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**REVIEW OF THE**  
ARGUMENTS AND THEORIES OF ANTITRINITARIANS,  
BEING THE SECOND SECTION OF  
**FLATT'S DISSERTATION**  
ON  
**THE DEITY OF CHRIST.**

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[Translated from the Latin.]

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BEFORE I proceed to examine in detail the particular tenets of conflicting sects, it may be well to take a preliminary view of some *general* arguments, which have been urged in opposition to the Deity of Christ, though not in support of any definite hypothesis. These are of two sorts, *philosophical* and *scriptural*—both of which have been the means of misleading many candid, acute, and so far as we can judge, sincere inquirers after truth, in relation to this subject.

I. Those of the first class may, for the most part, be reduced to this one objection, that the doctrine of the Deity of Christ involves an evident contradiction, or, to say the least, is utterly incomprehensible. And it must be confessed, that some ground has been given for this cavil by the manner in which *personality* and *consubstantiality* have been defined by many orthodox divines. But surely, it is most unfair to charge upon a church the imperfections or absurdities of individual theologians. That the doctrine of our church upon this subject, as set forth in her

confessions, involves no such contradiction, has been shown already. Indeed, the whole doctrine may be reduced to an abstract proposition in this form. *The relation existing between A and B is such, that with respect to C, they are identical; but, with respect to X, distinct.* Now, that this proposition, considered in the abstract, is in perfect harmony with the principle of *identity*, on which the objectors found their argument, and may be applied to the Divine nature without doing violence to the principle,\* that there exists in God something not comprehended in the number of his attributes revealed to us, (i. e. in his ουσια, properly so called)—appears to me so plain, that I would venture, a priori, to affirm the impossibility of pointing out the slightest inconsistency in the assertion.

It may be said, that we proceed upon the supposition of an *inconceivable relation*, which supposition is absurd, as it must be either a mere quibble or an unintelligible fiction: And we freely admit, that neither the connexion, nor the difference, between the persons in the Godhead can be conceived of, positively; in other words, they can be known, neither by intuition nor analogy. But we deny, that it follows from these premises, that our doctrine of the relation between Father and Son, resting, as it does, upon such high authority, is irrational and absurd. To set down as false or impossible whatever we can form no definite conception of, † is as if a man born blind should denounce, as impossible or false, the description of a painting, merely because he could

\* No one can suppose, that our reasoning is at variance with the principle *Quæ sunt eadem uni tertio eadem inter se sunt*, who understands the meaning of this axiom; unless, indeed, he has wholly misconceived the doctrine which we advocate, and confounded things essentially distinct. It has never been pretended, that the Father and the Son are identical in all points, or in precisely the same sense in which they are said to differ. See *Remarques sur le livre d'un Antitrinitaire Anglois*—Works of Leibnitz, Vol. I.

† See Ulrich's *Institut. Log. et Metaphys.* p. 302, &c.

form no image in his own mind of the object. To deny the possibility of any relations except those which exist among external objects, or such as may be inferred from them, evinces but a slight acquaintance with philosophy, and a lamentable ignorance or want of recollection, with respect to the limits of the human understanding. The truth is, that from the partial knowledge which we have, even of things subject to the cognizance of our internal and external senses, we have no right to conclude that the only relations of which they are susceptible are such as exist between external objects.\* How then can it be thought surprizing that there should be some relations beyond our comprehension, in the nature of the Deity; a nature so immeasurably far removed from all created things, that even of those attributes

\* For example, who can demonstrate the propriety of that division, by which all things (as well phenomena as things *οὐτως οὐρα*) are classed either as *substances* or *accidents*? See Ulrich's *Instit.* p. 341, and Heilmann's *Comp. Theol. Dogmat.* 2nd ed. p. 98.

Those who adopt Kant's doctrine in relation to the categories, are of all others, the last who should take offence at our position, that the relation between the Father and the *Λογος* is one which does not exist in the exterior world. Nor indeed, can those who maintain the empirical origin of the categories, or at least believe that they are to be classed among the *οὐτως οὐρα*, in any way demonstrate, that there is not some species of relation within the comprehension of superior intelligences, of which, in our present state, we can form no definite conception.

“Il faut avouer,” says Leibnitz, “qu'il n'y a aucun exemple dans la nature, qui réponde assez à cette notion des personnes divines. Mais il n'est point nécessaire qu'on en puisse trouver et il suffit, que ce qu'on en vient de dire, n'implique aucune contradiction ni absurdité. La substance divine a sans doute, des privileges, qui passent toutes les autres substances. Cependant, comme nous ne connoissons pas assez toute la nature, nous ne pouvons pas assurer non plus, qu'il n'y a, et qu'il n'y peut avoir aucune substance absolue qui en contienne plusieurs respectives.” (*Remarques sur le livre d'un Antitrinitaire Anglois*, Leibnitz' works, Dutens ed. Vol. I. p. 26.)

which are revealed, and which Natural Theology teaches, it is impossible to form any adequate conception.\*

If this be so, the perfect consistency of our opinion with the principles of sound philosophy is a priori so apparent, that a detailed examination of the arguments and sophisms which the wit of man has coined, for the purpose of establishing the contrary, would be altogether useless. I shall content myself, therefore, with selecting two from the mass, by way of specimens. The first is the argument of *F. Socinus*, and is in these words: "There is no man so stupid that he cannot see the repugnance of these two propositions, that *God is one* and *God is three*, (of which three, every one is God himself.) They say, indeed, that though as to his essence he is *numerically* one, he is at the same time, *personally* three—a distinction utterly repugnant, since there cannot be a plurality of persons where there is only one individual essence. For what, indeed, is a *person* but an intelligent, individual, essence? Or what distinguishes one person from another but the diversity of individual essence? . . . . . This doctrine implies that although the divine *essence* is numerically one, the divine *person* is more than one, whereas the divine essence and person are one and the same thing."

Now, it is clear that this objection turns entirely on the meaning which Socinus supposes to be attached to the words *persona* and *essentia*: and as he was led to attach that meaning to the terms by a mere misconception of the phraseology employed in common parlance and in the writings of some orthodox divines, the objection has of course, no weight. Where will be the supposed contradiction, if

\* I could easily show, were this the proper place, that every writer who has attempted to illustrate by comparison, or explain by reasoning, the relation between the Father and the Son, has missed his aim entirely; not even excepting Seiler. (See his work *über die Gottheit Christi beides für Gläubige und Zweifler*, Leipzig. 1775. p. 105, &c.)



the words be understood in the sense proposed by us above?

The second argument which we shall cite, is that of *Taylor*,\* and more plausible than the foregoing. He denies that there can possibly be any real difference between the Father and the Son, unless each possesses something which the other wants. "Now, this property," says he, "which each possesses to the exclusion of the other, must be reckoned among the divine *perfections*, unless it be admitted that there are *imperfections* in the Deity. Consequently each is destitute of some perfection; and as the idea of a God involves that of absolute perfection, it follows that neither Father nor Son is God."

This argument, however, specious as it is, will be found on impartial examination, to have no weight whatever, in opposition to the doctrine laid down in our former section. We have there maintained, that the Father and the Son are identical in essence, and expressly defined the word essence, as implying the aggregate of all those perfections which Natural Theology ascribes to God; such as eternity, necessary existence, infinite power and wisdom. Now, that either the Father or the Son is destitute of the necessary perfections, or, in any sense inferior, can by no means be argued from the fact that each possesses a distinctive character not belonging to the other. For we hold that there may be such a distinctive character, apart from the *ousia*, properly so called; and as to the doctrine, that the peculiarity by which Christ is distinguished from the Father is to be reckoned a *minor* or *inferior* perfection,† we regard it as a mere gra-

\* See the *British Theological Magazine*. Volume I. No. 4. (1770.) p. 111.

† Even assuming the *generation* of the Son—if we understand the term as meaning nothing more than this, that the distinctive character of the Son has some necessary dependence upon that of the Father, it

tuitous assumption. If any one, however, understands by *ουσια*, the *substance* or *nature* of the Deity generally, including the *ουσια*, strictly so called, and the distinctive personal characters alluded to, he can have no difficulty in admitting that the Son and the Father are the same in substance, at the same time that he holds them to be really distinct.

II. Some attention is now due to the other class of arguments employed to overthrow our doctrine respecting the Deity of Christ.

It is an admitted fact, that there are many passages in the New Testament which would seem to ascribe divine honors to the Father, exclusively of Christ; (such as John xvii. 3. 1 Cor. viii. 6. &c.,) or else to ascribe to Christ something utterly irreconcilable with the idea of a nature divine and infinite, (such as John xiv. 28. 1 Cor. xi. 3; xv. 27, 26. Mark xiii. 32. Heb. v. 7. Matt. xxviii. 18.) And we freely admit that from all these passages the inference is fair, that, in one respect, Christ is inferior to God. But as to the assertion that the language of these texts militates against the doctrine demonstrated in the preceding section, we deny it boldly, as incapable of proof, hermeneutical or otherwise, unless upon the supposition, that the doctrine of the word of God is inconsistent with itself. But in order to show more clearly, that the texts above referred to, are perfectly reconcilable with our doctrine, we shall premise a few general observations tending to explain the apparent contradiction, and then make an application of them to the passages themselves.

1. In the first place, then, we hold, agreeably to scripture, (see John i. 14, compared with 1—3,) that *Christ was*

does not follow, that the perfection of the Son is finite, or inferior to the perfection of the Father. Who, for instance, will infer that the will of the Father is inferior to his intellect, from the fact, that will, presupposes intellect.

*man, as well as God.\** Assuming this, and considering that the language of the scriptures is conformed to colloquial usage, and not to the subtle technics of philosophy; it is, evidently, just as natural and proper, that Christ should be described sometimes in a divine, and sometimes in a human character,† as that man should be called, at the same time, mortal and immortal.

2. But it is necessary that this observation be taken in connexion with another, of no less importance in relation to this subject. It is, that the word *πατηρ* is most commonly employed in the Sacred Scriptures‡ to denote the nature or substance of God generally, and that *θεος*, for the most part, is used in the New Testament, in the same sense, though sometimes employed to designate a particular person in the Godhead. Both these propositions may be readily demonstrated. For proof of the former we may refer to the general usage of the sacred writers respecting the words *אב* and *πατηρ*, or more particularly to those passages in which this name is ascribed to God,§ as the creator and preserver of mankind at large, or as the special benefactor of individuals with whom he has deigned to hold an intimate communion. And that this interpretation is equally applicable to those passages where he is called the Father of Jesus Christ, may be argued from the fact, that the man Jesus owed his origin to an immediate act of divine power, (on which account he

\* See Less' *Vers. einer. prakt. Dogmatik*. Art. VIII. Sect. I. n. viii. x. xi. Doederlein's *Instit. Theol. Christ.* P. II. † 251, p. 768. (1st ed.) Zachariae *Bibl. Theol.* P. III. † 156. seqq.

† See Baumgarten's *Untersuch Theol. streitigkeiten*. Volume I. 1762. p. 238. seqq.

‡ See Doederlein's *Inst. Theol. Chr.* P. I. † 104, p. 312. (1st ed.)

§ See Mal. i. 6; ii. 10. Deut. xxxii. 6. Ps. lxxxix. 27. Isaiah lxiii. 16; lxiv. 7. Matt. v. 16, 48; vi. 4; vii. 11. John viii. 41, (compared with v. 54.) Rom. i. 7. Eph. i. 2.



is called the Son of God, Luke i. 35,) and sustained a peculiar relation to the Deity.

As to the word Θεός, the assertion that it has a variety of meanings in the New Testament,\* can scarcely be disputed or disproved by those who are themselves in the habit of ascribing to it a diversity of senses, far more inconsistent with each other than those assumed by us. To an impartial mind, therefore, there can be no difficulty in perceiving that these passages of scripture, which, in themselves considered, would appear to militate against Christ's Deity, may be readily and fairly reconciled with those which describe him as God, identical with the Father. It may be well, however, to illustrate more particularly, the general observations which have here been made, and to view them in application to the most important texts cited by our opponents to oppugn our doctrine.

1. It has often, and in various ways, been proved, that those passages which describe the Father as the Most High God, at the same time distinguished him from the Son, are not inconsistent with the doctrine of the Deity of Christ. For example, in these words of Christ himself; (John xvii. 3;) *And this is life eternal, that they might know thee the only true God, and Jesus Christ, whom thou hast sent.* The words, *only true God*, are designed to contrast the Father with the idols of the heathen, not with Christ; for the context† seems to intimate distinctly that the first clause of the sentence, [*thee the only true God,*] has reference particularly to the Gentiles, and the latter, [*Jesus Christ whom thou hast sent,*] to the Jews, or, perhaps to both. Whether, therefore, we consider μονον as referring to the subject or the predicate,‡ the expressions of this text cannot

\* For example, John i. 1. (ο λογος ην προς τον Θεον.)

† See Noessett's *Progr. paschale*, 1732; and Storr *über den Zweck*, &c. p. 462.

‡ See Miller's *Compend. Theol. Polemicæ*. Lips. 1768. p. 90, &c.

be understood as denying to Christ the character and dignity of the true God.

Again, the words of Paul, (1 Cor. viii. 6,)—*To us there is but one God, the Father, and we in him, and one Lord Jesus Christ, and we by him*—contain nothing incompatible with our doctrine. It is plain that the preposition εἰς, [*in,*] is to be taken in connexion, not with πατηρ, but with Θεος, and is used to express a contrast with Gentile polytheism, (see v. 5.) And as to the circumstance of Christ's being here distinguished from the Father, that is certainly no proof that what is asserted affirmatively of the latter, is asserted negatively of the former. Is there not just as obvious a distinction drawn in John v. 20, where notwithstanding, the same power and operations are ascribed alike to both? Or, waving that, why may we not suppose, that it was the design of Paul to set God, generally, [πατερῶα,] and Christ particularly, in successive opposition to the imaginary beings, called among the Heathen, Θεοὶ and Κυριοὶ, Gods and Lords? Or even admitting the hypothesis of Clarke,\* that πατηρ denotes only the first person in the Godhead, the case is just as plain. Can any one suppose, that because Christ is called εἰς κυριος, † the κυριότης or *Lordship* of the Father is denied? If not, how

\* See *The Scripture Doctrine of the Trinity*. London, 1712. P. I. ch. I. § 1. p. 5; also, P. II. § 9. p. 245.

† Clarke assumes, upon mere conjecture, and in the face of facts, that Θεος (v. 5.) denotes *the superior Deities*, and κυριος *the inferior deities*, and that, consequently, κυριος, in v. 6, must also mean an *inferior deity*. (*Script. Doct.* p. 6.) Teller, in explaining κυριος by *Magister*, (See his *Dictionary of the N. T.* under the word *Herr*.) appears to have disregarded altogether the connexion between the *fifth* and *sixth* verses. But, even admitting this interpretation, it does not follow, that the Deity of Christ is denied in the text before us. It is clear from the consideration above stated that the apostle may have intended to distinguish Christ, merely as a man, from God.

can we argue, that because the Father is here called εἰς Θεός, the Θεῖος or *Godhead* of the Son is so denied?

It has been maintained by many, that the words δι' αὐτοῦ (a phrase, be it observed, which is sometimes used in relation to the Father, as in Rom. xi. 36, and Heb. ii. 10,) is to be understood in this case as implying the inferiority of Christ; but no proofs have been adduced in support of the assertion.\*

With respect to those passages, which expressly describe Christ as inferior to the Father, or ascribe to him actions and affections incompatible with Godhead, we hold that they may all be fairly understood as referring, either generally to his human nature, or particularly to the man Jesus' state of humiliation and exaltation. That the language of John, xiv. 28.† Mark xiii. 32.‡ Heb. v. 7, and other kindred

\* In Matt. xix. 17, it is probable, that Christ accommodated his expressions to the notion that he was a mere man, and meant to say nothing more than this: *If you deny that I am God you ought not to call me good.* As to Eph. iv. 6: consult Miller's *Comp. Theol. Polem.* p. 91.

† The words, *If ye loved me, ye would rejoice, because I said, I go unto my Father,* render it probable, that Christ intended to contrast, not his own *nature* with the *nature* of the Father, but the humble *condition* in which he himself then was, with the celestial *glory* of the Father, in which he expected shortly to participate. (See John xvii. 5, 24.) That the *usus loquendi* will justify this explanation of μὲν, as denoting a happier and more glorious *condition*, has been shown, from a comparison of Gen. xxvi. 13, by Storr (*über den Zweck, &c.* p. 460.)

‡ It is by no means a happy explanation of this passage, which many have borrowed from the words of Hilary, (de trinitate, ix.) “Id, quod nescit, non nesciendi infirmitas est, sed aut tempus est non loquendi, aut dispensatio est non agendi. Ea nescit quae, aut in tempore non sunt confitenda, aut non agnoscuntur ad meritum.” As to the conjecture of some respecting the genuineness and origin of this verse, (which has no parallel in the other gospels,) though specious,

passages, will bear this explanation, can scarcely be doubted, if it be admitted that Jesus was a man, and that his condition while on earth, was by no means an exalted one. On the other hand, we believe that in Phil. ii. 9, &c. Math. xxviii. 18. 1 Cor. xv. 27, 28,\* and the like, the state of glory to which the same man Jesus, after his passion, was translated, is either alluded to, or explicitly described. But

it is not necessary for the vindication of our doctrine. I think it a supposition perfectly reconcileable with a belief in the Deity of Christ, that the *man* Jesus, while upon earth, though united with the *λογος*, knew nothing about the time of the last judgment,

\* The language of Paul in the 28th verse falls, probably, within the number of *things hard to be understood*, mentioned in 2 Peter, iii. 16. I think, however, that the chief difficulty of the passage arises from a comparison with Heb. i. 8, and Luke i. 33, and is, besides, common to us with the Arians and Socinians. Let them explain, with any show of probability, the meaning of *υποταγισεται*, and the import of the phrase *παρεδωκεν την βασιλειαν*, in v. 24, and we will undertake to show, that the expressions so explained, may be applied to the *man* Jesus, without impeaching the divinity of the *λογος*. For example, let us take up the interpretation of Th. Emlyn, who, in his *Humble Inquiry into the Deity of Christ*, thus paraphrases the 27th verse: "Then the Son himself shall be subject;—that is, his subjection shall be then manifested by an open solemn acknowledgment of it, when he shall recognise the supremacy of the Father in that public act of surrender. (Collection of Tracts relative to the Deity, worship, and satisfaction, of the Lord Jesus Christ. London, 1731. Vol. I.) Now, it is evident, that this explanation of the terms may be made to harmonize fully with the sentiment of those who believe them to relate to the *man* Jesus, and not to some other spirit, as supposed by Emlyn. Emlyn adds, indeed, that "as there is no intimation of any distinction between the pretended two natures of the Son here; so there is enough in the words to show, that they are spoken of him, under his highest capacity and character." Now we deny that there was any occasion for such an explicit intimation as he here alludes to, though we admit what he afterwards asserts; viz. that the words in v. 27, are spoken of the man Jesus, *under his highest capacity and character*.



besides these, there are some texts in the New Testament which describe Christ generally as a man, or indicate his peculiar relation to the Deity. Such are 1 Cor. xi. 3, and other parallel passages; as well as many of those in which Christ is called the Son of God. For we hold it to be clear from the import of the terms employed, and from the context\* of innumerable passages, that this name (*the Son of God*;) is applied to Jesus *as a man*, and applied to him for this reason and for others, that he was the *image of the invisible God*, and intimately united with him as well as the object of his special favor. Every child knows, that in the Sacred Scriptures men are often called the sons of God, on account of some remarkable connexion with the Deity; or because they were the objects of God's special favor; or because they, in some sense, resembled God himself.† Now, is it not evident, that all these reasons join in one, to render the name in question pre-eminently applicable to that man, who sustained a relation to the Deity, which no prophet ever had sustained, (John i. 14; x. 38; xiv. 10,) and who, as the scriptures explicitly inform us, was the image of the Father, (Col. i. 15,) and beloved above all the other sons of God? (Math. xvii. 5. Col. i. 13. John iii. 35.) There can be no doubt, therefore, that the title, *Son of God*, would have been perfectly appropriate to Jesus, considered merely as a

\* We admit, that in some cases, (such as John i. 14, 18. Matt. xxviii. 19,) the name *υιός θεού* though properly belonging to Christ's human nature, is used to designate the *λογος* which dwelt in him, for the purpose of distinguishing it from the first person of the Godhead. As to those, however, who imagine that the words *υιός θεού* in such cases are designed to indicate the relation of the second person to the first, they can only repel the objections of the Homoeusians and Arians, by denying that they hold the relation indicated by this phrase, to be a relation of inferiority, or by adopting that definition of *generation* mentioned in a former note. (See p. 163, note †.)

† e. g. Gen. vi. 2. Ps. lxxxii. 6. Luke xx. 36. John i. 12. 1 John iii. 1, &c.



man. And it is no less clear, that this interpretation harmonizes fully with the context of many passages;\* such as Heb. i. 5. Rom. viii. 29, 32; but particularly John x. 31; a text often cited to oppugn our doctrine. In the latter, Jesus repels the charge of blasphemy which the Jews brought against him, by arguing thus:—any ordinary man may call himself the son of God, without being guilty necessarily of blasphemy—how much more, he who has claims to the title in its highest sense, and on the strongest grounds. He first proves from the sacred writings of the Jews, that some mere men had been properly called *Gods* and *sons of God*, citing for this purpose, Ps. lxxxii. 6, where God himself says to the Jews, *I have said ye are אלהים and בני עליון*. And the conclusion which he draws, that even a mere man, if united by resemblance to the Deity, may be called a *son of God*, is strengthened by the fact, that in the Psalm from which he quotes, the Judges, who are dignified by this high appellation, are censured and condemned. Now if the name—he argues, in v. 36—be applicable to such magistrates, how much more justly may it be applied, in its widest and most elevated sense, to him *ὃν ὁ πατήρ ἡγάσεν και ἀπέστειλεν εἰς τὸν κόσμον*, whom the Father hath sent into the world to be revered as one wholly distinguished from all others.† In calling himself *ἡγιασμενον*, Christ had reference here to his intimate conjunction with the Deity, as appears from the 37th and 38th verses, as well as from the language of parallel passages. In those two verses he is evidently urging, that his miracles ought to lead the Jews to repose implicit confidence in all his declarations, but espe-

\* See Doederlein's *Instit. Theol. Christ.* P. I. § 105. Obs. 1. p. 313. (1st ed.)

† It is well known, that according to the Hebrew idiom, of two words, placed in juxta-position, the latter often determines, and qualifies the former.

cially in what he had asserted (v. 30,) respecting his own connexion with the Deity. And this supposition is confirmed by John v. 20, (and the following verses,) a passage so parallel to this, that it may serve as a commentary on it. At the same time it is not improbable that he had reference in this case to his previous discourse with the Jews (recorded in chap. v.) and on that account expressed himself with greater brevity.

Enough has now been said to show that the difficulties with which our doctrine respecting the Deity of Christ is encumbered, are not sufficient to outweigh the arguments in its favor. In order, however, that it may appear more clearly how much that doctrine is to be preferred to the various theories which have been proposed in opposition to it, we shall now turn our attention to the latter, briefly stating the arguments which have been used in favor of the principal hypothesis, and the objections which may be urged against them.

1. The first who present themselves to our attention are such as deny both the *personality* and *consubstantiality* of the *λογος*, (or at least the former,) and maintain, that Christ was a mere man, who had no individual personality before he was born of Mary, but from the time either of his birth or of his entrance into the office of a teacher, was intimately united with the Deity, endowed by him with extraordinary gifts and virtues, and invested by him, after death, with the power and glory of the Godhead. It is probable that most of those who have held, with Noetus\* and Praxeas†, that the Deity generally—or with John Leclerc‡ and

\* *Epiphaniï panar.* lvii.

† *Tertullian contra Prax.* cxvi. p. 229. Semler's ed. xviii. p. 231.

‡ Leclerc, in his book called *Libenii de sancto amore Epist. Theolog.* (Irenop. 1679,) p. 18, says: "Since God being infinite, can think of various objects at one and the same time, we can conceive of there being in God, *the Father*—i. e. the divine nature think-

others that God *certo modo cogitans*—was united personally with the man Jesus, have been led to that conclusion by a comparison of the passages which declare the unity of God, with those which assert the divinity of Christ. We have already shown, however, that these passages (upon which the Noetians and Modalists founded their hypothesis) do not militate against our doctrine, and that the latter harmonizes much the best with John i. 1, 14, 18; xvii. 5, and many other texts. These we believe to be sufficient reasons for considering our doctrine as the better of the two; though at the same time, we cheerfully admit, that, as a promotive of piety, and a source of internal peace and comfort, it has no advantage over that of the Noetians and the Modalists.

2. At a much greater distance from our doctrine stands that of the Socinians generally, (not to mention Sabellius, Artemon, and others in detail,) who have followed Photinus in regarding Christ as a mere man born of Mary,\* but endowed with extraordinary gifts, and, after death, exalted by the Most High God to almighty power and supreme command.

Those who hold these sentiments, however, are divided among themselves, as to the worship due to Christ, some

ing in one particular way—the Son, and the Holy Spirit, i. e. the same, nature thinking in two other different ways. In this way, we can properly conceive of there being one God, i. e. one divine nature, but various modes of thinking pertaining to that nature, and in this way conflicting passages of Sacred Scriptures may readily be reconciled. And in fact, the scriptures indicate no difference between the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit, except in the mode of acting or thinking, for with spirits, thought and action are identical." He adds, on p. 21, that in his opinion, the divine and human natures were so far united in the person of Christ, that the names and qualities of both may be ascribed to him, just as mental and corporeal qualities may be ascribed to man.

\* See the chapter of the *Racovin Catechism* on the person of Christ, p. 120. ed. Oeder and Joh. Crellius de uno Deo patre libri duo. Irenop. 1656.

holding with Socinus and Blandrata, that he ought to be worshipped though a mere man, while C. Franken and others maintain the contrary.\* To draw a fair comparison therefore, between their doctrine and our own, we must examine, first, those points upon which Socinians all agree, and then those on which the contending parties differ.

In the first place, then, the opinion common to all Socinians respecting the nature of Christ, and the power conferred upon him after death, if brought to the standard of right reason, is encumbered with difficulties far more serious than those which attend our doctrine. We have already shown, that the charge of contradiction, brought against us by the disciples of Socinus, is a mere assumption and incapable of proof. The incomprehensibility of that relation which as we believe, exists between the Father and the Son, cannot be urged as an argument against it, least of all by the Socinians, if they have any desire to appear consistent. For what can be more incomprehensible than that a mere man should be exalted so far as to become a partner in the Divine power and government, an association really impossible without a participation in the nature of the Deity. If you ask for scriptural proofs, you will find in the writings of Socinians† such a vast accumulation of authorities, that if the controversy were to be determined by number instead of weight, they would undoubtedly prevail. Thus they appeal to all those passages, already mentioned, in which the affections and infirmities of human nature are attributed to Christ, or which represent his extraordinary prerogatives above the rest of men as having been bestowed upon him by the Father merely as rewards. (Phil. ii. 9, &c.)‡ But

\* See the controversy between Faustus Socinus and Chr. Franken *de honore Christi* in the *Bibl. Frat. Polon.* T. p. 767, &c.

† See the book of J. Crellius, quoted above.

‡ We can scarcely think it strange that Jesus should have spoken less clearly and explicitly than his apostles after him, respecting the



when we consider that all these passages, without exception, may be explained conformably to our opinions, without doing violence to the principles of interpretation ; whereas, on the other hand, the language of Christ and his apostles, which was cited and discussed in the former section, is utterly irreconcilable with their hypothesis, we cannot but conclude that the doctrines, held by Socinians in common, are wholly at variance with the word of God. And this conviction of the falsehood of those doctrines becomes stronger, when we come to observe the mutual disagreement of Socinians themselves, on the point above mentioned,—*the worshipping of Christ*.

As to those who hold with Franken,\* that adoration is not due to Christ, the impossibility of reconciling their opinion with such passages as John v. 23. Heb. i. 6. Phil. ii. 10, 11,

relation which he bore to God the Father, and that he never declared himself the creator of the world (an argument apparently in the Socinians' favor), when we consider that a different method would have been unworthy of the divine wisdom, which required that the Jews should be drawn off, *by slow degrees*, from their too contracted notions respecting the unity of God, and gradually imbibe just sentiments in relation to the person of the Messiah. Besides, it was the design of the Almighty, that Jesus should, for our sakes, spend his days on earth in a state of humiliation, which evidently forbade his manifesting, clearly and habitually, the glory of the Godhead which dwelt in him. (Phil. ii. 6.) But when he had undergone the sufferings imposed upon him, for the good of men, and had received his recompense in being raised to the highest dignity, having become a participator in the Divine power, and clothed with supreme command over the most exalted spirits, then, indeed, it was altogether proper, that the Divinity of Christ should be exhibited, even among men, in all its brightness.

\* Among the modern advocates of this opinion may be mentioned Lindsey, whose arguments have been refuted in a book called "Remarks on Mr. Lindsey's Dissertation upon praying to Christ, in which the arguments he there proposes against the lawfulness of all religious addresses to the Lord Jesus, are examined."



(comp. Isa. xlv. 24,) has been ably demonstrated by Socinus himself.\*

\* See the controversy between Socinus and Franken, before cited; also Socinus' Letter *de Invocatione Christi*, in the *Bibl. Fratr. Polon.* T. I. p. 353. "From this passage, (John v. 23,) we learn, that God would have all men honor the Son as they honor the Father: it is clear, therefore, that the same sort of honor is due to Christ that is due to God himself, and that he must, consequently, be adored. For adoration is, unquestionably, the sort of honor which we owe to God. The word *as* does not, indeed, necessarily, imply a perfect resemblance, but it certainly must imply a peculiar resemblance of some sort. For if a mere general resemblance were denoted consisting in the fact that both are to be honored, the addition of the words—*as they honor the Father*—would be superfluous and nugatory. Nor let any one suppose, that this ascription of equal honors to both, means nothing more than this, that the instructions and commands of Christ are to be as much regarded as the instructions and commands of God. For the reason assigned is, that God has *committed all judgment* unto Christ; i. e. the whole control and management of the church. It appears, then, from these words of Christ himself, to be God's will, that he should be worshipped and receive divine honors; which exposition of the divine will is equivalent to a command. It follows, therefore, that we are *commanded* to worship Christ. Besides, you will perceive from the very words themselves, that the power and authority bestowed on Christ is such as of itself to intimate, that he should be adored. We have another authority expressly to the same effect, Heb. i. 6, where the words of Ps. xcvi. 7, are obviously applied to Christ, for the purpose of showing his pre-eminence above the angels, from the fact that he is entitled to their adoration. It need not here be proved, that even if the words are addressed in the Psalm to God himself, the Divine writer was at liberty to make an application of them to Christ, unless, indeed, we question his authority, as well as that of the other writers of the sacred volume. Now if Christ ought to be adored by all the angels of God, how much more by men, over whom he is more properly Lord and King." It is scarcely necessary to observe, that these and other arguments adduced by Faustus Socinus, may, with a few slight alterations, be employed with equal force, by the advocates of our opinion against the same hypothesis. With respect to John v. 23, see Storr *über den Zweck*, &c. p. 198.

Those, on the other hand, who maintain that he should be worshipped, at the same time denying his divinity, involve themselves in a difficulty equally perplexing. The Old Testament teaches most explicitly, that religious worship is due to none but Jehovah, the creator of the heavens and the earth. (Isa. xlii. 8; xlviii. 11. seqq. Jer. x. 11, &c.) No *v.* is it credible, that God himself, or Christ, or Christ's apostles, after recognizing, so distinctly, the divine authority, and confirming so expressly the doctrines of the Prophets, would have stooped to the inconsistency of claiming divine honors for "a creature, by exhibiting a man, *μη ποσειδοντα Θεον*, (Gal. iv. 8.) as an object of worship to the Gentiles? The weight with which this difficulty bears upon those who hold the doctrines of the Racovian Catechism, is apparent from the very ingenuity of the arguments, offensive and defensive, which Socinus has invented for the purpose of evading it. That acute controvertist argues,\* that, even admitting the exclusive application of the command respecting worship, to God alone, as originally given by the mouth of the prophets, it does not necessarily follow, that it continued equally exclusive *after Christ's glorification*. But he maintains that no such concession need be made, because the command to worship God alone, may be understood in such a way, that the word *alone* will not exclude such beings as are *subordinate to God*: Besides, the adoration of Christ will appear less derogatory to the honor of the Most High, when it is considered that all worship rendered to the Son, must redound to the honor of the Father from whom he derives his power, and that the worship due to God, and the worship due to Christ, † though generically the same, are by no means identical.

\* See Socinus' Letter, *de Invocatione Christi*. in the *Bibl. Fratr. Polon.* p. 354.

† See the Letter quoted above, and the *Racovian Catechism*. Qu. 245. p. 447. ed. Oeder.

It is easy, however, to perceive, that there is much more ingenuity than truth, and very little consistency withal, in this reasoning of Socinus and his followers. For how can it be asserted with any appearance of truth, that a divine decree, not local or temporary in its nature, but derived from the very nature of the Deity, and implied in the very idea of creation, was abrogated even after Christ's exaltation, when, in fact, it is most clearly taught after that event, by the apostles of Christ himself? (Gal. iv. 8, 9.\* ) As to the assertion that the command to worship God alone, is to be understood as not excluding those subordinate to God ; it appears to me, to be irreconcilable with God's design of drawing the Israelites off from every form of polytheism—as well as with the explicit declarations of the prophets, (Jer. x. 11, Isa. xliii. 10. &c.) and the plain expressions of the New Testament. (Matt. iv. 10.† Gal. ix. 8, 9. Rev. xix. 10.) Not a whit more plausible is the argument added by Socinus and the Racovian Catechism respecting the difference between the honors due to Christ, and those due to God himself.‡ It is notorious, that the very same expressions which are used in the Old Testament in claiming divine honors for Jehovah, are used in the New Testament respecting Christ, (compare

\* To which may be added, Rev. xix. 10.

† If the hypothesis of Socinus be correct, Christ ought not to have derived his answer to the tempter, from the precept which he quotes, but from this consideration, that as the tempter was not *subordinate* to God, (that is, one whom God had made his minister,) nor clothed with such power as he pretended, he was not entitled even to a subordinate degree of worship. For it is wholly incredible, that Satan who himself derived his power from a superior, meant to demand the worship due to the Supreme Being. (See Luke iv. 6.)

‡ The general idea of *divine honors* is defined in the Racovian Catechism, (Qu. 212—215, p. 432. ed. Oeder,) in a way which can scarcely be reconciled with the doctrine of the same book respecting the honor due to Christ, (Qu. 236. p. 442,) and the difference between that honor and the honor due to God, (Qu. 245. p. 447.)

Heb. i. 6, with Ps. xcvi. 7, and Phil. ii. 10, 11, with Isa. xlv. 23, 24,) nor is there any thing in the context which requires that the words should be understood as implying an inferior sort of worship.

But admitting that the words in question do not denote the highest sort of worship, and that the exegetical and philosophical principles upon which Faustus Socinus and his followers build their hypothesis respecting the nature of Christ, and the worship due to him, are altogether valid—I would ask, how can it possibly be proved, consistently with those principles, that the highest sort of worship is due to the Father, or that none at all is due to angels? In proof of the former proposition, they cite 1 Cor. viii. 6. (But, to borrow the Socinian mode of interpretation,) may not  $\Theta\epsilon\omicron\varsigma$  signify some inferior and created Deity? May it not be gathered from this passage, that the Father is merely  $\Theta\epsilon\omicron\varsigma \text{ ΗΜΩΝ}$ , and not the Most High God? That cannot be, say they; for he is also said to be  $\text{ΕΙΣ } \Theta\epsilon\omicron\varsigma$ , *the one God*,  $\epsilon\grave{\xi} \omicron\upsilon \tau\alpha \pi\alpha\nu\tau\alpha$ , *of whom are all things*. But is not Christ in this very same verse (compare Eph. iv. 5.) called  $\text{ΕΙΣ } \kappa\upsilon\rho\iota\omicron\varsigma$ , *one Lord*, without excluding the idea of a superior Lord? And is it not clear from John i. 3, and Col. i. 16, that the phrase  $\tau\alpha \pi\alpha\nu\tau\alpha$  in many cases does not mean *all things* in the very widest sense?

Again, they appeal to the language of Christ himself, in John xvii. 3. But the word  $\mu\omicron\nu\omicron\nu$ , Socinians themselves being judges, is often used, especially in relation to Jehovah; in such a way as to exclude only idols or false gods.

In addition to these and other passages,\* in which the Father is expressly mentioned, they bring forward many others

\* Such as Eph. iv. 6. 1 Tim. ii. 5, &c. It is unnecessary, however, to consider these texts separately, not only because they afford less striking evidence than John xvii. 3, and 1 Cor. viii. 6; but also, because what is said in relation to the latter, will apply as well to them.



which apparently ascribe the highest sort of worship to *God* or *Jehovah*. But may not the command to worship Jehovah and him alone, have been a mere temporary institution? Or even waving that objection, how can it be proved, agreeably to Socinian principles, that προσκυνειν and λατρευειν in Matt. iv. 10, (compare Deut. vi. 13, and Heb. i. 6,) denote the highest sort of adoration, or that the words αυτω μονω, are not merely exclusive of the false gods of the heathen, but imply that worship is due to no one whatever but Jehovah? It may be answered, that the highest worship is unquestionably due to Him who is the creator of the universe, and who, *of himself*, has omnipotent authority over us; and we freely grant it. But how will the Socinian prove, that the being called Jehovah or the Father, is the creator of the universe, and of himself, possesses divine power? May not those passages which are generally interpreted as relating to the creation of the universe, be understood in relation to a mere renovation of the *earth*? May it not be supposed that the creative power exerted by Jehovah, as well as the power which he exercises over men and spirits, is derived from some superior Deity? For that the words ברא and κτισειν often mean mere *reformation*, and that the attributes of God may be imparted to a creature, no Socinian can consistently deny. It appears, then, that Socinus and his partisans are utterly unable to demonstrate the great fundamental doctrine of their creed, that the Father alone is God in the highest sense, and is alone entitled to the highest sort of worship.

But they involve themselves in another difficulty, which appears to me inextricable. They deny that it is lawful to render to angels any species of religious worship. In this very denial, however, they seem to be at variance with their own principles. For if worship is due to Christ, not on account of his essential nature, but because of the power which he possesses,\* and which Socinians regard as absolute,

\* See *Bibl. Fratr. Polon.* Tom. II. pp. 769, 775.



but inferior to God's, and consequently finite, why may not the angels who are also clothed with power—inferior, indeed, to Christ's, but notwithstanding, great\* be adored in a proportionate degree? Is it because the glory of the Most High God would thereby be diminished? No, for the honor rendered to the angels on account of the power conferred on them by God, must redound to the glory of God himself. Is it because we are commanded in Matt. iv. 10, (compare Deut. vi. 13,) to worship God alone? No, for Socinians themselves understand the word *alone* as not excluding those who are *subordinate to God*. For the same reason, their favourite argument derived from the words of the angel to John, forbidding him to worship him, and commanding him to worship God alone, is futile. For who could use this argument, if like F. Socinus, he interpreted the command to worship in a different manner from the angel who conversed with John. It is true that the worship of angels is no where

\* That angels are clothed with extraordinary power, and exercise no small authority over the earth and its inhabitants, is plainly taught in various parts of the Sacred Scriptures, particularly in the Apocalypse, the divine authority of which, is acknowledged by Socinians. It appears, indeed, to have been admitted by Faustus Socinus, who (*Bibl. Fr. Pol.* Tom. I. p. 791,) after asserting that the angels are possessed of great glory, and some authority, proceeds as follows: "As to the argument, [urged by those who deny that the words of God, in Gen. i. 26, were addressed to angels,] that it is not allowable to make the angels in any sense, partners of the Deity, in the creation of the world; we reply, that such reasoning is perfectly irrelevant, since nothing is more certain, than that God does communicate his own peculiar attributes to such of his creatures as he makes his instruments. We read, that man was first formed from the dust of the earth, and that afterwards the breath of life was breathed or blown into his face, (or rather nostrils). Now, although this is said to have been done by God himself, it can scarcely be doubted that he did it by the agency of angels. It is evident, indeed, from the expressions, *formed and breathed.*"

enjoined upon Christians in the scriptures. But that a thing may be lawful, though not positively commanded, is self-evident, and can scarcely be disputed by Socinus, who maintains that the *invocation* of Christ (which he distinguishes from *adoration*,\*) though not commanded, is allowable; and that, if no command existed to the contrary, adoration itself would have been due to him.

But to pursue this any longer would carry us too far. Enough has now been said to demonstrate the inconsistency of those Socinians who admit that worship is due to Christ. On the whole, we feel ourselves justified in saying, that the higher Socinians place Christ, the more they are inconsistent with themselves and sound philosophy—and the lower they place him, the more they are at war with the plainest declarations of the New Testament.† There can be no doubt, therefore, that, all things considered, our doctrine is more rational and credible than that maintained by Socinians of either class.

3. We must now consider briefly the sentiments of those who believe, with us, that a personal distinction existed between the Father and the Son before Jesus was born of

\* *Bibl. Fratr. Polon.* T. I. p. 354.

† S. Przipcov entertains higher views of Christ than F. Socinus. He declares (in his works, p. 452, &c.) that Christ partook of both the divine and human nature, but that both did not co-exist in him at once; the nature of the Son of God, who now reigns in heaven, being not human, but celestial and divine. But if this be so, it necessarily follows, that the human soul of Christ was annihilated, and a spirit substituted for it, endowed with all the attributes of God; a supposition, I need scarcely say completely at variance with the declaration of the Sacred Scriptures, that the same man Jesus, who was, on earth, now reigns in heaven, as well as with the doctrine of the unity of God, which cannot be reconciled with Przipcov's hypothesis, that all the peculiar attributes of God, and all the eternal concomitants of the divine essence and nature, are inherent in Christ since his exaltation.

Maty, but define the nature of that distinction in such a way as to reject the idea of consubstantiality. To this class belong, 1. the *Tritheists*, if any such there are, who believe that the *ουσια* of the Father and the Son are precisely equal, but not numerically identical. 2. Those who hold that the nature of Christ is super-angelic as well as super-human, but regard the Son as inferior to the Father. The former hypothesis is so palpably inconsistent with the doctrine of the unity of God, that it needs no refutation. In examining the latter, we shall pass by the rigid Arians, and confine ourselves very much to those who hold, with the ancient *Homoeusians*, that the Son is *similis κατ' ομοιωσιν* to the Father, or, with Clarke\* and others, that the Son partakes of all the

\* "The Father alone," says Clarke, "is self-existent, underived, unoriginated, independent; made of none, begotten of none, proceeding from none. (*Scripture Doctrine of the Trinity*. P. II. § 5.) The Father is the sole origin of all power and authority, and is the author and principal of whatsoever is done by the Son or by the Spirit. (ib. § 6.) The Father alone is in the highest, strict, and proper sense, absolutely supreme over all. († 7.) The Son is not self-existent, but derives his being, or essence, and all his attributes, from the Father, as from the supreme cause. († 12.) In what particular metaphysical manner the Son derives his being or essence from the Father, the scripture has no where distinctly declared; and therefore men ought not to presume to be able to define. († 13.) The scripture in declaring the Son's derivation from the Father, never makes mention of any limitation of time; but always supposes and affirms him to have existed with the Father from the beginning, and before all worlds. († 15.) Whether the Son derives his being from the Father, by necessity of nature, or by the power of his will, the scripture hath no where expressly declared. († 17.) By the operation of the Son, the Father both made and governs the world. († 26.) Concerning the Son, there are the greatest things spoken in scripture, and the highest titles ascribed to him; even such as include all divine powers, excepting absolute supremacy and independency, which to suppose communicable is an express contradiction in terms. († 27.) The Son, whatever his metaphysical essence or substance be, and whatever divine greatness and dignity is ascribed to him in scripture; yet in

communicable attributes of God, but in the mode of his existence and the order of his operation, is inferior to the Father.

The advocates of this doctrine are of opinion, that the language of such passages as John xiv. 28. 1 Cor. xi. 3; xv. 28. Col. i. 15. Phil. ii. 6, &c., can in no way be reconciled so well with those which ascribe the creation of the world and the possession of the highest divine attributes to Christ, as by supposing that the *λογος*, though endowed with the attributes of Deity, is in some way generated or produced by the Father, and subordinate to him in all his acts. And it must be confessed, that among the many texts which speak of Christ, if you except Rom. ix. 5, there is scarcely one which may not be readily explained on the Homoeusian and Clarkian hypotheses, and that some, when considered in themselves without reference to the context, admit of a more satisfactory explanation upon the principles of Clarke than those of the Homoeusians. But since there are none at all which may not be reconciled with our doctrine without doing violence to the principles of interpretation,\* the whole con-

this he is evidently subordinate to the Father, that he derives his being and attributes from the Father, the Father nothing from him. (§ 34.) Every action of the Son, both in making the world and in all his other operations, is only the exercise of the Father's power, communicated to him after an ineffable manner. (§ 35.)

\* As to Col. i. 15, on which Harwood and others lay such stress, the words *πρωτοτοκος πασης κτισως* may be understood in application to Christ's human nature, exalted above all creatures on account of its union with the Deity, or in reference to the *λογος* in the same sense in which God himself (as Wolf observes,) is called by the Jews *primogenitus mundi*. (See Doederlein's *Instit. Th. Christ.* P. II. p. 257. 3d ed.) And as to Phil. ii. 6—8, though I do not agree with those who regard it as an argument for the Deity of Christ, I think it has been clearly shown by some celebrated interpreters, that this passage may be readily explained in accordance with our doctrine, by referring the expressions in v. 6—8, (or at least in v. 8,) to Christ's human



troversy evidently resolves itself into the question, whether the hypotheses of the Homoeusians, and of Clarke, are more consistent with themselves, with the scriptures, and with sound philosophy, and are encumbered with fewer difficulties than our doctrine. That they are not, we have already shown. (p. 2.) But admitting for a moment, that the arguments which we have urged are not conclusive against the objections of the Homoeusians; admitting, that the unity of the creator or Most High God is not so clearly taught in the scriptures, as to destroy the force of their arguments against it; still we may demonstrate the inconsistency of their hypothesis, by applying to it, with a few modifications, the arguments which we have urged above against the Socinians, who admit that Christ is to be worshipped. For let it be granted, that the passages which inculcate the worship of one God, are not to be understood exclusively; that the words which signify adoration, are sometimes used to denote a subordinate species of worship; that the divine attributes are communicable to a spirit distinct from the Most High God—granting all this, how can it after all be proved, that the being called Father and Jehovah in the scriptures, is, indeed, the supreme and independent God? Can it be inferred from the phrase, *one God*, applied to him in 1 Cor. viii. 6? Is not Christ in the same verse, called *one Lord*, though according to the Homoeusians and Arians, subordinate to another Lord?\*

nature. (See Zacharia's *Bibl. Th.* III. Th. p. 201. Doederlein's *Inst. Theol. Chr.* P. II. § 231. obs. 4. Storr's *Dissert. in Epist. ad Philipp.* Tübingen. 1783. p. 18.) On the other passages see our remarks above, (p. 164, &c.) in addition to which we have only this to say, that there is not a passage in the Bible, which asserts, that any perfection or dignity was *bestowed* upon Christ by God before his incarnation.

\* That the fourth verse is not more favorable to the Homoeusian and Clarkian hypothesis, will be apparent on a comparison of that verse with Isa. xliii. 10, 11, and xlv. 6—8. As to the supposition,



Or from Christ's repetition of the words of Moses in Deut. vi. 4? (See Mark xii. 29.) But it must be admitted, even by those who maintain the Deity of Christ, that these words are to be understood in a restricted sense. Why then, may we not suppose, that they were intended merely to exclude the false gods of the Gentiles, or to assign to Jehovah the highest place among the θεοὶ ἡμῶν, or gods who *pertain to us*. It is easy to draw the same conclusion, with respect to the other passages adduced by Clarke in his scripture doctrine of the Trinity, (P. I. Ch. I. § I.) But, say the Homoeusians and the followers of Clarke, the creation of the world is referred to the Father as a primary cause: for the Father is said (Heb. i. 2,) by the Son to have made the worlds. But even admitting that the Father was the primary agent in the creation of the world, how can it be inferred from this, that he is the supreme and independent God—by those too, who believe that an inferior spirit may be endowed with all the attributes required in the creator of a world? It follows, therefore, that the hypothesis of the Homoeusians and of Clarke, is inconsistent with itself;\* a conclusion greatly

that, in all these texts the unity of the *Supreme God* is asserted, without denying the existence of a plurality of *true Gods*, I do not see how it can consist with the drift and context of the passages. In I Cor. viii. 6, particularly, those who are called *Gods* are placed in opposition, not to the *Supreme God*, as such, (for most of the Gentiles acknowledged one Supreme being,) but to the one *true God*. (See Gal. iv. 8, 9.)

\* The same objection may be urged against the theory proposed by Paul Maty, though certainly ingenious and well calculated to remove some exegetical difficulties. He assumes, that the *λογος* is a finite Spirit, produced by the infinite and uncreated Spirit called the *Father* in the scriptures, and personally united with him, before the creation of the world. (See Mosheim's *Modesta inquisitio in novam dogmatis de S. Trinitate explicatione, quam cl. P. Maty nuper proposuit*. Helmst. 1735, and Anton. Driessen's *Examen sententiae quam D. P. Maty proposuit* Groningae. 1733.) Now I cannot see how it is

strengthened by the philosophical arguments which we have adduced above.\* It may be observed in addition, that they are involved, in no small difficulty respecting Christ's *exin-  
anition*, as it is called. For besides that, it is unscriptural† to suppose such a change in the *λογος* as Arians and Homo-  
eusians for the most part believe him to have undergone when he *was made flesh*; it is certainly quite as hard for human reason to comprehend how an exalted spirit could be thus thrust down into a state of infantile ignorance and weak-  
ness,‡ or how the divine wisdom could allow it, were it pos-  
sible,§ as it is to understand the mysteries involved in our hypothesis. || We have no hesitation, therefore, in drawing

possible for Maty to demonstrate his proposition respecting the *Father*, without contradicting himself. For suppose some one should contend that the *Father*, as well as the Son, is a finite spirit, and is called God (in 1 Cor. viii. 6) merely on account of his intimate union with the Deity, affirming that this hypothesis harmonizes better than that of Maty, with the baptismal formula in Matt. xxviii. 19. Can the followers of Maty possibly refute such a theory with any show of consistency? Besides, as Maty assumes the union of three natures, God, the *λογος*, and the man Jesus, his doctrine is certainly not less *mysterious* than ours.

\* To which may be added, those adduced by Toellner, in his *Theol. Untersuch.* I. B. 1st. St. p. 33.

† See Heb. i. 12. *Συ ο αυτος υ.*

‡ This difficulty is not at all diminished by the hypothesis suggested by an anonymous author in Priestley's *Theological Repository*, Vol. I. p. 431, and in the *British Theological Magazine*, Vol. III. p. 802, that the *λογος* was changed into a human soul.

§ See Lardner's letter against the Arians, in the *Brit. Theol. Mag.* Vol. III. p. 731.

|| The Homoeusians, whom I have read, are not very happy in their explanation of those passages which relate to Christ's exaltation. I do not see how the supposition, that the reward of Christ consisted in the pleasurable consciousness of his own merits, (See *Br. Theol. Mag.* Vol. III.) can be reconciled with some expressions used by the apostles, descriptive of Christ's glory, (such as Phil.

the conclusion, that the hypothesis of the Homoeusians and of Clarke respecting the divinity of Christ, plausible as it is, and in a practical point of view so nearly allied to ours, must, nevertheless, yield to the latter as being more harmonious with the whole tenor of the scriptures as well as more consistent with itself. That it is not, after all, wholly free from difficulties, can give offence to no one, who remembers the words of Paul (1 Cor. xiii. 9.) ΕΚ ΜΕΚΡΟΥΣ ΓΙΝΩΣΚΟΜΕΝ, *we know in part*.

ii. 9. compared with Eph. i. 20. Heb. i. 3; x. 12. &c.) And as to the hypothesis of Clarke (Scripture Doctrines, P. II. § 47.) that the *λογος*, who before his incarnation merely participated in the honors of Jehovah, was permitted, after death, as a reward for his services, to be worshipped as personally distinct from Jehovah, it would seem to imply that Christ enjoyed higher honors *before* than *after* his incarnation.