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ART. I.—*The Union of Church and State in the Nicene Age, and its Effects upon Public Morals and Religion.* An Historical Essay.

THE name of Constantine the Great marks an important epoch in the history of Christianity. With him the church ceased to be a persecuted sect, and became the established religion of the Roman Empire. Since that time the church and the state, though frequently jarring, have remained united in Europe, either on the hierarchical basis, with the temporal power under the tutelage of the spiritual, or on the cæsaro-papal, with the spiritual power merged in the temporal; while in the United States of America, since the end of the eighteenth century, the two powers have stood peacefully but independently side by side. The church could now act upon the state, but so could the state act upon the church; and this mutual influence became a source of both profit and loss, blessing and curse, on either side.

The martyrs and confessors of the first three centuries, in their expectation of the impending end of the world, and their desire for the speedy return of the Lord, had never once thought of such a thing as the great and sudden change, which meets us at the beginning of this period, in the relation of the Roman state to the Christian church. Tertullian had even held the Christian profession to be irreconcilable with the office of a

7. Finally, God has revealed himself to us in the person of his Son. No man knoweth the Father, but the Son, and he to whom the Son shall reveal him. Jesus Christ is the true God. The revelation which he made of himself while on earth, was the manifestation of God in the flesh. He and the Father are one. The words of Christ were the words of God. The works of Christ were the works of God. The love, mercy, tenderness, and forgiving grace, as well as the holiness, severity, and power manifested by Christ, were manifestations of the nature of God. We see, therefore, as with our eyes what God is. We know that, although infinite and absolute, he can think, act, and will; that He can love and hate; that He can hear prayer and forgive sin; that we can have fellowship with him as one person can commune with another. Philosophy must veil her face and seal her lips in the presence of God thus manifest in the flesh, and not pretend to declare that he is not, or is not known to be, what he has just revealed himself as being. As this doctrine concerning the nature of God, as the object of certain and true knowledge, lies at the foundation of all religion, it was necessary to devote the more time to its explanation and vindication.

ART. V.—*A History of Christian Doctrine.* By WILLIAM G. T. SHEDD, D. D. In two volumes. New York: Charles Scribner. 1863.

THE title of this work, coupled with the author's reputation, will awaken large expectations in all who take an interest in the scientific unfolding of Christian doctrine. These expectations will not be disappointed, in the case of those who love the distinctive truths of Christianity, and who study these volumes sufficiently to understand their significance and power. In our judgment, no production of greater moment has been given to the public for a long time. It will, beyond doubt, attract great attention, and exercise a commanding and permanent influence in shaping opinion, in regard to those highest Christian doc-

trines which have ever staggered the reason, humbled the pride, and rebuked the corruption of fallen man—which constitute the offence of the cross, and leave not the flesh whereof to glory. And we are happy to say that, in support of nearly all those high Christian doctrines which have suffered most violent and persistent assaults from heretics, latitudinarians, rationalists, infidels, heathens, and atheists, but which still keep their grasp on the faith of the church, these volumes render efficient and signal service. We say this with none the less emphasis and cordiality, although we shall be constrained to differ with the accomplished and respected author, on an occasional point.

There is a great advantage in the study of doctrines and creeds by the light of history. The maxim of Bolingbroke, now become proverbial, that "history is philosophy teaching by example," has a pregnant import in regard to church history. For not only can the doctrines of Christianity be illustrated and interpreted by Christian history, but, so far as the scientific statement and exposition of them is concerned, they are evolved by history. That is, while, for substance and implicitly, they were held by the church, from the first; yet it was only as they came in conflict with heretical and rationalistic opposers, that they were developed into those exact and self-consistent forms of statement, which parry the ingenious assaults of adversaries. The great Christian doctrines, and more especially the symbols which articulate them, will be best understood in the light of the heretical assaults by which they were impugned, and to guard against which, they were expressly shaped and phrased. It is notorious that the creed-formulas in which the mind of the church finally settled, were reached in successive eras—in regard to different doctrines, as they were successively impugned, and by such antagonism developed into greater clearness and fulness. Says Dr. Shedd, "The endeavour to defend Christianity very often elicits a more profoundly philosophic statement of it. The defence of the doctrine of the Trinity against Sabellian and Arian objections, resulted in a deeper view of the subject than had heretofore prevailed. The subtle objections, and dangerous half-truths of the Tridentine divines, were the occasion of a more accurate statement of the doctrine

of justification by faith without works, than is to be found in the ancient church. Indeed, a clear, coherent, and fundamental presentation is one of the strongest arguments. Power of statement is power of argument. It precludes misrepresentations. It corrects misstatements. Hence, we find that the Defences of Christianity embody a great amount of philosophical expansion of Scripture doctrine; so that the history of Apologies is oftentimes, to a great extent, the history of the influence of philosophy upon Christianity." Vol. i. p. 31.

The author gives a fine illustration of what we have been saying, while he sets forth his own method, which is mainly that of "Special Dogmatic History," or the history of individual doctrines. We should be glad to quote, but have room only to refer the reader to pages 33, 34, of vol. i.

In these volumes the author precedes his history of individual Christian doctrines, by the history of Apologetics, and of philosophy in its relation to and influence upon Christian doctrines. He follows it with a history of Symbols, which concludes his work; the body of which is occupied with the analysis of the historical development of particular doctrines.

As the several formulas of doctrine are best understood in the light of their historical genesis in guarding the truth against opposing errors, so that historian is best qualified to understand and explain this historical evolution, who, *ceteris paribus*, has had most personal experience of the antagonistic relations between these truths and their correspondent errors. He will best appreciate the doctrine of atonement and justification as exhibited in the Symbols of the Reformation, who has lived amidst and been called to combat the contrary errors; and all the more so, if in his own personal experience and thinking, he has been led to work his way out of such errors into the clear light of the glorious gospel of the blessed God. Dr. Shedd, with eminent scholarship, with the studies demanded in the chair of ecclesiastical history, which he filled many years with such honour to himself and advantage to the church, with a mind apt by nature and early training for metaphysical and dogmatic insight and discrimination, with a keen relish for doctrinal discussion, and the most solemn earnestness in his convictions of the importance of doctrinal truth—with these

and other qualifications for his task—combines that to which we have just referred. He has lived in a region which boasts of great improvements in the church theology he vindicates and loves. We find no trace of the so-called New England Theology in his book; and so far as this theology boasts peculiarities, the counter-points of catholic doctrine are boldly and sharply set forth by him. We know little of the relation of these matters to his personal experience, beyond what may be indicated by the foregoing facts, and by his intense earnestness.

The superiority of the author's method of historico-doctrinal analysis to the methods which have generally been in vogue, is evident. Most historians of doctrine have also mingled with it all other matters pertaining to the progress, organization, and vicissitudes of the church. They have followed the order of time in their treatment of the whole. They have treated continuously of doctrine only so far as it characterized the period under review, and then have left it to record all else belonging to the history of the church during that period. Of course, this gives only a fragmentary and confused view of the unfolding of any particular doctrine. Others, who are historians of doctrine only, conduct the thread of their narrative according to centuries or periods, rather than by the course of particular doctrines as they are severally evolved into creed-formulas in successive ages. They treat of *all* the doctrines as they are connected with each period, before they pass on to the next period. This method is measurably exposed to the same objections as the last-mentioned. The treatment of each doctrine is necessarily a series of fragments, separated from each other by the accompanying matter interposed in regard to other doctrines. No clear and complete view is presented of the progress and vicissitudes of any one doctrine, until it reached a form of statement with which the mind of the church, as a whole, has been permanently satisfied. By far the most thorough and satisfactory method is that adopted by the author, of treating each doctrine by itself, tracing its development through successive controversies with antagonistic heresies, until it reached its fixed form, which parried the thrusts of adversaries, and satisfied the theological mind, as being an adequate summation of scriptural doctrine.

We have spoken of the "development" of Christian doctrine. Development is a favourite idea of our author. It is in this light that he contemplates all history, especially church history, and the history of Christian doctrine. He is, however, careful to repudiate the modern German pantheistic doctrine of development, in all its forms. Development has no relation to the Infinite and Absolute, who is evermore perfect, and is, therefore, *ex vi termini*, incapable of development. He is not, like the Absolute of the pantheists, a mere "potentiality," to be developed in man and nature. Development, according to Dr. Shedd, pertains only to created things, which are capable of imperfection and immaturity. Creation mostly produces germs which are ceaselessly evolving into actuality what is potentially enfolded in them. But inasmuch as God is good, and creates only that which is good, how are sin and evil evolved from what he creates? The answer is, that sin is not the creation of God, but of the free will of man. Thus was interpolated an alien and abnormal germ into humanity, which is in constant development, and bringing forth fruit unto death. To counterpoise and neutralize this pernicious development of sin, God has introduced a supernatural force among men, which is continually working itself out in the redemption and salvation of men from sin and the curse. These germinant forces, however, do not, as we understand our author, evolve themselves in any such changeless or fatalistic uniformity as to preclude God's providential government of the world, or his sovereignty in the administration of grace.

So far as doctrinal development is concerned, Dr. Shedd carefully guards against the idea of adding to the teachings of Scripture. The sum and substance of all Christian doctrine is to be found in the sacred volume. But to gather up its manifold representations into one whole, which shall set forth all, and contradict nothing, that is essential in these representations, is often the work of ages, consummated only after long and dire conflicts with opposing heresies. This is the only doctrinal development for which our author contends.

Dr. Shedd begins by tracing the mutual relations of philosophy and Christianity. He shows that it is vain to ignore this relation; that men will philosophize and inquire what truths

are witnessed by the light of nature, by consciousness, sense, and reason; and that this philosophy must ever tend to an accordance with their religious convictions, since truth cannot contradict truth, and the human mind cannot be brought to accept contradictions. Hence philosophy will either control or be controlled by men's acceptance and interpretations of Scripture. The course of Christian doctrine will depend largely upon the type of philosophy dominant for the time being, and the degree and manner in which they interpenetrate each other.

The author assigns to the systems of Plato and Aristotle a paramount influence and ascendancy in the apostolic and all subsequent periods marked by decided doctrinal development. And they have been antiquated only by systems that have sprung from them by lineal derivation, so far as the latter have exerted any formative influence on the modes of stating, defending, and explaining catholic doctrine. Of course, Dr. Shedd does not allow to philosophy any authority in matters of Christian doctrine that is original, paramount, decisive, or coordinate with revelation. When Scripture and philosophy conflict, of course the latter is convicted of error by infallible authority, and must yield. But as Scripture must be interpreted in accordance with known and indisputable truth—as a true philosophy supports, and a false philosophy antagonizes with all other truth, natural and revealed—it follows logically, as it has been found historically, that a certain class of philosophical principles have generally prevailed in connection with a sound theology. We do not go quite the length of our author in regarding Platonism as forming the base of this Christian, or as Turretin calls it, “regenerate philosophy.” Its supersensual and spiritual element gives it a more friendly relation to Christianity than Epicureanism, while, nevertheless, this element is overstrained so as to make body intrinsically evil, and the great source of evil. Probably Plato's realism is the important matter with Dr. Shedd, as furnishing that philosophic solution of the race sinning in Adam's sin, which he evidently has fixed upon as the church view, and true view, of that subject. There is no doubt that something like this was at times apparently advanced by Augustin, and entered con-

siderably into orthodox anthropology, until the advance of the Protestant reformation, which had for its special doctrinal mission, to unfold and formulate the doctrines of sin and grace, particularly as regards their origin, and their responsible, legal, and judicial relations.

We think the author rather fully estimates the influence of Locke over English and American theology, until a recent period. That influence was undeniably felt, not for good, but for evil. But we quite disagree with him in regarding the Scotch school as in any sense retaining the system of Locke, and counteracting its virus by a loose interpretation. On the contrary, as represented by Reid, its founder, this school is in direct and avowed opposition to Locke's sensuous system.

We are glad to observe the just and discriminating view which the author gives of Mysticism, in both its potencies, as related to extreme speculative subtlety, to orthodoxy, and to practical piety, especially on pages 79, 80.

Dr. Shedd, of course, attributes to Aristotle the predominant influence during the mediæval scholastic period, in which dialectic subtleties so largely anatomized the great living ideas and truths of morals and religion till they perished, and gave place to the legion of cadaverous entities and quiddities brought forth in their place. During this period, according to Dr. Shedd, the prevailing philosophy had Aristotelianism for its base, with some infusion of Platonism, and was Aristotelo-Platonism. During the healthier periods which preceded and followed the scholastic era, it was Platonism with a tincture from Aristotle, Platonico-Aristotelianism—idealism systematized and regulated by logical order and precision, and dialectic forms filled with the content of Platonic ideas. This is Dr. Shedd's ideal, if we may not say of Christian philosophy, at least, of a philosophy favourable to Christianity. And undoubtedly it is more so than the exclusive and overbearing predominance of either of these systems. The virtue of metaphysical and ethical distinctions in shaping the construction of formulas, so as to express the various elements of Christian doctrine, clear of contradictions, and invulnerable to the shafts of adversaries, is happily illustrated by our author, in the instance of the *Symbolum cuiuscumque*, ascribed, and probably with justice, to

Athanasius. We barely refer the reader to volume i. pp. 72, 73.

The author's estimate of German philosophy, theology, and especially of Schleiermacher, have importance and interest for various reasons. After saying that pantheism destroys the foundations, not merely of revealed religion, but of all religion, by affirming that God is the only substance, and the only Being, and that all that has been, is, and ever shall be, is his self-evolution and manifestation, he proceeds thus:

“On looking at the scientific theology of Germany, during the present century, we find it modified by both of these two great philosophical tendencies. The two systems of theism and pantheism have been conflicting in this highly speculative country, with an energy and intensity unequalled in the history of philosophy; so that the theological mind of Germany exhibits a remarkable diversity of opinions and tendencies. Even in the anti-rationalistic or spiritual school, this same opposition between the historical Theism and Spinozism is to be seen. The theology of Schleiermacher, which has exerted a great influence upon classes that disagree with it—upon the Rationalist on the one hand, and the Supernaturalist on the other, and upon all the intermediates between these—is characterized by a singular heterogeneity of elements. Its founder was a diligent student of Plato, and an equally diligent student of Spinoza. Hence, while we find in this system, a glowing and devout temper that is favourable to a living theism, and a vital Christianity, we also find *principles* that are subversive not merely of revealed but of natural religion. In fact, this system presents, in one respect, the most remarkable phenomenon in the whole history of theology and philosophy—the phenomenon of a system mainly pantheistic, instrumental at a particular crisis in the history of a national mind, in turning its attention to the more distinctively spiritual and evangelical doctrines of Christianity. Having served this purpose, however, its work is done, and it cannot, as the course of thinking now going on in Germany itself plainly indicates, continue to satisfy the wants of the theological mind, but must either be adopted in all its logical consequences, and thereby become the destruction of evangelical religion, or else be rejected and left behind, in that further

progress towards, and arrival at New-Testament Christianity, which it was instrumental, by a logical inconsistency however, in initiating.

“The final judgment, consequently, in respect to the real worth and influence of the philosophic movement of the German mind, must be held in reserve, until the final issue appears. The estimate which the future historian will form of it, will be determined according as the German Church of the future shall draw nearer to the symbols of the Reformation, or shall recede further from them.” Vol. i. pp. 98—100.

Passing on to theology proper, we can barely refer to the author's ingenious defence of Anselm's ontological argument for the being of a God. We cannot see our way clear from the mere idea of a perfect and necessary being to his actual existence. We require other evidence, which is so abundant and overpowering both within and without us, that only the “fool hath said in his heart, there is no God.”

With regard to the attributes of God, we find that our author is profound and discriminating. He justly observes, what we think must soon attract increasing attention, as undeniably and deplorably true in the first eight centuries: “Phraseology was, however, sometimes employed by orthodox teachers themselves, that would be pantheistic if employed by an acknowledged pantheist.” P. 225. We will add that such phraseology did not cease with the expiration of that period. It abounds in later writers, such as Aquinas and the scholastic theologians. Not being among the disputed points of the Reformation, some of it was taken up inconsiderately by many reformed divines, and was not entirely eliminated from the lucid, precise, and profound works of Turretin. In the lights and shades thrown upon this subject from revelation and the dark background of modern pantheism, we are satisfied that some phrases which have passed current with many standard theologians, will require to be revised, and either amended or expurgated. Dr. Shedd well observes:

“As theological science advanced, however, it was perceived that the essence of the Deity cannot safely be contemplated apart from his attributes. The essence is *in* the attributes, and the attributes *in* the essence, and consequently Christian

science must seize both ideas at once, and hold them both together. This led to the examination and exhibition of the Divine attributes, as *real* and *eternal* characteristics of the Deity.

“We cannot follow out the development of thought upon the Divine attributes; for this would require their being taken up one by one, and their history exhibited through the various periods. A single remark, only, can be made at this point. In proportion as the attributes have been discussed in connection with the essence of the Deity, has the doctrine of God been kept clear from pantheistic conceptions. In proportion, on the contrary, as speculation has been engaged with the essence of the Godhead, to the neglect or non-recognition of the attributes in which this essence manifests itself, has it become pantheistic. It is impossible for the human mind to know the Deity abstractly from his attributes. It may posit, i. e., set down on paper, an unknown ground of being, like the unknown x in algebra, of which nothing can be predicated, and may suppose that this is knowing the absolute Deity. But there is no such dark predicateless ground; there is no such Gnostic abyss. The Divine nature is in and with the attributes, and hence the attributes are as deep and absolute as the nature.” Vol. i. pp. 240—1.

On the subject of the Trinity, the author finds no trace of the Christian doctrine in pagan writers, and utterly repudiates the Socinian pretence of its being borrowed from Plato. He also maintains the doctrine of the Nicene creed, in all its fulness, including the eternal generation of the Son and procession of the Spirit, and shows, beyond a peradventure, that it has been so uniformly the doctrine of the post-Nicene church, that the exceptions, outside of Unitarians and within the pale of the church, are too slight to deserve serious notice. For proof of this we deem it unnecessary to do more than to refer the reader to his very extended and thorough historical review of this subject. In regard to the opposition which the doctrine of eternal generation has encountered in New England, he barely remarks, in a foot-note, which we give below.*

* This foot-note is as follows, on p. 383. “The Nicene trinitarianism came with the English and Continental colonists into the American churches. The

While Dr. Shedd ably vindicates the thorough church doctrine of the Trinity without qualification, there are one or two solutions or explications, which he either propounds or appears to approve, that call for a word of criticism. We think the following has some look of explaining the oneness of substance in the three persons of the Godhead by the realistic theory, and shows that the want of precision in the use of certain terms, so common even in standard writers on this subject, has not been wholly avoided by the rigidly logical and metaphysical mind of Dr. Shedd.

“The Father and Son are of one and the same uncreated and infinite essence, even as the human father and son are of one and the same created and finite essence. The participation in the same identical nature or essence, or, in the Nicene phrase, the consubstantiality (*ὁμοούσιον*), places the first and second persons in the Godhead in the same class or grade of being. Both are equally divine, because they share equally in the *substance* of deity; as, in the sphere of the finite, both father and son are equally human, because participating equally in the *substance* of humanity. The category of substance determines the grade of being. That which is of a divine substance is divine; and that which is of a human substance is human. And the mere relationship in each case—the mere being a father, and the mere being a son—

Episcopalian church adopts it, in adopting the Thirty-nine Articles. The Presbyterian church receives it in the Westminster Confession; as did also the early Congregational churches. The churches of New England, represented in the Synod at Boston in 1680, made their statement in the following phraseology: ‘In the unity of the Godhead there be three persons, of one substance, power, and eternity; God the Father, God the Son, and God the Holy Ghost. The Father is of none, neither begotten, nor proceeding; the Son is eternally begotten of the Father; the Holy Ghost eternally proceeding from the Father and Son.’ (Boston Confession, chap. ii.) An earnest defender of the Nicene doctrine of ‘eternal generation,’ is Samuel Hopkins, (Works, i. 293 sq.,) the leader of one of the later New England schools. The elder Edwards is also supposed to have left in manuscript reflections upon the doctrine of the trinity, in the line of the Nicene trinitarianism. During the present century, some opposition to the doctrine of the Eternal Sonship has shown itself in a few New England writers. The opposition, however, is founded upon an inadequate dogmatic-historical knowledge—the Origenistic theory of eternal generation, as revived in England in the last century by Samuel Clarke, being mistaken for the historical doctrine of Athanasius, and the Nicene theologians.”

does not in the least affect the grade or *species* of being to which each belongs. The human son is as truly a *man* as is the human father; and the Divine Son is as truly God as is the Divine Father. "We men," says Athanasius, "consisting of a body and a soul, are all *μίας φύσεως καὶ οὐσίας*, of one nature or essence; but we are many persons." Again, when his Anomoean opponent compares the Father, Son, and Spirit, to a bishop, presbyter, and deacon, Athanasius directs his attention to the fact that these latter have all the same nature, being each of them man.* Vol. i. pp. 342-3.

There are two or three terms that play an important part in this controversy, and in that respecting realism, whose ambiguity causes great confusion, unless understood and guarded against. The first of these is the word "same," which strictly denotes numerical identity or oneness, but is often used in the sense of similar. Thus we say, one man is of the same nature or substance with another, meaning that he is of similar nature, &c. Two houses are built of the same *i. e.* similar materials. This ambiguity sometimes extends to the word "identical," which is of stricter import than "same." This equivocal import of these terms would enable them to take in not only the *ὁμοούσιον* of the Athanasian creed, but the *ὁμοιούσιον* which it rejected, because the latter would let in Arianism, and not only that, but Tritheism. Then again, "essence" has its original metaphysical sense of substance or being, and its logical meaning of the essential marks (genus and specific difference) of a species. In the former sense, unity of essence means unity of substance. In the latter, it means those similar marks in a plurality of substances, which make them of one species or kind; as animality and rationality are the essence of manhood, or of the species man; four sides with the opposites parallel the essence of a parallelogram. Now, it is only in the second meaning of the word essence that "the

*Our Author says in a foot-note: "It should be added to this illustration of Athanasius, that the *whole* Nature or Essence is in the divine Person; but the human person is only a *part* of the common human nature. Generation in the Godhead admits no abscission or division of substance; but generation in the instance of the creature implies separation or division of essence. A human person is an individualized *portion* of humanity."

human father and son are of one and the same created and finite essence," *i. e.* they have similar marks which constitute the logical essence of humanity, but are different beings. But it is very clear that this is no proper or safe illustration of "consubstantiality" in the persons of the godhead; for thus they would become not only three persons, but three beings. And when he illustrates this consubstantiality by the statement that "both father and son are equally human, because participating equally in the *substance* of humanity;" this can be true only in a loose and unusual sense of the word *substance*, as equivalent to logical essence as above defined, in which case it would be obnoxious to the criticisms already made. Or, if substance be used in its strict and proper meaning, then it can be true only on the supposition that manhood is one numerical substance, by participation in which individuals become men. This is realism. If true, undoubtedly it would solve all difficulties in regard to the oneness of substance in the three persons of the godhead. If all human persons are one substance, much more are the Divine hypostases. But it is to be considered first, whether the realistic theory does not involve more difficulties than it removes—a question on which we may yet have somewhat to offer—and next, whether, if the consubstantiality of the divine persons be only such as subsists between men, the Trinity be not cleared of all that mystery which, from the first, friends and foes have agreed in attributing to it, and does not amount to tritheism.

We do not forget that our author, in the foot-note we have quoted, attempts the distinction between the unity of substance in the divine and human persons, that the former partake of the whole, the latter of a part of it. But if realism be true, every man is permeated by the one substance of humanity, which being one, can suffer no "abscission." If it be false, there is no one numerical substance common to all men, either partially or wholly.

We do not place strong reliance on the author's evolution of a Trinity, through the self-consciousness of the Deity, as giving us three eternal personal distinctions, or supposita in a subject-*ego*, an object-*ego*—and the union of the two—although he is far from being novel or singular in this view.

While we have noted these slight questionable points, they are as nothing compared with the great service which Dr. Shedd renders to the trinitarian cause, by his masterly analysis of the history of the doctrine, and the ability with which, on the whole, he maintains the church doctrine.

In his Christology, Dr. Shedd states clearly, and defends ably, the scriptural doctrine which the history of the church has only served to develop and confirm. He introduces his chapter on this subject with the following passage, which fully defines the true doctrine and its antagonistic heresies, while he goes on to show how, as the latter successively infested the church, they were exorcised, until the scriptural view of the Incarnation became the permanent catholic doctrine.

“Four factors are necessary in order to the complete conception of Christ’s Person: 1. True and proper deity; 2. True and proper humanity; 3. The union of deity and humanity in one Person; 4. The distinction of deity from humanity, in the one Person, so that there be no mixture of natures. If either of these is wanting, the dogmatic statement is an erroneous one. The heresies which originated in the Ancient Church took their rise, in the failure to combine all these elements in the doctrinal statement. Some one or more of these integral parts of the subject were adopted, while the others were rejected. The classification of the ancient errors in Christology will, therefore, very naturally follow the above enumeration.”
Vol. i. 392.

Although the author treats Anthropology next in order, and not without support of logic as well as usage, still Christology naturally links itself to Soteriology. And it will best suit our convenience, to say what little we have to offer upon his treatment of Soteriology first. There is little need of comment here, as his views on this whole subject are, with hardly a qualification, those of the Reformed symbols. If he varies anywhere, it is in not assigning the obedience, as distinguished from the sufferings of Christ, its due prominence in our justification.

The following in regard to the nature of the atonement, and the tardy evolution of the explicit definition of it in creed-formulas, is highly satisfactory, and all the more so from one

whose theological life and training have been in New England. The italics are the author's.

“Taking the term atonement in its technical signification, to denote *the satisfaction of Divine justice for the sin of man, by the substituted penal sufferings of the Son of God*, we shall find a slower scientific unfolding of this great cardinal doctrine than of any other of the principal truths of Christianity. Our investigations in this branch of inquiry will disclose the fact, that while the doctrines of Theology and Anthropology received a considerably full development during the Patristic and Scholastic periods, it was reserved for the Protestant church, and the Modern theological mind, to bring the doctrines of Soteriology to a correspondent degree of expansion.” Vol. ii. p. 205.

The Arminian, which is also the modern New England and New-school theory, and resolves the divine justice into benevolence, so making the atonement really a mere satisfaction of benevolence, is disposed of as follows.

“According to these positions, the sufferings of Christ were not a substituted penalty, but a substitute *for* a penalty. A substituted penalty is a strict equivalent, but a substitute *for* a penalty, may be of inferior worth, as when a partial satisfaction is accepted for a plenary one, by the method of acceptilation; or, as if the finite sacrifice of the lamb and the goat should be constituted by the will of God an offset for human transgression. And the term ‘satisfaction,’ also, is wrested from its proper signification, in that the sufferings of Christ are asserted to be a satisfaction of *benevolence*. ‘Our Lord satisfied . . . not the rigour and exactitude of divine justice, but the just and *compassionate* will of God,’—a use of language as solecistical as that which should speak of smelling a sound.” Vol. ii. pp. 373—4.

Two more extracts from our author's exceedingly valuable historical survey of this doctrine, one on justification, and another on the extent of the atonement, must suffice.

“The ‘justification of the *ungodly*,’ of which St. Paul speaks—*i. e.*, the judicial acquittal from condemnation of a soul that is still polluted with indwelling sin, and will be more or less until it leaves the body—cannot of course be founded upon

any degree of holiness that has been wrought within it by the Holy Spirit. It must rest altogether upon an outward and finished work, namely, the atoning suffering of the Son of God. This *declarative* act of God, whereby, on the ground of the objective satisfaction made to law by the Redeemer, he forgives the past, must be carefully distinguished from the subjective transforming work of God in the soul, whereby he secures its holiness in the future." Vol. ii. pp. 256, 257.

The remaining extract occurs in his analysis of the controversy between the Arminians and the Synod of Dort, relative to the extent of the atonement. The author does not expressly declare which view he adopts. But the manner in which he puts the arguments of the respective parties shows unmistakably the drift of his own convictions.

"The Arminians held that the atonement of Christ is intended for all men alike, and indiscriminately. As matter of fact, however, it saves only a part of mankind. The reason why the atonement does not save all men alike and indiscriminately, lies in the fact that the will of the finally lost sinner defeats the divine intention. There is no such degree of grace as is irresistible to the sinful will. The effectual application of the atonement, therefore, depends ultimately upon the decision of the sinner's will, and this decision in the case of the lost defeats the divine purpose. In opposition to this view, the Dort Synod held that the atonement, though sufficient in value for the salvation of all men, was intended only for those to whom it is effectually applied, viz., the elect. The Holy Spirit possesses a power that is irresistible, in the sense that it can subdue the obstinacy of any human will, however opposed to God. Hence, the application of the atonement depends ultimately, not upon the sinner's decision, but the divine determination to exert special grace. There is, therefore, no defeat of the divine intention, and the atonement saves all for whom it was intended." Vol. ii. 496, 497.

Dr. Shedd treats of regeneration under the head of Anthropology.

In regard to regeneration, our author thoroughly repudiates all theories which militate against its being exclusively the work of the Holy Ghost. Contrary choice, synergism, all

grades of ability in man for self-regeneration, or any part thereof, find no favour with him. And he writes with an earnestness and clearness which betray an experimental, not less than a speculative ground. We will not detain the reader with further remark on this subject, but refer him to the work itself. We shall confine ourselves in the residue of this article to the author's speculative and historical analysis of the doctrine of Original Sin.

On the subject of original sin, native corruption, and inability, as on other subjects, Dr. Shedd's opinions appear more in the manner in which he portrays historical controversies than in his own express avowals. It is inevitable that a writer should be able and willing to put doctrines which he believes, and the arguments for them in a stronger light than the contrary. He believes, and therefore he speaks. He is likely to apprehend his own doctrine and the reasons of it more fully than its rejecters, and the opposite side more imperfectly than those who embrace it. In this way, the reader feels no doubt with which set of opinions Dr. Shedd is in sympathy, or to which of them he would be glad to win assent. According to this criterion, Dr. Shedd takes the highest ground with regard to the native inherent corruption, and spiritual impotency of man. He also maintains that the race fell in the first sin of the first man; that this sin sustains a real causative relation to the corruption of the race, because it was the sin of the race, in such a sense that the race is justly condemned, and abandoned to the bondage of a sinful nature, as a natural and penal consequence. All this abundantly appears not only in these volumes, but in other publications of the author. It is further to be said, that he holds the inherent native sinfulness and impotency of man, not only on speculative grounds, but in the interest of a deeper religious experience than consists with Pelagian and Arminian theories. Moreover, all his theories in regard to the manner of the fall of our race in Adam, by virtue of that kind of race-unity which he maintains, and we are about to discuss, are held in the hope of conciliating with philosophy the testimonies of Scripture and religious experience in regard to the depth, sinfulness, and obduracy of our inherent native dispositions.

The chief question of moment between him and us relates to the kind of union, in virtue of which Adam's sin was accounted and treated as the sin of the race. We hold that we sinned in Adam, as he was our federal head and representative, and acted in our "room and stead;" that his act was therefore ours representatively; that thus it was imputed to us, and is the ground of our original guilt, and condemnation, and abandonment by God to that loss of communion with him, whence came the loss of original righteousness, and the corruption of our whole nature, whereby "we are utterly indisposed, disabled, and made opposite to all good," and whence "do proceed all actual transgressions." The theory of "race-unity" by which the author explains our participation in Adam's sin, is the realistic, or that the manhood common to Adam and his descendants is one substance, so that when he sinned the race sinned. At least, this is exhibited as the theory of those defenders of original sin who are signalized and made prominent, and which is itself presented in its utmost strength, in this work. The other system, which is not only ours, but that of the leading Reformed, Puritan, and Calvinistic divines and creeds, since the theological mind of the Reformation fully developed the judicial relations of sin and redemption, is scarcely exhibited; indeed, we should judge, very imperfectly apprehended by the author. The theory presented in the strongest and most favourable light in this work, will be seen in the extracts we shall make from his sketches of the anthropology of Augustin and Anselm, which, in view of the following at the conclusion of his sketch of the latter, may not unjustly be taken as a fair exponent of the author's theories on the subject.

"The harmony of Anselm's doctrine of original sin with that of Augustin is apparent. Had the anthropology of the mediaeval church been shaped by the profound contemplations of Anselm, instead of the superficial speculations of Lombard—had the archbishop of the then unknown and insignificant see of Canterbury been accepted by the Latin church as its leader and thinker, instead of the Master of Sentences—the history of the Western church would have been that of a gradual purification and progress, instead of a gradual corruption and decline." Vol. ii. pp. 138, 139.

Augustin's theory is thus stated, vol. ii. pp. 77 et seq.

"These passages, which might be multiplied indefinitely, are sufficient to indicate Augustin's theory of generic existence, generic transgression, and generic condemnation. The substance of this theory was afterwards expressed in the scholastic dictum, '*natura corrumpit personam*,'—human *nature* apostatizes, and the consequences appear in the human *individual*. In the order of nature, *mankind* exists before the generations of mankind; the *nature* is prior to the individuals produced out of it. But this human nature, it must be carefully noticed, possesses all the attributes of the human individual; for the individual is only a portion and specimen of the nature. Considered as an essence, human nature is an intelligent, rational, and voluntary essence; and accordingly its agency in Adam partakes of the corresponding qualities. Hence, according to Augustine, generic or original sin is truly and properly sin, because it is moral agency.

"The Manichaean theory that sin is a substance created, and infused into man by creative power, Augustin refuted and combated with all the more energy, because he had at one time been entangled in it. Hence, he was careful to teach that original sin itself, as well as the actual transgressions that proceed from it, is moral agency. But in order to agency there must be an agent; and since original sin is not the product of the individual agent, because it appears at birth, it must be referred to the generic agent—*i. e.*, to the human *nature* in distinction from the human *person*, or individual. Hence the stress which he laid upon the act of transgression in Adam. At this point in the history of man, he could find a common agent, and a common agency; and only at this point. Ever after, there are only portions or individualizations of the nature, in the series of generations. This one common agent yields him the one common agency which he is seeking. In this manner, original sin is voluntary agency, as really as actual sin is—the difference between the two being only formal. Both are equally the product of human will; but original sin is the product of human will as yet unindividualized in Adam, while actual sin is the product of human will as individualized in his posterity."

Anselm's Realism is thus described by Dr. Shedd: "In

Anselm's theory, the species is an entity as truly as the individual. For him, the universal has *objective* existence, and is not a mere name for the collective aggregate of particulars. The human 'nature' is prior to the individuals that are produced from it, and is as substantially existent as they are. For the individuals are only the nature *distributed*; they are the 'species' metamorphosed into persons. The 'nature,' therefore, is not the collective aggregation of individuals; for in this case the nature is not an entity,—it is only the name given to the aggregation of particular individuals, and the only entity is the individual. On the contrary (according to the theory of Realism), the nature is a primary entity, having real existence, which is metamorphosed by distribution into a multitude of individual persons." P. 117.

The quotation which follows, with much more equally pronounced, shows the application of this realistic doctrine by Anselm to the explication of original sin.

"That only is imputed to all men which *all* men have committed; and the only sin which *all* men have committed is that one sin which they committed when they were all '*ille unus homo*,' one human nature, in the first human pair.

"Thus, in Anselm's anthropology, as in Augustin's, everything starts from the *original unity of the human race*. If this idea is not conceded, the whole doctrine of original and transmitted sin, as Anselm constructs it, falls to the ground. Original sin is original agency; but original agency supposes an original agent; and this original agent is the whole human nature undistributed and unindividualized, in distinction from this or that individualized part of it. Original sin, coming into existence by the single primitive act of apostasy, is then transmitted along with the nature, from generation to generation—the generation being so many individualizations of the common humanity. The first pair of individuals are created, and contain the substance of the entire race, both upon the spiritual and the physical side. All the posterity, as individualizations, are propagated, not created. Herein consists the possibility of a transmission of sin from the first human pair, to the whole posterity, and also of a transmission of holiness." • P. 120.

The theory thus clearly and undeniably found in Anselm, (but not without question as to interpretation, to be acknowledged as the mature and steadfast doctrine of Augustin,) Dr. Shedd considers to be characteristic of the Protestant anthropology. He says,

“The Reformers constructed their doctrines of sin and regeneration after the same general manner with Augustin and Anselm; so that the somewhat minute account which we have given of the Augustinian and Anselmic anthropologies renders a detailed representation of the Protestant anthropology unnecessary.” P. 152.

On this we think proper to say just here; 1. Although Augustin firmly maintained such a union of Adam and his posterity in reference to the first sin, that they so sinned in him as justly to suffer the punishment of his sin, yet he was far from having developed into clearness, consistency, and stability his view of the nature of this union, whether it were federal and representative, or a realistic and numerical oneness. Thus Turretin at once interprets Augustin, and gives his own view as to the natural oneness of our race, and whether it is such that realism or federal representation explains the manner of our sinning in Adam. “Ut Adamus esset persona publica et repræsentativa, non necesse fuit, ut munus illud a nobis ipsi demandaretur, ut tam nostro quam suo nomine ageret; sufficit intercessisse justissimam Dei ordinationem secundum quam voluit Adamum esse stirpem et Caput totius Generis humani, qui ideo non sibi tantum, sed et suis bona acciperet, vel amitteret; unde omnes dicuntur fuisse unus homo. ‘Quicumque,’ inquit August. ep. 106, ‘ex illo uno multi in seipsis futuri erunt, in illo uno, unus homo erant,’ unitate *non specifica, vel numerica, sed partim unitate originis, quia omnes ex uno sunt sanguine, partim unitate repræsentationis, quia unus omnium personam repræsentabat, ex ordine Dei.*” *Loc. ix. Quæst. 9.*

2. It follows that nothing can be inferred from the frequent reference in the Reformation theologians and symbols to Adam's being the root and natural head of his posterity, or to their being seminally in his loins, and other like phraseology, against their holding to representation and denying realism in the premises. We see that this is done by Turretin, in the

same paragraph in which he expressly denies the numerical or realistic, and asserts the representative oneness of Adam and his descendants. And this often occurs in other writers and creeds that avow precisely the same principles. This remark applies especially to the *Formula Consensus Helvetici*, composed by Turretin, Heidegger, and others, in opposition to Joshua Placæus's theory of mediate imputation, and quoted by Dr. Shedd on pages 158, 159, which we will soon notice more particularly. 3. It is proper to add, that like Augustin, some of the Reformation divines, especially before the Protestant theological mind had worked out their theology to its full development, have a wavering, indeterminate style of expression, which simply shows that they had not very fully examined and settled the kind of oneness with Adam which was the ground of the imputation of his sin; and that nothing conclusive on this point can be inferred from their statements. Conspicuous among these was Calvin.

We are bound to add, that Dr. Shedd evinces a less satisfactory acquaintance with the Reformed doctrine of representation in Adam, and consequent imputation of his sin, and the terms related thereto, than is usual with him on historico-theological points. Thus he translates *culpa* and *reatus* in the *Formula Concordiæ*, the first "guilt," and the second "crime." We will now look at his analysis of the *Formula Consensus Helvetici*, which he justly says, in regard to sin and grace, contains "statements that are more exhaustive and scientific than that of any of the other creeds drawn up by the Reformed or Calvinistic theologians," as well as the "most clear and specific;" also at his analysis of the system of Placæus, which this *Formula* was framed especially to repel.

Dr. Shedd says, "the imputation of the effects of Adam's apostacy, Placæus denominated 'mediate;' while the imputation of the apostatizing act itself, or of the cause of these effects, he called 'immediate.'" P. 159. As we understand it, it is agreed on all hands that the imputation of the effects of Adam's sin, *i. e.*, of inherent and actual sin in his descendants to the subjects of it, is immediate. How can it be otherwise? The question, as stated by Placæus himself in the passage quoted from him by Dr. Shedd immediately below the fore-

going is, whether the imputation of Adam's sin is immediate, or mediate; *i. e.*, antecedently and without regard to personal hereditary sin; or "mediately, *i. e.*, through the medium of hereditary inward corruption;" in other words, whether, in consequence of such corruption, we are regarded as either virtually sanctioning, or being equally criminal as if we had personally committed, Adam's sin; and so, on this ground, or through this medium, it is mediate imputed to us. Immediate imputation Placæus rejects; mediate, he maintains.

"In opposition to this theory of 'mediate' imputation," says Dr. Shedd, "the Formula Consensus makes the following statements," a part of which only we have room to quote:

"As God entered into a covenant of works with Adam, not only for himself, but also with the whole human race in him as its head and root, so that the posterity who were to be born of him would inherit the same integrity with which he was created, provided he should continue in it; so Adam by his sad fall sinned not for himself only, but for the whole human race who were to be born 'of blood and the will of the flesh,' and lost the blessings promised in the covenant. We are of opinion, therefore, that the sin of Adam is imputed to all his posterity by the secret and just judgment of God. For the apostle testifies that 'in Adam all have sinned,' 'by the disobedience of one man many were made sinners,' and 'in Adam all die.' . . . Thus it appears, that original sin, by a strict discrimination, is two-fold, and consists of the imputed guilt of Adam's transgression and the inherent hereditary corruption consequent upon this. For this reason, we are unable to assent to the view of those who deny that Adam represented his posterity by the ordinance of God, and, consequently, deny that his sin is *immediately* imputed to them, and who, under the notion of a 'mediate' and consequent imputation, not only do away with the imputation of the first sin, but also expose the doctrine of innate and hereditary corruption itself to grave peril."

The following is a part of Dr. Shedd's comment on this, which seems clear enough of itself.

"According to this statement of Turretin and Heidegger, mediate imputation must rest upon immediate; and *both* impu-

tations must be asserted.* They did not consider it conformable to justice, to impute an effect without imputing the cause. The posterity could not properly be regarded as guilty for their inward corruption of heart and will, unless they were guilty for that primal Adamic act of apostacy which produced this corruption. . . . The Adamic sin itself must, therefore, be imputable to the posterity, in order to legitimate the imputation of its consequences. And, furthermore, this act, they imply, must be imputed upon *real* and not nominal grounds. The imputation of Adam's sin must not be a 'gratuitous' imputation, for this would yield only a 'gratuitous' condemnation. Righteousness may be imputed when there is no righteousness; but sin cannot be imputed when there is no sin. 'David describeth the blessedness of the man unto whom God *imputeth righteousness* without works: saying, Blessed are they whose *iniquities are forgiven*, and whose *sins are covered*. Blessed is the man to whom the Lord *will not impute sin*.' Rom. iv. 6—8. The imputation of righteousness when there is no inherent and real righteousness, according to this explanation of St. Paul, is simply the forgiveness of iniquity, or the non-imputation of sin. It is a gratuitous imputation, and a gratuitous justification. But when Placæus proposed to carry the doctrine of a gratuitous imputation, such as holds true of Christ's righteousness, over to Adam's sin, and proposed to impute the Adamic guilt without any real and inherent demerit upon the part of the posterity, in the same manner that the righteousness of Christ is imputed without any real and inherent merit upon the part of the elect, Turretin and Heidegger opposed him. The doctrine of a gratuitous justification is intelligible and rational; but the doctrine of a gratuitous damnation is unintelligible and absurd. Hence the Formula Consensus taught that 'man previous to the commission of any single or 'actual' transgression, is exposed to the divine wrath and curse from his very birth, . . . first, on account of the

* The author has the following also in a foot-note:

"Turretin also asserts both imputations in his Institutes, upon two grounds, viz., the *natural* union between Adam and his posterity, and the *political* or *forensic* union whereby he is 'the representative of the whole human race.'"

transgression and disobedience *which he committed in the loins of Adam.*' The posterity must be really, and not fictitiously, in the person of the progenitor, in order that they may be 'immediately' and justly charged with a common guilt." Pp. 159—163.

Here it is to be noted again, that Dr. Shedd carries the idea that two imputations are in question, that of the "cause" and the "effect" of Adam's sin, (which, agreeably to his theory, he always calls the "Adamic sin,") and the inherent hereditary corruption of his descendants resulting from it. Now we have known of no dispute about the latter, unless as against Pelagianizing controvertists, certainly not among reformed theologians. The only question about the imputation of sin to men, respects Adam's sin; whether it is to be imputed at all; and if so, whether that imputation is mediate or immediate. The latter was the only question among the reformed theologians. There can be no doubt on which side this was settled by their most authoritative creeds, especially when interpreted by the writings of their framers and recognised expositors and defenders. We know not why Turretin is said to have maintained two imputations. Certainly he held that on the ground of his being the natural as well as federal head of the race, Adam's sin was, representatively, the sin of the race, and therefore imputed to them immediately. This is the only imputation in question between Turretin and Placæus—the only imputation arising either from his natural or forensic headship, and supported alike by both, or more especially by the latter as having its reason in the former. It cannot be that Dr. Shedd, as his language in one place implies, means that Turretin teaches a mediate and immediate imputation, which some have claimed to be proved by a mistranslation of the following passage, that expressly denies it: "*Illi cum quibus hic agimus, vel negant absolute imputationem, vel mediatam tantum admittunt; Nos vero cum Orthodoxis utrumque affirmamus, et dari imputationem, et eam esse immediatam et antecedentem.*" *Loc. ix. Quæst. 9.* Some have strangely construed this as if *utrumque* referred to both mediate and immediate imputation, which are mutual contradictories, whereas it plainly refers to what follows, for the purpose of explaining, viz., both that imputation is true, and

that it is immediate. A like misconstruction appears when the author says that "Placæus proposed to impute the Adamic guilt without any real and inherent demerit on the part of the posterity." This, as we understand it, is the exact opposite of Placæus's doctrine, which was that Adam's sin was imputed in view and in consequence of inherent corruption and demerit as the antecedent and meritorious ground. He represents Turretin as opposing this doctrine, which he attributes to Placæus; whereas the former held, as we have seen, that the sin and guilt of Adam were imputed immediately, and antecedently to such inherent corruption, and constituted the judicial ground of abandonment to such corruption. And it is thus imputed, because it is treated as the sin of the race on trial in the person of its first representative.

When Dr. Shedd represents Turretin as holding that the imputation of Adam's sin is "upon *real* not nominal grounds;" that it is not "gratuitous;" that "the posterity must be really, not fictitiously, in the person of the progenitor, in order that they may immediately and justly be charged with a common guilt;" if he means to imply that this great theologian held that they were so in Adam as to participate in his sin literally, or in a realistic sense, or otherwise than representatively; or that such a representation in him was not a reasonable and just ground of its imputation to them, we think the contrary has been abundantly shown. We hold that such a relation to Adam affords a ground of imputation which is neither unreal, unjust, gratuitous, nor fictitious.

We object to the realistic solution of the fall of our race in Adam, because, 1. We object to the doctrine of Realism itself, on general grounds. This doctrine we understand to be, that the unity of a class, species, or genus, consists not merely in the similarity of the objects composing it, whereby they are generalized and denoted by a common term, but in a numerical oneness of substance pervading them—so that the abstract terms denoting conceptions of what is common to the class, or, in other phrase, denoting universals, denote not only such conceptions, but real universal entities that are numerically single. So manhood, humanity, animality, denote severally one substance pervading respectively all men, or all animals, and

making them such. This not only destroys individual substances, and subverts all personal identity and responsibility, but, in its last analysis, logically terminates in one substance in the universe. For all lower classes may ultimately be generalized into one, the *summum genus*, *i. e.* being, which comprehends all things. Now, if the unity of a class consists in their being one substance, then all things are but one substance in manifold manifestations. What this amounts to, we need not say, except that it is what Dr. Shedd abhors, *ab imo pectore*.

2. If what Adam did the race did, because all men are, by virtue of a common manhood, one substance with him, then this applies not only to his first sin, but to all his subsequent sins, by necessary and inevitable consequence. Not only so, but the acts of all other parents become the acts of their descendants. In fact, the acts of each and every man become the acts of all men. Our readers have seen that Dr. Shedd tries to parry this inference by putting a difference between the first man, the first pair, and all their descendants. But so far as the present point is concerned it is unavailing. If Adam's posterity participated literally in his sin, because his act was the act of the entity manhood common to him and them, the same effect follows every act of every man by virtue of this same community of substance. This confounds and vacates personal identity and responsibility.

3. We object to this solution of the relation of Adam's sin to the sin of the race, because it reacts upon the relation of Christ's righteousness to our justification, in consequence of the parallel drawn by Scripture between the two, Rom. v. 15—19. If then the way in which Adam's sin avails to our condemnation be, that we literally committed it, or that it is ours inherently and personally, then the way in which the righteousness of Christ becomes ours is that, by a community of nature, it is ours personally and inherently. Thus subjective righteousness or personal holiness becomes the ground of justification. Such, in our view, are the logical and historical tendencies of this realistic solution of original sin, which make us afraid of it, and lead us to cling to that upon which the Reformers ultimately settled, and which appears in the federal, representative, and public character assigned to Adam in their sym-

bols, and more fully in their great theological treatises, to explain the sin and fall of the race in him.

Yet, if one can bear the realistic philosophy, it must be confessed that it has its charms as a solvent of many of the difficulties connected with the doctrine of original sin. It enables one to adopt, in their utmost literality of meaning, all phrases of Scripture in regard to the fall of the race in Adam; and in like manner the strongest language of our Confession and Catechisms, if we except the federal and representative office ascribed to him. But surely none can say with greater sincerity than the realistic Calvinist, "All sinned in him and fell with him in his first transgression." And they only, who have had a similar experience, can appreciate the attitude of mind of persons, who, like Dr. Shedd, have lived and moved and had their being in a region where original sin is widely decried, and the imputation of Adam's sin seldom spoken of, but as the climax of all absurdities. Those who have a Presbyterian training cannot understand the difficulty experienced by such persons in digesting the doctrine of imputation. When they come to those profounder scriptural and experimental views which radiate sin deeper and earlier than any conscious acts, by which character is formed in our present state, and look for a theory which will serve as a scientific frame for such views, the realistic hypothesis is extremely alluring. It seems to solve all difficulties, to conform, *quoad hoc*, to the language of Scripture and the creeds, to have the traditional dignity and authority given it by the adhesion of some of the greatest heathen philosophers, and Christian divines—and withal to be arrayed in the united charms of mysticism and philosophy. We speak what we do know, and testify what we have seen in the conflicts of personal experience. But it must be remembered, that nearly all that we have said of the attractions of Realism, on this account, might be said of Pantheism. That too, on some of the most high and difficult doctrines, can adopt *ex animo* the literal statements of the Scripture and the creeds. But it can adopt and does include a great deal more, utterly inconsistent with other portions of Scripture and the creeds. Similar in its degree is the objection to Realism in the various departments of theology.

Here we close our examination of this high work, on the whole, so creditable to the author's learning, piety, and doctrinal insight. It is because of our sense of its great excellence, and probable influence, and because it generally takes so high ground in behalf of thorough orthodoxy, that we have felt constrained to indicate what we deem its chief error. This error, indeed, pertains rather to the circumference than the centre of Christian doctrine. It is embraced by the author all the more earnestly, because he regards it as a powerful means of holding fast that centre—of keeping true to what is so fundamental in the Christian system as the doctrine of Original Sin, and its correlates, Divine Redemption and Regeneration. We reject it, as untrue in itself, and as fraught with contrary tendencies. Notwithstanding this drawback, the work is, as a whole, among the strongest promoters of high-toned orthodoxy, which has been of late given to the public. In its grand exhibition of standard scriptural and historical theology, it will shed great light upon some boastful but narrow provincial schemes that vainly aspire to supplant that theology.