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I. THE LATEST INFIDELITY.

A REPLY TO INGERSOLL'S POSITIONS.

THE phase of infidelity most current among those who do not profess to accept the gospel is marked by two qualities: It is aggressive, and it is extreme. It refuses to stop short of that last result, blank atheism, or, at least, blank agnosticism, from which even the skepticism of previous ages recoiled with abhorrence. This ultraism of the present adversaries is in one aspect very shocking; but in another it is promising. They are practically teaching the world that conclusion, on which James Mills justified his atheism, that when once a man's sense rejects the gospel theory, he finds no stopping place between that rejection and atheism; because, as Bishop Butler has forever established, every difficulty which besets the old gospel plan equally embarrasses the deistic plan. This disclosure is useful. Our atheists are teaching people that there is no decent middle ground for them to stand on; but the voice of nature and conscience never permits decent people to stand long on the ground of atheism. This outrages both head and heart too horribly. Were a son to insist, contrary to sufficient evidence of the fact, upon denying and discarding the very existence of his father, we see plainly enough how his position involves every phase of filial transgression, because it involves the absolute neglect of every filial duty. The position may involve, in the form of a sin of omission, the crime of parricide. The atheist discards the very existence of his heavenly Father; so, unless he has justified his denial by sound evidence, he includes in that

(Revised Version) This 'mystery of God' may, in general, be said to be the subject of the book. One finds in it, indeed, when carefully studied, what seems like a gathering up, in brief and sublime summary, of the whole of that inspired prophecy, the details of which we find sown all through the earlier books of Scripture. It is a panoramic exhibition of the divine procedure in dealing with the church and the world. It is human history at the point of view of the kingdom of God in its *origin*, its *ordeal*, its *progress*, its *consummation*."

In the body of the work we find the accepted and revised versions arranged in parallel columns, and after each chapter occur "general comments" which embody for the most part historical illustrations, or practical suggestions more in place there than in the strictly exegetical portions, and also an occasional "*eccursus*" treating somewhat in detail of such controverted or doubtful points as the forty-two months and twelve hundred and sixty days, antichrist, the vials, the battle of Armageddon, etc., which features add to the value of the work. It is, of course, too much to expect universal accord with all our author's views, but our judgment is that, for private and family reading, for Sabbath-school teachers, and for the mass of our clergymen, pressed as they are for time, no more useful commentary on the Apocalypse has issued from the American press.

W. W. HARSHA.

SHIELDS'S "PHILOSOPHIA ULTIMA."

PHILOSOPHIA ULTIMA; OR, THE SCIENCE OF THE SCIENCES. *By Charles Woodruff Shields, D. D., LL. D., Professor in Princeton College.* New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1889. Two Volumes. Pp. 420 and 482.

In the year 1865 several gentlemen in Philadelphia, impressed with the importance of the matter, united in founding a chair in the College of New Jersey which should deal with the relations of science and religion. The scope of the work pertaining to this chair is indicated by its title, "The Harmony of Science and Revealed Religion." To this chair the author of these handsome volumes was appointed, and their contents are the fruit of his labors therein. In the preface to the first volume the author tells us that this treatise is the result of nearly thirty years' work in the department of inquiry to which it is devoted. This being the case, we would naturally expect breadth of view and wealth of learning, and we are by no means disappointed, though unable to agree with the learned author in some of his main positions.

It is proper here to state that, while closely related, the two volumes do not contain a continuous treatment of the subject in hand. This arises largely from the fact that they were not originally published at the same time. The first volume was originally published in 1877, and was in a measure complete in itself. It is the third edition of this volume which is now before us, and along with it the first edition of the second volume appears. Moreover, the second volume consists of an elaborate expansion of the last chapter of the first volume, and in this way the two volumes are linked together historically rather than logically.

A general idea of the scope of the two volumes may be gathered from their titles, which are as follows: Volume I.: "An Historical and Critical Introduction to the Final Philosophy, as Issuing from the Harmony of Science and Religion." Volume II.: "The History of the Sciences and the Logic of the Sciences." Both

volumes are largely historical, and there is considerable repetition in them. This could scarcely be avoided, as more than half of each volume is historical, and much of the same ground is travelled over twice. Yet the treatment throughout is so interesting and eloquent that the repetition is not tiresome, but rather helpful to a better understanding of the whole subject.

It is worthy of remark, that the aim of the author is a noble and inspiring one. At the present day the advance made in the various sciences is marvellous; and any attempt to obtain a systematic view of the whole field, and to link science and religion, reason and revelation, in one comprehensive system deserves high praise. This is the splendid goal, high up near the portals of the temple of eternal truth, which the Final Philosophy as the Science of the Sciences sets out to reach. We may now follow our author through his readable volumes, and see how successful he is in his lofty endeavor.

VOLUME I.—A very readable introductory chapter treats of “the academic study of Christian science.” The province of each science is carefully defined and its limits clearly prescribed. The various topics with which it is to deal are outlined, and the general relations of science and religion are indicated. That there must be inner harmony, not inherent antagonism, between science and religion is assumed, and the importance of this, alike to science, to philosophy, and to religion is emphasized. Here also the scope of the author’s conception of the Final Philosophy appears. It is “the theory and art of perfect knowledge.” This Final Philosophy, he thinks, will “promote science and vindicate religion.” The real question to be discussed is, “whether true science and true religion are susceptible of being correlated;” whether, “though distinct and diverse, they are not reciprocal and complementary;” whether they are “but opposite halves of the same rounded whole of truth?” These hints as to the nature of the task undertaken by the author appear a little vague, but they open up as he proceeds. A captious critic might be disposed to find some fault with the title of the treatise, but as the author adopts it and tells us what he means, we are not disposed to criticise.

The main body of this volume is divided into two parts. Part I sketches “The Philosophical Parties as to the Relations between Science and Religion,” while Part II unfolds “The Philosophical Theory of the Harmony of Science and Religion.” Each part is divided into five chapters, making ten complete discussions in all.

The first chapter traces “the conflicts and alliances between science and religion” from the dawn of Greek philosophy, through the pre-Christian and post-Christian ages of pagan science, and then through the patristic, scholastic and Reformation periods of Christian science. The treatment of these topics is well balanced and quite complete. Compared with Draper’s sketch of the same period it is immensely superior. The absence of a clear distinction between science and religion in early times leads our author in his discussions over nearly all the ground of philosophy as well as of science. It might have been an advantage if our author in his expositions had always kept this distinction more clearly before his own mind.

The other four chapters of this part traverse the field thus marked out in a four-fold way and with much ability. One treats of the modern *antagonism* between science and religion; another of the modern *indifferentism* between them; another discusses modern *eclecticism* between science and religion, and the last deals with modern *skepticism* between them. This plan of discussion leads us over nearly

the same ground four times, but as a different conveyance carries us each time by a new route and past other landscapes, we do not feel like objecting to the trips. Each journey we are led through the territories of the following sciences: Astronomy, Geology, Anthropology, Psychology, Sociology, Theology, Religious Philosophy, and Religious Culture. Four pleasant journeys through these interesting fields are made. The first time we take the coach of *antagonism*, the second that of *indifferentism*, the third that of *eclecticism*, and the fourth that of *skepticism*. This historical sketch, occupying nearly two hundred pages and covering a very wide field, deserves much praise and little criticism. Three simple remarks is all we have space to make:

1. In the chapter on modern antagonism between science and religion it is made evident that the conflict is not always that of theologians against scientists, but often that of scientists against each other. This consideration might have been even more strongly stated than it is by our author, for many new scientific discoveries were as much opposed by scientists themselves as by theologians, and the theologians were not always on the side of error. The controversy concerning Harvey's discovery of the circulation of the blood is but one of many illustrations that might be quoted here.

2. The geological and anthropological sections are generally the most satisfactory in each of the four chapters, while the chapter on Modern Skepticism between science and religion seems more meagre and superficial than any of them. In the chapter on Eclecticism, the treatment of Genesis and Geology constitutes a very complete discussion of an extensive and inviting field.

3. The general conclusion of Part I. may be given in the author's own words: "We may therefore conclude, after a full survey of all modern philosophical opinions, that the two great interests of religion and science are not only reconcilable, but actually being reconciled. Let neither the scientist nor the religionist despair of their ultimate harmony, but rather let both strive together to effect it, and therein hail at once the thorough fusion of Christianity and civilization, and the practical union of earth and heaven." (P. 242.)

Part II. opens with a significant chapter on the "Umpirage of Philosophy between Science and Religion." This chapter is by far the most important in the book, inasmuch as in it is unfolded the author's fundamental positions in regard to the relations between science, philosophy and religion. We shall, therefore, examine this chapter with some care, first stating the author's views pretty fully, and then estimating their import.

Professor Shields' general position is thus expressed: "Philosophy, in the best sense of the word, is the umpire between science and religion." (P. 271.) In this statement it is of great importance to get a clear idea of the meaning of the term philosophy; yet we have to confess considerable difficulty in getting such an idea. He defines and explains philosophy in various ways, of which the following are some leading examples: "It is the science of things human and divine, together with their causes." "It includes whatsoever is common to both the secular and sacred departments of learning." "As the science of knowledge, it aims to ascertain inductively the validity, the limits and the functions of reason and revelation." "As a summary of universal science, it receives and cherishes impartially and equally the discovered and revealed bodies of knowledge that it may organize them into a rational system." "In the most common and literal sense of the

word, it is love of wisdom." (P. 271.) "If we would characterize a lover, seeker and reconciler of all truths, both natural and revealed, we must term him a philosopher." "If we would describe that special work which is to be done in adjusting the relations of religion and science in ascertaining and defending their respective spheres and prerogatives, in devising and applying logical rules to their pending controversies, in sifting their several portions of truth from error, and combining them into a harmonious system, we can only speak of all this as a peculiar intellectual task belonging neither to religion alone, nor to science alone, but to their common ally and friend, philosophy." (P. 272) It must be confessed, that no very clear conception of the nature and office of philosophy can be gathered from these passages, other than the very general one of the love of truth, and the right use of reason in general.

As to the umpirage of philosophy, our author says: "Religion alone could not furnish the needed umpire;" "science alone could not furnish the needed umpire;" "philosophy, at least, is the actual and accepted umpire;" "philosophy, too, is the only available, . . . the only desirable umpire." (Pp. 272-274.) "The reconciliation of science and religion is not only the distinctive problem of philosophy, but precisely that one chief problem by the solution of which her own function is exhausted, her goal attained, her mission accomplished." (P. 276.) This is certainly a high and sacred task for philosophy; but it may be doubted whether philosophy will submit to such limitations as are therein involved. She will likely still persist in dealing with many other problems besides the reconciliation of science and religion, important as that office is admitted to be. It must be added here that our author is careful to point out, that in using the term "umpirage," he does not design "to exalt science over religion, or philosophy over either." "An umpire is but the servant of the game that he watches, making neither the laws nor the facts, but simply applying the one to the other." (P. 277.)

To illustrate the manner and results of the "umpirage of philosophy," a few examples may be taken from some of the living issues between science and religion as mentioned by our author. The first is from purely physical science, and relates to the origin of the cosmos. It is thus stated in the book before us: "On the scientific side of this question we have the hypothesis of universal evolution, of a spontaneous growth of worlds out of crude matter, by means of its own laws, from an indefinite immensity and antiquity; in a word, the rise of the present cosmos from a primitive chaos." (P. 249.) "On the religious side of the same question we have the dogma of immediate creation, of an instantaneous starting forth of the heavens and earth from nothing, in their present form, at the mere word of Jehovah." (P. 250.) In geology a similar antagonism appears: "On the one side (that of science) of the question is the hypothesis of secular evolution, of a slow unfolding of the globe from a chaotic mass into its organized form, through the action of existing causes, during indefinite time." (P. 252.) "On the religious side of the same question is the dogma of successive creations, of Almighty fiat calling into being one after another land and sea and sky, reptiles and plants and animals, in six days of twenty-four hours, a few thousand years ago." (P. 253.) Another example from anthropology must suffice: "On the scientific side rises before us the hypothesis of derivative evolution, of a gradual growth of animal into human species, under organic and climatic laws, long ages ere history was born." (P. 255.) "On the other side of the same question stands the dogma of independent creation,

of an immediate formation of man, out of the ground, in the image of God, on the sixth day of the first week of the world." (P. 256.)

According to our author, philosophy is to act as umpire between these antagonistic views on the scientific and religious sides, and decide whether the cosmos is the result of "a spontaneous growth by means of its own laws," or the product "of immediate creation;" whether the present condition of the earth is the result of a "slow unfolding of the globe from a chaotic mass into its organized form," or the product of "successive creations;" whether man is the result of a "gradual growth of animal into human species," or the product of "an independent creation." The "umpirage of philosophy" between science and religion will at once appear from these examples to be a delicate and difficult task. It will likely happen that in many cases one side or the other will dispute the decisions of the umpire; and in that case our author does not say what must be done.

In replying to certain objections to his views, our author makes some important statements of much value in this connection. In regard to the conflict between science and religion he says: "Before the debate can proceed intelligently there are certain preliminary questions which must and ought to be settled, and which can only be settled, as we have maintained, by philosophic minds." (P. 280.) These preliminary questions are such as lie in the field of natural theology and the evidences of Christianity. He says: "The whole field of natural theology and the Christian evidences logically precedes all questions between science and the Bible." "If these evidences are sufficient, it would be unphilosophical for a scientist to reject or ignore that revelation in debating with a theologian." (P. 280.) The following remarks may be made on the views above stated:

1. Our author's conception of philosophy seems extremely vague and indefinite. He says it means a love of all truth, and other statements imply that he employs the term to denote the proper use of human reason in regard to the questions in debate between science and religion. This conception is as applicable to the scientist and theologian as to the philosopher. All profess to be lovers and seekers of truth, and all three would no doubt regard it as slander to accuse them of not using reason properly. A conception of philosophy which is so broad as to be equally applicable to science and religion is of little use in deciding controversies between them. We admit that reason has an important preliminary office in regard to the evidences of religion; but our author evidently means much more than this when he says that philosophy is the umpire between science and religion. Something much more definite than this view of philosophy is needed in order to meet the demands of the problem.

2. In the examples of the antagonisms between science and religion cited by our author, the form of expression presents the opposition too sharply, and in a somewhat one-sided way. Why use the term "dogma" in every case on the religious side when that term is in bad repute in certain quarters and the better word, "doctrine," is at hand? Why present the extreme non-biblical hypotheses on the scientific side in every case, as if these were fully established on merely scientific grounds? Moreover, there are scientific dogmas and dogmatic scientists, as well as theological dogmas and dogmatic theologians. At the present day perhaps the former outnumber and make more noise than the latter. A little care here would have made this chapter much more satisfactory.

3. In regard to the discussions on the scientific side, as above cited, it must be

remembered that the work of the scientist is not complete until he has reached well assured conclusions. The scientist has not merely to frame hypotheses and hand them over to the philosopher for verification ; he himself must verify them before his work is done. In regard to the origin of the cosmos, the method of its development, and the origin of man, as cited from our author, it cannot be said that science has yet reached her final result, for the theories of to-day may be discarded to-morrow. Until science has spoken her last word she is not prepared to hand over her jurisdiction and submit to the umpirage of philosophy. Hence philosophy cannot commence her umpirage till science has ended her labor, and then it may be found that there is nothing for philosophy to do, inasmuch as all conflict with religion has vanished when true scientific results have been reached.

4. In like manner, on the religious side as little can religion be expected to abdicate in favor of philosophy, and submit her well founded doctrines to the umpirage of philosophy for modification or rejection. Reason having discharged her primary office in regard to the evidences of divine revelation, and sound interpretation of that revelation having been reached, the result on the religious side is final, and no umpirage on the part of philosophy is permissible, and none is necessary. The proposed umpirage of philosophy, in spite of our author's protest, brings us dangerously near the malarial region of unhealthy rationalism.

5. The nature and relations of science, philosophy, and theology can only be indicated in the briefest way. Science deals with observed facts in any field ; philosophy treats of first principles in general ; and theology, in the strict sense, discusses revealed truth. Science has a wide field, but raises questions which philosophy must answer, while philosophy again starts problems which theology only can solve. To a certain extent they may cover the same ground, and deal with various phases of the same problems, and yet each has its own distinctive territory and material. Scientific inquiry necessarily runs up to the region of philosophy, and philosophical speculation naturally rises up to the realm of theology. Hence science, philosophy, and theology constitute a trinity graded in order one above the other. When reason has discharged its preliminary office in regard to theology and set her upon the throne, it must at once acknowledge her supremacy. Thus philosophy cannot remain the umpire between science and religion. Revealed theology is supreme, not only in her own proper sphere, but wherever she speaks concerning topics common to her and science, or to her and philosophy. At her right-hand stands philosophy, and at her left science ; both must heed her voice and do her homage.

In the second chapter the "Positive Philosophy, or Theory of Nescience," is discussed in a very satisfactory way. The pretensions of Comte are passed through the crucible. It is shown that the law of the three states—*theological, metaphysical and positive*—is not confirmed by the experience either of the individual or the race. The three stages are found coëxistent at the present time ; and, instead of supplanting one another, are actually complimentary. Our author also points out that there is no basis in the mental and moral constitution of man for this law ; and it is further found that both theology and metaphysics are flourishing at the present day. This chapter, though going over well beaten ground, is a very satisfactory one.

The third chapter deals with the "Absolute Philosophy, or the Theory of Omniscience." Five questions concerning the absolute are asked and answered. Is it

conceivable, credible, cognizable, revealable, and demonstrable? An affirmative answer, with certain limitations, is given to each of these questions, and with most that is said we can agree. The only remark we are inclined to make is that our author does Hamilton scant justice in such passages as this: "It was charged by Hamilton that Kant 'had slain the body, but had not exorcised the spectre of the absolute; and this spectre has continued to haunt the schools of Germany even to the present day.' But it may now be charged upon Hamilton himself that in his zeal to exorcise the spectre he has mangled the body of the absolute, and left the remains of philosophy in the hands of infidels." We call attention to this passage as an illustration of many that we find in current philosophical literature which seem to us to indicate a somewhat one-sided and superficial view of Hamilton's philosophy as a whole; for while we admit that Hamilton too rigidly maintained that by the pathway of pure intellect the absolute is inaccessible, yet by another avenue, too often overlooked—that of faith—a well grounded conviction of the reality of the absolute is reached. Many writers ignore this important side of Hamilton's philosophy, and Spencer especially has done Hamilton serious injustice in using him as he does in support of agnosticism.

The fourth chapter deals with the "Final Philosophy, or the Theory of Perfected Science." As neither the positive nor the absolute philosophy furnishes a complete theory and system of knowledge divine and human, as that wherein reason shall appear concurrent with revelation, another theory must be sought. Here, again, with some repetition, the objects, methods and results of positivism and absolutism are defined and contrasted, and various reasons are given for their reconciliation in the so-called Final Philosophy. Whilst the aim which our author has in view is lofty and noble, and the discussion scholarly, yet it must be confessed that the treatment of the subject is so vague and general that its perusal is not entirely satisfactory, especially as expectation is somewhat raised by the title, Final Philosophy.

VOLUME II.—Having devoted so much space to the first volume, much less can be given to the second. It has already been stated that the second volume consists in an expansion of the last chapter of the first volume, which treats of the "Project of the Perfected Sciences and Arts," and that the title of the second volume was "Philosophia Ultima, or the Science of the Sciences—The History of the Sciences and the Logic of the Sciences."

The introduction is an exceedingly eloquent exposition of the aim and scope of philosophy. The term philosophy is still used in a general sense, and it aims, our author says, to answer three questions: What can we know? How can we know? Why should we know? The answer to the first gives "a science of the sciences," to the second "the art of the sciences" and to the third "the science of the arts." This opens up the main divisions of the treatise, but in the detailed discussion of these three questions the first occupies 410 out of 482 pages. What we have to say by way of review will be confined entirely to this part of the work, wherein philosophy is viewed as the science of the sciences, in the discharge of her function as the umpire between science and religion.

The first chapter proceeds to discuss, at great length and with much ability, "The Purification of the Sciences." After the manner of Bacon, the sources of error are pointed out, and then a definition of "science" is given as "exact, verified organized knowledge." The great topic of the classification of the sciences is treated at length and with immense stores of learning. The conditions of the for-

mation of a science of the sciences are then laid down as follows:—1. All the sciences must have come into being. 2. All the contents of all the sciences must be included. 3. All the legitimate factors of human knowledge must be included. 4. Revealed religion as the metaphysical complement of the sciences must be embraced. These conditions are important, and this chapter is an able and instructive one, showing everywhere marks of wide and careful research.

The second chapter makes a rapid yet very complete survey of the various leading sciences, and the ground travelled over is nearly the same as that covered by the historical portion of the first volume. Astronomy, geology, anthropology, psychology, sociology, and theology are each gone over in turn, and in each science the *natural* and the *revealed* elements are sketched in a very complete manner. No proper idea of the extent of our author's work here can be given.

In the third chapter "The Science of the Sciences," the Final Philosophy, is taken up, and the most important part of this volume now comes before us. This universal science is divided into three great branches:—Philosophic science, metaphysic science, and theosophic science. The first deals with "the theory of knowledge," the second with "the theory of being," and the third with "the theory of divine things." In the first department the relations of realism and idealism, of transcendentalism and empiricism, and of absolutism and positivism are dealt with. In the second department the relations of monism and dualism, of evolutionism and creationism, and of optimism and pessimism are sketched. In the third department an outline is given of the relations of naturalism and supernaturalism, of rationalism and super-rationalism, and of agnosticism and gnosticism.

The scope of the discussion will appear to be of immense extent from the above brief recital of the topics embraced. There is much that we would like to say, both in way of commendation and of criticism, but we mention only two things in a sentence or two.

1. There is in this chapter a very good and careful sketch of the field of Comparative Religion, where the conclusion is reached (p. 285), "That as yet it would be premature and misleading to attempt anything like a strict scientific correlation of non-Christian and Christian, or rational and revealed religions." It may be questioned whether such correlation should be regarded as an open question, even with the incomplete study of non-Christian religions that has yet been made. Such study has, in our judgment, pointed more and more to the *generic* difference of Christianity from all other forms of religion rather than to their correlation.

2. The conclusion reached as to the present state of the question in the review made by our author of evolutionism and creationism is stated as follows, on p. 343: "From present signs it would seem that the tide of controversy has turned in favor of evolutionism in some form and degree as logically consistent with the strictest creationism." We cannot here enter upon this question at any length, but must confess our inability to agree with the conclusion thus stated. To us *strict* creationism and evolutionism in any *proper* sense are inconsistent with each other. Much of course depends on the meaning given to the terms in the above statement, especially the term evolution. If it be used in the wide sense of ontological evolution, as it is by H. Spencer, then creation in the strict sense can have no place. But this form of evolution must build bridges between the non-vital and the vital, between the vital and the mental, between the mental and the moral, and between the moral and the religious, before it can carry us across. Here we venture to say

that the first bridge is not yet built, and what is more significant, the architects seem to have given up the contract. If it be used in the narrower sense of biological evolution, then the bridge between different species in the vegetable and animal kingdoms must be completely and permanently constructed. Here, too, we venture to think that the proposed bridge is not strong enough to carry its own weight; and, if we are not mistaken, the tendency on the part of leading scientists during the last four or five years is to speak with more caution than was their habit fifteen or twenty years ago upon this great subject. One example of great weight may be quoted in this connection. Professor Virchow, of Berlin, is one of the leading biologists in the world at the present day. At a meeting of an Anthropological Congress held during the present year in Vienna, he made an able address, in the course of which he said: "Twenty years ago the Darwinian theory made its first victorious march through the world. . . . We have sought in vain for the intermediate stages which are supposed to connect man with the apes—the proto-man—the *pro-anthropos* is not yet discovered. For anthropological science *pro-anthropos* is not even a subject for discussion. The anthropologist may see it in his dreams, but as soon as he awakes he cannot say that he has made any approach towards him. In the course of five thousand years no change of type worthy of mention has taken place. If you ask me whether the first man was white or black, I can only say I do not know. Every living race is still human; no single one has yet been found that we can designate as simian or quasi-simian."

But we cannot follow this subject further, nor can we allude to many other inviting things in this elaborate treatise of Dr. Shields. To those who wish to know more about it we would say, "Get the portly volumes and read them carefully." Their perusal will well repay the reader for the time spent in going through them.

Before concluding we wish to call attention to some simple blemishes which mar the text of the second volume especially. These blemishes appear in the orthography of proper names. The following are some examples: We find Jehovah on p. 24, and Jehova on p. 445; Du Bois Reymond, p. 105, and Dubois, p. 211; D'Holbach, p. 214, d'Holbach, p. 363; Haeckel, p. 246, Haeckel, p. 313; Wolff, p. 63, Wolf, p. 260, Wolfe, p. 297; Mahomedanism, p. 266, Mohamedan, p. 268, Mohammedan, p. 274; Boodhism, p. 268, Budhism, p. 277, Buddhism, p. 283; Luthardt, p. 325, Luthard, p. 366; Tholuch, p. 366, Tholuck, p. 384; Shakspeare, p. 176, Shakespeare, p. 389. Whatever form of these proper names is chosen by the author or proof-reader, there should be uniformity in the one used. Otherwise the letterpress is excellent, and the paper and binding all that could be desired.

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SAYCE'S "HITTITES."

THE HITTITES: The Story of a Forgotten Empire. *By A. H. Sayce, LL. D., Deputy-Professor of Philology, Oxford.* London: The Religious Tract Society, 56 Paternoster Row. 1888. pp. 150; 7½ x 5 in. Price 2s. 6d.

This slender volume, which one can read at a single sitting, is the latest addition to that excellent series now widely known under the general title of "By-paths