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## ARTICLE I.

### JOHN KNOX AS THE ENGLISH AND AS THE SCOTTISH REFORMER.

In connexion with a notice of Dr. Lorimer's monograph on the "Knox Papers," recently discovered in the Williams Library, it was proposed in our number for July last to present the character of John Knox as a Reformer in the new light thrown upon it by the discovery of these papers. And as the best method of presenting this character, it was proposed to exhibit him, first, in the light of the newly discovered papers, as the English Reformer; then, with the key to his character thus furnished, to reëxamine the current conception of Knox as the fierce, implacable, narrow, iron-sided Reformer of the Church of Scotland.

It has been shown from the "Knox Papers" that in his career as a Reformer of the Church of England under Edward VI., and among the English exiles on the Continent, embracing nearly the first half of his public life, Knox exhibited little of the fierceness and harshness of character which is popularly attributed to him; and therefore the presumption is that any fierceness and harshness exhibited by him during his career as the Scottish Reformer may not have been from the inherent tendencies of the man's mind and heart, but because the circumstances that surrounded him and the work which he was called upon to do, forced upon him as the leader of reform the exercise of harsh and seem-

could not do other than desire and seek it, as the hart panteth after the water brook. It was the master spiritual passion of his soul; and he was never satisfied until he waked in heaven in the likeness of God. Such we understand to be the true sentiment of the Christian heart; the sentiment which has ever characterised, not the lower, but the highest grades of real piety which have ever adorned the Church. It loves and honors God's perfect law as the only standard; it seeks the highest possible attainments in real piety; it eschews all spiritual pride and pretension and fanaticism, and walks humbly before God.

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ARTICLE IV.

REASON AND UNDERSTANDING.

The next movement of mental philosophy will probably be a more thorough discussion and settlement of the question, whether man has two faculties of intelligence, reason and understanding; or whether there is really but one faculty. The contribution which we now attempt to this discussion, proceeds on the recognition of two doctrines, in which all seem to concur. One is, that the mind is a *monad*, a being of entire unity, and that the faculties are therefore not separate entities or members, but only modes of function, in which the unit-power, spirit, acts. The other is, that among the multitude of mental modifications known in consciousness, there are true agreements and differences, grounding a systematic classification. Says Hamilton: "On this doctrine, a *faculty* is nothing more than a general term for the casualty the mind has of originating a certain class of energies: a *capacity*, only a general term for the susceptibility the mind has of being affected by a particular class of emotions." He makes the special faculties of knowledge the following:

1. The Presentative Faculty, with its external form, perception; and its internal, self-consciousness.
2. The Conservative Faculty, memory.

3. The Reproductive Faculty: involuntary, or suggestion; and voluntary, reminiscence.

4. The Representative Faculty, imagination.

5. The Elaborative Faculty, or logical understanding.

6. The Regulative Faculty, or reason.

This division is usually followed by Hamilton's American imitators, as Dr. Porter. Kant presented a similar one as to the last two heads, in his well known distinction between the *Reiner Vernunft*, or pure reason, and the *Verstand*, or understanding. Hamilton supposes that the Scotch school of philosophers intended the reason, or regulative faculty, by their term "*common sense*." Spinoza, followed by a multitude of transcendentalists, made the distinction still wider; assigning to the understanding only empirical and deductive functions, and to the reason all ontological notions and intuitive, primary judgments. In the hands of him and the various schools of Pantheists, this distinction was most widened, and also bore its worst fruits.

The history of the progress of philosophy in modern times shows a plausible plea for this division of the faculties. The first influence of the Baconian impulse, upon the students of mental science, was to incline them to exclusive empirical methods. It was, to Locke and his followers, a fascinating idea that they should take nothing upon trust, but deduce everything from actual observation. The miserable results of empiricism in the hands of French and British sensationalists could not but produce a revulsion. Philosophers were obliged to see that the same rule of reducing everything to the test of sensible observation, which was proper for the study of the external world, could not be applied to the observing subject itself, without some restriction; that there must be some rational notions *a priori* to observed facts, in order that they might construe the observations themselves; that unless some primary judgments are allowed to begin with, there can be no beginning of thought at all; that in order to prove anything to be understanding, there must be some premises whose authority is prior to that of proof. Now then, the question became pressing: "Since it is the understanding which sees deduced truths, by what faculty are these *a priori* notions

and primitive judgments seen? Must there not be a higher, a more immediate faculty to perform these supreme functions? Let it then be distinguished as the pure reason, or the intuitional reason. And let its characteristic be, that its vision is immediate, while that of the mere understanding is mediate; that however an empirical perception may be the *occasion* of the rise of its *a priori* abstractions, these have no *cause* before them; and that its primitive judgments of truth are independent of all premises. Does not this characteristic mark it as a distinct faculty?" This was plausible.

The fruits of all the transcendental schools, from Spinoza's down, have taught us the danger of this concession: it has encouraged them to claim an emancipation from logical obligations. The result has been a frightful license in dogmatizing. Does an honest logician object to them, that the first principles of their systems do not appear true? Does he array logical objections? The answer is, that these objections rest only on the authority of an inferior faculty, the plodding, logical understanding; and it is irrational to call down the higher faculty to the bar of the lower. Do we reply: "But we have no such intuitions as these which they assert"? They reply: This may very well be, because the pure reason is so much less developed in us than in them. If this supreme visive faculty is keener in them, it is the most natural thing in the world that they should see farther, and include in their circle of intuition objects not visible to the dimmer reason. For instance: here are two men in a field. The one says: "Do you see yonder bird sitting on the dead branch of the distant tree"? The other answers: "I see none, and I do not believe there is one there." Now suppose the first man to rejoin: "But I do see it that it is there; and this discrepancy shows that you are near-sighted." If there is no umpire with them, how shall the man thus charged silence the one who asserts for himself this intuitive evidence of a sharper vision? This illustration defines exactly the attitude of the debate between us and the transcendentalists, so long as we grant to them this distinction between the understanding and the reason. How shall we enforce any restraints upon the most licentious and destructive dogmatizings?

Thus, Spinoza constructed his system of Pantheism, with geometric rigor, upon a few principles, which he advanced as intuitions of the pure reason. One of these was the proposition, that all true being must be self-existent, and so, eternal. Another was, that attributes of extension and attributes of thought may be modes of subsistence of one and the same necessary being. It was in vain that sober reasoners protested that the first was not intuitively true; and that to their reason the notion of a true being, originated in time, while mysterious, was not impossible. It was in vain that they declared, to their intuition the reference of the antagonistic modes of extension and thought to the same being was impossible. The followers of Spinoza had a short answer: If these men could not see what the great master had seen intuitively, it was only because their development of the reason was inferior to his. And what is there strange in the ascription of different degrees of faculty to different men? It would seem that this difficulty had its influence in forcing *Plato* and *Cousin* to their doctrine of the impersonal unity of the pure reason. How else, admitting its distinct and superior rank as a faculty, have we any uniform, authoritative standard of truths left? Assign the reason this supreme, intuitive function, and also individualize it in each man, and we seem to have no defence against this absurd result: that each man may have his own code of truths intuitively valid to himself, yet contradicting his fellows' equally (to them) valid codes.

It would also seem that Kant and Sir Wm. Hamilton seek to escape the same destructive result, by stripping the pure reason of all positive power as a source of cognitions. The former says that it contributes nothing to the matter or substance of our knowledge, but only furnishes the conditions of its cognition. The latter says "it is not probably a faculty; that is, it is not an active power at all." It gives us only "the primary conditions of intelligence." It should be said here, that the language of the author in other parts of his lectures and notes on Reid leave us in doubt whether he designed to discriminate the two faculties or not. The statement of his scheme, on our first page and on this, although given almost in his own words, must be taken with this

explanation. This mode of escaping the *dilemma* seems vain, because the position that the faculty of intuitions is not a true faculty, and contributes nothing positive to cognition, is untrue. Hamilton confesses that it is not merely a "capacity." Primitive judgments are as truly cognitions, as derivative ones; and they are the most important ones we possess. Kant would represent our *a priori* notions of time, space, relation, as mere empty *matrices*, into which perception places the whole substance of knowledge. The conception is false. Hamilton himself cannot avoid calling the regulative forms of our cognitions by the same name, "necessary cognitions." Another difficulty arises in the way of our availing ourselves of that escape. Psychologists now concede that the informations of self-consciousness and of perception are as truly intuitions as our primitive judgments. And the concession is right; for these have all the distinguishing traits, self-evidence, immediateness, and necessity. But now, can Kant and Hamilton say that self-consciousness and perception are not positive faculties, and make no substantive contributions to our cognition? Surely not. The latter expressly calls them "the acquisitive faculty." Both regard them as the all-contributing faculties.

Let us prepare the way for the *thesis* we wish to sustain, by some further remarks upon the method in which our perceptions become true cognitions. That thesis is, that *understanding and reason are the same faculty*. Our argument here will be of the following character. Kant and Hamilton assign the cognitive or intellective part of the processes of perception to the understanding, as they classify the faculties. We shall show that this part, the action, namely, by which sensation becomes perception, clearly involves the function of the reason. If this be so, then so far as the method of this acquisitive faculty, at least, is concerned, we shall have removed all ground of distinction between the understanding and the reason. The argument of the Idealist is, that nothing is known to the mind except that which is in consciousness; but in any sensation nothing is in consciousness except the subjective affection itself: whence we are not authorised to suppose any objective reality, as truly perceived. How

can this process be refuted? The method suggested by the best psychologists is, to show that *every perception involves a judgment*, in which the relation between subjective sensation and objective source is intuitively affirmed. Let us grant this. We then ask, *what is the relation* affirmed in this perceptive judgment? No other than that of *cause and effect*. Let the perception be, for instance a visual one, the sight of a house. Of this, all that self-consciousness feels subjectively, is, that it is affected with a modification called visual sensation. Now the very point of the Idealist's plea is, that the mind has no right to step outside of the charmed circle of its own subjective consciousness, and to suppose, what is not by sensation in consciousness, an objective reality, house. It is apparently to meet this difficulty that Hamilton advances the inadmissible statement, that the mind is literally and immediately *conscious of the house!* This is his way of escaping pure idealism! The proposition is utterly irreconcilable with the nature of consciousness, as a faculty strictly subjective. And our common sense tells us that the thing of which we are conscious is, not the house, but our seeing of the house. How, then, is idealism to be escaped? We answer, that our immediate self-consciousness of the subjective part of the sensation is also attended with another intimate consciousness equally immediate, viz., *that we do not affect ourselves* with that subjective modification. We are intuitively conscious that it was not self-caused; that, in it, self has been not agent, but merely subject. But now, this twin consciousness arises always under the interpretative light of that great first truth, *No effect without its cause*. Hence it is, that the inevitable reference is made in the intelligence, connecting the subjective sensation with its necessary and real objective source, the house. Does any one object that we are not distinctly conscious, in every sense-perception, of this rational process, of thinking this intuitive premise to our perceptive judgment? Our answer is, that the brevity, the facility, the necessity, the exceeding frequency of the process, have so familiarised the consciousness to its elements, that we take no conscious, remembered note of them. The same solution must be resorted to to explain how the rapid reader spells the

syllables whose letters he seems to himself not to note. The same solution must be resorted to to explain how the practical man, unconsciously, interprets the elements of visual sensation so as to judge relative distance and shape. Bishop Berkeley himself, the great modern Idealist, demonstrated that we do not really see relative magnitudes and distances, but infer them; and yet we do not consciously note our inference. The solution applies with equal fairness to our theory of perception.

Now then, our argument is, that we find, after all, one of the highest intuitions of the pure reason involved in every act of objective perception. But this our opponents deem the most ordinary and plodding function of the understanding. So far, then, as the analysis of perception goes, understanding is reason, and reason is understanding.

But Kant, if we comprehend him aright, names the intuition, "Every effect must have its cause," as a judgment of the understanding, and not of the pure reason. Possibly he does so in order to avoid the very refutation given above. But in assigning it to a faculty other than, and lower than, the reason, he is obviously in error. He, himself, declares that it is a judgment *a priori* in source, immediate, and necessary. Add another trait, which Kant would be the last to deny, that it is universal, and we have every character by which the judgments of the reason can be distinguished. So that the true analysis of perception shows us a rational element at the root of every act of this acquisitive faculty, usually classed under the understanding.

It may be objected, that since brutes have perception, this argument would also prove them to be rational. We reply, that the real nature of the brutes' faculties is so obscure to us that he would be a rash man who should found any very certain conclusion on the assertion of the presence or absence of a given power in them. Suppose it be admitted that they have some reason? Many have admitted this on plausible grounds. But it is more probable that sensation in them is a mere sensibility, that the responsive use which they make of their sensations is instinctive, as opposed to rational; and that they lack the intelligence for construing rationally their own perceptions, as reasoning



man does. For instance: the horse sees the green herbage in an adjoining field. He has a species of animal spontaneity, and he moves towards it. This act does not necessarily prove that the horse has construed its sensation to itself rationally, by consciously referring it to its objective source. Does one ask, How came it, then, to move towards the grass? We answer, This may be the prompting of a mere instinct, which the animal does not rationally construe nor comprehend at all,—like that which prompts the young chicken to peck, and the young quadruped to walk, without any experience. Sir William Hamilton, if we understand him aright, believes that man sees just as the animal does. This is the extent to which he carries his theory of immediate perception! The “Hamiltonian” at least, then, cannot pronounce our theory of animal perception absurd when applied to animals. What we assert is, that it is incorrect when applied to rational man.

But the most characteristic function of the understanding, as distinguished from the reason, is supposed to be logical deduction. Here, they suppose, the method of intellection is clearly diverse; because, in judgments of the pure reason, the mind has no premises, while in the logical judgment, it only sees by premises; because the former kind of judgments are self-evident, the latter illative; because the former kind are necessary, the latter often uncertain, held by some and disputed by others; and because the former are universal, and the latter are not. But here, in the citadel of their strength, we take issue with them, and assert that in every *valid* illation, the logical judgment must be immediate, necessary, and intuitive. Every sound deduction virtually resumes the force of a primary judgment, and hence the whole of its validity.

The simple and sufficient proof of this view of the logical function is in these questions: What is the human intelligence but a faculty of seeing truth? But, as the eye only sees by looking, and all looking must be immediate, how else can the mind see than by mental looking, or rational intuition? Whether the object of bodily eye-sight be immediate or reflected, an object or its *spectrum*, it is still equally true that the eye sees only

by looking, and looking directly; only, in the latter case, the *spectrum* is its immediate object. So the mind, which only sees by looking, can only look directly; its look is immediate, or it is naught. One of the earliest English philosophers, Locke, concurs with one of the greatest of the recent Americans, McGuffey, in adopting this view. We find it also asserted in a late work of great originality and boldness, "Metaphysics the Science of Perception," by the Rev. John Miller, D.D. The thesis of this book is, that perception, emotion, and volition, are all one. This is an extreme; but its identification of the logical and the rational faculty confirms our position. Locke's proof that every valid logical judgment is intuitive, seems as simple as it is conclusive. He argues, (Book IV., chapter 2, §§ 1 to 7,) that, in a primary and immediate judgment, the agreement of ideas between subject and predicate is directly seen, because the mind has the two together before it. In a deduced judgment, the mind's decision cannot be thus immediate, because the terms are not brought immediately into juxtaposition in the mind. It is for this reason that their agreement cannot be immediately seen. Hence, we adopt the expedient of interposing a middle term, which can be immediately compared with first one and then the other of the former terms. By seeing the entire agreement of the first term with the middle, and then of the middle with the third, we are convinced of the agreement of the first with the third. But, in both these mediating comparisons, the view of the mind is direct; the two terms compared are in immediate juxtaposition in the mind, and their agreement immediately inspected. He argues, that if our perception of a valid relation between a proposition and its next premise were not immediate, then there must be, between the two, some term to mediate our view of it. But, between a proposition and its *next premise*, no other term can be interposed. So, we conclude, that the mind only sees truths in any proposition by looking; but, as with the external, so with the internal eye—the *looking must be immediate in order to be one's own.* •

To this view, objections will probably be opposed, and by those who are no friends to transcendentalism in any form. It may be

said that a truth which is seen only by its dependence on premises, is not a primitive judgment. It is the function of the pure reason to make primitive judgments. We admit that of course a dependent truth is not seen by such a judgment, in the sense of having no premises. But the essential thing is, that it is seen immediately and intuitively. The objector seems to suppose that the sight of the deduced truth cannot be immediate, because it is a truth of relation; seen only in relation to premises. But we remind him that sundry of our primary judgments are also truths of relation, and are intuitively seen only as such. "The whole is greater than either of its parts;" "If two magnitudes are each equal to a third, they must be equal to each other;" "Every effect must have its cause:"—these are all truths of relation. The fact, then, that a truth is only seen by a relation to premises, does not make its sight less immediate and intuitive.

This may be pushed, indeed, much farther. Is any truth at all, whether primary or deduced, ever seen in the mind, which is not so far a truth of relation as to affirm a relation of predicate to subject in a proposition? In this sense, every truth in the realm of mind is a truth of relation. And judging (which Kant and Hamilton would make the most characteristic function of the logical understanding,) is nothing but the intuition of a self-evident agreement between a predicate and a subject. Now, our opponents would describe a primitive judgment, which is a function of the pure reason, if anything is, as one seen in relation to no other proposition as premise. That is to say, this primitive judgment is nothing but an intuition of a self-evident relation between a given predicate and its subject. On this unavoidable concession we have two remarks: First, a multitude of judgments which our opponents refer to the "lower faculty" of understanding, do precisely the same thing, see intuitively the relation of a predicate to its subject; and second, the intuitive discernment of a relation of agreement between two propositions (what is done in the syllogism,) is surely not a lower function of the intelligence, than between two terms in the same proposition. What ground is left, then, to separate the logical understanding

from the reason, and call the former a "lower faculty," or a "dependent faculty"?

Another test of rational intuitions is, that they are necessary; and hence a second objection, that deductions are not seen as necessary truths. In one sense, we reply, they are not. The necessary truth of a deduction is not seen so long as it is not connected with some necessary truth by its premise. But we assert that when once that connexion is validly instituted, the deduction does become necessary. Let a syllogism be made which is correct in form. Let the terms of enunciation be clearly and fully apprehended by the student, without a shade of ambiguity, and with full attention. Let the premises be seen to be indubitably true. Then, we insist, the truth of the illation will be seen as inevitably, as necessarily, as in any first truth; and that by every mind.

The last words suggest a third objection: that it is the prerogative of the pure reason to discern universal truths. Her *dicta* are and must be admitted by every sane mind the world over, as soon as their enunciation is understood. But they say, logical deductions are held by some men and disputed by others; and the understandings of different ages and races, not to say persons, exhibit the widest discrepancies about them. To this we reply, that propositions called axioms have not always commanded universal agreement. We do not now regard as self-evident, or as true, that "nature abhors a vacuum," that "no substance can act in space except where it is present;" that "*ex nihilo nihil fit*," in the Platonic sense of no creation without eternal matter. But the days have been when these were regarded as axioms. Today many regard it as an ethical axiom, that "all slave-holding is sin." But all who truly reverence the Bible, believe that this proposition is false. Now how shall the credit of the pure reason be saved and its certainty defended? Only by saying that these propositions called axioms are not real axioms; that misapprehension of terms, or ignorance of relations expressed in the statements, or haste, or inattention, has led to this mistake. Well, the same plea avails for us. Statements have been mistaken for syllogisms which were not syllogisms, and from similar

causes. If prejudice or carelessness exists, the mistake was easier and more probable, because the syllogism contains three propositions and three terms, by which the danger of fallacy is multiplied. Again, first truths are few in number; and they are perpetually resumed by the mind in its processes; but deduced truths are numberless and varied, and many of them novel to any one man. If there has been some error and dispute touching first truths, it is just what we have to expect, that there will be much error touching derived truths. Yet the mind's sight of the latter may be as intuitive as of the former.

We conclude, then, that there is no generic difference between the action of the reason in the intuition of the two cases. It was with accurate insight that the people named the deductive process "reasoning." It is, in fact, but another exercise of the same reason, the same faculty, which discerned the first truths. Logical understanding and reason are one, not two. One gain which we win by this demonstration, is the simplifying of logic and a juster view of its processes. A more important one is, that we make an end of the license of dogmatizing claimed hitherto by transcendentalists. They can no longer refuse to be amenable to logical processes, and claim for their assumed postulates the authority of a superior faculty; for the rational and the logical faculties are one. In the one exercise it is as authoritative as in the other.