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I. REVIVALS OF RELIGION.

The word Revival implies the previous existence of life ; more properly, it means resuscitation or resurrection from the dead. But according to usage, and with reference to the secondary meanings of the word *life*, it means calling into active exercise a life which has become torpid or has been slumbering. Hence, it has special application to the church, not to the world outside. In Acts 2: 41 ff. we have an account of a revival in the proper sense of the word ; for all the statements there concern the members of the visible church of God. What is commonly called a revival—a general religious movement among the unregenerate—was called by our fathers an “awakening.” There is a sense in which such an awakening may be called a revival, to-wit : a revival of God’s work, (Hab. 3 : 2)—that work of salvation, of calling in His elect—which He has been doing from the beginning. This work seems at times, and in some places, almost to cease ; the Lord seems to abandon His church and give it up to the power of Satan, as in the days of Elijah, at the crucifixion of Jesus, and in the “Dark Ages.” Then comes a time of reviving, a great movement among the dry bones, and a great multitude stand up for the Lord. (Josh. 24—1 Sam. 12.—Judg. 2.—1 Chron. 29.—Hezekiah, Josiah, the Maccabees, Pentecost, the Wilderness, the Brethren of the Common Lot, the Reformation, the Kirk of Shotts, Northampton,

and creator. His higher sentiments and aspirations, his self-denying philanthropy, his enthusiasm for the good and true, all the struggles and sufferings of heroes and martyrs, not to speak of that self-sacrifice which is the foundation of Christianity, are in the view of the evolutionist mere loss and waste, failure in the struggle of life. What does he give us in exchange? An endless pedigree of bestial ancestors, without one gleam of high or holy tradition to enliven the procession; and for the future, the prospect that the poor mass of protoplasm which constitutes the sum of our being, and which is the sole gain of an indefinite struggle in the past, must soon be resolved again into inferior animals or dead matter. That men of thought and culture should advocate such a philosophy, argues either a strange mental hallucination, or that the higher spiritual nature has been wholly quenched within them. It is one of the saddest of many sad spectacles that our age presents," p. 396.

Such is the conclusion to which one of the leading scientists—a layman, not a divine—of our day has come. The judgment of one of our ablest theologians, lately passed away, the lamented A. A. Hodge, is in accord with that of Sir. J. W. Dawson. "You cannot, therefore"—writes he, "take this speculative evolution as a fact; the testimony of science thus far, with regard to the facts, is against it. It is a vain, vapid, pretentious philosophy of evolution, which has no scientific basis, and is absolutely devoid of any scientific authority. You must oppose this, first, in the interest of the convictions of your own reason and of the fundamental principles of human thought and intuitions; secondly, in the interest of natural religion; thirdly, in the interest of revealed religion." (*Popular Lectures on Theological Themes*, p. 175.)

In his preface to this ninth edition of his book, the author tells us: "Several corrections and additions, rendered necessary by the progress of discovery, have been introduced into the text, and notes have been added with reference to other new points. The general statements and conclusions remain, however, substantially the same as in 1873; the author having seen no valid reason to depart from any of them; while with respect to some, additional evidence in their favor has been furnished by the facts and discoveries developed in recent years." For the reader who desires a popular treatise on Geology, fully abreast with the science of the day, I know of no book better than "The story of the Earth and Man."

GEO. D. ARMSTRONG.

SCHURMAN'S "ETHICAL IMPORT OF DARWINISM."

THE ETHICAL IMPORT OF DARWINISM. *By Jacob Gould Schurman, Sage Professor of Philosophy in Cornell University.* New York: Chas. Scribner's Sons. 1887.

This, if I mistake not, is Prof. Schurman's first appearance as an author, in book form, before the public, and will undoubtedly secure for him full citizenship in the republic of Letters. The book furnishes

abundant evidence of a wide acquaintance with what has been written, since Darwin's *Origin of Species* appeared in 1859, in the department of philosophy to which the work belongs; a wide acquaintance with what has been not inaptly termed "the Darwinian literature."

Darwin's hypothesis of evolution, as held and defended by Profs. Huxley and Spencer, *i. e.* evolution in its atheistic form, Prof. Schurman utterly rejects. Quoting Darwin's description of "natural selection,"—"This preservation of favorable individual differences and variations, and the destruction of those which are injurious, I have called natural selection, or the survival of the fittest,"—he remarks, "the process, therefore, does not touch the origin of the variations, or even the accumulation of them. Natural selection produces nothing, either at the beginning or in the progress of the development; it means only that *when the variations have somehow appeared*, the most advantageous are preserved, and that *when these favored forms have been somehow propagated, and thereby somehow consolidated*, the most favored again survive in the struggle. Nature originates the modifications, nature propagates them, nature accumulates them through propagation; but how all this is done is a mystery on which science throws no light, and the personification of nature serves only to disguise our real ignorance," p. 86. And, subsequently, he adds: "One may still question whether in its native province of biology the account given of the origin of species is not ultimately as supernatural as the dogma it displaces. . . The gradual development of species is one mode of conceiving the action of supernatural causality, the sudden formation of them is another," pp. 94, 95.

Prof. Schurman's position on the subject principally discussed in the volume under examination is clearly set forth in these words: "Biology warrants the belief that non-moral beings existed on our globe long before the appearance of the only moral being we know—man; and natural selection explains the process by which the latter may have been descended from the former. But natural selection, as we have already shown, creates no new material; it merely sits in judgment upon what has already appeared. Given acts, or habits, or moral practices, natural selection is the name for the survival of the fittest of them; not the talismanic cause which originates any of them. However they originate, they must have a definite relation to the constitution of the being that manifests them; and to suppose that moral sentiments, moral notions, moral practices, could be grafted upon a primitively non-moral being is, in the first place, to take grossly mechanical views of human nature, and, in the second place, to transgress the limits alike of natural selection and of evolutionary science. Yet this is what is done by our evolutionary moralists," p. 146. This position he defends with great ability.

"Ethics as a science," Prof. Schurman contends, "is a branch of history." What he means by this he explains in his words, "If dropping these speculative puzzles, we shift our position altogether, and

raise the simple inductive inquiry, what acts have men everywhere and at all times considered right or wrong respectively, and what acts have some considered right or indifferent and others wrong? tables of agreement and difference can be drawn up to show what mankind at least has regarded as the essential content of moral law (and some explanation might even be suggested of the divergence in the outlying area beyond this common circle), though we should still be unable to say whether the end of life was pleasure or something else, or how this common human morality might be regarded by other spirits, as, for example, by God. For the rich harvest which this treatment of the moral field is sure to yield we shall have to wait until the spirit of science has exorcised the spirit of speculation from our contending schools of ethics," p. 205-6.

On this idea of "a science of ethics as a branch of history," I have two remarks to make, viz: 1. Such a science may give us rules by which to distinguish right from wrong, but for an authoritative code of moral law, we must look to the "Word of God" alone; and so perfect is the code there given us that we need no other. Thoughtful men of every country into which the Bible has gone, and of every age, have recognized in the decalogue, and in that summary of it which Christ gave us in His words: "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and with all thy soul, and with all thy mind," and, "Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself," a divine authorship, and divine authority. 2. In pursuing the historic method proposed, we must carefully avoid the error into which such writers as McLennan, Morgan and others, who, as Prof. Schurman remarks, have examined "a single plot of the field," have fallen, of discrediting, or utterly ignoring the only book which gives us a history of man reaching back to the beginning, and which Lenormant remarks should "always form in sound criticism the base of all history." In nothing does the unscientific, uncritical character of the treatment of such subjects as the one under consideration by the class of writers referred to above appear more conspicuously than in the confidence they place in the histories of Berosus, and Manetho, and Herodotus, whilst they treat with entire neglect the history of Moses, far better authenticated than any one of them.

The closing paragraph of Prof. Schurman's book is one which may well arrest the most serious attention of the people of the United States in our day. Referring to the extreme laxity of view on the subject of divorce, now so common in New England and at the West, he writes: "This change in the constitution of the civilized and Christian family, with the consequent obscuration of domestic virtue, receives no countenance from ethical science. On the contrary, comparative and historical ethics show that the 'pairing' family has hitherto always been associated with a stage of culture immensely inferior to our own. And, from the interrelation of social forces, it might not unreasonably be apprehended that a return to the barbarous system of conjugal relations

would entail general social deterioration. If ethical science does show that the family, and the morality of the family, have had a historical growth, and that they vary with time and place, it does not thereby really derogate from their sanctity or authority within a civilization which has once absorbed them. Science, indeed, can tell us nothing of the validity of virtue, duty, or good. And if speculation, in the guise of moral philosophy, takes up the problem, it will find that the domestic virtues have the same warrant as justice or benevolence—that warrant being, in a last analysis, an inexpugnable consciousness of their right to us and authority over us," p. 264.

GEO. D. ARMSTRONG.

MAX MULLER'S "SCIENCE OF THOUGHT."

THE SCIENCE OF THOUGHT. *By Professor Max Muller, University of Oxford.* 2 vols. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1887.

A new book by Max Muller cannot fail to command a wide success in all lands in which the science of philology has received adequate recognition from professed specialists, or is enjoyed by a discriminating public, as an intellectual diversion or pastime.

However thoroughly we may dissent from some of his fundamental views, the grace and charm of his style assure him a hearty greeting even from those that stand at the opposite pole of his science. A German by birth and education, the son of an eminent German poet, he is one of those rare and conspicuous examples of men who have become great writers in a language other than their mother-speech. The lucidity of his diction is a brilliant contrast to that ripeness of corruption which characterizes the prevailing philological style in Germany, as well as in America. Without controversy, he may be designated the Macaulay of comparative philologists. The present work is in the main an endeavor to elaborate and expand the peculiar views of linguistic science which were first formally given to the world in his memorable "Lectures," delivered in London more than twenty years ago (1861-63). Nothing can surpass the ease and felicity with which our author discusses the essential phases of his subject, the diverse stages of development, such as the discovery of Sanscrit, the happy grouping or combination implied in the term Indo-Germanic, the influence of phonetic decay in transmuted language from an analytic to a synthetic type, as well as from synthesis almost back to the original analytic form, as is notably illustrated in the evolution of our own English, the rise and growth of grammatical science among the Athenian sophists, the relations of the Aristotelian categories to our grammatical nomenclature, the diffusion of this nomenclature among the nations of Europe largely in consequence of the adoption of Latin grammar as a standard and basis of comparison. All this is set forth with singular perspicuity, and with a "fluidity" of style, to appropriate Matthew Arnold's phrase,