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ARTICLE I.

THE PROVIDENCE OF GOD AS RELATED TO THE WORK OF REDEMPTION.

There are two great chains connecting man in his destiny with eternity and with God. One is the chain of God's providence; the other is the chain of Christ's redemption. It might at first appear difficult to decide which of these, considered in itself and apart from its relations to the other, affords matter of more profound and interesting inquiry.

How wonderful, for instance, is the chain of divine providence, as, taking its origin in the depth of the eternal purposes of God, and interweaving itself with all the details of human history, it forges its successive links in the midst of the rise and fall of empires, the growth and decay of civilisations, and the revolutions and dismemberments of states, presenting to us the finger of God in every event of history, from the falling of a sparrow to the overthrow of a kingdom or the extinction of a world.

How wonderful, on the other hand, is the chain of redemption, which takes its rise in the depth of the same unfathomable eternity, which we may trace backward link by link to the same deep counsels of the same unchanging Jehovah; and

to terminate without appeal to earthly tribunals. There are disputes, perhaps, concerning ecclesiastical jurisdiction which Christians should be able to end without strife. But there is one termination of such controversies which is absolutely impossible, and that is the absorption of the Southern Church by the New Church of the North. To all the enterprises of that Church for the glory of Christ and the extension of his kingdom, we cordially bid God-speed; and with all such we cultivate an ardent sympathy. The New Church has inherited a glorious record, marred latterly by ill-judged acts, weak or wicked, when men's passions were inflamed; but another generation may possibly efface such stains without "stultifying" themselves or their fathers; and then, while we fulfil our vocation in our humbler sphere, we will, with Dr. Van Dyke, look forward with joyful anticipation to a complete union with them "in the general assembly of the first-born in heaven."

ARTICLE VI.

NATURAL THEOLOGY.

1. *A Demonstration of the Existence and Attributes of God.* By M. Fenelon, the late Archbishop of Cambray, etc. (De l'Existence de Dieu). Harrisburgh, 1811.
2. *Natural Theology.* By W. Paley. Gould & Lincoln, 1864.
3. *Synopsis Theologiæ Naturalis.* Auctore Gerschomo Carmichael, (Professor in Glasgow). Edinburg, 1729.
4. *Bridgewater Treatise, No. I.* By the Rev. T. Chalmers, D. D. Two Volumes. London: William Pickering, 1834.
5. *On Natural Theology.* By Thomas Chalmers, D. D., LL. D. Two Volumes. Glasgow: William Collins, 1836.

Two hundred years ago the English deists had a fashion of extolling natural religion at the expense of Revelation. Leland, in his "View of Deistical Writers," says of Lord Herbert of Cherbury, "His lordship seems to have been one of the first that formed deism into a system, and asserted the sufficiency,

universality, and absolute perfection of natural religion, with a view to discard all extraordinary revelation as useless and needless."

The same doctrine was taught in the eighteenth century by Tindal, in his work, "Christianity as old as the Creation; or, the Gospel a Republication of the Law of Nature." The reaction against this on the part of the defenders of Christianity has driven them into the opposite error of extolling Revelation at the expense of natural religion. The pendulum has swung back beyond the vertical line of truth. Thus, no less a thinker than Sir Wm. Hamilton has said, that "the only valid arguments for the existence of a God, and for the immortality of the human soul, rest on the ground of man's moral nature." (Philosophy of the Conditioned, p. 506.) On one plea or another, natural theology has been overlooked or decried in a pietistic way, by what are called well meaning men, especially by such as are inclined to mysticism; until, by a very singular conjunction, atheists and devout Christians are found occupying positions much too near to each other.

To say that the light of the sun is greater than that of the stars, is to say what every body knows to be true. Yet the stars do shine. Their soft radiance cheers the benighted wayfarer, and guides the mariner through the trackless wastes of ocean. It is the opinion of some recent philosophers, that the combined warmth of the stars is very considerable, so great indeed that the want of it would render our globe uninhabitable.

So when it is affirmed that Revelation gives us a far clearer and more extended knowledge of God than the book of nature contains, we yield a prompt and hearty assent; but when men, who should know better, begin to disparage nature, we beg leave to ask them to pause, and not affect a contempt for the works of the great Architect. Surely the heavens declare his glory; the firmament showeth the work of his hands; and day in sweet intercourse with day, and night in solemn communion with night, alike tell of the wisdom, might, and majesty of God. Many of the sweetest notes of the royal Psalmist catch their thrill from nature. Everywhere in nature he saw the hand of nature's

God. Paul states the case more didactically, when he says that τὸ γνωστὸν τοῦ Θεοῦ, that which is or at least may be known of God, is manifest in the ungodly and unrighteous men of whom he speaks; for God hath shown it unto them—ἐφανέρωσε, manifested. For the invisible things of him from (the time of) the creation of the world are clearly seen, being understood by (the aid or light of) the things that are made—τοῖς ποιήμασι νοούμενα—even his eternal power and Godhead—θειότης, divine majesty—so that they are without excuse. Paul speaks of the heathen as, originally at least, knowing God. They forsook him, not for lack of objective manifestations, but because of that subjective darkness which is produced by depravity. Their foolish heart was darkened.

When Revelation itself, therefore, takes up and defends the cause of nature, who are we that we should withstand God? And who can undertake to say how much the claims of Revelation would be obscured, and its hold on our race weakened, if there were no nature to echo back, Jura-like,

" . . . From her misty shroud,"

the grand utterances of heaven,

" . . . That call to her aloud "?

Surely the Most High has not spent ages of time, and vast treasures of divine power and skill, in elaborating a universe which we are on any account authorised to treat with disdain. The same Holy Spirit who regenerates and sanctifies the soul of man, inspired psalmists and prophets of old time to write those beautiful descriptions of earthly and heavenly scenery. It is an exquisite touch near the close of the 104th Psalm, to tell us that Jehovah rejoices evermore in his works; to which the writer devoutly adds, "My meditation of him shall be sweet; I will be glad in the Lord."

PALEY'S NATURAL THEOLOGY.

This odd mixture of atheism and mysticism has been partially counteracted by Archdeacon Paley's work, written at the instance of the Lord Bishop of Durham. Paley's mind was well adapted

to the task set before him; singularly luminous, clinging firmly to the dictates of common sense, candid, fair, exact in particulars, broad in generalisation; it was perhaps the very best intellect in Great Britain for the special work he has done. It would have been too much to expect absolute originality on a theme that had been discussed for so many centuries on one of the "*loci communes*" of theology. But we claim for Paley that what others have done well, he has, at least in some points, done better. To adopt an illustration of Pascal's, he had the same tennis ball, but he played it better than they—for instance, in the opening illustration of the watch. Since the invention of portable time-pieces, it would have been almost impossible not to refer to them as an analogue to the mechanism of the material universe. Thus Fenelon says, section 73d of the work named at the head of this article, "If a man should find a watch in the sands of Africa, he would never have the assurance seriously to affirm that chance formed it in that wild place." The eye had been employed in the same way. "The single eye of the least of living creatures surpasses the mechanics of the most skilful artificers." Fenelon treats also of "animals, beasts, birds, fowls, fishes, reptiles, and insects;" of the sun, the stars, the planets; in a word, of well nigh every topic handled by Paley; yet how much clearer and more forcible in the main is Paley's presentation. We must be allowed to criticise one thing, and only one thing, in his introductory remarks. He seems to think a stone, against which one pitches his foot in crossing a heath, by no means so wonderful as a watch. A mineralogist would ask what kind of a stone it was. If in the volume of a few cubic inches it contained the silicious skeletons of a hundred millions of animalcula, if it were a lily encrinite or any other of a thousand interesting fossils, even if it were only a bit of marble, gneiss, or granite, it might evoke the geologist's most lively curiosity, and point to a creative hand as unerringly as a chronometer to the skill of its maker.

Bating this, however, as not affecting the argument, we cannot but admire the masterly way in which Paley handles his material. His work must long keep its place as a manual of

instruction for youth, and continue to interest the thoughtful reader of maturer years. More learned botanists, physiologists, and astronomers, may and will arise; they may correct a few unimportant errata in his statements of fact or his scientific theories; but they will hardly make the argument more lucid, more entertaining, or more convincing.

THE TELEIOLOGICAL ARGUMENT.

It is necessary only to know what the nature of the argument is in order to be astonished that any one could ever seriously question its validity. That every effect must have a cause, that this cause must be adequate to the production of the effect, that none but an intelligent agent can desire the accomplishment of an end and select the appropriate means for its accomplishment, are all propositions so plain that no one but "a fool or a philosopher" can call them in question. This is called the doctrine of "final causes," though it is in its totality, and, as commonly stated, a compound of the ontological with the teleiological. An ancient analysis assigns several causes to every phenomenon: the material, the formal, the efficient, the final cause, to which some added the *causa sine qua non*, or indispensable condition. The four causes of the table on which I write would be, 1st. The wood of which it is made, and which is of course necessary to the existence of the table—*causa materialis*. 2d. The particular shape or *forma*, which constitutes it a table, and more particularly the sort of table that it is and no other kind; for the wood might have been wrought up into a box, or a different kind of table—*causa formalis*. 3d. The efficient cause, the cabinet workman who made it. 4th. The final cause, the useful end it serves as a piece of household furniture. The last two of these are specially dwelt upon in the argument from design. The forms or structures of things do indeed receive much attention, but only as subsidiary to the purpose in view, the final cause; and this again conducts us to the efficient cause, the Maker himself.

We can scarcely open our eyes without seeing some illustration. For instance, the light by which I am writing. A metal-

lic pipe descends from the centre of the ceiling. Three arms or brackets extend in as many directions. Several of the arrangements are evidently for ornament rather than utility proper. Bronze and gilt alternate. Infant Bacchuses sport around the central shaft. But all this is secondary. That light may be afforded, burners are placed on the ends of the brackets. The orifices are so adjusted as to secure a perfect combustion of the gas. The whole chandelier is overhead, so as not to impede locomotion in the room; but in order to supply a brighter light for reading or writing, a flexible tube comes down from one of the brackets to a lamp-stand, an argand burner furnishes a brilliant flame, but to protect the eyes from the direct, unnecessary, and hurtful rays, a shade surrounds the blaze. That a little light may still go out into the room, the panels of the shade are translucent. To avoid danger from fire they are made of sheets of mica instead of paper; and to render them pleasing to the eye, they are painted with figures and landscapes in bright, transparent colors. Now to suggest to a rustic that all this adaptation was the result of mere chance, that no intelligence, no selection of means, no exertion of voluntary power, had a place in the affair, would be to amaze him beyond expression. We can hardly be surer of our own existence than that the chandelier is the work of an intelligent artisan.

DEFICIENCIES OF PALEY'S TREATISE.

While bestowing so high praise on Paley's Natural Theology, we must admit that there are some topics on which he is silent, and yet topics of very great importance. Is it not wonderful that he says so very little of the mind of man? If God is a spirit, may we not rationally expect to find more exact and more striking exhibitions of his attributes in the construction, so to speak, of other spirits, than in the adjustments of matter? How could Paley explore so thoroughly and so skilfully the casket and say nothing of the jewel it contained? The claims of the human intelligence to be considered in such an argument, must have perpetually obtruded themselves upon his attention, and we are almost persuaded that he purposely passed them by. He

may have thought that the readers for whom he wrote would not appreciate an argument drawn from our mental as distinguished from our corporeal machinery. Or the omission may have been due to the strongly objective turn of his mind; for the introspective element does not seem to have been vigorous in him. Whatever may have been the cause, he comes so near the subject as to treat of the *instincts* of animals, that obscure but curious branch of inquiry. It is very surprising to us that he restrained himself from taking one step more, into the broad and beautiful and sunlit domain of the mind. If anything could add to our surprise, it is that he has a chapter on "The relation of animated bodies to inanimate nature." The transition would have been not only easy, but we had almost said unavoidable, to the relation of the mind of man to the physical universe. We intend presently to offer some thoughts upon this subject, but just here would suggest that recent discoveries are showing a still more intimate relationship between our bodies and the general system of nature. The strength of our bony framework is nicely adapted to the weight of the planet. Our muscular force not only sustains a similar ratio, but is itself the resultant of many forces, among which may be mentioned the deoxidizing power of the sun and the special chemical affinities of the terrene elements. My ability to hold this pen might serve as the text for a detailed and marvellous physical commentary, so closely are we bound to the worlds.

Growing, as we suppose, out of too exclusive an objectivity of attention, is the disposition of Paley to fall back upon the *a posteriori* argument. "Chance never has done anything for us. A clod, a pebble, a liquid drop, might be the effect of chance," (which, by the way, we utterly deny), "but a watch, a telescope, never was." Now we merely say that he here descends from the height of his great argument. The necessary connexion between cause and effect is one of the intuitive, *a priori*, convictions of our intelligence. Chance not only never *has* produced, but never *can* produce any of those works which we are irresistibly led to attribute to design. The question does not appertain to empirical philosophy. It is not concerned with probabilities. It

does not count up instances. It does not balance one thing against another, or a thousand cases against one. By an ultimate *dictum* of the νοῦς, reason, intuitive power, or whatever we may please to call it, we decide the point once and forever. The actual results, as ascertained by the senses, or the discursive faculty, may be said, in a loose way of speaking, to corroborate this *dictum;* or there may be errorists who will call in question some of the fundamental laws of thought. Either or both of these considerations can serve as an apology for the archdeacon.

What he says concerning the infinitude of the divine attributes will be considered under another head. We proceed to the

RELATION OF THE HUMAN MIND TO THE PHYSICAL UNIVERSE.

1. *Perception.* I touch the writing-table beside me. Two sensations arise corresponding to the two sets of nerves—the sensation of coldness, and that of resistance. The former has in the main a subjective character; the latter, an objective. I do not stop at the sensations. I am irresistibly driven to the apprehension of an external object. How the chasm between mind and matter is bridged, I cannot tell. Why this belief in an external world accompanies, or in any way depends upon, or grows out of, the contact of my hand with the table, I know not. But this only the more assures me, that my perceiving mind has been made by another being.

I need, however, to perceive objects at a distance from my organism. It is a sunny winter's day. The smooth sward of the front yard is bounded by an arbor vitæ hedge, beyond which the pine and the cedar preserve a cheerful green, and over all the blue sky hangs like a heavenly benediction. It is certainly wonderful that light should thus reach the optic nerve; but is it not still more so, that the mind always, and in the vast majority of instances, without knowing anything of the laws of light, should refer to the location of objects back, along the course of the rays? Is not this the work of another? Why do I believe that what I see, exists? Because God has made me so. The senses put us in communication with the outer world. They open our ears to the voice of the teacher appointed for us, even

the material universe by whose glory we are continually surrounded.

A few hours hence, and nature will assume a sombre hue. Night with her soft mantle will enfold the earth, and myriads of stars will appear on high. Venus, now approaching her greatest eastern elongation, and consequently at her greatest brilliance, will light her silver lamp in the west. In the zenith, Jupiter, not far removed from the sweet influences of the Pleiads, will dominate the sky. In the east, the belted Orion will wield his ponderous mace, followed a little later by the bright-eyed Sirius; while northward Ursa Major will maintain his endless circuit about the pole. The tremulous light of those celestial orbs has been sweeping on for centuries through the wilds of space, and to-night it will tell of the glory of Him who is higher than the heavens. Impinging upon the nerve of vision, it will end its long, long flight. It will accomplish its mission and die, or rather by a sublime transmutation of force, it will emerge into the higher domain of mind, and the living soul of man shall learn that God is great. What we wish to urge is, that the transmuted force, the intellectual cognition, is not less worthy of our consideration than the course of the ray of light; that the domain of mind is, in truth, nobler than the domain of matter; and that the adaptation of the intelligence to perceive the truth is at least equally as conclusive of the being of a God, as is the adaptation of the eye to the perception of the light.

We can conceive of man as having the power, and perhaps the angels do have the power, of flying from world to world. A more extended locomotion may be granted us in the future state, than we now enjoy; but for the present we are limited to a very small part even of this atom, earth. Looking down from Trinity steeple, we see our fellow-creatures in the busy metropolis

> " . . . Show scarce so gross as beetles."

The wide range of our perceptive faculties is adapted to our *limitation in space.*

2. *Memory* is adapted to our *limitation in time.* Let us not be misunderstood. There is but one moment of time ever in

existence for the entire universe. We do not except God himself from this statement. Most devoutly, most reverentially, do we object to the representation of his eternity as a "*punctum stans*," a to-day without a yesterday or a to-morrow. If there be such a thing as an eternal now, we say with Mansel that it is to us unthinkable. The words convey no intelligible idea. But the Eternal One contemplates the infinite past and the infinite future with one glance of the eye. Nothing is old to him; nothing is new. We, however, have a very narrow field-view. One thought crowds another out of sight. Yet it is absolutely necessary to us, in a variety of respects, that we shall be able to recall past perceptions. Without memory I could not so much as know that this is paper on which I am writing.

We need not name at length the three of four primary laws of suggestion, or the ten or more secondary or subjective laws. But it concerns our argument to say that these laws are *over* us. We are subject to them. We do not originate them, and yet they are the very ones we need. The paper suggests the pen, and the pen the paper; the telescope reminds us of the star, and the star of the telescope; the land of the plough, and the plough of the land. There is a pervading utility in the arrangement. It is the plan of an intelligence superior to our own; a law impressed upon us from without; a rule which we follow without (in most cases) knowing why, and whether we will or nill; and though the symmetry of our argument requires us to confine special attention to the external world, yet it is easy to see, in passing, that the principle admits of a wide application.

3. *Reasoning.* Limitation in space and time necessitate limitation in knowledge. We have often admired the singular wisdom and benevolence of the Creator in adapting the external world to our capacity of reasoning. The schoolmen say that God never reasons, but knows all things intuitively. *We* cannot know all things, even within our limited range, by intuition, yet without some intuitions we can never know any thing at all. By our perceptions we gain material for thought. If every thing we saw were entirely unlike every thing else, we should never get beyond the most elementary knowledge. Our minds are

fitted to perceive points of likeness, and we are not disappointed of finding them. We cannot help classifying, and the classes exist for us in nature, not in any realistic sense of course, but the similarity is there, and much of it is apparent on the surface. Early in life we form the conceptions of trees, flowers, and birds, of plants and animals, etc. Wearied of sameness, we require something different, we desire dissimilars, we distinguish; but we could not distinguish if there were nothing distinct. We learn what does, and what does not belong to a class. This is a tree; that is not a tree, but only a shrub. This is a Caucasian, that an Indian, the other a Mongolian. Thus the actual world is suited to the mind, and the mind to the world. God has so appointed.

Classification, however, is a subsidiary procees. How does man reason? How does he infer the unknown from the known? Evidently from the similarity of the one to the other. The horned and cloven-footed animals which I have observed, are all ruminant; hence I conclude that they also ruminate, which I never have seen. Having thrust several small sticks of pine or poplar wood into jars of sulphuric acid, and found them to be charred by the process, I believe the same result will occur under like circumstances a century hence, or would have occurred a century ago. Descrying a certain yellow line in the spectrum when *sodium* is burned, and a line of like situation in the solar spectrum, I learn that *sodium* exists in the envelope of the sun. Like causes produce like effects. Man cannot but believe this, and nature responds to him. Every yea has its amen; otherwise man would have been an easy prey to universal and irremediable scepticism.

To use the nomenclature of logic—the major premise of a deductive syllogism must be the conclusion of a previous inductive syllogism, and the inductive syllogism itself must ultimately proceed on the assumption of the uniformity of the laws of nature. This belief, in other words, is a premise in the inductive syllogism. Now, whence this belief? It is an intuitive judgment. Mill absurdly ranks it among the conclusions of induction, because, forsooth, we find it in fact verified by obser-

vation. He fails to see this grand principle of the correspondence between the intellectual and the material.

It is of our intuitive beliefs that Fenelon speaks, when he says, "The superior reason that resides in man is God himself." Some of his remarks are very striking indeed. "That superior reason overrules and governs to a certain degree with an absolute power all men, even the least rational." What we desire to signalize is the thought that the lawgiver of the human intelligence is also the lawgiver of the worlds, and that he has adjusted them, mind to matter and matter to mind in the most wondrous manner. "Marvellous are thy works, O Lord, and that my soul knoweth right well."

WAS GOD CREATED?

If the orderly array of man's powers necessarily induces in us the belief that he is not self-originated, why not extend the same thing to God also? Are not the faculties of the Infinite One exquisitely balanced? Has he not sensibility, intellect, and will? Is not the first of these enthroned and crown-bearing in him, as it is in us? And do not the other two stand on either side of the ineffable glory, majestic ministers of his good pleasure? Does not the argument from design, then, prove too much? If it be valid in our case, why not in God's? The first distinct recollection we have of this question is the statement of it in Abbott's "Young Christian," a very readable book that was popular some twenty-five years ago. The author presents the difficulty and confesses his inability to solve it.

1. The first and most obvious remark we have to make is that at least nine hundred and ninety-nine men of a thousand who should feel pressed by this difficulty would be sure that after all it was only a puzzle, an apparent conflict of truths, and their faith would not be shaken. Such a state of mind is an interesting study to the psychologist. It arises when some truth has been established by incontrovertible evidence, and yet an unexpected objection is stated, which we cannot answer at the moment, if at all. Referring back to the illustration already employed, if the chandelier before me is the work of chance, or is self-

existent, I cannot feel sure of any truth whatever. My nature is a downright lie, or it is at least a witness whose testimony cannot be trusted. On the other hand, the immense majority of our race have considered the conception of a self-existent God a wonderful, yea, transcendent conception, but not one that involved any contradiction. Carmichael (Synopsis, page 25) says that nearly all men of every age and nation, however they have differed about the nature and properties of God, nevertheless have unanimously agreed "*esse aliquod supremum numen*," that there is some supreme deity. He pronounces the atheist's difficulties in conceiving a deity to be imaginary—"*dum imaginarias quasdam in numine concipiendo difficultates declinare satagit.*" We have no real difficulty in believing *that* to exist of which we can frame no exhaustive, positive conception; and just here, it is probable, most men who ever think at all of the subject let it remain—as a difficulty unsolved, but soluble; a question unanswered, but answerable.

2. We have sometimes advanced a counter argument. If the Creator of the worlds was himself created, then his creator must have been created too, and his also in an infinite series. So that the number of gods would be infinite, and the Hindoo mythology with its 330,000,000 of deities would become comparatively a sober and prosaic affair. But the "*law of parcimony*" to use an expressive phrase of Sir Wm. Hamilton's, requires that no more causes shall be assigned to any phenomenon, than are necessary to its occurrence. One God could produce the universe. Besides, the law of "excluded middle" would soon determine between one deity and an infinite number; the former hypothesis being encompassed with far less difficulties than the latter.

3. There is still another presentation of the case which may be more satisfactory to some minds. Let us state the original argument syllogistically.

Whatever bears marks of design has had an intelligent author. The physical universe bears marks of design. Therefore it has had an intelligent author. Or, the human mind bears marks of design. Therefore, etc.; which are syllogisms in "Barbara," as the logicians say.

Now, in place of the physical universe, or the human mind, substitute our Creator: Our Creator bears marks of design. Therefore he has had an intelligent author.

The syllogism is correct in form, and if the premises are granted, the conclusion follows irresistibly. Then one premise or the other must be false, and we must hold that nothing, or at least only *some* things, not all, that bear marks of design have had an intelligent author; that is, the major premise must be wholly or partially false; or we must hold that our Creator does not exhibit in his nature the marks of design, that is, the minor premise is false. We take the last alternative, and deny the truth of the minor premise. The physical universe, and the mind of man, have limitations and adaptations evidently superimposed upon them by a higher power and a higher wisdom; but the divine attributes do not by their correlation exhibit what are rightly called marks of design.

GOD'S INFINITUDE.

Is Paley right or wrong in thinking that a finite universe, as an effect, does not prove the being of an absolutely infinite cause? If an absolute Creator *ex nihilo* be not possessed of infinite power, we may well ask who is? Especially, since he must have possessed this power at every moment of his immeasurable existence; so that if the number of the worlds is not unlimited, it is not due to the want of power in the Creator.

The idea of the infinite is one which enters every human mind, and this is a phenomenon which has a cause, and may in some way be accounted for. Fenelon was a disciple of Des Cartes, and adopts the Cartesian explanation that every idea in the mind is produced by an objective reality. In vision—*εἶδος, ἰδέα*—the appearance, form, that which is seen, is outward as a cause, but makes an impression on our intelligence. Descartes extended this to other notions. Consequently the conception of the infinite is caused by the suitable presentation of an infinite object *ab* extra. Fenelon urges this view quite eloquently. Carmichael briefly refutes Descartes: "*Quod quidem argumentum recte fundari agnoscerem, si Deum nos hic conciperemus per*

speciem propriam, sive (ut loquuntur scholastici) quidditatiam; qualem habere ab ipso objecto ceu causa exemplari impressam beatos cælicolas est credendum." He goes on to say, that in this life we have only an abstract idea of God, such as we form of various things by analysis or synthesis, and which need correspond to nothing external.

The "philosophy of the conditioned" would settle the matter at once by denying that we have any positive conception of the infinite; but we have not space for the discussion of that point. Revelation can not account for the conception. It does not furnish us with any new *elements* of thought, with any primitive cognitions. In other words, it is addressed to our nature as already made by the Creator.

We are led, therefore, to class the idea of the infinite among our intuitive conceptions, and there is no other so likely way to account for its presence within us, as that an infinite God has placed it in our souls in order to give us a knowledge of himself. We insatiably long for an infinite object of veneration and worship; and if our Creator were a finite *demiurge* or *æon*, we could not worship him as God.

This article has reached such a length that we are constrained to omit some remarks on the discussion of the unity and personality of the Deity, as well as the chapter of Theodicy, entitled the Goodness of God. The general considerations on the structure of society are highly valuable, particularly in these days of rampant radicalism, when everything established, everything sacred, is questioned or contemned; and thoughtful, sober-minded men cannot look forward into the future without misgiving, if not dismay.

Dr. Chalmers has two works on this subject, viz., the first of the celebrated Bridgewater Treatises, and two volumes on Natural Theology. The latter work is not so much a new production as an amplification of the former. The peculiarities of Chalmers's style are well known. There is a hyper-ciceronean "*copia fandi;*" there is a reiteration of the same thought, which might be dispensed with; but again there are passages of

singular beauty and elevation which would atone for a thousand blemishes. With nearly all that he says we agree; and, if in a few minor points we dissent from his views, we are charmed even when we are not convinced.

1. His opinion of Paley is substantially that which has been given in these pages. After commending some previous writers, he proceeds to say, "Even these, however, have been now superseded by the masterly performance of Dr. Paley, a writer of whom it is not too much to say, that he has done more than any other individual who can be named, to accommodate the defence both of the Natural and the Christian Theology to the general understanding of our times. . . . . Of him it may be said, and with as emphatic justice as of any man who ever wrote, that there is no nonsense about him. . . . . His predominant faculty is judgment. . . . Although never to be found in the walk of sentiment or of metaphysics, or indeed in any high transcendental walk whatever, whether of the reason, or of the fancy; yet to him there most unquestionably belonged a very high order of faculties. All the mental exercises of Paley lie within the limits of sense and of experience. . . . . It is the perfection of his common sense which makes Paley at once so rare and so valuable a specimen of our nature. . . . . It were curious to have ascertained how he would have stood affected by the perusal of a volume of Kant, or by a volume of Lake poetry. . . . . He would have abhorred all German sentimentalism. . . . . The general solidity of his mind posted him as if by gravitation on the *terra firma* of experience, and restrained his flight into any region of transcendental speculation." The amount of which is, that he was a very cogent *a posteriori* reasoner, but lacked at times the full, clear perception of those intuitive principles on whose validity all reasoning depends, and without which it cannot be legitimated.

2. Chalmers saw that Paley had omitted some of the most interesting themes appertaining to his grand subject. Paley's stronghold is in the evidences of design furnished by the human body. The wisdom of this is commended by Chalmers. "What an amount and condensation of evidence for a God in the work-

manship of the human body! What bright and convincing lessons of theology might man (would he but open his eyes) read on his own person—that microcosm of divine art. . . . . Anatomy is so much more prolific of argument for a God than astronomy." "It is passing marvellous that we should have more intense evidence for a God in the construction of one eye, than in the construction of the mighty planetarium; or, that within less than the compass of a handbreadth we should find in this lower world a more pregnant and legible inscription of the Divinity, than can be gathered from a broad and magnificent survey of the skies, lighted up, though they be, with the glories and the wonders of astronomy."

We cannot accept this without considerable qualification as to the comparison between anatomy and astronomy. However, the quotations bring out fully the author's appreciation of Paley's good sense in making a stand just where he did in the battle; while Chalmers could not but see that there were other and more commanding heights where batteries might well be planted. In his third book, therefore, he considers the "proofs for the being and character of God in the constitution of the human mind;" and in book fourth, chapter fifth, he treats of the "adaptations of the material world to the moral and intellectual constitution of man."

3. It is at least questionable, whether Chalmers does not underrate the comparative force of the argument drawn from the mental constitution considered in itself. For instance: "In the mental department of creation, the argument for a God that is gathered out of such materials, is not so strong as in the other great department." To understand this we must advert to the very striking and suggestive distinction he makes between laws and collocations. "The main evidence for a God, as far as this can be collected from visible nature, lies not in the existence of matter, neither in its laws, but in its dispositions." "For, of what significancy is it towards any conclusion of this sort—that an isolated lump is possessed of hardness, or solidity, or weight; or that we can discern in it the law of cohesion, and the law of impulse, and the law of gravitation." The laws might all exist, but without the proper disposition of the parts no intelligent

result could be evolved; just as the metals of all the wheels and springs, axles and levers of a watch, might exist with all their properties, in a shapeless mass, constituting no mechanism whatever. Of this we shall speak after a little. But just now we remark it is plain enough that the evidence of design does increase with the number of individual parts of an organism. If only two separate things, as light and the eye, were brought together in order to make vision possible, the argument would have a certain measure of strength. If a third concurrence is found in the refrangibility of the rays of light, and a fourth in the exquisite structure of the lenses of the eye, and a fifth in the varying adjustment of the distance and form of the lenses for seeing nearer or remoter objects, and a sixth in the contraction or dilatation of the pupil to suit different intensities of light—at every step the atheistical solution becomes, to use a solecism, more and more impossible.

Now, Chalmers argues, there is no such complexity in the mental constitution. A few distinct faculties or powers residing in a simple, indivisible substance, exhibit intelligence in the framer, but not so forcibly as do the more complex arrangements of the material economy. In answer to which, we would urge the views presented in the former part of this article. How many things must concur to render our ratiocinations possible! These again are largely dependent on the will; and that on the wonderful machinery of the desires; and they radicate in the emotions. Surely there is complexity enough here.

Again, our distinguished author does not consider the limitation of the creature, and the profound wisdom of the Creator in adapting our mental conformation to those limitations. He comes so near this thought occasionally that it is wonderful he does not stumble on it. He discourses upon the mental laws of association or suggestion, and our belief in the stability of the laws of nature, yet somehow fails to notice their relations to time and space and finite knowledge, understanding and power.

With regard to laws and collocations, we have another instance of this great man's excess of candor. As at one time of his life he was inclined to give up the internal evidences of Christianity

as unsatisfactory, and open to much objection from the infidel; so here we find him saying that the "chemical, and optical, and magnetic, and mechanical laws," "might be discovered in a confused medley of things," "and yet, from the study of these, no argument might be drawn in favor of a God." "It is not the law of refraction in optics that manifests to us a designer." His precise idea is a little hard to arrive at, but we take it to be that laws without collocations could never produce any work of design, and would not account for the material universe, which is true. But neither would collocations without laws produce the universe, or any existing organism whatever. Both are indispensable. Besides, law is necessarily opposed to chance. Chance is irregular and capricious; law is uniform and immutable.

4. Mr. Hume objected to every thing that is true; of course he must needs object to the almost self-evident proposition, that the world is in no important sense a *singular effect;* in other words, its having been made before our knowledge, its being larger than even the pyramids, and its being amazingly full of beneficent and skilful arrangements—these facts do not take it entirely out of the class of effects. Dr. Archibald Alexander thought that Chalmers had given an unnecessary amount of attention to this idle sophism of Hume. The Christian philosopher certainly does demolish the atheist; but we refer to chapter fourth, more particularly, because there we find so superb a vindication of one of our prime logical beliefs, viz., that "this instructive expectation of a constancy in the succession of events is not the fruit of experience, but is anterior to it." As this, however, has to do with Logic more nearly than with Natural Theology, we dismiss it with only a passing allusion.

5. If our earth had a creator, why, by parity of reasoning, was not God created too? This question has already been discussed in the foregoing pages. We have examined Chalmers's answer with a very curious attention, and the result is that we cannot but consider the fifth chapter the least satisfactory in the whole book. His reply to Mr. Hume is concisely stated thus: "We have had proof of a commencement to our present material

economy; we have had no such proof of a commencement to the mental economy which may have preceded it." His proof of the former is two-fold: first, from geology; second, from history. But the only history we have of the creation is that contained in the Bible, and must have been made known by revelation, as it antedates all human experience. The objection to the argument is not that it is invalid, but that it is foreign to the domain of Natural Theology.

The geologic argument is appropriate, and is a weighty confirmation of our belief in the world's having been created. Yet it does not seem to us to reach the other question as to the Creator himself. Grant that *we* have no proof of a commencement to the preceding mental economy. This does not show that proof may not exist. It is only an appeal to our ignorance. It is but a negative argument, on which we dare not rest our faith. In this chapter, Chalmers forsakes the high ground of eternal and immutable principles, and descends to the lower level of experience. To be consistent with himself, he ought to hold that "our expectation of a constancy in the succession of events" is *not* anterior to, but is the fruit of experience.

6. Only one point remains to be considered, and it occurs in Book fifth, chapter first: "On man's partial and limited knowledge of divine things." There is hardly a more interesting theme in the whole range of philosophy than this. The special question here is, why our Maker has employed such "complex instrumentalities" for effecting his purposes. Why might he not have grafted all our mental powers and capacities "on a simple elementary atom?" Why make these bodies so fearfully and wonderfully, microcosms of art, and so highly organised chemically, that only the mysterious potency of life can keep the atoms in combination?

This is akin to the question started by Paley, "Why resort to contrivance, where power is omnipotent? . . . To have recourse to expedients implies difficulty, impediment, restraint, defect of power." His answer appears to us very satisfactory, if it be modified slightly. "It is only by the display of contrivance, that the existence, the agency, the wisdom of the Deity, *could*

be testified to his rational creatures." Omit the word "only," or omit "the existence, the agency," and we accept his statement.

Chalmers, however, goes a step farther into the inquiry, by asking why the Creator should have first made so resisting a substance as matter, and thus hampered himself with difficulties of his own origination. This he pronounces to be "a mystery that we cannot unravel." Again, however,—for we wish to follow him to the very end of his reasonings,—he suggests that these manifold adjustments "give more intense demonstration to the reality" of the divine intelligence; but this only makes God's "policy more inscrutable."

To this we may be permitted to reply, that every explanation of a natural phenomenon conducts us to a broader generalisation only, and does not absolutely or finally solve. At each step in the ascent the circle of vision enlarges, and the dim borders of the horizon expand. In the second place, to develope Paley's thought, we are perpetually surrounded by matter with its laws already fixed, and unchangeable by any efforts of ours. If the Almighty condescends to be our teacher, he must subject himself to at least some of the same limitations under which we are constrained to act. In the third place, we often limit our own power for the pleasure of exercising our skill. A pretty illustration of which is seen in the game of chess, for instance. The pawn can ordinarily move but one square; even the queen, that potentate of the board, has her constitutional restraints; and without these *rules*, the game would be impossible. Now, why should not the Highest delight in the exercise of his exquisite wisdom? His is an endless activity that must have scope; it is not a blind power, but an intelligent, all-wise efficiency, and we can see no room for its action, unless under some form or other of restriction.

This again brings us face to face with a very deep speculation. Are these restrictions *all* self-imposed by the Almighty, or do some of them exist in the nature of things? Interesting as this is to many thinkers, it belongs rather to the department of metaphysics, that charmed region to whose confines we are irresistibly led along so many lines of thought.

We have already said much more than we originally intended, and will now conclude by expressing the wish that some writer may arise in the Church, who shall profit by the labors of Paley and Chalmers, and recast the whole subject into a text-book for our colleges and theological seminaries.

CRITICAL NOTICES.

History of the Reformation in Europe in the Time of Calvin. By J. H. MERLE D'AUBIGNE, D. D., etc. Vol. V. England, Geneva, Ferrara. New York: Robert Carter & Brothers, No. 530 Broadway. 1869. Pp. 470. 12mo.

This is the tenth volume of D'Aubigné's *History of the Reformation in the Sixteenth Century*, and the fifth of the second series. The first series brought the history down to the Confession of Augsburg (1530). The second is to include the years from that period until the triumph of the Reformation in Europe generally. One or two volumes more, we are told, will bring the history to a conclusion. The author promises, after going a little further with his details of events in different countries, to concentrate his narrative, and present the progress of the great transformation in a single picture. In the next volume after the present, he will conduct us to Scotland, Denmark, Sweden, Hungary, and other parts of Europe; and then we shall return to Luther, Melancthon, and also see Calvin at his work in Geneva.

This is a feature of D'Aubigné's undertaking greatly enhancing the difficulty of his complete success. The field over which he passes is so wide and so varied that he does but touch at any point; and before we have time to rest a little, and look about us, he is calling on us to be up and away to new ones.