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ARTICLE I.

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NUMBER III.

THE FINAL CONFLAGRATION.

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It is a remarkable fact, that wherever the assaults of infidelity have been most confident and most contemptuous, with the loudest flourish of trumpets, and the boldest tones of defiance, *there* the progress of scientific enquiry has most completely unmasked her pretensions, and confirmed the credibility of the Sacred Scriptures. Especially is this true, in regard to that permanent topic of Infidel derision,

“THE FINAL CONFLAGRATION.”

Whatever may be our theory of the earth's “Internal Heat,” whether we believe in a great ocean of central fire, increasing, as we descend, to an intensity of heat far surpassing that of melted iron, with Sir W. Herschell, and all the bolder theorists; or attribute all the phenomena, with Lyell and Sir Humphrey Davy, to the influence of chemical agencies, to the combination and decomposition of various elements, beneath the constant play of

when we are assured also that Moses was, under God's own guidance, the promulgator of the only true religion, the originator of all sound jurisprudence—the great teacher of pure morals! Yea, that Moses was also, the planner and the author of the first truly popular government among the nations of the earth. If George Washington is, by a great nation, justly honoured as the Father of his emancipated Country, much more should Moses be honoured by all men, not only as the *first* and the *most distinguished* of all the prophets of God, but also as the Instructor, and the *Benefactor of the whole Family of Mankind*.

W. T. HAMILTON.

MOBILE, March 5, 1852.

ARTICLE IV.

REMARKS UPON THE WILL, WITH SOME STRICTURES UPON THE OPINIONS OF McCOSH.

The soul is a simple, spiritual essence. The term essence refers to that which constitutes, or is its being. The spirituality of the soul is that which distinguishes it from matter. Its simplicity refers to the fact, that it is not compounded of any other spiritual elements, into which it can be resolved.

The soul, as a spiritual essence, possesses such properties as the following: Susceptibility, or the power of being acted upon; activity, or the power of acting; intelligence, or the power of knowing; reason, or the power of comparing and judging; conscience, or the power of feeling moral approbation or disapprobation.

These capabilities of the soul are not to be considered as so many distinct and separate faculties, each acting independently of the rest; nor are they to be regarded as mere mental states or conditions. Wherever there is spiritual action, there is a concurrence at least, and often a

close co-operation, of all the various powers of the soul. In other words, where the soul acts, it acts as a soul, as one indivisible spiritual essence, and not as if it were composed of parts or divisions, whose operations are distinct from each other. Nor yet are these properties of the soul its mere temporary states or conditions. A soul, under the influence of error, or prejudice, or sorrow, or joy, is in a certain state or condition. But such states or conditions are very different from those essential qualities of the soul by which it can be duped by error or prejudice, or is sensible of sorrow or joy. While then, we do not consider the properties of the soul as so many distinct and separate faculties, neither do we regard them as certain conditions in which the soul is placed by the operation of certain causes. They are qualities or attributes of the spirit God has given to man; they inhere in the essence of that spirit, and constitute it what it is.

No one can survey the list of these mental and moral qualities of the soul, without perceiving the admirable and perfect adaptation of man to the condition in which he has been created. He is, so to speak, in the centre of an infinite universe, created by God, and consecrated by his presence. His susceptibility of receiving impressions from this universe and from its glorious Author, yields him advantages of knowledge, of pleasure, and of virtue, that must continue coeval with his immortality of being. His capability of acting, of reciprocating, so to speak, the influences exerted upon him, renders him a co-worker with all other intelligent beings, and with God himself, in carrying forward and completing those mighty ends for which the universe was created. Intelligence enables him so to perceive the beings and facts around him, as to act towards them, not at random, but under the control of a sound discretion. Reason, occupying a sphere beyond simple intelligence, reveals to him the two great kingdoms of philosophy and Divinity—the one canvassing the laws of the created universe, the other the being and attributes of its Infinite Author. But there is one attribute more, that man needs to perfect his nature—conscience, or the moral sense. By this, he is enabled to see that God is at the head of an infinite government—that that government has laws—that these laws are “holy, just and good,” and that

in the observance of them, the interests, not of himself alone, or of a part simply, but of the whole universe of created beings, are promoted. Moral relations and moral duties now come up before the mind, and the distinctions between right and wrong are established on an immutable basis.

Three of the above mental qualities, though in a far superior degree, man possesses in common with brutes; two are peculiar to himself. That the lower animal natures around us possess intelligence, susceptibility and activity or will, is evident. Their field of observation, it is true, is very limited; yet, within that field many of them exhibit a remarkable sagacity. They are, too, acted upon by various objects of sense, and exhibit very decisively the powers of an active and energetic will. In the higher provinces of mind—in reason and conscience—the animal creation exhibits an utter destitution. In all such mental processes as associate cause and effect, right and wrong, and as judge of the relations of things, brutes manifest an utter incapacity. Hence, they are as unfit to establish or receive systems of philosophy or of religious belief, as the very clods and blades on which they tread.

We have introduced this comparison, not for the sake of idle curiosity, but to advert to a fact that seems very much to have been overlooked. Many writers on mental and moral philosophy have given such a prominence to the will, as to leave the impression, not only that it is a sort of soul within a soul—an existence by itself—but that the very essence of responsibility and *virtue* is to be found in it. McCosh, in his late work on the Divine Government, uses such language as the following:

“It is the will which determines what is to be preferred or rejected—what is good and what is not good.” “The will, no doubt, does prefer the pleasurable in itself to the painful; but it is because it wills to do so.”

Again he says:

“These laws, which are just the rules of the action of the will, *the rules which it adopts (!)* do in no way interfere with the freedom of the will.”

Not satisfied with even such an hypostasis of an actual being as all this, he applies the pronoun I, to this faculty:

“The will assumes this form—I choose this; I resolve to obtain it—this object is good, I wish it and desire it.”

Now, according to this language, we must conceive either that the entire soul is but will, or that will, as a sort of vicegerent and governor, controls and determines all the other faculties of the soul. How humiliating to such speculators on the almost divinity of the human will, must appear the fact, that the ox that grazes in the valley, or the mule that struggles in the street, has a *will* as well as himself! If will chiefly be the groundwork of responsibility and the essence of virtue, why, we must divert our observations from the higher walks of humanity, and fix them upon the inferior creatures around us, as so many examples of these noble qualities! Look, too, at the maniac; by some cause or other, his *reason* has been upset. This, however, does not destroy his *will*; which often becomes even more obstinate and perverse after derangement than before. This poor madman imbues his hand in the blood of another; he is not, however, considered as guilty, but innocent. Why? For the lack of *reason*, not of will.

We strongly suspect, after all that such writers have said of the independence and sovereignty of the will, that the culpability in any case of crime is to be charged, not so much to this faculty, as to something existing anterior to it, and which is the cause of its action. McCosh has involved himself, here at least, in perplexity if not in contradiction. He admits that volitions are effects, but denies that they are the effects of motives:

“But still these facts conduct us to the important truth, that the law of cause and effect reigns in the will, and in regard to the responsible acts of man, as it does in every other department of the mind, and indeed, in every other department of God’s works.”

But if volition be an effect, what is its cause? Motive, says Edwards—

“It is that motive which, as it stands in the view of the mind is the strongest, that determines the will.”

But hear McCosh—

“There are persons who tell us that the will cannot be independent, for it is swayed by motives.” “And when we ask what the motive is? it is answered, all that sways the will! We are

making no progress; we are swinging on a hinge in advancing and re-advancing such maxims."

So lightly does this new candidate for metaphysical fame toss aside one of the strongest bulwarks of the illustrious Edwards; of whom the venerable Dr. Chalmers, while treating on the same subject, says:

"His is by far the highest name which the New World has to boast of, and that he distanced immeasurably all the speculations of all the schools in Europe."

But McCosh does Edwards great injustice, by a partial quotation. Motive, says Edwards, sways the will; and, then, in defining motive, he says as a *general* statement—

"By motive, I mean the whole of that which moves, excites or invites the mind to volition, whether that be one thing singly or several things conjunctly."

He then proceeds *in extenso* to particularize all those things which act as motives on the will. Is there any turning on a hinge here? Suppose we were asked, what sets a body in motion, and should reply, force. We are then asked, what is a force, and our answer should be, that which sets a body in motion; proceeding, however, forthwith to specify steam, water, muscles, &c., as so many examples of force. Is there no progress here? The truth is, McCosh, who has written well on other subjects, has handled this one badly; and this he proves by setting Edwards so unceremoniously aside.

But let us see what is the result of his own investigation after the cause of volition. Cousin, whom he here follows, places the cause of volition in the will itself:

"Above my will, there is no cause to be sought; the principle of causality expires before the cause in the will."

This would seem to be a just conclusion from the premises. If the will is not determined by motives, surely it must be either wholly given up to caprice, or governed by itself. But from both of these conclusions, McCosh dissents—

"If it be said that the cause lies in the human will itself, we go back to that human will, and insist that it too, as a phenomenon, must have a cause of its operation and the mode of it."

And when he finds out that cause, what is it?—*the laws which the will adopts for its own government!!*

“ We discover laws in the department of the will, as we discover laws every where else. Not only so, but we find the will regulating itself by laws even in regard to actions that are moral and immoral.”

Who, then, we ask, is swinging on the hinge ; Edwards, who affirms that the will is governed by motives, or McCosh, who insists that it is controlled by laws of its own adoption ? McCosh should certainly have run his doctrine to the terminus that Cousin reached—the self-determining power of the will itself. The French philosopher tells us plainly, that the will is the cause of its own volitions ; McCosh declares this to be false, but that the will is the author of a set of *laws* that are the causes of volition ! Apprehensive that some might question the conclusion at which he arrives, he says in a note, that

“The power of the will and the universal reign of causation are ultimate facts, attested by primary principles, in our constitution.”

By “the power of the will,” here, he doubtless means its independence or sovereignty ; for on the very next page he employs the following language :

“ We believe man, morally speaking, to be as independent of external control, as his Creator must ever be, as that Creator was, when in a past eternity, there was no external existence to control him !”

This is certainly rhetorical enough ; and proves that its author had a soaring fancy, whatever may be thought of his judgment and modesty. Now, so far from acquiescing in the statements here made, our own mind teaches us, that *experience*, universal experience, has established our belief in a general system of causation ; and that as to any consciousness of having a will as unrestrained as that of God, we have none at all. We feel perfectly sure, that while the will is free in its ultimate action, there are nevertheless innumerable causes, both within and without the mind, that do perpetually direct and determine that action. So that whether this writer refer us to the self-made laws of the will, as the causes of its volitions, or to primary principles in our nature, we consider him in either case to be extremely unfortunate.

But we have intimated, that in moral enquiries, an importance has been attached to the will which is not due, and which has led into error in estimating the moral quality of actions. Our impression decidedly is, that volition is *that which gives existence to the soul's action*, but not that which imparts *moral character* to such action. Volition is not simply an action of the will, but the soul's entire affirmative or negative, to every question submitted to it for determination. And it is in these adjuncts to volition—the result of the reasoning thus expressed, and the affirmation or negation of the passion thus embodied—it is chiefly in these moral exercises and reasonings that precede volition, and of which volition is the authoritative announcement—it is in these prior elements, that we find the virtue that brightens, or the vice that blackens every volition and deed which the soul performs. “The tree is known by its fruits;” the fountain by its streams; and a man by his acts. But what are the acts of a man, save the doings of the spirit that is in him? These are the deeds for which he will be judged in the last day. Now, the mere fact, that muscular action follows, or does not follow the volitions of the soul, does not destroy the action of the soul in the case. He who takes his stand by the road-side with the purpose to shoot a fellow man, although some unforeseen circumstance may prevent the execution of his design, is as truly a murderer in the eye of morality, as he who succeeded and actually shed another's blood. *In volition the soul acts.* Previously to this, the moral elements and reasonings were arranging themselves to the business of acting. But in forming a will—in giving birth to a volition—the matter is completed, and the *deed* becomes perfect. Volition thus gives *being* to spiritual action, but it does not determine its *character*. Let the following suffice as an illustration: a man is found dead on the road-side; the first enquiry relates to the author of the crime—the individual man who has destroyed life; the next subject of inquiry is, was the man, who has been proved to be the author of the deed, in his right mind when he performed the act? Should this be decided affirmatively, it is then asked, whether he did it voluntarily or by accident, or in some other exculpatory manner? Should this interrogatory also be settled in the affirmative,

the highest point at which the investigation thus far reaches is to this fact, *that the deed is in every sense the deed of the accused.* The action is now fastened upon the agent—the destruction of human life upon him who destroyed it. But even this does not establish criminality. The dead man may have been killed wholly in self-defence. If so, the action was justifiable, and the prisoner is to be released. But if all the circumstances and the testimony go to prove, that the deed was one of malice, that there was in it not simply volition, but hatred, then does a criminality become attached to it, that renders it definitely and positively murder. Volition is thus essential to *personal action*, but it does not of itself determine the *moral quality* of such action.

The doing of the soul, however, may refer to something within as well as to something without itself. It may refer to a process of reasoning, or to the exercise of an affection, or to the indulgence of a desire, or the entertainment of an imagination. The truth of the position presented above, however that volition is essential to action, holds as good in reference to the exercises of the soul within, as it does in relation to objects that are without. An external object, or a transient recollection, may awake in the soul certain desires, or trains of thought. Now these desires or trains of thought become a part of the soul's acting when they receive the concurrence of the will. The mere awaking within of an involuntary desire is not sin, nor does any one conceive it to be such. It is when such an emotion receives the sanction of the will that it *may* become either virtuous or vicious. Nor even then, is its moral character determined, but arises wholly from the nature of the desire or thought, which the will has sanctioned. The primary desire which Eve exercised for the forbidden fruit *as fruit*, was not criminal; it was a perfectly natural feeling, and probably *must* have arisen under the circumstances; but when that act was assented to by the will, when she voluntarily indulged the desire, then it became criminal, and even had she abstained from it afterwards, she had nevertheless sinned—her abstinence being wholly the result of *fear*, and not of a spirit of obedience to God. Now, what the will did in this case, was to put forth an action of the soul in reference to a *forbid-*

den object ; a desire which could only have been innocent by an instantaneous expulsion from the soul was cherished, and by being cherished, even in the first degree, became sinful. So we hold in reference to every other mental exercise, it becomes an act of the soul when the will concurs, still, however, it derives its moral character from its own nature.

Now, if the affirmation or negation of the will—its “yes” or “no” to every question of truth and duty presented to it—be that which gives *personality* simply but not morality to its actions, those philosophers who give this faculty such great independence, who represent it as the supreme arbiter of the soul, and as deciding upon all questions of morality brought before it, if our positions be true, then have such philosophers separated the will from the whole domain of virtue and vice altogether. They concatenate its infinite number of deeds, and press them upon the soul as its responsible acts ; but whether those deeds be right or wrong, virtuous or vicious, *their* systems of philosophy can never determine. Why, no tribunal on earth or in heaven could either condemn or acquit an arraigned criminal on this ground. It is not enough that the will be determined in any case whatever—it is not enough that it act, *the cause* of that action must be ascertained ; its action may make the deed a matter of *accountability* ; it may fasten it upon one man rather than another, but it never can decide whether the action were right or wrong ; suppose the act to be in *itself* good or evil, virtuous or vicious, the question then occurs, what is it *in the agent* whose act it is ? In other words, neither the volitions nor deeds of a man can be righteously adjudged, until the *motives* that produced them are considered. The will merely as will never can determine the moral character of its acts. This character is derived wholly from the virtuous or vicious principles which lie in the nature of the soul itself, and of which the will is merely the agent or executive.

The question, then, whether the will be under control, or whether it revel in absolute freedom, is one of the gravest ever presented to the mind for contemplation.—Some philosophers there are, who in discoursing on this subject, are so bent on establishing the dependence of the

will, that they deprive it of its *nature*. Others again, by over-magnifying that nature, deprive it of its *government*. The one class destroy it ; the other isolate it in a sort of independent sovereignty. Truth is with neither party. *Willing* is the very nature of the will. Its acts, *so far as itself* is concerned, are, and must be, and can be nothing else, but free. Deprive it of this *mobility in itself*, and you destroy its nature. We will illustrate this by allusion to a physical substance. *Liquidity* is essential to water—make it a solid, and it becomes ice, but is no longer water—so, in reference to the will, spontaneous spiritual action is essential to its existence ; and were you to take this away, it is no more will, but necessity. The personality, and therefore the *responsibility* of an act of volition would be forever destroyed, and there could be no government in the universe.

But while spontaneity or self-activity constitutes the nature of the will, its operations are the results of causes as fixed and efficient, as any thing in nature. On this point, McCosh is entirely sound, save that in referring to the *causes* of volition, he specifies the will itself, and the laws it adopts for its speedy government, as the most efficient of all others :

“ If by motive is meant the sum of all the causes producing the final volition, it is evident that the motive ever determines the volitions ; but then in the sum of causes *the main element is the will itself*. If by motive is meant merely the causes acting independently of the will, then we hold that they do not determine the volition, they merely call the will into exercise as *the true determining power*.”

We must conceive that in specifying *the causes of volition*, this author flatly contradicts himself. How does the above, for instance, agree with the following ?

“ According to what Cousin holds to be a universal and necessary principle, every particular act of the will, as a phenomenon commencing to exist, must have a cause. If it be said that the cause lies in the human will itself, we go back to the human will, and insist that it too, as a phenomenon, must have a cause of its operation, and the mode of it.”

Here it is stated, on the one hand, that in reference to one class of motives, the will is the “*main element*” of the causes that produce volition ; in reference to another,

that it alone "is the true determining power!" There is such a confusion here of our author's language, that we really confess we do not understand him. So far as we do comprehend his meaning, it seems to be this, the will is controlled by motives in part, and in part by the laws of its own adoption; in either case, however, it is supreme, and may yield assent or not as it pleases! Now, how it is that volition can be a fixed and necessary effect, and yet the cause of that effect be wholly contingent, we cannot conceive. The truth is, that McCosh, in attempting to thrust a new theory concerning the will between that of Calvinists and Arminians, has made himself obnoxious to both, and satisfactory to neither. We think, however, that by far the most of his positions are decidedly Arminian. Even when he fastens the will to the moral nature, or maintains the fixedness and certainty of its operations, he spoils all by making the will *causal* of its own volitions. He certainly ascribes to it a sovereignty and power, not often heard from the lips of true Calvinists.

But we have said, that the operations of the will are subject to causes, that act with positive certainty in every case whatever. These causes are both internal and external to the mind. No one can for a moment doubt, but that there is in man, both a physical and moral adaptation to the beings and things around him. Now, the power of the external universe, to exercise a controlling influence over the human will, is to be found in this very adaptation of man to the creation around him. Has that creation light? He has eyes to enjoy it? Is that creation clothed with rich harvests and luscious fruits? He has appetites to desire them. Does that creation exhibit everywhere the signs of Divine wisdom and benevolence? He has an understanding and heart to appreciate both. Are there in that creation the morally good and the morally evil? He has a nature so endowed, as to distinguish between them, and to see the consequences of pursuing the one in preference of the other. The power, therefore, of all beings and things external to the soul, to control the action of the soul, depends upon certain fitnesses and adaptations in the soul itself to be controlled. The physical universe makes certainly a very different impression upon the mind of a brute, from what it does upon the mind of

man. And again, among men themselves the impressions are infinitely various, as their mental organizations and tastes differ. The same principle holds true in the moral world. The power of moral considerations to influence the conduct of men, is to be found in the adaptedness of men to admit those considerations. Where sin reigns and depravity is supreme, they can have little or no influence ; but where the spirit of man is in harmony with such considerations, they are not only cordially received, but exercise an absolute control. The very same law, therefore, of cause and effect that exists universally in the physical creation, has an equal ascendancy in the world of mind. And if it be true, that the strongest conceivable motives often fail of producing effect upon obdurate and hardened natures, equally true is it in physics, that there are bodies that the most powerful agents cannot dissolve. The will being the faculty of choice, and that choice depending upon the physical and moral constitution of the soul itself, its habitual inclination must be in the line of the nature to which it belongs. If that nature be lofty and aspiring, the will will fix its desires and aspirations upon the noble and the great. But if a man's nature be grovelling and vile, his will will crawl in the dust, amid things that are base and mean. This is a universal law of our natures. It is utterly impossible for a man's moral nature to be one thing, and the habitual inclination of his will to be the opposite. Nor is it the will that controls the nature in this case, but the nature the will. It is too, just at this point, that a *sort* of force is sometimes placed upon the will—an influence is brought to bear upon it not in harmony with its habitual inclination ; the consequence is a *temporary departure* from that inclination, followed it may be, either by remorse or a subsequent sense of great personal frailty.

While then we consider the will in its *nature* as free, we yet hold, that it is under the constant pliances of influences and principles, that control it with as much certainty, as any cause in nature does the effect it produces. True, a physical cause might not produce a mental effect, or a mental cause a physical effect. Both causes and effects are different in the moral, from what they are in the physical world. But what we maintain is, that the

certainty and regularity of operation is as fixed in the one case as in the other. With the same certainty that physical causes produce physical effects, do moral causes produce moral effects.

Probably nothing will give a fuller illustration of the points we are here discussing, than the system of moral training or education, to which man is subjected in this life. As it seems to us, the great object to be accomplished by that education, is *to secure the action of the will on the side of virtue*. External acts are but the muscular expressions of the acts of the will; these last being the true and real acts of the soul. It is matter then of supreme importance, that the rectitude of the will be established upon an immoveable basis. But how is this done? By training the will *as will*? By seeking to develop its energies by the frequency of its exercise? Not at all. There are two senses in which the action of the will may be wrong; it may be wrong in the violation of truth, or it may be wrong in the transgression of some principle of duty. In other words, it may err both in belief and practice. But how are these errors of the will to be corrected? Not by any pliances of education, pressed directly upon the will, but by inculcating the lessons of truth upon the understanding, and by seeking to infuse a love for it into the heart. Let the educator of the human soul fasten his principles immovably deep in the mind, and let him assiduously cultivate the moral principle; and if at all successful, he will find the will of his subject as naturally follow the bias of his teachings, as do physical bodies the law of gravitation. The will under the influence of error is erroneous; and under the control of depravity is vicious. If then, we would remove these misdirections of that faculty, we must dissipate that error, and eradicate that depravity. Now the whole object of moral training in this life, whether conducted by parents, teachers, ministers of the gospel, or God himself, is to produce these very results. In the child, where the convictions of duty and the principles of morality are not firmly established, nothing is more capricious than the will. We must think, too, that this was the case with our first parents at the time of their fall; they had not that *experience* which was necessary to confirm the will in the choice of that alone

which was right. We do not mean by this remark to apologise for their transgression, but simply to assign a reason for its occurrence. As the child becomes the man, his will assumes much more pertinacity and strength. If he has been well trained, that firmness of will is on the side of virtue; if otherwise it is the dupe of vice. Thus the work proceeds onward through life, the will acquiring a marble stability, an iron-like hardness, as virtue or vice has taken possession of the soul. Who thinks of effecting a change in the character and conduct of the veteran transgressor? And who ever calculates that the avowed apostle of virtue should decline from his integrity, and thus reverse at three score years and ten, the principles by which his whole has been governed? And that educational course, which in this life attains to such maturity, will be conducted infinitely farther in the life that is to come. It will probably be more rapid there than here; so that if after the flight of some millions of years, a comparison should be made between some heir of life and some child of hell, the fixed opposition of their wills would almost be like that between Gabriel and Apollyon. In such a condition at least, the advocates of the will's sovereignty, must admit, that no exercise of that sovereignty whatever can cause the sanctified saint in heaven to consent to a crime, or the lost soul in perdition to choose a deed of virtue.

There is one point in the training of a soul for eternity, which no education whatever can reach—*its moral renewal*. The Scriptures, as well as our own experience teach, that there is a *vice of nature* in man, that man himself can never eradicate. As long as this innate vitiation remain, the inclination and action of the will are always wrong. Indeed, such is the power that this depravity exercises over the will, that its wrongness or misdirection is, in a moral and philosophical sense, necessary. The will, as will, cannot possibly be different from what it is, the moral elements of the soul continuing what they are. Now, the remedy for this evil, as taught by Christ himself, is not any peculiar sovereignty which the will has to throw off this oppression; nor yet any power of mere motives and inducement to effect a change—it is a *regeneration of the soul itself*—“Marvel not that I said unto thee,

ye must be born again." This work of omnipotence upon the soul, changes its entire moral condition; hence, a change of the will necessarily follows; and with these new elements of moral power to control it, the will can no more now prefer a life of sin, than it could previously choose one of holiness. And yet even this mighty moral revolution, that has effected an entire change in the bias of the will, has in no sense destroyed even a particle of its essential liberty. It is now in its physical nature, just what it was before the change took place—it is *will*. Nor has a disruption taken place between it, as a sort of executive of the other faculties of the soul, and those faculties themselves. It is controlled by the inner powers of the mind now, just as truly as it was formerly. The change throughout has been a *moral*, not a physical one. A bad nature has been made virtuous—a dynasty of evil powers has been transformed into an administration of love and purity—"old things have passed away, and all things have become new."

Our last remark on this subject is, that most of the errors concerning the freedom of the will, have arisen from not distinguishing between the nature of the will itself, and the laws of control to which its actions are subject. Water is essentially a fluid. This fact, all who deal with it must ever keep in mind. To manage it as you would a solid, would be egregiously to err. But are there no laws which control this element *as a fluid*? If we cannot manage it as a solid, can we not manage it at all? Surely we can; and with as much certainty, as we do the harder substances around us. Just so, we say of this faculty, it is will—and its exercises are volitions—the *free preferences and choices of the soul*. But are there no methods established by God, for determining and controlling this free element of being? Has the creator established a most positive and fixed administration over all other creatures and things, and left this anomaly of existence an absolute *outlaw* from his government? So much did McCosh feel the necessity of such laws for the government of the will, that, overlooking the fact that God had enacted them, *when he created the will*, he even sets the will forth as an intelligent agent, to originate a code for itself! We hold it as a truth as fixed as any other

whatever, that the human will essentially free in itself, is under as absolute a control from causes both within and without the mind, as any other creature or thing that God has made. He, therefore, who would seek a change of will in himself or in others, must not accost directly the faculty of volition as a power by itself, and as capable of itself to determine its own *æts*. *This would be to force the will ab extra!* He must approach the will by those avenues that God, nature, and universal experience have indicated; he must enlighten the understanding; he must appeal to the heart; he must arouse the conscience. Set these agencies at work, and your end is forthwith accomplished. But should you ply the will, as will—should you expect the change to begin with it, in it, and by it, the general state of the mind and heart remaining what it was, your endeavours would be not only abortive, but absurd. Complaining, possibly, of the *force-work* employed by necessarians about the will, you are seeking to *necessitate* it in a way against which it must forever rebel. Indeed, the mis-named system of freedom that Arminians and others advocate, concerning the will, is the only system that subjects it to *force*, and which by *revereing* the modes of its operation, destroys the only freedom that it possesses. Even if such freedom existed, what is it worth? It is but caprice at best, a mere thing of chance and uncertainty. What, separate the control of reason and conscience from the operations of the will! Dislodge it from all the foundations of virtue and holiness; yea, separate it even from God himself, and yet expect it to be worth any thing! The human will is down-trodden enough already—it is abased by the control of evil lusts and passions; but verily, if the doctrine of these philosophers could hold, its friends would be its worst enemies, and hands extended to give it aid, would only sink it into a deeper abyss of degradation.

There is one practical suggestion, which we must beg leave to offer, for the sake of our younger class of divines. A pretty long experience has taught us, that the holding forth from the pulpit of man's *dependence*, is far more effective in promoting his conversion, than the empty laudation of his vainly imagined sovereignty, and greatness. Humanity is already too much exalted, the work of the

preacher should be to *abase it*, that it may have a true exaltation. Yet, when abased by the convictions of truth, when humbled by a sense of its guilt and *helplessness*, it must not be left in that condition. Let not the preacher, however, aim at the work of resuscitation, by accosting simply the will, by magnifying its freedom and self-agency, and by thus transferring the sinner's trust from God to himself, from grace to the energies of his own nature. Let, on the contrary, God's co-worker (which every true preacher is) do as God himself does—level such an array of argument and appeal at the understanding, the conscience and the heart, as to lead, through grace, the will captive, according to God's established laws for its government. He who attempts, primarily, to find his way into the scul by the *door of the will*, will discover, both to his defeat and mortification, that he has been attempting an entrance, where there is and can be *none*. But he who seeks such admission by the reason, the conscience and the heart, will find himself master of the spiritual citadel, often, even ere he is aware of it. Some truth or motive lodged in these potent pre-agencies of volition, will so remain, and so act, that even that stern keeper of the soul—that faculty by which its full action is expressed—will yield; and another trophy will thus be added to the triumphs of the cross.

ARTICLE V.

ANALOGY OF THE SOUTHERN LANGUAGE OF EUROPE WITH THE LATIN.

BY V. H. MANGET.

In a former number we spoke of the first inhabitants of France, Spain and Portugal; of their different dialects, of the invasion of their country by the Romans, and its effects upon their customs, religion and language; finally, we traced, step by step, the origin and progress of the present languages of Southern Europe and their literature.