities than those which may be selected from

\* Introd. p. 321.

† Ib. p. 323.

‡ Ib. p. 414.

§ Ib. p. 305.

the German, and the mock-German metaphysics, we believe the world never beheld; and these not in scattered places, but for page after page, and chapter after chapter. The Germans of the Transcendental School complain that we of the Anglo Saxon race are dull, terrestrial, and shallow; their defect is equally unfortunate, for no one of them has the faculty for describing an absurdity, as such. The grossest and most drivelling nonsense, which could be expressed in a jargon of words, would probably to a transcendentalist exhibit nothing ridiculous, and perhaps something august. Except the Philosophy of the Absolute, few things can be imagined more ludicrously and disgustingly absurd than the revelations of Böhme; or Jacob Behmen, as we more familiarly call him. Yet these ravings of the inspired shoemaker are regarded with "affectionate reverence,"\* not only by Schelling but by Coleridge; and, more amazing still, have conduced in no small degree to the production of the modern philosophy, as has been proved and acknowledged.†

In the land of their prevalence these systems have been frequently compared to the dreams of the early Gnostics, and the resemblance is too striking to escape any one versed in church-history; as has been to our knowledge admitted by some of those concerned. The very name *Gnosis* reminds one of the claim to direct knowledge of the absolute; but the parallel may be carried out in almost every particular of the two classes of opinion. This has been done in a profound manner by the learned Baur, in his work on the Gnosis of the Christian church. He has traced out at full length the horrid pictures of the Valentinians, and the Ophites; of Marcion and the admirers of the Pseudo Clementine Homilies; he has set over against this the portraiture of Böhme, of Fichte, of Schelling, and of Hegel; and, comparing their respective lineaments, has revealed a likeness as striking as it is frightful. This he does moreover not as an enemy, but as an adoring devotee of the new theogony. He shows the remarkable coincidence between Schelling and Böhme, and between both and the Gnostics; and he makes the analogy no less apparent in the case of Hegel.‡ In all these schemes, the ini-

\* Thus Coleridge speaks of Jacob Behmen, *Biogr. Liter.* vol. i. p. 96, see also p. 90.—Baur's *Gnosis*, pp. 557—611.—Heinroth: *von d. Grundfehlern der Erziehung*, 1828, p. 415.

† We observe two new biographies of Jacob Böhme, among the latest German works.

‡ *Die christliche Gnosis, oder die christliche Religions-Philosophie in ihrer*

tiated are incited to an esoteric vision of truth, a Gnosis which the common herd cannot attain: in all, the promise is, Your eyes shall be opened, and ye shall be as gods, knowing good and evil. The conflicting sects agree in this, and in a consequent contempt for what they call popular, experimental, or empirical philosophy.\* As there are certain limits to intellectual powers, which the immortal Locke endeavoured to ascertain, and beyond which we float in the region of midnight, so those who have forgotten these cautions have in their most original speculations only reproduced the delirium of other times, which in the cycle of opinion has come back upon us "like a phantasma or a hideous dream."† In the French imitation, no less than the German original, there is a perpetual self-delusion practised by the philosopher, who plays with words as a child with lettered cards, and combines what ought to be the symbols of thought, into expressions unmeaning and self-contradictory.‡ And as in this operation he cannot but be aware that these expressions are the exponents of no conceptions of the intellect, he demands, as the only possible prop of his system, a specific faculty for the absolute, the unconditioned, and—may we not add—the absurd! Thus Fichte asked of all such as would aspire to his primary,

geschichtlichen Entwicklung. Von Dr. Ferdinand Christian Baur.—Tübingen, 1835. In this elaborate work of Professor Baur, nearly two hundred pages are devoted to the exhibition of the parallel between the modern seers, and the frantic Ophitês and other transcendentalists of the primitive age. Let the reader suspend his judgment until he shall have inquired into the justice of this comparison.

\* Hegel gives himself great amusement at the English acceptance of the word Philosophy. He alludes to Lord Brougham's having, in a speech in parliament, spoken of "the *philosophical* principles of free-trade." He attributes a similar expression to Canning; and gives the following as the title of a recent English book, viz. "The Art of Preserving the Hair, on *Philosophical* principles."—*Hegel's Encyklopadie*, pp. 11, 12.

† When we look at the prodigious speculations of the schoolmen, we find expressions highly transcendental. Even Hegel is shorn of his originality, and Pantheism is discovered among the lucubrations of the dark ages. Thus, Johannes Erigena says of the divine nature: "Deus est omne quod vere est; quoniam ipse facit omnia, et fit in omnibus; omne enim quod intelligitur et sentitur, nihil aliud est, nisi non apparentis apparitio, occulti manifestatio, negati affirmatio, etc."—*De Divisione Naturae*, lib. ii. p. 80. Here we have pantheism. Again, "Per nihilum ex quo omnia creata esse scriptura dicit, intelligo ineffabilem et incomprehensibilem divinæ naturæ inaccessiblemque claritatem, omnibus intellectibus sive humanis sive angelicis inaccessibleiter incognitam." Lib. iii. p. 127, apud Rixner, vol. ii. pp. 13—15.

‡ "Little did Leibnitz, Wolf, &c. believe that the language of science would become a witch-jargon (*Hexensprache*) which we should learn like parrots."—*Herder Metakritik*, ii. 74.

free and creative act of the *Ich* or *Ego*, a certain power called the *Anschauungsvermögen*. It is the want of these optics, alas! which spoils us for philosophers. Reinhold, who often combated, and sometimes rallied his old friend, avowed that he was utterly destitute of this sense, a misfortune, adds M. Degerando, common to him with all the rest of the world.\* It is however the happy portion of the absolute Philosophers, the Behmenites, the Gnostics, the Soofies, the Budhists, and a few of the Americans.

It would afford a subject for many more pages than we can allot to this whole discussion, to compare the new philosophy with that of the Oriental mystics. We look with amazement at the exact reproduction of almost every eastern error in the musings of Europe. It should seem that no form of profane absurdity can ever finally die out of the world, until the great suggester of them all shall be cast into hell. Pantheism has by some been regarded as the mother of Polytheism; but mother and daughter have loved to dwell together, and the parent has in many cases survived the child. This form of error prevails widely among the Soofies of Persia, and the Budhists of the remoter east, as well as in countless minor sects in that nursery of

All monstrous, all prodigious things,  
Abominable, inutterable, and worse  
Than fables yet have feigned, or fear conceived,  
Gorgons, and Hydras, and Chimaeras dire.

Two valuable works of Tholuck relate to this subject: the one being a treatise on the Pantheism of Persia,† the other an Anthology of Oriental Mystic Poems.‡ There is scarcely a page of these volumes which does not show something to identify the ancient and eastern with the modern Pantheism. The resemblance is declared by the learned and pious author, who has a decided leaning towards the mystical philosophy. Hegel himself cites this Anthology, with acknowledgment of the same truth, complimenting Tholuck for his genial disposition towards profound philosophy, and at the same time lamenting his still remaining prejudice and narrowness.§ Among these Mo-

\* Life of Fichte, by M. Eyriès.

† Ssufismus: sive Theosophia Persarum Pantheistica, etc. Frid. Aug. Deofidus Tholuck. Berolini, 1821.

‡ Bluethensammlung aus der Morgenländischen Mystik, u. s. w. von F. A. G. Tholuck. Berlin, 1825.

§ Encyclopaedie, p. 592, note.

hammedan heretics, the Soofies, we find the declaration that God is every thing; *nihil esse praeter Deum*.\* We have also the mental gaze of intuition, the absolute *Anschauung*.† We have creation represented as a necessary emanation from the divinity.‡ We have the absorption of all self in God.§ We have, ever and anon, the same glorification of nihility, *das Nichts*;|| and, as if no plague-spot of the pestiferous philosophy should be wanting, we have complete Hegelianism in the doctrine that sin is no evil, nay, from one sect of transcendental Persians, that sin is even preferable to holiness.¶

Every reader of the common religious news is informed that millions of the Indian and Indo-Chinese people are pantheists. Hegel dwells on this, and quotes the *Bhagavad Gita*, in which Krishna is introduced thus speaking: "I am the breath which dwells in the body of the living; I am the beginning, and the midst of the living, and also their end.— I am, under the stars, the radiant sun, under the lunar signs, the moon," &c. &c. He denies, however, that in this there is proper Pantheism, as he also denies it of his own system.\*\* It would be difficult to deny it of the books of the Vedam. "The school of Vedantam," say the Roman Catholic missionaries in China, "has an authority superior to that of all the others. It professes, as the fundamental principle of its doctrine, the opinion of the simple unity of one existing essence, which is nothing but the *Ego*, or soul. Nothing exists except this *Ego*, in its simple unity; this essence is in some sort *trine*, by its existence, by its infinite light and supreme joy; all is here eternal, immaterial, infinite. But because the inner experience of the *Ego* is not conformed to this beautiful idea, they admit another principle, but purely

\* Ssufismus, p. 222.

† Blüthensammlung, p. 116. See also p. 198, where Tholuck says 'Here we have in simple terms the results of the loftiest speculations of modern times. From contrast and comparison the infinite can never be learned.'

‡ Ssufismus, p. 173, ff.

§ Ib. p. 64. "Dixit aliquando Bustami Deo: Quamdiu mi Deus inter Egoitatem et Tuitatem me manere vis, remove Egoitatem et Tuitatem ut Ego nihil fiam." And in the *Blüthensammlung*, Mewlana Dschelaleddin Rumi, a Persian poet "follows (says Tholuck) the pantheistic-mystic view, that all revelations in all religions are alike true, as being different, gradual, evolutions of God," &c. p. 69. So at pp. 87, 88, 89, are exhibitions of the sublimest pantheistic fatalism.

|| Blüthens. p. 66, note 1.

¶ Blüthensammlung, p. 123, note 1, p. 134, note 1, where Tholuck controverts this absurd doctrine with proper warmth.

\*\* Hegel's Encyk. p. 586.

negative, [das Nichts] and which, consequently, has no reality of being; this is the *Maya* of the *Ego*, that is, *the error*. The key for the deliverance of the soul is in these words, which these false philosophers have to repeat incessantly, with a pride beyond that of Lucifer: *I am the supreme Being, Aham ava param Brahma.*"\* We could not ask a more lucid or comprehensive view of the modern German system; for even if the missionaries invented what they say, they have in their invention, anticipated the grandest result of Schelling and Hegel.† And the Luciferian pride, engendered in the Chinese, is precisely the temper which is manifested by those of the Indo-Germanic school who have come to the conclusion that God never arrives at so high a degree of self-consciousness (to use their jargon) as in their own minds. When applied to the doctrines of revealed Christianity, these dogmas produce a portentous mixture. We then learn that the Messiah or God-man is self-developing humanity—the race at large. On this topic many illustrations might be offered; one of these, from a popular poet of genius, we throw into the margin, as neither caring nor daring to translate it: but let him that readeth understand.‡

So far as M. Cousin is concerned, we are ready to concede to him the possession of learning and genius. But his philosophy, as far as he has developed it, is to the last degree superficial and conceited. Making great pretensions to extraordinary profoundness, it does in truth but skim the surface of things, and then fly off into thin and unmeaning abstrac-

\* Choix des Lettres édifiantes, Paris, 1809, T. iv. p. 246. ap. Tholuck's Ssufismus, p. 214.

† We should, perhaps, have said before, that Kant is altogether exempt from the charge of Pantheism, representing God as "not by any means a blind, acting, eternal, *Nature*, the Root of all things, but a supreme Being, who by understanding and freedom is the author of all things." See Jacobi, u. s. p. 114.

‡ Drum bitt' ich, vor der Hand den Prediger

Auf seinem Berge ungekränkt zu lassen,

Doch dass beschwor' ich, so gewiss das Alte

Der Alten nicht mehr neulebendig wird:

Der Mann, in welchem Gott war—Gott wird leben!—

Der Mann, wer er dereinst zu euch herabsteigt,

Und zweifach, dreifach, millionenfach

Bei euch als Mensch, als alle Menschen lebt:

Er wird nicht dreifach goldne Kronen tragen,

Er wird in's Knopfloch keinen Orden knüpfen,

Er wird der Herr von Bethlehem nicht heissen,

Er wird nicht weibesbaar im Kloster singen, u. s. w.

Laienbrevier von Leopold Schefer. Berlin, 1835.



tions. The "witch jargon" which it employs, when you have taken infinite pains to penetrate it in a given case, is often found to contain only some old truth, swathed and bandaged in this hieroglyphic dress. And one known truth, thus prepared, is then "made use of, to pass off a thousand nothings with." There is not, and in consistency with the first principles of this philosophy, there cannot be, any attempt at ratiocination. It is a string of assumptions, and of assertions of the most unqualified and dogmatic kind. The reader cannot have failed to remark, in the extracts we have given, the peculiar kind of generalization in which M. Cousin habitually indulges. Because England is an island, therefore every thing in England stops short of its proper development, and England can make no valuable contributions to science. Because in religion, God is ever thing and man is nothing, therefore no religious man can be a great man. Thus on all occasions he takes but a single step from the narrowest possible premises, from vague analogies, and sometimes from nothing more solid than verbal puns, to the most wide and peremptory conclusions. A hundred times in passing over his pages, we have been constrained to ask, is this philosophy, or is it poetry? It can surely make no pretensions to the one, and it is but sorry stuff, if meant for the other.

But the philosophical defects of this system, do not constitute its chief point of repulsion. We have a wide charity for what seems to us nonsense, and we can even extend an amiable and silent tolerance to the pretensions of those who utter it, to be the depositories of all wisdom. But when this nonsense begins to ape the German impiety, when it openly professes to cast off all subordination to religion, and prates in dogmatic superiority to divine revelation, we cannot but lift up our solemn protest against it. It has been made sufficiently evident that the philosophy of M. Cousin removes the God of the Bible, and substitutes in His stead, a philosophical abstraction; that it rejects the Scriptures, and thus robs us of our dearest hopes; and that, in common with other like systems, it erects a false standard in morals, and confounds the distinction between right and wrong. We cannot therefore behold in silence the efforts which are making to introduce this system of abominations among us.

It has already made some progress. The Introduction to the History of Philosophy was translated and published in 1832, by M. Linberg. The first edition of the Elements

of Psychology was published in 1834, and having been adopted, as the translator informs us, "as a text-book in several of our most respectable colleges and universities," a new edition is now issued which has been expressly "prepared for the use of colleges." It might be well if the names of these most respectable colleges and universities were made known to the public. We should like to know which of our public seminaries of education has so far distinguished itself in point of science as to take, for its text-book on mental philosophy, an immethodized set of criticisms upon Locke. The work of M. Cousin does not pretend to the order and method of a scientific treatise; it only claims to be a criticism upon the defects and errors of the sensual Philosophy. It formed a part of the author's regular course of lectures upon the History of Philosophy of the 18th century. And has it really come to this pass with any of our most respectable colleges and universities, that they are using fragments of Historical treatises as text-books upon science? Do they also learn the Newtonian Philosophy from Clarke's criticisms upon Rohault's Physics? And is Varignon's reply to Rolle, their text-book upon the Differential Calculus?

But, for more urgent considerations than those of science, is it important that these most respectable colleges and universities should be known to the public. Most of the extracts which we have given from M. Cousin, have been taken from his Introduction to the History of Philosophy, and yet it will be seen that some of the worst of them have been furnished by what Dr. Henry has dignified with the title of Elements of Psychology. And this latter work implicitly contains them all, since it teaches, in their application to criticism upon Locke, the same principles which in other modes of their application, yield the results which we have exhibited. It should be known therefore what college or university dares assume the responsibility of instilling the principles of this book into the minds of the young men committed to its care. Where are these literary institutions that are so ambitious to commence the work of flooding the land with German infidelity and pantheism? If they are willing to undertake the work, they will doubtless, in a measure, succeed. There is something in this new philosophy which will recommend it to many, and especially to young men. It has the charm of novelty. It affects to be very profound. It puts into the mouths of its disciples a peculiar language, and imparts to them a knowledge which none others can at-

tain. It gives them the privilege of despising all others, and makes them incommensurable with any standard of criticism but their own. If pursued and pressed by argument, they have but to rail, as their master does, at "the paltry measure of Locke's philosophy," and ridicule the bounded, insular character of all science except that in which they are adepts. It flatters the pride of the youthful heart, it takes captive the imagination, and, a still more dangerous recommendation, it tends to lighten and remove the restraints of passion. It recognises no standard of right and wrong but the reason of man, and permits no appeal from the decisions of humanity to the authority of the one living and true God. While it retains the name of God, and does not therefore at once startle and shock the feelings like open atheism, it teaches its disciples to deify themselves and nature, and to look upon all phenomena alike, whether of the material universe or of the mind of man, as manifestations of the Deity. Every emotion of the heart is an acting forth of God, and every indulgence of a passion, however depraved, becomes an act of worship.\* The man who exercises in any way, according to his inspired impulses, his body or his mind, even though God is not in all his thoughts, is really rendering to Him as acceptable service, as if his heart were filled with emotions of adoration and reverence. The forge of every smithy, as Thomas Carlyle has taught us, is an altar, and the smith, labouring in his vocation, is a priest offering sacrifice to God.

Such being the recommendations of this philosophy, it cannot be doubted that it will find many willing disciples, some attracted by one set of its charms, and some by another. If any of our most respectable colleges have engaged in teaching it, they will not find refractory pupils. But we warn them that when this system shall have worked out, as work it must, its pernicious and loathsome results; when our young men shall have been taught to despise the wisdom of their elders, and renounce the reverence and submission which the human intellect owes to God; when in the pride and vain glory of their hearts, they shall make bold question of the truths which their fathers have held most dear and

\* See ample evidence of this base and diabolical tendency of the doctrine of pantheism, in an article in Professor Hengstenberg's Journal for November 1836, entitled, *Bericht über ein pantheistisches Trifolium*. For example, as we have said elsewhere, we learn, that Schefer and his compeers teach "that *sin* is the hither aspect of that which *on the other side* of the heart is entirely laudable."

sacred; when the Holy Bible shall be treated as the mere play ground of antic and impious fancies, and an undisguised pantheism shall spread its poison through our literature; then shall they who have now stepped forth to introduce this philosophy among us, be held to a heavy responsibility. Are these idle fears? They are at least real. We believe, therefore do we speak. And we point the incredulous to the gradations of folly and wickedness, through which this same philosophy has led the German mind. If neither the internal evidence of the system, nor the lights of ancient and modern experience, are sufficient for conviction, we can only appeal to the verdict that time will give. In the mean while every parent and guardian in the land, has an interest in knowing which of our colleges are making experiment of the effects of this philosophy upon the minds of the young men entrusted to their care.\*

We have another alarming symptom of its progress among us, in the Address delivered in July last, by the Rev. Ralph Waldo Emerson, before the Senior Class in Divinity, at Harvard University. This Address is before us. We have read it, and we want words with which to express our sense of the nonsense and impiety which pervade it. It is a rhapsody, obviously in imitation of Thomas Carlyle, and possessing as much of the vice of his mannerism as the author could borrow, but without his genius. The interest which it possesses for us arises from its containing the application of the Transcendental Philosophy in the form of instruction to young men, about to go forth as preachers of Christianity. The principles upon which Mr. Emerson proceeds, so far as he states them, are the same with those of M. Cousin. We find the same conception of the Deity as the substratum of all things, the same attributes assigned to the reason, and the same claim of inspiration for every man. But here we

\* How the writers of 'Young Germany' regard the religious tendencies of their coevals, may be gathered from the extravagant and wicked writings of Heine. After saying in his 'Allemagne,' that Pantheism was the ancient faith of the Teutons, and that "man parts not willingly with what has been dear to his fathers," he says (we ask that it may be duly noted), "Germany is at present the fertile soil of Pantheism; that is the religion of all our greatest thinkers, of all our best artists—and Deism is already destroyed there in theory. You do not hear it spoken of—but every one knows it. Pantheism is the public secret of Germany. We have in fact outgrown Deism." Again, "Deism is a good religion for slaves, for children, for Genevise, for watch-makers."—"Pantheism is the hidden religion of Germany; and this result was well foreseen by those German writers who, fifty years ago, let loose such a storm of fury against Spinoza."—See *Quarterly Review*, Vol. LV. for December, 1835, pp. 7, 8, 12.

have a somewhat more distinct avowal of the results to which these principles lead, in their application to Christianity, than M. Cousin has seen fit to give us. What we had charged upon the system, before reading this pamphlet, as being fairly and logically involved in its premises, we have here found avowed by one of its own advocates. Thus we have said that if the notion which it gives us of God is correct, then he who is concerned in the production of any phenomenon, who employs his agency in any manner, in kindling a fire or uttering a prayer, does thereby manifest the Deity and render to him religious worship. This consequence is frankly avowed and taught by Mr. Emerson. Speaking of the "religious sentiment," he says. "It is a mountain air. It is the embalmer of the world. It is myrrh, and storax, and chlorine, and rosemary. It makes the sky and the hills sublime, and the silent song of the stars is it." And again, he tells us, "Always the seer is a sayer. Somehow his dream is told. Somehow he publishes it with solemn joy. Sometimes, with pencil on canvass, sometimes with chisel on stone; sometimes in towers and aisles of granite, his soul's worship is builded." He even admonishes us that the time is coming when men shall be taught to believe in "the identity of the law of gravitation, with purity of heart." To show that this tree of knowledge resembles that in Eden in one respect, that it has a tempter beside it, we have but to quote at random from Mr. Emerson's Address. "Man is the wonder-worker. He is seen amid miracles. The stationariness of religion; the assumption that the age of inspiration is past, that the Bible is closed; the fear of degrading the character of Jesus by representing him as a man, indicate with sufficient clearness the falsehood of our theology. It is the office of a true teacher to show us that God is, not was; that he speaketh, not spake. The true Christianity—a faith like Christ's in the *infinitude of man*—is lost. None believeth in the soul of man, but only in some man or person old and departed." He complains grievously of this want of faith in the infinitude of the soul; he cries out because "man is ashamed of himself, and skulks and sneaks through the world:" and utters the pathetic plaint, "In how many churches, and by how many prophets, tell me, is man made sensible that he is an infinite soul; that the earth and the heavens are passing into his mind; that he is drinking for ever the soul of God?" Miracles, in the proper sense of the word, are of course discarded. "The very word Mira-

cle, he tells us, as pronounced by Christian churches, gives a false impression. It is Monster; it is not one with the blowing clover and the falling rain." And when Christ spoke of miracles, it was only because he knew "that man's life was a miracle, and all that man doth." Jesus Christ is made the mere symbol of a man who had full faith in the soul, who believed in the infinitude of our nature, and who thus assists in admonishing us "that the gleams which flash across our minds, are not ours, but God's." Any man may now become Christ, for "a true conversion, a true Christ is now, as always, to be made by the reception of beautiful sentiments."\* There is not a single truth or sentiment in this whole Address that is borrowed from the Scriptures. And why should there be? Mr. Emerson, and all men, are as truly inspired as the penmen of the sacred volume. Indeed he expressly warns the candidates for the ministry, whom he was addressing, to look only into their own souls for the truth. He has himself succeeded thus in discovering many truths that are not to be found in the Bible; as, for instance, "that the gift of God to the soul is not a vaunting, overpowering, excluding sanctity, but a sweet natural goodness like thine and mine, and that thus invites thine and mine, to be, and to grow." The present mode of interpreting Christianity, even under the form of Unitarianism, he abhors as utterly repugnant to reason, and insufficient for the wants of our nature; he stigmatizes it as a historical traditional Christianity, that has its origin in past revelations, instead of placing its faith in new ones; and "like the zodiac of Denderah, and the astronomical monuments of the Hindoos, it is wholly insulated from any thing now extant in the life and business of the people." He treats Christianity as a Mythos, like the creeds of Pagan Greece and Rome, and does not even pay it sufficient respect under this aspect to be at the trouble of interpreting for us more than a few of the hidden meanings that lie concealed under its allegorical forms. In a word, Mr. Emerson is an infidel and an atheist,

\* "Our world," says Lichtenberg, a witty German philosopher, "will yet grow so refined, that it will be just as ridiculous to believe in a God, as now-a-days in *Ghosts*. And then after a while, the world will grow more refined still. And so it will go on, with great rapidity, to the utmost summit of refinement. Having attained the pinnacle, the judgment of the wise will be reversed; knowledge will change itself for the last time. Then—and this will be the end—then shall we believe in *nothing but Ghosts*. We shall ourselves be like God. We shall know that essence or existence is and can be nothing but—a phantom."—*Vermischte Schriften*. B. 1. S. 166.

who nevertheless makes use, in the esoteric sense of the new philosophy, of the terms and phrases consecrated to a religious use.\* We have at least to thank him, on behalf of those whose eyes might not otherwise have been opened, for giving us so distinct and ample an illustration of the kind of service which M. Cousin professes himself willing to render to Christianity by means of his philosophy. We would call public attention to this Address, as the first fruits of transcendentalism in our country. We hold it up as a warning evidence of the nature of the tree which has produced it.

We know not with what degree of favour Mr. Emerson's rhapsody was received by those to whom it was addressed; but we are pleased to learn that it was offensive to the authorities of the university. Professor Ware has since delivered and published a sermon, containing an earnest and strong defence of the personality of the Deity.† In obvious allusion to Mr. Emerson, he thus expresses his opinion, "Strange as it may seem to Christian ears that have been accustomed to far other expressions of the Divinity, there have been those who maintain this idea; who hold that the principles which govern the universe are the Deity; that power, wisdom, veracity, justice, benevolence, are God, that gravitation, light, electricity, are God." We noticed too, some months since, in one of our public papers, a severe rebuke of Mr. Emerson, which was attributed to another of the Professors of the university.‡ This then cannot be one of "the most respectable colleges and universities," which have adopted the Elements of Psychology as their text-book on mental science.§

\* It is within the compass of the transcendental philosophy to accommodate itself to any form of religion, and appropriate its language. Schelling himself, and some of his disciples, who had been educated in the Protestant faith, embraced, it is said, the Romish religion, and formed within its pale, a sort of inner church, whose symbol and watchword was the name of the Virgin Mary. We have shown it among the Ophites, the Soofies, and the Chinese. Mr. Bancroft has with distinctness laid it open in the scheme of early Quakers, (*History*, Vol. II. chap. 16.) and it is now proffered to us by a clergyman of a church, to say the least, as little tinctured with this sort of poison as any in Christendom.

† The Personality of the Deity. A Sermon, preached in the Chapel of Harvard University, September 23, 1838. By Henry Ware, Jr., Professor of Pulpit Eloquence and the Pastoral Care. Published at the request of the members of the Divinity School. Boston. 1838.

‡ A paragraph has fallen under our eye, while writing this, which informs us that this same Mr. Emerson has received so much encouragement for what are softly called, "his daring and imaginative speculations," from the people of Boston, that he is now engaged in the delivery of a Course of public Lectures upon them.

§ Since the body of this article was completely written, we have received the *Christian Review*, of Boston, in which there is a notice of the system of Cousin.

It is suited to excite a feeling of surprise, not unmingled with sorrow, that a system of philosophy, which in its immediate and natural results is indignantly repudiated by Unitarians, should be urged upon us, with high praise of its merits, by an accredited minister, and a Doctor in Divinity, of the Protestant Episcopal Church. We are willing to believe that he knows not what he is doing; that fascinated by the first charms of the new philosophy, or perchance dazzled by the brilliancy of a correspondence with a Peer of France and the great founder of Eclecticism, he is not able to see the end from the beginning. But this excuse, the only one that we can make for him, increases our apprehension. M. Cousin informs him, in a letter which has been given, in several different forms, to the public, that he "shall watch with the liveliest interest, the progress of philosophy in America," and that in one of the works which he intends yet to publish, he "will endeavour to be useful to America." In the mean time, he says to Dr. Henry, "it is with great pleasure that I see you resolved to establish yourself in the state of New York, where public instruction is so far advanced, but where philosophy is yet so very languishing: it will be *your duty* to re-animate it, to give it a strong impulse." Dr. Henry has taken care to inform the public that he has been honoured with this commission from the great head of the sect; it has been published and re-published until the whole nation have learned that he has been consecrated by no less a personage than M. Cousin, to the duty of re-animating our philosophy. Can he now abandon this work, and leave the duty assigned him to be performed by any meaner hand? We fear not. We fear that if any misgivings should cross his mind, they will give place to assurance with the arrival of the next packet that shall bring a letter and a presentation copy of some new work from M. Cousin, or even at the very thought of such an arrival.

If our augury should prove right, we too will watch his labours. We read the Introduction to the History of Philosophy, and the Elements of Psychology, upon their first appearance, but we kept silence because we did not wish in any degree to draw public attention to them until evidence was afforded that they were read. We now have this evidence, and have felt it our duty to be no longer silent. But, having

We are encouraged by these signs of healthful resistance, and corroborated in our judgment, by finding that the author of this sound and conclusive review, who has evidently seen the monster in its native German forests, recognises its tracks in the attempts of M. Cousin.



done so, we gladly desist from the attempt to trace the pedigree or indicate the family traits of these various systems. Be they Indian, Teutonic, or French, we regard them alike with fear, as if some demon were bent on playing fantastic tricks with poor, proud, purblind man. We pretend not, as we have said, to comprehend these dogmas. We know not what they are: but we know what they are *not*. They are not the truth of God; nay, they gainsay that truth at every step. They are, if any thing can be, profane and vain babblings, and oppositions of science *falsely so called*.\* So far as received, they rob us of our most cherished hopes, and take away our God. No one who has ever heard such avowals can forget the touching manner in which pious as well as celebrated German scholars have sometimes lamented their still lingering doubts as to the personality of God. But while these systems rob us of our religious faith, they despoil us of our reason. Let those who will rehearse to us the empty babble about reason as a faculty of immediate insight of the infinite; we will trust no faculty which, like eastern princes, mounts the throne over the corpses of its brethren. We cannot sacrifice our understanding: If we are addressed by appeals to consciousness, to intuition, we will try those appeals. If we are addressed by reasoning, we will endeavour to go along with that reasoning. But in what is thus offered, there is no ratiocination;† there is endless assertion, not merely of unproved, but of unreasonable, of contradictory of absurd propositions. And if any, overcome by the *pré*stige of the new philosophy, as transatlantic, or as new, are ready to repeat dogmas which neither they, nor the inventors of them can comprehend, and which approach the dialect of Bedlam, we crave to be exempt from the number, and will contentedly abstain for life from "the high priori road."‡ The more we have looked at it, the more we have been convinced of its emp-

\* The original is pregnant: τὰς βεβήλους κενωφωρίας καὶ ἀντιθέσεις τῆς ἑσθωνύμου γνώσεως.

† Bretschneider, though a German, seems to have felt this. "It would be unreasonable," says he of Schelling, "to demand a *proof* of such a system. For as *to prove*, means but this—to deduce something true, from something else previously known as true, there can here be no such thing as proof from higher principles, since we seek the *first truth* from which all others are deduced." Bretsch. Grundasicht, p. 7.

‡ Even the Critique of Kant, which was rational and common place when set by the side of our recent philosophy, was by Herder regarded as so extravagant, that in his answer to it, he cites from Swift's Tale of a Tub, the ninth section, being "A digression concerning the original, the use and improvement of *Madness* in a Commonwealth." Herder, Vol. ii. p. 223, ff.

tiness and fatuity. It proves nothing; it determines nothing; or where it seems to have results, they are hideous and godless. Moreover, we think we speak the sentiment of a large body of scholars in our country, when we say, that if we must have a transatlantic philosophy, we desire to have it in its native robustness and freshness. We do not wish to have it through the medium of French declaimers, or of the French language, than which no tongue is less fit to convey the endless distinctions of the German. We wish to have it before it has undergone two or three transmutations; not from subalterns but from masters.\* We do not wish to have a philosophy already effete, long since refuted, and heartily denounced by the best men in the country of its origin; and above all we do not wish to have a philosophy which shall conduct our young scholars into the high road to Atheism. We learn with pain that among the Unitarians of Boston and its vicinity, there are those who affect to embrace the pantheistic creed. The time may not be far off, when some new Emerson shall preach Pantheism under the banner of a self-styled Calvinism; or when, with formularies as sound as those of Germany, some author among ourselves may, like Dinter, address his reader thus, *O thou Son of God!*† For the tendency of German philosophizing is towards impious temerity. We have long deplored the spread of Socinianism, but there is no form of Socinianism, or of rational Deism, which is not immeasurably to be preferred to the German insanity. In fine, we cleave with more tenacity than ever to the mode of philosophizing which has for several generations prevailed among our British ancestors; and especially to that Oracle in which we read, what the investigation of this subject has impressed on us with double force, that God will destroy the wisdom of the wise, and bring to nothing the understanding of the prudent; that the foolishness of God is wiser than men, and that when men change the truth of God into a lie, he will give them over to a reprobate mind.

\* 1. *Witch*. Say, if thou'dst rather hear it from our mouths,  
Or from our masters.  
*Macbeth*. Call them, let me see them.

† Evangelische K. Zeitung, 1836, p. 569.