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By Whom, all things; for Whom, all things.

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POPULAR EDUCATION AS A SAFEGUARD FOR POPULAR SUFFRAGE.

THE extension of suffrage in Britain under the last "Liberal" ministry was closely followed by an extension of primary education. The argument was, that the new popular element, now invested with power in the government, must be fitted for its new franchise by being made more intelligent. The ministers of the crown were reported as saying that they could not govern England by popular suffrage unless the populace were educated. In like manner, we meet perpetually, in ethical, philanthropic, and even in Christian writings, with the declaration that "Ignorance is the parent of vice" (meaning the sole parent). Americans express the same ideas: "Popular suffrage and popular education must go together." So, it is heard on all sides of the bestowal of suffrage on the Africans: "If they are to vote, then they must be educated." By this "education" is practically meant a training in literary rudiments.

One truth plainly implied in these popular propositions is: That without some safeguard, universal suffrage is liable to be abused to work injustice and calamity. This is a clear concession that this proposed remedy for unjust government, the right of all the ruled to vote for rulers, is capable of being itself perverted to oppression. The other proposition implied is that such literary culture as state-schools may make universal is the adequate safeguard against the perversion. It is upon this position that the views of the opposing parties will be dispassionately compared.

It is presumed that no party holds ignorance to be preferable, *per se*, for any human beings, over intelligence; and that none deny that ignorance is an evil, and is often an occasion of aggra-

vation to the evils which originate in other causes. Doubt only exists to this extent: whether intelligence alone is the adequate remedy. It is presumed no one denies the ignorance of voters to be dangerous to the commonwealth; the extent of the inquiry is only this: whether popular intelligence may be relied on to eliminate the peril. The sceptics here argue on the general principle that the admitted reality of a danger is not enough to lead, by the mere rule of contraries, to the adequate remedy. Famine destroys life; and yet food may be so administered to the famished as to hasten their death. To the safe exercise of power two conditions are essential. One is sufficient intelligence, and the other is righteous purpose. Ignorance in those who rule is a great evil, because it makes the unrighteousness of purpose blindly aggressive. Yet something else than the diffusion of intelligence may be necessary to remove the unrighteous purpose; and it may even be that if this remains, increased intelligence will arm it with deeper powers of mischief. On the other hand, it appears almost self-evident to multitudes of our people that the diffusion of intelligence is the obvious and the adequate remedy. They hold that the purpose to act wrongfully proceeds from thinking erroneously. "Ignorance is the parent of vice;" and therefore, it is self-evident, knowledge is the remedy; for ignorance and knowledge are the obvious opposites. In other words, the philosophy of this party in our Christian country is that which Plato imputes to Socrates: the key-note of whose inculcation was that any soul may be imbued with virtue by didactic instruction; or, that right thinking is the sufficient and sure condition of right acting. Which of these rival views is true? Or are they both half-truths, dangerous from their confusion of partial truth and error?

1. To reach an answer to this question, the first requisite appears to be that we shall perceive how, and from what cause, the dangers of the perversion of popular suffrage are to grow. This will be best seen by retracing a few of the admitted rudiments of the science of government.

Civil government is founded on the will and ordination of the Creator. These he makes known to his believing servants in Revelation; and to the reason of mankind in certain necessities of their nature and facts in their exist-

ence. Of these, one is that man must be and is a social being. For social life he was created; and its conditions are necessary for his proper development and happiness, not to say to his very existence. Consequently God constituted man a sympathetic and social creature. But man has also personal and self-interested principles; and the general law is *that these are far stronger than the social*. The importance of this law is not weakened by the fact that a few extraordinary persons are wholly disinterested, and that the immediate domestic and especially the parental affections tend towards impersonal actions. The general case, for which political philosophy must provide, is this: that in society the personal or self-interested principles override the social. Now, out of these two facts emerges the necessity for civil government. Men cannot exist apart. But when they come together, the principles of self-interest, which always dominate over the social, tend constantly to aggression upon their fellows. Government is, in its simplest idea, the forcible restraint which is necessary to curb this tendency. 'Without this, man's social existence would be a perpetual competition of individuals against their fellows for personal advantage, tending to anarchy and a universal violence which would break up social existence and either destroy life or drive men again into solitude. This result, without restraint, would follow in large degree, tho man were actuated by no principles of self-interest except the natural ones. But the case is greatly strengthened by that fact which observation should teach us, without Bibles: that all men are naturally depraved. Man's natural will is not only more inclined to personal than impersonal ends, but it is also unjust. Thus man in society is prone to yet more mischievous and wicked aggressions on the social order, amidst which he is yet ordained to exist. Civil government is the necessary restraining power upon this perpetual tendency.

But plainly: civil government cannot be an abstraction, executing itself; neither can it find superhuman beings to administer it. The power of restraint must be committed to human beings. But in these governing human beings, also, the personal principles are stronger than the impersonal. Hence the general tendency will be for them to use, for unjust aggressions on their

fellows, the power of control entrusted to them to prevent such aggression. The additional power of rule annexed to their own individual powers only enables them the more for the unjust engrossing of others' rights to their own gratifications. Thus the remedy, unavoidable as it is, reverts to the disease! Experience tells just this story in all history: that while government suppresses the anarchy of rival, private wills, it introduces in its place the unjust tyranny of the ruler's will over the ruled. As men felt this, they learned their first lesson in the science of government. Suffrage seemed to be the obvious expedient for obviating this peril. Let the ruled elect the rulers, so that the rulers shall derive their powers from, and return them to, the ruled, at stated times; and it was hoped that this danger would be precluded.

But experience soon dashed this hope also; for the most radically democratic commonwealths were found to be far from the most justly governed. Whence this disappointment? When the answer to this question is reached we shall have the central truth which solves our inquiries. It was found that, tho every citizen were made an equal voter and equal to the candidates also in eligibility, still all could never have, or think they had, identical interests; and there must ever be wide natural differences of natural strength, talent, appetencies, and will. Hence it was possible that a line of governmental policy could be made to press differently upon individual interests. Any one line of action which was specially promotive of the personal interests of one class of citizens must be, for that very reason, adverse to the different interests of another class. In every country, climates and other geographical causes force some parts to pursue different industries from other parts. Or, if the country were so small as to be absolutely uniform in its industrial conditions, still native differences of powers, tastes, and wishes must dictate to different people a preference for different pursuits. Or if, by some miracle, every man's heart were made exactly like every other's, the necessity of raising and disbursing taxes must still generate an inevitable difference of interests, that of the tax-payers and the tax-expenders. Even if taxation, the only equitable way to provide the cost of a government, were distributed with absolute equity upon rulers and

ruled, still the ruled cannot equally share with the rulers the power of disbursement. Whence it must ever follow that there will be here two classes with clashing personal interests.

Hence, in a freely elective government, sameness of interests and unanimity of wishes must be forever impossible. But there is no other practicable rule for electing than that the majority must prevail. Now, let it be supposed that the theoretic power of the electors over the elected were not in the least interrupted, or obstructed, or swayed by any arts of faction, *caucus*, press, or demagog, the *utmost and most accurate result of suffrage would be*: that *the elected, in ruling, would exactly reflect and reproduce the wishes of the dominant majority of electors*. That would be all. In fact, suffrage never gains so much; because the arts of those who manipulate it always pervert it, in large measure, so that the majority of electors is really but the tool of a designing, or more acute, or more active minority; and it is only the aggregate personal wills of this minority which are virtually reflected in the administration. Let this fact be added: that as political experience is gained and mental intelligence diffused, a perception of ways in which the government's action can be made to promote or injure classes of private interests is acquired by classes of citizens. Possible combinations for advancing some interests, to the detriment of others, are thought out. Thus, the same law of nature with which we set out reappears: that the personal and self-interested principles of men are stronger than the impersonal and equitable principles. The same problem confronts us. Our first experiment in constructing a government, that of the one-man power, gave us, in place of the anarchical despotism of individual aggressions, the despotism of the monarch. Our second, that of free suffrage, gives us, in place of the oppressions of a tyrant, the despotism of the majority over the minority—or, more probably, of the shrewd oligarchy who wield the majority over both them and the minority.

And here, interposes every intelligent reader, appears the necessity of constitutional stipulations or limitations, protecting the rights of minorities and regulating the mode and limits within which the majority shall govern. Not any preference of any major number shall be the righteous law for all; but in the im-

mortal words of the Scotch freemen of the seventeenth century, *Rex Lex*. The Constitution is the king. For it is simply childish to demur to the mere arbitrary will of one human being, because he is a selfish and fallen being and thus ever prone to injustice; and then accept the mere will of an aggregate of just such beings. For if the natural traits of the sinner who is made a monarch incline him to injustice, the same traits in each individual of the majority made a monarch will cause a far stronger tendency to injustice, because it is an invariable rule of human nature that *it feels less responsible to conscience in associated than in individual acts*. It always yields, more or less, to the temptation to view the responsibility as distributed out, divided among the multitude, and thus diminished. From these results no reflecting man dissents; but thus far all sides agree. Thus the problem again recurs: how shall power to control the unjust, personal principles of man be trusted to man, and not be liable to abuse?

It is equally obvious to all sides that as we found civil government could not be an abstraction executing itself, so these constitutional limitations would be a mockery if they were left a mere abstraction, self-executive against the encroaching ruling power. To curb power, they must be somehow imbued with power. How shall these protecting safeguards be reinforced so as to become practical? The answer has taken three shapes. One plan has been to arm the restraining safeguards with protective energy, by so distributing the actual forces of government between the different parts of the commonwealth that while capable of combining for good to the whole, they shall lack the ability, or the motive, to combine for the unconstitutional oppression of a part. By this happy expedient the very principles of human nature which we dread as prompters of aggression are enlisted as preventives of aggression. All the functions of rule are not aggregated in the hand of one class, even tho that be the most numerous; but they are distributed between different representative centres, each of which is armed by law not only with the abstract title but the practical forces for defending its own legitimate functions. And it is from this expedient, in one or another form, that all the regulated liberty which has been known in history has proceeded. In the

Roman commonwealth powers were distributed between the annual consuls, the senate, and the *plebs*, who were armed with its tribunitial *veto*; and as long as that constitution was maintained in actual "working order" Rome was free and prosperous. So, in Great Britain the powers were divided between king, Lords, and Commons. From William and Mary until this day Britain has enjoyed a longer period of true liberty with order than any modern people. But just so soon as the distributed powers of the European governments were engrossed in one centre, it mattered not which, despotism was the immediate result. Thus, the French Republic of 1790 professed to be founded on the freest basis of "liberty, equality, and fraternity." But as soon as the French National Convention had engrossed to itself all the functions of state, France had the most wicked, despotic, and worthless, as well as the most corrupt government on earth. Its diabolical tyranny and outrages on equal rights actually surpassed those of Louis XIV. when he was able to say *L'état, c'est moi*, by absorbing into his monarchical hand the former feudal rights of the nobles and political and judicial rights of the parliaments of the provinces.

Another expedient for solving the difficulty of just government is to imbue the minds of those entrusted with power with justice, benevolence, and virtue; or, in other words, to rely on moral power to curb the tendency of human nature to forcible injustice. This was one of the chief expedients urged by the Father of his Country in his "Farewell Address." So far as it is available it is excellent. But since man is a morally fallen creature, and since the state as an organism is equipped with no agencies for sanctification, its ability of self-help in this direction must be very limited. Hence Washington, after pointing to moral restraints as the best foundation for liberty, correctly pointed to the *Christian religion* as the chief source of moral restraint. The old adage says: "If a man wishes to thrive, he must ask his wife." So, if the commonwealth desires to possess this safeguard of moral power for the liberties of the people, it must look chiefly to its equal and ally, Christianity, to propagate it for them. But in this the simile does not hold: the state must not marry Christianity, lest it should paralyze it; but must leave it to help it as an independent friend.

The third reliance for solving the problem of just government in human hands is the mental culture of all the voters. Their expedient is: Let the state itself undertake the work of giving the rudiments of mental culture to all the people, and their intelligence will ensure their using suffrage safely. In other words, their remedy is dictated by taking the dangerous half-truth, "Ignorance the source of vice," as a whole truth. In the light of the examination made above, their reliance on this expedient is obviously the same as the assertion of this proposition: *Sufficient knowledge will render the selfishness natural to man unselfish in its associated actions.* For, as we saw, it was man's natural selfishness which necessitated civil government. But free government is only power wielded by men associated.

Reflecting men would hardly deem this proposition, on which the third expedient is really grounded, either tenable or debatable (viz., that sufficient knowledge will render the selfishness natural to man unselfish in his associated actions), did they not tacitly mingle with it the second expedient. Moral discipline, so far as it can be applied efficiently, is a valuable remedy for this tendency; and thus a real solution for this great problem. But, as was pointed out in this REVIEW in a previous essay ("Secularized Education"), it is exceedingly hard to eliminate the moral from the mental discipline. The soul is a monad, and cannot be cultivated or nurtured by patches. In this respect it is a fortunate thing that this is so. Let education be in theory secularized, yet it is almost impossible to communicate secular knowledge without both teaching theological ideas and wielding moral control. This mixture of the Christian and moral discipline, in what is heedlessly called mental culture, is the thing that misleads the extreme advocates of the half-truths, and causes them to suppose that they see, in simple training of the intelligence, a remedy for the tendencies of natural selfishness and injustice. But, in order to a just discussion of the several theories, the different elements of moral discipline and mere mental culture should be viewed apart. Let the question then be entertained for a moment: How much would mental culture do if it were, or could be, conferred alone, as a safeguard for suffrage? Is there any justice

whatever in this Socratic yet pagan theory that social vices are removed and virtues are propagated by simple inculcation of knowledge?

The fairest, because the most general and scientific, mode to test this extreme opinion is to examine the relation of knowledge to volition and desire, in the fundamental law of human action. Sound psychology settles these propositions. Man is a rational free agent. Every soul has, in addition to the powers of cognition, appetency, and choice, some natural disposition. This natural disposition expresses itself in the desires and consequent volitions, and thus discloses itself as the regulative principle of them. The object to which the soul moves is never the efficient, but only the occasion of its activities of desire and choice: otherwise the man would not be a free agent: the efficient of his action is his own subjective and spontaneous appetency, moving from within outwards, according to the regulation of his own native disposition. These are simply results of experience and facts of consciousness, which need no argument with such readers as those of this journal. It follows from them that neither is cognition the efficient, but only the normal occasion of free action; because all that cognition does in the case is to set the object before the soul in the aspect of the actual or the real. But does that soul view that object also in the aspect of the desirable? Here is the hinge of the whole question! Notoriously, not every object viewed in the intelligence as in the aspect of the real is desirable to man: some objects are, some are not. Bread is desirable to man's animal, and applause to his mental, appetency; grass and ridicule are not. But now, what is it in man that determines that to eat grass or to be ridiculed is not and cannot be desirable to this man? Is it his cognition of them or of the mode of their attainment? Is it any degree of clearness in that cognition? Obviously not; but there is something original in the man which has potentially determined, in advance of cognition, that the ideas of eating grass or being ridiculed shall never be the desirable, for their own sake, to that man, however clearly thought. That something is, indisputably, *disposition*. Whether a given object, when presented as real in the intelligence, shall

be felt as desirable: this is determined *a priori* by the nature of the soul's disposition. Hence it is obvious that no presentation of an undesired object in the intelligence—which is just what cognition does—can reverse or modify the regulative disposition. The effect cannot reverse its own cause. It is the native disposition which has already determined that this object shall be undesired. This native disposition is as ultimate and fundamental a fact of man's constitution as the intelligence itself, and is coördinate therewith. But does not man feel as he sees? Yes; cognition is the necessary condition of his feeling; but it is disposition which determines how he shall feel towards the object seen.

The application of this psychology to the question whether sufficient knowledge will infuse civic virtues is made by this assertion: That the personal and self-interested affections, together with their ordinary preponderance over the disinterested affections, are natural to man. *They are of that native disposition* which is regulative of appetencies and volitions. This, sound observation proves by all the *criteria* by which any original disposition can be ascertained. This preponderating selfishness is the common trait of natural men in all ages and countries. It develops itself from the beginning of their lives. It molds their average conduct. In a word, every practical man knows that it is as natural to man to love himself better than his neighbor as it is to fear pain or to dislike being laughed at. This being so, it appears as unreasonable to expect selfishness to be conquered by mere increase of knowledge in the intellect as to expect a man's natural revulsion to pain to be revolutionized by studying pathology.

The abstract argument is greatly strengthened by the experimental. If we look at the influence of mere mental culture on individuals devoid of morals, we do not usually see these persons grow better with their attainments. Such authors and artists are by no means famous for morals superior to their fellow-men. The cultivation of the taste is not found to rectify the heart. The morality of seats of learning is rarely so good as that of the classes of society which furnish their occupants. No business man accepts the mere mental culture of his *employé* as the essential guarantee of his fidelity: were one to tell the

shrewd banker that his cashier might be safely trusted because he was well posted in physics and algebra, he would resent it as a mocking of him. This rapid enumeration shows that sensible men recognize no causal tie between mere mental culture and integrity. If we look at aggregates of men, we find that the cultivated Greeks were confessedly more immoral than those whom they called "barbarians." The fall of Athenian liberty came soon after the splendid meridian of her art and literature. Close after Pericles came Cleon, the murder of Socrates, and the Macedonian subjugation. Egypt, the schoolmistress of Greece and the old world, became "the basest of the kingdoms." The "Augustan age" of Rome was also the age of the fall of the republic, and the military despotism. These instances may be thought irrelevant, because in all the ancient commonwealths, however free in name, far the larger number of persons was disfranchised. The political *populus* was a small minority, and, however cultivated, was underlaid by an uneducated mass. But this ignorant body was without power or influence in the government. The fact then remains that ancient liberty was ruined, in each case, in the hands of the educated.

But recent history is more instructive, because it offers us illustrious experiments of popular education, carried for two generations as far as it is ever likely to be carried. Our overweening hopes of good from mere mental culture are much curtailed by observing that the condition of Christendom was never more ominous and feverish than it now is, after these efforts at education. Military preparations were never so immense, or so onerous to the national industry. The spirit of war was once ascribed to the ambition of kings, regardless of the blood of their peace-loving subjects. But we now see that since the instructed peoples have acquired influence in the governments of Europe, this fell passion is more rife than ever. It seems, moreover, that the German nation, the most educated one of all, is in as unstable a condition as the rest. The wildest political heresies prevail; and these rulers, the special and boasted exemplars of popular education, rely least on popular intelligence, and most on the sword, to save society from destruction. Intelligent men there dismiss the idea with ridicule that any actual diffusion of intelligence among the peasantry, by the schools, is the real safe-

guard of their universal suffrage. They tell us that not one in three exercises his accomplishment of reading, when an adult—a statement which the scanty circulation of newspapers among them confirms. They say that the primary schools are useful chiefly as a *drill in obedience*. They teach the child early to submit to superiors, to move at the sound of a bell, to endure tasks, to fear penalties, to study punctuality, at the command of others. Then comes the conscription, and seven years' drill in arms, to confirm the habit of submission. Thus the German system produces a peasant who is in the habit of voting as the upper classes bid him; not of thinking for himself! It is presumed that this picture of the virtues of the system is not very flattering to our American hopes.

The extremists who seek to depreciate to the utmost mere mental training as a source of virtuous civic action even claim experimental arguments from American history, which, if not sound, are yet plausible. They remind us that in these States the educated classes have usually been as wide apart in political convictions as the uneducated; and this result seems to show that mental culture has no regular connection with right thinking about politics. They say that the demagogues again, whom every enlightened patriot dreads more than he does the mob, are usually from the educated, or at least the shrewd, active-minded, and self-educated classes. They point to the great newspapers, which in fact represent the prevalent political literature and mental activity of the American people, and they ask, What political heresy which has ever plagued the country has not been confidently advocated in this newspaper press? And from these assertions they draw the inference that there is no causal tie between mental activity and civic virtues. They also propose to test the moral effects of mere mental culture by examining its control over individual conduct as disclosed by the statistics of crime. We claim such statistics as in favor of our system of popular instruction, because it is reported to us that the large majority of criminals are illiterate. But they reply that this is not a trustworthy mode of making a comparison; because hitherto letters have been the accompaniment of reputable and pious domestic surroundings and easy circumstances; while illiteracy has been the usual accompaniment of degraded

and destitute circumstances. And they claim that the prevalence of crime is produced by the want and degradation hitherto associated with illiteracy, and the comparative virtue by the comforts and decencies hitherto connected with letters: not by the mental culture itself. They say that, were popular education made really universal, the idea that mere letters diminished vice would be exploded by our finding a larger percentage of crime in the whole community, other things being equal, than before. And such, they exclaim, is already the mortifying result; as is visible to the eye of the traveller in America. Where the State-school system is in its infancy, as is evinced by the sparseness and humility of the school buildings and the poverty of the endowments, the jails, penitentiaries, and almshouses are few and small. But when the observer begins to admire the magnificent endowments and palatial buildings of the public schools, he is also struck with the number and vastness of the prisons. The two kinds of structures seem to flourish together.

Experience thus confirms reasoning, in moderating our hopes of result from the mere enlargement of knowledge. Man's disposition, including his overweening personal affections, is as original and fundamental as his faculty of intelligence. Hence this disposition determines, by its *a priori* force, that disinterested actions, however known in the intelligence, shall not be so attractive to the human heart in the general as personal actions. Increase of knowledge then has no more efficiency, *per se*, to change this inclination than would a flood of light thrown on an object intrinsically repulsive to a man's taste, to make that object beautiful to him. The natural man does not postpone the disinterested virtues merely because he misconceives them. He does it, correctly appreciating them and self-interest in their essential nature, because his nature is selfish.

But it is pleaded that knowledge may curb the unjust passions by presenting, as a better alternative, enlightened self-interest. This wider intelligence may not make natural selfishness unselfish in its associated actions, but it is hoped it may show men that equity is the most enlightened self-interest. Again, experience answers that this hope usually fails whenever a strong temptation to unjust but self-interested action arises.

The thoughtful observer is not surprised at this failure, when he considers that the principle cultivated by this plan is still selfish. What is it but to expect selfishness to cure selfishness? The popular remark that "enlightened self-interest is a curb on passion" involves this mistake: It implies that self-interest is not in its nature a passionate but a rational principle, and thus opposite to the passionate. But why does any object engage man's self-interest? Because it gratifies some passion! Be it, for instance, money: this only enlists self-interest because it is the object of the passion of avarice. Our passions are the animating souls of our interests. He who acts from the most steady and clear-sighted self-interest is the very man who is governed by the most intensified passion. So, again, the mistake appears of relying on passion as the cure for passion. The most likely result of such enlarged intelligence will be that the self-interested affections will only employ it to devise more indirect and astute means of unjust advantage, more injurious to others' rights than the simple aggressions of the ignorant man, as they are more extensive.

In the light of these views, the overweening value sometimes attached to mere knowledge, apart from moral training, as the efficient of man's civic elevation, is sufficiently exploded. But when mental culture is put in its proper place, as the ally and handmaid of moral culture, there are still several facts which cannot but moderate our expectations from it, while they will not cause us to deny its value. We have seen that the problem on our hands is: How to make man, naturally selfish in his personal, unselfish in his associated actions. But we have shown that he is far more likely to yield to unjust selfishness, in the latter class of acts; because his responsibility is apparently so divided and concealed among the numbers. For instance: a little reflection will show any man that if he buys the manufacturer's calico for silver coins really worth but ninety cents on the dollar and sells it for a par currency, he is wronging his fellows precisely as though he had cut one ninth from his yardstick when he sold. Few men are prepared to use false measures in selling; but multitudes were willing to clamor for the "silver bill." Men who would not steal from a creditor yet demand from the government a depreciation of the currency in

which they hope to pay that creditor. Britain probably contains more truly honest and Christian persons than any other country; and yet its government practises the most flagrant wrongs, such as the opium trade with China, and the annexations in South Africa. There is not a nation in Europe which does not deal with its neighbors in international affairs on principles of suspicion, violence, and injustice which the average private citizen of those governments would blush to imitate in his own acts. The work to be done to secure just associated action is, then, a peculiarly arduous one.

It must be remembered that the civic affairs of the great industrial nations become exceedingly complicated. The interests of classes are exceedingly diversified. Legislation touches these interests in most intricate and unforeseen ways. Hence it is obvious that a very wide and mature knowledge is needed to judge public measures equitably and wisely. It needs no words to show that the popular discussions of such a government offer an almost boundless field for the plausible ventilation of those sciolisms and half-truths which are so seductive to the shallow scholar, and yet so perilous. How thorough and profound ought the popular education to be in order to qualify each voter under universal suffrage to judge independently and wisely for himself! Every man would need to be a profound statesman! But can we hope to communicate this breadth of culture to all, and also to cause them to retain and employ it during their toiling existence?

But if the voter cannot judge for himself, and yet votes, then he is the prey of the demagog, that fated curse of all popular governments. The greed and selfishness of human nature will always ensure the presence of men who will plan to use free suffrage as a tool for their own unjust ends. "Where-soever the carcass is, there the eagles will gather together." Now, it must be remembered that in the demagog we often have to meet not ignorant, low cunning only, but the highest subtlety, armed with the most extensive knowledge. Can popular education so furnish with statesmanship and knowledge the laboring man who votes as to fit him to cope with the accomplished demagog who aims to use him as a tool to destroy liberty? Can it fit him even to listen, as an intelligent umpire, to the

debate in which the accomplished and true statesman unmask the sophistries of this accomplished demagog? But if this laborer is to vote safely, it would seem that this is the least attainment he ought to have.

In the face of this requirement we now ask, How much knowledge can popular education confer on the masses? All that is usually attempted is to give the rudiments. The result, if realized, would be chiefly to put the voter in the way of reading the journals of the country and a few other works of ephemeral nature. But a more serious question is, How much of this culture can we make the laboring voter retain? We have seen that the Germans testify that altho every child there is taught to read, only one adult in three retains or uses his accomplishment! The causes of this disappointment are patent. Civilization means, first, a great deal of labor, and, second, great aggregations of capital, with extreme contrasts of condition between capitalist and laborer, with a keen struggle for existence for the larger part of the people. Now ordinary men are not usually energetic in two independent directions. The motive power is not sufficient to drive two sets of machinery. Men of capital energies present rare exceptions; but the rule is that those who are addicted to manual labor are not active in any other sphere of exertion. The average man who spends the day in work for his daily bread, sleeps or lounges at night. This law sealed the fate of the "manual-labor schools," which were expected to do so much for the classical education of the poor. The students could not both work in earnest and study in earnest. But it may be argued that our wonderful progress in physical science will soon make a few hours' work, by the aid of machinery, earn a day's living. Thus the laborer will have leisure for reading. There is a cause in human nature which will always and infallibly disappoint this hope. Desire always outruns the means of attainment. If the laborer earns in five hours what his father got by twelve hours' toil, he and his family will speedily come to regard additional indulgences as "necessaries of life," so as to require again the twelve hours' labor. The capitalist will think, now that profits on every hour are larger, that it is far more intolerable to have his machinery stand idle and rusting nineteen hours per day. He will bribe

the operative to fullest work. It will be precisely the provident, the industrious, who will be thus stimulated to continuous labor and larger gains. It will be the listless and idle who will stop with the five hours' work. But these will be the very men to spend the rest of the day, not in study, but at the bowling-alley and tavern.

Once more: if education is to be the safeguard of suffrage, who is to be the safeguard of education? The popular theory answers, No other than the civil magistrate. For if the direction is given to any other, that other director may so shape education as to injure the commonwealth. This is precisely the argument which is to-day prompting Belgium and France to secularize education. For they have learned that if the Jesuits direct it, it will work wholly against free suffrage and free government. But we have seen that this is precisely the weak point in our theory of government by suffrage: that as "the majority must rule," the danger is the civil magistrates will represent the majority and not the commonwealth. And the safeguard against that danger we propose to entrust to those civil magistrates! This is very much as tho we should build folds for our sheep for fear of the wolves, and then appoint the wolves to keep the doors of the folds. To repeat: It is the selfishness of human nature which necessitates government. But the same human nature must ever tempt the men who are entrusted with the governing powers to use them selfishly instead of equitably. The very heart of the problem of free government is here: How to trust to fallible men enough power to govern, and yet prevent its perversion. The theory we discuss proposes popular education as the check. What is it we need to check? Our elected rulers' possible selfishness. Then we put into those rulers' hands the control of the check itself. But the very selfishness in them which makes them dangerous will be just as certain to prompt them to pervert the proposed check as to pervert any other public power. The plan moves in a vicious circle. There will be an ever-present temptation to use the schools as a *propaganda* for the rulers' partisan opinions instead of useful knowledge and virtue. The ultimate result of this tendency, if unchecked, would be, in the second generation, to extinguish utterly the wholesome competition of a rival

party,—the very condition of free government,—and to realize a Chinese civilization.

Such are the deductions which must be made, from our expectations of security in popular education, against the dangers of universal suffrage. They do not imply that education is valueless, or that ignorance is preferable. The drawbacks are not found in the worthlessness of true education, but in the objective difficulties which it has to meet. The good ship is not to be slandered because it has to buffet perilous storms and head-winds. Yet when we freight our fortunes in it, we shall be wise to take into account the tempests and gales it must meet.

Let the reader be again entreated to weigh this argument, not as an argument against true education, or against its great value as a political safeguard, but as a refutation of the claim that mere intelligence is the efficient of civic and social virtues. This dangerous half-truth, openly advanced by some, is heedlessly accepted by many. They claim for this partial culture, mis-named ‘education,’ the honors which can only be challenged for true, moral discipline. Education is the nurture of the whole spirit, as a whole. This point is demonstrated in an essay against “secularized education” in the number of this REVIEW for September, 1879. No true education of the faculties of the intelligence can be given without involving the discipline of the conscience and affections. And in this complex process the mental culture is ancillary to the moral; from this subordinate ministry to the moral it derives all the value it can ever have as a means of propagating virtue. The primary education of Scotland, Germany, and America has doubtless been of advantage to these nations. It is because it has fortunately always been essentially a moral discipline. One of the arguments against a secularized education was that it is practically impossible; that religion, morals, and knowledge are inseparable. It is because this has been true hitherto that all the efforts to educate the people have done good. But could education be really and truly secularized, then it would become as utterly disappointing, as a safeguard for free government, as the most gloomy extremists, who have been heard in the previous pages, represent it. And just in degree as Christianity, the only mother of sound morals, shall

be eliminated from the state education, in that degree will the results approach that futility.

This discussion explains why it is that popular education has been useful just in proportion as it was grounded on the Scriptures. The Bible is, for the laboring masses, pre-eminent as an instrument of culture, as it is as the instrument of redemption. With them mere literary interests must ever be feeble. They may have sufficient piquancy to interest the genteel leisure of the rich. There are also, among the laboring classes, a few extraordinary minds who are strongly bent to literary pursuits by idiosyncrasy or native vigor. But to the average working-man, materialized in his ideas by all his surroundings, and bound by the needs of existence to daily toil, letters must ever be too weak an attraction to be heartily used for self-culture. The grand advantage of Bible-truth for this end is that while it is a system of truth, an ethic, a theology, a philosophy, a history, an epic, and that the noblest, and thus a more manifold implement of culture than any one human science, it also meets and grasps, as a system of redemption, the master-principles of all souls. It answers the deepest want. It stirs the most deathless affections. It solves those questions of duty, trial, and destiny, which at some time assume the foremost place in every soul not utterly stolid. Hence it is that Christian duty and redemption, draped as they are in the most moving history and poetry on earth, energize the torpid soul, which is stirred to true activity by nothing else. The best hope, therefore, to have the great toiling masses readers of anything good would be to have them Bible-readers. Unless this *primum mobile* of mental activity be applied they are not likely to retain any. Here was the wisdom of Knox in his scheme of universal popular education, and hence his transcendent success, that he made the Bible and Catechism the universal text-books. Other rulers have taught all the children of their land to read; no other ever succeeded, so nearly as Knox did, in rearing a people who actually continued to read after they became men. Among no peasantry in Europe has the actual taste for and practice of reading been so nearly universal as among the Scotch. It was because Christianity was the *stimulus* of the national mind, and the Bible was the text-book. It is the only mental interest

which can maintain the competition with material wants in the sons of toil. Their recreation, if literary, will be in this, or else it will be in animal repose, or sensuality. Even when a heretical religion, like the Mohammedan, makes its sacred books the textbooks of popular education, it impresses a far higher mental activity than their other unwholesome conditions would ever produce.

One other lesson should be derived from this discussion. It is suggested by the question, Can a nation living under a free government secure its own future by any means or expedients whatsoever to be employed by the government? To many an eager mind this question causes only astonishment and offence; he answers hotly in the affirmative. His boast is that a great people is master of its own destiny. How often has he not heard it eloquently proclaimed from the hustings and the Fourth-of-July platform that if the people are true to their free principles they are invincible? There is a sense in which this is true; but it is not the sense of this boast. Both the Scriptures and history teach us that nations have not their destinies in their own hands, neither are there any statesmen or institutions on this earth that can assure them absolutely. God says: "Lift not up your horn on high: speak not with a stiff neck. For promotion cometh neither from the east, nor from the west, nor from the south. But God is the Judge: he putteth down one and setteth up another." There is no human wisdom, power, nor virtue great enough to control the complicated and mighty issues of a nation's destiny: It is one of the exclusive prerogatives of divine Providence. It is a task beyond the power of teachers, rulers, congresses, and constitution-makers. It is true that this Sovereign Providence treats nations as corporate personalities, holds them responsible, and rewards and punishes according to justice. It is from this source, and from this alone, that we can infer the nation which is true to his righteous precepts will receive the reward of prosperity from his judgments, and in that sense can assure its welfare by being true to itself. The divine rule is, "It is RIGHTEOUSNESS which exalteth a nation." Some are so overweening as to suppose that they can do it by literature. But mere knowledge cannot take the place of righteousness. God will not permit himself to be thus refuted. And if

even his own church is unable, in its own strength, to sanctify a single soul, but is dependent on the dispensation of sovereign grace, still less can the state, a mere world-power, propagate true righteousness. When God bestows the conditions of national freedom and greatness, he works as a sovereign, and men, with their plans, are but instruments in his hand. Nor are the legislator and the office-holder usually important instruments: they do not direct the current of destiny, but are rather the straws floating with it. The efficient instruments are "men whose hearts God hath touched," the great elaborators of vitalizing truths—the Gospel—and the godly parents of the land.

Must magistrates, then, stand idle like fatalists, awaiting God's sovereign dispensation of weal or woe? By no means. God does not work without means. And the most effectual way for the government "to educate the people" in the interests of national prosperity is to make every official act a lesson in straightforward righteousness. Thus the tremendous influence of the government's example is directed to inculcate the valuable lessons. But if that influence teaches dishonesty, all the book-lessons of all the State schools in the broad land will be too weak to correct it.

Prophecy assures us that God is shaping the fortunes of empires with supreme reference to the spread of Messiah's kingdom. Here is another truth which politicians will probably hear as disdainfully as the proposition that no people is master of its own destiny. They little think that a secret but omnipotent hand is making all their mighty policies subservient to that spiritual dominion of the despised Nazarene which they scarcely deign to remember. But doubtless the Almighty intends to teach men both truths effectually; and it may be done at the cost of destroying many admired theories of worldly wisdom.

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