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ART. I.—*The Doctrine of Perception, as held by Doctor Arnauld, Doctor Reid, and Sir William Hamilton.*

IT is our purpose in this article to offer a monograph upon one of the most limited questions in psychology. But inasmuch as the interest of the discussion must turn very much upon a particular controversy, and even on the opinions of an individual, we think it advisable to place at the beginning all that we have to say of a historical nature, in order that no details of fact may be left to embarrass us in recording the series of philosophical determinations. Working in a somewhat un-frequented field, we hope to be able to show, that in regard to the true doctrine of Immediate Perception, the great Jansenist was not only a successful co-worker, but that he approached singularly near a solution of the problem.

It is not quite ten years since we asked the attention of our readers to a special article on the Family of ARNAULD.* Our purpose at that time was not so much philosophical as theological and religious. But the good and ascetic recluses of Port-Royal des Champs also entertained themselves in spare moments with questions of metaphysic; and one of these now concerns us.

Let memory be refreshed by the statement, that Descartes was born in 1596, and died in 1650; that Arnauld was born in

* Princeton Review, 1849, pp. 467—502.

the joint action of any commission that could now be constituted by authority. But what is to become of the Bible Societies, with their numberless editions "without note or comment?" We will not alarm our readers by suggesting as a possible contingency, that these institutions may confine themselves hereafter to the collection of the necessary funds, and leave the printing of the Scriptures to the trade, and its distribution to be regulated by the churches. We make no such practical proposal, and express no wish upon the subject. But if the improvement of the authorized version should be found incompatible with actual arrangements, and the clamor for the former should grow louder, it may some day overbear the latter. But if this should not be so, we are prepared to see the authorized version circulated as it is, believing that with all its imperfections, it will do as little harm in future as it has in time past, and that while any tampering with its text would be like the letting out of water, fraught with error and confusion, truth contained in the existing version will to countless generations be found able (or sufficient) to make wise unto salvation.

ART. V.—*Morality and the State.* By SIMEON NASH. Columbus, Ohio: Follett, Foster & Co. Boston: Phillips, Sampson & Co. 1859.

MORALITY and the State! How noble the theme in itself, and how urgently requiring treatment at the hands of a master, with special reference to our own time and our own country! Amid the shameless venality and profligacy which scarcely try to veil themselves under the mask of a decent hypocrisy in our American politics, and which taint our national, state, and municipal legislation, the voice of a judge and civilian expounding and enforcing the obligations of morality in the state, seems like a living spring bubbling up in a stagnant pool.

The purpose of this book, therefore, commands our warmest sympathy. And we are happy to add, that the execution of

that portion of it which bears directly upon the subject indicated by the title, is, in many respects, successful. This portion is exclusively the latter half of the volume, beginning with chapter eighteen, on "Social Morality." Here the ethics of sociology, as applied to the family, to society, and the state, are discussed with vigour. The moral standard set up is lofty, and, at times, even severe. In defining details of duty, the author sometimes runs into extravagance and ultraism. Thus he strenuously insists that every "individual has a right to a portion of the earth; to a portion sufficient by the application of his labour to provide for his physical wants." If this means any thing more than that those who have no land, may take to themselves a portion of the earth's surface not yet appropriated by man, we see not how it can stop short of agrarianism. Besides, it is inconsistent with what he says of the right of property, as that which "cannot be limited in time; a right of disposition whether by sale or gift, whether to be delivered in his (the owner's) lifetime, or after his decease." No way can be devised by which property, and the right to dispose of it at pleasure, can consist with its universal distribution. The right to dispose of property is a right on the part of the improvident and unfortunate to transfer it to the prosperous and prudent; and it is the right of the latter class to keep for themselves and their heirs what they honestly acquire.

Again he says, "a thing is worth what it cost to make it, on the principle of paying labour a fair day's wages for a fair day's work, and capital a fair return. It is a sin to sell or buy at a less price." Such unqualified language as this refutes itself. A thousand cases may be supposed, and are of constant occurrence, in which it is a duty to buy and sell at less than cost.

"The same view strips slavery of all legality, of all justification, even of all apology. Slavery is inconsistent with the right of education, of moral culture, of free thought. Man is bound to all these; but slavery deprives him of these rights, forbids him to perform these duties," p. 298. Slavery is involuntary servitude, in which the law gives the master the title to the services of the slave, without his consent. But it is clear that all this may be without interfering with his right of suit-

able education, moral culture, or free thought. The law may guaranty all these rights to him while it makes him a slave. Or if the law comes short in this respect, the master may not. The above language of the book is in direct conflict with the Bible. It pronounces that a sin, in all circumstances, which the word of God treats as no sin in some circumstances. A super-scriptural morality is an infidel morality. It can do no good. It works evil and evil only in church and state. Abolitionism only binds the burdens and fetters it seeks to loose. It has yielded nothing as yet but the apples of Sodom and the clusters of Gomorrah. Its most significant achievements thus far, are open infidelity in its foremost leaders, and a school of extremists in opposition, who advocate slavery as the ideal form of society, and the slave-trade as a means of invigorating and perpetuating it.

While a certain radicalism of the kind we have indicated detracts from the value of the political part of the treatise, we are happy to say that it is largely compensated by a sound conservatism in other respects, and by a high moral tone, whereby it brings politics, in every aspect, attitude and relation, under the most stringent applications of Christian ethics. Judge Nash repudiates the popular infidel theories as to the origin of government, and the ground of its obligation. He rejects the social compact theory in all its forms. He denies that superior numbers, power, or the consent of the governed constitute the ground of the obligation to obey government. He takes the Christian ground, that it is the ordinance of God, and therefore, within its proper sphere, its ordinances bind the conscience by a divine authority. And so long as it duly fulfils its functions, the obligation to obey it holds, whatever be its form—monarchic, aristocratic, democratic, or mixed. The obligation to obey any government ceases, when it transcends its sphere, and commands us to disobey God. To obey it then is to abet a creature in his rebellion against the Creator. There is no room for doubt, when the only question is “whether we ought to obey God rather than man.” Yet, if one is conscience-bound to disobey human laws, in fealty to God, our author teaches, that he must quietly bear the penalty, committing his cause to him that judgeth righteously; unless when government

has become oppressive, to that degree that renders revolution both justifiable and feasible. All mere insurrections and rebellions are condemned, while the right of revolution is asserted, in cases where the people have outgrown their form of government, or are hopelessly oppressed by the reigning dynasty, and have the spirit and probable power to apply an adequate remedy by overturning it. According to our author, the state and its authority are one thing; the particular organization or persons by whom its authority may be exercised for good or evil, are another. The former always live without intermission. The latter may be changed for cause, either under the forms of law as in free governments, or in conformity to the behests of eternal justice, and the only end for which government of any sort ought to exist—as in the case of our own Revolution. We do not, however, endorse the opinion, more than once advanced by the author, that there can be no revolution, rebellion or other general uprising of the people, which is not stimulated by oppressions or grievances, such as either absolutely justify it, or would justify it, if it could succeed. We think history furnishes abundant examples of popular outbreaks stimulated by artful and aspiring leaders, where the oppression is slight or imaginary.

The earnestness and force with which Judge Nash insists that the state should subordinate all material interests to the moral and spiritual well-being of the people, in providing education, protecting and encouraging Christian institutions, in suppressing licentious and demoralizing publications, is well fitted to enlist that attention to these high themes, which they deserve and now urgently need. His vehement denunciation of that popular Political Economy which ignores man's spiritual and immortal nature, and treats of him as a being of exclusively material wants, is both deserved and needed. In all his utterances he is perfectly outspoken and uncompromising. While he insists on the duty of voting for the most upright and able men for all public offices and trusts, and on goodness as the most indispensable requisite in public officers, he urges upon good men the duty of accepting and discharging public office. The demagogue, the partisan, the mere politician as distinguished from the statesman, are held up to reprobation, with

indignant and excoriating eloquence; while he forcibly shows that the chief peril of democracy lies in ignorance and vice among the masses, combined with able, adroit and unprincipled leaders, who use them without scruple for their own aggrandizement. Of the partisan he says :

"He never has any opinions of policy but those which are considered popular; hence he never originates, but servilely follows. With him the question is not, what is right, what is best for national dignity and true progress; but what course will secure votes at the next election; what policy will keep him in office? . . . His speeches are not made to elucidate truth, to establish right, to enlighten the public mind, and advance great national interests; they look lower; their object is to secure a personal and party triumph at all hazards; hence the staple of them is crimination of all political opponents, and a studied effort to make the worse appear the better reason, to dash and perplex maturest counsels. His haunts are crowds and bar-rooms, and party-caucuses, and secret party meetings; he is more familiar with the cunning devices and tricks by which an election may be carried, than with the science of politics, or the nature of governments, or the manifold applications of political and moral truth." . . .

"Out of such men is constituted that party organization which seeks personal aims, not national good. They are envious of the really great and good; and hence combine to put them down by slanders, which may render them unpopular with the ignorant and the bad, unsuccessful at the polls. Party machinery is worked to prevent such men from occupying public positions, lest once there they cannot be displaced. . . . Against such minds, smaller and narrower minds ever conspire and plot, well knowing that their own success depends upon keeping all intellectual and moral suns below the horizon, so that mere political moons may become the light of humanity. They are right in their schemes; but their schemes are schemes of deceit, and fraud, and wickedness, tending to dwarf, instead of elevating the head and heart of a great people." pp. 395-7.

We are sorry that this is no fancy-sketch, but a true portrait of a large proportion of those who make politics their

vocation in this country, and worming their way into various offices of state, are contributing to debase the people, and degrade the government. In taking leave of the portion of the book which deals with the topic indicated by the title, while we regret the exaggerations and ultraisms which occasionally deform it, we appreciate its elevated and even intense ethical tone, and the sledge-hammer blows which it visits, with crushing effect, upon various noisome social and political corruptions.

The first half of the book is another matter. It does not treat, except incidentally, of "Morality and the State." It consists of a series of essays on Psychology, Metaphysics, Ethics, and Theology. It seems to us mostly out of place. Not that these topics are not implicated with political morality. They interlock with it in various points. So, in their way, do Physiology, Medicine, Logic, Physical Geography, whatever sheds light upon Anthropology, Sociology, or Theology, in any of their departments. It is impossible, however, in treating any one subject, to give formal treatises on all topics that mingle with it, or conduce to its illustration. Plain and unquestionable truths in other related sciences must be assumed and taken for granted. Debatable points must be ventilated as they arise in prosecuting the discussion of the principal theme, otherwise the disquisitions on related subjects overshadow the principal topic. They obstruct the way to it, tire the reader in his search for it, divert attention to irrelevant issues, and, at best, serve as an incumbrance to the main work. We think this is the effect of the author's method in this volume. We have no doubt that, so far as "Morality and the State" are concerned, the portion of the book which treats of it, would be far more widely read and influential, if it were published by itself, and eased of its preliminary burden of discussions philosophical and theological. We suspect, however, that, in the author's view, this would have been giving us the house without its frame or foundation, the appetizing condiment without the substantial nutriment, the chief thing to which the other is accessory. In other words, we fancy that he had the propagation of his philosophy and theology quite as much at heart, as his political and social ethics. We judge so from the position

and emphasis, and apparent elaboration, given these topics. Were this all, we should drop the matter here. But the philosophy and theology are of a peculiar stamp. They belong to a mode of thinking unknown in this country until a recent period. They are somewhat crude, but bold and vigorous specimens of a type of theologizing and philosophizing that has worked its way from Germany, mostly via France and England, to this country, and is now actively obtruding itself on the public mind from various quarters. We will proceed forthwith to show more definitely what we mean.

The following from the Preface will indicate the sources of the author's inspiration. "The two modern writers who have exerted and are still exerting upon the thinking minds of England and America more influence than all other writers, are Coleridge and Carlyle. Now, this patent fact could not exist unless these men, with all their errors, had got hold of some vital truths hitherto overlooked; some new views of humanity, not hitherto developed; views approved by consciousness, and hence the ground of their power."

The following also from the Preface, reveals, in some measure, the conscious animus or drift of the author in this work. "I have written this work with no feelings of hostility to *evangelical Christianity*; my object has rather been to reconcile its teachings with those of human consciousness. If, therefore, any reader discovers reasonings coming in conflict with his own cherished views, and sapping some of his venerated dogmas, let him not deal in hard and unkind epithets, but let him be assured that in my view there is here no vital conflict with the *truths* of revelation, only with the errors and dogmas enunciated by human minds." The italics are the author's. As any assailant of evangelical Christianity who was not an avowed infidel would be likely to try, in advance, to conciliate his Christian readers by writing in this strain, while no sincere defender of such Christianity would use such language, we are furnished, at the very threshold, with a clew to the real scope and purpose of the book. Before we go further, we take occasion to say, that Judge Nash wholly overestimates the influence of Coleridge and Carlyle on British and American thinking. It is undoubtedly considerable, and has been more considerable

than it now is, since the German philosophy which is filtrated through their writings, and is the source of most of their speculative novelties, is coming to be more fully and extensively understood. It is a great mistake to suppose that the immediate coterie or circle with which the author is conversant, constitute the mass of thinking minds that use the English tongue. There is no doubt that the influence of Dr. Mahan at Oberlin and Cleveland, and of Dr. Hickok at Hudson, have given this type of thinking a certain currency in parts of Ohio, and that through other agencies, it has obtained a foot-hold in some colleges and seminaries of the north-east and north-west. It has also struck more deeply and widely into the centres of learning and culture in this country than in Britain. Indeed it was in this country that this class of authors first found the ardent welcome, and admiring appreciation, that lifted them to the rank of guides and oracles. Their significance in the sphere of theology and philosophy in their own country, has not been so much indigenous, as a reflection from the oracular authority conceded to them by their American admirers. These, however, never amounted to more than a thin stratum among the various orders of our thinkers. They have, nevertheless, been forward and pretentious. They have pressed and obtruded their views with the earnestness of men who felt that they had a mission and a message; a body of new and precious truths to unfold to their fellow-men.

Among these are two late works, besides that here under review, significant both from their authors and their contents, which have simultaneously appeared to claim the attention of the public. We refer to Dr. Bushnell's "Nature and the Supernatural," and Dr. Hickok's "Rational Cosmology." We refer to them here, irrespective of what we may say elsewhere, for the purpose of signalizing the fact that they, with the book under review, are all largely founded on one radical principle borrowed from Coleridge, which they make their starting point. In the book now under examination, the source of it is explicitly acknowledged, and presented in full and formal quotations from Coleridge's "Aids to Reflection."

Says our author, (p. 72,) "Before proceeding with the question which the last chapter (on "Moral Psychology,") clearly

propounds, let us for a moment consider the meaning of a few words, which are necessarily being repeatedly used. A clear understanding of these terms, will contribute to a clear understanding of the views here set forth.

"The first of these words is NATURE. For our explanation of this, a remark of Coleridge may be cited. It will be found in his 'Aids to Reflection.' 'I have attempted then,' he says, 'to fix the proper meaning of the words *nature* and *spirit*, the one being the antithesis of the other; so that the most general and *negative* definition of nature is, whatever is not spirit; and *vice versa*, of spirit, that which is not comprehended in nature, or, in the language of our elder divines, that which transcends nature. But nature is the term in which we comprehend all things that are representable in the forms of time and space, and subjected to the relations of cause and effect, and the cause of whose existence, therefore, is to be sought for perpetually in something *antecedent*. The word itself expresses this in the strongest manner possible; *nature*, that which is *about to be born*, that which is always *becoming*. It follows, therefore, that whatever originates its own acts, or in any sense contains in itself the cause of its own state, must be *spiritual* and consequently *supernatural*.'" This passage will be found on page 155 of Marsh's edition of the *Aids to Reflection*, and others of like purport appear elsewhere in that volume, and in his other works.

To the same effect says Dr. Hickok: "Take then this free personality; this spontaneous agency with its law written upon and rising out of its own being; and we have made a long advance in our way to the Idea of the Absolute. We have found that which may absolve itself from the domination of nature, and stand forth *wholly supernatural*. . . . But truly an activity that goes out of its own accord, as is the rational in humanity, and *thoroughly supernatural* as it is, yet is ever subject to the colliding influences of flesh and sense." *Rational Cosmology*, pp. 80-1. The second chapter of Dr. Bushnell's *Nature and the Supernatural* is only the development of this germ from Coleridge. Indeed it runs as woof through the whole treatise. As we have here found the seed-principle of three separate works, on subjects widely different, yet all of

unsurpassed importance, it will not be amiss to offer some suggestions upon it, as it is presented by the master, as well as in the various dilute forms and applications of it given by his disciples. We do not mean to imply that what is novel in it is original with Coleridge. It bears unmistakable traces of a German paternity.

1. There is no fallacy more common than that of arguments founded on etymology. The force of the terms *nature* and *supernatural* is to be ascertained from good usage, which is constantly advancing beyond the original etymological import of words, and is controlled by the growth of human thought and knowledge, of which language is the inevitable exponent. We even speak of the nature of God. Does nature here mean that which is "*about to be born*," or that God is not supernatural? This argument from etymology, a favourite one with this class of writers, is wholly impotent and unworthy. If valid, it is a two-edged sword, which is quite as fatal to them as to their adversaries. Horne Tooke argued that there could be no eternal and immutable truths, because the word *truth* is derived from *trow*, to believe! How would they relish such an application of etymology?

2. Nature as contrasted with the supernatural is not necessarily contrasted with the term *spirit*. The established sense of the term supernatural confines it to beings, forces, and works, above man and physical nature. It is contrary to all usage to apply it to any thing that man can be or do of himself, *propriis viribus*, or with the aid of any mere powers or laws of the physical world. There is, indeed, a narrower sense of the word nature, in which it is sometimes used for the physical universe in contrast with man. But when used in contrast with the supernatural it always includes man, both as to his corporeal and spiritual nature. Any other use of it confuses and vitiates all discussions on this subject. Men claim to be supernaturalists, or to have established supernaturalism, by maintaining that man has reason or free-will. It is in no sense true that whatever is a spirit is "*consequently* supernatural."

3. Neither is it true, that whatever "*in any sense* contains in itself the cause of its own state, must be spiritual." Does not the acorn or egg contain in itself that which is in some

sense the cause of the various states into which it passes in becoming the oak or the ostrich? Or did not these contain in the germs whence they were developed, the causes of their being what they are? On the other hand, if the Christian doctrine of regeneration is true, the spirit in fallen man does *not* contain in itself that which is the cause of its purest and most perfect state as a spirit. So far from this, God maketh it to differ by his Spirit dwelling in it. And so false is it that "being the cause of its own state" is a criterion of spirituality, that the word of God styles those, by way of eminence, spiritual and spiritually minded, who are born of the Holy Ghost.

4. Still less is it true, that it is a criterion of nature as distinguished from spirit, that "the cause of its existence is to be sought for perpetually in something antecedent." Is not the cause of the existence of every created spirit to be sought in something antecedent—the creative fiat of God? What then can such language mean, unless that all spirits are but the Infinite Spirit in varied manifestations? Is this "the hidden mystery in every, the minutest, form of existence," of which Coleridge discourses so sublimely, (*Aids*, p. 315,) and which, he says, "freed from the phenomena of Time and Space, and seen in the depth of *real* Being, reveals itself to the pure Reason, as the actual immanence of ALL in EACH?" The italics and capitals are all his. Or if this pantheism be not intended, what is? Is it that the cause of the acts and states of the soul, or the will, are not to be sought for "in any thing antecedent?" But this is untrue. No act of will or choice is without its cause in the antecedent bias, desires, views of the soul, and the objective motives which address them. Every man knows this as surely as he knows that he ever put forth a free act of choice. Is not the cause of every act of God to be found in his Infinite Goodness and Wisdom? This is not, indeed, a physical or compulsory cause. It does not militate against the most absolute freedom of choice between contrary objects. But it is the cause of that choice being what it is and not otherwise, and of its being impossible to be otherwise, *and at the same time free*.

5. Being "representable in the forms of Time" is no criterion of nature as distinguished from spirit; and being "repre-

sentable in the forms of Time and Space," is no criterion of nature as distinguished from the supernatural. Can any spirit be conceived to be or to act otherwise than in time! And are not nearly all psychologists agreed that the idea of time is suggested to the mind by the succession of which it is conscious in its own acts and states? On the other hand, it is not representable in space. Yet it is not supernatural in any known or appropriate meaning of that word.

Finally, although the spirit is out of "the relation of cause and effect" so far as physical or any other causation inconsistent with freedom is concerned, yet it is not beyond the reach of the great law, that every event must have a cause. Every act of the will is an act of causation which in the first instance suggests to us the clearest idea of cause. Nor is any volition of the mind irrespective of antecedent, subjective states and objective influences which ensure the mind's choosing as it does and not otherwise, if it choose freely, i. e. if it choose at all.

The application by our author of his views of nature and the supernatural, coupled with another Germanism borrowed from Coleridge, will appear in the following passages.

"We have already seen that the mind presents two aspects, two sides as it were; one toward the *natural* and the other toward the *spiritual*; the first is sometimes called the *understanding*, the faculty judging according to sense; the other the *reason*, the faculty judging according to the *spiritual*. . . These two principles are ever in conflict, the one against the other; the reason ever tending to subject the body, its passions and appetites to the wholesome restraints of law, of moderation and of temperance; the understanding ever tending to subdue the reason and spirit to nature, to govern it by natural causes, and to bring it in subjection to matter. . . These various ideas shadow forth the prevalence of the notion of an irreconcilable antagonism between these two faculties of man, these two forms of development, called here the *understanding* and the *reason*. The same idea is developed by Paul in Romans vii. 23, 'For I behold another law in my members warring against the law of my mind, and making me captive to the law of sin which dwells in my members.' Again, 'For they who live after the flesh

mind fleshly things; but they who live after the spirit mind spiritual things.' Here the apostle clearly recognizes two distinct sources of action for man; what he calls in the one case the law of sin and death, in the other the law of the spirit. . . This view clearly corresponds with our division of the understanding and reason, the one partaking of the flesh, the other of the spirit; the one leading the mind to carnal gratifications, the other to spiritual acts of duty." Pp. 178-80. The same exegesis is also applied elsewhere to Romans viii. 5-13. On this we remark:

1. That we do not object to the use of the words Reason and Understanding to denote different faculties or classes of faculties or modes of knowing in the soul, provided such use be clearly defined and steadily adhered to. There is doubtless a distinction recognized in the *usus loquendi* so far as this, viz. that whereas understanding or intelligence of some sort may be ascribed in a low degree to animals as well as men, reason or rationality cannot be ascribed to the brutes. When we think of a nature as rational we also think of it as immortal, not necessarily so, however, when we think of it merely as, in some sort, intelligent. There is certainly a faculty of intuition called sense, by which we immediately perceive external objects. And there is certainly a faculty by which we perceive certain intuitive ideas and self-evident truths not given through the outward senses. We have no objection to calling this inward eye Reason in contrast with the Understanding as the discursive faculty. This, at times, appears to be all that Coleridge and others intend. But they sometimes mean a vast deal more, as may be seen from the passages quoted from the work under review. And they often give vague and mystical intimations of much more than they express. But, at times, they let out enough to appal us. Thus Coleridge says (Aids, pp. 307-8) "I should have no objection to define Reason with Jacobi, and with his friend Hemsterhuis, as an organ bearing the same relation to spiritual objects, the Universal, the Eternal, and the Necessary, as the eye bears to material and contingent phenomena. But then it must be added, that *it is an organ identical with its appropriate objects. Thus, God, the Soul, eternal Truth, &c., are the objects of Reason: but they are themselves*

reason." To the same effect he says, p. 137, "Reason is the power of universal and necessary Convictions, *the Source and Substance* of Truths above sense, and having their evidence in themselves." And, p. 142, "The Reason in all its decisions appeals to itself, as the ground and *Substance* of their truth." In this last passage the italics are his, thus proving it no incautious statement. We see not how it could be more explicitly or emphatically affirmed that the Reason in man is no mere cognitive faculty, but that it is God in the soul. It is not probable that Judge Nash means to teach pantheism, because he says much of a contrary purport, and does not appear to be aware of the abysmal depths in which he is floundering. This indeed may be said of Coleridge and most others who have caught up pantheistic theories. But what less than that the spirit in man, be it reason or will, is God, can be implied in the doctrine he adopts from Coleridge, that it is not that "the cause of whose existence is to be sought for perpetually in something antecedent?" He often speaks of the "divine in man," and of Reason as being the divine. What is the meaning of the following passage? "Hence it may be said that man's life is hid in God; since *God's life in its fulness includes all life, the life of humanity entire, as well as of each individual man.* All men will in this ideal state live upon God's truths and laws, so far as their capacities can take them in and work them out in life; and yet *all humanity can exhaust but a fraction of that infinite fulness of life, which is found alone in God.* . . . This unity of life is entirely consistent with distinct personality; it by no means destroys either man's or God's individuality. Each lives his own life, though all live the same life. . . . In this explanation is seen the error as well as *the truth of pantheism.* God does in one sense live and work in humanity, but yet in entire consistency with the distinct personality of each," pp. 420—1. This certainly indicates the author's adhesion, so far forth, to the "truth of pantheism." What "error" of that system it points out is less apparent. Pantheists usually hold that each separate phenomenon of God has its own individuality, as well as an identity with God. All the waves of the ocean have their separate individuality; they "exhaust but a fraction of its infinite fulness." Yet they are

phenomena of it, consubstantial, all-one, with it. So of the relation of man and nature to God, in modern Monism or Pantheism.

2. Admitting the distinction between Reason and Understanding in the only sense which, as we have shown, is allowable, there is no such "antagonism" between them as the author maintains, herein not only following, but outrunning his master. The understanding is not, in its own nature, a "faculty judging according to sense," any more than according to spirit. The discursive faculties, which Coleridge identifies with the understanding, act indifferently upon the matter furnished by our external and our internal intuitions, by sense or reason. The discursive operations of thinking under the forms of abstraction, generalization, judgment, reasoning, take place just as freely with reference to self-evident mathematical, moral, logical, or metaphysical, truths or ideas, as in reference to objects of sense. Indeed, these processes could be carried on to only a limited degree, if at all, upon objects of sense, without the aid of these primitive internal cognitions. Such an "antagonism" as that set up by our author supposes a dualism in the human soul; not a mere conflict of passions and desires, resulting from its depravity, but two constituent elements in its normal state, in its very essence as a human soul; the divine and the human; the natural and supernatural; the one judging solely according to sense, the other according to spirit; the one lifting us to God, the other sinking us to the dust. According to this, one part of the human soul is corrupt and corrupting, the other pure and purifying. The author fitly illustrates his theory by the old oriental notion of "two souls, the good and the bad, which were ever in conflict, each striving for the supremacy, and the man became good or bad, as the good or bad soul obtained the mastery." P. 179. The doctrine of Christianity supported by consciousness is, that the mind is one, indivisible substance, with various powers, sensitive, cognitive, volitional; that, in its normal sinless state, all these act harmoniously, and so far from being "antagonistic," mutually complete each other; that the senses are not antagonistic to the spirit, but are the inlets of knowledge, which is its needful food; that the body in sinless man is not antagonistic

to the soul, but is its appropriate residence and organ; that sin or depravity pollutes and depraves the whole soul, in all its moral and spiritual states and activities, sensitive and intellectual, emotional and volitional; not that it infects one part, and leaves the other stainless, making the man half-angel, half-fiend. The understanding is darkened. The mind and conscience are defiled. The heart is deceitful and desperately wicked. As to the will, men will not retain God in their knowledge. As to desire, they desire not the knowledge of his ways. The senses, and the members of the body, so far as it is an organ of the soul, partake of the depravation. The eyes are full of adultery; the poison of asps is under their lips; their feet are swift to shed blood. The conflict delineated by the apostle between the flesh and the spirit, the law in the members and the law in the mind, is simply the conflict between remaining sin and holiness dominant, but, as yet, imperfect; between the residuum of sinful nature pervading the man in all his parts and faculties, and the sanctifying Spirit whose work is progressive but as yet incomplete. It has not the remotest reference to the distinction between reason and understanding. The words *flesh* and *fleshly* are used to denote the depraved state of the soul, not because it is debased through the influence of the understanding operating as a "faculty judging according to sense," but because, when it swerves from holiness and God, from fealty to the supreme law by which it ought to be regulated, of necessity the lower and animal propensities acquire an undue sway. But this does not imply that depravity has its exclusive seat in the body, or its origin in any faculties exclusively sensuous. This is not what is meant by carnal as contrasted with spiritual mind. On the contrary the desires of the wicked are expressly styled "the desires of the flesh and the mind (*θιαροτῶν*)," Eph. ii. 3. The word *νοῦς* translated "mind," Rom. vii. 23, is also used Rom. i. 28, in the phrase "reprobate mind," also Eph. iv. 17, in the phrase "vanity of their mind," and elsewhere in like manner. So far is it from signifying that which is of itself antagonistic to another class of faculties which are, in their nature, debased and debasing.

3. It is a fatal objection to the author's view, that it traces the origin of depravity, not to the perverse action of free-will

in a being created every way upright, as God made man in paradise; not even to a privative cause; but to the very structure of the intellect as originally created, and the necessary antagonism in the working of its different faculties. This is only tracing its source beyond man to his Maker.

4. The necessary consequence of this is, that what the author calls depravity he denies to be sin. According to him the genesis of human depravity is as follows: "A mind left to itself would be left to the teachings of nature, and only its understanding could, under such teachings, be developed; the reason or spirit would remain unborn, unconscious, inactive, undeveloped; and the man, acted upon only by nature, would become a little more intelligent than the beaver or elephant, and as ravenous for the gratification of his own appetites as the hyena and the tiger.

"*Herein lies human depravity.* Our nature is disturbed, unbalanced . . . That there is anything like *sin* in this state of depravity is impossible, since sin is a personal thing, the violation of an admitted law; while this depravity is in nature, though its fearful consequences, like the pestilence, and the earthquake, and the storm, afflict all humanity. Still it cannot be *sin*, a personal act, for which the individual is responsible or can be held responsible. It is depravity, or spoiling, or rendering crooked, a distortion of humanity for which all suffer, but for which no one will be punished. If the human soul lives up to its present duties, it will not fail of its reward in consequence of this depravity, this spoiling of its nature.

"Such then is the condition of humanity, the understanding and reason in perpetual conflict; the understanding born first, the reason last; the understanding strong, the spirit weak, the understanding taught by that exacting teacher, nature; the reason by a feebler one the spirit of another." Pp. 182-4.

How then, we ask, are men "by nature children," not only of depravity, but "of wrath?" How has "death passed upon all men for that all have sinned?" And how is depravity seriously to harm us, if "living up to such present duties" as we may, still retaining it, "we shall not fail of our reward." Where is the need of cleansing by the blood of Christ, and the washing of

regeneration, of anything more than natural religion? We shall see. He says:

"The death of Christ is the peculiarity of Christianity, the corner-stone of the whole scheme. The necessity of this is laid in the necessity that some act should be presented to the universe, by which, while the repentant were forgiven, the sanctity, and goodness, and holiness of the law might be maintained. To pardon without some great act of this kind, might leave upon the mind of intelligence the impression, that there was little difference between obedience and disobedience." P. 187. This, however, can hardly be necessary for those "who are living up to present duties." However this may be, according to the above representation, the death of Christ is not penal, substitutional, expiatory, in satisfaction of divine justice. It is, like his life and teaching, designed simply to create an "impression" that there is not a little difference between "obedience and disobedience."

"Man, left to himself, would never attain to the spiritual, never attain to the ideal, to the conception of a God. Hence God revealed his existence, his law, his truth, to the spirit of man; and it is still necessary for our spirit to reveal to another these spiritual ideas, which can be derived in no other way. It is literally true that there is a spiritual birth; for what is born of the spirit is spirit. The spirit of the child is brought into consciousness by the spirit of another, and so is born of it. 'I have begotten you,' says St. Paul, (1 Cor. iv. 15,) 'through the gospel.' Here he calls himself their father; he has begotten them by the truth, which he has poured into their minds; and which truth became to them a source of new life, a spiritual life." P. 182. According to this, regeneration seems to consist in imparting truth to the mind, and thus bringing the reason to birth or consciousness. It is no supernatural transformation of the soul by the immediate energy of the spirit of God, except in the transcendental sense of the word "supernatural," which is only another name for natural. We discover no regeneration in this system, beyond the Socinian moral culture and development of the germinal forces of nature.

The author's views on this subject will still further appear, if

we notice the kind of truth which he deems necessary to beget moral goodness, effective for regeneration, and the class of persons who are partakers of it. He says, (p. 128,) "what man *believes* to be this correct expression (of the universe) is *truth* to it, and must have the influence of truth on the life." "Even error *believed*, is better than unbelief; since the first will develope the spiritual in man, which the latter cannot do." P. 141. "From our previous analysis of human consciousness, it is clear that *sin consists in acting in contradiction to and in violation of our moral judgments*. These moral judgments are subjectively the law of God, to violate which is *sin*." P. 163. "All that is required of humanity is to act up to its own standard of rectitude, and all feel that they have ability to do that." P. 169. "This view of conscience presents important practical results. It gives a clew to the best mode of moral teaching, and takes away all ground for uncharitableness on account of a difference of conduct. There may be as much of moral worth in the one case as in the other; each acting up to his moral belief of what is right." P. 70. "The moral life, the spiritual life, the divine life in humanity are all equivalent expressions, and are all equally a life of faith." P. 110. "It seems a narrow view of God's mercy to suppose that earnest, sincere pagans are beyond the reach of his Spirit." P. 197. Referring to Livingstone's account of the conversion of the rain-doctor who found the belief in his power to make rain the most difficult of his pagan principles to abjure, he says: "Here we have the declaration of a most remarkable man, after his conversion, that he honestly did believe in his power to make rain; that with him this was no sham, no imposture; that he followed his incantations because he believed in the truth of his power. This single fact shows in what absurd things, absurd to us, but *God's truth to them*, the mind may honestly indulge. It will not do, therefore, to consign all pagan populations to the world of shams, and hypocrites, insincerities and impostures. And we learn from consciousness that *what the mind receives as true, is true for it*, and will develope its moral and religious emotions. It is certain then that there must have been pious souls, even under pagan superstition." P. 199. "The Greeks and through them other nations were educated to form moral

judgments, and taught the vital importance of obedience to them. *Hereby was the truly spiritual in man developed.*" "Is the Hindoo mother a lie when she sacrifices her infant to her idol god?" Even the Sepoys are canonized, and the adage "there is honor among thieves" is adduced in illustration and support of the author's view. Pp. 64, 65.

We have quoted at this length, that there might be no mistaking the author's meaning, in regard to what is the most dangerous sentiment of his book, and runs, as our quotations indicate, like a thread all through it. It is a legitimate offspring of transcendentalism—a logical deduction from it. We are glad to say, however, that while he thus erects subjective beliefs of whatever sort into virtual truths or truth-powers for him who entertains them, and makes conformity to them moral goodness, he admits the reality of objective truth independent of personal faith. He asserts the obligation to seek this objective truth, and that we suffer loss so far as we are ignorant of or reject it. It is something for one who goes so far as he has done to escape the vortex of absolute subjectivity. We will further add, that there is no dispute that every man sins who disobeys his own conscience. But it does not follow that we escape all sin when we obey conscience, or that men are of course good and acceptable to God who live up to their own sincere convictions. The most common sins are sins of ignorance, secret sins. Sin does not cease to be such because we believe it right, nor are men of course good because they think they are, or sincerely mean to be so. The sin and woe of those who form false moral judgments, lie in forming such judgments, in calling good evil and evil good, putting light for darkness and darkness for light. Blindness to moral and spiritual truth is sin, and is among the most unequivocal proofs of moral corruption. Were the crucifiers of Christ blameless who knew not what they did? Was not Paul in need of mercy as a persecutor and blasphemer, albeit he did it ignorantly and in unbelief, nay verily thought that he ought to do many things contrary to the name of Jesus of Nazareth? Is not sin in its nature deceitful? Is it not declared "corrupt according to the deceitful lusts?" There is a way that seemeth right unto a man, though the end thereof is death.

In fact, on this system, there is an end of moral distinctions. Error, no less than the truth it denies, "developes the spiritual in man." Absurdities believed in are God's truth to the mind believing them, and will "develope its moral and spiritual emotions." Is not this monstrous? As to their effect on the soul, are Paganism, Atheism, Deism, Infidelity, one with pure Christianity? Will they all alike develope the spiritual in man? What then becomes of our author's invectives against persecutors? Are not they often sincere? Was not Paul sincere in persecuting the church? What becomes of his consistency, when he tells us that demoralizing publications ought to be suppressed by the state? Above all, what becomes of the gospel, and the command to preach it to every creature? Is it not true that Jesus Christ is the only name given under heaven whereby men can be saved? Is it not true that without faith it is impossible to please God? And how shall they believe on him of whom they have not heard? What Christian is not shocked to be told that the bloody orgies of Paganism, as truly as Christianity, wake the spiritual in man? What doctrine more dangerous, demoralizing, and subversive of all foundations can be propagated in the community, than that all is well with those who live up to their honest belief? What more does Deist, Infidel, or Universalist ask?

We might further notice the crude attempt of the author, in imitation of Coleridge, to invalidate the argument for the being of God from his works; on which the Bible founds in part the inexcusableness of idolatry; his denial of any source of knowledge except sense, consciousness, and revelation; and this in contradiction of his emphatic distinction between Reason and Understanding—a distinction unmeaning, unless Reason, as the inward eye, as really and intuitively discerns some first truths, as the outward eye perceives external objects; his assertion that all "discussions having for their object to prove an external world, and the manner in which we come to the knowledge of it, are not only idle, but wicked," p. 19; while he also tells us that "*by the study of sensations*, perceptions of an external world arise," when in fact, if we do not perceive external objects immediately, the "study of sensations" would never carry us beyond themselves, i. e. beyond our own sub-

jective states, i. e. beyond ourselves, which ends in idealism and monism; his attempted refutation of the argument for divine decrees from divine foreknowledge, on the alleged ground, that "time cannot be predicated of the Deity," p. 24; as if this, whether true or not, could at all undo the fact that known to God, and therefore certain and determined before the foundation of the world, was whatever should come to pass; his accounting for sin on the ground that free-agency implies inability in God to prevent it, without impairing that free-agency; as if the acts of men could not be rendered certainly good and yet be free; when he tells us that "in the character of God we find a necessity resting upon Him, and necessitating the character of creation, of the laws, and government, which He shall create and organize," and that "in all this the divine will acts freely in the highest sense of the term." "An honest man cannot steal; the very definition of such an act precludes the possibility of its being done by him; and still this condition is no limitation on his freedom and ability." Pp. 123-4.

We have thus taken pains to lay bare the real principles of this book, some of which are probably imperfectly comprehended by the author. His blunt, earnest, and assured style, notwithstanding the marks of slovenly haste which it often bears, will give it currency and power among a large class, who are poorly qualified to judge of its speculative principles. We understand that efforts are in progress to put it by the thousand in the libraries of the public schools of the country. The fact that suitable books are wanting, for the instruction of the young on political ethics, will facilitate its circulation. We greatly regret, therefore, that under cover of "Morality and the State," it should be a vehicle of transcendental, rationalistic theology, and of formidable errors in psychology, metaphysics, and ethics. We deem it our duty to expose the virus which saturates it, and more than neutralizes all the high and precious truth it teaches. We have thought it worth signalizing too, as an evidence that the transcendentalism which has been imported among us, is no mere ghostly shadow, haunting only the retreats of learning, and the closets of recluse thinkers; but a living, growing, pervasive thing, that begins to mould the thinking of our judges and counsellors, and worm itself into

the solution of the great problems of life, moral, religious, social, and political. As such, its subtle movements cannot be too closely watched.

ART. VI.—*Rational Cosmology: or the Eternal Principles, and the Necessary Laws of the Universe.* By LAURENS P. HICKOK, D. D., Union College. D. Appleton & Co. New York and London.

THE work whose title we have thus given in full, exhibits the results of much and earnest thought. Its aim is high; its field of research immense. We respect the author's talent; we honour, in themselves, his energy and industry; and what is more—much more—we have an abiding confidence in his piety. We desire to make this declaration frankly and fully at the outset of our remarks, that we may not afterward be misunderstood, if we shall be found, even conscientiously, and therefore very earnestly, to indicate our utter disagreement with many of Dr. Hickok's positions and conclusions.

The object of the book is to develop all that the title indicates. After an Introduction, the contents of which are "Facts and Principles—Facts determined by Principles—General progress of philosophical investigation—Theology and philosophy possible"—the author presents what he regards as "a concise and independent mode" for the "attainment of a clear idea of an absolute Creator and Governor." Then, much more at large, he discourses of the plan "of the creation itself;" of which he remarks in the general, that "To no finite reason, is it to be anticipated that this plan will ever reveal itself in all the clearness and completeness of the divine Ideal; yet nothing hinders, since such a plan certainly is, that the human reason may not earnestly and reverently apply its powers to the attainment of its grand outlines, and in the teaching of eternal principles find, by a rational insight, what and how creation must have been, and read her great laws, not as mere arbitrary