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REVIEW SECTION.

I.—PRACTICAL RESULTS OF THE SCIENTIFIC DISCOVERIES OF THE NINETEENTH CENTURY.*

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MR. ALFRED RUSSEL WALLACE has given an impressive list of the inventions and discoveries of the last hundred years, compared with those of the whole preceding period of the world's history. According to this, the fertility of the nineteenth century is nearly twice that of the entire previous period. But this is more impressive from a numerical point of view than from a discriminating analysis of the individual discoveries noted. Sailing-ships are indeed slower than steamships; but, with the aid of the mariner's compass, the world had been pretty thoroughly explored before the beginning of the last century. The telescope of the preceding century had also already taken us far into the mysteries of the starry heavens. The present century has improved the instrument, but the merit of discovery belongs to the past. The barometer and the thermometer are likewise heritages of the past. The idea of weighing the air and of measuring the actual degrees of heat is not original with the nineteenth century, however marvelous may be the applications to which we have put the later results of the idea.

Printing, too, is older than it seems. The use of movable types originated indeed in the fifteenth century, but coins were stamped in the classic days of Greece, and seals impressed in the dim ages of Babylonian antiquity. De Quincey has well shown that the significance of the printing-press is largely due to the discovery of cheap methods of paper-making; while at the present time the immense fertility of the printing-press is made possible by the substitution of wood pulp for cotton and linen fiber in the making of paper. There are not rags enough in the world to begin to supply the demand that is now made

* For "The Progress of Scientific Thought during the Nineteenth Century," by the same author, see THE HOMILETIC REVIEW for May, p. 387.



1. The Word is a vital power in the Church which pierces even to the dividing asunder of the joints and the marrow, and as such it is a divinely ordained instrument to create impressions in a man; and these impressions are the means by which holy inclinations are implanted in his heart.

2. *Life's experiences* also make impressions in us more or less lasting; and these God uses also to create holy dispositions.

3. The third instrument refers to the effect of *habit*. Repeated sinful acts make the sinner bold and create sinful habits; in this way he cooperates to make himself a greater sinner. In a similar sense the saint cooperates in his own salvation by allowing the holy disposition to radiate in good works. The frequent act of doing good creates the habit. The habit gradually becomes a second nature. And it is this mighty influence of habit which God uses to teach us holiness. In this way God can make one saint instrumental in the sanctification of another.

An architect builds a palace which makes him famous as an artist. It is true the contractor, an important person in his place, erects the structure; but his name is scarcely mentioned. It is the architect alone for whom all the praise is reserved. In sanctification it is not the Word by itself that is effectual, but that Word handled by the *Holy Spirit*. Neither is it the experience of life alone, but that experience employed by the *Holy Artist*. Neither is it the regenerate person who serves as foreman, but the glorious, Triune God, in whose service he labors.

V.—RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN BIBLICAL CRITICISM.*

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OF the titles in the footnote referred to in the heading of this article, the last two stand for estimates, made by distinguished men, of the effect upon current

* "JEWISH RELIGIOUS LIFE AFTER THE EXILE." By the Rev. T. K. Cheyne, M.A., D.D., Oriel Professor of the Interpretation of Holy Scripture at Oxford. G. P. Putnam's Sons, New York and London, 1898.

"THE DOCUMENTS OF THE HEXATEUCH." Translated and Arranged in Chronological Order, with Introduction and Notes. By W. E. Addis, M.A., of Balliol College, Oxford. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons. Part i., The Oldest Book of Hebrew History. 1893. Vol. ii., The Deuteronomical Writers and the Priestly Documents. 1898.

"THE PROPHETS OF ISRAEL." By Prof. Carl Heinrich Cornill. Translated by Sutton F. Corkran. Third Edition. Chicago: The Open Court Publishing Company, 1897.

"HISTORY OF THE PEOPLE OF ISRAEL." Written for Lay Readers by Carl Heinrich Cornill, Ph.D., S.T.D. Translated by W. H. Carruth. Chicago: The Open Court Publishing Company, 1898.

"DICTIONARY OF THE BIBLE." Edited by James Hastings, M.A., D.D. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. Vol. i., A—Feasts. 1898. Vol. ii., Feign—Kinsman. 1899.

"ENCYCLOPÆDIA BIBLICA." Edited by the Rev. T. K. Cheyne, M.A., D.D., and J. Sutherland Black, M.A., LL.D. New York: The Macmillan Company. Vol. i., A—D. 1899.

"THOUGHTS ON THE PRESENT POSITION OF PROTESTANTISM." By Adolph Harnack. London: Adam & Charles Black, 1899.

"HAS THE GOSPEL OF THE REFORMATION BECOME ANTIQUATED?" An Article by Prof. Friedrich Loofs, Ph.D., D.D., of the University of Halle. Published in *The American Journal of Theology* for July, 1899.

religious thinking of the critical views now prevalent. The other six stand for a few out of many scores of works in which the representatives of these critical views place their latest results before the public. These titles are here cited, not for any polemic purpose, but merely as a basis for the presentation of certain clear facts and the drawing therefrom of a practical inference.

Professor Loofs gives a negative answer to the question whether the gospel of the Reformation has for our day become antiquated. But in his negative answer two things are conspicuous. First, his attitude is not that of one who affirms an assumed and accepted fact, but rather that of one who argues one side of a disputed question. Second, he concedes his inability to establish his proposition except by first so defining the gospel of the Reformation as to exclude much that the reformers included. His definition is the following:

"The gospel of the Reformation is the message of God to our humanity, offering us justification only through faith in Jesus Christ the Savior, in whom the eternal God has revealed Himself to the world in the life of a human person by whose death and resurrection He has redeemed us from sin and death" (p. 440).

Clearly this statement reduces Protestant theological teaching to a minimum. In defining it Dr. Loofs specifically excludes the Reformation idea of the trustworthiness of the Scriptures as to matters of fact, and also excludes many particulars for which our sole evidence is the testimony of the Scriptures—for example, the miraculous birth of Jesus, His ascension as distinguished from His resurrection, His divine character as distinguished from a supernatural and unique character. These and other doctrines Dr. Loofs sets aside as being unessential parts of the gospel of the Reformation, and not of the essential and permanent part of that gospel. We are concerned, not with the question whether he personally rejects these doctrines, but only with the fact that he feels compelled to leave them out, in order to avoid conceding that the gospel of the Reformation is antiquated. Only so much as is contained in the above-defined residuum is all that he dares undertake to defend.

Dr. Harnack's utterance is less elaborate. It was originally an unwritten address which was widely reported and misunderstood, and it has been published to correct the misunderstanding. The affirmations in it are made primarily of the national Protestant churches of the continent of Europe, and Dr. Harnack courteously declines to say how far they may be applicable elsewhere. His thesis is that the Protestant churches have "broken with the Intellectualism of the old Protestant system." That is, the Protestant churches, as a matter of fact, no longer have a doctrinal platform, but have become merely organizations bound together by church government, worship, and work. He deplors this, but affirms that it is a fact. As a current fact, it makes a strong demand on men whose views are like his own.

"Whatever scorn and mockery may be poured upon those who put forward any such demand, the effort to state the old faith anew, and to state it simply and clearly in the language of our own time, is one which we must not abandon" (p. 60).

Such utterances by such men are too grave to be disregarded. We have not here claims of victory on the part of men who rejoice in the downfall of the old creeds; these men believe in the need of personal convictions of religious truth, and regret the extent to which these have gone out of vogue. Again, we have not here an alarmist attack upon the prevailing schools of criticism; these men in the main accept the views of these schools, even while they attribute disastrous results to them. Nor have we here the frightened holding up of a distant danger, which may turn out to be imaginary; these men say that the disaster has already come in the continental churches, and if they are correct, it is impending in the American churches.

The gravity of the consequences involved, therefore, gives added interest to a survey of the recently published critical literature. The six titles of critical

works connected with this article do not all stand on the same footing. The "Dictionary of the Bible," for example, includes among its contributors some scholars who have no sympathy with the prevailing critical school. Excluding all books not in English and all books properly American, the titles have been selected nearly at random. The recent work of American scholars in this field, however, is not inferior either in quantity or quality to that of their European compeers, nor have other languages been less prolific than the English.

In the cited volumes and the large body of recent literature which they represent, the critics of the current school are mainly engaged in bringing their theories to completion. They are reconstructing the records and the events on the basis of the destructive work done by their predecessors. They are filling in the rough outlines that have been sketched by the earlier men. They are applying the logic of their theory to the history of the postexilic times, and to other parts of the Old Testament which have hitherto escaped, and are extending it to the New Testament. But in particular they are endeavoring to popularize their work, to put it into the form of books of reference, manuals, primers, teachers' Bibles, Sunday-school lesson preparations, Bible stories, popular sketches, so that it may no longer be the property of learned men only, but of all who study the Bible.

1. In looking at this mass of recent writings one is struck with the seeming victoriousness of the school of opinion which it represents. The number of the gifted young scholars who appear in print as the advocates of these views, the prominence of the positions they occupy, the genuine strength of a good deal of their work, their issuing of new volumes at an average rate of two or three every month, the reception of these with no protest on the part of any one, the fact that the religious press always notices them civilly, seldom with disapproval, and often with strong approval—could triumph be more complete? Possibly we may find that this tranquil and undisputed enjoyment of the fruits of victory is rather apparent than real, but apparent it certainly is.

The men themselves regard their victory as won, and are not reticent concerning either their defeated opponents or themselves. If one might compliment them by a bit of plain speaking, one would say to them that, posing as martyrs when others disapprove our opinions, or persistently proclaiming ourselves to be "eminent scholars," or too much exhibition of our consciousness of the enormity of the intellectual sins of those whom we fail to convince, or accusing those who differ with us of bigotry and mental dishonesty are, perhaps, habits no more commendable than the habit of heresy-hunting itself. For the rest, these men have certainly gained a brilliant success in thus bringing their case so near to completion, and in making this voluminous and nearly unopposed presentation of it to the public. But this is a success in which their opponents should rejoice equally with themselves. In a thought-movement which attempts to revolutionize current thinking, all parties should be glad when that crisis is reached in which the case goes before the public on its merits. Five years ago men who were not experts had to judge of this controversy mainly by their estimate of the character of the disputants; thanks to the literature since published, a large part of the case itself is now generally accessible. If the public judges favorably the case as thus presented, that will make the victory of its advocates decisive. But the presenting of a case is not necessarily the winning of a verdict. There are instances in which the full understanding of a doctrine leads to the rejection of it. Which result will ensue in the present case remains to be seen.

2. Another thing that sharply attracts attention, in this body of recent critical writings, is the frankness with which the writers avow their opinion that the statements of fact found in the Scriptures are so generally untruthful that we can not depend upon them. Take two or three instances:

"The Israelitish narrative, as it lies before us in the books of the Old Testament, gives a thoroughly one-sided, and in many respects incorrect, picture of the profane history, and on the other hand an absolutely false representation of the religious history of the people,

and has thus made the discovery of the truth wellnigh impossible" (Cornill, "Prophets of Israel," p. 3).

Similar statements are repeated on pages 5 and 9 of Cornill's "History." With these compare the following, spoken concerning the books of Ezra and Nehemiah:

"The traditional account is, I regret to say, to a large extent untrustworthy. Tradition has partly imagined facts where there were none, partly exaggerated the really existing facts" (Cheyne, "Jewish Religious Life," p. 7).

Not all the critics of this school have formulated this doctrine as exactly as have Cornill and Cheyne, but it is the necessary main foundation of the reasoning of all of them. It is often to be found in the treatment of details, even where no formal statement of it has been made. The following instances are from Addis:

"We have indeed strong grounds for rejecting the theory . . . that Hezekiah's reform was caused by the teaching of Deuteronomy. No doubt the writer in 2 Kings xviii. 3-7 implies this, but then he himself belongs to the Deuteronomic school, . . . and would naturally take this for granted" (ii., p. 9).

"Modern scholars who can study Jeremiah's writings in a historical spirit of which no author of fictitious history in early days was capable" (ii., p. 7).

The "fictitious history" referred to is especially that found in the books of Kings and Chronicles. On the next page he speaks of—

"the admitted and evident fact that the narrative in 2 Kings has been altered in important respects by a later hand."

He is speaking of the account of what took place under Josiah. He adds that the record concerning Huldah's prophecy is false:

"It is simply incredible that she predicted . . . the inevitable and unconditional ruin of the nation."

There may possibly be advocates of the prevailing criticism who have avoided committing themselves to statements of this kind, but if so, they are rare exceptions. Saying this is not making an accusation; it is simply calling attention to what these men regard as correct method. If they are right in the matter, then it is commendable in them to follow their convictions. But, to be just, we need to know what their convictions are. One might consistently hold that the books of Esther and Daniel are works of fiction, and that Deuteronomy has a framework of fiction, and that the element of fiction elsewhere enters into the Scriptures, even in many matters that we have been wont to regard as fact, and yet that the Scriptures are thoroughly truthful in the statements of fact which they actually make. Or, again, one might hold that the Scriptures are essentially truthful, tho including some relatively unimportant mistakes. Occasionally we find in published articles the assumption that one or the other of these views is the view of the prevailing school of criticism. Those who make this assumption are not well informed. We have already seen what the prevailing critical view really is. Its representatives differ among themselves as to the extent of the untrustworthiness of the Scriptures; but it is as if one should say that nearly one third of the statements of fact are false, while another should say that less than one third are true. The statements they reject are not concerning matters of detail only, but include the heart of the history. They distinguish between what they regard as the earlier and what they regard as the later portions, but the distinction they make is this: that the earlier writers recorded legend as on the same footing with fact; while the later writers systematically and deliberately, tho perhaps unintentionally, falsified the records which their predecessors had made. This untrustworthiness, they hold, characterizes substantially every part of the Old Testament as it has existed for the past two thousand years, and also characterizes most of the sources, early or late, into which they resolve the historical books of the Old Testament.

Many of these men, however, would indignantly deny that they are assailants of the truthfulness of the Scriptures. Through this very process of rejecting

what they regard as false, they claim to be the real vindicators of the proper truthfulness of Scripture. But I think they will not deny the assertions I have just made. In any average case in which a Scriptural statement of fact conflicts with even a low probability derived from other sources, they are likely to accept the latter to the rejection of the Scriptural statement of fact. Whoever reverses this process, and accepts the Scriptural statement of fact except where the evidence against it amounts to at least a strong probability, will soon part company with the prevailing schools of criticism.

It is an important gain to have this so distinctly avowed and so sharply formulated as it is in the citations made above. In time past a good deal of discussion has been wasted through lack of distinctness in stating the issues. This issue, at least, is now distinct.

3. As a part of this affirmation of the relative worthlessness of the Biblical statements of fact, our attention is attracted to the ready avowal of the recent critical writers that their view of the history of Israel and of the dates of the Old-Testament books is in contradiction with all the testimony in the case, including that of the writers of the Old and New Testaments.

In arguing against them it is no longer necessary laboriously to prove that passages in Judges, Samuel, Kings, and the earlier prophetic books presuppose Deuteronomy and the priestly writings. They now fully concede this in the analyses they make, for in their analyses they ascribe large portions of these books to Deuteronomistic or late postexilic compilers or editors. In other words, it is undisputed that the Old-Testament books, in the form in which they have existed from the time of Jesus to the present, testify abundantly to the early existence in Israel of the writings attributed to Moses and to David, and of all the more important Pentateuchal ideas and institutions. It is further undisputed that the writers of the New Testament and those of the Apocrypha and the other secondary Jewish-writings testify to the same facts. That Paul and Jesus are among the witnesses who testify to these facts is the opinion of an increasing majority. It is easier to hold that Jesus was mistaken, and to give a kenotic explanation of His mistakes, than to force any other interpretation upon His words. Those who hold that the writings and institutions attributed to Moses and David originated centuries after these men, cheerfully admit that the testimony in the case is all against them. They stake their case on the proposition that the testimony is mistaken save in such shreds of truth as may be elicited from it on cross-examination. Here again the simplifying of the problem is of great advantage. Everything resolves itself into the question whether the proof they adduce to discredit the testimony is adequate for that purpose.

4. A different feature of the recent critical literature is the vagueness and the confessed indecisiveness of most of its reconstructive work.

This is the more noteworthy because it alleges the reaching of definite and exact truth, in contrast with the uncertain results of earlier methods, as the great motive of all its work. Dr. Cheyne gives the following admirable statement of this motive:

"It is not as a collection of picturesque tales that the narratives of the Old Testament will reconquer their position in the educated world. What a modern thinker most desires to learn from the Old Testament is the true history of the Jewish religion" ("*Jewish Religious Life*," p. 1).

In this ambition to learn the exact truth concerning Israelitish history all scholarly men will surely sympathize with them. But have they succeeded, they themselves being witnesses? Is their success such as to give us confidence in their methods?

Along this line they have done a good deal of brilliant writing. They have used to good purpose materials drawn from travel and from archeology and from insight into universal human nature. A reader who has previously had only

wooden ideas of the history is likely to find himself wonderfully attracted by their presentation of it. But when one compares their view carefully with the accounts given in the Bible, he is struck by its utter vagueness, its mere generality, its lack of grasp and point—in short, its negative character. From their point of view this is, of course, not a defect; it is the natural result of their eliminating, in the interests of alleged historical truth, the large mass of facts which they regard as insufficiently authenticated.

But with all this they frankly acknowledge that in their researches they have reached no high degree of average probability. Cheyne says:

"If I can not present you with absolute truth, I can at least be sympathetic and critical" (p. 2).

He says that his aim has been to give to students—

"a synthesis of the best critical results at present attainable, and so to enable them to judge of their degree of probability" (p. xix.).

He says of his lectures:

"They are the provisional summing up of a series of special researches" (p. xxi.).

One of many like statements from Professor Addis is the following:

"Separating conclusions which are certain, or at least highly probable, from those which do not rise above a low degree of probability, or are simply ingenious guesses on matters which must remain obscure till more evidence is forthcoming or the witnesses we possess have been interrogated with better success" (ii., pp. 1, 2).

Passages like these characterize most of the recent critical works. There is in them an intelligent candor that commands our respect, and might often serve for an example. But there is also in them a confession which it is important to estimate correctly. The opponents of these men would deny their conclusions *in toto*. They themselves own that the proportion of their conclusions that seem to them highly probable is so meager that they find it necessary constantly to supplement these by other conclusions ranging from low probabilities to mere "ingenious guesses."

Two questions are inevitably suggested: First, are the premises and processes by which just these results are reached so satisfactory that we ought to regard them as final? Second, has such reconstruction as this any real advantage to offer? Its authors say that the existing Old-Testament narratives are unhistorical; but they also say that their own reconstructed accounts are largely unhistorical, made up of low probabilities and mere conjectures. Are the uncertainties of ancient narrative greater than those of modern conjecture? The old stories are at least venerable and interesting and full of point. Even if one regards them as fictitious, can he find any utility in substituting a modern fiction for the ancient one?

5. Once more, the reader of this body of literature is struck with the frankness with which the writers acknowledge the use they make of the critical imagination. To cite a single utterance on this point:

"Let no one indulge in a cheap sarcasm on imaginative criticism. . . . These intuitions are not purely accidental. They spring, in exegesis, from sympathy with an author, and a sense of what he can and what he can not have said; in history, from a sedulously trained imaginative sense of antiquity supported by a large command of facts" ("Jewish Religious Life," p. 4).

In the literature we are examining this principle of historical study is not a mere form of words, but is widely acted upon. To mention the first three or four instances that come to mind, the assertion that Nebuchadnezzar established a Jewish kingdom in Bablylonia, the assertion that the Jews held sacrificial worship on the Temple site at Jerusalem from the time of Zedekiah to that of Cyrus, the assertion that no important immigration occurred under Zerubbabel, the assertion that Zerubbabel suddenly disappears from the history, the assertion that Artaxerxes Ochus captured Jerusalem, desolated the sanctuary, and devastated

the country of Judea, with hundreds of other statements for every period of the history, are products of the imagination.

In this use of the imagination the recent critics are following orthodox precedents. In Genesis we are told that Joseph was made superintendent of the storage of corn; the orthodox imagination has changed that to the very different office of prime minister of Egypt. The chronicler says that David brought up the ark after his conquests were complete; according to the orthodox imagination he did it directly upon becoming king in Jerusalem. Imagination has transmuted the copy of the law found in Josiah's time into the only copy then existing. Imagination has transformed Cyrus into a monotheist, and interpreted accordingly all the statements concerning him. These are a few out of many familiar instances. In some cases our understanding of the history has been helped by the imagination, and in other cases it has been dreadfully distorted.

Beyond question the use of the imagination is essential for the arranging and understanding of the facts, both in exegesis and in history. But he who uses his imagination as a source of facts is laboring under a delusion. Except in a very limited way, no man knows what another man can or can not have said; and no man has a "sense of antiquity" that amounts to a perception of facts. If any man thinks he has these powers, he is fooling himself. Imagination may help us to hypotheses, but a hypothesis must stand or fall according as it is capable of being verified by proof. It is a weakness in any school of men that they glory in the possession of fact-yielding imaginations.

6. This claim concerning the imagination is in part identical with the claim one might make to be an expert in some line of study in which he has had long practise.

As a matter of fact, the critical scholars of whom we are speaking have a larger following by reason of their supposed position as experts than for all other reasons put together. But in matters of permanent knowledge an expert does not expect to be believed permanently on the mere ground of his being an expert. He is under obligations to put it into the power of men who are not experts to test his conclusions. He may do this by the practical results he accomplishes. We who ride in trolley cars and use telephones and read by electric lights have no doubt that the experts in electricity have studied to some purpose. Or he may do it by placing the reasons before their minds in such shape that they can understand them. In one of these two ways the expert who claims to have discovered something for the benefit of mankind must, within a reasonable time, make his claim good. The public will give him time, will take him provisionally, for a while, at his own estimate of himself. But we can not forever accept him as a mere matter of tradition. He must give us proofs level to our understanding, or he will be consigned to the limbo to which obsolete traditions go.

The most astonishing thing in the recent critical literature is its utter unconsciousness of the need of giving any other evidence than the word of its experts. It has taken great pains to put its doctrines into such shape that all sorts of people can understand them. But to any one who asks why he should accept these doctrines as true, virtually its only answer is: Because "eminent scholars" say so. Unless a person can devote some years to becoming an expert, either he must accept the new doctrine as a mere matter of tradition, or he must reject it.

The supporters of the older church doctrines concerning the Scriptures are not shut up so exclusively to mere tradition. They point out to the student the testimony on which they rely, along with the corroborative evidence, as these exist in the Scriptures and other accessible sources, and they say: Look at the evidence and judge for yourself. Whatever blunders they may make, they at least pay outward respect to a person's right and obligation to form his own convictions. They hold that the evidence in this matter is intelligible to intelligent men, and that men ought to form their opinions on the evidence. And

certainly the advocates of the newer views would not concede that they are themselves lacking in their regard for the rights and obligations of private judgment. But if one asks for proofs on the basis of which he may form his judgment, the proofs will not be forthcoming; tho he will be given to understand that the holding of a diverse opinion marks him as behind the times, that it is as absurd as failing to wear a dress-coat at an evening party.

This way of dealing with the matter is not necessarily discreditable. Possibly it arises from the difficulties of the subject itself. But whether creditable or the contrary, it is a part of the existing situation. With the exception of the relatively few experts, those who receive the current theories of criticism, like those who receive the current theories of electricity, must receive them on tradition rather than on the basis of understood reasons. And up to date, the critical theories do not, like the electrical, commend themselves by their practical results. Their leading advocates deplore the unsettling of men's convictions, the rampant disbelief, that have thus far resulted. Their comfort is that this path through evil seems to them to lead to higher good. But the greater good has not yet arrived, and until it arrives the experts are not entitled to appeal to it as confirming their teachings.

7. For this confirmation, however, they appeal to the asserted unanimity among the experts themselves. The results must be true, they say, because so many investigators have reached them independently.

And this gives significance to the fact that there are wide variations from unanimity in this body of recent critical literature.

There are certain differences that concern matters outside the Old Testament. Some, for instance, assume that the New Testament stands on settled historical ground; while others would accept the following statement:

"Unfortunately the literary and historical criticism of the New Testament is by no means as far advanced as that of the Old Testament" ("Encyclopædia Biblica," p. xi.).

Other differences are in matters of minor detail, and others are in regard to questions newly brought under discussion, such, for instance, as the postexilic history. But apart from all such instances, many of the important older problems are still in controversy. On the question of the date of Deuteronomy, for example, Addis cites Maurice Vernes, 1887, Havet, 1878, and Seinecke, 1876-84 (pp. 2-4), as holding that Deuteronomy was first written long after Josiah's time. These three writers he dismisses by simply charging them with extravagance. But he cites Horst, 1888, as soberly holding a similar view, and devotes several pages to refuting his arguments (pp. 3-9). He himself differs from the majority in thinking that Deuteronomy may have been written soon after the reform of Hezekiah, tho he vehemently opposes the view of Oettli to the effect that that reform was caused "by the teaching of Deuteronomy" (p. 9). As to what the book was that Hilkiah found, and what were the component parts of Deut. v.-xxvi., Addis quotes severally the ideas of Wellhausen, Stade, and Kuenen, and the differing views of Cornill, 1891, Stärk, 1894, and Steuernagel, 1896, and the views of Kusters, 1896, attacking both Stärk and Steuernagel (vol. ii., pp. 10-19). Of Stärk he says:

"He heaps conjecture upon conjecture, and they remain mere conjectures notwithstanding his constant assurance that this is 'clear,' and that 'without doubt'" (p. 17).

Addis himself differs with Driver, in that Driver "sees no reason for rejecting" Deut. i.-iv. 40 (pp. 19, 20). And a great number of other differences of no small importance are mentioned by Addis and by other writers. Differences among experts are creditable as showing that there has been independent study; but they also remind us that the testimony of experts is not infallible.

8. Finally, in our examination of this body of literature we should not fail to notice the fact that some of the writers profess a reverent recognition of the su-

pernatural elements in the Bible and in the events therein recorded. Professor Addis, for example, speaks of his

"deepening conviction that Israel was the subject of a divine guidance, in the strictest sense supernatural and unique, till He came to whom the law and the prophets alike bear witness" (ii., p. vii.).

Plenty of similar statements are to be found. But those who think thus are, of course, aware that a majority of their fellow critics disagree with them at this point; and to outsiders it seems that the members of this school of criticism who thus exalt the supernatural are not the ones who are logically consistent.

In view of the situation thus roughly sketched, there is an obligation that rests upon those who disapprove the principles and practises of the prevalent schools of criticism, namely, the obligation to engage strenuously in the literary and scientific study of the Scriptures, on what seem to them correct principles. Let no one imagine that this class of scholars has become extinct. Some of the old heroes are still in the field. They are being constantly reinforced by such new champions as Pastor Rupprecht, Pastor Naumann, Pastor G. Stosch of Berlin, Dr. A. Zahn of Stuttgart, Dr. P. Haedemacker, Prof. A. Von Hoonacker, and many others. Many very distinguished scholars who are not openly at war with the critics of the current schools utterly dissent from their method of dealing with testimony. And Christendom is full of men who have found themselves puzzled, and have been quietly studying and waiting.

The obligation to do correct scientific and literary work on the Scriptures rests upon all who regard the current critical work as incorrect. Literary study ought not principally to consist in dissecting a work into its supposed original sources; it ought to include the more important matter of understanding the literary character of the work itself, and thereby illuminating the meaning. Scientific study should mean simply the correct examination of all the evidence in the case. The literary phenomena are as open to one class of qualified scholars as to another; so are the results that have been achieved in geography, in archeology, in the natural sciences, in the languages; so is our knowledge of the operation of the forces of nature, and of motives in human conduct. In all these regions of evidence there need be but slight difference between the two camps in which Biblical scholars arrange themselves. So far as scientific method is concerned, the contest between them is solely over the question how we ought to deal with testimony. Some of us hold, in opposition to the views of the literature that has been examined in this article, that *testimony is to be believed except where there are reasons for not believing it*. If those who hold and consistently use this principle will do a work on the Scriptures as broad and bright and painstaking as their opponents are doing, they will settle many questions. Otherwise these questions will remain unsettled.

The true division between the two opinions is the scientific doctrine of the general credibility of testimony, rather than the religious doctrine of inerrancy by reason of inspiration. Most men who shall start out with a rigid application of the principle that an average Biblical statement is to be accepted as true unless there are sufficient reasons to the contrary, will later reach the stricter idea of truthfulness guaranteed by inspiration. But the first of these positions, rather than the second, is the true starting-point for a scientific treatment.

If the scholars who hold that the testimony in the Bible is to be believed will supply the reading public with Bible dictionaries as rich in information as those of Hastings and of Cheyne, and with other equally good work in the various departments of investigation, they will meet the need of the hour. It is too late for them to expect to drive their opponents from the field by polemic argument merely; they can succeed only by giving the public a constructive treatment of the themes in hand which shall be better than that of their opponents. This is no trivial task, but it is not an impossible task. As we have seen, the recent

critical literature has placed the theories of the critics in good shape for a speedy final acceptance if they are true, but equally in good shape for rapid and decisive overthrow if they are false. If one believes these theories to be false, his surest way of demonstrating his belief is by presenting in their place the views that are true—presenting them in the strong light that recent research can be made to throw upon them. Those who shall undertake this work will have two important advantages:

First, they need not begin by any tedious process of destructive criticism; they may begin at once by constructive work based on the testimony of the Scriptures added to all the other evidence that exists. Only their work must not be a revamping of old traditions, but an actual reexamining of the testimony, statement by statement, under the strongest light that can be thrown upon it, and in view of the treatment that has already been made by their opponents.

Second, the statements of the testimony, thus treated, will give them reliable and interesting facts in most of the instances in which their opponents have to content themselves with uncertain generalities. It ought not to be impossible for the first decade of the twentieth century to produce a literature concerning the Bible that shall be immeasurably better than any hitherto produced.

SERMONIC SECTION.

REPRESENTATIVE SERMONS.

THE DREAM OF PILATE'S WIFE, OR WOMAN'S PLACE AND POWER IN RELIGION.*

BY GEORGE LORIMER, D.D., TRE-
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Have thou nothing to do with that just man.—Matt. xxvii. 19.

A FAMOUS picture of Pilate's wife's dream is blemished by a single infelicity. It represents her in person bending over the balustrade and whispering her communication in the ear of her husband. It is improbable, of course, that a lady of her condition and rank would, in those days, have ventured through the courts into the judgment hall to occupy so conspicuous a position; and the writer guards against any such impression, for he says, "His wife sent unto him," not that "she went." Possibly she caught up a tablet, hastily wrote a message, and sent it by some reliable attendant. But with this exception the painting to which I have referred is a remarkable one. It represents the woman as

standing in a halo of light, whereas Pilate is in the shadow, the thought of the painter evidently being that his eyes were darkened so that they did not see the significance of the hour in which he lived and in which he was playing so prominent a part; but that her eyes were opened, and that she, illumined by the divine glory, was saying to him, "Have thou nothing"—that is nothing unfairly or wrongly—"to do with that just man."

The dream occurred, probably, very early that morning, while the streets of the city were filled with the tumultuous throng, and part of the great tragedy had been already enacted. No doubt, as was the custom in those times among Roman women, she had had her early bath, and, resting once more upon her couch as her husband was summoned to the council hall, there came before her that which is not described, but which left a deep impression upon her mind. If she was a cultivated woman she may have associated this Jesus with the righteous man portrayed so many years before by Plato, and she may have thought of what

* Preached in Regent's Park Chapel, London.