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CHRISTIANITY AND THE HISTORICAL CHRIST.

EVERY one would admit that the true interest of theological controversy lies not in the personal element, in proving that some writer has contradicted himself, or admitted ideas which if developed would be fatal to his fundamental principles, but in bringing out the full implications of different lines or tendencies of thought, and the possibility or impossibility of reconciling them. Yet when we attack any such tendency, we may seem to be attacking individuals in whom it exists in different degrees, and each of whom would probably repudiate it if simply stated, or stated otherwise than with all the qualifications he gives to it. Such a tendency, however, may be a very real influence on the thought of a time, and it may be very important to separate it from its surroundings, to bring it out to light in its pure abstraction, and to consider what is its value, — what truth it represents, and what error it involves.

There is, then, a general tendency, which has manifested itself in different ways in Theology, in Ethics and in Politics, — to confine ourselves to these, — a tendency to look for the explanation of a thing to its origin, and even to treat the first form in which a principle or idea manifests itself as its true form, — as the type or standard to which all its subsequent phases must be brought, or by which they must be measured. Plato supposed that the ideal state, if once set up, would go on, *ὡσπερ κύκλος*, perpetually reproducing itself, and that any fundamental change must be a change for the worse. The only true course to meet any depravation of the original model must therefore be, simply to remove all subse-

## ECCLESIASTICAL JURISDICTION IN ITS RELATION TO CHURCH UNITY.

ECCLESIASTICAL jurisdiction is the jurisdiction which the Church has the authority to exercise in the administration of government and discipline. In modern times, especially in the United States of America, the government of the nation divides itself into three channels, — the legislative, the judicial, and the executive. The Christian Church has not developed in its government so far as the modern state. The three functions of government are, in Congregationalism, lodged in one democratic body, the congregation, a society of Christians in covenant relations with each other. In Presbyterianism, the three functions of government are lodged in the Presbytery. But inasmuch as there are several grades of presbyteries, — the parochial presbytery, the classical presbytery, the synodical and the national assemblies, — we have to distinguish between original jurisdiction, which belongs to the classical presbytery in the case of a minister and to the parochial presbytery in the case of a layman, and appellate jurisdiction, which belongs to the superior and the supreme bodies. But all of these presbyteries alike have legislative, judicial and executive functions to fulfill. Any presbytery may sit whenever it pleases and enact legislative rules, or it may sit as a court and decide cases of discipline, or it may act as an executive body and exercise episcopal functions.

In the Episcopal Churches the bishop is the executive, but in most Episcopal Churches he also assumes the authority to legislate and to discipline within his diocese. In England the Episcopal Church has developed ecclesiastical courts. In the Protestant Episcopal Church in this country there is a rudimentary ecclesiastical court in the provision for the appointment of courts by bishops. The Protestant Episcopal Church in this country has separated the legislative function and assigned it to the two houses of the General Convention, but the Church of England lags behind in this particular. In Lutheran Germany, the general superintendent is the executive, and the consistory combines the legislative and the judicial functions. The Synod is a development of recent years.

This brief survey makes it clear that no ecclesiastical organization has yet attained the stage of development in government and discipline which we see in the civil government of the chief

modern nations. It is necessary that we should recognize (1) that the jurisdiction of the Church assumes a different form in the different ecclesiastical organizations in accordance with their theory of government and their practice of discipline ; and (2) that the jurisdiction of the Church shapes itself differently from the jurisdiction of the civil government because of the difference in the stage of development of government in the Church and in the nation.

It is commonly agreed that all ecclesiastical authority is derived from Jesus Christ, the enthroned king of the kingdom of God, the sole head of his body, the Church. It is also agreed that Jesus Christ himself calls his ministry into the field. Jesus Christ himself appoints the earthly governors of his Church. Those whom he has appointed, and no others, have authority in the Church. The jurisdiction of the Church springs from the divine authority imparted by King Jesus to his ministers. The ancient Anabaptists, the Society of Friends, the Independents, the Plymouth Brethren, and several sects, think that every Christian is called of God to be a ruler and minister in the Church. They build on the universal royal-priesthood of all believers. But other bodies of Christians agree that ecclesiastical authority is lodged in the ordained ministry who have been called by the king, Jesus himself, and have been ordained by the Church. The old Congregationalists lodged the authority in the parochial presbytery, and refused to recognize any appellate jurisdiction. Each parochial presbytery was independent of every other and responsible to Christ alone. Presbyterians, however, asserted that the Church was one, and that there was appellate jurisdiction from the lower presbyteries to the highest, and they even contemplated an œcumenical presbytery. With few exceptions, and those chiefly of late date, appellate jurisdiction in all its stages is co-extensive with original jurisdiction. The Episcopal form of government intensifies the diocese and its jurisdiction. The Protestant Episcopal Church in the United States limits episcopacy to the diocese. There is no bishop of the bishops. Accordingly the diocese is more independent than in any other Episcopal Church in the world. There is no appellate jurisdiction in judicial or executive acts. The appellate jurisdiction is confined, for the most part, to legislative functions. There are certain executive acts which have to do with the whole church. There is no executive for these acts, although there is a rudimentary one in the senior bishop. Above the diocese, the Protestant Episcopal

Church is essentially Presbyterian in its organization. All appellate jurisdiction is lodged in the two houses of the General Convention. England and Ireland have retained the archbishoprics of Canterbury, York, Dublin and Armagh, and there is appellate jurisdiction from the diocesan to the metropolitan. When the Church of England renounced the appellate jurisdiction of Rome it became a national church, and has never contemplated œcumenical relations. It has its unity as a national church through the crown only.

The Greek and Oriental Churches developed the patriarchate at an early date, and the great historic patriarchates of Alexandria, Antioch, Constantinople and Jerusalem were established. These had appellate jurisdiction over the metropolitans. All of these patriarchates became subject to the Moslem dominion, and were restricted by that dominion in their jurisdiction; but they still retained it. The patriarchates of Alexandria, Jerusalem and Antioch, however, became subordinate to the patriarch of Constantinople, who is the head of the Greek Church. The orthodox church of Russia has its centre of unity in the patriarch of Moscow, who is nominally under the jurisdiction of the patriarch of Constantinople also.

The Western Church did not develop the patriarchate, but the see of Rome from the earliest times has been supreme over the Western Church, and from early times the Pope claimed to be the œcumenical bishop. The Church of Rome is, therefore, the only œcumenical Church in its ecclesiastical organization. It is the only one in which appellate jurisdiction is really exercised over churches in many different nations. It is the only church in which the episcopal organization has reached its complete development, and in which appellate jurisdiction regulated by canon law is complete and thorough.

The organization of the Greek and Oriental churches is national organization. The Episcopal Churches of England, Sweden and Denmark, the Presbyterian Churches of Scotland, Holland and several of the Cantons of Switzerland, and the Consistorial Churches of Germany, are national churches, established by statute law in those nations. The many modern denominations in Great Britain and America have no national existence, and their jurisdiction is limited to those who voluntarily adhere to them.

The old Presbyterians and Episcopalians agreed with the ancient Greek, Roman and Oriental Churches that, in addition to

the internal call of Christ to the ministry, there must be an external call and ordination by the Church, in order to the exercise of ecclesiastical authority and jurisdiction. The authority of the Church to give this external call comes from the institution of the ministry by Christ and his apostles, and depends upon the transmission of that authority in the Church from the apostles' times. There is a difference of opinion among theologians whether this transmission is through the presbyters or through the bishops, or through the entire ecclesiastical organization.


In the Christian world, then, there are numbers of ecclesiastical organizations which claim authority from Christ by the internal call and from the Church by the external call, which have some plausible historic right, and which exercise ecclesiastical jurisdiction. The problem, from the point of view of Church Unity, is how these jurisdictions, which are at present independent, indifferent one to another, or hostile, may be united in one jurisdiction. There may be Christian unity without unity of jurisdiction, but there can be no Church Unity without unity in jurisdiction.

The Roman Catholic Church claims jurisdiction over the whole world, and maintains that there is no other lawful church in the world. This claim was recognized for centuries by the nations of Northern Europe, which are now Protestant nations. Rome regards all the Protestants as in rebellion. All modern denominations are usurpers. The Episcopal Church of England, the Presbyterian Church of Scotland, the Consistorial Churches of Germany, are all alike in rebellion. They have no valid ministry, no valid sacraments. They are as guilty of schism as the sects of Anabaptists or Quakers. They would be dealt with by the ecclesiastical courts and given over to the civil authorities for punishment, if the Roman Church had freedom to exercise its authority which it derives from Jesus Christ. From the point of view of the ancient Roman Church and the ancient canon law, and from the point of view of Christendom before the Reformation, no other position can be taken. The appellate jurisdiction of the Church is in the holy father at Rome. It was so recognized by the English, German, Scottish, Scandinavian and Swiss nations for centuries. The reformers, who rejected that appellate jurisdiction and rebelled against that discipline, separated themselves from the supreme ecclesiastical authority, and thereby lost ecclesiastical authority. They could not lawfully exercise jurisdiction in the Church, or transmit authority to others to exercise

jurisdiction. If we recognize the external unity of Christ's Church as the design of Christ himself, and see that unity in the Roman Catholic organization for centuries, and agree that the decisions of the supreme appellate jurisdiction of the Church are final, then we must admit that there is no legal church in Western Europe but the Roman.

We build the right of ecclesiastical jurisdiction in the Protestant churches only upon the right of appeal from the highest tribunal of the Church to Christ, the Head of the Church. The reformers refused to submit to the appellate jurisdiction of the Pope, and declined to desist from the exercise of their ministry at his bidding; they appealed from the Pope to Christ. They exercised and perpetuated the functions of their ministry, although they were formally and technically irregular in so doing. The only way in which Roman Christianity and Protestant Christianity can ever combine is for Protestant Christianity to frankly recognize the technical irregularity of the Reformation, its revolutionary and illegal character; and for the Roman Church to repeal and recall all its unrighteous discipline. Such a course is entirely practicable, for the Roman Catholic Church has never taken the position that the Church is infallible in its discipline. The efforts of some Anglicans, to make their ministerial succession independent of Rome in its transmission, results in grievous error. History frowns upon the effort. Canon law does not admit of it. The disciplinary procedure of Rome was formally and technically legal according to canon law. The only thing about it that we can successfully challenge is the matter of the procedure. Rome erred in the grounds and reasons of the discipline, and therefore, when history has shown that those grounds and reasons were erroneous, the disciplinary action may be lawfully and in a regular manner reversed.

The Reformation was a revolution. The intolerable yoke of the appellate jurisdiction of Rome was thrown off, and each Protestant nation reorganized the Church in the nation in its own way. In England the metropolitans and bishops were retained, and a metropolitan Church was established by law; in Scotland the metropolitans and bishops were discarded, and a Presbyterian Church was established by law; in Germany the metropolitans and bishops were discarded and Consistorial Churches were established by law. In England the yoke of the prelatial bishops became intolerable, and the Puritans struggled until they threw it off, and the Church of England was established as a Presbyterian



Church for a brief period. At the Restoration, through a breach of faith, two thousand Presbyterians were deprived of their parish churches and prohibited from exercising their ministry, without trial, but by arbitrary enactments; and the prelates became more tyrannical than ever. The struggle continued until the Revolution settlement, when the Presbyterians, Congregationalists, Baptists, Quakers and other religious persons were permitted to organize themselves as independent ecclesiastical bodies.

No one can survey the history of Christ's Church without seeing very plainly that the disruption of the Church has been due in the main to the intolerable tyranny of the appellate judicatories in the Church. There can be no Church Unity without unity in appellate jurisdiction. But there can be no unity in appellate jurisdiction unless that appellate jurisdiction can be so limited as to make it impracticable that there shall be a recurrence of the intolerable injustice and tyranny under which our fathers suffered, and which still threatens us in all existing religious organizations which have appellate judicatories.

The question in Church Unity is, How far shall we go? Is it to be a diocesan unity, a national unity, or an œcumenical unity? If there is to be unity in any case, it must be in an appellate jurisdiction. Episcopacy finds the ultimate unity in the universal bishop, Presbyterianism in the œcumenical council. If the Episcopalian says the historic episcopate is the principle of Church Unity, he cannot in his conception of Church Unity go beyond the diocese; unless he sums up the dioceses in a provincial bishop, who can be no other than an archbishop. A house of bishops, with a house of clerical and lay deputies, is the Presbyterian system for a national organization. A house of bishops is one house of a legislative, judicial and executive body; but the executive function is lodged in a body as truly as it is in the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church, and not in a bishop; it is therefore unepiscopal. The episcopal system unfolds into an archbishop of a province, the patriarch of a nation, and the holy father of the world, just as truly as the classical presbytery unfolds and reaches its ultimate form in the œcumenical council. Unless we are prepared to go as far as this, we cannot think of œcumenical unity; we must limit ourselves to national unity or diocesan unity.

We have thus far reached three conclusions: (1) We must unfold ecclesiastical jurisdiction much further in the line of the development of civil jurisdiction; (2) We must seek appellate

jurisdiction in national and œcumenical ecclesiastical organizations; (3) We must so limit the appellate jurisdictions as to conserve the rights of individuals and of the lower judicatories, and make it impracticable that the appellate judicatories should tyrannize over the inferior judicatories. To this last proposition we shall now give our attention, summing up the exercise of jurisdiction under the three divisions: territorial jurisdiction, the subject-matter of jurisdiction, and jurisdiction of persons.

I. TERRITORIAL JURISDICTION. — The theory of church government which is held more or less tenaciously by all organized churches is, that there can be but one lawful church of Jesus Christ in one territory. Where two or more claim to exist, their claims are unlawful. They are schismatic and rebellious against the one Church of Christ. In the New Testament we find nowhere any more than one church in a city. The New Testament does not contemplate a church divided into a number of independent organizations in the same territory. The Christian Church asserted its unity in every country and nation in every century until the Reformation. It was regarded as intolerable that there should be any ecclesiastical jurisdiction but one in any diocese or nation. All schism was treated as rebellion and remorselessly crushed. The Church in the Roman Empire asserted its unity and trampled under foot every heresy and schism. The breaking of the unity was due to the rise of the independent nations. The strife of the papacy against the national spirit, through the centuries prior to the Reformation, necessarily prepared the way for the organization of the national Churches of Northern Europe. But these national Churches refused to recognize any other ecclesiastical jurisdiction within the nation than the one established by law as the national Church. Roman Catholics battled for existence in Northern Europe. Puritans struggled for existence in Great Britain. Various sects suffered persecution in the different Protestant countries. Only in quite recent times has toleration been granted. Religious equality is scarcely known outside the United States of America. Even among us, the churchmen of the different denominations regard it as a necessary evil. There are few thinking men who will say that the ecclesiastical situation in this country is desirable or permanent. The fact is that our theories of church government were evolved in a time when all men insisted upon the divine right of church government and the exclusive territorial jurisdiction of their form of government. We are all of us, consciously or unconsciously,



under the influence of the territorial principle. Let us then consider the working out of this principle.

The fundamental territorial division is the parish, which embraces all the people living within a certain district. The ecclesiastical jurisdiction of this parish is independent of the ecclesiastical jurisdiction of other parishes. They have their unity in an appellate jurisdiction of a classical presbytery, or a diocesan bishop, or any other higher organization. It has always been regarded as unlawful for the authorities of one parish to intrude into another parish. The parish system is retained wherever there are churches established by law. There is considerable friction between the parish churches and the dissenting churches which occupy the same territory in the larger part of Great Britain. But the established churches guard against intrusion of one parish into another. In our United States, where there is no church established by law, there are no parish churches. The same district of territory is occupied by several different denominations; and even in the same denominations it is practically impossible to prevent one congregation from encroaching on the field of another. The communicants of the congregations are intermingled with the communicants of other congregations of the same denomination, and territorial jurisdiction no longer exists so far as congregations are concerned. Each denomination endeavors to preserve territorial divisions in the appellate jurisdictions, but with only partial success. It is comparatively easy to do this with pastors of congregations, but it is difficult, and in fact impracticable, to do it with ministers without charge. Sometimes it is impracticable to preserve territorial lines with congregations. Two congregational associations coexisted for many years in the same territory of New York and Brooklyn; they united a short time ago. There were several presbyteries in New York and vicinity prior to the Reunion of the Presbyterian Church in 1870. These were not divided by denominational or territorial lines. It is far better, when ministers and congregations cannot work together in harmony, that they should arrange themselves in two or more local bodies, according to their preferences, rather than undertake the organization of two denominations.

The principle of non-intrusion into presbyteries and dioceses has been so overridden as practically to be destroyed by recent events. The Andover case destroyed it for Congregationalists, the Briggs case for Presbyterians, and the recent pastoral letter

of the bishops destroyed it for Episcopalians. The law of the Presbyterian Church prohibits presbyteries from intruding upon the disciplinary procedure of other presbyteries; and yet a large number of presbyteries overturned the General Assembly in 1891, condemning the inaugural of Professor Briggs, and urging the veto of his transfer to the chair of Biblical Theology. The General Assembly, under the influence of a panic, voted the veto, and condemned him and the Directors of Union Seminary without giving them a hearing, while the case of Professor Briggs was in the early stages of process before the presbytery of New York. The House of Bishops intruded upon the dioceses of Massachusetts and of Philadelphia in a pastoral letter which related to matters in discussion in those dioceses which the bishops of those dioceses were alone entitled to handle. Such acts of intrusion were contrary to the principles of canon law and the disciplinary practice of the Church. They show that territorial jurisdiction has broken down in this country, and that the general religious bodies no longer respect the original territorial jurisdiction of inferior judicatories.

The interrelation of the denominations has done still more to destroy territorial jurisdiction. In the holy city, Jerusalem, several episcopal jurisdictions coexist. Even in the church of the Holy Sepulchre several different rites of several different episcopal jurisdictions are celebrated. The Roman Church does not recognize the validity of any orders but her own. From her point of view she cannot be guilty of intrusion anywhere in the world. But Anglicans recognize the validity of Roman orders. They claim to be the national Church of England. The Church of England is established by law in England, but nowhere else in the world. It cannot escape the charge of intrusion therefore when it erects in Roman Catholic countries congregations subject to the Bishop of London. It seems to be rather inconsistent, therefore, to make a stand against the erection of an American episcopate in Mexico, and an Anglican episcopate in Madrid or in Jerusalem. It is only a difference of degree whether the Bishop of Oxford intrudes into a Roman Catholic diocese by the erection of a congregation in Florence, or the archbishop of Dublin erects a diocese in the Roman Catholic archdiocese of Madrid. In New York city we have an episcopal diocese of the Protestant Episcopal Church, and a metropolitan of the Roman Catholic Church, coexisting in the same territory. The Roman Catholic does not recognize the validity of the orders of the Protestant

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Episcopal diocese, but the Protestant Episcopal diocese recognizes the orders of the Roman Catholic clergy. In England the Church of England is established by law, and so may charge the Roman clergy with intrusion. No such charge can be made in New York, because there is no establishment of religion. The Episcopal Church never has been the established church in that city. There can be no question of intrusion where the law does not determine territorial right.

The first Roman Catholic bishop of the United States was Carroll of Baltimore, 1789; the first unquestioned bishops of the Anglican order were White and Provost of 1787. The circumstances of the origin of the episcopate for this country do not give any prior right to either line of bishops. The validity of the American bishops of the Protestant Episcopal Church depends on the validity of Anglican orders. The Moravians were prior in their episcopate to all others in this country, and they seem to have apostolic succession for their episcopacy. They have the priority of claim in this country. But, in fact, no valid claim to jurisdiction can be founded on priority of occupation of a territory. The question depends on which episcopate had the territorial right by ecclesiastical law. Each one had the right in ecclesiastical law of establishing missionary bishoprics. The same ecclesiastical right is exercised in all missionary lands, so that in all North America, in Central and Eastern Asia, and in all Africa, except Egypt and Abyssinia where ancient churches still continue, bishops of the several Episcopal churches occupy the same territory without intrusion. The result is inevitable that with the progress of Christianity the greater part of the world will be under the jurisdiction of coexisting bishoprics. When we further consider the intrusion of Rome into all Protestant lands, and the intrusion of other episcopates into Roman Catholic countries, we see that the territorial jurisdiction of the Church has been virtually destroyed. It has been condemned by the historic judgment of God. It is improbable that it will ever be restored.

It would remove a great embarrassment from the advance towards Church Unity, if territorial jurisdiction should be discarded altogether. It is impracticable at present to attain territorial unity. It is improbable that it ever will be practicable. Ecclesiastical jurisdiction is very much like marine jurisdiction. Each nation has jurisdiction over its own ships on the sea, but no jurisdiction over the sea itself. The Church in fact has no juris-

diction over territory, but only over certain persons and things in a territory.

II. THE SUBJECT-MATTER OF JURISDICTION.—The Roman Catholic Church claims universal sway as to matters of jurisdiction as well as to territory. The jurisdiction of the Church in Protestant lands has been limited more and more, until at present it is practically confined to spiritual things, religion, doctrine and morals. There are many things in which Church and State have what may be called concurrent jurisdiction, in marriage and divorce, in education, in sabbath observance, and in the regulation of vice; but in fact the jurisdiction of the Church is limited by the State, and is ordinarily confined to the spiritual side of these matters.

Matters of religion are those which have to do chiefly with the worship of God, e. g., the order of worship, ceremonies and sacred times. These are matters which belong to the jurisdiction of the Church. On these matters the several denominations differ exceedingly. The religious conflicts in Great Britain and America have been due largely to the desire for uniformity in religion. The Chicago-Lambeth articles happily limit religious uniformity to the two sacraments, with the invariable use of the elements ordained by Christ and the words of institution. If we could limit jurisdiction in matters of religion to the terms of this article, we should do away with almost all of the religious disputes in the Church and gain unity of jurisdiction in matters of religion. But some questions arise. Does this article propose to limit all ecclesiastical jurisdictions in matters of religion to the uniformity prescribed by Christ in the celebration of the two sacraments; or does it propose simply to limit the supreme judicatory of a national church to this jurisdiction, and leave a wider jurisdiction in matters of religion to lower judicatories? Is it proposed that every congregation in every diocese shall be independent of episcopal jurisdiction in all matters of religion except this? If so, it involves the union of Roman Catholic, Greek, Protestant Episcopal, Presbyterian, Congregational, Baptist, Methodist, and other congregations in one and the same diocese under one diocesan jurisdiction. You may baptize by sprinkling, by pouring, or by immersion as the local congregation may determine. You may baptize children or not, as you please. You may celebrate the Lord's Supper after the Roman, Greek, Anglican, or Presbyterian manner, without interference. You may have the confessional or you may reject it. You may do penance in public or you may

repent in private. You may say masses for the dead, you may grant indulgences, you may bestow extreme unction. You may have the most elaborate ceremonies, you may have no ceremony at all. You may use the Book of Common Prayer, or the liturgies of the Reformed churches, or the Lutheran liturgy, or the Mass book, or make public prayer with no book at all. You may refuse to say in public the Creed, or the Lord's Prayer, or the Ten Commandments. You may worship in any way you please, if only you celebrate the two sacraments with the use of the bread and the wine and the water and the words of institution; and no bishop, or presbytery, or convention, or conference, or any other judicatory shall have any jurisdiction over any of these matters of religion.

We do not know how far this limitation of jurisdiction has been thought out by the bishops into its practical details. It is doubtful whether they would deem it wise to permit every congregation to use such unlimited discretion as this. It would be intolerable for some congregations to feel even a limited responsibility for the disorderly practices of other congregations in the same diocese. It is probable that the Chicago-Lambeth definition of what is essential in matters of religion should be taken as limiting the supreme judicatory of the national church, so that it should not interfere with any inferior judicatory which was faithful to this article relating to the Sacraments, and so that it should recognize the jurisdiction of the lower judicatories as more extensive than that of the supreme judicatory. There should be a gradual limitation of jurisdiction in matters of religion as one ascends from the lowest judicatory to the highest. For those congregations which use the Book of Common Prayer, there is needed a judicatory to have jurisdiction over its use. There are in the Episcopal Church parties which differ in their ideas of worship. Each one of these parties might by elective affinity be organized in a convention under a bishop. Instead of increasing the number of bishops by territorial restrictions, the increase might be by divisions of dioceses in accordance with the subject-matter of jurisdiction. We might have in New York city not only a bishop of the Roman order, a bishop of the Anglican order and a bishop of the Moravian order, but also other bishops acting as the executives of dioceses constituted no longer in accordance with a territorial jurisdiction, which is really impracticable, but in accordance with the elective affinity of the congregations. These dioceses might retain their independence under a common bishop by a constitu-

tional limitation of his jurisdiction, or, if this union could not be consummated, these dioceses might be combined in an arch-diocese under a metropolitan, limited in his jurisdiction to the matters defined in the Chicago-Lambeth Articles.

The divisions of Christendom, however, have originated chiefly from differences in matters of faith. The definitions of the faith by superior and supreme judicatories have excluded those ministers or dioceses or provinces or patriarchates which could not subscribe to these definitions. In the evolution of the faith of Christ's Church every stage has resulted in the separation or exclusion of those who could not make the evolution. The faith of the ancient church was defined in the primitive creeds. The great councils decided the Trinitarian and Christological controversies, and by their supreme jurisdiction cut off the adherents of Arianism and Nestorianism and several other heresies. The Greek and Roman churches condemned each other as heretical, and the East separated from the West. At the Reformation, Northern Europe separated from Southern Europe; but every effort to construct a united Protestant Church failed, owing to international jealousies and rivalries. Therefore the Roman Church declared its faith at the Council of Trent, and each national Protestant Church declared its faith in national confessions and catechisms. An effort was made to unite all Lutherans about the Form of Concord, and all Calvinists about the decrees of the Synod of Dort, but these efforts failed. The Westminster Confession was designed to take the place of the separate national confessions of the three nations of Great Britain, but this design was not accomplished. All of these later confessions became confessions of the faith of parties and denominations. The XXXIX Articles became the legal statement of the faith of the Church of England. The Westminster Confession became the legal confession of the Church of Scotland, and displaced the original Scottish confessions. Ministers were now obliged by law to subscribe to these confessions, and these mapped out an extensive area of jurisdiction for ecclesiastical bodies in matters of faith.

Doctrinal jurisdiction depends upon the definitions of the creed or confession on the one side, and upon the terms of subscription on the other. Several questions now arise.

Do these confessions restrict the Church in its jurisdiction, or do they restrict the minister in his liberty, or do they restrict both Church and minister? Subscription was forced on the Church of Scotland by the Parliament of Scotland in order to

restrict the jurisdiction of the Church of Scotland. That is, any man who subscribed to the Confession and was faithful to its articles was free as to any matters not defined in the Confession. But the older view of the Church of Rome was, that the Confession restricted the minister, and that the jurisdiction of the Church was unrestricted. The Church had jurisdiction over other matters also. It was its right to define any matter of faith that was in dispute. The Confession was a restriction to the minister. It taught him what the Church had already said. This seems to be the historic position of the Church of England also. The American churches, with written constitutions, follow in principle the method of the Church of Scotland, influenced doubtless by the method of the Constitution of the United States. But, in practice, ecclesiastical bodies refuse to be restrained by constitutional barriers. They decide any question raised before them, whether they have the right so to do or not.

Does subscription bind to all matters stated in the Confession, or only to the essential and necessary articles? The Adopting Act of the American Presbyterian Church took the latter position, but it has not been adhered to in later decisions of General Assemblies, and this is not the usage of other ecclesiastical bodies.

Does subscription bind to the express statements only, or to all logical deductions also? If we take the latter position, it would seem that every logical deduction made by decision becomes an additional confessional statement. Can a minister be bound to such a logical deduction before it has been made by the decision of the supreme judicatory? Can the supreme judicatory make such an addition to the faith of the Church? All of these questions have arisen in the Presbyterian communion in recent cases. The General Assembly has interpreted the Westminster Confession by so-called logical deduction, and has condemned two ministers for heresy for teaching contrary to such pretended logical deductions. Professor Henry P. Smith made the point that his teaching complained of was prior to the definition of the General Assembly of such pretended logical deduction, and that, as applied to him, it was *ex post facto*; but the General Assembly decided against him. It is claimed that the decisions of the General Assembly in the Smith and Briggs cases are as obligatory as the confession itself. It is altogether probable that other supreme judicatories would take the same large view of their powers by majority vote, should party lines be drawn. Majori-

ties in party strife always break through legal forms and constitutional barriers.

Does subscription bind a man in his private opinions as well as in his official utterances? Is he obliged to teach the whole Confession, or may he avoid such parts of it as he doubts or misbelieves? Must he adhere to their forms of statement, or only use them in substance in other forms of statement? Is he simply restrained from teaching anything that contradicts the Confession, and allowed liberty in other respects, as to speech on the one hand and silence on the other? Anthony Tuckney, one of the chief authors of the Westminster Confession and Catechism, writes to Whichcote that the Westminster Confession was designed as a public confession: "In the Assemblée, I gave my vote with others that the Confession of Faith put out by authority should not be either required to be sworn or subscribed to, we having been burnt on the hand in that kind before, but so as not to be publicly preached or written against." But in the practice of Presbyterian churches, the views of the Westminster divines have not been followed. In other ecclesiastical bodies there has been no final determination of these questions. The stricter view has been ordinarily followed by the judicatories.

Does the Creed or Article of Faith fix the faith of the Church so that there shall be no further development? Does it mean that there is to be no further development in the faith of the Church, either in substance or mode of statement? Certainly no body which constructed confessions ever thought so. Either the Church has a sacred deposit which it cannot decrease or diminish, or its doctrine is capable of development. If it has a sacred deposit, no ecclesiastical body has any authority to change that deposit by introducing new doctrines into the area of definition. But who shall define that deposit? Has it ever been defined? What authority has the Church of the third century to define this deposit, which is not also in the Church of the nineteenth century? If the Apostles' Creed defines that deposit, what authority is there in the more elaborate statements of the Nicene Creed? What authority had the later Church to enlarge the original Nicene Creed? If the Church could go on enlarging its creed through the third and fourth centuries, why not in the centuries since the fourth? The Roman Church claims that the Council of Trent made a further definition of the original deposit. But, when we have gone as far as this, then the deposit is simply the original germ out of which the whole immense system of ecclesi-



astical dogma and ritual has developed. You have then virtually abandoned the theory of an original deposit altogether, and recognized that the faith of Christ's Church is a development from an original germ or germs of doctrine. The form changes, but the substance is eternal. If the faith of the Church is capable of development, then we must hold either that the ecclesiastical body which constructed the Creed or Articles of Faith attained the goal of the development of the Church, or else that the development continues, and a later body has the same right to define dogmas as the earlier body. Any ecclesiastical body, therefore, which proposes to define the faith of the Church, and check the further expansion of it, arrogates to itself an authority over both the past and the future; it assumes to improve upon the definition of the past, and asserts that no improvement can be made on its own definitions.

Is the interpretation of creeds and confessions to be regarded as fixed or as variable? If you say variable, there must be such limitation to variability as will forbid inconsistency between the statements and the interpretations. A judicatory, on the one hand, cannot vary the interpretations so as to evacuate the statement of its original meaning and give it a new and different meaning. No more can an individual. But where there are variant interpretations in the way of logical deductions, all such must be regarded as legitimate. It is improper for the supreme judicatory to make the Creed more rigid by limiting its interpretation to specific deductions, when other deductions are historically legitimate. Confessions are, in the larger part of their statements, compromises framed to admit of more than one interpretation.

If, on the other hand, we say interpretation is fixed, where shall we fix the fixture? Shall we find it in the traditional interpretation? This is the easiest and therefore the common method in Protestantism. But tradition is the reverse of fixed. A traditional interpretation is continually changing, adapting the statement to new cases, or to new forms of old cases, depressing one statement, enhancing another statement, and so entirely changing the proportions and relations of the original definitions. The traditional interpretation usually does not give the original meaning. Shall we find it in the opinions of the supreme judicatory? These will be essentially the same as the traditional, for the simple reason that the majority of ecclesiastical bodies is always controlled by traditional opinions. The Roman Catholic principle is to seek

it in the fathers of the Church. This is far safer than the traditional principle which has prevailed in modern Protestantism, only it is still indefinite. One asks which fathers? And who shall interpret the fathers? You may misinterpret them by your traditions with greater ease than you can the Creeds or Articles of Faith. The only safe principle is the historic one, — to interpret the Creed by the intention of its authors.

The denominations have unconsciously drifted from their Confessions into traditional opinions which envelop the confessions and the creeds, and are the faith of the Church to them, and it cannot be otherwise. We are all hurried along in the tide of opinion of our age, and our environment controls our opinions and practice. The majority simply drift. If they are in the stream of tradition, that is to them the evidence of antiquity. They little know how far the stream has carried them from their fathers. No man can really know whether he truly subscribes to any creed or confession until he has studied the writings of the men who composed it, and has investigated its sources and the mode of its construction. It matters little what our creed or confession may be, if the supreme judicatory may read into it anything it pleases. There is nothing gained by giving up the Westminster Confession and the XXXIX Articles, and falling back on the Apostles' Creed and the Nicene Creed, unless at the same time we may restrict the interpretation of that creed to its original historic sense, to be determined by a court of historical scholars, and not by a General Assembly, or a House of Bishops composed of all sorts and conditions of men.

It was a very important step toward Church Unity when the Chicago-Lambeth Declaration limited the faith of the reunited Church to the Holy Scriptures, the Nicene Creed and the Apostles' Creed; but it is necessary to know whether the Creeds are to be interpreted so as to comprehend the unfolding of their meaning in the decisions of the four great councils of the undivided Church, in the *Te Deum*, in the Book of Common Prayer and the XXXIX Articles. It is necessary to first fix the Creeds and know whether we are to subscribe to them in their original historical form, or in their later Roman and Anglican adaptations, before we can agree upon a fixed interpretation of these Creeds. It is necessary to know whether, when we accept the Holy Scriptures as the Word of God, we must accept with them antiquated interpretations of prophecy and old-fashioned explanations of the Gospel mysteries. The essence of the whole ques-

tion as to creeds and confessions is in the terms of subscription. The Christians of America will hardly agree to the doctrinal basis of the Chicago-Lambeth declarations until they know whether the jurisdiction of the Episcopate is to be limited to these articles, or whether these articles are simply doors through which they may enter in order to find themselves subject to any doctrinal deduction the bishops may make from them. The jurisdiction of the supreme judicatory in which Church Unity is reached should be strictly limited in matters of doctrine, not only to the Creeds, but to the express statements of the Creeds in their original form; and not only this, but to those express statements as interpreted, not by the judicatory itself, but by the historic interpretation of the authors of the Creeds, to be ascertained by historical scholars. In our acceptance of Holy Scripture as the Word of God, we do not relinquish our right as scholars to study them with all the help of modern criticism. We do not propose to relinquish the freedom of scholarship either to the timidity of the ignorant, or to the policy of time-serving ecclesiasticism. The cause of God will prosper much better in a divided Church, where freedom of historic research and Biblical criticism prevails, than in a reunited Church in which a supreme ecclesiastical court may, by a majority vote of mere traditionalists, attempt to fix the interpretation of Scriptures and Creeds and other historical documents. We have one such supreme judicatory in Rome, guarded by venerable canon law, and independent of civil, social, provincial and ecclesiastical influences, which has been a model of equity in recent times. Christendom desires no other, and will have no other.

There are some who will continue to cling to the Westminster Confession; others, to the decrees of the Council of Trent; still others to the Heidelberg Catechism and to Luther's Catechism. Let them retain their darlings and organize themselves in presbyteries and councils, and such other ecclesiastical bodies as they may prefer, in order to conserve their beloved opinions. What we need in order to Church Unity is that they shall unite with all other Christians in a supreme jurisdiction which shall be so limited that it will not, on the one hand, restrict the freedom to retain and advocate those confessions and catechisms, or any other statements of doctrine which may be framed; nor, on the other hand, impose upon subordinate jurisdictions anything more than the original historical interpretation of the express statements of the Creed adopted by all.

The Chicago-Lambeth Declaration does not in its statements reserve to the reunited Church any right of jurisdiction in morals. Is it proposed that matters of morals shall be outside of the sphere of ecclesiastical jurisdiction, or that these matters shall belong to the jurisdiction of the lower judicatories? It certainly cannot be designed that all matters of morals shall be regarded as outside the range of ecclesiastical jurisdiction on the one hand, or, on the other, that the jurisdiction of the supreme judicatory shall be unlimited in these matters. The Ten Commandments and the Lord's Prayer, the bases of the instruction of the Church and incorporated with the Creeds in all the liturgies, seem to have been overlooked by the bishops; but I think that they were quite right. Morals are not for the decision of the supreme judicatory, but for the lower judicatories. Rome claims for the Pope the authority to speak the infallible decision when he is summoned to judgment *ex cathedra* in matters of doctrine and morals. But the voice of Protestantism should reserve morals to the conscience of the individual and the jurisdiction of lower ecclesiastical courts. From this point of view the proposition of Mr. Theodore F. Seward that all Christians should rally around "A Life Creed," using the eloquent words of Dr. John Watson for the purpose, is a false step. Dr. John Watson himself made no such proposition, and he is not to be held responsible for it. His words are these: "I believe in the fatherhood of God; I believe in the words of Jesus; I believe in a clean heart; I believe in the service of love; I believe in the immortality of life; I believe in the Beatitudes. I promise to trust God and follow Christ, to forgive my enemies, and to seek after the righteousness of God." This is not a creed in any proper sense. The use of the word "believe" in these clauses is inexact. The terms in the clauses are generally loose and repetitious, and the selection of topics is capricious and insufficient. Such phrases are not suitable for a creed. They could not be made the basis of discipline in any judicatory. They do not define the life to live, or the morals to practice, and therefore they are not a guide to life or a check upon wrong-doing.

Let us take into consideration three moral questions as specimens, — divorce, Sabbath observance, and temperance. These questions belong to the State as well as to the Church. There is concurrent jurisdiction here of civil courts and ecclesiastical courts. Here is danger of collision in which the ecclesiastical court will surely be worsted. The Roman Church takes a decided

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position against divorce, but it cannot prevent laws by the State granting divorces which Rome refuses to recognize. The Westminster Confession contains a chapter on marriage and divorce. More than one minister has been suspended or deposed for marriage to a deceased wife's sister, and yet the supposed prohibition in Levitical law is a misinterpretation; and even if it were a Levitical law, Levitical marriage laws are no more binding on the Church of Christ than the Levitical prohibitions of wearing mixtures of wool and linen, or plowing with an ox and an ass harnessed together. Most Protestant denominations have removed this erroneous restriction, although the Anglican bishops still persist in opposing the repeal of the law. The right of marriage and divorce is determined by the laws of the State. The Church should beware of conflicting legislation. There can be no reunion of Christendom unless Christians with different views of marriage and divorce may freely organize themselves under the jurisdiction of lower judicatories that will recognize their views of marriage and divorce, and that will guard them from the intrusion of conflicting opinions.

It is impossible to unite in the matter of Sabbath observance. The Puritan view is very different from the Anglican, the Lutheran and the Roman. The Puritan cannot force his opinion on the rest of the world. The only thing the Puritan can do is to keep the Sabbath in his own way, and organize societies for Sabbath observance after his ideals. He cannot make the Puritan theory of the Sabbath the law for the United States, still less for the Christian world.

It is impossible to unite in matters of temperance. The Methodist will hardly compel all others to his views of total abstinence, so as to make it a matter of ecclesiastical jurisdiction. The only thing that can be done by those who believe in total abstinence is to organize societies for that purpose. Those ecclesiastical bodies which bind the ministry and people to this theory sin grievously against Church Unity.

We might illustrate by other matters, but these are sufficient to show that jurisdiction in morals must be strictly limited. The supreme judicatory should not have any jurisdiction in morals. The original jurisdiction belongs to the congregation in case of a layman, and to the presbytery or diocesan in case of a minister. We have to distinguish between crime, vice and sin. Crime and vice are in the province of courts of original jurisdiction, and there should be appellate courts to correct errors in law. But

questions of morals ought not to go to the supreme judicatories. It is most important to guard the conscience of the individual and the freedom of Christian love. Ecclesiastical decisions in morals tend to legalism, and legalism to a Pharisaism which is essentially Antichristian.

III. JURISDICTION OF PERSONS. — The most important and practical side of ecclesiastical jurisdiction is jurisdiction over persons. The Roman Church claims universal jurisdiction over persons. The National Churches of Protestantism claimed universal jurisdiction over persons within the nation. All the persecution and intolerance of ancient and modern times originated from this claim. In the United States, and in Europe to a great extent at present, it is commonly agreed that the jurisdiction of a church is limited to the persons who voluntarily adhere to it. After this limitation has been made, questions arise which are of great importance with reference to Church Unity.

The most comprehensive question is, Is the jurisdiction of the Church over persons total or partial? We should recognize that it is partial and not total. The jurisdiction of a Church over a person should be limited to the subject-matter of jurisdiction; it should not intrude upon his liberty in other matters. The Church should not intrude upon his civil rights and duties. The Church should not intrude upon his social and domestic relations. It should not interfere with his military service, with his club life, with his relations to secret societies, with his amusements or with his business, or with any one of a thousand matters in which he may engage, unless he transgress the lines of jurisdiction which the Church has reserved to itself. It is well known that the existing organizations intrude upon all of these relations. The Roman Catholics and the Reformed Presbyterians intrude upon civil duties. The Roman Catholics and the United Presbyterians intrude upon secret societies. The Methodists and Puritans intrude upon domestic affairs and amusements. All such intrusion, and any other like intrusion beyond the lines of the limited subject-matter of superior and supreme jurisdiction, must be debarred if there is to be Church Unity. If a man or a minister assume vows which subject him to more extensive jurisdiction, it should be in inferior judicatories. The judicatories in which the unity of the Church is fixed should not intrude in these matters.

The jurisdiction over persons should not be everlasting. A man or a woman may assume strict vows of obedience in a very

extensive jurisdiction, and should be held to these vows so long as either remains under that inferior judicatory. But no man or woman should assume life-long vows. There should be freedom to separate from one inferior judicatory and to unite with another whenever it seemed best to do so, provided pecuniary and personal engagements are filled, and the separation is made in an honorable, upright and courteous manner. Irrevocable vows are inconsistent with personal liberty and with Church Unity as well. There are many evils in the Church, both for laymen and ministers, which result from irrevocable vows. They are an inheritance of mediævalism. If a layman has made a mistake in his ecclesiastical connection, he should be free to correct that mistake without excommunication or lesser forms of ecclesiastical discipline. If a minister has made a mistake and has changed his opinions, he ought to be free to change his ecclesiastical relations without degradation. There cannot be Church Unity until such changes are recognized as lawful and proper.

The question now arises, how far ecclesiastical jurisdiction is exclusive of other jurisdiction. Before the Reformation the clergy were under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Church. But, in the modern states, the Church and the State have concurrent jurisdiction over persons each in its own sphere. In the Roman Catholic Church there are jurisdictions of monastic orders which are distinct from the jurisdiction of the diocesan. In Protestant churches ministers submit themselves freely to other jurisdictions than those of the Church and the State in relations which do not conflict with civil and ecclesiastical duties. A man may give an inferior jurisdiction the exclusive authority over him, but few men will in these times assume such vows of submission. The judicatories in which unity is to be found certainly cannot be so exclusive.

The question comes next whether it is necessary that a man should be under only one jurisdiction in ecclesiastical affairs. This is the common opinion, but there are numerous exceptions. A Presbyterian minister may be a member of a Congregational Church, and so subject to the jurisdiction of a presbytery of the Presbyterian denomination, and at the same time to a congregation of the Congregational denomination. He might be in good standing in the one and at the same time heretical in the other. There is no law to prevent a Presbyterian minister from remaining a Presbyterian minister and yet at the same time becoming a member of the Protestant Episcopal congregation by accepting

confirmation. It is possible, as things now are, for a minister to be in three or more denominations at the same time. Why not? It is quite true that complications might arise; but, on the other hand, great benefits might be conferred. There are many cases in which it would be of advantage to ministers and laymen to be in two or more ecclesiastical jurisdictions at the same time. The writer knew well a man who served as trustee of three congregations in three different denominations at the same time. He fulfilled his duties in all, and was repeatedly reelected in them all. If it was practicable in the management of the temporal affairs of the congregation, why not in the spiritual? It is quite as easy for a man to serve as elder or deacon or vestryman in three congregations as to serve as trustee. There are numerous instances in which men of influence reside part of the year in the city and part of the year in the country. In the city they worship in one denomination, in the country in another. They fulfill all their religious duties equally in both. Why should they not be enrolled as members and serve as church officers in both? Ministers are often called upon to minister, on the frontier, to two or more congregations of the same denomination; why not to two or more congregations of different denominations? There are thousands of communities in which there are three or more congregations of different denominations, each with a separate building, with occasional ministrations of ministers of its own denomination. It would be a boon if they could worship in the same building under the same minister. He might be a minister of three or more different judicatories. He might minister as an Episcopalian in the morning, as a Presbyterian or Congregationalist in the afternoon, and a Methodist in the evening. Why not? Many could do it and would do it if the way were open in the lower judicatories. Thousands of ministers and millions of dollars could be spared if we could have this kind of Church Unity. It would be a delight to many if they could be lawful ministers of several different denominations at the same time. Such would constitute a living bridge between the denominations.

It is commonly held that an ordained minister has authority to minister anywhere in the Church of God. It is maintained that the bishops of the Protestant Episcopal Church are not only diocesans, but bishops in the Church of God. These positions are untenable. It is quite true that there can be but one ordination to the priesthood according to the Roman doctrine. But admission to the order of priesthood does not carry with it authority



for a world-wide ministry. The priest is ordained to minister in a particular diocese, and ordinarily over a particular congregation. He cannot act as priest in any other diocese without the consent of the diocesan. He cannot be a free lance in the world. He can act only under the appointment of his superiors. A bishop is ordained over a diocese, but he cannot act as a bishop in any other diocese without the appointment of his metropolitan, or the invitation of another diocesan. He may act in council when summoned to the council, but even in council he acts as the head of his diocese, not as a universal bishop. According to the Roman œcumenical ecclesiastical organization, the world is mapped out into patriarchates, archdioceses, dioceses, and missionary jurisdictions. But those who minister in missionary lands are subject to diocesan authority, and are within the territorial and comprehensive dominion of the Roman Church. From the point of view of one holy catholic œcumenical Church, ordination constitutes a priest or a bishop a priest or a bishop in a universal Church; he cannot be reordained, but he cannot minister in any particular place without appointment by his diocesan, and he cannot remove without authority.

The situation becomes very much changed when we recognize more than one valid ecclesiastical organization. The Church of England has no ecclesiastical authority in any other land than England, save so far as she conducts missionary work. When she cut herself off from œcumenical relations, she lost the authority to give her ministry œcumenical relations, or to constitute her bishops any other than bishops of the Church of England. She could not communicate any more authority than she had, and that authority was limited to England. So soon as the authority of the Church of England was still further limited and restricted to her voluntary adherents, she could not impart to her ministry or her bishops any authority beyond the persons who voluntarily adhere to the Church of England. The Church of England became more and more limited in her jurisdiction and the authority of her ministry, with every separating of dissenters, until at the present time it is doubtful whether she has authority over one half of the English people. Under these circumstances it is no longer possible to think of Anglican bishops and Anglican priests as having any authority beyond that committed to them over the persons who adhere to them. No Anglican bishop can exercise jurisdiction in any particular over any company of Roman Catholics, or Presbyterians, or Congregationalists, or Baptists, or

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Methodists, or Unitarians, or Friends, or any others, except Episcopalians. He cannot convey by his ordination any authority to any person to minister over any congregation except congregations adhering to the Church of England. The same thing is true of every denomination of Christians. No denomination has the slightest authority, or the least shadow of a jurisdiction, beyond its own voluntary adherents. No ministers have any other external authority in the Church than that committed to them by the ecclesiastical organizations to which they voluntarily adhere. Some are Episcopal ministers, others are Congregational, others Presbyterian, Baptist or Reformed. No one of them can act as a minister in any other denomination without receiving authority from some jurisdiction in that denomination so to act. They are ministers of Christ by Christ's appointment, but none of them has any universal ministry, and they cannot have such ministry in the present divided state of Christendom until they have received authority and submitted to the jurisdiction of all valid existing ecclesiastical organizations.

I have been obliged to think this question out in my own case. I was ordained by a presbytery as a Presbyterian minister. The supreme judicatory of the body which gave me the external authority to act as a minister has suspended my authority so to act. They took away all the authority they ever gave me. They did it in an unconstitutional and illegal manner. If the case could be renewed in a competent court, their action would be declared null and void. But it stands until overruled. I have no present ministerial authority from any ecclesiastical judicatory. I have authority from Jesus Christ by the internal call. My internal call would doubtless be recognized by more than one denomination if I should seek recognition and authority. But so long as I abstain from such a course and my suspension is continued, my authority from the Church is void. I cannot act as a minister without being disorderly. I cannot say: "The presbytery made me a minister of Jesus Christ; they took from me only the right to act as a Presbyterian minister. I will now act as a Christian minister." If they had the authority to make me a Christian minister, they had the authority to unmake me also. But no one would recognize the right of the General Assembly to deprive a Christian minister of his ministry. If they can deprive one Christian minister of his right, they can deprive any other. If they can make one man a Christian minister, they can make another. If they have the authority to make a Christian minister,

then every denomination that refuses to recognize the Presbyterian ministry as Christian ministers is in rebellion against Christ.

It is intolerable to suppose that any ecclesiastical body, in the present divided state of the Church, can make or unmake Christian ministers for the whole world. Their making and unmaking will be recognized by no other body but themselves. The ministry are deceiving themselves in supposing that the separated denominations have made them ministers of the one undivided Church. They cannot do this so long as they remain divided. When the separated churches have become one undivided Church, then and not till then will a denominational ministry become an œcumenical ministry.

The Protestant Episcopal bishops are no more than diocesan bishops. They have no other Episcopal authority than that imparted to them at their ordination. They are bound to act under the canon law of the Protestant Episcopal Church. It is not in accordance with ecclesiastical law, and it is not safe to attribute to them any other authority, any other prerogative. They have no jurisdiction outside of their diocese except so far as they may be invited to exercise jurisdiction temporarily by other diocesan authority. If they act as bishops outside of their denomination, they act without authority, unless they receive additional authority so to act from a body of ministers competent to select them as their diocesans. Suppose that a number of ministers of different denominations should organize themselves into a body of ministry, and request a bishop of the Protestant Episcopal Church to act as their diocesan, and he should agree to do so, and they by the imposition of their hands communicate to one another all the ministerial authority they could communicate, — what would they communicate and what would be the result? No one of them could have any ecclesiastical authority to act outside of the ecclesiastical organization to which he belongs. They could not, therefore, communicate any authority whatever from their ecclesiastical organizations. The only authority they could communicate would be that which they possess by the internal call received by each of them from Jesus Christ. They would simply constitute a new denomination of Christians without transmitting any authority whatever from any existing denominations. This is the precise position in which Ballington Booth, Commander of the Volunteers, has been placed by his supposed ordination by ministers from several different denominations. These ministers disclaimed acting with the authority of their denominations be-

hind them. Therefore they disclaimed all ecclesiastical authority. The ordination was without the authority of any body of Christians. No authority was imparted by any Church. The ordination was a mere ceremony; it can only be regarded as null and void.

The reunion of Christendom depends upon these questions of jurisdiction more than upon any other questions. We have studied some of the difficulties in the way. We have examined some of the solutions of them which seem practicable. Church Unity is such an inestimable boon that many are willing to make great sacrifices for its attainment. But it is necessary for us to know what we are about, and to avoid compromising blunders. Roman Catholics and Anglicans, Presbyterians and Congregationalists and other religious bodies, have, through their supreme judicatories, spoken words of reconciliation and expressed the desire for the Reunion of Christendom. We may be sure, therefore, that there is a world-wide movement in the direction of Church Unity, and that all the difficulties which lie in the way will be carefully studied and eventually removed. It may seem like a dream to many. But it is really a constant feature in the vision of Biblical prophecy. It was the ideal of Jesus, and we may be certain that the ideal will eventually be transformed into reality.

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