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REVIEW SECTION.

I.—PROBATION AFTER DEATH.

IS THERE ANY FOUNDATION FOR THE DOGMA IN REASON OR REVELATION?

NO. I.

BY PROF. EGBERT C. SMYTH, CO-EDITOR OF THE ANDOVER REVIEW.

A DOGMA is not a doctrine. It has a secondary, not a primary authority. It is not an article of faith. In the shaping of the question upon which, with others, I have been asked to write, this distinction was doubtless regarded. Those who maintain the tenet of Probation after Death claim that it falls within the acknowledged limits of the Christian faith, is consonant with and tributary to the fundamental doctrines of the Gospel, and deducible from the absoluteness and universality of Christianity; but they do not maintain that it is an explicit divine teaching.

The word Probation has various senses which need to be discriminated. Since Bishop Butler's day it commonly designates a condition of moral trial, in which the future state of the subject of the trial is fully determined. Sometimes it signifies nothing more than preparatory moral discipline. In the early Puritan theology it was restricted to the Paradisiacal state. Mankind were put on trial in Adam. This theory is still held by many persons in its original strictness, and consistently they deny that men now are on probation. The extension of the word to Adam's descendants has come about through the growth of the conception of personality. Guilt is regarded as strictly personal. All of our race who attain in this life to conscious personality act as moral agents and under probationary conditions. This extended application of the word is by some associated with purely individualistic, and more or less Pelagian, conceptions of human freedom and human sinfulness. By others it is allied with a better philosophy of liberty, and with more Scriptural beliefs as to generic depravity and the universal need of spiritual regeneration.

ism disgusting the ordinary sensible mind and making it apathetic in the cause of temperance, where otherwise it would be energetic.

The Church Temperance Society of the Episcopal Church has founded its work on the true basis, where the individual differences of honest, upright citizens are recognized, and no Procrustean bed is established to destroy true manhood and attempt impossibilities. If the Prohibitionists would occupy such a platform and burn up the trashy literature which they circulate, where false exegesis of Scripture is the chief characteristic, they would accomplish something, and not waste their energies as they have been doing for years past. They would then help and not hinder the practical reforms which have heretofore found in them the most bitter opponents.

By all means let us bring temperance into politics. But let it be temperance and not intemperance of fanaticism. Let the patent evil of the grog-shop be aimed at, and not the personal preferences of the individual as to what he should drink. The former is in the proper sphere of law, the latter is not. Persuasion and teaching must do the work there. Individual liberty is not to be touched by laws, except where its exercise is an injury to persons or property, and it would require a marvellous logic to prove that A. selling a bottle of wine and B. drinking it at his meals is in either of them an injury to persons or property. But the grog-shop is the open manufacturer of crime, the place where the assaults and murders are almost every night committed, the place where the week's wages go into the pocket of the vender, and the family is thus pauperized, the place where thieves and prostitutes assemble, and the place which defies all restrictive laws. *Therefore*, abolish the grog-shop. There is reason in that. But in abolishing all sale or buying or drinking of wine there is only arrant folly.

Now let Dr. Johnson ponder on these distinctions which I have made, and let his strong mind determine according to the right reasonableness of things and not according to the mere impulse of good intentions.

III.—SYMPOSIUM ON THE "NEW THEOLOGY."

WHAT ARE ITS ESSENTIAL FEATURES? IS IT BETTER THAN THE OLD?

NO. III.

BY R. L. DABNEY, D.D., LL.D., AUSTIN, TEXAS.

I PROPOSE, in contributing to this symposium, to consider only one aspect: the attempt of the New Theology to explain the sufferings and death of Christ. Its characteristic here is, that it adopts, in preference to the old church doctrine, one phase or another of the Socinian explanation. The orthodox regard the moral necessity of satisfaction for guilt as the fundamental ground of Christ's sufferings, and these

as vicarious and strictly penal, expiating guilt in the person of our substitute, and so making the pardon of the sinner consistent with the truth, justice and holiness of the divine Judge, while they gladly admit as subordinate and secondary ends, the didactic influences emanating from the Redeemer's cross. Socinians were wont to deny totally the penal nature of Christ's sacrifice, and to represent the didactic results as the only ones intended by God in it. For they admit no necessity of reconciling God to sinners—He being pure Benevolence, too kind to be alienated from His creatures by sin—but only a need of reconciling sinners to God and duty; and this, the real work of redemption (so called), they suppose to be done solely by didactic and exemplary means, encouraging and assuring believers of their salvation by reformation and godly living.

Now, the "New Theology," discarding the old church doctrine, may teach that the cross was designed to make a dramatic exhibit of God's holy opposition to the sins He pardons; or, to present a divine love so tender as to melt sinner's hearts; or, to confirm against their guilty fears their trust in God's placability. Still we find the Socinian conception dominant; that salvation is not by a penal ransom-price, but only by didactic and exemplary influences.

The singular point is, that the "New Theology" disuses the points on which Socinus relied, against the doctrine of vicarious sacrifice, and seems to stake all on one philosophic argument of which he made no account. Did not he see how untenable it was? The objection now relied on against vicarious penalty is, that such exaction of punishment from a substitute, himself innocent, would be essentially unjust. It is under the stress of this supposed difficulty that they reject the *consensus* of Christendom, and collide with express Scriptures, wearying themselves with one or another answer to the inevitable question: How came a holy being to die under the allotment of a benevolent and just God? I will exhibit their argument candidly and in its utmost strength. It is in substance this:

1. A sin, if abstracted in thought from the sinning agent, is no entity, but only a concept, which is nothing save as thought in the spectator's mind. The only real, moral entity is the agent, not the act.
2. Let us define "guilt" as *obligatio ad pœnam ex peccato*; the only ground for attaching it to this agent is his evilness or badness expressed in his sinful acting. In the language of technical theology: Actual guilt can only emerge from "potential guilt."
3. This is the agent's subjective attribute.
4. An attribute cannot be transferred from the person it qualifies, by any true imputation. Hence, guilt, emergent only from the evil personal attribute of the sinning agents must be equally unalienable. To impute guilt to another than the personal agent can therefore never be more than a vicious legal fiction, intuitively rejected by a just reason. If penalty for a given sin strikes

any other than the agent himself, who qualifies himself by his evil acts as subjectively evil, that penalty has lost its whole moral significance and propriety, and becomes itself an injustice.

Again, a "God of love" can only entertain penal justice as a mode or phase of remedial benevolence guided by wisdom. Punishment is pain; a natural evil opposed to benevolence; it can only be reconciled with infinite love by regarding it as a beneficial remedy or preventive. Now, as the sick man gets no healing by having his well friend swallow his physic for him; so the morally diseased must take his own punishment, or otherwise it is unmeaning and cruel.

They say also Scripture and history concur. Moses prohibited penal imputations (Deut. xxiv: 16); God disclaims them (2 Kings xiv: 6; Prov. ix: 12; Ezek. xviii: 4-20). And while pagan States of old slew hostages and *αντιρπουκοι* modern Christian jurisprudence has wholly banished such barbarities.

Such is the argument. In testing it I proceed in the inverse order.

I. Had human jurisprudence really renounced this vicarious principle, it would not follow that God must. For there are vital differences. God has supreme, magistrates only subordinate, delegated jurisdiction. A breadth of discretion in punishing may be right for Him, which He refuses to them, not because "His right makes His might," but because His supreme authority and perfect wisdom and holiness render it morally right in Him. Here, the Scriptures cited are easily solved. The above must have been the ground on which God there restrained magistrates from vicarious punishments; in view of the stubborn fact that He continued immediately to use this method of government for Himself. We soon see Him doing to Achan's family (Josh. vii: 24) the very thing forbidden in Deuteronomy to magistrates, and to Saul's family in 2 Sam. xxi: 6-14. And He claims it in the Decalogue (Ex. xx: 5), as His perpetual prerogative. The reader must take the solution I give or charge God with fickleness and wickedness.

II. The civil magistrate may not usually inflict a vicarious death, because he finds no one entitled by autocracy of his own life, faculties and relations, to offer his life for another. A substitute, however generous, cannot give away what is not his own. God owns all lives. But Jesus (John. x: 18), claims this very autocracy of His own life as the ground of the Father's ordaining and accepting its vicarious offer.

III. The magistrate has no power to sanctify the heart of the felon thus redeemed from death and replaced in society, nor to raise from the dead the noble substitute who died for him. God has. The vicarious proceeding on the magistrate's part would only rob society of a virtuous member, and turn loose on it a vicious one. God sanctifies the sinner ransomed by the substitutionary death, and restores to the universe the generous substitute in renewed vigor. So this policy

may be very wrong for civil courts, and yet very right for God. But,

1. I utterly deny that any Christian government of this day has disused the principle of vicarious penalty. All exercise it in forcing payment of delinquent debts from securities who did not spend the money. Will one say that the creditor's claim is only pecuniary and not penal? The English common law, by enacting imprisonment for debt, doubtless regarded heedless debt as justly punishable, and such debt as a fault to be punished, as well as a pecuniary claim to be paid. The imprisonment has been retrenched by a milder age, but the principle remains. It is impregnable. The exaction of payment from the security is to him penal; it is a mulct, a *damnum*. But it was not he who sinfully wasted the money lent! His "going security" was generous and disinterested! For whose sin is this penal mulct laid on him? For the imputed guilt of his principal which he freely covenanted to assume.

The rules of modern warfare give a stronger case, where a captured enemy who has not personally forfeited his belligerent rights by breaking those rules, is killed for a comrade who has. This right of vicarious punishment is not surrendered by a State on earth; certainly not by "the best government in the world," which often enforced it in the late war between the States. The usual confident assertion, that the church doctrine proceeds on a principle too unjust for enlightened human jurisprudence, is simply ignorant and false. We find that the conscience of the whole world and of civilized jurists justify the principle in suitable cases.

2. The popular conscience sanctions it in another frequent shape. Among the natural—but none the less real—penalties of sins, are certain social disabilities and providential evils. There is not a Christian man in the land that does not concur in these hereditary penalties, even on sons clear of the father's special sins. The counterpart transfer of title is also recognized by all honorable men; that of the obligations of gratitude to the children of our own noble benefactors. The case of Barzillai the Gileadite, and David, is an instance:—2 Sam. xix: 31-38. Barzillai, not Chimham, had been personally David's benefactor in his disastrous flight. But David would have felt himself a scoundrel had he availed himself of this pretext to refuse the debt of obligation. Here was imputation, not of guilt, but of its counterpart, title to reward. Out of meritorious action under law, emerges title to reward: Out of sinful action, title to penalty or guilt. They are counterparts: the two poles of the moral magnet acting under the one energy of distributive justice. The man who has duly earned reward may, if he pleases, bestow his title on his beneficiary. Why, then, may not another benefactor, if he pleases, accept the transfer to himself of his beneficiary's title to penalty?

3. Experience also shows us daily that God has not disclaimed, in his

providence, that right to visit the sins of the ungodly to the third and fourth generation of them that hate him, which he announced in his immutable law. We see him constantly exercising that prerogative. The "New Theology," then, in rejecting the principle, has a much harder task upon its hands than refuting the church-doctrine; it has to convict God of wickedness.

It must also deny, with Pelagius, that natural evils and death are penalties for sin. For Jesus had no personal sin nor guilt. Yet, by the ordinance of God, He died a death of peculiar pain. Here, then, was a death which, according to the "New Theology," was not penal. Pelagianism was obliged to assume this position by the stress of its own errors, in order to parry Augustine's argument from the death of infants for birth-sin in them. But, Christendom has ever regarded this denial as monstrous. It violently contradicts the Scripture, "Death passed upon all men for that all have sinned." See also Gen. iii: 17-19.; Ps. xc: 7, 8. It attacks the justice and benevolence of God, in that it represents him as ordaining in his sovereign providence, natural evils against those who have no guilt. He who says that any death is not penal, has either said that God does not govern in that case, or that he governs unjustly and cruelly.

The "New Theology" professes to be striving to clear the divine equity; arguing that God is too just to punish imputed guilt. But it really involves and obscures that attribute. First, it must deny the necessity of satisfaction for guilt in order to pardon; for if Christ's suffering was not vicariously penal, for the sins pardoned to believers, no satisfaction for them is ever made to law. But this is the same as denying that justice is an essential and unchangeable attribute in God. The two statements must stand or fall together. Thus God's justice is degraded from an immutable principle to an optional expediency. On the new view, Jesus, an innocent Agent, was made to bear dreadful punishments which He did not deserve, in order to gain certain advantages of example and instruction for others. What does justice say to this? It is exactly as though we should now require an innocent man to submit to mortal vivisection, in the interest of philanthropy and medical science. This might be done to a dog; but if done to a man it would be murder. It degrades the holiness of Jehovah, as shown on Calvary, to the policy of those Spartans who made their Helots commit the sin of drunkenness, in order to exemplify its evils to the younger citizens.

IV. If the logic of the "New Theology" is valid, then it has proved that on any plan pardon of sin is impossible. Pardon is the undeserved remission of penalty due the sinner; the accounting or imputing away from the transgressor of the guilt or penal obligation due to his evil doings, the subjective attribute of evil remaining in him. For does not the confession, with which every truly pardoned man gratefully accepts

remission, avow continued personal unworthiness? Now, the argument was that as penalty and immunity draw their whole moral significance from the badness or goodness of the agent, and since these are the subjective attributes of that agent, the title to penalty or immunity must be as inalienable from that agent as his attribute is. But to pardon him without satisfaction, is to alienate away the title to penalty from him, the subjective unworthy attribute still inhering in him; the very thing the argument asserts to be impossible! If it is essentially unjust to alienate this title to penalty away from the unworthy sinner to the worthy substitute who volunteers to receive it; it must be a still greater moral solecism to alienate it to no whither. It is unlucky that the "New Theology" can only prove its point at the cost of sending all its own friends and all its amiable Socinian and Pelagian allies along with us naughty Calvinists, to an inevitable hell.

V. Punishment cannot be explained as the preventive and remedial expedient of God's benevolence. For, 1st. The expedient has mostly failed, sin remaining prevalent on earth and universal in hell; which would bespeak God neither wise nor sovereign in His plan. 2d. This question would be unanswerable; why God, being holy, benevolent and almighty, did not elect the efficient expedient of sanctifying lost angels and men, rather than the abortive one of whipping them. 3d. The explanation is utterly incompatible with everlasting punishments. For after the salvation of these men and angels has been finally given over, and all the holy are in a state of security against both their malice and moral contagion (in heaven); it is absurd to talk of remedy and prevention. There is no longer anything to prevent. For these still morally diseased, there is to be no remedy.

Thus this utilitarian theory of penalty is false; we must go back to the true doctrine, that the fundamental reason why sin is punished is because it deserves it, and God is just. Sin is punished, primarily, in order to satisfy the righteous law it outrages. For this end, vicarious punishment is as appropriate as personal punishment, provided the conditions of the imputations are suitable.

VI. The central argument against imputation is a sophism. We may concede its premises. Then, the evilness of sin is the wrong-doer's personal attribute. But the guilt emergent therefrom, is not his attribute; it is his relation; and that a relation to another personal will, that of the law-giver. Grant that subjective attributes are not transferable by any compact or imputation; it by no means follows as a necessary truth that relations are equally non-transferable. Such a proposition would be preposterous if advanced of any class of subjects in mathematics, physics, or morals. In § 2, several instances were shown in the sphere of morals where it was not true. When the well-doer, Barzillai, turned over to Chimham, his son, his title to recompense for his own loyalty from David's gratitude, no one dreamed of

arguing against him, that because his own loyalty was his subjective attribute, and his title to reward emerged therefrom, the latter could no more be transferred than the former. His request was equitable. Thus, the premise of this pretended argument is found not a general truth, and the conclusion invalid.

VII. One thing is certain, this new doctrine is contrary to that of the Church in all ages. If it is philosophical, all of God's saints have been absurd. What shall we believe? Even the corrupt communions of Rome and Greece hold fast to the doctrine that Christ was vicariously punished, retaining here the faith of purer ages. Hear Trent. Sess. vi. ch. 7., "Our Lord Jesus Christ. . . . merited justification for us by his most holy passion on the wood of the cross, and *made satisfaction for us* unto God the Father. Hear the conference of the "Orthodox Eastern Church," qu. 45. "Christ, without any sin of his own, *paid the punishments of our sins.*" Just so speaks their Catechism, qu. 208.

Of the Protestant doctrine, the Synod of Dort gives a clear, representative statement. Head ii. § 1, 2. "Which" [punishments of sin] "we cannot escape *unless satisfaction be made to the justice of God.*" Hence. . . . "He gives us his only begotten son for our surety, who was made sin and became *a curse for us and our stead*, that he might *make satisfaction to divine justice on our behalf.*" Thus speak the other Protestant creeds, not in all the same words, but always in the same tenor. Augsburg Conf., § 3 and 4. Formula Concordiæ, § 3. Zwinglii Art. Fidei, § 18; the 2d Helvetic Conf., ch. xi., § 15; Heidelberg Cat., qu. 37; French Ref. Conf., § 16; Belgic Conf. § 21; Episc., 39, Art. xv.; Westminster Conf., ch. viii., § 5. Arminian or Remonstrant Fire Art., § 2; Waldensian Conf., 1655, § 15.; Congr. Union of Gr. Br., § 10; Cumberland Presbn. Ch. viii.; § 5. Auburn Decl. (N. S. Presbn.) § 8. Methodist Articles of Religion, § 2, Ref. Episc. Ch., Art. xii.

In conclusion, the same is the teaching of Scripture in terms so clear and express that honest exposition cannot evade it. Thus, Prof. Fr. Delitsch, in his Com. on Hebrews, says that the doctrine of vicarious expiation for guilt is there unquestionably taught. As a few among many, let the reader collate these passages: Isa. liii: 5, 6; Dan. ix: 24, 26; John i: 29; Rom. v: 18; 2 Cor. v: 21; Gal. iii: 13 and iv: 4, 5; 1 Tim. ii: 6; Hebr. vii: 27; ix: 11-15; 1 Pet. ii: 24. 1 John ii: 2; Rev. v: 9. The candid man, who knows the scope of Hebraistic ideas and words, when he reads how Hebrews say "the Lord laid on him the iniquity of us all," with the result of the Messiah's being "wounded for our transgressions," and our being "healed by his stripes" (not by his example); of Messiah's "making reconciliation for iniquity," and "being cut off, but not for himself"; of his being "God's" (sacrificial) Lamb for taking away the world's sins;

with indisputable reference to the vicarious Levitical sacrifices; of His becoming, putatively, "a sinner for us," while himself "knowing no sin"; of His being "made a curse for us" (bearer of a penal curse) "to redeem us from the law"; of His "giving his own person a vicarious ransom-price for all"; of his "offering up himself as a sacrifice for our sins" in lieu of such clean beasts as the Levit.-priests vicariously offered; of His "obtaining eternal redemption for us by his blood"; of His "bearing our sins in his own body upon the tree," the known instrument of punishment; of His being the "propitiation for the sins of the whole world," and of the saints in heaven making "his redemption of them by his blood" the burden of their everlasting praises; this reader will conclude that the man who rejects the Church doctrine, Christ's actual endurance of the penalty of believers' sins, should, in consistency, also reject the whole Bible.

IV.—SYMPOSIUM ON THE MINISTRY.

HOW MAY THE MINISTRY INCREASE ITS EFFICIENCY AND USEFULNESS?

NO. III.

BY D. H. WHEELER, D.D., PRESIDENT ALLEGHENY COLLEGE.

THERE can be little doubt that one great need of the pulpit in our day is more interesting sermons. The exceptions are numerous and honorable; but, to a large extent, sermons are devoid of interest for the hearers. Edward Eggleston explained Dr. Talmage to me, ten years ago, in the pithy remark: "Talmage is never dull." The general pulpit is often dull; perhaps it is not too much to say that there is a general and not wholly unfounded belief that sermons are usually dull. The fault is not wholly in the preachers: perhaps a very small part of it is in them. In the first place, our pulpit is such as the people have made it, by false standards in the "amen corner" and in the back seats, and by miserable and miserly support. Nor has the complaining public asked for the right reform, or shown any proper interest in any reform at all. It has encouraged sensational sermons, such as one recently preached on "Absalom, the Dude;" and good preaching, which can be found in nearly every community, is habitually neglected. The best pastors I have ever known preached to small congregations, the "masses" utterly neglecting them. There is, however, no question of crimination or recrimination in this paper. The fact that the public does not expect to be interested by sermons remains—a fact to be removed out of the way by more interesting sermons.

It is a brave business to "speak the truth whether men will hear or forbear," but it is not necessary to court the alternative expressed by "or forbear." The first thought of the preacher ought to be on this