

THE SOUTHERN PRESBYTERIAN REVIEW.

VOL. XXXV.—NO. 3.

JULY, MDCCCLXXXIV.

ARTICLE, I.

EVOLUTION.¹

Gentlemen of the Alumni Association:

At the same time that you honored me with an invitation to deliver an address before you on this occasion, the Board of Directors of the Theological Seminary, in view of the fact that "Scepticism in the world is using alleged discoveries in science to impugn the word of God," requested me "to give fully my views, as taught in this institution, upon Evolution, as it respects the world, the lower animals, and man." Inasmuch as several members of the Board are also members of this Association, and both Board and Association feel the same interest in the Seminary, I have supposed that I could not select a subject more likely to meet with your approval than the one suggested to me by the Directors.

I am all the more inclined to make this choice, as it will afford me the opportunity of showing you that additional study has, in some respects, to a certain extent modified my views since I expressed them to many of you in the class-room.

¹ This Address was delivered May 7th, 1884, before the Alumni Association of the Theological Seminary at Columbia, S. C., and is published in the SOUTHERN PRESBYTERIAN REVIEW at its request, and also at the request of the Board of Directors of the Theological Seminary.

ARTICLE II.

THE EMOTIONS.

The Emotions. By JAMES McCOSH, D. D., LL. D. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 12mo., pp. 256.

The works on mental science most current treat almost exclusively of the intelligence, or cognitive faculties of the soul. Locke's great treatise dispatches the subject in his chapter on *Power*, and that in the most superficial and unsatisfactory manner. Sir William Hamilton and Dr. Noah Porter close their books without teaching us anything at all about the feelings of the soul, except the mere intimation given in their preliminary divisions of the subject, that human souls have such functions. Kant, in his *Critic of the Practical Reason*, speaks of the motives of human activity, thus recognising the emotive functions of the soul, and making some profound remarks. But the main object of the treatise being to discuss the ethical judgment and sentiment, as the peculiar characteristic of rational, responsible agents, it really presents no systematic discussion of the feelings as a whole. To us the most striking trait of this work of the great philosopher is the following: he alone, of all the psychologists, recognises and establishes "the propensity to evil" in human nature on pure grounds of psychology as distinguished from theology, as one of the constitutive traits of human character; just as other psychologists recognise and prove the natural love of happiness, of power, or of applause. Of this, more in the end. Dr. Thos. Brown devotes an adequate portion of his eloquent lectures to the feelings, for which, as for the elevation and purity of his views, and the ingenuity of his analyses, he deserves much admiration. But his distribution of the subject is not logical, and he leaves much to be done for the perfecting of this branch of the science.

Dr. McCosh seems to have been moved by this belief to the undertaking of this, his latest work. Dr. Brown had distributed the feelings into three classes. 1. Our "immediate emotions;"

such as wonder, beauty, the ludicrous, love, hate, pride, humility, sympathy. 2. Our "retrospective emotions;" as regret, anger, gratitude, gladness, remorse. 3. Our "prospective emotions;" as desires, fear, and hope. The basis of this classification is the way in which feelings are related to their objects in time. The first class he then subdivides into feelings involving moral quality, as love, hate, sympathy; and those involving no moral quality, as wonder, beauty, the ludicrous. Dr. McCosh has evidently had this distribution in his eye, and in attempting to improve it, he only changes it into one still more inconsequential. His plan is to distribute the feelings into: I. "Affections towards animate objects," the subdivisions of which are, (a) retrospective, (b) immediate, and (c) prospective, affections towards animate objects. II. "Affections towards inanimate objects," the æsthetic namely. III. "Continuing and complex affections." This list suggests easily many fatal objections. The divisions do not divide. Are not all feelings, in their very nature, more or less "continuing"? The same affection is in some spirits more persistent than in some other more fickle ones. No affection is, like volitions and like many sense perceptions, momentary. Again, love is classed in the III. division, for instance. But love is as simple as any of the affections, and certainly it is one which can only be directed towards an animate object. Again, have we no æsthetic feelings towards animate objects? Do we never see beauty in a squirrel, a fine horse, a graceful child? Must the object necessarily be dead, like a star or a mountain, in order to awaken the æsthetic sentiment? And if the division into prospective, immediate, and retrospective is worth anything, does it not also extend to the II. and III. classes? Once more, the complex affections we must unquestionably find very numerous, even as various combinations of a few letters make a multitude of different syllables. The list should be very long, whereas Dr. McCosh's is very short, and must, therefore, omit a very large number of complex feelings. And surely, in a philosophic classification, the complex emotions should be treated under the heads of the simple and elemental ones which form them by combination. What chemist would treat, in a separate book, sulphur

as a simple substance, and then in another the sulphates and sulphides?

Or, if we return to Dr. Brown's less objectionable distribution, we may well inquire whether the relations of feelings to their objects in time gives us any accurate or useful ground of division. In one sense all our feelings have a *posterior* relation, in time, to the cognition of their objects; for such cognition is the condition precedent of the rise of the emotion. For instance, when Dr. Brown makes wonder an immediate emotion, and anger a retrospective one, we must ask: Did not the cognition which excited the wonder precede that feeling just as truly as the cognition of the injury preceded the resulting emotion of anger? We may admit that desire, hope, fear, do look forward to future good or evil in the sense in which wonder and resentment do not.

But if we grant that the relation in time of the feelings to their objects gives a thorough ground of division, the equally grave objection is, that this division would be fruitless. The discriminative trait selected is one which has little importance, and leads to no scientific results. It is as though one should classify fruits by their *color*, when one class would be of "red fruits," including strawberries, some cherries, currants, grapes, and apples (and excluding others of the same species), with pomegranates. What light would botany ever receive from such a classification and treatment?

So it was erroneous for Dr. Brown to divide feelings into those qualified by moral trait and those having no moral trait. Strictly no feelings are ethical in quality, except the emotions of conscience, approbation, and reprehension. But in the popular sense any feeling may become moral, or immoral, according as it is conditioned and limited. The æsthetic feelings, the bodily appetites, the resentments, the desires, the loves and hatreds, may be virtuous, or vicious, or indifferent, according to their objects and limitations. If there are some objects of feeling such that the emotions cannot be directed to them without having some ethical quality, good or bad—which is admitted—this is far short of giving us a ground of general discrimination. A profitable classification must be obtained in far other ways than these.

Before dealing with this task, let us resume the question as to the importance of this discussion of the feelings in philosophy.

Our rational consciousness reveals to us a multitude of acts of intelligence, sensitive, intuitive, suggestive, or illative, which all have this in common, that their results are cognitions. The same consciousness reveals to the slightest glance that there is a class of functions in the human spirit very distinct from cognitions: *the Feelings*. The best description of these, and of their wide difference from cognitions, is that which we read in consciousness itself. Our admiration, disgust, desire, necessarily wait on our ideas of their objects; and yet differ as consciously from the acts of intellection which arouse them as the warmth of the solar ray, felt in our nerves of touch, differs from its luminous power, felt by the optic nerves. *Feeling is the Temperature of Thought.*

Although so many of the books direct our attention exclusively to the powers of intellect, the feelings are far from being the least important or least noble functions of the soul. These writers seem to think that the whole glory of the mind is in its discriminations of thought; that here alone they can display a glittering acumen. But this quality is no less necessary to the correct analysis of the feelings than of the logical processes of mind. If any eminency is to be assumed for either department, we should incline to claim it for the feelings, as the more noble and essential functions of the soul, rather than the cognitions. For,

1st. The conative feelings constitute the energetic and operative part of every motive to action. Hence, these are, in scientific view, more important than the cognitions which occasion them. Essentially, feelings are man's motive power. Intellect is the cold and latent magnetism which directs the ship's compass, and furnishes the guide of its motion, should it be able to move. Feeling is that elastic energy which throbs within the machinery, and gives propulsion to its wheels. Without it, the ship, in spite of the needle pointing with its subtile intelligence to the pole, rots in the calm before it makes a voyage anywhither.

2d. The morality of our volitions depends upon that of their subjective motives; and these derive their moral complexion

wholly from the feelings which combine in them; for this is the active, and therefore the ethical, element. It is chiefly the feelings which qualify the motives, as praise- or blame-worthy. Hence, again: a great and noble emotion is a higher function of the soul than any mere vigor of cognition. "The serpent was more subtle than any beast of the field;" and none the less the reptile, the most ignoble of his class of animals. "Magnanimity" is made up chiefly of the grand affections, and not of keen thoughts. Disinterested love is nobler than talent. Generous self-sacrifice is grander than acute invention; the heroic will is more admirable than the shrewd intellect. Hence, again: our moral discrimination, our analyses of our own motives, is chiefly concerned with the ascertainment of the real elements of feeling which combine in them. We shall strikingly confirm this by the instances to be cited hereafter, in which we shall find the moral problem: Was the act right? or, in other words, Was the emotional part of the motive right? will turn solely upon the analysis of the feeling which entered into the motive. Indeed, the intelligent moral government of the heart will be found to turn on such analysis of the feelings, tracing them to their real ultimate principles. The maxim, "Know thyself," resolves chiefly into a knowledge of the feelings which mingle within us. It is, then, chiefly the psychology of the feelings which is the moral guide of life.

3d. The vigor of the functions of cognition itself depends, in every man, more on the force of the incentive energising the faculty, than on the native strength or clearness of the intellect. Many a man whose mental vision was by nature like that of the eagle, has been practically of inert and useless mind: the luminous ray of his spirit was dimmed, and at last quenched by the fogs of indolence or fickleness. There was not *will* enough to direct the mental attention steadily to any valuable problem. But in the man of persistent and powerful feeling, the desire has so cleared and stimulated the vision that it has grown in clearness until it has pierced the third heavens of truth. It is chiefly the feelings which make the man.

If we examine a lexicon, we find names of feelings in almost

VOL. XXXV., NO. 3—3.

countless numbers. In a single subdivision we see "pleasure," "joy," "gladness," "content," "delight," "rapture," "cheerfulness," "a merry heart," and many others. In another we hear of "expectation," "wish," "hope," "desire," "craving," "lust," "concupiscence," "coveting," "longing." In another of "uneasiness," "apprehension," "alarm," "fear," "panic," "terror." But the faculties of cognition seem to be few, and easily separated. Hence, perhaps, some infer that there can be no complete psychology of the feelings; that this department of the soul's functions must remain an ever-shifting cloud-world, whose laws are too numerous and too fickle to be comprehended. But it is hoped that this mutable maze will be found like the kaleidoscope, all of whose diversified wonders are accounted for by two plane mirrors and a few colored beads. True science can bring order out of this confusion. And the most valuable ethical and theological results will be: that right emotions will be distinguished from the wrong; and we shall ascertain the line which separates the normal affections from the unlawful.

One simplification of the subject is at once effected by noticing that they may be the same in nature and *differ in degree*. So that many of the names of emotions do but express the same feeling in different grades of energy. Thus: "concern," "apprehension," "fear," "terror," are but four degrees of the same feeling, as calmer or more intense. What else is expressed by the terms "content," "cheerfulness," "joy," "rapture," "transport"? The word "passion" is often used colloquially, and even defined in some books, as meaning the emotion in an intense degree. They tell us, for instance, that "love" has become "a passion" when it has risen to an uncontrollable agitation, absorbing the whole soul, overpowering the self-control, making the pulse to bound and the face to glow. Thus they would call "displeasure" a feeling, but rage a "passion." And they have even separated off chapters upon the discussion of "the passions." But if the intense feelings are the same, except in degree, with their calmer movements, this is just as sensible as though the chemist who promised to treat scientifically of "water," should discuss separately water in a teacup and a tub; or, after announcing "calo-

ric" as his subject, should devote one chapter to heat in a tea-kettle, and a different one to heat in the boiler of a steam-engine. This abuse of the word "passion" has another mischief: it utterly obscures the etymology of the word, and in doing so helps to becloud another division of the feelings, which is, as we shall see, the most fundamental of all. *Passio* is from *patior*, "I suffer," "I endure." Passions should mean those feelings with which I am *passively impressed*. The English Liturgy uses the word classically and correctly when it teaches the worshipper to supplicate Christ "by his most holy cross and passion" (by his *sufferings*; the feelings of pain, bodily and spiritual, which he was made passively to endure); and our Confession uses it aright when it declares God "without parts and passions;" an Infinite Monad, essentially and boundlessly active, but incapable of being made to suffer or to experience any function of passivity.

This plain and obvious view of feelings, the same in element but different in degree, explains another very frequent fallacy. The feelings, in their calmer grades, are mistaken for the rational functions of judgment, which they attend. Thus, the man whose motive is caution, or apprehension, is described as acting rationally; while he who is actuated by terror is said to act with "blind passion." But what is "terror" except a higher degree of the very same element of feeling, "fear," which appears in "apprehension"? In the true sense of the word "passion," an emotional function of passivity, if terror is "a passion," so is "apprehension." Extensive delusion also exists in the idea which finds expression in the first word of the popular phrase, "*blind passion*." It is supposed that vehement emotion usually obfuscates the intellect. So it sometimes does, doubtless. And perhaps far more often *it clarifies the intellect*. Every faculty performs its functions more accurately when it is vigorously energised. Feeling is the temperature of thought. Is the solar beam in July less luminous than on some pale wintry day, because charged with so much more heat? Facts confirm this the true philosophy. Lawyers assure us that they get their most perspicacious views of the merits of their cases from the minds of their clients who are "piping hot" with indignation and zeal. The

great orator, when in the very "torrent and tempest of his passion," enjoys flashes of intellectual vision so clear and penetrating, that he sees by them in a moment logical relations which a day's calm study might not have revealed to him. Stonewall Jackson modestly stated, that the moments when he had been conscious of the best use of his intellect were in the crisis of a great battle, with the shells hurtling over him. To our apprehension it appears fully as probable that the dull and dim grade of an emotion will mislead the reason, as the vehement grade; especially in view of the fallacy which calls the calmer grade a rational judgment. The gentle wolf in sheep's clothing will be more likely to invade the peaceful sheepfold of the intellect successfully than the raging wolf in the confessed wolf's skin.

These fallacies also greatly obscure our apprehensions of the functions and value of the feelings in the conduct of the spirit. We must learn to separate from our conception of the essence of the feelings, that supposed trait of pungency or agitation. This necessarily characterises only the more intense degrees of the feelings. The mental state may be true feeling, and yet calm and even. Again we define feeling as "the temperature of thought." Now, the temperature of a beam of light may vary in incensity, from the faint warmth of the wintry sunlight to the burning heat of the midsummer beam condensed by a lens. Yet in both rays it is caloric, not mere light. Heat is usually thought of by the unlearned as imbuing only fiery or molten masses. Yet science teaches us that there is a smaller degree of caloric even in a block of ice, for it can so radiate from that ice as to affect a thermometer. These facts are only used to illustrate the proposition so often overlooked, that there may be an element of feeling in even the calmest processes of soul, and the analogy of the cases of itself raises a probability of the truth. But it can be demonstrated, and that by the following plain and short view. There can be no subjective motive without some feeling. But, without subjective motive, there can be no action of volition. Every rational volition is from a subjective motive to an object, which is the inducement, or objective end of the action. But in order for any object to be an inducement to rational volition, it

must present itself to the mind in the double aspect of the desirable and the real. For instance, if one says: "Come with us to the hill and dig laboriously, and you shall bear home on your shoulders a heavy load of rubbish;" no one responds. The object is real, but totally undesirable. Again one says: "Run, and overtake the foot of yonder moving rainbow arch! and under it you shall find a bag of gold." Not a soul moves a step. Why not? The object named, gold, is desirable, but the understanding knows it is unreal. Again, one says: "Come with us to the mountains of Georgia, and in the known auriferous veins of that region we will dig gold." The man desirous of wealth will now move. The objective, or proposed inducement, stands to the mind in the double category of the desirable and the real. But of course if this object becomes inducement to the soul, there must be an answering correspondency between it and the soul; the subjective actions of the soul going out towards it must also be double, including both a judgment and a desire. Thus psychology confirms the verdict of common sense and consciousness. Every motive to action must involve a desire. But desire is feeling. Hence in the states of soul leading to the calmest intelligent action, there must be some feeling.

We learn thus, it is a mistake to suppose that feeling is intermittent in the soul's functions, while cognition is supposed to be constant. It is as true that the waking soul is never without feelings (in at least some calmer manifestations) as that it is never without thoughts. One phase of feeling goes, but another takes its place in perpetual succession; it is only the intensity of feeling that ebbs and flows. Indeed, were all feeling really to desert a human soul, that soul would be as truly frozen for the time into fatuity as though it were struck idiotic. Suppose a man walking along the street under the impulse of some *purpose*, wholly deserted by feeling—he would not take another step! For thought is not purpose, unless it also involves desire. With the total extinction of desire, purpose would be annihilated, and the purposeless soul would pause as certainly as though it had become fatuous. Let the eager racer, who is about to bound towards the goal, see that the gold crown upon the goal, which was his incentive,

has turned to a clod. He stops. Why should he run? No feeling, no action. If a man totally lost all feeling, what would there be left to energise his attention so as to direct it voluntarily to any given subject of thought? Nothing. The processes of thought would remain as aimless and vacillating as the movements of the magnetic needle whose polarity is interrupted. Conscious thought might die away out of the soul after the death of feeling. Certainly there would be an end of all connected thought. For the act by which the soul directs its attention is a volition, and without feeling there is no volition.

The next step towards simplifying the multifarious forms of feeling should be, to search for those elements which are simple, original, and characteristic of human nature as such. This search must result in a correct classification; and only by such a result can its completeness be verified. And,

I. At the forefront of all proper classification of feelings must stand ever the distinction between those which have an external cause, and in which the soul is passive—acted on, instead of acting—and those which have a subjective source in the soul's own spontaneity and dispositions, and which act outwardly towards their objects. Had not the popular usage so totally spoiled and perverted the classical meaning of the word *passions*, this would give us exactly the term we need for the former class. The word would express states of feeling in which the soul is subject, and not agent, where the capacity for the feeling is a "passive power," or mere susceptibility lodged in the native constitution, and not a subjective activity. But as the persistency of the erroneous usage would cause us continually to be misunderstood, we surrender the word. Let us agree to call these feelings *functions of sensibility*, or *sensibilities*.

The opposite class of feelings, where the power in exercise is a subjective and active power, and the function of emotion has a subjective cause, we will call *appetencies*. But we must remind the reader that these inward activities may pronounce themselves for or against an object. They may take the form of desires or aversions; they may reach after or repel the objectives. And the one class of feelings will be converse to the other. We de-

sire, then, when we speak of "appetencies," to be understood as meaning either desires or aversions, either of these outgoings of subjective spontaneity.

It will soon be made to appear how all-important this division is. Yet many neglect it. Dr. Porter, dividing the powers of the soul, mentions them as three powers of "Intellect, of Sensibility, of Will." So Gregory, and many other moralists. Locke, in the brief discussion of the feelings referred to, insists, indeed, upon distinguishing between the desires and the will; but declares that all desire is determined by an "uneasiness," which he evidently regards as a passive sensibility. Kant, however, with his usual accuracy, divides feeling from desire. Sir Wm. Hamilton, in his Lectures on Metaphysics, announces and defends the correct distinction, making four classes of powers in the soul: 1. Of Intellect, or cognition. 2. Of Sensibility. 3. Of "Conation," including (*a*) appetencies, and (*b*) volition. He claims, with a rather hasty self-importance, that he was the first to see and announce the true distinction. Had he been as familiar with the Calvinistic divinity (even of his own country) as with the heathen Peripatetics, he would have seen that many of them had virtually taught the correct division generations before him. For, in their habitual distribution into "*understanding, affections, and will,*" they include, virtually, under the term will, not only the function of naked volition, but also all those of subjective conation. When, for instance, the Calvinist speaks of the "corruption of the *will,*" he means rather the conative movements preceding volition, than the mere power of volition itself. This distribution really meant to say, then, that the soul has three classes of powers: 1. The intellective. 2. The susceptibilities (passive powers). 3. The conative, or active, divided into (*a*) the appetencies, and (*b*) volitions. So that they really set forth the all-important distinction between the sensibilities and the appetencies.

It is true that the two opposite forms of feeling often, nay, usually, concur; both are usually present together. It is also true that the impressions on the sensibility are the *occasions* (not causes) of the rise of appetencies, or subjective desires and aversions. But none the less is the distinction just and fundamental. For,

First. Consciousness requires it. In the rise and continuance of a sensibility, I am conscious that, so far, I am only subject, and not agent; passive, and only impressed from without. I call into exercise no more spontaneity or self-hood as to experiencing or not experiencing the sensibility than the man unwittingly assaulted from the rear with a bludgeon has, as to the pain resulting from its stroke. And consequently, I feel no more responsible. But when I begin to harbor an appetency, though it be not yet matured into volition, I am conscious of self-action. I know that this action of soul is an expression of my own spontaneity. This appetency is the *Ego* tending outwardly to its objective. Its presence is as truly an expression of my free preference as is a volition. I feel thus only because *I incline*, or have the disposition, to feel thus. Whereas before, my sensibility was uttered in the passive verb, my appetency is uttered in the active transitive verb. Let the reader consider any actual instance. Suppose it to be that of the man causelessly assaulted with the bludgeon. The first consequence of the blow, which is reported in the man's spirit, is the grief or distress answering immediately to the physical affection of the bruised nerves. In this the soul is as involuntary and passive as a stone in falling. Next thereafter may arise in the spirit of the injured man the warm appetency or desire to retaliate the pain—active resentment. Or, this may not arise. If the sufferer is choleric, it may arise; if he is meek, or if the blow came from one he loves, it may not arise, but in its place will come a tender grief and a generous desire to render good for the smiter's evil. If the desire to strike back arises, its *occasion* will be found in the passive sensibility of grief or distress inflicted on the spirit by the blow; but the *cause* of the resentful appetency, or of the tender forgiveness, must be sought in the subjective feelings of the man struck. Let another instance be found in the complex feeling called the "appetite" of hunger. This includes, first, an involuntary sensibility, the uneasiness of want; and next, a voluntary desire, reaching forth to the food set before the eyes. But let us suppose that, at this moment, one informs him, "This food contains arsenic." The appetency instantly subsides, although the uneasiness of want

continues. A third instance may be found in the feeling of wonder. This, in its first movement, is a passive sensibility, excited by a novel object. It is, however, the immediate occasion of the active appetency of "curiosity," or the desire to know.

Second. This distinction is essential to explaining our conscious free agency, consistently with the certainty of volitions. The true doctrine here is undoubtedly the Augustinian: that *motives* regularly *cause volitions*. But now, if we confound passive sensibilities with spontaneous appetencies, and call the former "motives," that doctrine becomes inconsistent with our conscious free agency. If my impulse to strike back at my assailant is a passive sensibility, it is caused by his blow, as truly as the bodily pain. In the producing of that pain I had no more agency than the stone has in dropping when its support is removed. If that impulse was cause of the volition to strike back, then the whole series, feelings and act, was determined for me by a causal necessity, without my consent, by the assailant when he struck me. I was no free agent, but a sentient puppet. The last movement, the act of retaliation, was determined by the other's blow, as really as the movement of the hindmost link in a chain, whose foremost link is drawn forward by another hand. But if we make the proper distinction between sensibility and appetency, if we perceive aright the objective source of the one, and the subjective source and true spontaneity of the other, we are able to refute that fatal inference. It is this truth which dissolves the whole fallacies, both of the materialistic fatalist and the advocate of the contingency of the will. Grant with Hobbes, Condillac, and the Mills, that appetency is but "transformed sensation," or transformed sensibility, and every act of man is physically necessitated, like the movements of the successive links of the chain. But the Pelagian, seeing whither this fatal argument leads, sought to break it by denying that motives do cause volitions. He exclaimed: The feelings do not causatively determine the will, but the will is self-determined, and essentially *in equilibrio*, and always competent to emit the volition which is contrary to the strongest motives. Only thus can you save man's true free agency. But the Pelagian is here contradicted by conscious-

ness, by theology, by the absolute divine prescience of volitions, by experience, and by a thousand absurd consequences of his denial. *Motives do determine volitions. But what are motives?* This vital question cannot be answered without the just distinction between sensibilities and appetencies. Passive sensibilities never are motives—at least to responsible rational volitions—but only non-efficient occasions of those subjective appetencies which are the determining motives. And man is free in his volitions because he is spontaneous in those motives which determine them; not because there is any such monstrosity in his spiritual action as this function conformed to no law, even of his own subjective reason or disposition, and regulated by no rule, even of his own subjective constitution. Thus the errors of the two extremes are resolved at once, and the consistency of the true moderate doctrine reconciled with our conscious free agency.

II. The next fundamental point is, to ascertain the conditions under which feelings arise in the soul. One condition is obviously the presence, in thought at least, of some idea or judgment as object of the feeling. He who feels must have something to feel about. It is equally obvious that it is *some cognition*, some idea or conclusion presented either by sense, memory, association, imagination, or reason, which furnishes that object before the soul. It is an injury which excites resentment; in order that it may do so, the injury must be either seen, felt, or thought. The object of parental love is the child. This affection can only imbue the mother's spirit consciously as the child is present either before her eyes or her thought. Hence the maxim, that the soul only feels as the mind sees. Cognition is in order to feeling.

The other condition is, if possible, more important, though not so obvious. In order to feeling, there must be in the soul a given *a priori* disposition or *habitus* as to the object. And this is true both of the sensibilities and the appetencies. As the rise of bodily pain from a blow or stab is conditioned on the previous presence in the flesh of living nerve-tissue, so the previous presence in the soul of a given susceptibility is the condition prerequisite to the excitement of a given sensibility by its object. The blow did not put the nerve-fibres into the flesh; it found them

there. So, the presence of the object in thought does not create the susceptibility or sentiency of soul, but finds it there. The parallel fact is true of the appetencies. Unless the soul is naturally and previously qualified by a given disposition, or tendency of inclination for or against the given object, seen in cognition, this could not be the object of appetency or aversion. The racer would not, and could not, emit desire for the clod set upon the goal; he could and would for the gold crown. Now, did the clod and the metal, or either of them, propagate this difference in the man's desire? That is absurd; they are dead, inert matter; objects of desire or aversion, not agents. It was the native, subjective disposition of the racer's soul which determined the desire towards the golden crown, and away from the clod, when the two objects were presented in cognition. This is plain.

But from this it follows that if a given disposition is native to the soul, no object naturally indifferent or alien to that disposition can have any agency whatever to reverse it. This must follow by the same kind of reasoning which proves that, if the horse pulls the cart, it cannot be the cart which pulls the horse. What is it that has decided whether a given object shall or shall not be an inducement to this soul? It is that soul's disposition which has decided it, and decided it *a priori*. Then, an object which the soul's disposition has already decided to be alien or indifferent cannot influence that disposition backwards. The effect cannot reverse its own cause. If, then, we have ascertained a native disposition of souls, we have gotten an ultimate fact, behind which analysis can go no farther; a fact which is regulative (not compulsory) of human spontaneity, and through the spontaneous appetencies, of the will. Let an instance be taken from the class of feelings called appetites. We ask the child: Is this drug sweet or nauseous? If on experiment the native taste pronounce it nauseous, that is the end of the matter. Of course, the child may still be forced by manual violence to swallow it. The child may even elect freely to swallow it; may even beg eagerly to be allowed to swallow it, if it sees that the evil drug is the only choice except a more evil sickness or death. But that child will not freely eat that drug *for the sake of enjoying it*, nor will its

natural repugnance be in the least changed, but rather confirmed, by having the drug forced upon it. Let an instance also be taken from the spiritual dispositions. Is the human soul so constituted as to find an intuitive pleasure in the applause of its fellows, and pain in their contempt? If experiment uniformly reveals this, what would or could be the result of this appeal: "Come, my friend, and embark yourself in this laborious train of efforts. They cannot possibly procure for you any good or advantage, except that of being despised by all your fellow-men. Come, undergo these toils, solely to win that contempt." Every one knows that the appeal must totally fail, unless the man were a lunatic; and all except lunatics would think us lunatics for attempting to make it. Now, the hearer is, in this refusal, perfectly free, and yet his free refusal is absolutely certain. Why? The *a priori* constitutive law of disposition has settled the matter: that being well abused cannot be, *per se*, an inducement to a human soul; the native disposition is to find pleasure in the opposite—in applause.

III. From this simple view it results that the feelings, both sensibilities and appetencies, will present themselves *in pairs*. We shall meet with a given feeling and its reverse. The second essential condition of feelings, as we saw, was the previous existence of a native disposition. Now, the disposition which has decided a given object to be an inducement, will of course regard the opposite object as one of repulsion. The taste which has elected the sweet will *ipso facto* repel the nauseous as evil. Or, the disposition which recognises the approbation of fellows as the good, will *ipso facto* reject the obloquy of mankind as *per se* an evil, however one may endorse it for the sake of some other higher good. The pair of results in each case does not disclose two dispositions, but only one, acting according to its own nature oppositely towards the two opposite objects. In the compass it is the same molecular energy which causes the upper end of the needle to turn towards the north pole, and to turn away from the south. It is so of the soul's native condition of spiritual electricity: the one disposition discloses two opposite actions, either of sensibility or of appetency; the soul is affected, in virtue of

one disposition, with two sensibilities, or two appetencies, pleasure or pain, desire or aversion, towards the pair of opposite objects. Eminently is this true of the moral emotion: approbation of the virtuous and reprehension of the wicked, are the dual expression of the one, single right disposition of conscience.

Thus all the feelings may be shown to go in pairs, as Pleasure and Pain, Wonder and Ennui, Sublimity and Disgust, Beauty and Ugliness, Love and Hatred, Gratitude and Resentment, Beneficence and Malice, Fear and Bravery, Pride and Humility, Approbation and Reprehension, Self-satisfaction and Shame. And the whole list of *Desires*, whether for continued existence, power, money, fame, ease, has its counterpart list of Aversions, for death, weakness, poverty, reproach, sickness. Thus our analysis is at once simplified, and the number of cases to be reduced is diminished by one-half.

IV. This seems the suitable place to refute two kindred (or we may say, virtually identical) theories, which boast of a still greater simplification, and have infused boundless fallacies into the science of ethics. These writers say: Give us two feelings only, the sensibilities to *pleasure* and *pain*, and we have all the elements necessary to account for the multiplicity of human emotions. An object happens by chance to affect us a few times with pain or pleasure. We remember the effect of its presence. This memory of the experienced pain or pleasure is supposed to be sufficient to generate subsequent aversion or desire towards that object. Desire, then, is only rational self-calculation, proposing to itself to seek the same means in order to repeat the feeling of pleasure.

Hartley had applied his favorite doctrine of *association* for virtually the same purpose. The Mills, father and son, and even the witty Sidney Smith, heartily adopted the scheme. The "associational philosophers," dazzled by the power association evidently has over our ideas, and the wonders which this faculty works in suggestion and imagination, were led to suppose that they could account for all the higher functions of the reason by association; without postulating for the mind any of those *a priori* cognitions and judgments, which were so obnoxious to this

empirical school. They thought they could account for memory as a mere result of associated ideas. Our most fundamental judgments of relation were to be explained as a sort of trick the mind got into by seeing two ideas associated in a certain way, of supposing them necessarily related that way. Our belief in the tie of cause and effect, they said, was nothing but a habit of expecting a consequent to follow a given antecedent, simply because they had been so often associated so. What wonder that these men thought they could also account for all the marvels of emotion with the two simple elements of experienced pain and pleasure, and their magician association? Thus: Experienced pain has been associated with a given object a number of times. Afterward the sight of the object, by the law of association, suggests those former pains, and this is the genesis of the emotion of *fear*. Other objects caused pleasure. By the same power of association their presence suggested that former pleasure, and that gave birth to *desire*. Or if the rational faculty joined to the association a probable expectation of attainment, that was *hope*. The sight of the kind mother, by the associative tie, suggests to the boy or girl the many personal pleasures of which she had been the source, from the first remembered draught of nourishment out of her generous breasts to the last ministration of relief or enjoyment; and that string of associations constitutes *filial love* and *gratitude*. We see a person suffering; the association which the spectacle revives of our former suffering, gives us a gentle pain, and that is *sympathy*!

Now, in refuting this notable scheme, it need not be denied that our feelings do fall within the wonderful tie of association, nor that this faculty has a potent influence in combining and modifying the emotions. But elements must *exist* before they can combine; and the associative faculty, whose whole power is to procure the reproduction of ideas or feelings before connected, has no power to generate. The chief plausibility of this scheme is derived from its success in accounting for *fear*, as only remembered pain associated with its cause. But when we take another step in their process the plausibility vanishes. If their plan is correct, should we not account for all our aversions precisely as

we account for our fears? But then aversion and fear should be the same, but they are often widely distinguished.

But the more thorough and obvious refutation is to remark, that the whole trick of this analysis is in assuming that there is one pain and one pleasure only. But pains and pleasures are many and diverse. Some are animal, some spiritual. Is the pain of a stripe from the rod quivering in the animal nerves of the gross and selfish child the same with the pain of conscience awakened in the spirit of the ingenuous boy by the tears of the mother, who, while she disapproves, is too loving to strike? Can the one pain be analysed into the other by any jugglery of the associations? No. This Hartleian scheme thus begs the question at the outset, by confounding, under the names of pain and pleasure, functions of feeling widely distinct and equally original.

The fact substantiated under our II. head equally refutes it. As soon as we ask the question, Can any object whatsoever occasion in man's spirit any feeling whatsoever? the negative which common sense at once pronounces to that simple inquiry, gives us the material of this argument. Did the clod occasion the same joy and desire in the racer's mind as the golden crown? May a heap of rubbish be possibly the object of an æsthetic pleasure as the rainbow may be? Can a human spirit be pleased at being talked about abusively, as well as by being talked of approvingly? Of course not. But why not? The answer is as simple as fundamental: that there must exist, in the sensitive spirit, a capacity or specific disposition, establishing a relevancy of the soul to the specific class of objects. And that disposition must exist as a subjective law of the soul previous and in order to the result, the rise of the different feeling. It would be as reasonable to say that the rivulet generated the spring, as to assert that the feeling implanted the disposition and capacity, whose pre-existence is in order to the rise of the feeling. Hartley has missed then and totally overlooked the main fact in the problem. Since pains and pleasures are many, and are naturally distinct, it is vain to talk of a plan by which one pain and one pleasure may generate many other coördinate and equally original pains and pleasures.

Association, least of all, can work this effect. For the very

nature of this mental process is to connect ideas and feelings by some tie of pre-existence together in the mind—resemblance, contrast, causation, or logical relation—so that the *one idea shall reproduce the other*. That is all. But mere reproduction does not transmute. The suggested idea merely arises such as it was when cognised before, save as it is now thought in some new connexion. Hence, all these theories which seek to make association the generator of different mental states from those first associated, are worthless. Let us test in this way, for instance, the genesis of filial love and gratitude from the child's associations of experienced natural pleasures with the kind mother's person. Those pleasures, when experienced, were personal and selfish! But the very essence of filial love is, to be disinterested. How could the mere circumstance that these pleasures are revived by suggestion in association with the mother's image, work all that mighty change into an affection of the opposite class! Again, how do we get, from such a source, an ethical affection for the mother, including the judgment and sentiment of right, merit, desert, and obligation? Why should these remembered personal pleasures generate a love different from that felt for the kindly cow, which relieved the child's hunger more constantly than the mother's bosom; or for the jolly toy which gave him as many gay moments as the mother's caresses? There are loves, again, which go out towards objects which are sources of our griefs and not our joys: the mother's love for her new-born infant, which, up to that moment when she enshrines it in her heart of hearts, had made its existence as a *fetus* known to her only in the pains of gestation and the agonies of parturition; the parent's love attaching to a child whose faults and cruelties only pierce the loving heart with sorrows.

It is unnecessary to pursue the parallel process with the supposed generation of sympathy from our own remembered pains and of the other affections. The argument is so similar as not to need repetition.

The other branch of the theory which accounts for appetency as the deliberate self-calculation arguing from pleasures before experienced to the repetition of their means, receives a more easy

and popular answer. How was the soul carried to the appetency of that object the first time it sought it? Not by the experience of the pleasure derived from the object, for there has been no experience as yet, this being the first experiment. Here the theory breaks down hopelessly. Now, when the soul sought the object of its appetency the first time, the impulse to do so could not have been calculated, but it must have been immediate and instinctive. But this first instance of appetency is of the same class of mental affections with all the subsequent instances of the same appetency. In the subsequent ones, then, this immediate and instinctive desire cannot be absent, which was the sole element in the first and most characteristic instance. It is not meant to deny that rational calculation, founding on remembered experiences of advantage, does afterwards mingle with and reinforce instinctive desire; all that is argued is, that it cannot first generate it, any more than a child can procreate its own parent. Let us suppose that a physiologist was asked: What causes the newborn infant to imbibe its natural nourishment? and that he were to reply: "The cause is its experience of the sweetness of the mother's milk." The folly of the answer would be transparent. How did the infant know it was sweet before it had tasted it? By similar reasoning it appears, that, as this infant seeks the mother's breast under the guidance of an original and inborn animal instinct, so all the soul's elemental appetencies are spiritual instincts. This truth reflects new honor upon the wisdom of Him who fashioned human spirits, when we come to perceive the "final causes" of the original feelings. The designs which the Maker pursues in them are so profound that we learn man "is fearfully and wonderfully made," not only as to his anatomy, but as to the frame-work of his feelings.

V. We advance now to the true classification of the elemental feelings. We have already found them fundamentally separated by a dual division into sensibilities and appetencies, the former passive, and produced by an external cause, the latter active and springing from a subjective source. Then, in view of another principle of division, we found them all falling into pairs: sensibilities, pleasurable or painful; and appetencies, either of desire

or aversion; and each pair the expression, not of two, but of one original disposition of soul yielding the contrary feelings in response to opposite objects. Still another basis of a dichotomy was found, by remembering that man is corporeal and spiritual, and has accordingly animal sensibilities and mental. The passive sensations experienced in the animal susceptibility are impressions on the bodily senses; the corresponding appetencies are known by the name "appetites." In popular language, these are usually limited to the appetitive part of thirst, hunger, and the sexual sensibility. But it would be curious and interesting to inquire whether each of the appetencies occasioned by the sensation impressed on the other animal senses is not equally entitled to be called an "appetite." Why may we not say that the peasant whose back itches has an appetite to scratch as properly as we say that when thirsty he has an appetite to drink? When the eye is wearied by confinement in darkness, may we not say that it has an "appetite" for the light? When the musician's ear is wearied by silence, why should we not speak of him as having an "appetite" for harmony? But waiving this question, we only add, that the pleasures and pains of the sensuous æsthetic—we shall meet the mental æsthetic feelings farther on—and the desires and aversions occasioned by them, also belong to this division of feelings.

There remain, then, to discuss the mental feelings of the two classes: the sensibilities and appetencies which inhabit the rational spirit properly, as distinguished from the animal nature, to which the senses contribute nothing except the remoter ministerial service of channels for the cognitions which occasion the spiritual feelings. Let this be more clearly viewed in an instance. The virtuous man is informed of the utterance of a base lie. The feeling which we take into account here is, the ethical loathing he feels for the falsehood. Now, it may be asked, had not this virtuous man employed his acoustic sense, would his mind have known that the foul sin of lying had occurred? No; the bodily acoustic sense has been the channel of the cognition. But the evil quality which occasions his mental abhorrence does not all reside in the *sounds* through which, by the ministry of the ear,

his mind cognised the evil lie. It is not that these sounds were grating or unmelodious, or the words unrheterical. The vice is in the *thoughts uttered* by the liar; and the moral feeling is spiritual, and not sensuous.

Looking, then, only to the feelings of the mind, and excluding bodily sensations and appetites, we venture to suggest, as an imperfect and tentative arrangement, the following classification. The first column contains the objects, on the presence of which in cognition feeling is conditioned. These objects, as explained, fall into pairs. The second column contains the corresponding sensibilities; and the third the corresponding appetencies, also appearing in pairs of opposites. But each pair of pairs reveals only one subjective disposition or capacity of feeling in the soul. So that the whole variety of feelings is reduced to *nine principles*.

These nine elements of disposition, susceptibility, and conation, of course combine in various ways, producing many forms of complex feeling. Of these a few have been indicated in the table. The moral emotion may combine in many of these, as with instinctive resentment, love, sympathy, and modify the products. So the sensuous affections may combine with others, as love, selfishness, sympathy, and ambition, or avarice, producing the most energetic results, of which some are criminal and some legitimate.

The eight traits of disposition, with their resulting capacities for sensibility and conation, are implanted by our Maker in our souls. The ninth disposition was introduced by the fall. We may safely conclude that, had a given capacity no legitimate and innocent scope for its exercise, a wise and holy God would never have implanted it in the man made in his image. Hence, while the perversions of these feelings, produced by the combination of the ninth, native depravity, are all mischievous and criminal, there must be exercises of the other eight which are lawful. There is a legitimate wonder, curiosity, mirth, admiration, desire of power, delight in a good name. It is possible for a man to "be angry and sin not." There is a desire for one's own welfare, which is not sinful self-love (or the craving for unrighteous advantage and good). There is a generous emulation, which is sympathy with our fellow's manifested energy.

Dual Objects of Feeling	Corresponding Feelings of Passive Sensibility.	Corresponding Feelings of Active Appetency (Desire and Aversion).
1. { Existence and Extinction.	Simple Pleasure of Existence. Contrasted Pain at Extinction. { Sense of the Ludicrous, Sense of Beautiful. Wonder, { Sense of Sublime. Ennui. { Sense of the Dull, Sense of the Trivial, Sense of Ugliness.	Desire of life. { Motives of all self-protective acts. Aversion to Death. { } Curiosity, or Desire to know. } Disgust, or Aversion from contemplation of.
2. { The Novel, The Trite.	Instinctive Pleasure of Exertion. Pain of Inaction.	Desire of Power, or Ambition. Aversion to Restraint.
3. { Action, and Passivity.	Ethical Approbation. Ethical Reprehension. Remorse. (Rational Sensibilities.)	Avarice, or Desire of Wealth, as combined with No. 7. Desire of Reward to the Deserving. Desire of Penalty on Guilty.
4. { Righteousness and Sin.	{ Sympathy with others' joy, grief, &c. Emulation, being Sympathy with the energy of fellows.	Desire to Help. Desire to Excel. But, perverted by No. 7, Envy, or Desire to prevent others excelling.
5. Others' Feelings as Witnessed.	Pleasure in Praise. Pain in Dispraise. And combined with No. 7, Pride and Humility.	Love of Fame (or, with No. 3, Ambition). Haughtiness and Vanity. Desire of Improvement.
6. { Applause, and Reproach.	Gladness. Sorrow. But combining No. 4, Resentment at Injury.	Desire of our own Well-being. { Erroneously called Fear of Evil. { Self-love. Combining with No. 9, Selfishness, Desire to retaliate, and (combining No. 8, part 2d.) Revenge.
7. Well-Being, Ill-Being.	{ Love, or Delight in. Hatred of.	Desire to make happy, or Beneficence. Malice, or Desire to cause Suffering.
8. Our Fellow-Man.	{ Innate Depravity.	{ Aversion to Duty (at least some). } Preference for Self-will.
9. { Moral Obligation, License.		

Let us pause here to remark in this instance upon the important light thrown by a just analysis and classification of the feelings upon their moral quality. The emotion of emulation has been by some moralists applauded, and by others condemned. Some teachers and rulers appeal freely to it as a wholesome *stimulus* to effort. Others deprecate all use of the principle, as depraving to the morals. Now, if we conceive no emulation,

save that which is the outcome of envy, the latter are right. For envy can only be criminal and malignant. It is a mixture of selfishness, pride, and hatred, as quickened by the contemplation of a rival's superiority. The appetency of will which attends it is not the laudable desire to advance one's self, but the mean craving to depress and degrade the rival. The envious man does not wish himself better, but his competitor worse. Were all emulation but a phase of this vile emotion, it must always be wrong. But is there not a totally different phase? Every thoughtful man knows that the great law of sympathy extends to other affections besides sorrow. We sympathise with our fellow's joy, with his hope, with his courage, with his fear, with his resentment, with his mirth, just as we do with his grief. The philosophic meaning of *πάθος* is not sorrow merely, but feeling, all feeling; and *συμπάθεια* is the social infection of the one with all the forms of his neighbor's *παθήματα*. Now, love of action, energy, *is a feeling*, and a legitimate and noble one. Why may not the ingenuous spirit, witnessing the flame of this animating emotion, instinctively sympathise with it, just as he would with his neighbor's sorrow, or terror, or gladness? Doubtless this disinterested sympathy is felt. There is, then, an emulation which is *sympathy with another's energy*. It is from wholly another element of emotion than envy. It is not malignant, but just and generous. It does not crave to drag its honorable competitor down, but rightfully to raise itself up. And thus the Scriptures are justified and reconciled with themselves, which in one place rank "emulation" among the evil fruits of the "flesh;" and in another enjoin us to "provoke one another to good works."

The consistency of the classification proposed above must be left mainly to speak for itself. The reader's own reflections will pursue the hints which it presents him. This article is already approaching the limits of allowable length, and room can be claimed only for two other points.

One of these is the evident prevalence of "final cause" throughout the structure of the emotions. Every one has been fashioned with design. The skill with which they are all fashioned to educe their results bespeaks the Creator's wisdom

and benevolence just as clearly as the structure of the human eye. What was the end designed in imbuing the mind with the sensibility of *wonder* and its corresponding appetency of curiosity? To stimulate man to learn and to make his newly acquired knowledge sweet to him. Why was the law of sympathy established? To provide a spontaneous and ready succor for the distressed; to connect men in social ties, and to enable them to double their joys and divide their sorrows by sharing them. What is the "final cause" of instinctive resentment? To energise the innocent, weak man against aggression, and thus to prevent his giving additional *impetus* to the unjust assailant through timidity and sloth. But we must forbear this attractive line of thought.

Psychologists, in explaining the dispositions and classifying the native feelings of the soul, almost uniformly overlook the one we have placed in the ninth rank, native depravity. But we hold that the same sort of inquiry and reasoning from facts, which leads them to hold that the love of applause is a native trait of man's heart, should cause them to count depravity equally among man's constitutive dispositions. Why this grave and most inconsistent omission? Has the pride of reason blinded them? Kant is the only great writer, not teaching from the theological point of view, who has stated the psychological truth as to this trait, and therein he shows his acuteness and honesty at once. This original depravity he defines as a subjective "propensity" (*propensio*) prompting the soul to adopt something else than duty, as sensual good, selfishness, advantage, for the prevalent rule of voluntary actions. But notwithstanding this deplorable election, these lower motives may prompt the man to many actions formally right, as business honesty, domestic kindness; so that the man's *conduct* may be to a large degree moral. Yet the man himself is fundamentally immoral, radically depraved, because he has deposed from his soul what is entitled to be the supreme rule of all actions, and established the unrighteous rule of self-will, so that every one of his acts is bad in motive, at least by defect. If we ask what subjective cause determines the original propensity to determine the will to this life of disobedience, we raise an

absurd question. For, if an answer could be found, this would only raise a prior question, What determined that antecedent determining cause of propensity? The *regressus* would be endless. We must stop then with the inscrutable but indisputable fact, original evil propensity. It is the end for us of all possible analysis. But to preclude the sinner from the cavil, "Then my propensity, being native, infringes my free agency by a physical necessity; so that I am not responsible for the volitions that result," Kant argues acutely, that this propensity to evil is none the less a function of spontaneity, because it is original. For it is as truly and as freely elected into the soul by its free agency as is any specific act of evil freely willed by the sinner. Is not this propensity to evil as truly, as freely, as thoroughly, *the soul's preference* as any single bad act it ever willed? The propensity reigns in the soul by virtue of a perpetual, *continuing act* of spontaneity, unrelated to time. Each specific sin that soul commits is a similar act of spontaneity, related to some particular point in time. Hence, the soul's determinate preference for sin is both certain and free, and therefore responsible. The evidence by which Kant proves the existence of this original depravity is very plain and short. All men sin, both in the savage and civilised states, and the morals of nations (which have no earthly restrainer over them, and consequently show out man's real *animus*) are simply those of outlaws or demons. International relations are *frequently* those of active robbery and murder, and *all the time* those of expectation and preparation for robbery and murder.

Kant's description of that mixture of good and evil conduct which natural men exhibit, which yet coexists with radical depravity of will, is luminous and correct. We do not say that because the natural man is radically depraved, he is therefore as bad as man can be, or as bad as he may become in future. We do not condemn his social virtues as all hypocrisies. Many affections in this man are still normal and legitimate, and they concur in prompting many actions. His ethical reason in those judgments which recognise the rightness and obligation of God's holy law is not essentially corrupted, and cannot be, except by lunacy.

This sacred judgment of conscience in favor of the right has not wholly lost its force in this man. But he holds God's law persistently dethroned from the place of universal supremacy in his soul, to which it is entitled. When he does the formally right thing, he does not do it supremely to please God. When the law of right comes into clear competition with the law of self-will, the man always gives the preference to his own disobedient will. His conduct may be mixed—some good, some bad—but his soul as a moral monad, incapable of an ethical neutrality, is *decisively against duty*. The man is radically depraved.

In proving psychologically that the disposition to evil is a native spring of feelings and volitions, just as truly as the love of applause, the desire of happiness, or the love of the beautiful, it is not necessary, then, to assert that every natural man desires to break every rule of right. All we have to prove is, that every natural man is fully determined to commit some sins—such as his other propensities do not restrain him from—and to neglect some known duties. When an exact naked issue is made between God's holy will and self-will, the latter has the invariable preference.

Our first evidence is an appeal to consciousness. Let the man who is in the state of nature answer honestly the question, whether it is his *present* preference and (by God's grace) *purpose* to act from this time up to every known obligation, especially those due to God, and to forsake now every known sin, and he must say no. He thinks he admires virtue as a whole and in the future. To some of the particular parts of virtue he has, at this time, an inexorable opposition. Observation shows us that while some men are far less wicked than others, every natural man transgresses in some known things deliberately and repeatedly. The only man of whom the writer ever heard who asserted his entire freedom from the dominion of sin was a Col. Higginson, a Boston Socinian, who, in one of Joseph Cook's "*symposia*," declared that he had never in his life slighted a monition of conscience. But this claim to a perfect natural holiness was rather damaged with all men of common sense, when it became known that in the Confederate war he had raised and commanded a regi-

ment of runaway-negroes to invade his fellow-citizens. Thus he ran greedily into the very wickedness which his political gospel, the Declaration of Independence, had charged against George III. One is not surprised to find in such a boaster just that blindness of heart which would prevent his seeing the cruelty and wickedness of arming against his brethren semi-savages and slaves, whose allegiance to their masters was solemnly guaranteed by the very Constitution under which he pretended to act!

Again, if we trace this absolute aversion to duty back in each man's history, we find its appearance coincident in every child with the earliest development of reason and conscience. When first the child's mind comes to know duty rationally, he knows it but to hate it, at least in some of its forms. All sensible persons who rear children discover that their sin is in part always a development from within, and not a mere habit learned from imitation, or propagated by bad treatment and unwholesome outward influences. So true is this that the average child, left to its own expansion without any moral nurture or restraint, would be so much worse than the average child reared under a faulty and evil discipline, that average men would regard him as a monster. We view the evil of the nature of little children under an illusion. We call them "little innocent babes." Because their bodily and mental powers of executing their impulses are so weak, we think of them as harmless. The animal beauty of their bodies seduces our judgments. But let this picture be considered. Let us take the moral traits of an ordinary infant, his petulance, his unreasoning selfishness, his inordinate self-will, his vengefulness, his complete indifference, whenever any whim of his own is to be gratified, to the convenience or fatigue and distress of his loving mother or nurse, his entire insubordination to all force but corporeal, his bondage to bodily appetite, his uncalculating cruelty. Suppose him, instead of appealing to your pity by his helplessness, embodying precisely these qualities in the frame of a robust adult, we should have a wretch from whom his own mother would flee in terror. Does one say that these dispositions, which would be hateful sins in an adult, are no sins at all in the infant, because he has as yet no intelligence to know they are

wrong? We reply with this question: If this child were left absolutely free from all external restraints, *when his intelligence came to him, would he therefor forsake these dispositions?* Experience tells us he would not. But fortunately for society, while his native evil is at its greatest, his faculties of execution are at their weakest. Thereby Providence subjects him from the outset to an ever-present *apparatus* of restraints and discipline which, by the time his powers of mischief are grown, have curbed his native depravity within bounds tolerable to society.

Now, how can the existence of any native principle of feeling be better proved than by the fact that some degrees of it are found in every man; that it appears from the first in each, and that it develops along with the growth of his faculties? Is there any other or stronger proof by which psychologists show that the æsthetic sensibility, sympathy, resentment, love, are native to man?

One more fact remains: that this aversion to duty and love of sinful self-will operates with determining energy, and against all possible inducements. This dominancy of the feeling exhibits itself especially, in many cases, in resisting and conquering inducements which, rationally, ought to be irresistible. For instance, the love of life is usually supreme. Here is a man who is indulging a sensual sin to the injury and destruction of life itself. He is clearly forewarned; but he does not stop. In another man avarice, in another inordinate ambition, is his dearest permanent appetency. The one has wealth, the other fame and power, within his reach. But each is falling under the power of drunkenness, which is known to be destructive to fortune and to reputation. But this fact does not arrest the course of indulgence; the able, energetic man finally sacrifices his own dearer desire to the low and sensual vice. Or if we take the general view of this matter, it can be made clear to any understanding that, on the whole, a course of temperance, prudence, and virtue will be best for every man's own happiness. In the final outcome any and every sin must subtract from man's highest good. Indeed, this conclusion is the testimony of every man's conscience. Let men be urged, then, to make this true self-interest their uniform guide; to eschew all evil, and perform all duty. In each man the appe-

tency to sin will assert itself still, against the man's own highest interest and most reasonable self-love.

But it is when we observe man's uniform neglect of the duties of godliness this rebellion of sinful self-will becomes most marked. Here the inducements to repentance are literally immense, including all the worth of heaven and dreadfulness of hell. When the problem is urged, "What shall it profit a man to gain the whole world, and lose his own soul?" the judgment of every man's understanding is, of course, absolutely clear against the exchange. Or, if the sinner pleads, "I do not *decide* this horrible exchange; I only *postpone* the right decision in favor of God, and my soul, and heaven;" when we show him the unutterable rashness of this delay, and show that he is staking an eternity of blessedness, on a very perilous chance, against a worthless bauble of self-indulgence, his understanding is equally clear against his own proceeding. But none the less does he proceed in the paths of ungodliness.

Now, in mechanics we measure a force by the resistance it uniformly overcomes. And so it is correct to measure the energy of this appetency for transgression by the rational and moral obstacles which it overcomes.

Here, then, is a fundamental dislocation in man's soul. In his appetencies, man's subjective spontaneity finds its expression. They inspire the will; they regulate from within the whole free agency. In them centres man's activity. But on the other hand, conscience claims to be the rightful and rational ruler of mankind. It utters its commands with an intuitive authority; it is as impossible for one to doubt whether conscience, duly enlightened, is *entitled* to be obeyed, as to doubt his own existence or identity. We have, then, this situation in each natural soul: *the supreme faculty of the reason at war with the fundamental appetency of the free agency*. And this fatal collision presents itself on the most important of all the soul's concerns—duty; that on which the soul's destiny consciously turns. There has been, then, a catastrophe in human nature! Just as clearly as "there was war in heaven when Satan and his angels fought with Michael and his angels," there is a strife going on in the firmament of man's

spirit. We see no such dislocation in the natural laws of either man, or animal, or inorganic nature, in any other instance. In man's other faculties there is entire consilience. Perception, memory, suggestion, imagination, reasoning, all work together in substantial harmony. The laws of material nature concur. Or else, if we perceive in sentient beings any disorder similar to the one we have displayed in man's soul, we at once say, "There is disease." Is there not, then, a moral disease infecting the soul? It cannot be disputed.

When and how was this disease contracted? How can it be effectually remedied? To these momentous questions, philosophy has no answer. If we attempt to solve the second by saying, "Self-discipline can and must subdue the propensity to sin," philosophy herself meets us with this fatal difficulty: Whence is the effectual motive to that subjugation of the ungodly self-will to arise, within man himself? The dominant appetency has already pronounced, always pronounces, in favor of self-will and against conscience! Kant has seen, and stated with transparent clearness, this insuperable point. The soul is free agent, wherever it is responsible. True. Its action is self-determined? True. But unless the soul is an anomaly, a monstrosity in nature, an agent acting by no law whatever, it must contain some regulative law of its own determinations. If we violate its freedom by supposing an external objective law, then, at least, we have to suppose a subjective law regulative of its actions. What can that subjective law be but disposition—*habitus*? But as to this issue of an ungodly self-will against duty, we find *there* the regulative, ultimate propension, and *it is fundamentally against this subjugation of self-will*. This decision is native. Now, how can nature reverse nature? How can the first cause reverse its own law of effects? Can the fountain naturally propel its own stream against its own level?

The remedy for this spiritual disease, then, must begin, if it ever begins at all, in a supernatural source. So saith Scripture. John i. 13; iii. 5.

R. L. DABNEY.