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The Reverend John D. Davis, Doctor of Philosophy, Doctor of Divinity, Doctor of Laws, Helena Professor of Oriental and Old Testament Literature in Princeton Theological Seminary, died on June 21, 1926, in the seventy-third year of his age.

At the beginning of the last academic session he seemed to be in the full enjoyment of his usual vigor of body and mind, and, so far as his colleagues could observe, he performed his duties throughout the year with his customary fidelity, efficiency, and success. Few, even among those intimately associated with him, had any inkling that his health was being impaired. His familiar form was conspicuous for its absence from the Commencement Exercises in May, and as the word spread among the members of the Faculty, the graduating class, and the large gathering of alumni and friends of the Seminary, that our beloved senior professor had left town in order to undergo a surgical operation, expressions of sincere regret and deep solicitude were heard on every hand; nor were our apprehensions altogether allayed by the assurance, emanating from a seemingly trustworthy source, that under normal circumstances his early restoration might be confidently expected. All that human skill and af-

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"A NEW STANDARD BIBLE DICTIONARY"

Seventeen years have elapsed since the *Standard Bible Dictionary* was first published; and a new, enlarged and completely revised edition has recently appeared.¹ In general it follows the lines of the original work, its aim being to bring the first edition up to date. Consequently those who are familiar with the edition of 1909 will be able to judge fairly accurately of the general character of the present work. But for the sake of those who are not very familiar with the 1909 edition it may be well to describe it briefly before entering upon a more detailed examination of the new edition which is intended to supplant it.

THE EDITION OF 1909

The original edition was prepared by Jacobus and Nourse of Hartford Seminary and Zenos of McCormick Seminary working "in association with American, British and German scholars."² Of Americans there were twenty-one: eight from Hartford Seminary (Jacobus, Macdonald, Mackenzie,

¹ *A New Standard Bible Dictionary*: Designed as a comprehensive help to the study of the Scriptures, their languages, literary problems, history, biography, manners and customs, and their religious teachings. Edited by Melancthon W. Jacobus, D.D., Dean, and Hosmer Professor of New Testament Exegesis and Criticism, in Hartford Theological Seminary; Edward E. Nourse, D.D., Professor of Biblical Theology, and Instructor in New Testament Canonicity and Textual Criticism, in Hartford Theological Seminary; and Andrew C. Zenos, D.D., Dean, and Professor of Biblical Theology in McCormick Theological Seminary, Chicago; in association with American, British, and German scholars; completely revised and enlarged; embellished with many illustrations, plans, and maps; Funk and Wagnalls Company, New York and London, 1926. [N. B. Owing to the fact that so many names appear in the list of contributors to this dictionary it has seemed wise to omit such titles as "Dr." and "Professor" and refer to the writers simply by their last names].

² In the 1909 edition Jacobus is called "editor-in-chief" and Nourse and Zenos are described as "associates" (see title on the back of the cover). But in the 1926 edition as on the title page of that of 1909 no such distinction is made, and the order of names, Jacobus, Nourse, Zenos might be regarded as simply alphabetical.

Mitchell, Nourse, Paton, Pratt, Thayer); four from McCormick Seminary (Carrier, Dickey, Robinson and Zenos); two from Chicago University (Mathews, Price); one each from Auburn Seminary (Riggs), Western Seminary (Kelson), Cornell University (Sterritt), Harvard University (Ropes), Syrian Protestant College, Beirut (Post); also two pastors (Leary, Trout). Of British scholars there were ten: Bartlet, Denney, Dods, Driver, Falconer, Gray, Lake, McCurdy, Milligan, Sanday. Of Germans there were five: von Dobschütz, Guthe, König, Nowack, Thumb.

While the fact that fifteen of the thirty-six contributors to the first edition were British or German gave the Dictionary a markedly international character, it was of course in the main a product of American scholarship. Most of the foreign scholars, with the exception of the two Canadians (Falconer, McCurdy), contributed only a few articles, some but one: British—Bartlet (ACTS), Denney (CHURCH LIFE, JESUS CHRIST, PAUL), Dods (JUDE, EP. OF, PETER, EPS. OF), Driver (ARAMAIC LANGUAGE, CHRONICLES, JEREMIAH, NUMBERS), Gray (GENEALOGY OF O. T.), Lake (N. T. CANON), Milligan (ANTICHRIST, THESSALONIANS), Sanday (MIRACLES): German—von Dobschütz (N. T. TEXT), Guthe (MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE, PALESTINE (most), SHIPS) König (EZRA AND NEHEMIAH, ISAIAH, O. T. CANON), Nowack (15 articles, including AGRICULTURE, HEB. ARCHAEOLOGY, MOURNING, WARFARE), Thumb (HELLENISTIC AND BIBLICAL GREEK). But on the other hand the intrinsic importance of most of the articles assigned to these foreign scholars made their contribution to the Dictionary far greater than the relative number of the articles would indicate.

The two Canadian representatives contributed a considerable number of articles. Falconer's were mostly brief and dealt with the persons and places mentioned in the N. T.; but included also the articles TIMOTHY, TIMOTHY (EPS. OF), TITUS (EP. OF). McCurdy wrote the important articles ASSYRIA, BABYLON. BABYLONIA. EGYPT, ETHNOGRAPHY (in

part), ISRAEL (HISTORY OF), SEMITIC RELIGIONS, and about twenty shorter articles.

Turning to the American scholars we find that of the eight Hartford men, Jacobus wrote the important articles on the Gospels and on most of the Epistles of Paul, together with a number of others; Macdonald had three articles (ARAB, ECCLESIASTES, JOB); Mackenzie, ten (incl. CONSCIENCE, FAITH, GOD, JUSTIFICATION, WILL); Mitchell, one (GNOSTICISM); Nourse, a large number of articles, chiefly bearing on the O. T., both long (e.g., CHRONICLES, DEUTERONOMY, HEXATEUCH, PETER, PRIESTHOOD) and short; Paton, about sixteen articles (notably ESTHER, JERUSALEM, O. T. TEXT); Pratt, twelve articles (notably MUSIC, PRAISE, PRAYER, PSALMS and WORSHIP); Thayer, most of the brief articles on O. T. proper names.

Of the McCormick men, Carrier had forty articles (chiefly on O. T. biography, e.g., AARON, AMOS, EVE, JOSEPH, ZERUBBABEL); Dickey, about twenty usually very short articles; Robinson, twenty-five articles on O. T. place names; Zenos, many articles both long (e.g., ESCHATOLOGY, PROPHECY, SACRIFICE, SALVATION, TEMPLE) and short, in both the O. T. and N. T. fields.

Mathews of Chicago had four articles (DEMON, HEROD, PHARISEES, SADDUCEES); Price of Chicago, about thirty articles (chiefly Assyrio-Babylonian biographical and geographical names); Riggs of Auburn, about twenty articles (e.g., MACCABEES, TARGUM, WISDOM OF SOLOMON); Kelso of Western, about fifty articles (e.g., ARK, CHERUBIM, FLOOD, TRIBES, and a number on O. T. geography); Sterritt of Cornell, many brief articles dealing with N. T. geographical words (also article VERSIONS); Ropes of Harvard, one (SERMON ON THE MOUNT); Leary, many brief articles (also COSMOGONY, SONG OF SONGS); Trout, many articles on N. T. biography and geography (also PENTECOST), Post of Beirut, one (DISEASE AND MEDICINE).

In the Preface to the first edition, it is stated that the Dictionary owed its origin to two facts: the one that the

Biblical dictionaries of Hastings and Cheyne are too "discursive" and expensive to serve as handy reference books accessible to the general student, the other that the plan first entertained by the publishers of translating the one volume *Bibelwörterbuch* of Hermann Guthe did not prove to be a practicable one. This implies that what was intended by the editors might be roughly defined as a one-volume Hastings or Cheyne. And this is borne out by the statement of its critical position which is expressed as follows and appears unchanged in the revised edition :

The critical position to which such a Dictionary is necessarily committed must be one of acceptance of the proved facts of modern scholarship, of open-mindedness toward its still-debated problems, and of conservation of the fundamental truths of the Christianity proclaimed and established in the message and mission of Jesus Christ. The constituency to which the Dictionary appeals is not to be helped by an apologetic method that ignores what a reverent critical scholarship has brought to light regarding the Book of the Christian religion;³ nor is it to be served by a radical spirit so enamored of novelty and opposed to tradition that it would seek to establish a new religion on the ruins of the historical facts of Christianity. It can be ministered to only by a clear, charitable, uncontroversial presentation of the results which a century and a half of earnest, conscientious, painstaking, self-denying study of the Bible has secured, to the end that all students and readers of the Book may be led into its more intelligent understanding and its more spiritual use.⁴

It is further confirmed, if confirmation were needed, by the fact that nearly all the foreign contributors had been contributors to Hastings.

³ An interesting commentary on this phrase is to be found in the article BIBLE. It reads as follows: "Nothing can be further from the truth, then, than to say that the religion of Israel or Christianity are 'book-religions.' In both the book is the product, not the cause; in both the religion was in existence and in a strong vital touch with life and history before the book appeared; in both the book is the expression of and witness to the strength and vigor as well as character of the religion. How different in these respects the Bible is from other sacred books is as evident as is the related fact, the difference between the religions of other sacred books and the religion that produced the Bible" (1909 ed., p. 99). This means that the Bible is the product and not the source of Christian experience. This statement does not appear in the 1926 edition. But the same view is expressed by Moffatt in his article THE APPROACH TO THE NEW TESTAMENT (see pp. 607f *infra*).

⁴ P. viii (both editions).

THE REVISED EDITION OF 1926

As it is with the *New Standard* that we are primarily concerned, we shall devote our attention chiefly to the changes, the revisions and the new material, which it contains. But since, notwithstanding the extensive revision,⁵ old material is present in large measure, we shall not hesitate to call attention to it as occasion may offer, though it be at the risk of discussing matters which have already received attention at the hands of others. In discussing the Dictionary, both new and old material, it will be our aim to ascertain how far the *New Standard* realizes the aim set forth in the statement of its critical position and more especially the deeper question whether that position is a true one.

One of the important features in the *New Standard* is the considerable increase in the number of contributors: fifty-four as against thirty-six in the first edition. This is due largely to the fact that "a group of scholars were invited to revise, or rewrite if that seemed preferable, those articles whose authors had died in the intervening period, or found it impossible to undertake the revision of their own work." There are only four of the original contributors whose names do not appear in the new edition—Dods, König, Sanday⁶ and Thumb. This means that the new edition has twenty-two new contributors. We shall look first at the foreign contributors.

There are eleven new foreign contributors, most of whom have revised or rewritten only a very few articles; S. Angus of St. Andrews, Sydney, has rewritten several of Sterritt's articles, and revised most of the remainder; C. H. Dodd, of Oxford, has rewritten Falconer's *N. T. CHRONOLOGY*; G. S. Duncan of St. Andrews, Scotland, has revised Milligan's *THESSALONIANS*; A. E. Garvie, Principal of Hackney and

⁵ "It has covered every title, even the smallest, and in such a way as to make the book practically a new work" (p. xi).

⁶ The inclusion of the name of Sanday in the list of contributors is clearly a mistake, since his article *MIRACLES* has been "rewritten" by Gillett.

New College, Hampstead, England, has revised Denney's JESUS CHRIST and PAUL; W. G. Jordan of Queen's University, Kingston, Canada, has rewritten König's EZRA AND NEHEMIAH and O. T. CANON, and revised most of Riggs' articles; H. A. A. Kennedy of the New College, Edinburgh, has rewritten Dods' JUDE (EP. OF), PETER (EPISTLES OF), and Jacobus' COLOSSIANS; J. E. McFadyen of the United Free Church College, Glasgow, has revised Driver's CHRONICLES and NUMBERS, and also written an introductory article THE APPROACH TO THE O. T. H. R. Mackintosh of the New College, Edinburgh, has revised Mackenzie's FAITH, GOD, HOLY SPIRIT; J. Moffatt of Glasgow has written an article on THE APPROACH TO THE N. T. A. S. Peake of Victoria University, Manchester, has rewritten König's ISAIAH and Driver's JEREMIAH and also contributed an article ISRAEL (RELIGION OF); A. Souter of the University of Aberdeen has revised von Dobschütz's N. T. TEXT.

Of the new American contributors A. L. Gillett of Hartford Seminary has rewritten Sanday's MIRACLES; C. H. Hawes of the Boston Museum of Fine Arts has rewritten Sterritt's BOOKS AND WRITING and Falconer's MONEY; E. C. Lane of Hartford Seminary has rewritten McCurdy's ARAM, Riggs' ANGEL, revised Thumb's GREEK LANGUAGE (in part) and revised (or rewritten) a number of short articles by Falconer and Leary; R. H. Pfeiffer of Boston University School of Theology has rewritten McCurdy's ISRAEL (HISTORY OF); A. C. Purdy of Hartford Seminary has rewritten Jacobus' HEBREWS (EPISTLE OF); A. T. Robertson of the Southern Baptist Seminary, Louisville, Kentucky, has revised Thumb's GREEK LANGUAGE (in part); R. W. Rogers of Drew Seminary has rewritten McCurdy's ARTAXERXES, CHEDORLAOMER, CYRUS, DARIUS, and revised his ASSYRIA, BABYLON, BABYLONIA, and EGYPT; O. R. Sellers of McCormick Seminary has rewritten several of Carrier's articles and revised the rest, he has also revised Gray's GENEALOGY; J. M. Powis Smith of Chicago University has revised McCurdy's SEMITIC RELIGION; W. H. Worrell of the

University of Michigan has revised the ETHNOGRAPHY of McCurdy and Nourse; H. G. Dorman, of the American University, Beirut, Syria, has revised Post's DISEASE AND MEDICINE.

Of the original contributors the majority have taken no part in the revision and their work has been revised or rewritten by others. Of the fifteen foreigners four (Dods, König, Sanday, Thumb) have had their work replaced. Eight others (Denney, Driver, von Dobschütz, Falconer, Gray, McCurdy, Milligan, Nowack) have had their work revised and in the case of Driver, Falconer and McCurdy partly replaced by others. Three (Bartlet, Guthe, and Lake) have apparently done their own revising. Of them all Bartlet alone has made further contributions; he has rewritten Jacobus' APOLLOS, APOSTLES, BAPTISM, BARNABAS, and revised Denney's CHURCH LIFE and Falconer's TIMOTHY (EPISTLES OF), TITUS, TITUS (EPISTLE OF).

Of the twenty-one Americans, the work of seven (Carrier, Dickey, Leary, Mitchell, Post, Riggs and Sterritt) has been revised or rewritten by others. Eight others have revised all (Kelso, Pratt, Price) or most (Mackenzie, Mathews, Robinson,⁷ Thayer, Zenos) of their own work, but made no further contribution. The remaining six (Jacobus, Macdonald, Nourse, Paton, Ropes and Trout) have done all or most of their own revising and also revised, or rewritten, the articles of others or contributed new ones. Jacobus has revised most of Dickey's brief articles, and has written a new article SYNOPTIC PROBLEM while at the same time handing over several of his former subjects to others. Macdonald has revised Driver's ARAMAIC LANGUAGE. Nourse has apparently done more revising than any one else; we find his initials added to those of Dickey, Falconer, Leary, Mathews, Mitchell, Milligan, Riggs, Robinson, Sterritt, Thayer, Trout and Zenos.⁸ It would seem that Nourse has acted as a kind

⁷ Robinson's APHEK has been revised by Nourse.

⁸ Once or twice to those of Mathews, Mitchell, Thayer, Trout, more often to those of Riggs, Leary, Falconer, Dickey, and Sterrett, most often to those of Zenos.

of final redactor. Yet it is rather remarkable to find him editing the work of Zenos, his fellow editor and former teacher. Paton has revised or rewritten a number of articles, chiefly some by Leary, McCurdy and Nowack, and has contributed a new article EXCAVATION AND EXPLORATION. Ropes has rewritten Jacobus' BRETHREN OF THE LORD. Trout has revised a number of minor articles.

The greater part of the work of revising this Dictionary, in so far as it is indicated by the signatures appended to the articles, has consequently been done by Nourse, Paton and Lane of Hartford Seminary, by Sellers of McCormick, and by Angus of Australia. One of the clearest indications of the care with which the revision has been made is found in the way in which the results of recent excavations, etc., have been incorporated or referred to in the articles.⁹ In a similar way the bibliographies have been brought down to date in so far, that is to say, as works written from the critical viewpoint are concerned.

THE NATURE OF THE REVISION

Since we have in the *New Standard* so thorough-going a revision of the original edition it is important to consider the nature of this revision. There are two general types of dictionary of which the *Encyclopaedia Britannica* and the *New International* may be regarded as representative. In the one all the important articles are signed; and the reader knows on whom he is depending for information. In the other the articles are unsigned; the reader cannot tell who is responsible for a given article. He merely knows that it has back of it the authority and reputation of the work and its editorial board. It is claimed that this increases the value of the articles by making them less the expression of individual opinion. But the disadvantages of such a method are obvious. Few works of any great compass are of equal value throughout; a generally good work may contain some bad or

⁹ E.g., AMORITE, CARCHEMISH, GALLIO, GEBAL, NINEVEH, SAMARIA, UR, WEIGHTS AND MEASURES.

mediocre articles; and a contributor is more likely to do his best work when held personally responsible for it than when he does hack-work for which he receives no credit.

The *Standard* belongs as we have seen to the former class of dictionaries. All but the very briefest articles carry the initials of the author. And the list of contributors and the prominence given to this list (it is placed immediately after the title page) shows that the editors felt that a dictionary which contained contributions by such distinguished scholars as Denney, Milligan, Nowack and Sanday (to mention only a few) might claim to be authoritative and expect to be popular. The *New Standard* has continued the same general policy. All articles of any importance are signed; and the list of contributors is given the same conspicuous place. In the case of a much larger number of the very brief articles the initials of the author are omitted.¹⁰ But this is a minor matter. The noticeable thing is the great number of articles which have two sets of initials and for which consequently dual responsibility is claimed.¹¹ Thus "J. D.—A. E. G." at the end of the article PAUL means that Garvie has revised Denney's article.

Yet we note with some surprise that the changes made by the reviser are in no wise distinguished from the text of the original article.¹² This is noteworthy; it means

¹⁰ E.g. in BETH-HARAN (Zenos) and BEROEA (Sterritt) the initials have been dropped and editorial changes made. On the other hand in the case of ELIJAH, an article of nearly a page, the omission of Zenos' initials is clearly accidental.

¹¹ In many instances, especially in the case of very brief articles, the second initials simply indicate that the article has been passed on and *approved* by the reviser. e.g., in Dickey's CHASTE, Nourse has made no changes, while in his CHARITY Jacobus has only corrected an obvious misprint. In BARSABBAS, Falconer's initials (R. A. F.) have been allowed to stand alone at the end of the second part of the article. This is clearly an oversight.

¹² We are told in the Preface: "Naturally, wherever it was possible, the revision of articles that were to be retained was entrusted to the original authors, although cases were not infrequent where there was collaboration" (p. vii). We are left, however, in ignorance as to when this collaboration is to be assumed as having taken place.

that except where it is clear from the nature of the changes (e.g., the reference to literature published subsequent to the date of the first edition), the reader is in no position to judge how much of the new article is Garvie, for example, and how much is still Denney, unless he compares the new article with the old, which few are likely to do, or is so well acquainted with the views of the two scholars that he can, after the manner of the higher critic, distinguish D from G, and recognize where G, or we might better say R (the redactor), has edited the words of his source to make them reflect the truer wisdom of a later age (fifteen years advance in scholarship).

Let us look at an instance taken from the article PAUL which has been referred to above. The 11th section of this article deals with "The Council Decree." The opening sentences read in the 1909 edition as follows:

The provisional settlement of this question is recorded in Acts chap. xv; Gal. chap. ii. It was entirely in Paul's favor.¹³

In the 1926 edition these sentences have been altered and expanded to read as follows:

The provisional settlement of this question is recorded in Acts chap. xv. Whether Paul is referring to this settlement in Gal. chap. ii is very doubtful. Some scholars, on the basis of the 'South Galatian' view, hold that the Epistle to the Galatians was the first of Paul's letters, and was written in the first heat of the controversy from Antioch before the Council was held; and there is much to be said for this conclusion: for (1) it removes the difficulty of reconciling the accounts in Acts chap. xv and Gal. chap. ii of Paul's visit to Jerusalem; (2) the conduct of Paul, Peter, and Barnabas as depicted in Gal. is more intelligible *before* than *after* the decrees in Acts chap. xv (*per contra*, see GALATIANS, § 3). This decree was entirely in Paul's favor.¹⁴

Comparing these statements we see that Denney clearly believed that Gal. ii referred to the Council Decree, while Garvie considers this very doubtful. Furthermore, the changes of phrase, slight as they are, prevent the reader from detecting (we doubt if even a skilled critic would discover any "source analysis" unless he happened to know Denney's opinion as to Gal. ii) that D^G practically contradicts D. Has the view of Denney become so hopelessly old fashioned with-

¹³ P. 648b.

¹⁴ P. 687b.

in a decade and a half, that such liberties can properly be taken with his apparently mature and carefully stated opinions? Would it not have been much better to put such editorial changes in brackets? Then the reader would have the facts clearly before him. Denney's view would stand intact, and Garvie's disagreement and the reasons therefor would be apparent. This has nothing to do with the question whether Garvie is right in his editorial changes. The question is simply whether Denney, since his name still appears as the original author, should be allowed to speak for himself, with such clearly indicated comments as Garvie may deem it wise to supply, or whether Garvie is entitled to make Denney reverse his position without giving the reader the slightest intimation that he has done so.

Let us look at a few more examples. The 'Messianic Consciousness' of Jesus has been much discussed in recent years. Denney tells us:

We know nothing of a growth of the Messianic consciousness. No doubt it had psychological antecedents and conditions which prepared for it and made it possible, but we can only conjecture vaguely upon them. It appears as suddenly as a lightning flash, and it shows no trace of development or of modification. How the seemingly inconsistent elements in it were to be fused only His future life would show.¹⁵

Denney-Garvie reads thus:

We know nothing of a growth of the Messianic consciousness, at least not within the period of the public ministry. No doubt it had psychological antecedents and conditions, which prepared for it and made it possible, but we can only conjecture vaguely upon them. (Garvie, in his *Studies in the Inner Life of Jesus* (1907), has attempted as far as the data allow to explore the self-consciousness of Jesus in its development.) How the seemingly inconsistent elements in it were to be fused only His future life would show.¹⁶

Here the case is more complicated because the parenthetical reference to Garvie's discussion of this subject is misleading, since the date of his book (1907) suggests that the reference might originate with Denney himself, which it does not.¹⁷

¹⁵ P. 409a.

¹⁶ P. 438a.

¹⁷ Cf., e.g. p. 536 where the reference to Kaiser Wilhelm's visit to Machpelah in 1898 is an editorial addition of Paton's.

Further, the insertion of the clause "at least not within the period of the public ministry" and the omission of the sentence "It appears as suddenly as a lightning flash, and it shows no trace of development or modification" avoids any inconsistency with Garvie's reference to his own discussion of this important question. Is this quite just to Denney? His article appeared in 1909, two years after Garvie's book. He did not refer to this book, and his statements indicate that, if he knew it, as he may well have done, he did not agree with it. Garvie in revising the article incorporates a reference to this book and alters Denney's views to accord with it.¹⁸ Can we regard this as legitimate?

Turning to Denney's third article, CHURCH LIFE AND ORGANIZATION, which has been revised by Bartlet, we find an interesting example of editing in the comment on the word "disciples." Denney's words are:

This last word (the feminine *μαθήτρια* Acts ix. 36) is found only in Acts and in the Gospels. Though it signifies not merely a pupil but an adherent, it seems to have been felt unequal to the truth; Jesus was more than a Teacher, the Christian owed more to Him than a pupil to his master, and in the Epistles the word disappears.¹⁹

The following is Bartlet's explanation:

This last word is found only in Acts and the Gospels. Although it signifies not only a pupil but an adherent, its suggestion of actual personal relationship with Jesus as Teacher seems to have caused it early to die out (save for martyrs, as specially 'learners' of their Lord in His earthly example: so e.g., Ignatius).²⁰

That this explanation is quite different and avoids the clear implication of Denney's assertion that Jesus was more than a teacher, does not need to be stressed.

Many other examples might easily be cited. Thus, not merely has Dorman made many changes in Post's DISEASE AND MEDICINE, but he has also added a section on "The Healing Ministry of Jesus," in which he intimates that Jesus shared "the limitations of the human mind" in believing

¹⁸ Another example of the editing of this article is a long insert on pp. 441f. dealing with Jesus' miracles.

¹⁹ P. 132a.

²⁰ P. 133b.

that "insanity, hysteria and epilepsy" were due to an unclean spirit;²¹ and among His cures are mentioned "three cases of raising the apparently dead." The word "apparently" shows clearly the bias of the reviser. Yet there is nothing to indicate that this whole section is due entirely to Dorman. On the other hand in Mitchell's Gnosticism the first brief paragraph has been expanded (by Nourse?) to over a column and a half, the rest being only slightly changed. In his article EGYPT McCurdy referred to Merneptah's mention of Israel as one of the peoples conquered by him and added "It is doubtful whether the Hebrew 'Exodus' had then (c. 1260 B.C.) taken place." Rogers changes this sentence to read "It is probable that the Hebrew 'Exodus' had then (c. 1225 B.C.) taken place." In the article BABYLONIA McCurdy stated that "The first dynasty of Babylon lasted till about 2100 B.C." Rogers changes 2100 to 1760. This is probably approximately correct, but it is rather a drastic change to make in an article to which McCurdy's name is still attached.²²

In our opinion the only satisfactory, we are tempted to say, the only legitimate way in which changes can be made in a *signed* article is by bracketted insert, marginal comment, or concluding note.²³ But even if the validity of the other method is admitted, the question of how much revising is permissible in an article to which the name of the original author is still attached is a difficult one; and we do not think that it has been satisfactorily solved in this volume. There are articles which have been so radically changed (e.g., the article ELI) that it is hardly just to the original author to retain his name in connection with them. They have practically ceased to be his. On the other hand there are articles (e.g. BABYLONISH GARMENT) that bear only the initials of

²¹ Mathews holds that Jesus and His disciples "shared in the popular demonology" (p.177a). Denney argues that this does not matter, since Jesus did not come to teach medicine or psychology (p. 441b).

²² For other examples see pp. 596f *infra*.

²³ In some instances this would be quite simple (e.g., in the case of the new closing paragraph in GREECE and SAMARIA). In others it would be much more difficult.

the reviser, which follow so closely the general form of the original article that it seems hardly proper to ignore this fact.

One of the important new features of the Dictionary, as has been already pointed out, is that two articles have been added at the beginning treating of the important subject of "Approach." The one which treats of THE APPROACH TO THE OLD TESTAMENT is by McFayden; the companion article on THE APPROACH TO THE NEW TESTAMENT is by Moffatt. Both of these scholars are professors in the United Free Church College in Glasgow, and consequently speak more or less authoritatively for a large group of Presbyterians in Scotland and elsewhere. These articles are of especial interest because they are clearly intended to set forth the "critical position" of the Dictionary somewhat more in detail than has been done by the editors' preface. They therefore merit careful study as they reveal clearly the methods, tendencies and conclusions of that "modern" study of the Bible of which the *Standard Bible Dictionary*—both editions—is the expression.

THE APPROACH TO THE OLD TESTAMENT

McFayden's article is a thoroughly characteristic one;²⁴ and its significance lies in the fact that its author does not hesitate to state boldly and with manifest enthusiasm those conclusions of the critics which it is often the endeavor to tone down and conceal, lest they shock the devout and unsophisticated student of the Bible. Our author delights in the differences, discrepancies and even contradictions of the O. T. "The outlook and personalities of the writers are," he assures us, "refreshingly diverse." "Could any contrast be greater," he asks, "than that between the glowing exuberance, alike in message and style, of Deutero-Isaiah (Is. xl-lv) and the meager jejune prose of Haggai; or between Jeremiah who cared less than nothing for ritual and Ezekiel

²⁴ Cf. especially article "Zionism" in *Expos. Times* for May 1924; also the series on "The Bible and Modern Thought" in *The Record of the Home and Foreign Mission Work of the United Free Church of Scotland*, October 1925—March 1926.

to whom it was almost the all in all?" "The most pervasive and fundamental contrast, however, is," he assures us, "that between the prophet and the priest. Amos at the beginning and Malachi at the end of the prophetic succession are diametrically opposed." He declares that "by far the most flagrant divergence of all is that between Samuel and Kings on the one hand and Chronicles on the other." And finally we read "The most momentous contradiction in the O. T. occurs in connection with the origin of the Hebrew sacrificial system." These are strong and arrogant words to use regarding the Old Testament Scriptures: "most pervasive and fundamental contrast—diametrically opposed—flagrant divergence—most momentous contradiction"!

The reason for McFadyen's apparent delight in such alleged differences, is not far to seek. "Criticism," he tells us, "is inevitable. The problems with which it deals are created by the facts, such facts, *e.g.*, as discrepancies and contradictions." No wonder then that he is interested in these alleged differences. He is a critic; and criticism deals largely with just such phenomena. If there were no discrepancies and contradictions, criticism, as understood by him and as practiced by most of the critics, would be at a discount. It would not play the superlative rôle that it does. It is natural, then, that the critic should be on the lookout for differences and contradictions. They are his specialty. Explain them satisfactorily; and his services as an expert on such morbid phenomena are not needed.²⁵ But if the critic is an expert on such

²⁵ We have referred to these difficulties as "morbid" phenomena, but the word is even more appropriate as applied to the critic's attitude toward these phenomena. He is constantly searching for "difficulties"; and in consequence he becomes hypersensitive and finds them where none exist. Thus Nourse counts up as many as *seven* points about which "the main differences" between J and E in Exodus centre (p. 249f.). But most of them simply result from the determination of the critics to analyze Exodus into documentary sources. Similarly, Paton holds that the book of Esther "contains a number of inconsistencies with itself" (p. 230a). As an illustration of this he tells us that "In ii. 6 Mordecai is one of the captives carried away with Jehoiachin in 596 B.C., but in iii. 7, viii. 2, he becomes prime minister in the 12th year of Xerxes, 474 B.C."

distressing phenomena as "contradictions," features which seem to make it impossible to believe in the infallibility and authority of the Bible—we cannot regard two contradictory authorities as both of them valid—, how does he solve them?

"The Most Momentous Contradiction"

We have a good example of such a solution in the case of the "most momentous contradiction in the O.T." already referred to. The whole paragraph reads as follows:

The most momentous contradiction in the O. T. occurs in connection with the origin of the Hebrew sacrificial system. Amos (v. 25), still more explicitly Jeremiah (vii. 22) and by implication Micah (vi. 6-8), maintain that J" had given no commandment concerning sacrifice, His demand was for a moral service. But how is it possible to reconcile this with the book of Leviticus which, almost from end to end, is an elaborate regulation of the sacrificial and other ritual, prescribed and issued by Moses at the command and with the authority of J" Himself? Criticism resolves this contradiction by putting the law, as expressed in Leviticus and the cognate sections of the Pentateuch, later than the prophets. The true chronological order is not the law and the prophets, but the prophets and the law; and this is one of the most vital and illuminating discoveries of criticism.²⁶

This statement will bear careful scrutiny. It would indeed be an "illuminating" discovery that Amos, Jeremiah and Micah could truthfully say that they knew nothing of a Mosaic ritual of sacrifice, because the "priestly" ritual which makes such definite claims to Mosaic authority was the invention of

This sounds serious. But it is not. In ii. 6f. we read, "Now in Shushan the palace there was a certain Jew, whose name was Mordecai, the son of Jair, the son of Shimei, the son of Kish, a Benjamite; who had been carried away from Jerusalem with the captivity which had been carried away with Jeconiah king of Judah, whom Nebuchadnezzar the king of Babylon had carried away." The question is simply to whom does the "who" refer, Mordecai or his great-grandfather Kish? If to Mordecai, we have a glaring inconsistency: if to Kish, the inconsistency disappears. The language is ambiguous: "grammatical considerations do not decide the question"—even the keen eyed Kuenen admitted that (Hastings' Dictionary, *in loco*). It is decided by the critic's attitude to Esther; and Paton's attitude is hostile in the extreme. Consequently instead of giving Esther the benefit of a favorable interpretation of an admittedly ambiguous expression, he asserts positively and dogmatically that it contains an inconsistency.

²⁶ P. 6.

a later age. It would seriously affect our attitude to the O. T. were we to find that considerable portions of it make explicit claims which other parts emphatically deny. But we are unable to see that Criticism "resolves" this difficulty by the apparently simple process of post-dating the Law. If the Law was Mosaic, the prophets ought to have known this. Their denial amounts to a contradiction of its claims. But if the Law was late and non-Mosaic, then the 'priestly' writers of post-exilic times ought to have known this; and their assertion of its Mosaic origin and authority contradicts the prophets. The contradiction has not been "resolved"; the *onus* of it has simply been shifted. Instead of its being the priests who are right in affirming that the ritual of sacrifice is of Mosaic and therefore Divine authority and the prophets who are in error in denying this, it is the prophets who are right in denying these lofty pretensions of the priests and the priests who are guilty of what we might call, to put it mildly, a selfish use of the imagination.

Furthermore it is to be observed that this so-called solution of the critics has very serious implications. For if the critics are correct in maintaining that the prophets were right in denying that Moses legislated regarding sacrifice, and if the priests' claim of Mosaic authority for it is false, what reason is there to suppose that ritual sacrifice formed a part or at least an essential part in the religion of Israel of which the prophets were the great exponents? McFadyen speaks here only of the *origin* of sacrifice. But the contradiction which the critics find here goes far deeper than the origin of sacrifice; it concerns its value and validity as well. It tends not only to the disparaging of priestly religion; it leads logically to its rejection *in toto*. This appears clearly in the antithesis which he has drawn for us between Jeremiah "who cared less than nothing for ritual" and Ezekiel "to whom it was almost the all in all."²⁷ It appears even more clearly in the

²⁷ Cf. p. 581f *supra*. Elsewhere McFadyen has called Ezekiel "a priest, or a prophet with a priestly heart" (*Expos. Times*, May 1924, p. 343). Wellhausen dubbed him the "priest in prophet's mantle." Paton tells us

evidence cited to show that Amos and Malachi are "diametrically opposed." For McFadyen goes on to picture this antithesis as follows: "Amos maintaining that J" demands not sacrifice and offerings but righteousness only (v. 24f), and Malachi declaring that the people have robbed God and brought His vengeance upon themselves by withholding the tithes and presenting blemished and inadequate offerings (i. 14, iii. 8-12)." This comes very far short of being a solution of difficulties. For it leads to the conclusion that in the Old Testament we have two distinct types of religion, or two different religions, the prophetic and the priestly, which can by no means be reconciled the one to the other.²⁸

Furthermore the proposed solution has the most important

that the prophets of the post-exilic period "lost their ethical message" (p. 403b), and he alleges in proof of this that "After the fall of Jerusalem Ezekiel ceased to preach repentance, and concerned himself with the restoration of Judah. In chaps. xl-xlviii he gave a purely ritual code for the use of the restored Temple." Malachi (to whom McFadyen has referred as "diametrically opposed to Amos") and the Third Isaiah are similarly rebuked by Paton for their interest in priestly ritual (*Id.*).

²⁸ In discussing PROFITATION (p. 743f) Mackenzie attempts to avoid the "contradiction" between priest and prophet of which the critics make so much. He holds that we have in the Old Testament two views of the method of the Divine forgiveness. In dealing with the word *kāphar* and its derivatives, he points out that in some instances it is used with "reference to the ritual of sacrifice," while in others it is used of "the immediate Divine act of pardon." Speaking of the latter he holds that "In some of these cases the sin was probably committed 'with a high hand,' *i.e.*, it was a breach of that covenant within which alone the sacrificial system had its force. And hence we find this marvelous act of Divine mercy traced directly and only to the mercy and loving kindness of God (*e.g.*, Ps. xxv. 11, cxxx. 3, 4)." He characterizes as "superficial" the view that the priestly conception of religion was primitive and inferior: "It is superficial to solve the problem by saying that the sacrificial view was lower, because it grew out of primitive notions of the Divine nature and relations, and was really abolished for the higher spirits by the other view that the Divine forgiveness is unconditioned save by the repentance which its promise produces. The two views lived on together in Israel." Yet Mackenzie's own view is open to the most serious difficulty. It is expressly stated in the Old Testament in more than one passage that the punishment of the sin of the 'high hand' was not simple forgiveness, but the "cutting off" of the guilty party. We do not read that Eli's sons were forgiven; we read rather that there was no forgiveness for them

New Testament implications. If the priest and the prophet represented different and conflicting types of religion, with which party did Jesus side? Paton tells us that "John the Baptist and Jesus represent a revival of the ethical message of the pre-exilic prophets" (p. 403b). In discussing the attitude of Jesus toward sacrifice, Zenos tells us:

The birth of Jesus was signaled by the offering of the customary sacrifice of purification (Luke ii. 22). But in His life and ministry, He placed the sacrificial system as a whole in a very subordinate position. As a topic of direct teaching, in fact, He completely ignored it. . . . As far as known He never offered sacrifice. To what extent His conduct should be interpreted as a formal rupture with the sacrificial system, and how far, if at all, He regarded it of use, cannot possibly be ascertained. It is certain, however, that by shifting the centre of thought and practise from the outward to the inner sphere, Jesus effectually introduced a new view of religion, which was inevitably destined to result in the abrogation of the old system. His disciples evidently so understood His mind.²⁹

This is of the utmost significance, because "rupture" cannot possibly be construed as meaning "fulfilment." "Rupture" would be the appropriate word only if Jesus adopted the "prophetic" doctrine in its strictest form, as the words "if at

and that they perished ignobly at the hands of the Philistines. To assume that under the Old Dispensation sins for which no atonement was provided or permitted were simply forgiven raises the question "Why should atonement—the covering of sin with blood—be necessary for sins of infirmity and ignorance, and none be needed for those which strike at the very throne of God?" Mackenzie does not answer this question satisfactorily. There is no satisfactory answer to it; and simply to ask it shows how serious is the difficulty in which this solution lands us. The Old Testament clearly sets forth a ritual of atonement as the means by which forgiveness is to be secured. It also describes the sin of the high hand as unpardonable. Consequently it would seem that in passages where forgiveness is spoken of without any mention of sacrifice, we are expected to understand that it is simply assumed that the conditions of the law are to be and will be complied with. This does not mean that there could be no exceptions to or modifications of the exact terms of the prescribed ritual (the law of the delayed passover (Num. ix. 6f.) and the irregularities connected with Hezekiah's passover (2 Chron. xxx. 17f) are examples of such exceptions); but it does mean that these exceptions to the law of expiation are not to be elevated into a new and better way which makes the legal requirements meaningless and insistence upon them absurd.

²⁹ P. 797b.

all" would suggest that He did. That Zenos favors this view seems to be indicated by the further statement that the "abrogation" of the sacrificial system is due to His "shifting the centre of thought and practise from the outward to the inner sphere" which is a "new view" of religion which the critics regard as characteristic of "prophetic" religion. Zenos' words therefore, imply that Jesus' attitude toward sacrifice was clearly "prophetic," it being only a question as to the extent to which he carried His opposition to the whole priestly system. This is to be borne in mind in reading such a statement as the following: "In the development of New Testament thought upon the basis of the life and teaching of Jesus, sacrifice gradually receded into the background." Did ritual sacrifice recede into the background because Jesus fulfilled it or because He opposed it? Zenos points out that "In Hebrews the position is clearly reached that every cardinal thought of the ancient ritual, and many subordinate ones, had been brought to their full expression and, therefore superseded by the person of Jesus." This might seem to imply that the word to use is "fulfilled." But of Jesus' own attitude Zenos goes on to say: Jesus Himself did not use the language of the ritual in laying before His disciples the meaning of His own work, and especially of His death. His expression with reference to giving His life 'a ransom for many' (Mk. x. 45) is open to debate, but in all probability is not drawn from the sacrificial system. The nearest approach made by Him to identifying His death with an Old Testament sacrifice, as regards significance, is that contained in the words of the institution of the Lord's Supper (q.v.). But the Apostolic interpretation, in both the Pauline and Johannine forms, very clearly works out the meaning of the Gospel along the lines of sacrificial symbolism.

Here we observe a marked tendency to distinguish the teaching of Jesus regarding the significance of His death from that of His disciples. If in the face of what the Old Testament has to say about the necessity of expiation (Lev. xvii. 11 sums up for us its doctrine of blood atonement) and if, despite the high estimate in which Jesus held the Old Testament, as to which we have many proofs, and if, in spite of the clear teaching of the New Testament that the Old Testament law of expiation was fulfilled in the death of Christ (Heb. ix.

22 so interprets Lev. xvii. 11)—if, in spite of these things, Zenos is prepared to admit that the word “rupture” is at all applicable to Jesus’ attitude to the priestly ritual, we have in this very fact a clear indication of the grave consequences of the critical theory of a “contradiction” between the priest and the prophet. It is true that in his discussion of the LORD’S SUPPER to which he refers the reader, Zenos rejects the view that after the crucifixion, when it had “dawned” on the disciples that Jesus was the Passover sacrifice, “The original circumstances were lost sight of, and new words and acts imagined in their place.” This theory together with others which he mentions he regards as “too ingenious to represent the true history.” But it is hard to see wherein his own view differs essentially from it. If the words of institution recorded by the evangelists and Paul are the words of Jesus Himself, how can anyone deny that Jesus, far from repudiating the priestly ritual, expressly taught that His death would constitute its fulfilment? If the words are not His, or if they have been garbled or twisted or “interpreted,” then the word “imagined” is as appropriate as any other.

It is to be noted further that Zenos holds regarding the Supper that “it is evident that its meaning was primarily that of the mystic infusion of the spirit of Christ symbolized in the external act of the eating of a common meal.” Whether the word “primary” is to be taken in the sense of *original* or of *most important*, is not clear. Perhaps both ideas are involved. At all events it is important to note in this connection that Zenos holds that the “root” out of which Hebrew and heathen forms of sacrifice issued is not expiation, but “the table-bond between the worshiper and his god.” This, he assures us, includes the idea of expiation: “In the notion of such a bond all the other ideas, expiatory, propitiatory and tributary are germinally present.” If then the primary meaning of the Supper was “table-bond” communion, the element of expiation might be only “germinally” present in it. Hence we find here a double tendency: to deny that Jesus looked

upon His death as sacrificial, and to make expiation a subordinate element in sacrifice.³⁰

It is not clear just how far Zenos is prepared to press the application of the critical theory we have been considering. That the statements we have quoted tend strongly in the direction of an undue if not exclusive emphasis upon the "prophetic" (using the word in the "critical" sense) office of Christ and a corresponding depreciation or denial of the "priestly" office cannot be denied. Yet Zenos in describing the meaning which the Lord's Supper has for the "modern mind" places first "the commemorative aspect of it, bringing to mind the redemptive death of Christ"; and he twice uses the word "redemption" in describing it. Just to what extent "expiation" is involved in his use of this word it is difficult to say. Some statements would suggest that it is only "germinally" present, if present at all. Others would indicate that it is to be recognized as a valid, perhaps even an important factor. We do not wish to do injustice to a distinguished scholar or to draw inferences from his words which he would himself repudiate. Our principal concern is to point out that by its assertion of a "contradiction" between *priest* and *prophet* and by its "solution" of that contradiction through the depreciation or rejection of the priestly side of the religion of Israel, Criticism has forged a weapon that is most destructive to our Christian faith. The "contradiction" destroys the

³⁰ In discussing the word LAMB (p. 503) Zenos tells us that in Isa. liii. 7 the metaphor is that of "guilelessness as opposed to cunning," that "In the testimony of John the Baptist (John i. 29) to Jesus, the *ἀμνός* is evidently the lamb of Is. liii. 7" which of course means that John's language was not sacrificial; in fact he contrasts it with the use of the word in Rev. which he regards as "undoubtedly sacrificial." We note further that Jacobus feels that "the Baptist's designation of Jesus as the Lamb of God that taketh away the sin of the world (Jn. i. 29, 36) is so different from his conception of the Coming One as given us in the Synoptics as to suggest a development of his spiritual ideas by others" (p. 470). This is of course open to the objection that these words are expressly declared to be the words of the Forerunner. It also raises the vitally important question whether this "development" is to be regarded as authoritative.

trustworthiness of the Bible; for two contradictory systems of religion cannot both be true. The "solution" strikes at the heart of Christianity, the Cross of Christ as a sacrifice for sin. Yet both contradiction and solution are of the critic's own making. The Old Testament Scriptures make it abundantly plain that the Law with its ritual of sacrifice was divinely ordained, that the non-observance and abuse of the Law was due to apostasy, that the polemic of the prophets was not directed against sacrifice as such, but against the abuse of sacrifice; while the New Testament Scriptures assert that Christ bare our sins in His own body on the tree and in so doing fulfilled the teachings of both the Law and the Prophets.

Old Testament Religion "in the Raw."

How drastic is the reconstruction of the Old Testament which is made necessary by the acceptance of the "critical approach" is further illustrated by the following statement taken from near the middle of McFadyen's article:

The full appreciation of the sequence of O. T. history and the development of Hebrew thought is only possible on the basis of such a rearrangement of O. T. material as has been won by the patient toil of generations of critical scholars. To begin with Gen. chap. i or to regard the book of Lev. as a witness to the mind of Moses would be to vitiate our conception of the sequence and development, as these belong to the latest and post-exilic stratum of the historical books. In view of the composite nature of these books it is not easy to say where a beginning might be most wisely made—possibly with the book of Judges, where social and religious life is, so to speak, in the raw.

The first six books of the Bible—Genesis, Exodus, Leviticus, Numbers, Deuteronomy, Joshua—constitute nearly thirty per cent of the entire Old Testament. They tell of Creation, the Fall, the Protevangel, the Call of Abraham, the Sojourn in Egypt and the Exodus, the Giving of the Law at Mt. Sinai, the Wilderness Wandering, the Crossing of the Jordan and the Conquest of Canaan. But we dare not begin at the beginning because to do so would violate the critical "conception of the sequence and development" which has been won by "the patient toil of generations of critical scholars," and which rests on the theory of "the composite nature of these books."

We must begin with Judges. We are not to start our acquaintance with the Bible with Adam, Abraham, Moses, Joshua. That would be fatal. But Gideon, Jephthah, Samson, and the Danites will serve as a proper introduction. Why? Because in Judges we meet the social and religious life "so to speak, in the raw."

This expression, "in the raw," is not an Old Testament phrase; it does not occur in Judges. But it is true to the life which Judges pictures. For Judges tells us that Israel had "turned quickly" away from Jehovah their God, and that then "every man did that which was right in his own eyes." But, why, if this be so, should we want to begin our study with such a distressing picture as Judges presents to us? If the life of this period was a declension from a better and a higher scale of living and thinking, why not study it in its true perspective as an apostasy from Israel's true religion, and begin with the picture of that true religion which is given in the preceding books? The only answer that can be given to this very natural question is that the critic is unwilling to accept the account which the earlier books give of that higher and better condition from which this is declared to be a tragic declension. This can be attributed to the fact that as McFadyen tells us criticism has so disintegrated the earlier books that only when they are reconstructed by the critic can they be read with understanding by the Bible student. But this is not the most important, the really fundamental reason, since Judges can be and is disintegrated by source analysis just as readily as the books which precede it. The ultimate reason is indicated by those illuminating words "in the raw." McFadyen counsels the reader who wants to approach the Old Testament with the right perspective to begin with Judges because the critics believe that it gives a fairly correct picture of what the early, or we might say the pre-prophetic, religion of Israel *actually* was. Actually, we say, because the critics are quite sceptical as to that higher religion from which it is represented as a declension. They will admit that the cult of the 'desert god' of Sinai was relatively purer than the Baal

worship of agricultural Canaan. But they are not at all certain just how much—we would better say, how little—of the corpus of legislation attributed to Moses can be really conceded to him. Why then accept the picture in Judges? Simply because it accords fairly accurately with what the critics think the religion of Israel ought to have been or might have been at that time. It represents the actual social and religious state of Israel as similar to that of the neighboring peoples. As a picture of actual conditions, it makes no such unique claims for Israel as are made in the preceding books. Consequently it fits into that theory of naturalistic evolution which is in the mind of the critic, consciously or unconsciously, the controlling factor. Hence the critic endorses it. But the Bible represents this approximation of Israel to the religion of their neighbors as an apostasy.³¹ This the critic denies, emphatically denies, in the sense in which the six skipped-over books—Genesis-Joshua—represent it. The *real* religion is to be learned from the *apostasy* of the Judges! This method of approach is quite generally reflected in such of the Old Testament articles as are not of a purely objective nature.

Thus Paton's new article ISRAEL, SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT OF,³² throws considerable light upon the subject of "life in the raw." If the first six books of the Old Testament are to be largely ignored in determining the nature of the early religion of Israel, are we not left very much in the dark with regard to it? Judges does not give us much information.

³¹ Cf. espec. Judg. ii. 10-19. We are told expressly and repeatedly that Israel "did evil" (ii. 11, iii. 7, 12, iv. 1, vi. 1, x. 6, xiii. 1), that they "forsook" (ii. 12, 13, x. 6, 10, 13), that they "turned quickly out of the way which their fathers walked in, obeying the commandments of the Lord" (cf. Josh. xxiv. 31). Such statements must of course be attributed to a Deuteronomic or post-Deuteronomic editor, if the theory of the critics as to the true significance of Judges' picture of Israel's life in the raw is to be accepted. Hannah's Song is also treated as late.

³² While this article deals with the social development, it also discusses religious problems in a very illuminating way, as the following quotations will indicate. It takes the place of Nowack's HEBREW ARCHAEOLOGY in the 1909 edition.

Paton tells us that he aims to give a "genetic study of institutions"; and he divides the subject into four periods: "Semitic, Nomadic, Agricultural, and Commercial." The first gives the familiar evolutionist sketch of primitive society and its development. The second is entitled, "The Hebrew Nomadic Period (Before 1200 B.C.);" and its first section is of great interest as it tells us definitely how the higher critic reconstructs the history of Israel. It is called "Sources for the Hebrew Nomadic Period."

Our sources for the Nomadic Period of Hebrew history are in the main the documents embedded in the Hexateuch. (See HEXATEUCH). These documents are based on oral traditions, and these traditions are of very diverse origin, namely: (1) traditions which did not arise until after the conquest of Canaan; (2) traditions borrowed from Babylonia;³³ (3) traditions borrowed from Egypt; (4) traditions borrowed from the Amorites who preceded Israel in the land of Canaan, and (5) genuine old Hebrew traditions that have come down from the period prior to the conquest. There is thus only a small portion of the Pentateuchal tradition that can be used as a source for the Hebrew nomadic period. This is supplemented by comparative philology, comparative sociology, and comparative religion, the presumption being that ideas and institutions which later Israel had in common with the other Semites existed already in the nomadic period.³⁴

How theoretical this is, and how large a margin it allows for conjecture is obvious. *Comparative* philology, *comparative* sociology, and *comparative* religion are to figure largely in the reconstruction of a religious history which claims to be different, distinct and unique. Consequently we are not surprised to read that "The Kenites were the primitive worshippers of Jehovah at Sinai³⁵ who accompanied Israel into the

³³ Cf. p. 244a where he tells us that "The cosmogony and astronomy of the latter Hebrews, their traditions of the creation, Garden of Eden, fall, antediluvian patriarchs, and flood, the types of their religious poetry, and the fundamental principles of their religious and social legislation, are now known to have come from the ancient Sumerians by way of the later Semitic Babylonians and the Canaanites" (p. 244a)—a sweeping statement to say the least!

³⁴ P. 399b.

³⁵ On the other hand, Nourse (p. 492a) speaks of this theory as "beset with many difficulties," while Peake (p.385b), regards it as "dubious."

land of Canaan";³⁶ and that "The Hebrew prophets who preceded Amos seem to have held theories similar to those of the Kenites and Rechabites. They agreed with them in hostility to the Baals of Canaan (2 Kgs. x. 15-17)." So understood the epic struggle between Elijah and the baal-priests resolves itself largely into one between the servant of the 'desert god' of the Kenites and the devotees of the agricultural gods of Canaan and Tyre; nomad vs. farmer or, to use more up-to-date language, communist vs. capitalist!³⁷ This Kenite influence apparently ended with these early prophets, for we are told: "There is no evidence that the writing prophets shared in the nomadic ideals of the earlier prophets."

Similarly Peake, while affirming that "Strictly speaking the religion of Israel was, like the nation, the creation of Moses," yet maintains that "The Hebrews were a Semitic stock and they brought much of their Semitic heritage with them in the religion of Yahweh." There is of course an element of truth in this. The Hebrews did not cease to be Semites when they became followers of Jehovah. But when Peake goes on to say a little later on

But it is very difficult to reach any satisfactory conclusion as to the religious beliefs of Moses and the characteristics of the religion he founded. We can not assign any of the Pentateuchal sources to him. But the earlier documents may be used with proper precautions, and the value of the tradition they contain should probably be rated higher than they have been by the dominant critical school. Since he, no doubt, drew on earlier religious and legal developments, our knowledge of surrounding peoples may be of service. But it is not easy to draw the right inferences, and no people made even a distant approach to Israel's achievement.³⁸

³⁶ P. 401b. Paton assures us elsewhere (p. 399b) that "J" was not the ancestral god of Israel (Ex. iii. 13f and vi. 2)" despite the fact that the very passages cited in proof of the statement imply the contrary. The most that could be argued from the passages referred to is that the God of Israel was not originally known by the *name* Jehovah. But this is not what Paton means as the quotations we have given conclusively prove.

³⁷ Cf. Sellers on Abel's sacrifice: "Why the sacrifice of Abel was more pleasing to J" than Cain's is not stated; the implication may be that Cain's bloodless offering, like that of the agricultural Canaanites to their Baals, displeased J", who preferred pastoral life" (p. 16a).

³⁸ Art., ISRAEL, RELIGION OF (p. 383b)

it is clear that conjectures based on comparative religion must figure largely in this reconstruction. Consequently we are not surprised when Nourse tells us that Jeroboam "was not guilty of making a complete innovation" when he introduced the calf worship: "for the worship of J" by means of images was practiced before his time (cf. *e.g.*, Judg. xvii. 4, xviii. 17, 30-31)."³⁹ Here the references are to Judges; and of course nothing is said to suggest that this picture of life "in the raw," as McFadyen has called it, is an apostasy. On the contrary the remark that "the plural (*these be thy gods*) . . . is more natural here than at Ex. xxxii. 4, 8" indicates that to be a polytheist as well as an idolator was not a heinous offence in the days of Jeroboam.

Such being the case, it is no wonder that more than eleven pages should be given to the article SEMITIC RELIGION. The original article by McCurdy has been revised by J. M. Powis Smith. Smith has largely rewritten the opening sections; and in them we find the following illuminating statement regarding the "Semites and their Neighbors":

They were in constant contact one with another and developed a common type of civilization. No people was able to live in isolation or desired to do so. . . . The striking thing about the Hebrews was their readiness to borrow ideas and customs, as well as the more concrete products of civilization, from whatsoever people came into association with them. Hebrew civilization and religion were to a considerable degree the result of an eclectic process. The remarkable thing is that the Hebrew exercised such a fine discrimination in what he took and what he rejected.⁴⁰

"Fine discrimination," indeed! We wonder what Moses and Joshua, Elijah and Isaiah would say as to this. But we do not need to wonder. For they have told us again and again what they thought of Israel's "readiness to borrow" from their neighbors; and how far from "fine" they considered such conduct to be. But they labored, of course, under the mistaken impression, as the comparative religionist would call it, of supposing that the religion of Israel was really essentially different and distinct from all others.

³⁹ P. 121b.

⁴⁰ P. 817b.

This article, it may be noted, furnishes us with excellent illustrations of the hand of the redactor. Not merely does the statement which we have just quoted, come from Powis Smith, but in the paragraph on the "Ultimate Origin of the Semitic Religions,"⁴¹ we note a significant change. In the 1909 edition the opening sentences read thus:

What, in brief, were the origin and history of the Semitic religions? All heathen religions seem to be alike in their ultimate beliefs and motives. The immense differences between them are due to the differentiations of environment and historical vicissitude.⁴²

In the second sentence the word "heathen" is significant. It seems to imply that the religion of Israel is to be distinguished from the other Semitic religions: and this is favored by the fact that an allusion has already been made to the "spiritual worship of Jehovah." Smith changes the word "heathen," to "Semitic." Evidently he does not like to call these religions "heathen," since this implies a distinction which he would regard as invidious. We observe further that according to this writer human sacrifice was an element in Israel's religion. Speaking of "Molech" he tells us that "human sacrifice seems to date in Israel from the earliest times."⁴³ In this he differs from McCurdy who held that these practices "came too late in Israel's history to have been derived from Palestine proper."⁴⁴ We note further that in the section on "Images and Idolatry" McCurdy has used the words "idol,"

⁴¹ P. 818b.

⁴² P. 781a.

⁴³ P. 825a. He goes on to say "cf. the story of Abraham and Isaac which is a protest against it, and the laws regarding the offering of the first-born in the oldest codes." This is a good illustration of the use which the critics make of narratives which they treat as *late* and unreliable. Smith would probably hesitate to affirm that Abraham was a historical person or that there was any such actual transaction as the narrative describes. Yet he finds in it not merely an instructive illustration of the prophetic protest against human sacrifice, but even a proof that such a rite was an *ancient* one in Israel. Eclecticism has become a fine art with the critics.

⁴⁴ P. 787b (1909 ed.). Zenos treats the slaughter of enemies (enjoined and described in Deut. xx. 12-14, Josh. vi. 25ff.) as a "sacrifice" to the Lord of Battles "according to a primitive Semitic custom" (p. 162a).

“idolatry,” “idolatrous.” These, except where reference is made to the usage of the EV, are carefully eliminated by Smith. This is not a mere stylistic preference of this writer for we note that the article GREEK AND ROMAN IDOLATRY by Sterritt and Zenos has been replaced by two articles by Angus entitled GREEK RELIGION and ROMAN RELIGION. Clearly the word “idolatry” is offensive to the student of comparative religion.⁴⁵

In connection with this subject of idolatry or image worship as he prefers to call it, Powis Smith makes a further interesting modification of the words of McCurdy in the article we have just been discussing. In speaking of “images of living objects,” McCurdy has told us:

The human shape, as distinguished from the animal, was natural, and perhaps mostly inevitable, where the motive was to give expression to the conception of the character of invisible deities by visible and tangible features. And yet, so far as we know, Jⁿ Himself was never represented in a human likeness; His supposed salient qualities were set forth symbolically in animal form in imitation of heathen cults.⁴⁶

The first sentence has been retained without change by Powis Smith. But the second has been altered to read as follows:

Whether or not Jⁿ was ever represented in human form is another question. He was certainly thought of in highly anthropomorphic terms (see *Gen*, § 2), and His worshipers constantly spoke of going to worship

⁴⁵ This would naturally be the case with one who attaches the importance to the Greek religion that is done by Angus, for he tells us that “. . . Greek religion did not perish. It was disintegrated to reintegrate and bequeath its timeless truth to Christian theology. The Greeks consecrated their unique genius to Christ—an epochal event for our faith, contrasted with the failure of Mithraism to secure Greek loyalty” (p. 321). This is decidedly different from Paul’s view, for he found that his sermon on Mars’ Hill made no appeal to the cultured and intellectual Greeks; and he told the Corinthians bluntly that the essence of Christianity, “Christ crucified,” was foolishness to the Greek, which it should not have been if there was as close connection between Christianity and the mystery cults as the statements of this writer would seem to imply. That the Greek and Roman religions were disintegrating Paul recognized and has made clear in the first chapter of *Romans*. But that something far more drastic than “reintegration” was needed was equally clear to him.

⁴⁶ P. 787a. A reference to the discussion of the “Golden Calves” follows this quotation.

as 'going to see the face of J'. But His supposed salient qualities were commonly set forth symbolically in animal form in imitation of heathen cults.⁴⁷

This quotation gives us another interesting example of editorial revision; but it is specially significant because of the light which it throws on the important question of "approach to the Old Testament." For our interpretation of the expression "going to see the face of J" will depend upon our manner of approach to the Old Testament as a whole. If we accept the view advocated in this volume that the best and safest place to begin our study of Israel's religion is with the apostasy of the Judges, and if we adopt the comparative method of study as the surest means of ascertaining its true nature and development, then of course it will be natural to interpret this phrase in a baldly literal sense, as meaning originally 'going to worship before the idol-image of the god of Israel,' and it will then be an interesting task to ascertain when this grossly anthropomorphic conception gave way to a true and worthy one. But if we approach the study of the Old Testament by reading the books in the old familiar order—Genesis, Exodus, Leviticus, etc.; if we read the express warnings against idolatry which they contain (Ex. xx. 4, 5, 22, 23; Deut. iv. 12ff., etc.), then it will be clear to us that to the true Israelite 'going to see the face of Jehovah' meant something totally different. Logically the critic has no right to insist upon interpreting these words in a way which drags the religion of Israel down to the level of the heathenism by which it was surrounded. And the critic is too strongly opposed to what he terms the *literalism* of the "traditionalist" to be entitled to insist upon a strictly literal rendering here, merely because such an interpretation happens to accord with his low estimate of the religion of Israel. It is his method of approach which is his only real warrant for what would be otherwise an utterly unwarranted interpretation.

⁴⁷ P. 824a. The reference to the discussion of the "Golden calves" is retained by Smith.

Our "Mother," the Serpent!

As an excellent illustration of the way in which comparative philology, comparative sociology and comparative religion reconstruct the Bible we may refer to Carrier's EVE as revised by Sellers, placing the two forms of the article side by side for the sake of easy comparison:

EVE (הַוְוָה, *hawwāh*): Adam's wife (Gn. iii. 20, iv. 1; 2 Co. xi. 3; 1 Ti. ii. 13). Similar word-formations are often used to denote occupations, hence הַוְוָה should mean 'motherhood' preeminently. The story of the Fall indicates a stage of culture wherein woman was already subordinate, hence it is probably subsequent to the hypothetical matriarchate period.

A.S.C.

EVE (הַוְוָה, *hawwāh*): Adam's wife (Gn. iii. 20, iv. 1; 2 Co. xi. 3; 1 Ti. ii. 13). The popular etymology in Gn. iii. 20 is doubtful. A possible meaning of *hawwāh* is 'serpent,' and we may have here an instance of the primitive cult association of women and serpents (*Proc. Amer. Philosoph. Soc.* 50:5, 11). But cf. Skinner's note on Gn. iii. 20 in ICC. The story of the Fall indicates a stage of culture wherein woman was already subordinate, hence it is probably subsequent to the hypothetical matriarchate period. A.S.C.—O.R.S.

This brief article deals in both editions with two points: the meaning of the name Eve and the age of the story. Carrier apparently found no difficulty with what Sellers calls the popular etymology" which explains the name "Eve" (*life*)⁴⁸ as given because she was "the mother of all living" (*hayyim*). But his account of the origin of the story is noteworthy. The story itself plainly purports to describe the creation of the first human pair, and the relation in which they stood to one another and to the rest of mankind. It is to this fact that the name "Eve" owes its singular appropriateness. The story is so interpreted by Jesus. In arguing with the Jews about divorce, He refers to this narrative as setting forth the original marriage relationship, "from the beginning it was not so." According to this passage man has not slowly worked up to

⁴⁸ His explanation of it as a *nomen opificum* (*fa'âl*) seems, however, questionable. It would be more natural to regard it as a feminine segholate of the *ā* class (like *gannā*, *rabbā*, etc.), which seems to be the usual classification.

the ideal of monogamy; it was his original state. And, according to Jesus' interpretation of it, all lower standards are a falling away from the original state as there set forth. Yet Carrier tells us that this is not the case; that the "subordinate position" of woman fixes the date of this story as subsequent to the "hypothetic matriarchate period."⁴⁹ The creation story would then reflect not the primitive but a comparatively advanced stage in the social life of mankind.⁵⁰ It is noteworthy therefore that Carrier uses the word "hypothetic." There is no proof, aside from the theory of evolution, that the matriarchal system ever was universal or that it necessarily preceded the patriarchal system.⁵¹ Carrier virtually admitted this by calling it "hypothetic." Yet he did not hesitate apparently to attach more significance to this questionable theory of the evolutionist than to the definite words of Jesus "from the beginning it was not so."

Turning now to Sellers' revision of this article, we notice that Sellers sees no reason to change the part which we have just been discussing. It is allowed to remain intact. It is the first part to which he takes exception, the name "Eve." He tells us that the interpretation given in Genesis, an etymology which he contemptuously stigmatizes as "popular," is "doubtful." He does not explain why he regards it as doubtful. He is not sure that he has a better one to offer. But, while merely speaking of the meaning "serpent" as "possible," which suggests that it is no more probable than the one he discards, he clearly prefers it to the one given by the narrative itself.⁵²

⁴⁹ The Matriarchate is referred to by Paton who states positively that it was "the earliest form of Semitic society" (p.398b). Nourse apparently agrees with this view, but holds that the matriarchate or polyandry lies "beyond the horizon of O. T. history" (p. 259a) and, that "the original constitution of Israel was patriarchal" (p. 492b).

⁵⁰ It has been claimed that an example of the matriarchate is to be found in Jacob's marriages.

⁵¹ The Babylonian civilization was patriarchal in the time of Abraham and earlier. As compared with this recognized fact the arguments derived from Arabia for a Semitic matriarchate are late and inconclusive.

⁵² In this Sellers is simply reviving the theory put forward years ago by Nöldeke and favored by Wellhausen, that the name "Eve" is to be

The only advantage of the serpent etymology⁵³ seems to be that, instead of being simple, natural and sensible, as is the case with the "popular" etymology which Sellers rejects, it is suggestive of superstition and myth, folk-lore, totemism and magic, and therefore suited to the supposedly primitive conditions which a creation myth might be expected to reflect.⁵⁴ EVE accords now very well with the evolutionist's scheme of things.⁵⁵ But there are two serious objections to it: it makes 'primitive' nonsense out of a sublime Old Testament narra-

connected with the Arabic word for "serpent" (*ḥayyath*). But in Arabic, both the etymology and the meaning of this word are doubtful. If, as seems probable, it comes from the root "to be alive," the serpent may have received this name because of its supposed longevity (Cf. Lane, *Arab.-Eng. Lexicon, in loco*; Encyc. Brit., 11th ed., XXIV, 677a). This would be a natural explanation. In Hebrew the word has acquired the meaning "wild animal," though it does not mean "serpent."

⁵³ As to the difficulty, if it really be such, that the name Eve is written *ḥawwāh* not *ḥayyāh*, this Arabic etymology does not help us, since the word "serpent" in Arabic is written with "y," the etymology from a waw root being doubtful (cf. Lane, as cited).

⁵⁴ Nourse tells us: "We cannot go to Gen. chaps. ii-iii for the literal facts of the origin of man, or of evil," but "We must judge the material or formal elements of all these narratives [Gen. i-xi] precisely as we do the very similar matter [note the phrase!] found in abundance all over the ancient world" (p. 292). What is meant by "similar matter" it is not hard to discover. Thus the statement is made by Carrier-Sellers that the bells on the high priest's dress suggest "the idea of a counter-charm by which evil influences were to be driven away" (p. 539b). Kelso explains the cherubim by saying that "The religious imagination of the Hebrews, working on mythological figures which they had in common with their neighbors, produced these symbolic figures" (p. 128b). We are told by McCurdy-Smith that the narrative of the brazen serpent rests on "the widespread notion that looking upon the image of a noxious creature was curative" (p. 826b). Kelso points out that the names Leah (wild cow), Rachel (ewe), etc., have been regarded as survivals of totemism. But he declares that "philologically, this view has a shaky foundation" (p. 922a). The distinction between clean and unclean beasts has often been explained in this way (cf. e.g. art. UNCLEAN in Hastings' *Dictionary*; art. TOTEMISM in *Encycl. Brit.*

⁵⁵ Since the word *ḥayyāh* means "serpent" in Arabic, Sellers might well carry his "serpent" etymology a little further and render the verse thus "and Adam called the name of his wife 'Serpent,' for she was the mother of all serpents." But apparently he felt that he had gone as far as the evolutionary theory demanded.

tive, and it makes the Lord's use of that narrative an illustration of His inferiority to the higher critic of today. These objections deserve careful pondering. In his article *MARRIAGE* in *Hastings' Dictionary*, W. P. Paterson has stated the issue clearly as follows:

The scriptural account of the origin and history of marriage cannot satisfy the thorough evolutionist. According to the biblical representation, its perfect type was exhibited in the union of the first pair, upon this followed a declension to imperfect forms and sexual licence, and finally Christianity summoned mankind to realize the ideal by reverting to the divinely instituted original. But on evolutionary principles the ideal is to be found, not at the beginning but at the end—if anywhere; and the problem is to show from what base beginnings, under what impulses, and by what stages, marriage as we understand it came to be, and to be entrenched behind the laws.⁵⁶

Yes, the scriptural account cannot satisfy the thorough evolutionist. So Carrier made it late and unreliable (reflecting a relatively late stage in human history, the patriarchal) and Sellers has completed the process by making it speak the language of grotesque mythology. Yet the Lord appealed to it as setting forth the original form and the ideal form of marriage!

"Life in the raw," as a picture of the religion and culture of Israel, with comparative philology, comparative sociology and comparative religion brought in to fill in the details, necessarily gives us as we have seen a description of the religion of Israel which closely resembles that of the neighboring nations instead of one which is markedly different from them. But it is to be observed that such a reconstruction as the critics attempt has a still more disastrous result: it even pictures conditions in Israel as worse than in these nations by which she is said to have been so strongly influenced. Thus Guthe tells us, that "Israelitish marriages were regularly polygamous, in remarkable distinction from the regulations of the *Codex Hammurabi*, which holds fast to monogamy as fundamental"⁵⁷—a statement which is to say the least much too sweeping in view of the qualification which follows

⁵⁶ Vol. III. p. 263a.

⁵⁷ P. 555a.

closely upon it: "Poor people contented themselves with one wife, although that cases were not rare in which a man had two wives is evident from the fact that the law in Deut. xxi. 15-17 deals particularly with such cases." Similarly the emphasis placed on the 'double standard' of morality for men and women is decidedly overdone in the statement regarding the man, that "We nowhere read anything to the effect that he was forbidden extra-marital intercourse with other women."⁵⁸ It is true that the standard of chastity was more strict for the woman than for the man, that for a man such an act was adultery in the strict sense only when committed with a married or betrothed woman. But when we remember the numerous restrictions that were imposed by the Law and by the conditions of Oriental life,⁵⁹ it is evident that, except that polygamy was allowed the man, so high an ideal standard was set before him, that it can be truly said "In this, as in other respects, the Jews had a message for the world." Furthermore, it should be remembered that, by its rigid exclusion of everything suggestive of sensuality the religion of Israel separated itself most markedly from the neighboring peoples. But what we are particularly concerned to point out is that according to the express claims of the Old Testament, claims for which the authority of the Lord Himself can be invoked, monogamy was the *fundamental* law not merely for Israel but for all mankind. Polygamy is traced to the Cainites, the Law tolerates but does not sanction it, "Bible pictures of domestic happiness are always connected with monogamy."⁶⁰ It is only when the evolutionary approach of the higher critic is adopted and obvious facts are ignored or

⁵⁸ P. 555b.

⁵⁹ Such facts as these: that in the East then as now men and women probably married young and that not to be married was regarded as a disgrace; that if a man violated a free virgin he must marry her or pay her father the dower of virgins, it being expressly provided that a father must not prostitute his daughter; that even if the woman were a bond-woman the act was sinful; that intercourse with "strangers" was prohibited; that religious prostitution was forbidden.

⁶⁰ Cf. Oehler, *Old Testament Theology*, § 69; *International Standard Bible Encyclopaedia*, p. 1998a.

misinterpreted that the social and religious standards of Israel fall below the level of her neighbors.⁶¹ The Law did not it is true set Israel a perfect standard. The New Dispensation is clearly superior to the Old. But the Law did set a standard so high that Israel was never able to attain to it. On the contrary the history of Israel was one of constant revolt against the Law of God and of turning aside to the cults and customs of her neighbors, which shows that these were less rigorous and more attractive. The Old Testament represents such conduct not merely as an act of treason to Jehovah but as a sinful falling away from the high ideal of life which He had given them, a forsaking of His way to walk in ways that were not good.

THE APPROACH TO THE NEW TESTAMENT

In his article on *THE APPROACH TO THE NEW TESTAMENT*, Moffatt deals with three fundamental questions: the canon and text of the New Testament, its authority and its interpretation. They are not discussed under exactly these heads; but these are the problems with which he deals.

As to the text, while recognizing that there are many controverted readings, he assures us that as to "the large majority" there is "a fair consensus of authorities for some one reading." And he makes the following statement:

With any good modern edition of the Greek text in his hands, supplemented by an adequate modern English version, the reader need have little hesitation in believing that he is as near as can be, or need be, to the position of those who first read these documents in their original form.⁶²

This statement is reassuring and gratifying, but our satisfac-

⁶¹ We note at times what seems like a definite attempt to disparage Israel as compared with other nations. Why, we are tempted to ask, does Zenos say of the slaying of Sisera that Jael "put him to death in a most revolting manner" (p. 409a), but simply remark regarding the treacherous murder of Ben-hadad "The next day Hazael put Ben-hadad to death and usurped the throne" (p. 332b)? Is it because in Judg. v. Jael is highly praised for an act which delivered Israel for a time from a foreign yoke? It might seem so

⁶² P. 9

tion with it is somewhat marred by the freedom which is characteristic of certain of the modern versions which might have our author's approval. It is also adversely affected by the statement made elsewhere in this article that an outstanding question of the day is whether some of the New Testament books—notably John and Acts—may be translations of Aramaic originals. This question is regarded as important because “it suggests the possibility that here and there the passage of the tradition from Aramaic or Hebrew into the Greek may have altered the sense of a saying.” The disquieting nature of such an admission is not allayed by the words, “But, upon the whole, it is not likely that investigations in this field will affect materially the main outlines of early Christian belief.” For the phrase, “main outlines of early Christian belief,” may mean different things to different people, and what we would regard as very drastic and dangerous conjectural changes might be made without affecting what Moffatt might regard as essential to early Christian faith. Since the days of the Reformation the appeal of Protestant theologians has been to the Scriptures in the original tongues, to the Old Testament in Hebrew (and Aramaic), to the New Testament in Greek. But if this theory of Aramaic originals for considerable parts of the New Testament were to be admitted, the Greek text would lose its place as the ultimate authority. The thorough-going Biblical scholar would have to ask himself not merely whether he had ascertained the correct meaning of the Greek text, but a further and a far more difficult question, whether this text was the correct translation of a hypothetical Aramaic original. The ultimate question would be, not, as has been for centuries supposed, What is the meaning of the original Greek? but, Does the Greek correctly represent the Aramaic original? The practical effect of such a theory is obvious. If a man is dissatisfied with the English version he can consult commentaries which will give him the facts in so far as one who knows no Greek can appreciate them. If he is still dissatisfied, he is at liberty to study New Testament Greek and

read the New Testament, as we have been wont to say, "in the original." But suppose he is told that this is, at least in part, a translation and perhaps an inaccurate translation of an Aramaic original, what then? "Where can I get a copy of this Aramaic original?" he asks. "Nowhere," is the reply. "We do not know that there ever was one. But its possible existence is one of the 'outstanding questions' for scholars to determine." "But how can I be sure," he asks, "that this Greek translation is reliable?" And the only answer the critic can give him is this doubtful comfort: "Upon the whole, it is not likely that investigations in this field will affect materially the main outlines of early Christian belief"!

As regards the Canon, Moffatt tells us:

While all the books in the N. T. were written within a hundred years after the crucifixion of Jesus, it took several centuries before the Church finally fixed the Canon, that is, the list of the books which were to be regarded as inspired.

The Canon was fixed, he believes, "by the end of the fourth century"; but he does not state specifically on what basis the decision was made.⁶³

We come now to the question of the authority of the New Testament. To what does the New Testament owe its authority? The belief of evangelical Protestantism has been that the books which comprise the New Testament were accepted by the Early Church because they were written by or under the authority of the Apostles, the men whom the Lord made in a peculiar sense His witnesses. But nowhere does this article make any such claim for them. On the contrary we are told:

⁶³ A little later he tells us that "the books of the New Testament are not in the collection by accident." He is almost prepared to say with Denney that "they gravitated toward each other in the course of the first century of the Church's life and imposed their unity on the Christian mind. That they are at one in some essential respects is obvious. They have at least unity of subject: they are all concerned with Jesus Christ, and with the manifestation of God's redeeming love to men in Him." But that this unity is due to anything more than close contact with the One who is the "focus" is not asserted.

Whether or not Paul wrote Ephesians or the Pastoral Epistles, whether Peter wrote First Peter, or the Apostle John the Fourth Gospel, are matters which, although profoundly interesting, do not essentially alter the religious message of these documents. The determining issue is the primary conviction about the significance of Jesus Christ, and the main interest today is to evaluate the forms in which this was conveyed to the first generation of Christians.⁶⁴

This statement is significant. It is of course true that in so far as the statements in Ephesians for example are impersonal they would be true whether Paul made them or not. But the Epistle begins "Paul, an apostle of Jesus Christ by the will of God to the saints which are at Ephesus, and to the faithful in Christ Jesus" (cf. iii. 1ff., iv. 1, 17, vi. 19 ff.). If the value of Ephesians is independent of Paul, why does he assume such an air of personal authority instead of simply writing an objective statement regarding "the significance of Jesus Christ"? The natural answer is that there were then as now many different opinions as to "the significance of Jesus Christ." Herod held one, Pilate another, Caiaphas another, the Judaizers another, the Gnostics yet another. The Apostolic conception claimed to be, and the Early Church regarded it as, the correct and authoritative portrayal. Yet apparently Moffatt attaches little importance to the question whether these writings were Apostolic or not. It is enough for him that they were written within a century after the crucifixion and consequently may be regarded as conveying "the immediate impression of God's revelation in the life of Jesus Christ" made upon the early Christian community. But surely early date is not sufficient in itself to guarantee the credibility and adequacy of the record. Some of the most dangerous misconceptions of that Life arose in this very period as the Apostolic polemic clearly shows.

But if the New Testament does not owe its authority to the fact that it is the work of Apostolic men, an authoritative record because given by inspiration of God, what is its authority, if it indeed has any?

The N. T. is the record of a supreme religious experience and also of the interpretations of that experience. The latter are often couched in

⁶⁴ P. 12.

temporary and transitional forms, which lie open to historical criticism; but the religious experience does not depend necessarily upon the interpretations. The living Spirit of God maintains the life of the Christian fellowship, which penetrates again and again to the reality of the creative force of the revelation in Jesus Christ.⁶⁵

If we understand correctly the meaning of this passage and of other statements which bear upon it, Moffatt is here attempting in Ritschlian fashion to make the Gospel independent of the destructive results of higher criticism. Believing as he does that criticism has made it impossible to accept many of the data of the New Testament, that belief in its infallibility is impossible, he cannot say of the New Testament as Jesus said of the Old: "It is written." He believes that it contains errors of fact and errors of interpretation. So he takes refuge in the belief that all such matters are non-essential. The centre of the Gospel is Christ, and the picture of Christ is so tremendous, so overwhelming that it is self-evidencing:

For the revelation with which the N. T. is charged is not a fixed deposit of dogma, supernaturally conveyed, but a Life generated by the Spirit of Jesus Christ. This Life implies no doubt certain truths or doctrines which have to be retained and from time to time restated. But they are only tenable in and through participation in the Life itself. What enforces them is not any dogma of Church tradition, not any arbitrary hypothesis of verbal inspiration, but the authority with which life speaks to life.⁶⁶

The N. T. books are the record of this experience. They were written in the first flush of this supreme revelation, and they eventually acquired their common title on account of their religious content.⁶⁷

This simply means that the final authority in religion is Christian experience. We go to the New Testament not as an authoritative book, but as a book which gives us the "immediate impression" of Christ as received by His early followers. And we must trust to the Spirit of God to give us "a fresh interpretation" suitable to our own age, to enable us to distinguish between the kernel and the husk, between "the reality of the creative force of the revelation in Jesus Christ" and interpretations which are "often couched in temporary and traditional forms which lie open to historical

⁶⁵ *Ib.*

⁶⁶ P. 13.

⁶⁷ P. 11.

criticism." The New Testament may be "an indispensable record of the revelation in Christ"; but there is much in it which must be restated or interpreted if it is to have meaning and value for the present age.⁶⁸

This brings us to the question of interpretation. Our author is deeply impressed with the difference, we might call it gulf, between our age and New Testament times. To appreciate the New Testament we must be receptive; but

This does not imply that we are called upon to believe exactly as men in the first century believed about the world and nature; their mental environment and outlook has long passed, and the more we recover it by antiquarian study, the more do we realize that it would be unreal for us to put ourselves back into their attitude of mind toward miracles, for example. What is essential is the faculty of entering into the religious faith which took this form at this period.⁶⁹

Elsewhere we read:

In our own day, the argument from prophecy has been reset, for example. It is no longer possible to expect a literal fulfilment of some O. T. prophecies about the rehabilitation of Israel as a Messianic community ruling the world from Jerusalem, or to treat the Messianic anticipations of the O. T. as literally fulfilled in Jesus. What appeals to us is rather the religious experience and ideals of the O. T., and in the N. T. we recognize that the primitive Church reads its O. T. under the limitations of a time-view which we can no longer fully share.⁷⁰

The above quotations make it clear that miracle and prophecy are two, and apparently two of the most obvious. as we should consider them also the most important, ele-

⁶⁸ Thus Dickey has told us of the raising of Lazarus: "It is too stupendous for any personal follower of Jesus, at least, simply to have invented. Some historical foundation is required, and the underlying facts, whatever they are, may therefore belong to that body of trustworthy information regarding the ministry of Jesus in Judaea which appears to have been known to the author of the Fourth Gospel alone." In revising these sentences Jacobus has simply substituted the words "most probably therefore belong" for "may therefore belong." But neither scholar tells us what these underlying facts are. Dickey adds, however, "Assuming this to be true, and that our philosophical attitude to the miraculous does not preclude its possibility, the resurrection of Lazarus may have occurred, and the words 'I am the resurrection and the life' have had, therefore, more than a purely spiritual significance"—a non-committal statement which Dr. Jacobus cuts out.

⁶⁹ P. 8.

⁷⁰ P. 10.

ments in that New Testament time-view which according to Moffatt the modern man "can no longer fully share." Consequently it is plain that "critical" interpretation of the Bible, both Old Testament and New, must concern itself primarily with these two phenomena as outstanding examples of that supernaturalism which pervades the Bible.

That the task of restating or interpreting the Bible in terms of the modern time-view is a difficult one, would seem to be obvious. Moffatt finds a great difference even between the New Testament and the Old, despite the fact that "historical criticism [as he understands it] was hardly in existence at such an early date," so great, indeed, that he can say "as a rule the only way of conserving the Old Testament was to allegorize it," which means that the Old Testament is allegorized in the New. But if the difference between the Old Testament and the New Testament was so great, even in an age when higher criticism was unknown, as to make it necessary for the New Testament writers to resort to so drastic a method of interpretation or conservation as *allegorizing*, how much more drastic must we expect the modern interpretation of the New Testament as well as of the Old to be, now that "historical criticism" is so powerful a factor in determining men's attitude toward the past? That "criticism" is a two-edged weapon, Moffatt feels obliged to admit. "Some critical methods and conclusions would," he warns us, "idealize Jesus into a symbol. It is idle to pretend that the acceptance of such theories would not impair the security of Christian truth." Perfectly true, but where are we to draw the line? For example, we read:

The N. T. is dominated by the impression of the redeeming realities of the Gospel. Jesus Christ's person and work are the supreme subject and object of all the N. T. books, and it is by the standards of this revelation that they are ultimately to be weighed. These standards are not to be picked up by a superficial reading even of the Gospels. For the Gospels themselves witness to a variety and a development in their interpretation, and they present the difficult problem, for example, of determining how far the eschatological horizon affects the outlook of Jesus as well as of the Early Church upon duty.⁷¹

⁷¹ P. 12.

This means that one of the tasks of criticism is to determine to what extent the Lord Jesus Christ was Himself influenced by a time-view which we cannot any longer accept. Yet what could be more disastrous to faith in Jesus as Saviour and Lord than the fear that in matters which **have to do with that mysterious world of the Future, which no one of us can see, but whither the destinies of all of us are surely tending, Jesus our Guide may have been a child of His age, influenced by the current opinions of two thousand years ago?**

Just before writing the words last quoted Moffatt refers to de Morgan's "satirical" description in *Joseph Vance* of a Positivist solicitor who "was an example of a Christian who had endeavored to strain off the teachings of Jesus the Nazarene from the scum and the dregs of the world and the churches, and had never been able to decide on the mesh of his strainer." Then Moffatt goes on to say: "Now the mesh of the strainer is not constant. But a mesh there must be, and a mesh which does not allow the fundamental reality of the divine Sonship of Jesus to slip through as an accretion." Every Trinitarian will agree to this. But is it not equivalent to letting this fundamental reality slip through when the express prerogative of the divine Son to speak "with authority" is set at naught by the critic who claims the right to determine to what extent the divine Son of whom we read in John, "He that cometh from Heaven is above all. And what he hath seen and heard, that he testifieth," was influenced by the "eschatological horizon" of the age of His earthly ministry? What boots it to insist on retaining the divine Sonship as a fundamental reality, if the glorious prerogatives and attributes of this Sonship are to be allowed to slip through the mesh?

What mesh are we to use in interpreting the Bible? Is it to be the mesh of "the level of contemporary intelligence"? Moffatt tells us that no religion ever survives in any healthy form if it allows itself to fall below this level. But what does this mean?

This does not mean that religion is bound to accept the dicta or dogmas

of contemporary science, either in philosophy or in history. These have their vogue, and yield to others, or suffer modification as research proceeds. But it does mean that religion can not afford to ignore or defy the methods of the purest and most exacting research as applied to its sacred books.⁷²

In the first two sentences of the above quotation Moffatt speaks as a historian, and his characterization of the contemporary intelligence of any age as ephemeral, having a certain vogue and likely to be modified or replaced, is eminently fair. But in the last sentence he does not speak as a historian but as a special pleader. If what he has already said is true, "the purest and most exacting research" of any given age is no infallible mesh. It may have its vogue and give way to a better. Yet clearly he is claiming in effect that the "higher criticism" is the purest and most exacting form of research, and also giving to it an authority and finality which, speaking as a historian, he would consider decidedly hazardous. With Moffatt the historian we are heartily agreed. With Moffatt the special pleader for "higher criticism" as the "purest and most exacting form of research" we are utterly at variance. "Pure" should mean impartial, unprejudiced. The higher criticism is not unprejudiced. It approaches the Bible with a precommitment in favor of naturalism and of evolution, both as philosophy and as science; and it insists on applying these principles in a "most exacting" way to a Book which from cover to cover claims to be the record of a unique, pervasive, and supremely important supernatural revelation in word and deed. If it were conclusively proved that the "modern" time-view accepted by the critics is unalterably true, a revolutionary restatement of Biblical data would unquestionably be necessary. But Moffatt the historian has warned us of the unlikelihood that finality has been reached. And we believe that the Christian should regard the fact that criticism plays such havoc with the Bible as sufficient warrant for agreeing with Moffatt the historian and for

⁷² P. 10.

adopting a cautious and conservative attitude toward Moffatt the critic.

Since Moffatt in pointing out the difference between the modern time-view and that of New Testament times refers expressly to miracle and prophecy, we shall consider briefly the nature of the reinterpretation advocated, as it is set forth in this Dictionary in the articles dealing with these topics.

Miracles.

The article MIRACLES by Gillett replaces that of Sanday in the first edition. Its author is especially concerned with what Sanday has called "the rationale of miracles." Like the latter he believes it "is beyond possible doubt" that what are commonly called miracles have occurred. The problem is simply to relate these phenomena to our modern knowledge. Miracle, he tells us, is "a general term used to designate a certain group of phenomena of human experience all of which contain three elements which may roughly be characterized respectively as the scientific, the psychological, and the logical." As to the scientific element he assures us that either to affirm or deny miracles as non-natural or supernatural involves "the same fallacy of a presupposed omniscience as to the range of human experience." All we can safely affirm is that they are "*unusual, extra-ordinary.*" As to the psychological element we are told that a miracle "produces in the beholder, or in the one who hears of it second hand a characteristic psychological reaction. It awakens wonder, surprise, perhaps also gratitude, fear, self-examination." The logical element may be called "possibly better the causal or metaphysical." It has frequently led men to infer that back of a non-natural event there must be a supernatural power. "Such a conclusion suggests," our author thinks, "the dualistic notion of two powers at work in the field of human experience. . . ."

While as we have intimated our author believes that so-called miracles have actually occurred, in discussing "miracles as facts" and "miracle as a religious factor" he makes a significant limitation of the function of miracle:

Its value as a religious concept does not lie in proving the existence of God, or the divinity of the agent exhibiting supernatural power; but in manifesting the attitude of God, already conceived to exist, toward man, and indicating the consequent response that should be made by man toward God. Religion and revelation are reciprocal terms. As religious phenomena, miracles are not to be viewed as proofs of God; but as revelations about God.

This certainly seems a very arbitrary attempt to restrict the function of miracle. It is hard to see why an event which will reveal *what* God is should not also show that God *is*. And if it is uncertain "just how far the occurrence of such events provided the original stimulus to the conviction of the existence of deity," i.e., if we are not clearly entitled to assume that miracles are needed to prove the existence of God, why should they be needed to reveal His nature, unless it is to be frankly admitted that that revelation may and does transcend the natural? But it is not difficult to understand why Gillett should draw this arbitrary distinction. For one who believed in God might be expected to seek to discover His hand in history and to recognize it even in relatively ordinary events, while one who did not believe in Him would demand and might not even then be convinced by proofs of the most conclusive character. The believer will seek to see God everywhere, the unbeliever will see Him nowhere. If miracles are addressed only to the believer this naturally tends to shift the problem of miracles from the objective to the subjective sphere. Assume a sufficiently sensitive religious consciousness and *natural* events will acquire great *religious* significance.

Consequently it is natural that stress should be laid by our author upon the "interpretation of miracles." "The modern distinction between facts and values" is stressed, and we are told that it "puts the interpretation of miracles in a new light":

The essential question is not as to the precise accuracy of the description of the event, or as to the existence of a power other than that operating in nature; but as to the meaning and value of the event in its bearings on the mutual relations of God and man.

In other words, what actually happened is a secondary mat-

ter as compared with the meaning and value which, rightly, or even wrongly it would seem, can be derived from it or attached to it. Our author continues:

That the appearance of a non-natural event, i.e., an event outside previous experience, proves the operation of a divine, supernatural agency is psychologically true—men have widely interpreted it that way—but logically false. That the appearance of a non-natural event, in the above sense, proves either the operation of an unknown 'natural law' or the unobserved operation of a known 'law' is, similarly, psychologically true and logically false. Both rest back on metaphysical presuppositions as to the nature of ultimate reality, more or less religious.

This coincidence of the "psychologically true" and the "logically false" may be a great comfort to the Ritschlian theologian. But it is likely, we think, to be rather confusing to some at least of the readers of this article. So it will be well perhaps to use a concrete illustration. We turn, therefore, to the one which Gillett himself uses, the Crossing of the Red Sea.⁷³ He writes as follows:

The record of miracles in the Bible and their progressive interpretation as clarified by modern historical scholarship not only illustrates what has been said concerning the general attitude toward miracles, but also indicates that modern thought with respect to them is moving more nearly into accord with the Bible view. Take for example the O. T. miracles associated with the deliverance of the Hebrews from Egypt. They were brought out 'with strong power and with a mighty hand.' It is evident that the narratives themselves show, as they recede in time from the event, a marked increase in marvelous, *extraordinary* accessories to the occasion, as in respect to the crossing of the Red Sea (cf. Ex. xiv. 21a [J] and xiv. 22 [P] or the poetic statement in xv. 8). But it is not simply as marvelous events associated with the departure from Egypt and the wanderings in the wilderness that they are through all Hebrew history lauded and sung. They are the lore of the folk; but they are not simply folklore. Their significance is profoundly religious. They are rehearsed

⁷³ It would be possible to select a better illustration since in the narrative of the Red Sea the use of secondary causes—the wind and sea—is clearly stated and strongly emphasized. Consequently this event was in the main at least a special providence, rather than a miracle in the narrowest sense of an event "in the external world, wrought by the immediate power of God and intended as a sign or attestation" (Davis, *A Dictionary of the Bible*, p. 504). But this one illustrates with sufficient clearness the unwillingness of the critic to do full justice to the simple statements of Scripture describing the sovereign control which God can and does exert over His universe.

as a revelation of the gracious attitude of Jⁿ toward His chosen people which it is both the privilege and the duty of the people to discern, and which ought to awaken in them the response of loyal hearts and obedient conduct.

What does this mean? If we understand the writer correctly, it means that we cannot assert that any thing "non-natural" occurred at the Red Sea. The "marvelous, *extra-ordinary* accessories" are late; the earliest account, that of J, describes a natural phenomenon of which we can only say that it was very opportune, and even that account is relatively remote and may be overdrawn.⁷⁴ We are dealing with folk-lore. What, then, is it which made this event so wonderful, so memorable? It is that Israel was able to draw such a profound religious lesson from an event which was perhaps relatively inconspicuous. But this brings us to the great question whether we can accept the *psychological* interpretation if we reject the *objective* fact. Gillett states the problem thus:

The crux of the question of miracles is not whether or not an 'absolute miracle' is conceivable, or whether or not the records of miraculous events are scientifically precise in their historical details, or whether or not they involve a dualistic view of the universe. It really lies in the validity of the value judgments of the religious consciousness as interpretive of a certain class of events in the natural world as revelations of the character of God.

Yes, here is the "crux" of this theory. For suppose the Hebrew's interpretation of the Crossing of the Red Sea should prove to be one of those value-judgments which as Patton reminds us "need objective reality to make them worth anything." If there was nothing extraordinary about the Cross-

⁷⁴ Pfeiffer describes the Crossing of the Red Sea after this fashion: "Leading the tribes across a shallow branch of the Red Sea where the pursuing Egyptians perished at the return of the tide, Moses brought the wanderers to the oasis of Kadesh, near the southern border of Judah" (p. 377b). Certainly there is nothing very extraordinary about that! McCurdy had expressed it more strongly: "Pursued by Egyptians, a way was opened for them over an arm of the Red Sea," which sounds more like what he called a "signal proof of the favor and power of Jⁿ." Apparently Pfeiffer thought that this savored too much of the miraculous or as he would probably prefer to say, magical, so he changed it accordingly.

ing of the Red Sea, were not the men who invented the religious interpretation of it recorded in Ex. xiv-xv and the men who accepted this interpretation, living even in their remote age in "a fool's paradise of subjectivity"? And if there is serious danger today that in the case of the Ritschlian theologian "religion will share the fate of the German mark which had subjective value so long as it represented objective reality, but when it came to have only subjective value lost even that," did not the Israelites who followed Moses stand in a similar peril? If they had had no signal proofs of Jehovah's favor, were they not presumptuous in looking upon themselves as in a peculiar sense His people? If something had actually happened, they were entitled to build on it. But a value judgment resting on no tangible evidence is as valueless as "the ghost of a dead faith."⁷⁵

It is clear then we believe that the whole trend of this discussion is to avoid the "scientific" objections to the supernatural by regarding miracles as "psychological" phenomena. According to the Bible the miracles were mighty acts of God wrought in behalf of a people only too ready to disobey and reject His will and therefore constantly in need of Divine guidance, help and correction. According to Gillett, and he is only speaking for many who adopt the view set forth in his article, the miracles were events "in the natural world" the exact nature of which is uncertain, but from which the religious genius of the Israelites was able to draw "meaning and religious value as respects the mutual relations of God and man." The "wonder" lies not in the objective act but in the subjective interpretation. Instead of marvelling at the wonders which God wrought in behalf of a perverse and unresponsive people, whose history was signalized by disbelief and disobedience, we are expected to marvel at the wonderful religious interpretation which the Jew has given to his, according to the critics, rather ordinary and commonplace history.⁷⁶ "The genius of Israel"—so runs the title of a recent

⁷⁵ Cf. Patton, *Fundamental Christianity*, pp. 202, 205, 300.

⁷⁶ Thus Carrier-Sellers conclude the article FASTS AND FEASTS with the

book which represents this viewpoint—is the wonderful religious phenomenon with which the Old Testament seeks to acquaint us. On this wise the Biblical miracle is replaced by a psychological miracle of man's devising. The question ceases to be, What hath God wrought? and becomes, What has man inferred and discovered? Yet we believe that those who will study this psychological miracle in the light of real history and of a true psychology which does not idealize man but sees him as he really is, will realize that this psychological miracle which the critics have devised is a far more difficult one to account for than the objective miracles of which the Bible tells us.

The trouble with Gillett's whole argument is, as we see it, that he adopts an attitude toward the supernatural which leads him to reject what the Bible has to say both as to the nature and the cause of the miracles which it records. When the Christian accepts the resurrection, for example, as a miracle, he does not assume "omniscience as to the limits of the natural world" nor does he accept "the dualistic notion of two powers at work in the field of human experience." What he does do is simply to accept the express statement of the Bible that this amazing act was wrought by the power of God and to draw the inference that the works of God as Redeemer may and do supersede and transcend His works of Creation and Providence. The Bible gives him both the record of a wonderful event and points him to a Cause adequate to its accomplishment. Accepting the Biblical account of the wonder

following paragraph: "In conclusion, it is important to observe that, under the transforming genius of Israel's religious teachers, these feasts became the medium of expression for the people's gratitude to J", and the memories of his grace, which quickened their sense of unworthiness. Only a narrow view would insist that a people could put no more into a form of worship than existed in the crude period of inexperienced childhood, for this would deny to growing spiritual consciousness that larger expression which maturity demands." That these feasts commemorated great deliverances and blessings which the nation owed to Jehovah their God is lost sight of or ignored. The higher significance which the Old Testament attributes to acts of God is ascribed to "the transforming genius of Israel's religious teachers."

as actual fact and realizing the adequacy of the Cause to which it is attributed, he finds in the miracle a sufficient basis for all the precious religious implications which are drawn from it. But when the extraordinary character of the miracle is disparaged or denied in the interest of "scientific" naturalism, the inevitable result is a religious value judgment built upon no tangible foundation.

Prophecy.

The article PROPHECY by Zenos has only been slightly changed in the new edition. We note that its author in speaking of "prophetic inspiration" tells us that

The secret of the prophets' power was the invincible conviction in their own souls and in the souls of their hearers that the message which they delivered was not their own invention, but came directly from the God whom they served. They felt themselves to be appointed to their life-work and equipped for it by an irresistible influence which was none other than the very spirit of J".⁷⁷

We are told further with regard to "predictive prophecy" that

The power of the prophet to foresee and announce beforehand events which J" designed to accomplish was a gift of J" endowing and distinguishing its recipient as a special agent of God in furthering His will. The prophets as a class did indeed possess a large amount of political sagacity; but they invariably viewed the quality as something not acquired by education, inherited, or otherwise obtained in natural ways, but as a bestowment from on high.⁷⁸

These statements seem to indicate that their author is prepared to do full justice to predictive prophecy as an outstanding feature of Biblical prophecy. Unfortunately there are other statements which very greatly impair their value. One of these is the following statement as to the "interpretation of prophecy":

The starting-point in the interpretation of prophecy is that the prophetic word is always addressed in the first place to a specific audience. There in no such thing as prophecy dealing with non-existent situations. Every word of God is called forth by a definite time and environment.⁷⁹

⁷⁷ P. 741a.

⁷⁸ P. 742b.

⁷⁹ 742a.

This statement resembles the familiar dictum of A. B. Davidson: "The prophet is always a man of his own time, and it is always to the people of his own time that he speaks, not to a generation long after, nor to us."⁸⁰ The extent to which this limits the scope of prophecy should be apparent to everyone. The disastrous results of its application to the Old Testament are most clearly illustrated by the partitionment of the book of Isaiah which is largely the result of the application of this principle. Thus, Peake in his article ISAIAH tells us that:

The third division [xl-lxvi] is by common consent not the work of Isaiah. For the conditions in which he lived and worked have been replaced by a wholly different situation. Even had he foreseen the Babylonian Exile, he must have spoken of it in the future tense; whereas in this section the Jews are described as in captivity and in many passages their deliverance is said to be at hand.⁸¹

Consequently the "Second Isaiah" is assigned to a date "toward the close of the Babylonian Exile." But the whole of this section cannot be attributed to this prophet, for "the situation changes" we are told, even within these twenty-seven chapters. So the last eleven are assigned in the main to "about the middle of the 5th cty. B.C. or perhaps somewhat earlier." Hence we have not merely a Deutero-Isaiah, but a Trito-Isaiah also, not to mention lesser editors and contributors. And this principle does not affect the second part of Isaiah alone, for we are told further by Peake that

In chap. xiii. we have a prediction of the final overthrow of Babylon by the Medes, which also reflects conditions toward the close of the exile; and the same is probably true of xxi. 1-10. This demonstrates that even in chaps. i-xxxv. there are non-Isaian elements.

No reference is made by this scholar to the fact that xiii. 1 reads thus: "The burden of Babylon, which *Isaiah the son of Amoz did see*." This important statement is simply ignored. We cannot depend on it for the date of the prophecy. Instead we must seek to determine "to what historical situation or stage of religious development any particular section

⁸⁰ Hastings' *Dictionary*, Vol. IV, p. 118b.

⁸¹ P. 370.

is to be assigned." This shows us not merely that the theory of the critics as to the *occasion* of prophecy results in the dismemberment of Isaiah, but that in applying it the critics are ready to disregard testimony of the most positive character if it is not in accord with the theory which they have propounded.

But if prophecy must have, as we have seen, a "specific audience," and if these auditors must be the contemporaries of the prophet, of how distant a future may the prophet speak without talking "above the heads" of his auditors? This is an important question. Let us hear what Zenos has to say about it by continuing the quotation of his statement regarding the "interpretation of prophecy." After stating as we have seen that "every word of God is called forth by a definite time and environment," he continues:

But when the exigency that has elicited it has passed away, the word does not lose its value; for in meeting the exigency the prophet has announced principles of permanent validity. Whenever similar situations arise in the future the prophecy serves as a standard to be referred to. Circumstances may change, but principles remain the same; and once uttered, principles must be recognized as having bearings whenever similar circumstances arise again. The interpreter must then first ask: What did the prophet intend to say to his immediate audience? and afterward: What underlying principles of his utterance may be taken as his message to the world of mankind for all time? This does not mean that the prophet had two separate audiences in view when he spoke, but that the fundamental positions on which his address is based are the same for all ages.⁸²

If we understand it correctly the meaning of this statement is that prophecy being designed to meet an exigency affecting an existent (i.e. contemporaneous, or clearly impending) situation, will have a fulfilment appropriate to this exigency. Its bearing upon a future not closely or immediately connected with this exigency will not be in the nature of fulfilment, strictly speaking, but will be due to the fact that the prophet has announced principles which because of their permanent value will fit and therefore be applicable to all similar situations in the future as they may arise. This will

⁸² P. 742a.

be clearer perhaps if we use as an illustration Zenos' interpretation of a great and familiar prophecy, the Immanuel prophecy in Isa. vii. 14:

The only admissible view, as far as the intention of Isaiah is concerned, is that he had in mind a child born in his own days, whose birth would be symbolical of the Divine favor displayed in such manifest power as to assure His people that God was with them. But if this was Isaiah's thought, the use of the passage by Matthew must be either the result of misunderstanding of the prophet's meaning, or the appropriation of his words as a formula in which the virgin birth of the Savior might felicitously be embodied. If the alternative be drawn sharply between these two views, the second would be by far preferable. But it is quite possible to suppose that the evangelist did see in the birth of the Savior the fulfilment of the hopes roused by the promise of God's presence with and among His people, and expressed this thought by applying the old oracle to the event he was narrating. Such an appropriation altho not correct, judged by standards of modern literary and historical usage, would be in perfect harmony with the methods of using the O. T. at the time.⁸³

Here we have a clear illustration of the application of the principles enunciated by Zenos. The only "admissible" view is that Isaiah had in mind a child born in his own day. That would relate the prophecy both as to the time of its utterance and the date of its fulfilment directly to his own immediate audience. The underlying principle of permanent value would be that a child might symbolize the Divine favor, if the events attending its birth and infancy were sufficiently remarkable to "assure His people that God was with them." Any subsequent event which illustrated the same principle might, then, be said to fulfil the prophecy.⁸⁴

⁸³ P. 368b.

⁸⁴ This is illustrated by Nourse's discussion of the "Servant" passage in Isaiah. He tells us: "One figure alone in all history has fully met the ideal sketched by the prophet here. Yet it is neither necessary nor possible to hold that the prophet foresaw His actual career, His life, His cross, and His resurrection. The prophet grasped certain of those great essential elements which, just because they are necessarily true, must have been realized in Him who came to fulfil all righteousness" (p. 834a). It is of course a debatable question how fully the prophets were able to understand the meaning of the revelations which were given to them regarding the promised Salvation. We are constantly in danger of reading into them more of the fulfilment with which we as Christians are

Yet Zenos cannot disguise from himself the fact that Matthew seems clearly to see in this prophecy something more than a symbol or typical instance of God's helpfulness, that he sees in it what we would call a real prediction of the birth of the Savior. So he sets before us two alternatives: either Matthew was laboring under a "misunderstanding" of the prophet's meaning or he was using the words as a "formula." Of the two, if the alternative is to be sharply drawn, he prefers the latter. But he tells us frankly that if "the evangelist did see in the birth of the Savior the fulfilment of the hopes roused by the promise of God's presence with and among His people, and expressed this thought by applying the old oracle to the event he was narrating" (an explanation which he describes as "quite possible"), such an appropriation would not be "correct" judged by modern standards but would be "in perfect harmony with methods of using the Old Testament at the time."⁸⁵ In other words, if Matthew thought Isaiah really foretold the birth of Christ, he was mistaken; if he used Isaiah's words as a "formula," he was making an incorrect use of it, but one perfectly permissible in his day. In short, the Immanuel prophecy was "fulfilled," if we are really entitled to use this

familiar than we can be sure the prophets themselves were able to see. They were spokesmen, their message was not their own but God's. But such New Testament passages as Luke iv. 16-21, Matt. xxii. 41-46, John xii. 41, Luke xxiv. 25-27, are irreconcilably opposed to a conception of prophecy which reduces it to the formulation of "principles of permanent value" which must be exemplified to some degree in every worthy life and therefore supremely in the one perfect Life. To deny this is to deny that there is any essential difference between Isaiah's prophecy of the Suffering Messiah and Plato's moral judgment that if a perfect man were to visit this earth he would certainly be put to death.

⁸⁵ Cf. the following statement by Leary (retained by Paton) regarding the Patriarchs: "We may safely say, however, that there is a strong presumption against the individual interpretation of any of the patriarchs before Abraham. Nevertheless, the Biblical writers may have believed that these names belonged to individuals" (p. 684a). The modern critic has no hesitation about disagreeing with the statements of the Old Testament when they are out of harmony with his own opinions.

word at all, in the days of Isaiah: any use of it by Matthew other than as symbolic of the presence of God with His people, was either mistaken or incorrect. How seriously such a view restricts the perspective of prophecy and how clearly it tends to reduce it to the limits of the natural, must be apparent to all. No wonder Moffatt tells us that the New Testament writers "allegorized" the Old Testament.

To the Bible student who is familiar with the methods of the Old Testament critic this use of the word "formula" will be quite familiar. When we read repeatedly in the book of Leviticus the words "and the Lord spake unto Moses, saying," that is a "formula." It does not mean what it says, that the Lord spake unto Moses. Nourse does not mention Moses once in his article *LEVITICUS*; the Priest Code is of course late. The words "the Lord spake unto Moses saying" are simply a formula by which the authority of the great Moses was claimed for laws of which he had no knowledge. The critics know that the laws are late, consequently the word "formula"⁸⁶ is a euphemism for a statement contrary to actual fact. And here we have the same thing in the New Testament. The words "that it might be fulfilled" are a formula. They do not mean "fulfilled," they are simply a high sounding and impressive phrase with which a New Testament writer introduced his own mistaken or incorrect ideas as to the meaning of an Old Testament prophecy, or, as Moffatt would say, "allegorized" it. When we remember that quotations from the Old Testament are of frequent occurrence in the New Testament, that the theme of many of these quotations is the 'fulfilment' of Old Testament prophecy, and that this is especially true of Matthew,⁸⁷ we realize

⁸⁶ Zenos tells us elsewhere (p. 758b) that "The formulas 'The Scripture saith,' 'It saith,' 'It is written,' 'Then was the Scripture fulfilled which saith,' 'This was done that the Scripture might be fulfilled,' sometimes mean no more than quotation-marks in modern book-making." In view of what we have read we are inclined to doubt whether to Zenos they mean as much as this. It must be on some such basis as this that he interprets our Lord's express reference to Ps. 110 as Davidic, since he tells us that it may be "of Maccabean date" (p. 575a).

⁸⁷ Jacobus says of Matthew: "Matthew presents the Master from the

the significance of this restriction of the scope of prophecy advocated by Zenos. Theoretically he may admit predictive prophecy; practically he denies it, and in denying it he does not hesitate to challenge, indeed he cannot avoid challenging the correctness of the New Testament interpretation of Old Testament prophecies.

CONCLUSION

Further examples and illustrations of the critical position of the *New Standard* might easily be given. But this review, though in many ways inadequate, has already made too large demands upon the patience and interest of the reader. Yet despite the fact that many topics have not been touched upon and most of the contributors have been hardly more than mentioned, enough has been said we believe to make its controlling principles clear and to show the serious results of their application to the contents of the Bible.

The fundamental assumption of the editors is clearly this, that the Bible must be *adapted* to the requirements and standards of modern scholarship. This, as we have seen, is made evident in the Preface, where we read that the critical position of the Dictionary is one of "acceptance of the proved facts of modern scholarship, of open-mindedness toward its still-debated problems, and of conservation of the fundamental truths of the Christianity proclaimed and established in the message and mission of Jesus Christ." The meaning of this statement should be clearer now, in view of the discussion upon which we have been engaged. What are these "proved facts," the acceptance of which is assumed at the outset? The first "fact" is the *humanness* of the Bible. This means that the Bible contains both truth and error and represents a time-view or a series of time-views which have been largely superseded. Its contents must therefore be sifted and interpreted for the double purpose of distinguishing truth

view-point of fulfilled prophecy, to appeal to Jewish minds" (p. 309b) When we remember that Westcott and Hort find more than a hundred Old Testament quotations in this Gospel, we realize something of the seriousness of the charge that Matthew's methods of quotation will not stand the test of modern scholarship.

from error and of stating the truth in modern terms. It means in other words that the Bible has only so much authority as modern scholars are willing to recognize as compatible with the acceptance of the modern "time-view." The second "fact" is the theory of *evolution*. This means that in explaining the phenomena of history, Biblical no less than secular, the emphasis is to be placed on the natural or human side of history, despite the emphasis which the Bible so carefully and repeatedly places on the Divine factor both as regards origin and development. It means that miracle and prophecy must not interfere with the normal and natural development. In other words, it involves an attitude of distinct unfriendliness to the supernatural. The third "fact" is the *comparative* method of studying and investigating the phenomena of the Bible. This means that the statements of the Bible regarding the religion of Israel are to be tested as to their credibility by our knowledge of conditions existing among other peoples, despite the insistence of the Biblical writers that the religious history described in the Scriptures is unique and distinctive. The fourth "fact" is the correctness of the conclusions which are generally accepted in "critical" circles and which represent the application of the above principles to the Scriptures.

These "facts" are *accepted* by the editors of this Dictionary. They regard them as no longer open to discussion, the argument is closed. It is only toward the "still-debated problems" that "open-mindedness" is promised. This is noteworthy because the editors assure us that their aim is to furnish the reader with "a clear, charitable, uncontroversial presentation" of the results of the "critical" movement which they accept. This would seem to be a very difficult task in view of the highly controversial nature of many of the conclusions arrived at by the critics. How is it accomplished? By ignoring all those who do not accept the "critical" viewpoint. Thus, Peake in his article on the RELIGION OF ISRAEL, while assuming that Deuteronomy (or the "kernel" of the book) was probably prepared during the reign of Manasseh, gives

courteous consideration to the radical theory of Hölscher and others, which would make it post-exilic. Yet he ignores completely the fact that most Christians accept the manifest claim of the book to be at least substantially Mosaic. Is this "clear, charitable, uncontroversial"? Plainly it is not. It is not *clear*, because it conveys the impression that Deuteronomy may be later than the time of Manasseh but cannot be earlier, despite the fact that its Mosaic authorship was never questioned until comparatively recent times. It is not *charitable*, because it treats a view which has been held for centuries and is still the view of most Christians as if it were unworthy of mention, not to say serious consideration, and its advocates might be regarded as negligible quantities. It is not *uncontroversial*, because to ignore an opponent is usually regarded as the most serious affront which can be paid him; and this method has not infrequently led to more controversy and bitterness than a treatment which while frankly controversial has showed itself both clear and charitable by recognizing the existence of an opposing view, however unwelcome the fact of the existence or persistence of such a view may be. Yet this Dictionary is characterized by "open-mindedness" only so far as the problems of criticism are concerned. Toward what they would call the "traditional" view the editors claim the right to maintain a "closed mind." For them it has only antiquarian interest.

Since the editors of this Dictionary proceed upon the assumption that the critical theories are correct, it may be noted that this volume offers an excellent opportunity for testing the correctness of one of the most important of their "proved facts." This is due to the fact that we have before us a book which is distinctly described as a revision of a previous work. According to the critics the literature which we call the Bible has passed through many editions and revisions; and they claim the ability to detect the hand of editor and redactor and to disentangle sources in a way which to the average reader is both amazing and bewildering. The critics assume that this analysis is correct, at least in

the main. But many Bible students—in the opinion of the editors they do not deserve to be called scholars—are still very skeptical of the conclusions reached. Here would be a good opportunity to test its correctness. The *New Standard* is a volume not very much more extensive than the English Bible. Many of its articles are clearly designated as “edited” by the appending of two sets of initials. To disentangle these sources should be child’s play for the critics as compared with the task on which they have been engaged in the Old Testament. Yet we venture to assert that if they would attempt the source analysis of the *New Standard* and test their conclusions by the *Standard* their confidence in their Pentateuchal sources would be not a little shaken. We do not expect them to accept this suggestion. But we would commend it to any whose attitude to this question has not yet become that of unquestioning acceptance of the conclusions of the critics.⁸⁸

In forming our final estimate of the *New Standard* as of its predecessor we must remember the thesis upon which it proceeds. It aims to *adapt* the Bible to the conclusions of modern scholarship. How much of the Bible can be adapted is not clear. But that a great deal must be rejected or so radically reconstructed as to be scarcely recognizable is perfectly obvious. Thus, the radical change which “comparative religion” is insisting on in the message and methods of the missionary is a cause of grave concern to those who still believe in the uniqueness of Christianity, and in its exclusive

⁸⁸ A. Bertholet in his “Apokryphen und Pseudepigraphen” (added as a supplement to Budde’s *Geschichte d. altheb. Litteratur*, 1906) makes the following striking statement regarding “source-analysis” as applied to the extra-canonical books: “What they [the writers of this literature] offer us is, consequently, in no sense entirely original, and it cannot even be claimed that they have always made the borrowed material entirely their own: this often results in obscurity and contradiction, in confusion of ideas and expression, which can be remedied by source analysis only in the rarest cases.” This is a remarkable admission. For surely a method which as the critics think can be applied with such success to the Pentateuch should be applicable also to Enoch, Jubilees and Tobit and, we may add, to the *New Standard Bible Dictionary*.

claims. It is astonishing that so many of the critics seemingly fail to recognize the drastic character of the reconstruction which they advocate. McFadyen tells us :

Criticism is only a means to an end, and the end is interpretation. Its purpose is essentially constructive; it aims at destroying nothing but misconceptions. The question is often asked, 'How much has criticism left?' and the answer is 'Everything.' The land has been redistributed, but the ground remains—every inch of it.⁸⁹

True, but how and what does it remain? The beautiful picture of a garden in which our first parents lived in innocent communion with God and with one another has been redistributed as a jungle in which a beast-like man gradually mastered the beast within and the beast without. The patriarchal period is so hidden by the haze of distance, that its heroic figures appear as myths or tribal movements. Sinai is so veiled in mist and fog that we cannot be sure whether we see before us the unshakable granite of that mountain "where God dwelt" and at which, He proclaimed the Ten Words and entered into covenant with Israel, or whether we see before us boldly outlined on the clouds a Brocken spectre, the reflection of later Israel's pious imaginings. Redistributed? Yes, but as granite fact or fog bank fancy? We see Abel offering a sacrifice which Jehovah accepted and we trace the blood which flowed from that first sacrifice and lo, it leads to Egypt and the passover, to Sinai and the priestly ritual, to the tabernacle and the temple and finally to the Upper Room and Calvary. And lo, we are told that this stream had its rise in the land that is called Primitive, and passes through the terrible region called Expiation which belongs to "the angry god," whose servants are called priests, and that the prophets long ago told men that they need no longer pass through much if any of this dismal country with its blood bespattered altars and its distant glimpse of an awful Cross, but that they could pass directly by the gateway called Repentance and Reformation into the land of Beulah. This longer journey becomes in the redistribution of the land unnecessarily circuitous;

⁸⁹ *The Record* for October 1925, p. 422.

and so that Priestly Land whither so many resorted for healing of their infirmities now tends to become an unfrequented byway. The ground remains, perhaps, but how changed, how unfamiliar, how unsubstantial is that panorama which the Scriptures unfold before us, when redistributed by the critics. The Bible has been *adapted* to modern standards and has ceased to be the Book that so many generations of believing Christians have revered and loved. It is no longer a final authority to which men can appeal; it is an old-fashioned book which must be brought up to date if it is not to lose caste in this rapidly moving modern age and cease entirely to influence the course of human history.

The claim which the Bible makes for itself is a very different one from this which the critics make for it. It claims to be a standard to which every age must conform and by which every age will be judged. "The grass withereth," cries the prophet, "the flower fadeth; but the word of the Lord shall stand for ever." "Heaven and earth shall pass away but my words shall not pass away," says One to whom all the prophets bear witness. "For we have not followed cunningly devised fables," declares the Apostle Peter, when we made known unto you the power and coming of our Lord Jesus Christ, but were eyewitnesses of his majesty." "As of sincerity, as of God, in the name of God, speak we in Christ" says the Apostle to the Gentiles. "If any man thinketh himself to be a prophet, or spiritual, let him acknowledge that the things that I write unto you are the commandments of the Lord." The Bible speaks with the authority and finality of God: "Thus saith the Lord!" Men can as little outgrow it, as they can outgrow its Author. To the ear that He has opened it speaks with an immediacy and certainty which needs no "reinterpretation," and will accept none.

The issue between the Bible and the critics can be summed up in a word: *adopt* or *adapt*! Shall we *adopt* the Bible as the standard by which all things, even the conclusions of modern scholarship are to be tested? Or shall we *adapt* the Bible to what may be today "the proved facts of modern

scholarship," but tomorrow may occupy a conspicuous place in the museum of exploded theories. The one will give us the blessed assurance that we are built upon the foundation of the apostles and prophets, Jesus Christ Himself being the Chief Cornerstone, that we share the faith of Abraham and David, of Isaiah and Ezra, of Paul and John. The other will impress us more and more with the distance which separates us from them, and what is far worse, separates us from Him to whom they bear witness, a distance which tends to become a gulf which the bridge that is called Reinterpretation can never span. ADOPT or ADAPT,—which?

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