

# The Practical Philosophy

BEING

THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE FEELINGS,  
OF THE WILL, AND OF THE CON-  
SCIENCE, WITH THE ASCER-  
TAINMENT OF PARTICU-  
LAR RIGHTS AND  
DUTIES.

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*A categorical dogmatic polemic*

BY

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## PUBLISHER'S PREFACE.

The revered author of this volume possesses at least three qualifications which eminently fit him as a teacher in psychology; and the want of either of which would have rendered impossible the production of a work of such rare accuracy, thoroughness and power. They are his gift of generalization and analysis; his broad and accurate scholarship; and the holding of his great intellect, in all his scientific investigations and reasoning, in loving, loyal and child-like subjection to the revealed World.

Add then to his native endowments the thorough training he received in the log school-house in Virginia, at Hampden Sidney College and the University of Virginia, and the additional knowledge and training acquired by his investigations while teaching Philosophy when temporary president of Hampden Sidney College, and for thirty years in Union Theological Seminary, Va., in connection with the History of Doctrine and Philosophy; and all his powers true to the Bible as his pole-star—and we have in this, “the crowning work of his literary life,” the splendid product of his matured powers and genius; a work of accurate and thorough analysis; of unsurpassed ability; one that caters not for notoriety in the realm of doubt, but teaches the truth in modest, unassuming simplicity, Christian honesty and convincing logic. It is a safe book.

THE PUBLISHER.



## PREFACE.

### The Practical Philosophy, What?

To conceive the topics and the character of the following discussions the reader must take their title, Practical, in the original and classical sense, as the *πρακτικόν* of historical philosophy. In the common language of the populace the word carries a wholly different meaning, and the practical man there is supposed to be one who applies his experience and common sense successfully to business actions. He is set in opposition to all theorists and psychologists with all the speculative processes of thought. This derivative meaning must be wholly discarded here. The Practical Philosophy is that which treats of the executive or conative, and the moral powers of the human spirit. This is indeed the same department treated by Drs. Reid and Stewart under the title of the Philosophy of the Active Powers, as distinguished from the Philosophy of the Intellectual Powers. It may be asked, then, why I have not adopted that description, already familiar in the Scottish philosophy. The answer is, Because I dislike the intimation, thus given, that the intellectual are not also active functions of the soul. I would jealously resist even the seeming of such a concession. Upon that shallow and one-sided theory of the mind which describes it as originally a *tabula rasa*, endowed only with the passive powers of receptivity and reflection, it was natural to conceive of all the processes of intellect as passive. In them, all the mind was supposed to experience was simply what it was made to experience by objective causes acting upon it, either directly or remotely. The nomenclature which resulted from this erroneous psychology had so established itself in the English language that it

was not unnatural that the earlier Scotch philosophers should yield to it. But it is high time this was changed.

#### Thought Also Active.

I hold that man's spirit is as active in its thoughts as in its desires and volitions. These thoughts are as truly the forth-putting of its subjective and innate powers of intellection as its volitions and desires are the forth-putting of its innate and subjective disposition. The two kinds of activities are, indeed, essentially different, as consciousness shows; but they are both active. Hence we need another word to describe that characteristic and all-important class of functions, feelings and volitions which stand in conscious contrast over against our functions of cognition, and which are the special objects of the judgments and the sentiments of conscience. To express just this great class the word *practical* was, for centuries, appropriated by Philosophy. So well defined was the usage that the kindred science of Theology conformed to it, and termed its discussion of feelings, volitions, duties and rights from the religious point of view Practical Theology. Kant recognized the established phraseology in naming his discussion of these powers of the soul "A Critique of the Practical Reason." I wish to render to Philosophy the service of restoring this needed and time-honored term in its proper sense.

#### Some Feelings Passive.

There is another reason for discarding Dr. Reid's phrase. I shall show that a large and important class of man's feelings are not active, but passive; viz., his immediate sensibilities. One of the prime efforts made in the following discussions is to establish an all-important distinction between the feelings of passivity and those of activity.

My reason for bestowing so much attention in the first book upon the psychology of the feelings is, that in some of the works usually found in the hands of American students that topic is wholly omitted, or, at most, it is treated with repre-

hensible brevity; and in none of them does it receive thoroughly correct explanation.

**The Psychology of the Feelings All-Important to Ethics.**

This has been the neglected section of Psychology; but its complete analysis and correct understanding are essential to the endlessly debated subject of free-agency, and thus of all ethics. The intelligent reader will see the natural and logical progression which leads him from the psychology of the feelings to the theory of volitions, then to the settlement of the ethical theory, and then to applied ethics. The last field (Book Fourth) might be endlessly extended; but I have only attempted to give the student specimens of the application of the correct ethical principles to some questions of duty and right. In the selection of these I have been guided by their importance, their timeliness and their need of direct discussion.

R. L. DABNEY.

# PSYCHOLOGY OF THE FEELINGS.

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## CHAPTER I.

### THE FEELINGS DEFINED.

#### I. Value of Feelings.

##### Cognitions Classified.

Hitherto, young gentlemen, our first class in philosophy has been occupied with inquiries into the intellect exclusively; the set of faculties by which the human soul has cognitions; more plainly, the knowing faculties. These we explored with an approximate completeness, under the heads of the presentative faculties (consciousness and sense-perception); the representative (suggestion, memory and imagination); the elaborative (judgment, generalization and reasoning); and the regulative (the *a priori*, necessary and immediate cognitions, notions and judgments of the reason). We reached the conclusion that we have thus found the source and methods of all the ideas, all the abstract or *a priori* notions, and all the judgments which the mind validly forms. The territory of human cognitions is thus fully mapped out, at least in outline, and the boundaries and relations of the several parts shown.

##### Feelings Defined, Importance of Their Study Argued.

But this same consciousness, in the field of which we found all these facts of cognition, reveals to our slightest glance that there is another great class of the functions of the human spirit, connected always with, yet differing most obviously from, mere cognitions—the Feelings. The best definition of the feelings and of their difference from bare cognitions is that given you immediately in your own conscious-

ness. Admiration, disgust, desire necessarily wait on ideas of objects. But these feelings as consciously differ from the mere acts of intellection as the warmth of the solar ray differs from its brightness. "Feeling is the temperature of thought." The powers of feeling do not constitute the least important department of the human spirit, nor the least noble. The lectures of Sir William Hamilton close with brief, and those of Dr. Porter with no discussion of them—a reprehensible omission. Writers seem to think that the whole glory of mental science is in its intellectual discriminations. Here, it is supposed, is the acumen, the glory of mental talent. But I remind you that acumen is no less necessary in the analysis of the feelings than in that of the logical steps of the mind. I assert, on the contrary, that the psychology of these functions of the mind is more noble than, and as important as, that of the cognitions. For, (A), the conative emotions constitute the energetic and the operative part of motives to volitions. Thus, in a scientific point of view, they are most decisive of the moral character and desert of the person. (B), The morality of acts turns wholly on the moral quality of subjective motive, but in the latter it is the emotive which is the active element, and, therefore, the ethical one. Hence the analysis which eliminates the ultimate elements of complex feelings, and presents to view their essential ethical or non-ethical character, is far more important to the moral guidance of the mind than any psychology of the mere intelligence. It is chiefly feelings (not the cognitions) which qualify the man as praise- or blameworthy. (C), Hence nobleness and greatness of emotion are higher functions of the soul than vigor of mere cognition. These, and not the functions of mere mental perspicacity, are what mark the soul as grand. The serpent was more subtle than any beast. Affection is greater than talent. To be magnanimous in self-sacrifice is nobler than to invent. To be able to feel nobly is better than to think acutely. He that has the greatest heart is the greatest man. And when we remember (D), that the

vigor of cognition itself in every man depends more on the power of incentive energizing the faculty than on the mere strength of the faculty, our argument is complete. Many a man whose mental vision had a native power like that of the eagle has been practically of inert and feeble mind, the luminous ray of his nature being dimmed and quenched by the murky fogs of indolence or vile affection. On the other hand, the noble incentive of generous feeling, energizing the will, has so exercised and whetted the common intelligence that it has grown until it pierces the very heavens of truth. The feelings practically make the man. Intellect is the cold, feeble magnetism which gives the ship its compass to steer by. Feeling is the motive power, throbbing within the vessel and propelling it; without which the ship, in spite of the needle pointing with its subtle intelligence to the pole, rots in the harbor and makes no voyage any whither.

## 2. Apparent Complication and Innumerability of Feelings.

### Difference of Degree.

It may be supposed that an almost insuperable difficulty will beset the psychology of the feelings from their multiplicity and complexity. If we examine the lexicon of any civilized language, we find an almost countless number of terms by which human feelings are named—*e. g.*, in a single subdivision: pleasure, joy, gladness, content, delight, rapture, cheerfulness, etc., etc.; in another: wish, desire, lust, craving, covetousness, hope, expectation, assurance, etc., etc.; in another: uneasiness, apprehension, fear, panic, terror, alarm, etc., etc. But the faculties of cognition are few, distinguishable and easily enumerated. Hence the inference that there can be no psychology of the feelings, no true science of them; that this department of the functions of the human spirit must remain the cloudland, reducible to no scientific laws and method.

## Simplification Practicable.

But I reply: If the feelings are of such practical importance in the working of human souls, and yet so diversified and complicated, there is all the more necessity to find some analysis by which they may be reduced to an intelligible method. I hold that the intelligent effort to do so will be rewarded with success. We shall find that, as in the intellect, so in the human heart, the elements of feeling are few. The diversified appearances are only differences in degree and combinations of these elements. Science can bring order out of this seeming confusion. The most precious result will be that the right emotions will be safely discriminated from the wrong, as we ascertain the elements that color them and the line where normal affection passes into the abnormal.

## 1. By Differences of Degree.

One simplification of the multiplex subject of the feelings is at once effected by noticing that they differ in degree, and that many of the names of feelings belong to the same essential affection of soul, only marking the degrees; thus, apprehension, fear, terror, are but three grades of the same affection, calmer or more intense. So cheerfulness, joy, rapture, transport. The word "passions" is often used in speech, and even defined in scientific books, as properly meaning feelings in their highest intensity. Thus displeasure would be called a feeling, but the rage of anger "passion," while both are but different degrees of the one feeling of resentment. But we shall see that this use of the word "passion" does not correspond with its etymology. Another very important remark to be made concerning the degrees of feeling is, that the calmer degrees, although true feelings, are often mistaken and spoken of as if they were only functions of rational judgment. The calmest are still feelings, not judgments. The man under the influence of calm emotion (caution, for instance) is said to be acting "rationally," while the man under the influence of an intense degree of the same feeling of fear is said to be

acting "passionately." This is all false analysis, and it greatly perverts our understanding of the functions and value of the feelings of the human soul. We must learn to separate from our conception of the essence of the feelings the supposed traits of urgency, intensity, agitation. These necessarily characterize only the higher degrees of the feelings. Feeling may be feeling and yet be calm and even. "Feeling is the temperature of thought." Well, the temperature of a beam of light may vary in intensity from the faint, almost imperceptible warmth of a ray of wintry sunlight to the fierce, burning heat of the midsummer beam condensed by a lens. Yet both are caloric, not mere light. Heat is usually thought of as imbuing fiery and molten masses. Yet the physicist convinces us that there is a smaller degree of caloric even in a block of ice, for it can be so made to radiate from that ice as to affect a thermometer.

#### The Proof.

That these calm states of soul are truly feelings may be proved thus: There is and can be no motive, and so no action, without feeling. No object can be an objective inducement to action except as the soul takes it into the category of the real and the good. But what is the good except the desirable? Thus it appears that the calmest rational motive must include desire.

#### Feelings Continuous in the Soul.

Hence we learn our mistake in supposing that feeling is intermittent in the soul's functions, while cognition is supposed to be constant. We erroneously think of feelings as states of soul that ebb totally or flow, while thoughts abide. This is a mistake. Feeling is as perpetual in its calmer degrees as thoughts in all the conscious conditions of our souls; it is only its intensity which ebbs and flows. In fact, were feeling really and wholly to desert a human soul for a time, that soul would be as truly frozen into fatuity as water into ice by the departure of the caloric. Suppose a man



walking along the street under the influence of some purpose wholly deserted by feeling. He would not take another step, for thought is not purpose, except as it involves desire. The sight of the crown in the goal makes the racer rush forward to it. Would the sight of a clod there make him do so? What is the practical difference between the two objects? Both are equally cognized by sense-perception. Desire cleaves to the idea of the crown, and not of the clod. No feeling, no action. If a man for one moment lost all feeling, his attention could not possibly direct itself to any object of thought; for the motive to energize attention would be totally lacking, and thus conscious thought would die away out of the soul after the death of feeling; man would be reduced to both apathy and idiocy. Let us learn then from these just views how universal and essential are the functions of feeling to the very life of the soul, and how much more valuable to human existence and action are those calm and equable grades of feeling I have pointed out than the rare accesses of intensity to which the name of feeling is usually applied.

### 3. Original and Derivative Feelings.

#### Associational Analysis.

The next step towards simplifying the multifarious subject of the human feelings is to inquire which of them are original, distinct and immediate in the human soul, and which are derived from these original ones by modifications and combinations. A moment's reflection will show us that this inquiry cannot be successfully pursued except by the help of a correct classification of all the feelings. This analysis and classification must go together, in order to lead to clear results.

**Hartley's Reduction of All to Pain and Pleasure is Incorrect.**

But there is one answer to the question, Which are the truly original feelings of human nature? that is so extreme and radical in its simplification, that it demands our consideration at the outset. It is that of Hartley, and the associational

psychologists, followed by the Mills and even the witty Sidney Smith. The leaning of this school, as we have seen, is to attempt to account for all the faculties and capacities of the soul by taking the fewest original elements and combining them by the action of the faculty of the association of ideas. Thus we saw in our study of intellectual science they attempt to construct memory, imagination, reasoning and primitive judgments themselves, such as our belief in causation, out of mere association of ideas derived from sense-perception. So Hartley and his followers say: Give us two passive elements, the susceptibility to pain and pleasure, and we need nothing else beside the action of the association of ideas to generate all the wonders of feeling and desire. Take, for instance, fear; the ignorant child has no fear of a given object at first; *e. g.*, the infant does not fear to grasp the flame, but craves it. He does not fear the shining adder, but laughs as he handles it. Fear, therefore, is not an original feeling. But when once the child has felt the pain inflicted by the burning candle, association has only to put the idea of that flame in juxtaposition to the idea of the pain first felt, and this gives him the uneasiness we call fear. So the feeling of sympathy is supposed to be only a suggestion of our former grief or pain by the sight of another's grief. No other original capacity of soul, say they, need be assumed than the associative faculty, together with the susceptibility in ourselves to pleasure or pain. So they endeavor to resolve the most disinterested personal affections, as the son's love for his mother, into association. He first knew her as the instrument of his own pleasures, the source from which he drew the food that gave him the animal pleasure of satisfied hunger, the bringer of toys, candies, raiment, the tender succorer of his pains. Association gradually connected her person with these remembered selfish pleasures, until her person and image became pleasant simply because of the remembered pleasure connected with her presence. This is filial love! If we ask them, How comes this love, purely selfish and even

sensuous in its genesis, to take on the disinterested form, and to work that generous gratitude which seeks to confer instead of exacting happiness? they answer: Oh, this is one of those transmutations which the associational faculty often works by gradually dropping out the middle link of the chain and uniting the extremes by force of familiar and repeated occurrence of the suggestions. The idea of the pleasure remains, connected with the kind mother's image, after the mind of the child has ceased to bethink itself of the mediate fact, that it was his selfish pleasure of which she had been the regular instrument.

This worthless analysis derives its plausibility from the success with which it resolves the feeling of fear into pains of the past, associated with the idea of the object which was their source. Here the analysis is approximately just.

**Its Defects—Pains and Pleasures Not One, but Many.**

But (A), the apparent success of the other analysis is due partly to the trick of wrapping up under the two general terms, capacity for pleasures or pain, a number of capacities equally original. Are our natural pleasures all one? are our natural pains all one? or many? All of them are not animal; but some are animal and some mental. Is the smart of the blow from the rod, quivering in the animal nerves of the gross and selfish child the same with the pain of conscience awakened in the spirit of the ingenuous boy by the tears of the mother, who, while she disapproves, is too loving to smite? Can the one pain be analyzed into the other by this jugglery of associations? No. So that we find this Hartleian analysis begs the question in the outset, by confounding under the common name of pain and pleasure, functions of feeling widely distinct and equally original.

**Association Colligates, Does Not Transmute.**

Again, (B), the theory perverts the essential nature and law of the associative faculty. The sole power of that faculty

is to connect, and by connecting, enable the soul to reproduce mental states present in consciousness before. But this theory represents the associative faculty as transmuting previous mental states into new ones essentially distinct and even opposite. The only feelings which mere association would connect with the image of the mother as the known instrument of experienced animal pleasures, would be feelings terminating on self. But the very essence of filial love, that deserves the name, is a disinterested delight and gratitude, that goes wholly out of self to bless the dear mother in whom it delights.

Again, how do we get, by such a genesis, an ethical affection for this mother, which rises far beyond the memory of the animal pleasures she has brought us, to ground itself in moral judgments of the nobleness and virtue of her self-sacrifice for our advantage? Why do regards generated by these groveling associations rise any higher than those the child feels for the kindly cow which relieved his hunger even more fully than the mother's breasts; or the jolly toy, which gave him as many gay moments as the mother's caresses? There are loves, again, which go out, not towards the source of our joys, but of our griefs; loves which attach to the child, whose faults and cruelties only pierce the loving heart with pangs of anguish. Some other analysis than this of selfish associations must be found to account for such love.

#### Sympathy Not Mere Association.

The corresponding analysis of the instinctive affection of sympathy has also these effects. Before we could sympathize with a given kind of grief exhibited to us, it would be necessary, on this theory, that we should also have felt the grief ourselves. This is not true to fact. The happy child sympathizes with the grief of a parent which it witnesses, but is wholly unable to comprehend or imagine, because its little experiences have never included that form of sorrow. Yet it sympathizes, and all the more tenderly and quickly because it

is unhackneyed of grief. The explanation is, moreover, clearly untrue to our consciousness. When I witness and sympathize with the grief of my fellow, my thought does not first, nor necessarily, run back to my own former suffering of a similar type of sorrow. The truer and purer my sympathy the more complete my self-forgetfulness. When the tender nurse stands by your pillow and strives to soothe the agony of your aching head, it is not necessary that she shall have thought of her own agony under the same disease. She may never have felt it. She may be so generous in her self-forgetfulness as not to bethink herself at all of it, but to think only of your pain and the prompt desire to relieve it. This suggests the crowning refutation of this solution. On the consciousness of the sympathetic grief there always waits, as an essential part of the affection, the immediate and disinterested desire to succor the sufferer. No association of the memory of the selfish desire of relief you felt in your hour of pain can account for this impulse. For the impulse to succor is disinterested; it leads directly out of yourself. Your remembered desire of relief was self-interested and personal, pointing to self exclusively.

When we thus reject this analysis into mere results of association we do not mean to deny the extensive concern which our suggestive faculty has with our affections. It concurs with the original springs of feeling in manifold and marvelous ways, as we shall see; but co-operation requires the previous and independent existence of the power to be co-operated with.

#### 4. Distinction Between Sensibilities (Passive Feelings) and Desires or Appetencies (Active Feelings).

The reduction of our feelings to their elements, then, cannot be so easily effected as this plausible jugglery of association would represent. Far deeper inquiry must take place before the secrets of the human heart are explored and numbered. I attempt this more thorough work by stating

and establishing a series of propositions and of distinctions, and providing as I proceed a simple nomenclature for the different classes of feelings; and,

(1), At the beginning of the analysis of feelings I insist again on the all-important distinction, so commonly omitted in our books, between feelings of sensibility and feelings of conation.

#### Our Nomenclature Fixed.

Let the word *feelings* stand as the universal term, including all forms of sensibility and of desire and of emotion. Let the word *sensibility* stand for our passive feelings, in which the soul is simply subject and not agent. Let the word *desires* or *appetencies* stand for those opposite feelings in which the soul acts from within outwards, by the outflow of its own spontaneity. It will be understood that we include under the term *appetencies* those repulsions which are really the counterparts of appetencies, and yet are equally with them the outgoings of the subjective spontaneity.

#### The Great Distinction Proved by Consciousness and Experience— Instances.

Now, it is true that sensibilities (passive) and appetencies (active) are often intimately conjoined. It is also very true that the sensibilities, when impressed from without, are the occasions, even the conditions, *sine qua non*, for the rise and outflow of the active and subjective appetencies. But, none the less, is the distinction fundamental and all-important. For fidelity to consciousness requires and justifies it. When I am impressed from without through a sensibility or passive capacity of feeling, I am conscious that so far I am only subject and not spontaneous agent. I do not emit action of soul; I am acted on. The causation is from without, not from within. I have no more free agency, either in the form of appetency or volition about the result, than the iron has for being struck by the hammer. But when I harbor appetency, though not matured into volition, I am conscious

that now the ego is acting, the exercise is spontaneous (in that sense voluntary, though not voluntary in the other and ambiguous sense of being a result of volition). The desire (or repulsion) tends to act from within outwardly, from the ego on an object. The emotion is in its tendency transitive and its exact expression is an active verb. Thus an aggressor does me a sudden corporeal injury. The first result is pain. This is a feeling of susceptibility. The aggressor impresses it upon me from without; I am passive in it; I experience it, but I do not act it. Let this pain now be followed by the desire to retaliate. It is very true that the pain is the occasion and condition of this appetency, but the desire to retaliate is now contrasted with it in its source. It is subjective, it tends from within the ego outward on him who was before aggressor. I am spontaneous in the appetency instead of passive. So inspection of consciousness will tell you that the feeling of wonder is a sensibility, passive and involuntary. The appetency of curiosity, or the desire to have the astonishing facts explained, to comprehend them, is subjective and spontaneous. So sympathy is a sensibility; the answering impulse to succor connected with it is an active and subjective appetency. So sensibility to pain and pleasure are passive feelings. Desire of one's own well-being is an active appetency related thereto. So in the appetites called corporeal the sense of privation is a passive sensibility. The desire of indulgence is clearly distinguishable, and is an active appetency; distinguishable, for let hunger be felt, and let one convince you as you are about to project yourself on the savory food before you that eating at this time will cause you violent pain, though hunger remains, appetency to eat is gone, abolished by stronger feelings of fear and love of life. Take a second instance: Here is a loving mother violently struck by her own child. There is the sensibility of pain and also of inward grief. But there is no appetency to retaliate because her heart is imbued with a tender forgiveness which entirely quenches that desire. Or, here is a friend who ex-

periences acute pain from the unintentional act of his friend. Here is the sensibility in its acutest degree, but there is not a trace of the appetency to retaliate, because the total lack of intention in the friend's act forbids the rise of this desire in a just mind. I claim that such instances give me a perfect demonstration of my doctrine; the sensibility and the appetency, however entwined, are distinct functions of soul. The proof is that the one may exist while the other is totally absent.

**Illustrated by the Compressed Spring.**

How many psychologists allow themselves to be deluded by the intermixture and the nearness of the relation between the appetency and the sensibility that conditions its rise! This deception is that of the child who should look at a man compressing and then releasing a coiled metallic spring. What the child thinks he sees is this: that when the man presses his hand downward the spring sinks, and when the man lifts his hand again the spring rises. To the child, ignorant of the intrinsic elasticity of the metal, it appears as though the man's hand both depressed the spring and raised it up. The upward motion is so instantaneous, that the child is tempted to suspect some attachment between the top of the spring and the man's hand, by which he is enabled to lift it. But this is all delusion. While the downward pressure of the man's hand was the true cause of the sinking of the spring, the upward motion of the man's hand was not the cause of the rise of the spring. There was in fact no attachment of the metal to the man's palm; the spring instantaneously raised itself as the pressure was removed. The whole cause of the second motion was within itself—viz., its own elasticity; and yet it remains true that this elasticity would not have exerted itself except on the condition that the man should first compress it.

**Other Instances of Distinction.**

Let these additional instances be analyzed in the same manner. Shame is a passive sensibility; desire of applause



an active appetency; pleasure is a sensibility; gratitude the appetency seeking to reciprocate the benefaction. The conscious delight which love feels in its object is a sensibility; the desire to bless that object with our benefactions is a subjective appetency. The noblest of all the sensibilities are the æsthetic, and, above all, the moral. These have their answering subjective appetencies. The sense of beauty is passive, excited from without. The desire for the beautiful is active, moving from within towards its object. The sentiments of moral approbation and disapprobation, the highest of all, are evidently (though supremely rational) sensibilities arising, in the virtuous soul immediately and involuntarily, upon the apprehension in the reason of the virtuous agent and his act. The hatred of sin and the hungering and thirsting after righteousness are appetencies active and subjective; and they are the crowning, the all-regulating ones, the noblest of all.

**The Distinction Vital in the Doctrine of Free-Agency.**

This distinction between the functions of sensibility and the related yet contrasted functions of appetency is fundamental to our conscious free-agency. Unquestionably motives prompt or cause our volitions. Appetencies are the essential element of motive. If, then, we view our feelings as all mere sensibilities, in being affected with which our minds are passive, our free-agency is lost; our souls, instead of being free, are a species of unfortunate, sentient puppets, moved without spontaneity of our own. Thus, if my volition to strike back at my aggressor is the effect of my resentment; if my resentment is the passive effect of the pain; if the pain is the necessitated and physical effect of the aggressor's blow, then when he struck me first without my knowledge or consent, he compelled my striking him back, as surely as the material link at the first end of the chain drags the other links at the hinder end. This is the vicious analysis by which the fatalists of the Sensualistic school (Hobbes to Mill) always seek to argue

away my free-agency. But now, I know that in the feeling of a mere sensibility I am passive and possess no spontaneity; yet I intuitively know by consciousness that in my subjective motive and volition I am self-active and free. How are these two convictions to be reconciled? Only by drawing the proper line between the sensibilities and appetencies, and by claiming for the latter, notwithstanding their sequence on the former, a contrasted source and nature, as occasioned indeed by some impression stimulating the passive susceptibilities, but caused wholly from within, proceeding from the ego outward, and springing from the soul's own spontaneity.

### 5. Conditions of the Rise of Feelings.

(A), Cognition in Order to Feeling; (B), Native Disposition.

The next fundamental point to be established is to ascertain the conditions under which feeling arises in the soul. And (1), it is obvious that one condition is the presence, in thought at least, of some idea or judgment to be the object of the feeling. He who feels about something must at least think he has something to feel about. One never has feeling about nothing. It is equally obvious that it is some cognition—some idea or concept presented either by virtue of perception, or else of memory or association, or some judgment pronounced by the intellect, which sets that object before the soul; *e. g.*, is it injury which causes the feeling of anger? Then the anger can not arise unless there is either sense-perception or recollection of the injury. The child is the object of maternal love; that affection can only be felt consciously in the mother's soul, as the child is either seen or thought of in her mind. Hence the maxim, that the soul only feels as its intelligence sees; cognition is in order to feeling.

Subjective Disposition Also Essential.

(2), The other condition is, if possible, more important, though perhaps not so obvious. There must be, *a priori* in the soul, a given subjective disposition as to given objects, in

order to feeling. This is true of both classes of feelings, the sensibilities and the desires or appetencies. As the rise of a bodily pain from a wound or blow is conditioned on the presence in the flesh of living nerve-fibres, so the presence in the soul of a given innate susceptibility is the condition previous to the excitement of any given sensibility by its object. The blow does not put the nerve-fibres into the flesh, but finds them there. So the presence of the object of sensibility before the thought has not created the susceptibility or sentiency of soul, but it finds it there. A parallel fact is equally true of the appetencies or subjective active desires and repulsions. The soul must have been qualified naturally by a certain disposition or tendency or inclination, towards or against given objects seen by the intellect, in order for these to become the objects of appetency. Thus the racer did not, could not, emit desire, stimulating his running towards a clod set before his eyes at the goal. He did exercise desire towards the golden crown exhibited there. Why? Did the metal or the clod effectuate this difference? That is absurd; they are dead inert matter, the objects, not the agents, of desire or indifference. It is the subjective, *a priori* disposition of the racer's soul, which, as taught by his cognitions, determined the crown to be and the clod not to be an object of desire. This only needs to be stated in order to be seen to be true.

Corollary.

But from this it follows, that if a given disposition is native to the soul, no object indifferent or alien by nature to that disposition can have any agency whatever to change or reverse it. This is established by the sort of reasoning that makes us infer that if the horse pulls the cart, the cart can not be made to pull the horse. The disposition has decreed *a priori*, whether a given object can or shall be inducement to it; ergo, an alien or indifferent object for which disposition has not pronounced cannot influence it to act contrary to itself. When we have ascertained a native disposition, we

have, therefore, gotten an ultimate fact, regulative (not compulsory) of human spontaneity. Here our analysis must stop.

**Illustration from the Palate—Equally True of the Spiritual Tastes.**

As this point is so fundamental, let us test and further establish it in a few instances. The healthy child has an appetite for sweets, an aversion to bitter and nauseous drugs and an indifference to substances entirely insipid. Thus we popularly say: The sweetmeats attract the child, the drugs repel him, the insipid substances are neutral to him. What has determined these three results? The obvious answer is, a native or instinctive condition of the gustatory nerves in the child's mouth, which condition existed there before he tasted either substance. What would common sense decide concerning an attempt to reverse this state of the gustatory nerves, which decided the child's preference for the sweetmeats, by plying those nerves with the drugs? Everyone sees it is preposterous. The more the drugs are plied, in quantity and intensity, the more will the child's aversion be stimulated instead of being converted into appetency. This result will be sure, at least until all sensation is dulled by over-stimulation. One may object that this instance is taken from an animal propensity. Let us select another then from a rational disposition of the spirit. I make this proposal to a youth: Embark with me in a line of effort which shall prove long and arduous, but which shall be rewarded by the contempt of all your fellow-citizens. Will my proposition be suasive to him? No; he will regard it as idiotic. But if my proposal is that this labor shall win for him the applause of the virtuous, he will think it reasonable to consider it. What has determined these results? The native disposition of the spirit which decides contempt to be repulsive and applause attractive. The disposition exists in the soul *a priori* to the applause or reproach. To ply this soul with reproaches would be a preposterous means for reversing the disposition. Indeed, no objective inducement can either reverse or extinguish it.

But both the child and the youth are entirely free in both their appetencies and their aversions.

**Feelings, When Intense, Produce Effects—Their Restraint Reacts to Check Feelings.**

Given, then, these two conditions, relevant cognition and *a priori* disposition or susceptibility, feeling imbues the soul. In its higher degrees feeling is known in consciousness as excitement or even agitation of soul. In these grades of energy feeling naturally manifests itself externally in organic excitements or changes of the body—fear in pallor and trembling; anger in flushed face and tension of muscles; joy in smiles and laughter; grief in sighs and tears, sometimes in actual nausea; passionate desire in pantings, etc., etc. Some have been so incautious as to account these corporeal effects as parts of the feelings. To the psychologist they are not parts of the feelings of the soul, but only consequences and visible symbols. They give us the most remarkable instances of the connection between soul and body, which is instituted by the animal incorporation of the rational spirit. This interesting and important connection now manifests itself in another law: that the corporeal expression of feelings intensifies them for a time, whereas the suppression of such corporeal expressions usually results in the subsidence of their intensity. For instance, a person somewhat affected by resentment sometimes talks himself into a rage by expatiating upon his supposed wrong, but he who steadily suppresses the excitement of his voice, the nerves and muscles, speedily finds his anger reduced within the control of reason. There is another law controlling the intensity of the feelings which Quintilian expresses in the Latin apothegm, *Nihil citius lacrimis inarescit*. The very intensity of our feelings abbreviates their duration in the higher degrees. The human spirit seems to show its finitude in this way among others, that it is able to endure its own highest tension of feeling but for a short time. When we combine this law with the previous

one, we see an explanation of a well-known fact, that passionate weeping relieves the intensity of sorrow. It seems to do this by bringing it to its acme, and thus causing it to exhaust itself more quickly. The sorrow which does not weep is less tumultuous, but becomes for that very reason more chronic and inflicts a more permanent injury upon the spirit.

#### 6. The Sensibilities and Appetencies Always Present Themselves in Contrasted Pairs—Why?

From the facts stated above it follows that both kinds of our feelings, the sensibilities and the appetencies, present themselves in pairs, a given feeling and its opposite. One of the conditions of the rise of feelings was, as we saw, a subjective susceptibility or disposition qualifying the soul *a priori* to the view of the object of that feeling in the intellect. Were not the native disposition of man towards the approbation of his fellows, he would not certainly desire that as a good when presented to him in thought. Now the same original disposition which ensures desire of a given object will equally ensure aversion to the opposite object. Take an instance from the bodily appetites: The palate which prefers the sweet will, *ipso facto*, decline the bitter. Or take an instance from the spiritual: The soul which delights in applause will, *ipso facto*, shrink from obloquy. The two results, pleasurable or painful sensibilities, desires or aversions, in each pair of cases do not signify two sensibilities or dispositions, but only one, acting according to its own nature, oppositely towards opposite objects. As in the magnetic compass, it is the same magnetism which causes the pole of the magnet to seek the North Pole and recoil from the South Pole of the earth. This is eminently true of the two moral emotions, approbation of the virtuous and disapprobation of the vicious. The opposite sentiments are the consistent expression of one and the same moral sensibility. Hence we are prepared to expect that all the feelings of both classes will

manifest themselves in pairs. Consider thus pain and pleasure, wonder and ennuï, sublimity and disgust, beauty and ugliness, love and hatred, benevolence and malice, fear and courage, pride and humility, approbation and disapprobation, satisfaction and shame. And the whole list of desires for power, wealth, fame, ease, continued existence, with their counterpart aversions for weakness, poverty, contempt, pain, death or danger. As the shadow follows each man walking in the sunlight, so the opposite negative feeling may accompany each affirmative one, the opposite object being presented. Thus we simplify our analysis and reduce the number of cases to be solved at once by one-half. For each pair of feelings represents only one original principle or active power of susceptibility.

#### 7. Instinctive Nature of Truly Original Appetencies.

There is a truth, as to the instinctive nature of all the truly original appetencies, which should now be noticed; because it shows us the vanity of another class of attempted analyses and simplifications. This theory proposes to account for a multitude of our desires as generated out of our experience of natural good and evil. Having happened by chance, it teaches, upon a certain object several times, and found it painful or pleasurable, we learn by a rational calculation, based on these experiences, to seek that object again for the sake of the pleasure we remember finding in it. That pleasure experienced is supposed to originate or create the desires; and the deliberate calculation of the mode by which we can repeat the pleasure, *plus* the elementary feeling of pleasure, is the desire. This theory, then, would reduce all feelings, except those of simple pain and pleasure, to memory and rational calculation concerning these, instead of instinctive emotions; *i. e.*, they would cease to be distinct feelings and become general judgments, operating on the elemental sensibility. Of course, this analysis, if just, would simplify matters in as sweeping a way as Hartley's. But it is not true

to facts in consciousness. Like Hartley's, it overlooks the fact that pains and pleasures are not one, but many, and that the different kinds are equally original. The susceptibility to a feeling is grounded, as we saw, in a subjective state of sensibility or disposition, which is *a priori* to the object and to the earliest experience of the feeling which that object occasions. The analysis attempts to account for the case by putting a result before its own cause, as an account thereof. I like and desire a sweet fruit, for instance, because whenever I tasted it I experienced pleasure. But how came it that I did experience pleasure every time I tasted it? No such result follows from tasting sawdust! It is because there was in my palate, before the first taste of the fruit, a state or disposition determining me to like it. The native liking must be *a priori* to the pleasure, else there would have been none. The more obvious and popular objection is still more fatal. How is the soul carried to the appetency of that object the first time it seeks it? Not by the experience of the pleasure found in it; as this is the first time, there has as yet been no such experience. This theory breaks down here hopelessly. Surely if the first appetency was an instance of the action of this principle of soul, it must be, in kind, like the other subsequent instances. But the first instance was one of uncalculating, immediate impulse. The subsequent instances must, then, contain the same essential element. We do not here teach that desire receives no reinforcement from rational calculation, after it has acted and gained experience of the pleasure. Doubtless it does receive the increment. But desire does not thus originate. Suppose a psychologist were to answer the question, Why does the new-born infant suck? by saying: "The pleasure found in the sweetness of the milk makes it suck." All would see the folly of that solution. They would ask: "How did the infant find out, before it had sucked, that the milk was sweet?" Instinct first prompts it to the act. So it must be that all our original or elemental appetencies are



spiritual instincts. This light will reflect new honor upon the wisdom and skill of Him who formed human spirits.

**Final Cause Here.**

When we come to study the "final causes" of our feelings, we shall find that the wisdom and the purpose of the Creator have a much larger share, and the wisdom of man a much smaller share, in the framework of the feelings.

## CHAPTER II.

## CLASSIFICATION OF THE FEELINGS.

## 1. Classification of Brown and McCosh.

Before proceeding to a correct classification of the feelings, it will be best to examine one or two other arrangements which have been proposed, so as to gain acquaintance, by their inspection, with the subject. Dr. Thomas Brown, in his elegant discussion of the feelings, divides them into three main divisions: immediate emotions, such as wonder, beauty, the ludicrous, love, hatred, sympathy, pride and humility; retrospective emotions, as anger, gratitude, regret, gladness, remorse; prospective emotions, as desire, fear, hope. The basis of this attempted classification is the supposed relation of the feelings to their objects in time. The first class he then divides into emotions involving moral quality, as love, hate, sympathy; and those involving no moral quality, as wonder, beauty, the ludicrous. Dr. McCosh, attempting to improve on this classification, renders it still more incomplete and irrational. His plan is: I. Affections towards animate objects; (1) retrospective, (2) immediate, (3) prospective. II. Affections directed to inanimate objects—*i. e.*, the æsthetic affections. III. Continuing and complex affections. Under the last he ranks love, which is as simple as any affection we have, whereas, if we attempt in good earnest to make a list of the complex affections, it must needs be a very long and varied list. His is very short, and is guilty, therefore, of a multitude of omissions. It is a false arrangement which takes the complex affections separately. As complex they ought, of course, to be connected with the elemental affections of which they are compounded, not to be put apart in a separate main

division. It is as though the chemist should treat, in a separate book, sulphur as a simple substance, and then, in another book, the sulphates and sulphides.

#### Brown's Defects.

Returning now to Dr. Brown's more ingenious classification, we may well doubt whether the attempt to separate the feelings by their relation in time to the cognition of their objects can be successful or accurate. In one sense all our feelings have a posterior relation to the cognition of their objects; for this cognition is the condition precedent of their rise. When Dr. Brown, for instance, makes love an immediate emotion, and anger a retrospective one, we naturally ask: Has not the new cognition which excites the love preceded it, at least as much as the injury which excites the resentment precedes that feeling? So of others. There is, indeed, a sense in which desire, fear and hope do look forward, as the other emotions do not. But the distinction is unimportant, if real. Further, it is erroneous to divide our emotions as Dr. Brown does into those qualified by moral quality and those not so qualified. In the strict sense, no feelings are essentially moral save those which belong to conscience, the feelings of approbation and disapprobation, desert and ill-desert. But in the wider sense any emotion may become moral or immoral, according as it is conditioned and limited. The æsthetic emotions may be morally indifferent, or they may become criminal. So of any of the others. The same bodily appetite may be innocent or guilty, accordingly as it is conditioned. Love may be morally indifferent, or virtuous, or vicious, according to the quality of the object loved. There is a hatred which is wicked, and there is a hatred which is holy. There are, indeed, some objects of feeling such that the emotions directed towards them are necessarily qualified by some ethical trait, good or bad. If this is what Dr. Brown meant, it is true; but the fact belongs

rather to ethics than to any thorough psychological classification of the feelings.

## 2. Nature of Pleasure and Pain (Plato and Aristotle).

Having cleared the way, we may now approach a more intelligible statement of the feelings which are only elemental. Let me again remind you that we do not give a true classification by ranking them all as pleasures and pains.

Pleasures are not one; nor are pains. We have already learned that pleasure does not generate the affection which it attends by a process of rational calculation of the experience we have had of the feeling and its result. The truth seems to be that either pleasure or pain attends all our sensibilities and appetencies, according as the former are impressed harmoniously or not, and as the latter attain their object or not. Hence these two functions of sensibility are common traits, the one or the other qualifying the action of all the other feelings. The phenomena of sensibility most important to the student are those of pleasure and pain. For these are the integers which make up man's happiness and misery; and these last, in turn, are the objects of men's strongest and most fundamental appetency and aversion. We need not be surprised, then, that pleasure and pain have been subjects of philosophical discussion since the dawn of our science. In one sense, no other description of them is needed, or indeed is possible, except the testimony of each man's consciousness. You will correctly say that you know what pains and pleasures are better than anyone can tell you. Doubtless these are original, simple, fundamental traits of sensibility, belonging to men's *essentia*, and admitting of no analysis. Yet interesting questions remain as to the nature and condition of our pleasures and pains and their relation to other functions of sensibility. I shall mention but two theories.

### Theory of Plato and Kant—Kant's Results.

One is that which Plato ascribes to Socrates. According to it, pleasure is but the negation of pain, the state of relief

following upon the cessation of pain, and delusively supposed by us to be a positive state of enjoyment only by the influence of contrast. According to this theory, no pleasure is anything more than a relief from previous pain. Pain then is positive, pleasure negative. Pain must immediately precede every pleasure; this is the only condition on which any pleasure can be enjoyed. The pungency of the previous pain is the measure of the degree of the pleasure. Kant, among the moderns, has adopted this theory and carried it to its fullest and gloomiest extent. He paints this as the condition of our existence: that every pleasure must be paid for in advance and that by larger pains. The student will easily surmise the species of facts used to support this theory; that after the pain of extreme fatigue, merely sitting down is pleasure; that the wretch who had expected instant death is jubilant simply because he does not die; that the sick man who has received no other boon than the mere cessation of pain calls himself happy. Such instances are plausible, and do at least show that the pain immediately previous seems to enhance the following pleasure by the law of contrast. But other facts are overlooked. There are many cases where, when one's pains end, the next state of sensibility is not a pleasure, but a new pain. The fever succeeds the ague, grief is overpowered by fear, or hatred by terror. Next: there are pleasures which immediately succeed a state of ease or calmer pleasure; as when one is roused out of a pleasant state of reverie into delight by a beloved friend's arrival. Again, it seems strange that Plato and Kant did not bethink themselves whether their hope of a state of future happiness would not be refuted by their theory. If they have described aright the essential nature and conditions of pleasure, it can only arise out of an immediately preceding pain, and hence it would be impossible for heaven to be other than a mixed state, like the one we live in now, where short pleasures follow long fatigues or sufferings. The relation which this theory supposes between our pains and pleasures is that of the shades to the lights, or the background and the fore-

ground in a picture. Now can there be any picture at all if all the shades or backgrounds are left out?

Aristotle's Theory True.

The rival, and, we think, the true theory, is that of Aristotle, adopted and cleared up by Sir William Hamilton. Pleasure is unimpeded, normal activity of any power proper to man; pain is the activity of the same power impeded, or carried beyond the legitimate degree. In explaining and defending this theory, I must remind you that in the nomenclature of Aristotle and Hamilton the term *powers* includes both active and passive powers, both faculties and capacities. That constitution or trait of soul by which man desires and wills is an active power; that one by which he feels an impression on a given sensibility is a passive power—a capacity for the given impression. Their definition of pains and pleasures includes both kinds of powers. Again, we must remember that it is the energizing of these powers according to their nature which characterizes man as a living soul. To energize is to live. To cease all energy would be a suspension of life. It is the potential presence of these powers which most literally constitutes life, and their destruction is death. So the energizing of these powers according to their nature would be the fullness of life. This would be complete pleasure. The impeding or over-tension of these powers is the diminution of life; and this is pain; the partial beginning of death. That this is the true and satisfactory account will appear from the facts of consciousness. It meets the facts advanced above against the Platonic view. It satisfies our consciousness by recognizing pain and pleasure as contrary phenomena (not always contradictory). While it teaches that pleasure is as positive as pain, it accounts for these facts that the same capacity (or sensibility) may be affected with pain in two ways, and with pleasure in one way, under the impression of the same objective agency. Take the visual sensibility. Deficient light is disagreeable to it; adequate light is pleasant to it; an over-

intense light is acutely painful to it. Or if we note the acoustic sensibility, we find silence too long continued is oppressive; tones of moderate force please it; while the same tones raised to great intensity pain it.

**Spiritual Pleasures and Pains Receive the Same Solution.**

From our spiritual powers let us select another instance. If curiosity, or the native appetency to understand, be suppressed, we feel an intellectual pain. If it be gratified by successful thought, proportioned to the mind's powers, we are conscious of a pure pleasure. If we are urged to thought over-arduous and long continued, we feel an intellectual fatigue and distress. These facts exactly answer our theory: the activity of the power up to its normal grade is pleasure, the impeding or over-straining of it is pain. And there is less difference between these causes of pain than appears at first sight. By suppression of action, the power is thrown back upon itself unenergized (hence the pain); and by over-impression the activity of the power is over-dominated, and thus suppressed by excessive force of the objective stimulus.

**3. Pleasure and Pain Are Qualities of All Our Powers, Not Separate Sensibilities.**

According to our doctrine again, all activities of our natural powers should be found to involve some degree of pain or pleasure, though in many of them the sensibility may be calm and quiet. I believe every man's consciousness confirms this. In any normal action of any faculty or capacity we feel at least some gentle pleasure. As the activity begins to pass beyond the bounds of Nature, either by over-intensity or feebleness, a sense of the pain of fatigue begins to be felt, mingled it may be, for a time, with the pleasure of action, but gradually supplanting this, and growing, if the activity is prolonged to excess, into a stronger pain. One may say that there are exceptions to this statement, presented, for instance, in the action of those powers of whose presence we are only

conscious by the pain they cause us. Thus no man has any conscious pleasure from the healthy action of the nerve in his tooth; he never knows of its existence even, until it begins to ache. The anatomist explains this case by showing us that these nerves belong to a class which only make themselves known to the sensory ganglia when they become diseased. Such is the strange fact as to the great nerve-masses of the cerebrum itself. The true theory concurs with what consciousness tells us, that, in reality, the pains are many and different, and that the pleasures also are many and different. The pain of an aching tooth, of an eyeball over-stimulated by extreme light, of a conscience stung by remorse, of an affection bereaved by death, are all true pains, doubtless; but each one is as different from the others as any two feelings are. So the pleasure of pure color, of melodies and harmonies, of fragrant odors, of intellectual activities, of the instinctive benevolent affections, of an approving conscience, are all pleasures; but each differs consciously from the others. We should cease then, to speak of pain and pleasure as single. We form each group into a class, only because all of the one have the common feature that they promote satisfaction; and all of the others, that they suppress or impede it. Our pains and pleasures consequently are not to be classed along with the other native sensibilities as divisions distinct from and co-ordinate with them. They are to be viewed rather as traits qualifying each distinct action of sensibility and of faculty. We can not say that the eye has three distinct co-ordinate sensibilities—a sensibility to light, a co-ordinate sensibility to pleasure, and a third parallel sensibility to pain. The ocular sensibility is but one; its sensations are qualified by pleasure or pain, according as it is energized in a normal or in an impeded manner by its appropriate objective stimulus. Especially must we remember that pains or pleasures qualify the activities of our active powers, our mental faculties, desires and volitions, even more than our sensibilities. And this is precisely what our theory of their nature would lead us to expect.



#### The Final Cause Benevolent.

In conclusion, it follows from this theory that pleasure is, in the best sense, natural, as pain is abnormal. The Creator formed man an active, living creature, and so constituted him that to act, to energize, is to enjoy. Pleasure is the appointed incident of the use, pain of the abuse of our powers. A moral poet has sung that "Man was made to mourn." In the sense stated above, this is expressly contrary to the truth. The Creator made man to be happy. The fact that so much pain is unavoidable in our present state intimates to us that our state is now perverted in some important respects. Enjoyment is one legitimate end of our being. Pain has no virtue in itself. The ascetic theory of virtue is, therefore, contrary to the voice of Nature and the ordination of the benevolent Maker.

#### 4. Principle of Classification of the Feelings.

##### 1. Desires Imply Aversions.

In seeking a correct and thorough analysis of the feelings, we find a safe and obvious guide in this fact, that the sensibilities are only the occasions and conditions of the appetencies. If we can separate and enumerate the former, we are led to the correct distinction of the latter. Let me again remind you, that we agreed for convenience sake to include under the class *Appetencies* both desires and aversions, both affirmative and negative actions of the spontaneity; because, although opposite in their action, each corresponding aversion is an outcome of the same elemental principle of feeling from which the corresponding desire proceeds, evoked by the opposite quality of its object, and because aversions are like desires in this all-important respect, that they proceed from the ego outward, are active and spontaneous; whereas the sensibilities are passive. From this point of view the student will understand why I do not always stop in my enumeration to describe both parts of a pair of appetencies; to say as

much about the hatred as about the love. The analysis of the one implies that of the other. We save time by agreeing that the description of the one shall imply that of the other.

## 2. Desires Are Either Corporeal or Spiritual

Man is body and spirit. The spirit, by reason of its incorporation in a sentient animal body, is involved in its susceptibilities, and hence becomes the subject of animal sensibilities as well as spiritual, and their corresponding appetencies. Note, by the way, that psychologists have agreed to use the adjective *sensuous* in a distinct meaning from the adjective *sensual*. The latter carries a bad meaning and describes some affection which is criminally animal. The former carries, necessarily, no bad moral meaning, but describes an affection of sense simply and irrespectively of its being moral or immoral, as affecting the soul by its organic and animal origin. The sensuous affection may be a very innocent one, as the smell of a rose, the harmony of musical chords. The feelings derive, then, their simplest, most natural and unavoidable grand division from the two parts of a human person in which they originate—the body and the spirit.

It is very true that when the object of a spiritual feeling happens to be placed before the soul by sense-perception, a bodily sense becomes the medium. The purest spiritual love for the purity of an invisible angel has its rise mediated, it may be, through the ear listening to the words which describe that angelic character, just as truly as the sensuous feeling of the harmony between two musical tones comes also through the ear, the acoustic sense. But it would be very absurd to say that the moral emotion is, therefore, as sensuous as the feeling of harmony. Everybody sees the difference. The moral emotion has its proper seat in the spirit; the sensuous primarily in the body. The exciting object of the one is not the auricular vibrations merely of the words on the nerves of the ear, as those words are used to describe angelic character,

but it is an idea, a spiritual intellection. The exciting cause of the feeling of harmony is the acoustic vibrations playing on the nerves of the ear. Our feelings are, then, first, sensuous, and, second, spiritual.

### 5. Bodily Feelings—(A) Sensibilities of the Several Senses—Appetites.

The bodily senses are five, or, counting the "muscular sense," six. These give us six forms of sensibility, whose impressions may be attended with pleasure or pain, and consequently six objects of possible appetency (desire or repulsion): pleasure of touch, of taste, of smell, of melody and harmony, of the eye (as light, colors and form), and the pleasure of animal motion. Now, to three of these the books give the name of appetites: thirst, hunger and the sexual feeling. They usually define appetite as an affection proceeding from a bodily cause, including a sense of need and a consequent desire of gratification, and having periodical accesses and satieties. Now, I admitted and claimed that in appetite (*e. g.*, in hunger) there are the two elements: a sensibility (feeling of need of food) and an active appetency (desire to eat). But the question is, whether other sensuous affections are not as truly appetites? Has not the child who itches an "appetite to scratch"? Does not the eye, enclosed in a dark dungeon, long for the light? May not the silenced musician long for melody? Does not the florist crave the smell of his roses? Certain it is that there is in the healthy child an instinctive desire for motion, corresponding to the pleasures and pains of the muscular sense. This desire for motion, and delight in motion, may be accompanied in the healthy and young by exceedingly vivid feelings, as the privation may cause great pain. Thus children find themselves often grievously tormented by the enforced quiet of the school-room and church. This pleasure of motion, the work of the muscular sense, is a large element in the excitement of the chase, of athletic

games and of dances (combined with the musical and other æsthetic excitements).

**The Æsthetic Is Sensuous or Spiritual.**

The simple æsthetic sensibilities are obviously sensuous. The word "æsthetic," introduced from the Germans, has nearly banished the old English term, "taste" (not *gustus*). Æsthetic is derived from *αἰσθάνομαι*, of which the proper and common meaning in Greek is to cognize by the senses. Etymologically, then, æsthetic feeling would be simply sensuous feeling. But psychologists now use it as a synonym for all the affections of taste. Often they say that the æsthetic faculty is the faculty by which we feel the beautiful and the sublime. In descanting on it they say this faculty perceives and feels beauty in harmonies and melodies (the acoustic sense), in light, colors and figures (the ocular), in motions (the ocular), but also in rational characters, in moral actions, in spiritual affections, in mental processes and combinations of ideas; so that we speak of a beautiful idea, metaphor, train of thought or action as readily as of a beautiful harmony or a beautiful rose. Now, it is perfectly obvious that if the æsthetic faculty is intended to include all this, there is a confounding of sensuous feelings with spiritual feelings. The sensibility excited by the pink of a rose or the azure of the sky, though more refined than that enjoyed by the rustic in scratching his back, is as merely and unquestionably sensuous. But the sensibility excited by a right metaphor, a poetic description or splendid action is as certainly spiritual, as merely spiritual, as our admiration (ethical) for virtue. No wonder that discussions of the sublime and beautiful which set out with this confusion, as so many do, calling all these feelings æsthetic, make us a confused analysis; and no wonder there is endless dispute as to what the original common element of beauty is. The preposterous attempt is made to find a common element in opposite, essentially distinct feelings. Between the sensuous sensibility and the spiritual there may be a

certain marked analogy, as there doubtless is between the sensibility excited by combined beauty of color and figure and that excited by a symmetrical metaphor. But there is no identical element common to the two sensibilities. For the one is sensuous, having its cause in nerve organs; the other is spiritual, having its conditions exclusively in cognitions and susceptibilities of the soul. Let us, then, evade this unfortunate confusion, and separate the feelings of sensuous beauty from the spiritual. They cannot be discussed together.

**Beauty, Sensuous or Spiritual.**

The word "beauty" we use in our common language with the same confusion as the psychologists their word, the "æsthetic." But we must remember, if we will speak of beauty in this extent, that there is sensuous (or æsthetic) beauty, and there is wholly a different spiritual beauty.

**Strictly the Æsthetic Only Sensuous.**

Let us also reform our nomenclature. Let us use the word "æsthetic" (if we must needs bow to the fashion) in its proper Greek sense, of sensuous impression. Æsthetic pleasure will be, then, pleasure of the ear and eye, the pleasure excited by melody and harmony, by light, colors, figures and motions, as given in the music, the picture, the landscape, the sky, the ocean, the palace, the statue, the bird, the animal, the human form and face. Certain traits in all these excite the æsthetic (or sensuous) pleasure; certain others do not. The pink, the azure in color excites it; the dull brown or dusky black does not. The motion of the squirrel does; that of the sloth does not. The face of the Caucasian woman does; that of the prognathous African does not. The harmonies of a Mozart do, the clang of Chinese gongs does not. The symmetrical form of the palace does, the rude, amorphous heap does not. It is as useless to imagine why these objects of sense thus affect the organic sensibility as to ask why saccharine matter stimulates the organ of taste in the mouth

pleasantly and wormwood unpleasantly, or why the effluvium of a rose affects the olfactory nerves pleasantly and that of a carcass unpleasantly. We are at the end of our analysis.

Some More, Some Less Refined.

But, if the æsthetic is properly the sensuous impression, why should psychologists restrict the term to the pleasure of two bodily senses, the eye and the ear, and refuse the name to the other four, which are no more clearly corporeal? Why not call the glutton's pleasure in his oysters and truffles, the rustic's pleasure in scratching his back, by the pretty name of æsthetic? There is no reason. It is urged that those pleasures of eye and ear are more refined than these. True, yet as purely organic and sensuous. So among the sensuous impressions of the same sense there is the more and the less refined. The fashionable lady, regaling her senses with delicate "*eau de mille fleurs*," thinks herself much more refined than the Spanish peasant, snuffing her amulet of garlic and rue. The genteel epicure tickles his gustatory nerves with delicate ragouts and champagne, the negro with fried pork and cabbage and corn-whisky. In spite of all the modern glorification of the so-called æsthetic, the pleasure, if organic, is simply sensuous; no more, no less. Do we thus prove the æsthetic pleasures to be immoral, or necessarily degrading? Not at all, unless they be made so by intemperance in them. These sensuous pleasures are legitimate human pleasures in their subordinate place, not low because animal. It is their abuse which is low. But, on the other hand, neither are they morally elevating; and all the eloquence of your modern æsthetes in claiming this is groundless. What they call æsthetic, the pleasure of ocular and acoustic harmonies, has no more tendencies to moral refinement than the fashionable woman's gilded flask of "*eau de mille fleurs*," nor that any more than the honest peasant girl's odious package of garlic and rue.

The *Æsthetic Non-Moral.*

A British journal well exemplifies this fact by contrasting a cunning, supple and educated Bengalee with a Presbyterian crofter in the north of Scotland. The Hindoo is the incarnation of taste and grace. His every movement and posture are harmonious. He folds his indigo-cotton garment around him with the grace of a Greek statue. His language is poetry. Give him a pencil and paper, or a white earthenware plaque and a spoonful of blue paint, and with the point of his taper finger for a brush, he will reproduce with flowing grace the outlines of tree and flower. But none the less is he a sensual, treacherous tyrant in his home, and a faithless liar abroad. He will tell you a whole system of ingenious lies for a sixpence, and then laugh unblushingly at his detection as a mere jest. Look now from this elegant brute to the Scotch Christian peasant. You may find everything about him and his surroundings rugged and uncouth; his person is as ungainly as his rough coat, hob-nailed shoes and rustic gait can make it. His cottage is a tasteless heap of stones and thatch, and the cowshed and the kail-yard to the right and left exclude every flower and shrub. But here is a man who will die before he will betray the truth, who rules his daily life and his homely toils by the purest sentiments of duty; and under his rough and undemonstrative manners are hidden the most enduring affections and the noblest and tenderest sentiments. It is the unæsthetic man who has in this case all the moral elements.

The discussion of the true faculty of the beautiful (*i. e.*, spiritual beauty) must be reserved for the proper place.

## 6. (B), Animal Instincts.

The animal instincts must obviously be classed, so far as human beings share them, among the sensuous feelings. These instincts are so much more fully manifested in animals that their nature may be best studied there. Man has less need of them all, in that his actions have larger guidance

from his intelligence, but man is also an animal and presents, especially in his younger age, some traits of animal instincts. These is also a sense in which I shall apply the adjective to the spiritual sensibilities and appetencies. But the word does not mean that these are sensuous; it only means that they have this in common with the sensuous instincts, that they are original like them, and often act *a priori* to any reflective process of the intellect. The animal instincts are feelings which act immediately in living creatures for intelligible ends, and yet are not prompted by any intelligence of those ends in the agents, and are not learned by individual creatures from teaching by or observing of their parents or fellows. In animals we see marked instances of instincts in their preparation of nests and other habitations, in the incubation of birds upon their eggs, in the selection of food, in the storing of winter supplies, in the migrations of birds and fishes, in the temporary parental affections, in the knowledge of their natural enemies. In children the animal instinct is seen at least in their impulses to take their natural food, and in adults in the attraction of the sexes for each other. These feelings contain at least one analogy to the other feelings in combining a passive function of sensibility with an active, conative function of appetency, where the former is the occasion of the latter. The former appears in the sense of uneasiness which stirs the impulse to action, and the latter in the appetite which seeks to execute that impulse.

#### God's Final Cause Seen Here.

All the impulses tend to intelligible ends, the propagation of the species and the welfare of the individuals. But the animals are not directed therein by their own intelligence of those ends, for they continue to perform these acts under conditions which, as any intelligence would show must render them futile. The bird incubates porcelain eggs as faithfully as living ones. The young beaver domesticated in a dry enclosure endeavors, when the periodic instinct seizes him, to



construct his dam where there can be no water. It is equally clear that the instinctive acts are not taught animals by their parents or learned by observation and experience. The young perform these acts just as skillfully as the old. Those which are secluded from their parents perform the instinctive acts as well as those which grew up in the company of their fellows. The young fawn, reared and protected by human hands, is as promptly agitated by the scent of beasts of prey as though it had been compelled to learn self-protection in its native forests. The delineation of the instincts suggests an important inquiry. They are regularly directed to intelligible ends; they must, therefore, be the results of intelligence. But this intelligence is not in the animals which perform the instinctive actions. Then where is it? The only answer is that this intelligence is exerted by the Creator, whose power produced and whose perpetual providence superintends all animal life.

7. Table of Feelings and Appetencies.

Tabular Statement of the Feelings, Arranged under the Two Classes of Sensibilities and Appetencies (or Aversions).

<p>I. Corporeal Sensibilities.</p> <p>(1) Sensibilities of each of the six senses, sight, hearing, muscular, etc.</p>	<p>Appetencies, parts of corporeal sensibilities.</p> <p>(1) Appetites or desire to satiate sensibility.</p>
<p>(2) Animal Instincts.</p>	<p>(2) Desire for Instinctive Action.</p>
<p>II Spiritual Sensibilities, with</p> <p>(1) Sensibility of Existence and Activity as to any or all powers.</p>	<p>Corresponding Appetencies and Aversions.</p> <p>(1) Desire of Existence, Aversion to destruction.</p>
<p>(2) The Rational Sensibilities : (a) wonder, (b) beauty, (c) the sublime, (d) the ludicrous.</p>	<p>(2) Curiosity or Desire to know. Desire of beauty, sublimity, wit (with aversion).</p>
<p>(3) Sensibility to Applause (or Contempt).</p>	<p>(3) Desire of Applause, love of fame and counterpart aversion.</p>
<p>(4) Sensibility to exerting Power.</p>	<p>(4) Desire of Power, or Ambition, Avarice.</p>
<p>(5) The Social Sensibility, called love and sympathy, or (a) Pleasure in a fellow-being, (b) Sympathy.</p>	<p>(5) Desire to promote his happiness. Desire to succor.</p>
<p>(6) The Ethical Sensibility to approbation or disapprobation, Moral Resentment, Remorse, etc.</p>	<p>(6) Desire of Retribution or Reward.</p>
<p>All these combining with and modified by the sensibility to pain and pleasure, which we found to be rather traits or attributes common to every and each sensibility than distinct, separate sensibilities.</p>	<p>Combining with above makes them (or mixtures of them) reappear as our natural desire of happiness. The Omnibus Appetency.</p>
<p>(7) Inordinate Self-will, or No. 4 perverted.</p>	<p>(7) Desire to Sin, selfishness, or No. 4 perverted.</p>

These elements of sensibility and corresponding desire, by their combinations and modifications, I believe, can be made to account for all the protean forms of human feeling.

**Apparent Omissions Explained.**

Your own memories will immediately suggest to you that in my list a number of names of feelings do not appear—*e. g.*, pride, revenge, malice, envy, gratitude, hope, despair, etc., etc. I will attempt to show you how these all arise from modifications and combinations of the elements named above. It should be remarked that the order of analysis does not decide the order of practical importance of man's emotions. One which is complex and derivative in its origin may practically play a far more important part in life than another which is original and elemental. Thus, avarice, which is not a single, simple and elemental affection, but a complex of selfishness, the love of power and the love of applause, with sensual appetite, is far more noticeable and influential in actual life than the simple and elemental feeling of wonder. I remark, further, that the method I shall now pursue will be to take up each of these elemental principles in turn; to show, first, what is its nature and what are its conditions, and then to follow it into its different degrees and its modifications or combinations in the complex and derivative feelings. Thus the original parent feelings will be presented along with the progeny that forms their families, and the numerous and varied forms will be reduced to a simple order. But this method must, of course, involve the anticipating of some facts touching other elemental feelings lower down in my list.

CHAPTER III.

PLEASURE OF EXISTENCE, WITH ITS COUNTERPART DESIRE AND AVERSION.

Dread of Annihilation Instinctive.

Proofs

The aversion which is the opposite of this principle is dread of destruction and annihilation. Several writers have denied that this is an instinctive and elemental desire. They suppose that it is a derivative affection, propagated by our experience of the many pleasures which accompany existence. Milton, in "Paradise Lost," makes Adam say to the angel, that on awakening to consciousness of his creation he felt no care or interest in the question whether life might not soon depart as mysteriously as it had come.

"Pensive I sat me down : there gentle sleep  
First found me, and with soft oppression seized  
My drowsied sense, not troubled, though in thought  
I then was passing to my former state  
Insensible and forthwith to dissolve."

Some have represented Milton as eminently philosophical in this. I do not think so. The desire for existence and the aversion to annihilation are instinctive; and that they should be so is just what the wisdom of the Creator would lead me to expect, for it would seem a monstrosity that he should confer a sentient and, much more, a rational existence, as a boon, and not implant the instinct that would serve to protect it. I find in animals another probable proof that the desire of existence is instinctive as well as self-calculated. They are not capable of the rational self-calculation described, yet they universally display the instinctive desire of life. Again, if we

consult our own consciousness, it gives the same answer. Why did I spring aside so instantaneously from the sweep of that falling tree? Was it because I had recalled the pleasures and advantages that previous days of life had brought me, and reasoned thence that it was preferable not to have the falling tree deprive me of similar advantages in future days? No, I thought not of the past; only saw with my eyes and mind the imminent danger to life, and I instantly gave play to the desire of life. So we see this feeling in the little child before the age of rational self-calculation. He may need the teachings of experience to show which things around him are instruments of danger (as the pistol, the fire, the adder), but he needs none to teach him to connect the idea of danger with the impulse to shun it. Again, this desire of existence continues to operate after life has ceased to be a benefit, and has become only a burden of pains. It operates even in the case of the deliberate, rational martyr, who has determined to surrender life rather than sin. I suppose that if the Apostle Paul, when deliberately going with his executioners along the Ostian road at Rome, inflexibly determined to lay down his life then and there for the testimony of Jesus, had seen a tower toppling over on him, he would have instinctively sprung aside, just like his unbelieving guards, because the desire of life is instinctive and it would have acted in advance of any rational calculation, that it might be easier to die by the falling stones than by the sword a few moments later. The trite old maxim, "Self-preservation is the first law of Nature," expresses, then, good philosophy. The appetency is primary and original; it is, perhaps, the most permanent and abiding of all. It is never satisfied with length of days; but, however long the rational man may have lived, it will still be only the more unnatural and irrational to be willing for annihilation. Doubtless the fear of annihilation is the most powerful of our spiritual instincts next to the fear of future retribution for our guilt.

## Suicide.

Are there not cases of suicide where the suicide is not insane? Probably ; but the natural desire of life still operates, though countervailed and overcome by the disgusts and despair of life. The originality and force of this appetency give us the testimony of Nature against the sin of suicide. That act is one which fundamentally outrages Nature. Does not this appetency also give us a probable argument for the immortality of the soul? I have not only admitted, but claimed, that it acts in the brutes in a certain form ; and it might be retorted to me that this argument would be as strong for their immortality as for man's. But the reply is, that the appetency in us is, more than in the brutes, a desire not only for animal life, the only object of desire they can know, but also a desire for a continued existence after the death of the body.

## Final Cause.

The final cause of this appetency is very obvious. Our Maker has plainly implanted it as a needed stimulus of our powers, to impel us against the *vis inertiae* of Nature, to impel us to exercise them for our own development and the good of our fellows. It is also the motive provided to urge us to the enduring of the responsibilities of one's existence ; a result necessary to the very ends of our probation and our life's task. Without this appetency, yea, without its customary intensity, the disgusts and disappointments of life would continually tempt us to lay down the contest, leave the work unfinished, and thus disappoint all the ends of being. Inasmuch as the Creator knew that the trials of life are often extreme, he made this principle of resistance the most energetic in our nature. "All that a man hath will he give for his life," observed the fallen archangel.

## CHAPTER IV.

## THE RATIONAL ÆSTHETIC SENSIBILITIES.

## SECTION I.

## 1. Wonder.

We now approach these feelings of the soul which, although so different in their qualities as apprehended in consciousness, are yet kindred in the causes of their rise. These are wonder, the feeling of the ludicrous and that of beauty and sublimity. The objects which excite these sensibilities will be found nearer alike than is at first suspected.

Wonder is an immediate, instinctive and original sensibility. It arises upon our knowledge of something new and strange, and of sufficient moment to interest the intellect. It is a pleasing emotion. It doubtless contributes much to the happiness of natural and unsophisticated minds. That which excites it is the new and unforeseen, and if it is beyond our comprehension, the wonder is more intense. The new instance which we can explain—*i. e.*, can refer to its obvious cause and class—is, in one sense, not new, and so does not excite much wonder. The instance may be new, but the concept under which we rank it is old and already familiar. Thus the student who has learned most of the phenomena of electricity sees an experiment he had not witnessed before—*e. g.*, a deposition of a metal from the solution of its neutral salt in electrotyping. There is interest and pleasure, but little wonder, for this is only another instance of the power of the electric energy to dissolve chemical affinities and to carry the metal to that pole of the battery which presents the attraction of an opposite electricity. But to the active-minded child the result is full of delightful wonder. To the latter it is an un-

explained phenomenon; therefore, it has a true novelty. To the man of science it is not new in principle, but at once falls under the old and known concept formed by all the other chemical effects of electricity.

#### Astonishment.

If suddenness of disclosure be added to novelty, and to suddenness that grandeur of scale which awakens the sensibility of the sublime, then we have wonder in that more intense form which we call astonishment. Indeed, I am persuaded that wonder is always an element in our feeling of the sublime, if not also of the beautiful. This is so true of our feeling of sublimity that we may almost define it as simply one phase of the sentiment of wonder; that phase, namely, where the novelty of the object is chiefly found in unexpected vastness, and the other feature of the object, unaccountableness, appears in the imposing form of a vague mystery. What is our feeling of sublimity but a grandly large wonder? Does one reply that our sentiment of the sublime carries with it a peculiar and intense, though thrilling, pleasure, a species of delicious horror? I answer: Wonder is always a pleasing feeling, and what more natural than that the pleasure should intensify itself with the feeling?

#### 2. Curiosity.

Curiosity is the (active) appetency occasioned by the feeling of wonder. It is unquestionably a native appetency, although our minds, while incorporated in animalized matter, often feel some of that *vis inertiae* which is one of matter's essential attributes, just as the effort to make the first plunge in the desired bath of cold water is attended with a certain shrinking. Still curiosity, or the desire to learn and understand, is a native appetency of the soul. Truth is *pabulum mentis*. Curiosity is the healthy appetite of the soul for its native food. The new and unexplained phenomenon piques the mind with a spiritual hunger which curiosity craves to



satisfy. Notwithstanding the occasional friction of the soul's indolence, curiosity is an exceedingly vivid desire. Let the alert school-boy come in, for instance, from his evening sports and find an intelligent, perspicuous narrator, who is giving an account of his journeys into strange lands, or his explanation of some novel apparatus, and you shall see that boy, although having a boy's appetite for his supper, forget to eat it in the keen delight of his questions. One of the most precious features of this appetency is that it can not be cloyed or satiated. It is a purely spiritual desire, and, therefore, partakes of the immortal nature of the soul. The more we know, the more we wish to know. One may ask: But are we not satiated with inquiry? Does not the mind acknowledge its fatigue as truly as the senses and muscles; and, like them, demand rest, even from the enjoyment of its activities? I reply: Only until the bodily organs of the mind's action are refreshed by rest. The mind itself would know no fatigue did not its material organs become fatigued. After making allowance for these admissions, the noble trait still remains, that the mind's appetite for knowledge, unlike the boy's appetite for sensual excitements, is never permanently dulled, but grows by what it feeds on.

#### **Their Final Cause.**

This pair of feelings, again, wonder and curiosity, evince their benevolent final cause most obviously. The purpose they are designed to effect by our wise Maker in the economy of the human spirit is as obvious as that which the heart and arteries effect in our bodies. Wonder is the great awakener of the attention, and attention is the condition of clear knowledge. Curiosity is evidently placed in our spirits as the stimulus to inquiry, the spur to wholesome and useful mental activities. The benevolence of the Creator is also seen in His making the stimulus not an importunate, but a pleasant one. Wonder is the source of a great fund of innocent enjoyment, which is as healthful for the mind as the pure air

is for the lungs. Doubtless one of the great pleasures of Heaven will be wonder. The happy occupation of immortality will be the exercise of curiosity in exploring the marvels there presented to our knowledge. It may be at first glance supposed that, as novelty in objects is the condition of our wonder, one result of the acquisition of knowledge will be to diminish our capabilities for wonder; that, as we learn more and more, there will remain fewer and fewer objects capable of administering to our curiosity. This may afford us a very good probable argument to show that this finite life and world of ours do not constitute the whole of man's destiny. The wonders of terrestrial nature have novelty enough to employ our curiosity at least during our threescore years and ten. When we pass into a wider sphere, we shall have for studies the whole universe, which is practically illimitable, and the perfection and ways of the infinite Maker and Ruler. The appetite is immortal, but the banquet spread before it is inexhaustible.

Does not this analysis of this feeling tell us by Nature's loudest voice that we are all designed to seek this knowledge? Here is the proper scope of our being. Ignorance is our greatest opprobrium next to vice, and next to the pursuit of virtue the pursuit of true knowledge is the chief honor and blessing of our nature. Reason's voice thus calls us to self-culture.

#### The Pedagogic Corollary.

Much light may be thrown on the methods of teaching by the example of Nature here. The teacher's chief aim should be to appeal to the feelings of wonder and curiosity in order to arouse the pupil's mind to spontaneous and happy effort instead of driving it like a weary beast of burden. Whatever we see with awakened attention we remember without effort and with pleasure. The wise art of the teacher will be, therefore, in proceeding from the concrete phenomena to the rational explanations. It is the phenomena, presented in a novel light, which awaken wonder. Thereupon the

desire to comprehend arises and the study becomes a spontaneous joy.

### 3. The Witty.

We have here a sensibility whose trivial character, as apprehended by most persons, makes it unworthy of serious analysis. It is, indeed, not a distinctively moral sentiment. But the same may be said of all the sensibilities except those of conscience itself; and the sense of the ludicrous, like the rest, is right, wrong or morally indifferent, according as it is governed aright or misdirected and abused. The ludicrous suggests at once levity. It is often abused until it becomes frivolity. The signs of the sensibility are laughter and smiles and vivacious movements of the body. But it is the source of a great amount of enjoyment to human beings, much of which may be innocent and healthful, and all of which ought to be when unmingled with excess, irreverence, malice and cruelty. Moreover, the sense of the ludicrous is clearly a rational affection. It seems peculiar to human beings. The gambols of some animals clearly disclose a sense of fun or sport, and even of sportive mischief. But we suppose that all animals except man are as incapable of the perception of true wit and of the rational feeling stimulated thereby as of logical or moral relations. The true sense of the ludicrous is distinctly a human attribute; so clearly so that some psychologists have proposed, and that not in jest, to define mankind as "the biped that laughs."

#### Wit and Humor Kindred, but Distinct.

We found this general rule as to all feelings: that their rise must be conditioned on the presence in the intelligence of some idea or judgment. When we examine our own consciousness and that of our fellow-men, we find (so nearly all psychologists hold) that the ludicrous includes two kindred phases of sentiment—that of the witty and that of the humorous, their two kindred objects being wit and humor.

Ordinarily they are both laughable, but distinguishable. The two seem fairly to include all the multifarious objects which excite the pleasure of the ludicrous. It should also be stated that both elements, that of the witty and that of the humorous, may be present together in the object of our laughter. Then the sentiment of the ludicrous takes on its most pungent and pleasant form.

**Hobbes' Definition Refuted—Its Importance in Morals.**

The singular definition of old Thomas Hobbes is often cited: "Laughter is a sudden glory arising in the mind from the perception of our own eminence over our fellows." According to him, scorn is the essential element of the ludicrous, and the sentiment is but one of the more amiable phases of the emotion of pride. This definition discloses the saturnine character of the philosopher rather than the accuracy of his analysis. It is refuted by this question: How, then, does a man laugh at himself? Would Hobbes answer, that sometimes a man despises himself? True; but when he does so, he does not laugh; the emotion is only bitter, and not pleasurable. Again, if Hobbes' explanation were right, the sense of the ludicrous ought to be strong in inverse proportion to one's amiability. But this is not so; amiability and wit and humor, instead of excluding, usually accompany each other. Once more an appeal to our own consciousness assures us that the emotions of the ludicrous and of scorn or arrogance are not akin to each other. This question is a good instance of the moral importance of our psychology of the feelings. If Hobbes' definition were true, would it not be our duty to suppress every rising of the ludicrous as an unjust, unamiable, sinful impulse? But is it so? Must man cease to laugh in order to live up to the Golden Rule?

**The Accepted Definition of the Witty.**

The explanation of the witty upon which the best writers agree is, that it is a vivid and pleasurable feeling, arising instinctively upon the unforeseen and sudden percep-

tion of an apt, but new, correspondence of ideas, otherwise regarded as irrelevant the one to the other. I think that our consciousness evidently sanctions this account of the matter. Let us examine as many as we please of the witticisms at which we are instinctively amused; we shall find this to be the common element and the essential one: that between two ideas which we should have judged disconnected and irrelevant, the speaker has flashed upon us a relation, unperceived before, yet possessing an aptitude or fitness. Thus in that witticism of John Randolph, of Roanoke: "They say that our opponents have no principles guiding their political actions. Yes, fellow-citizens, they have principles; seven of them: the principles which prompted the mercenary Jews to follow our Saviour across the Lake of Galilee—the five loaves and two fishes." Or in that of Scipio Africanus to the poet Ennius, recorded by Cicero *De Oratore*. Scipio had called, and caught a glimpse of Ennius through the window; the maid-servant had been made to say: "Not at home." Ennius afterwards called on Scipio, and as the maid came to the door to answer his knock, Ennius heard Scipio's own voice saying: "Tell him your master is not at home" Whereat, of course, Ennius complained at the obvious contradiction of the order and the master's voice. Scipio's witty reply was: "Just hear the captious fellow; when he was at home and his maid told me he was not, I politely believed it on the word of his servant, and now he will not believe me on my own word." In each of these there is the sudden, unexpected flashing on us of a relation between thoughts other than the expected one, which had been a relation of irrelevancy. Taking the word "paradox" in its classic sense, "other than the reasonably expected," every witticism is a paradox. The mental vividness is the same in both. The seeming paradox is a more serious species of wit. May not the vividness of antithesis be due to the same cause? This is worth inquiry.

#### Wit and Ingenuity One.

That I have given the correct analysis of the witty is

confirmed again by this thought, that we naturally applaud the witty man as ingenious. The witty conceit is an ingenious conceit. Wherein is the ingenuity? Evidently in the bringing of ideas which to our more sober thought had no relation of relevancy into a suddenly seen and novel relevancy. The ingenuity of a mechanical or scientific invention has the very same element of wit in it: the unforeseen relevancy of two ideas not thought of before as so connected (the ideas being in this instance ideas of mechanical or physical instrumentalities); and the pleasure felt in one of these novel inventions is precisely the pleasure of wit, and is evinced by the very same signs, as laughter, etc. It was with a true philosophy that wisdom was described as, "Finding out the knowledge of witty inventions." This analysis of the witty is confirmed also by this fact: that wit is more pungently felt in a given witticism when first comprehended than in subsequent narrations of it. The novelty is wearing off; it was the suddenness of the apt relation to us which made us feel it witty.

#### Serious Wit.

The next point I wish to make, you see, is that there may be serious wit. The unthinking usually assume that only the funny is witty. But there are phases of wit which excite the highest pleasure and admiration and in which there is the most vivid and delightful apprehension of new and unforeseen relations of thought, which are yet too high for the lighter ludicrous. Such are many of the quaint and happy sayings of the old Puritan expositors. Such are the proverbs, "Every man's wisdom: one man's wit," which fix themselves in the memory of nations. At this saying of the French essayist: "Indigestion is the remorse of a sinning stomach," I presume no one feels much inclined to laugh, and yet every thoughtful mind recognizes with sober pleasure the quaintness of the analogy then presented between the abuse of the stomach and the abuse of the conscience and the consequences.

"That salient is unattackable." "Sir, the word is not English." (Wellington.)

**The Wit of Illustration One Element of Its Value.**

It is this serious wit which explains one of the great advantages of illustrations in discourse. Not only does the analogy of the illustration to the abstract connection of the ideas illustrated assist the mind to apprehend those ideas in relation, defining to us what the argument really aims at, and relieving the labor of careful abstraction, but the serious wit of that unforeseen and novel analogy between the illustration and the thing illustrated charms the mind with pleasure, and that pleasure is associated with the thing illustrated. Thus the Pharisees professed to be so punctilious in obeying God's law as to strain all their water before drinking lest they might break the ceremonial law against swallowing unclean animals, as a gnat. They paid tithes of the little bunches of herbs gathered in their gardens. They washed their hands always before eating. But they were not too good to plunder a widow of all her fatherless children's patrimony. "This," said Jesus, "is as though a man should 'strain out a gnat' and yet swallow a camel" (the largest domestic animal and an unclean one). Now, the analogy is really and logically parallel to the glaring solecism of Pharisaic morals, and the novel relation established between the great filthy camel and the big sin is so full of wit that it illustrates the moral argument with its vivid pleasure.

**4. The Humorous.**

**How Different.**

All the writers acknowledge that there is some difference between pure wit, and especially serious wit, and the humorous. There is much confusion and difference between them in saying what the distinctive element of the humorous is. No one was better qualified than the famous wit and humorist, Sidney Smith, to form an opinion on this point. I adopt his

view, that while the element prominent in the witty thought is the sudden and unexpected display of resemblance between ideas, the chief characteristic of humor is, that it is the sudden and unexpected recognition of incongruity between the ideas brought together. We see a large man walking in a pompous and consequential way on the sleety path, and next he lies sprawling on the ground. The sudden incongruity of his dignity and his awkward fall is supremely humorous. So the jocular mimicry of the grave or elevated person by one young or insignificant, for purposes of ridicule, strikes us as humorous, because with the aptness of the resemblance we see the incongruity of the grave speeches and acts mimicked with the levity of the mimic's person and object. The Irishman's bull strikes us as humorous because of the incongruity between the literal sense of his words and his designed meaning. But wit and humor may both appear in the same ideas. As an instance we may cite the illustration of our Saviour, the gnat and the camel. Not only is there vivid wit in the parallel of the two animals to the two classes of sins, but a startling incongruity in the image of the huge, sprawling beast going down the dainty throat of the Pharisee. Doubtless the audience, while charmed by the logical wit, were compelled to laugh at the humor of this contrast.

#### The Ludicrous and the Wonderful the Same.

But one of the most important points about this analysis is to show how closely the sentiment of the ludicrous is allied to wonder. I told you that we should find them near akin; perhaps so near as to be capable of a resolution into the same elements. We saw that wonder is a vivid, instinctive and pleasurable sensibility, arising immediately upon the cognition of something new and surprising. But novelty, surprise, unexpectedness in the relation of congruity or incongruity flashed upon the mind, we discover to be the cause of the ludicrous. It may almost be described as a phase of wonder. The ludicrous is but laughing wonder; wonder circumstanced



somewhat differently as to the relation of the objects seen in the mind and their gravity.

#### Benevolent Final Cause.

It only remains to speak of the "final cause" of the sensibility of the ludicrous. One obvious result is to add much innocent enjoyment to rational life and to brighten and warm the social bond between mankind. But its intellectual consequences are much more serious and valuable. This sensibility assists the attention, lightens the labors of abstraction, and makes truth vivid and pleasing. Thus it very seriously assists us in the acquisition and memory of truth; for what is so easily and pleasantly learned is never forgotten.

#### 5. Confusion of Sensuous Æsthetic Feeling with Spiritual Beauty.

The description and analysis of this sentiment is, as I have told you, the most confused and litigated of any of our feelings. When speaking of the sensuous feelings (those whose specific causes are in the corporeal, animal senses), I gave you some account of these confusions and assigned what I believe to be one reason for them. The psychologists usually class all our sentiments of sublimity and beauty as æsthetic. Yet they also divide them into material beauty (or sublimity), literary, mental and moral beauty. Their aim in calling all these by the common name of æsthetic is to claim for the sensuous feeling of material beauty the same high, rational elements and nature as for mental, or literary, and for moral beauty. They must admit that the sentiment of material beauty (that of the rose or sweet harmony) is mediated to the soul by the sense of eyesight or hearing; but they claim, notwithstanding, that the element in the percepts of the color, figure, harmony, etc., which awakens the feeling of beauty is not a sensuous, but a mental and rational, relation of ideas. They would say: As the sense of hearing carries to the mind one of the beautiful metaphors of Shakespeare, and yet the cause of the pleasure

is purely literary and mental in some relation of his ideas, so the eye conveys to the mind the color and shape of the beautiful rose-leaves combined into a flower, and yet the relation of ideas which awakens the feeling of beauty is mental still. My consciousness does not tell me that this is so. To me it seems clear that while the two feelings of beauty are analogous, they are not the same. The one is sensuous, not in any gross or bad sense, yet as truly sensuous as the fragrance of the refined perfume; the other is spiritual, seated particularly in the rational soul, and as truly mental as the pleasure arising from studying a beautiful argument of the logical order. I believe that these writers have deceived themselves by the influence of two facts. One is, that material beauty is higher, though still sensuous, than the grosser sense-pleasures, as in eating and drinking and smelling; the other, the fact that between material and mental beauty there is a certain analogy in some cases, which, according to the well-known law of association, may occasion the one's suggesting the other.

#### Material Beauty Not the Same as Spiritual.

Let us settle this point. It is important; for I assert that the insoluble confusion which rests in the discussion of the beautiful has been caused in large part by this mistake of treating material beauty and mental beauty as the same, under the common title of the æsthetic. If I show that they are not the same, but only analogous, I shall prepare the way for disentangling the doctrine. I assert, then, that material beauty is strictly a sensuous, as distinguished from a mental, feeling. It is not identical, I admit, with the grosser sense-pleasures, as the taste of good victuals, as the smell of perfume, as the pleasure of scratching; it is more refined. But that does not disprove its sensuous character; for some sense-pleasures are far more refined than others: that of a delicate perfume than that of gluttony. Again, Cousin argues that if it were sensuous, then objects of material beauty would, of course, come under the old maxim, *De gustibus non disputandum*; whereas

objects of material beauty do not come under that statement. He asserts that he can convince any sensible man by reasons that an object of material beauty is beautiful. This proves, he infers, that there must be some rational standard of material beauty. I dispute his facts. Objects of mere material beauty fall under the rule he disputes. We can not convince a neighbor, by reasons, of the beauty of a material object he had felt to be ugly. We can only apply an inducement of social ambition to him to persuade him that he does admire when he really does not, and to mix pleasant suggestions, and to be in the fashion in affecting to admire. Men do sincerely differ in their feelings of material beauty as to the same objects. No reasoning of Mr. Oscar Wilde would ever convince me that his coarse sunflower is pretty, any more than were the flat-nosed negroes, whose pet flower it was fifty years ago.

Proved by the Beauty of a Single-Color or Form.

Again, if the feeling of material beauty were mental and not sensuous, then, as all these writers admit and argue, its cause must be in some relation between ideas cognized in the sense-perception of the object. Yet the feeling of material beauty is awakened, not so strongly, but as truly, by a sense-perception of one single property in matter, giving but one single idea. But it requires two ideas to give a relation; let a man look through a tube at a homogeneous patch of blue sky on a clear day: the azure is beautiful. The pink of the rose-leaf is beautiful by itself, apart from the leaf's graceful, rounded shape. A curved line may have beauty of figure, although drawn in sheer black on a blank white ground. There is beauty in a single musical tone, without either melodic sequence or harmonic combination, if that tone is acoustically pure and resonant. The only possible escape would be for Cousin to say, in the case of the beautiful azure, the relation is between the single, pure tint and the mental and moral purity suggested by it, and that the feeling of material beauty was from that relation. But if he says that, he has given up his position; he is

on my position, which accounts for these feelings of beauty by suggestion through the associative faculty. But this would not suit Cousin at all.

## 6. Nature of Sensuous Beauty.

**Beauty Not to be Analyzed into Something Else; as Utility.**

But let us look at some of the explanations by which those who think all feelings of beauty are alike æsthetic endeavor to analyze beauty into its elements.

(1) The grossest of these makes material beauty identical with the sensual pleasure, granting no difference whatever between the savory taste of a viand, or the good smell of a dish, and the feeling of beauty in a rose or a statue. But this is easily refuted, as Cousin does, by remarking that the object may taste and smell well, and yet be only ugly; that the æsthetic impression is consciously different from that of the coarser sensuous pleasure, and experimentally separated in the object. The ugly may be pleasurable, and the beautiful, like the statue, may have nothing whatever about it to please touch, taste or smell.

(2) The useful is really the beautiful. Things strike us as pretty because they are adapted to use. The forms of a machine, for instance, strike us as graceful or handsomely proportioned because they are proportioned for the best utility. So of the human body, etc. This is obviously false: some things are recognized as very useful and still hopelessly ugly in shape, as a reaping machine. The scrub cow may give more milk than a thoroughbred, but she is not therefore accounted as more handsome. Many things impress us as beautiful which are never imagined to have any material utility, as a marble statue, an ornament, a jewel.

**Beauty Is Not Mere Association.**

(3) There is the famous theory of the associationist. Objects are made beautiful by the pleasing associations connected with them. Probably the most thorough, eloquent

and plausible presentation of this analysis is that found in "Allison on Taste." He denies that there is any one such single principle, quality or relation as that of beauty at all. He holds that whatever we call beauty is only the combination of any or all known pleasures, sensuous or mental, suggested to the mind by the object called beautiful, through association, and combined by the imagination. Anything that reminds us of pleasant past impressions of any sort by association of ideas, and thus starts the imagination on a pleasing work of ideal construction, is a beautiful object. Thus, clear, running water is felt to be beautiful because, by association, it reminds us of pleasant sensations, of the soothing coolness of the bath we lately enjoyed in water, of the satisfaction we had in drinking pure water when thirsty, of the pleasure of the easy, gliding motion when on water in a boat, etc., etc. A fertile champaign is beautiful only because associated with the useful crops of grain and fruit it can yield, and the domestic peace and comfort thus provided for, etc., etc.

Now, what gives plausibility to this analysis is the fact that our sentiments of beauty are undoubtedly so much reinforced, recalled and enhanced by our associations. The beautiful landscape where the home of our childhood stood is made more pleasant by all the soft and tender associations tied to it. The tune heard in that home is more beautiful to us, suggesting the voice of the mother who first sang it to us; and I am persuaded that the sensibility connected with the old idea may begin again to thrall the heart before the memories themselves have shaped themselves as conscious thoughts in the intellect. In other words, the tie of association between two feelings of sensibility may be immediate and not only mediate.

**Disproved.**

But the theory of association is evidently incorrect when it pretends to give us the whole genesis of our sense of beauty. Association does not create beauty, but combines with it where already existing. We must again recall the fact

that the power of association is to collect or to colligate, not to transmute ideas and feelings. The idea of feeling which is reproduced by association comes back in the same kind as where it first appeared; it may come back fainter and dimmer, that is all. Now, our consciousness tells us that the feeling of beauty is not of the same kind with the taste of cold water or the pleasure of having full crops of wheat or fruit. It is a feeling of its own distinct, unique kind. These feelings of utility or sense-pleasure, when recalled by association, would not appear as the feeling of beauty, but only as what they had been at first.

(4) Again our consciousness refutes Dr. Allison, in that, when we see the beautiful object, the æsthetic feeling comes before we think of any train of images. It is immediate; it rather helps to suggest such a pleasing train of other images than is suggested by them. Again, visible objects may suggest very pleasing or tender trains of association and yet remain ugly. A skull might suggest, instead of death and the grave, that chain of pleasing thought the English poet connected with it: "Thou dome of thought, thou temple of the soul," etc. And yet the skull would remain essentially ugly. So the muddy road might suggest that delightful reunion to which it was leading us, and yet remain itself repulsive.

**Simple Beauty Ultimate, so Not Analyzable.**

If one ask, then, What gives a material object beauty? I shall have to answer as to a case of simple and incomplex feeling (*e. g.*, the beauty of a simple color or a simple figure), that there is no analysis into simpler elements. Why is saccharine matter sweet in the mouth of a child? Why is that sweetness pleasant? I can only answer that the matter and the nerves of taste are so related as to provide immediately for that result. It is the child's nature. Why are azure and pink beautiful? I have only the same answer.

**Complex Material Beauty Is Harmony in Variety.**

But the same concrete object may include more than one element of æsthetic beauty. The rose has, perhaps, two or three tints about its corolla, pink, white and yellow (the stamens and calyx), and green in the leaves beneath. Each of the colors is pretty. The corolla and its petals also have great softness of rounded figure, and the green leaves of pointed figure. The beauty of the whole is increased by combination of pretty parts, and I am ready to believe that here a higher element of beauty enters (of which Cousin speaks so much), the beauty of a relation of parts, harmony in variety. And this is the element of æsthetic or sensuous beauty, which I would so distinctly admit is analogous to spiritual or mental beauty. When we grasp, even in the sensuous beauty, this higher form of it which is inspired by this perception of harmony in variety, we are rising gradually toward the confines of the true spiritual affection. But the latter is still the highest, and it is inspired not by any material symbols, but by spiritual ideas themselves cognized in proper relations. This complex sensuous beauty is found in its higher forms in the landscape, combining many charms of field, wood, water, mountain and sky; in the picture, including many graces of color, figure and expression; in the grand and complex piece of architecture, embracing many forms and magnitudes; in the symphony, enriched with a variety of melodies and harmonies.

**7. Nature of Spiritual Beauty.**

We are now prepared to consider the true, superæsthetic, spiritual beauty. We recognize this in certain combinations of thoughts and images, as the poetic metaphor or simile, both vivid and just; in the harmonious and candid and just collocation of logical truth; in thoughts clothed in happy language, and in generous, spirited actions. Here we have a beauty which is no longer æsthetic or sensuous; its true elements are spiritual. The literary beauty of a Miltonic metaphor is

conveyed by words, which carry their meaning to the mind through the acoustic or the visual sense; but that there is a purely spiritual, literary beauty there is proved by this fact: the voice that reads those words may be the harshest and most ungainly, or the written character in which we read them may be the most awkward scratches, yet the image and feelings are beautiful still. This is that beauty which deserves the definition of Cousin: "Beauty is the divine splendor of the truth."

#### **Poetry and Rhetoric Combine Both.**

We are not to forget that the poet aims to combine with the highest spiritual charm certain sensuous elements. The very words which clothe the thoughts are not only perspicuous symbols of them, but bring the additions of melody and rhythm. Hence the full beauty of such poems is not felt until they are appropriately read aloud, so that not only the beautiful thoughts, but the sensuous beauty of prosody may be expressed by the voice. Here both kinds are present, the lower and the higher.

#### **Mental Beauty, What?**

What is that trait of the mental images which procures for them the quality of beauty? If it can be described, I would say it is a certain harmony in variety. It is a certain diversity in unity. The very fact that elements of thought which at first seemed far apart in their diversity are yet harmonized in a consistent and logically just expression of the states of the soul, enhances the beauty. Mental beauty is the fulness of a new consistency in diversity. This conception satisfies the consciousness.

#### **Mental Beauty Is Wit.**

Hence follow several inferences: First. The line is very narrow which separates mental beauty and serious wit. If we look at the analysis of the latter, it approaches very near that of the mental beauty. The sensibilities are very near akin. Indeed, can anyone contemplate an instance of serious wit



without feeling that there is actual beauty in the features, the appropriateness of the unexpected collocation of related thoughts? Is there, after all, any real difference except that the sentiment of the witty has a dash of wonder added from the sudden novelty of the relation we are made to see? One laughs at the higher wit; so one laughs at the lesser beauty. Both are joyful emotions, instinctively pleasurable.

#### Mental Beauty Is Rational.

Second. I infer that the ability to create and to enjoy spiritual or literary beauty involves correct intellectual, rational power much more than the creation and enjoyment of sensuous beauty. A consistency in the truth of the diverse thoughts united to create mental beauty is essential, and this is nothing else than justness of reason. Hence, in the rational scale, mental beauty is the highest and noblest of our sensibilities, except the ethical. Hence, too, that fact, which we had to confess as to sensuous beauty, *De gustibus non disputandum*, has no place in mental beauty. There is here a standard of appeal, a critical principle, by which all just minds can be made to see the difference between true and spurious mental beauty; for the diverse elements of thought have to be united with a rational consistency in order to give the beautiful. I may almost say that there is a logic of the criticism of mental beauty separating the spurious from the genuine, as the formal logic separates truth from error in arguments. The phrases, "a just taste," "a rational taste," are here no metaphors. Hence it follows that while discussions about beauty of forms and colors, about the styles of music and fashions in dress, are in great part futile and endless, *belles-lettres* criticism has its stable principles and establishes for all minds of a true culture a fixed and uniform standard. No educated man who understands Milton is a skeptic as to the spiritual beauty of the Miltonic images. All schools of merely æsthetic art, even down to Raphael, have met their skeptics (as John Ruskin).

Complex Material Analogous to Mental Beauty, but Not Identical with It.

Third. The sensuous or merely æsthetic beauty is lifted towards it by the ties of association. The material traits of this lower beauty may come, by virtue of educating associations, to suggest the mental beauty of truth seen in its diversity in unity, and may thus acquire expression. The justness of that expression may then ally it closely to the divine beauty which the mind sees and the senses can not apprehend. This is the most refined and worthy result to which the mere æsthetic can attain. Justness of expression, fidelity to the true and the virtuous and noble affections, ennoble the works of material art and make them works of more than handicraft. This is the criterion of genius. The painter who can give rational and ethical expression, true to the right soul, to his features and figures, has genius. He is an artist in the higher sense. He who can only combine pretty shapes and pleasing colors without spiritual expression is a mechanic; a very accurate and handy one it may be, but still a mechanic. Of course art-genius must employ the very best resources of the constructive imagination, and that an imagination not only sensuous, but rational.

Beauty an Ultimate Intuition.

Fourth. I admit, of course, that the faculty or power by which spiritual beauty is cognized is an original intuition of the soul—with Cousin, Kant and McGuffey; more than an instinct, a true species of rational intuition. So far I admit that Cousin did right in his "*Le Vrai, Le Beau, Le Bon,*" in assuming that these three primary coördinates of the human spirit are the products of the three forms of rational intuition: the intuition of truth in propositions, the intuition of beauty in spiritual relations, and the intuition of virtue and merit in agents.

The Ideal Beauty, What?—Points to God.

Fifth. We shall admit with Plato, that there is an ideal

beauty, or notion of the perfection of beauty, which the reason apprehends and yet never comprehends. As our rational cognitions of duration and space are too abstract to become ideas, and as they ever tend to infinitude, but yet we are unable to grasp infinitude, and as our reason makes us believe in that infinite space and time which we can never comprehend in thought, so we believe in an ideal beauty, which we never actually see. What we see and feel is an approximation to it. No artist, whatever his genius, could ever make his picture express all the spiritual beauty which his soul believes in. The ideal ever advances before the actual. For instance, we think that the spiritual beauty which shines through the features of Raphael's Madonna, the high thought, the reverence, the sanctified imagination, the holy maternal love, is beyond any actual human face. Yet which one of us does not believe that if, like John, we should see an incorporate angel, we should find his face reflecting a higher spiritual beauty than the Madonna's? We can not picture to ourselves how, yet we assuredly believe that we should see in him that higher beauty. Now, if this ideal is not false, it must be realized fully somewhere. In what? In whom? There is but one answer: in God. The infinite, perfect God, and He alone, presents the perfect beauty. The less perfect beauty which we attain unto is, then, the reflection in our souls of His image. Thus Plato. But I go one step further, and by this step I correct that error of Plato and his modern follower, Cousin, by which they confound the material and the spiritual beauty. God is pure spirit; hence the perfect ideal beauty must be spiritual; that which is impressed on matter must be of a lower type.

#### 8. Sublimity Is Both Material and Mental.

The sentiment of sublimity is evidently akin to that of beauty, and yet is something different. Dr. Thomas Brown illustrates the resemblance and the difficulty of drawing a dividing line between them by supposing the man of sensibility

traveling down a river. Near its origin it is beautiful and not sublime, a tiny sparkling rill. Near its mouth it has become grand in the might and vastness of its volume, and is sublime. At what point on its course did the beauty give place to the sublimity? At no one point; the beauty grew gradually into the sublimity. When an object has become sublime, it has not ceased to be beautiful; that trait is still present, but it is a grand, a gigantesque beauty. The very name indicates that the feeling of the sublime was felt as something elevative. I have already stated the conviction that it is near akin to the sentiment of wonder; for the conditions of its rise and the nature of the feelings are both closely analogous. I repeat, sublimity is but a grand and large wonderfulness, excited by the knowledge of an object at once novel, surprising, unaccountable and of grand dimensions.

As in beauty, so here; there is a material sublimity and a mental sublimity. The former is found in mountains, the ocean, the storm-cloud; the latter, in grand conceptions, like those of astronomy and theology, and in grand exhibitions of mental powers. It is not necessary to repeat the description, which runs parallel to that given of beauty.

### 9. Moral Beauty Is Merely the Moral Sentiment.

#### Conclusion.

Is there in addition to the material and the mental beauty also a moral beauty? That is, do we have this particular sensibility of the beautiful excited by a splendidly appropriate act of virtue, as we do by a splendid collection of thoughts? Or is the delightful and admiring feeling which that virtue excites rather the distinct ethical feeling which attends on our moral judgments, and with them constitutes our moral sentiments? Now, the position would be intelligible, that the splendid virtue might at the same time affect the soul through two of its rational sensibilities—*i. e.*, that the witnessing of this virtue might, by its appropriateness and harmony, excite

the sense of the beautiful (precisely as does the consistent and harmonious metaphor in literature), and also the severer and calmer sentiment of moral approval; and that the two sentiments might thus be fused into one complex feeling, "The beauty of holiness." The advocates of this view would ask: Is not holiness beautiful as well as right and deserving? Is not depravity ugly as well as wrong and ill-deserving? To this question I would say, that if the advocates of this view will only hold fast to that grand peculiarity of the moral sentiment, that it not only admires the right, but pronounces the intuitive, rational imperative, thus elevating the moral function of the soul, as the supremely rational one and the crown and queen of all the rest, then we have no practical objection to their analysis; but if that analysis is so taught as to lean towards the degrading of the moral sentiment to the grade of the æsthetic and towards the denial to our moral sentiments of an invariable, rational standard, leaving them to vacillate, like the æsthetic sentiments, with every phase of culture and fashion, then we must resist this theory to the utmost. We can never accede to that soft and pretty philosophy which teaches that the virtuous act is to be preferred by us only as the more beautiful, vice to be eschewed only as "bad form." Virtue is imperative; beauty is not. The reason for preferring virtue is not that it pleases a just taste, but that it is right; and the right is supremely and rationally obligatory. Further, I would admit that there is a sense in which virtue is beautiful doubtless, if we are allowed to use the word "beauty" in a wider sense. That is, no right mind can contemplate the splendid virtue without a warm, happy, admiring feeling, analogous to that awakened by mental beauty. But when I ask my consciousness: Is that bright and pleasurable sentiment the glow of the moral sentiment, approbation and moral love, raised to a warmer degree? my mind answers: Yes. I see no ground to say that the approbation is one feeling and its glow another. As was well remarked by Dr. Thomas Brown, the poverty of our language constrains us to use, as a

name for this moral feeling or moral love, a word almost of judicial coldness, borrowed from the Latin (*ad probatio*). But let us not be deceived by a word. This moral sentiment is an emotion, attendant on a judgment in the intellect, and while, as I showed you in our first lecture, all the feelings, as well as this, may exist and actuate us in their very quietest degree, this is as capable of the warmest glow as any other affection of the soul. The sentiment of moral beauty is to me the sentiment of moral approbation warmed to a more vivid heat by the contemplation of a more splendid object of virtue. It is somewhat like the sentiment of beauty, but is superior to it.

So much our time allows for the discussion of beauty and sublimity. It is enough to say that this sensibility implies its opposite. There is also a sensibility to ugliness, the opposite of beauty, and to pettiness or meanness, the opposite of sublimity, and the soul is determined to both these opposite sentiments by one and the same instinctive disposition. As the beautiful affects us pleasantly and attracts us, so the ugly affects us painfully and repels us.

#### The Final Cause.

The "final cause" or the design in view of the Creator in imbuing man's soul with the capacity for the beautiful seems in part clear. He was prompted by His benevolence and His wisdom: His benevolence in providing for us a multitude of innocent pleasures; His wisdom in placing in us a happy incentive both to learn and to love. Doubtless æsthetic and sensuous beauty is a powerful and happy stimulus to our minds to observe and study the objects of Nature and thus to acquire useful knowledge; even so mental beauty is the most pleasing incentive to reading and meditation. We are here uttering almost the same thoughts which we had to express in order to give the final cause of wonder and curiosity. So that from this point of view again, the close relationship of beauty to these feelings appears. Once more, the quality of beauty is one of Nature's great incentives to love. Thus it attracts us to that beneficent affection and makes its exercise easier.

## CHAPTER V.

## LOVE OF APPLAUSE.

## 1. Nature and Quality of Love of Applause.

I have hesitated long whether this feeling and desire are entitled to be ranked as original, or as only modifications of our moral sentiment of approbation for that which is right in combination with other feelings. By virtue of this feeling we experience a happy complacency in ourselves when we do right, and a happy complacency in our fellow-man when we see him do right. Out of this highest rational sensibility grows the desire for virtue, and the aversion to vice, and the consequent desire for the subjective happiness which virtue gives. That happiness is the sweetness of self-approbation—*i. e.*, of self-applause. Now how narrow is the step for a social being from the desire of self-applause to the desire of applause from his rational fellow? Especially when he recognizes that his fellow is like himself, an intelligent, moral being, an *alter ego*. I desire to have a right to applaud myself. I desire to give my neighbor ground to applaud me. I enjoy the latter result very much as I do the former. Thus near is the connection. What element has to be added to the ethical desire to fill up this distinction? Merely this, that my nature is social and not solitary; that my fellow-man is, in many respects, as myself. That is to say we are sympathetic beings. At least this inquiry shows that, if the desire for my fellow's applause is not my love of self-applause, merely modified, there is in man's social nature a constraining reason, which prompted his Maker, after implanting love for self-approbation, not to leave out the desire for others' approbation; if it is another desire. The two necessarily go together, if they are twain.

**How Bad Men Desire Applause for Evil.**

But it will be objected that the explanation is incompatible with these two facts: that wicked men desire others' applause, and not virtuous men only; and that they desire and seek to win applause, not so much by doing virtuous things as evil things, or indifferent things, provided only that these happen to please their foolish and evil companions and thus evoke their praise. For instance, one worthless man will strive to purchase the applause of fools like himself by the skill with which he can pitch a quoit or push a billiard ball or tie a cravat, while he stupidly slights and forfeits the moral approbation of the wise and good for true virtues. Another monster will actually seek the applause of being more able or skillful in perpetrating crimes, in seducing innocence, or gathering rapine, or murdering *secundum artem*. These facts are true, and they certainly show that the desire of applause exists in us in our fallen estate in a very perverted shape. Such desires of applause are, of course, illegitimate, and they are the wicked travesties of the legitimate. Of course, to educe them there has been a transmuting of the lawful feeling by mixture and modification. This I will attempt to explain; and whereas it is argued that the love of applause could not have had its germ in the desire of moral approbation, because the wicked also love applause; I answer, the wicked man is such, not because he has ceased to feel the moral sentiment, but because his perverse will has ceased to be governed by it. The ethical feeling is not dead; it is disobeyed, while still felt. There is, therefore, no paradox in a bad man's earnestly craving approbation for good. Another thing we must remember is, that man has a delight in the successful use of his own powers, in the production of visible effects, and the corresponding desire of power, which is just as original and native as his delight in moral approbation. This sensibility to the pleasure of power or successful faculty, therefore, generates another species of self-satisfaction, not ethical—indeed, not as ennobling as moral self-approbation, yet equally natural. As the virtu-



ous man morally and rightly applauded himself for his virtue and was therein legitimately and nobly happy (with due modesty), so the natural man applauds himself for his power, his faculty whose successful exercise is to him an instinctive source of pleasure, with a self-congratulation as natural as the other, though not like the other moral. As the delight of self-applause in the first case aroused the desire of his fellow's applause also, so in the second case. He is pleased with his own power successfully exerted. He is pleased that his neighbor is pleased with his power. Here is the point where the two feelings unite in the emotion of ambition, which is at once a love of power and a love of applause. The solution is completed by remembering that in all sinful men the evil affection of selfishness is in exercise—*i. e.*, the perversion and inordinate exaggeration of man's legitimate desire for his own well-being. Selfishness, craving personal pleasure or gratification in disregard of equity, now combines with the other elements of the love of applause, and we have the wicked, foolish or monstrous phases of the desires which were above described.

#### The Moral Quality of the Appetency.

Is then the desire of applause righteous? Here again our psychology must guide us to an answer. To desire the approbation of the good for doing well is righteous. To be gratified by it is righteous. The pleasure is legitimate, healthful to the soul. I may even say that to seek this pleasure is positively obligatory. When we hear the transgressor fortifying his wilfulness by protesting that "he does n't care what people think," we judge that a sinful sentiment. First, because it is false—he does care (he would be as unnatural as a fish with feathers if he did not); and second, because he ought to care. It is immoral to be indifferent to our fellow's conscience, properly enlightened, as it is to be indifferent to our own. But if the virtuous act is done for the sake of the applause, instead of for the sake of the duty, then the act has ceased to be virtuous and the desire to have it applauded has become illicit and un-

healthful. The pleasure which one takes in being applauded for his efficiency in the other faculties may be, like the faculties themselves, indifferent naturally, neither good nor evil. The school-boy is pleased for being praised as a rapid runner; the rifleman by praise for his accurate shooting; the blacksmith, for the muscle which holds the sledge off at arm's length. Their pleasure in itself is neither moral nor immoral. It may be innocent. It becomes wrong and unhealthful as soon as it becomes inordinate or is preferred to more weighty and moral motives. But he who seeks praise by a skill in sinning has perverted the feeling into its most criminal and monstrous shape.

The feeling of shame scarcely needs farther remark, since it is the counterpart pain produced by the dislike or reproaches of others. It receives the parallel description to that just given.

## 2. Pride and Humility—Vanity and Haughtiness.

One of the most interesting modifications of the love of applause is pride. This is usually and correctly defined as the feeling of elevation which arises upon the contemplation of our supposed eminency or superiority over some of our fellows. This is obviously a phase of self-applause. It may be correctly defined as comparative or relative self-applause. The mental occasion of the feeling is always a comparison between himself and some other he deems his inferior. Humility is, of course, its opposite, and is, like pride, a comparative feeling, occasioned by the view of a superior along with ourselves. Vanity and insolence, or haughtiness, are two manifestations of the inward pride. The first seeks to display and gratify the elation, by showing its superiority to others; the second by making others feel their inferiority painfully. Vanity is, therefore, the more good-natured sin; haughtiness, the more malevolent. It is often said of some man, "He has too much pride to be vain." This may be true. Experience has taught the man that the betrayal of vanity appears always petty; it is

a petition for the covert or tacit applause of observers. Hence the self-importance and dignity of a great pride causes the man to suppress this manifestation, and this confession of dependence for happiness on the applause of others.

#### Their Moral Quality.

In estimating the moral quality of pride, several thoughts must be weighed. One is, that popular language uses the word "pride" with a latitude which includes many phases. It is used often, perhaps, under the connection of "an honest pride," for what is not pride, but that self-respecting feeling aspiring for the excellent in conduct, and appreciating the rights and the demands of one's position, which the Greeks expressed by *αἰδώς* or *σωφροσύνη*. This is a virtue, and a valuable safeguard against sin. Second, there is such a thing as rational and just self-appreciation, to which excellence is entitled, which may be wholly distinct from the selfish depreciation of others. Washington, no doubt, knew that he was a greater soldier than the crude militia officers around him, and a greater statesman than the demagogues who were blundering in the Continental Congress. This was not vicious pride, but a legitimate feeling and knowledge of self-approbation: first, because true; and, second, because neither selfish nor malignant, nor unjustly disparaging to others. Then, next, the question is important in what respects the superiority exists that is valued. If it is moral superiority, and the claim is real and true, and not the illusion of selfishness, the sense of elation is more pardonable. If the superiority is in trivial qualities, then the elation is immoral and degrading. If in vicious qualities, the elation is criminal in the highest degree, and monstrous. Last, and perhaps most important, is this consideration, that be the ground of self-approbation what it may,—a virtue we suppose ourselves to exercise, an ability we think we possess, or a silly foible which all are fools for valuing,—self-satisfaction in the shape of pride is a comparative feeling. It brings our fellow-men into the field of con-

trast. It thus involves at once the equities of our relative emotions towards them ; it thus involves and includes in its very impulse a tendency to depreciate them. The perpetual tendency is to enjoy the pleasing elevation as to self, by means of their unjust disparagement. Hence it is impossible for pride to be felt without becoming inequitable, selfish, malignant. When it takes on these forms, which are its usual ones, it becomes that odious spiritual sin, which our Maker especially abhors, and which the spectator's conscience reprobates. But to the selfish man it is perhaps the most seductive of all sins, because secretly so pleasant. This criminal pride, then, is the combined emotion, made up of self-satisfaction and unjust selfishness.

### 3. Pride Aspiring?

Pride is often spoken of as "aspiring," "lofty," and humility as "lowly." Every proud man, I suppose, fancies that his elation is elevating to him. He speaks of "looking down" on others. Let us consider. We have seen that pride and humility are comparative emotions. Pride is incited by the comparison between ourselves and our inferiors ; humility, by the comparison between ourselves and those felt to be our superiors. This is unquestionable. It follows, then, that the proud spirit must be habitually conversant with things meaner than itself, and the humble with things nobler than itself. But we always tend to be assimilated to what our vision dwells on. Thus we learn that pride is the grovelling, the degrading temper, and humility the exalting one. Pride is the vulture which may exult in sailing a little above the tree-tops, because its eye is fixed on the earth and the foul garbage with which it desires to glut itself, while it becomes foul itself and loathsome as its food. Humility is the eagle soaring into the upper sky, yet never judging itself to have risen high, because its eye is fixed upon the distant sun. This explains and is confirmed by just observation. Sciologists are always proud of their little knowledge. Profoundly learned

men are always modest about their attainments. This was eminently true of Newton, the greatest of human intellects. The sciolist does not know enough to be aware of what vast stores of knowledge he is still ignorant. Hence he compares his little store with the greater ignoramus around him, and feels elation from that sordid superiority. The man of extensive learning knows how much remains in the vast realms of science to be yet learned; and, comparing himself with these wider reaches of knowledge, he is humble. In like manner the most virtuous man is most humble as to his merit. Why is he most virtuous? Because his attention is directed to the highest and purest ideals of rectitude, and hence the contrast between his infirmities and the divine beauty impresses him with the clearest sense of inferiority. But the proud man only maintains the elation of his fancied superiority by gloating on the base vices beneath his own grovelling standard; and thus he ever gravitates towards the vile level, by the contemplation of which he feeds his pride.

#### The Bible Value of Humility Is Philosophic.

This analysis shows us which of the two emotions is the elevating one, stimulating to the pursuit of higher excellence. Pride is degrading, enervating. Humility suggests noble aspirations and leads to right efforts, and thus to elevation and excellence. "A haughty spirit goeth before a fall." "Seest thou a man wise in his own conceit? There is more hope of a fool than of him." "With the lowly is wisdom." These maxims are thus seen to be profoundly philosophical. The same analysis also explains to us the importance which the Christian system assigns to the grace of humility and the exercise of repentance. That code makes repentance the parent grace out of which all improvement springs, the condition, as well as the beginning, of all upward moral progress. We have seen that this is profoundly rational. Effort for improvement springs from the sense of defect. For what cause has he who sees no defect in himself, to endeavor to improve? But defect is only

discovered by the perception of our own inferiority as compared with a superior standard. This comparison grounds humility. It has been often remarked, that the pagan ethics show their shallowness and incompleteness by discounting contrition and humility entirely as virtues. The pagans could not distinguish humility from mean-spiritedness, the pusillanimous temper.

#### Dangers from Public Opinion.

Returning now to the elemental affections, the pleasure of applause and desire for it, we see on the one hand, that it subjects the moral coward to a great temptation; on the other, it stimulates brave men to right, or, at the least, to useful conduct. The tyrant of this affection is "public opinion." This potentate is not seldom wrong in his demands. Then it requires the highest moral courage to resist his voice, the "*ardor pravus civium jubentium*," as righteousness demands. But resistance is then a sacred duty. It may be that, as the world actually goes, men are largely strengthened for this resistance by a species of haughtiness, an arrogant contempt for opinion that reproaches their action, as one either ignorant or vile, rather than by the pure energy of conscience. Is pride here a good thing? Pride is never good. It may yet be the honor of the providence which governs men to bring this good out of the evil of our pride. Clearly the truth is this. It is good to have that clear honest knowledge of the right which shall enable us to distinguish the mistakes of the perverse public opinion, and which, inspiring a firm confidence in our own conscience, shall enable us to pursue the right course scorn for our deceived maligner, but with compassion and magnanimity.

#### The Final Cause.

But, on the other hand, Providence has provided a check upon the errors of public opinion, in the conscience it has implanted in our fellow-men. They cannot reproach us for doing right, and applaud us for doing wrong, without violat-

ing their own consciences. The general rule is, that the public conscience tends to be on the side of the right; and thus the desire of its applause is a powerful strengthener of our conscience. Or, at least, the public opinion is pretty sure to applaud what it supposes useful and beneficent; so that it acts as a stimulus in the direction of benevolence, which is a virtue and an important one. Here we see the "final cause" of this feeling. It is the Maker's contrivance to weld men into society, to induce them to act for each other, and not for self exclusively, and to make man a check upon his brother man. The love of applause, while a personal appetency, is in its effects as powerful a social affection as love itself.

#### 4. Desire of Fame, Not an Independent Emotion.

The desire of fame has been the extensive topic of moralists and poets; and they have treated it as though it were an independent emotion. But can there be any doubt of its being a mere extension of the love of applause? What is fame, but the applause of many men, and distant men instead of a few near us? It needs no discussion. And the moral questions as to the lawfulness of the desire of fame, and as to its final cause, must receive the same answer. To notice the last first, the Former of our spirits evidently contrived it as a support to our virtues and energies, and a stimulus to our activity in doing right. There is this superiority of fame over local applause, as an object of desire, that fame being general is freer from partialities of particular affections, and from perversion of the judgment as to the really laudable, by the local and temporary prejudices. The desire of fame is moral, on the same conditions as we found the desire of applause moral, when we desire the approval of the good for doing well. It is unhealthful and immoral under the same circumstances as we found the desire of applause immoral; when we crave it for trivial, or worse, for unworthy qualities. In the love of fame, as it usually appears in ambitious spirits, the cognate

element of pride is largely combined. Fame is valued because it is thought of as evidence of that eminency or superiority on which pride founds itself. The more extensive the fame the more pride values it, because the extent is more plausible evidence of greater superiority over one's fellows. The thought that he is applauded across the ocean seems to say that he must rise high indeed above nearly all the men on this side. So far as pride enters, the love of fame becomes an illicit affection and is imbued with sinful selfishness.

This affection has been supposed to involve two mysteries needing a solution by psychology. By what illusion is it that the lover of glory is pleased by an applause too remote to be heard by him; and why does he value posthumous fame, when his reason must tell him that it must be practically nought to him, he will have ceased to exist before it will be uttered?

#### Unheard Fame Valued—Why?

The first, I think, scarcely needs a solution. In every necessary sense of the word, the applause of the distant and absent is heard by the famous man. That is to say, his soul hears it. The belief that it is offered to his name at the remotest distance is an inward voice, sounding in his soul even more distinctly and sweetly than the shout of the mob in his bodily ears.

#### Desire of Posthumous Fame Explained.

The thirst for posthumous and even for immortal fame is more mysterious; yet none can doubt that it is the instinctive desire of the ambitious spirit. The ingenious demonstrations of the moralists concerning its absurdity have no more influence to correct it than to stay the flow of the tides. Dr. Thomas Brown argues very ingeniously that our idea of the ego, or self, unavoidably includes the conviction of our consciousness, because self-hood is only known to us in consciousness: I cannot think self, save as I think it conscious. Hence the mind is under a necessity, in order to connect anything in



the future with the ego in the thought, to connect it with the conscious ego. Though this conviction of that future consciousness be illusory, yet it is unavoidable. Hence if I think at all of men praising me after I am dead, I must think the me as still conscious of the praise, in spite of the customary expectation that after death I shall be conscious of nothing in this world. But I think a simpler explanation is found by bringing in the force of anticipation. The mind which rejoices to think of men's applauding it after death is under no illusion as to whether it will then hear that applause. It clearly believes it will not. But by anticipation the soul hears the future applause now. That is, now while still a conscious, observing inhabitant of this life. It then thinks that the praise will be uttered in the future, when it shall be absent. Is it any harder or more mysterious for him to think this, than for me to think the occurrence of some other event, say a prophecy fulfilled in the far future? But now the ambitious man's reason finds in that future praise, which he knows he will not be there personally to hear, a perfectly rational ground of pleasure. The fact that he will be remembered after others will be forgotten, foreknown in the reason, is the present evidence of his eminency. This is the ground of his gratified pride. The foreseen praise, remote in time, is construed by him precisely as the known contemporary praise, remote in place, was. The remoteness is accepted by his mind as the higher evidence of his superiority.

It would be interesting to raise the question, however, whether this desire of posthumous fame is not connected with man's deep expectation of immortality and craving for it. Does the ambitious man, when imagining his posthumous glory, really think that he will be ignorant of it, or that he will appropriate it only by the illusion Dr. Brown describes? Does he not rather expect to hear it then? This desire seems to be a result of man's expectation of future existence.

## CHAPTER VI.

## LOVE OF POWER—AMBITION—AVARICE.

## 1. The Exertion of Power Is Pleasure.

## Reprehensible and Laudable Ambition.

The next pair of feelings which we find to be elemental to man is the sensibility to pleasure in action, to a native satisfaction in the exertion of our native powers and the production of effects, with the consequent appetency—the desire of power or ambition. The animal analogue of this feeling is the instinctive pleasure which the healthy person, and especially youth, finds in mere muscular action. It is a pain to the child to be still; a native pleasure to move, a pleasure so positive that it makes little difference to the appetite whether the exertion results in anything else than the motion. That the mind feels the corresponding pleasure in the exertion of power is evident. To produce an effect ourselves is far more pleasing than to witness it as produced by another. Is the child pleased with the jingle of its new rattle in the hands of its nurse? That pleasure is soon superseded by the eager desire to have the toy in its own hand, and when the infant finds that he can produce the same effect, the pleasure is doubled. The boy sees his father aim a gun and hit a mark; he is almost in a craze to have the gun in his own hands and repeat the exploit. The same native appetency is found in the man. To exert power, to be efficient, is pleasing; impotency is a pain. I do not conceive that the desire of power over sentient things, or over our rational fellow-men, is anything else than this native appetency. When we crave to sway them, it is that we may make them our implements. That they are living and rational implements

instead of tools of wood or iron makes the exploit of wielding them only the more brilliant to our apprehension. To the boy the dumb watch is less a joy than the watch that moves. The living pony is more valuable than the wooden hobby-horse. These tools which he wields have the splendor of life, and the sympathy between life and life makes the exploit all the sweeter. When the ambitious man feels more elation in swaying his equals than in governing dolts, what is this but an extension of the same sentiment? This instinctive love of power is the central nucleus of the passion of ambition. Doubtless this, as it actually exists, is complex. The love of fame mingles with it. Pride arises and is gratified by large power because that power confers an eminency and implies superiority over the fellows controlled.

#### The Elements of Ambition.

No doubt selfishness may bring its own self-calculation to reinforce the lust of power, by the deliberate reflection that power may be so employed as to bring the means of gratifying many other desires besides pride and the lust of applause. Power is a means to get wine and luxurious meats and all sensual indulgences. Power commands money, "and money answereth all things." These elements, then, usually make up the feeling of ambition. The instinctive love of power, which we have just traced, pride, lust of applause, calculating selfishness, when they combine, present in strong natures one of the fiercest and most inextinguishable of human emotions and one of the most remorseless and malignant. Doubtless in the successful tyrant, fear and resentment combine to add fires to the ambition which prompted him to usurp the power. He repels with hatred and rage the supposed intrusion of a competitor for his prize of power. Conscious of the crimes he has committed against his fellows, he expects their resentment, and his fears enhance his cruel jealousies. The man has now gone downward until his wickedness resembles that of the fallen archangel, who judged it "better to reign in hell than serve in heaven."

**There Is a Lawful Ambition.**

But is the simple love of power necessarily evil? This cannot be asserted in the face of our knowledge. That it is an instinctive and immediate emotion shows that its implantation was the Creator's work. But He does nothing ineptly or thoughtlessly. Had there not been anywhere in human experience a lawful scope for this emotion, it would never have been implanted. Again, the pleasure in the successful exertion of faculty and production of effects is not, *per se*, inequitable or malignant. Why may it not be as innocent as the pleasure of muscular action, or of the smell of a flower? Again, the simple love of power has a useful and wholesome tendency to prompt man to activity. Power is given to be used. Power is the parent of effects. If effects are valuable, power, the parent, is legitimate, and the impulse which prompts to its use, while unperverted, must be innocent. If we may use the word "ambition" then, for the simple love of power, uncomplicated with pride, arrogance, calculating selfishness, resentment, hatred of rivals and fear, we may say that there is a laudable ambition. And we will not call it, with Milton in his "Lycidas," "the last infirmity of noble minds," but a virtue, the necessary and legitimate energizer of the soul to nobility, the useful handmaid of the imperial faculty of conscience. The love of power becomes sinful by being perverted into selfish ambition. Let it always aim at right, equitable ends, and it is innocent. This is, of course, hard for man to do. But to exterminate the elemental love of power wholly, if it were possible, would be to sink the soul into ignoble sloth and indolence. The only virtuous course that remains to us, then, is to watch ourselves, to chastise quickly every wrong impulse which seeks to mingle with our aspiration, and to have "all the ends we aim at our country's, our God's and truth's."

**2. Derivative and Complex Nature of Avarice  
or Covetousness.**

**Its Elements.**

Avarice, or covetousness, is not an original, but a derived

and complex emotion. It is popularly called "the love of money." Is it true, then, that among primitive communities that have no money the feeling can have no place? Far from it. Avarice loves money, not for its own original sake, but for its ascertained purchasing power. But for this coins or notes would attract men no more than other bright toys which give a slight æsthetic pleasure by their material beauty. Avarice is the love of wealth. Covetousness is the illicit desire of wealth. These feelings have attached themselves specially to money, because "money answereth all things." It is the exchangeable medium for procuring most of the things which men naturally desire. For this reason "money is power." Money is enabling. This fact shows us that the original love of power is one of the elements of that combination of feelings we call avarice. Another trait of resemblance to ambition appears when we notice that the love of distinction, or love of fame, is also an element of avarice. Wealth is a distinction; it makes a man talked of, it procures from the venal homage and admiration. Thus it gratifies pride and the love of applause. A sordid old man, who had no family to provide for, was asked: "Why do you deny yourself your ease and comfort to add field to field?" His answer was: "I desire when I die that the sale of my estate shall be the largest auction ever known in the county."

Do you ask then, why the miser often secretes his wealth and denies its existence, thus depriving himself of the fame of its possession? Because fear of robbery, another more pungent emotion, prompts his concealment—that is, when he speaks to those he suspects of designs on his wealth. It is a fact that the most suspicious miser, when complimented on his wealth by such persons as cannot be suspected of evil designs, is greatly pleased. The love of applause, then, and pride of eminency are another element of avarice. The third element which completes it is selfishness. Every bad man is selfish. It is his disposition to crave and seek his personal advantage and sensual pleasures inordinately and inequitably. Of course, then,

so soon as he learns from experience the enabling power of money, he desires it with a self-calculating desire which centers upon it any and every craving of selfishness. The foolish girl worships gay ribbons. Money buys ribbons. The ambitious statesman worships distinction and homage. Money buys them. The glutton worships his stomach. Money buys rich victuals. The man of taste delights in art. Money buys music and pictures. All of them crave increase of wealth. Money is soon found to be a prime agent for getting money.

These facts explain why covetousness is, to selfish men, so nearly the all-absorbing emotion. Being a complex one, and its object, wealth, being able to answer to nearly all the appetencies of a selfish soul (either in fact or in pretense), covetousness is able to include and combine nearly all the manifestations of evil selfishness. Hence it is, that inspiration pronounces it above all other wrong appetencies, idolatry. Hence the "love of money is a root [not the only root] of all evil." Of course it scarcely needs to be said that such a principle must be resisted and extinguished by a good man. The moralist justly points out several particular causes which make covetousness peculiarly treacherous and perilous. It is the dry rot of the soul. Not only do all other selfish affections enlist under it, and reinforce it, but the objects of avarice are concrete, material and ever-present; so that the sin is perpetually fed and stimulated. Again, most other vices are held in check by shame and the fear of reproach; "But men will praise thee when thou doest well to thyself."

#### All Desire of Wealth Not Avarice.

Do I mean to teach that all desire of property is morally evil? This position would meet the following objections: that in fact the most virtuous men, as Abraham and Washington, have disclosed a care for property, and labored to acquire, or at least preserve, it; that most disinterested men show distress at loss of property; that this money, which "answereth

all things," is the means of lawfully procuring not only the supplies of greedy selfishness, but the most legitimate and praiseworthy objects, food for our beloved children, healing for our beloved sick, alms for our suffering fellows, education for the immortal mind. Is it not right for us to desire these? Again, one element in the desire of wealth is the native love of power. We had to allow, notwithstanding the gigantic crimes of vicious ambition, that there may be an innocent desire of power. Once more, we found selfishness to be a prominent part of evil avarice; but there is a lawful appetency, the counterpart of selfishness—viz., the rational desire of our own well-being. May there not be an appetency for wealth, into which this may enter in place of sinful selfishness?

**The Lawful Desire, How Conditioned? Psychology Must Answer.**

We have to admit, then, that wealth may be desired within proper limits without committing sin. The all-important-question for the conscience is, What are those limits? Now the value of the simple and obvious analysis we have made appears. It is the plain answer: First, that the desire of wealth must not become inordinate, else it becomes wrong. That is, it must not usurp the place of other affections which are entitled to supersede it, the affections of conscience and the social love and sympathy which work beneficence and add to our fellows' happiness. Second, the desire of wealth must propose to itself only pure and just objects; the wealth must be looked at only as means for procuring such things as are worthy of a good man's desires. Third, the desire of wealth must never become inequitable. It must never be so greedy as to disregard the rights of others. Will it not be very difficult for any one to entertain a love of wealth and keep it within these just bounds? It will. But this is only one instance among many which show that virtue can only be attained at the price of the greatest vigilance and self-knowledge. Here we see the vital importance of the study of psychology, either practically or scholastically pursued. How can any man safe-

ly guide himself between the allowable desire of wealth and the sin of avarice, without the ability to analyze the elements of his own feelings, and separate the wrong from the right as we have done above?

### 3. Prodigality and Miserliness.

One phase of the vice of avarice remains to be examined. The explanation we have given makes it intelligible how the covetous man desires to gain in order to spend. Wealth is means to the ends of direct or immediate enjoyment. Means severed absolutely from the end cease to have any value. It is very natural, therefore, that avarice should exhibit that phase which Sallust describes in the Roman patrician: "*Alieni boni appetans, prodigus sui.*" The man who selfishly craves to spend must, of course, crave to get; otherwise his spending is arrested. Now there is a popular falsehood which contrasts the prodigal disposition with the covetous, as though the one excluded the other. There is a popular talk, as false as it is stupid, which claims the title of generous, or liberal, for the prodigal in his self-indulgence, while it reviles the careful and saving man as "stingy, close"; although the uses for which the careful man is reserving his possessions (reserving them at the cost of the most generous self-denial) may be splendidly disinterested. By this deceitful scale of speech, the greedy wretch whose extortion is peeling the widow and the orphan of their just pittance, in order that he may be able to waste his excessive hoards upon the most selfish sensual gratifications, shall be called liberal forsooth! because his money flows forth with a lavishness which is only the measure of his enormous selfishness; while that widow who is jealously reserving the pennies she has earned by her needle at the cost of her own hunger and nakedness, for the holy purpose of nourishing her fatherless babes, is the stingy one! Away with the wicked perversion. The truth is just opposite. Prodigality and avarice are kindred vices, so closely allied



that it may be safely said: no spendthrift is wasteful without covetousness, at least in the alternations of his career of vice.

**The Miser: His Paradox.**

But avarice in its extreme form, when the victim of the passion is called "miser," presents a curious anomaly. Whereas the only value of money is to use it rationally for procuring what will do us and our fellow-creatures good, this extreme avarice fixes on the coin so intense a love as to be incapable of spending it. Money thus loved has become wholly unfit to be an object of love; it is worthless. Yet at this stage it is loved the most. This looks like lunacy. Yet the miser is not in any other sense deranged. The name given by usage to this grade of the vice is significant, "miser," the miserable one. It estimates correctly the wicked perversion of the affection carried to this stage. It presents to psychologists a curious problem. How is it that the shrewd miser persists in a feeling essentially and utterly disappointing? How is it that he does not see that his love for his money, carried to this grade, has utterly annihilated the money's whole value? It is, in fact, a substitution of the means in place of the end, so absurd as to seem inexplicable save by the theory of monomania.

I think the solution usually given points in the right direction. The various and numerous pleasures, any one of which a given coin in the miser's hand might purchase, when added together make an aggregate much larger than any one pleasure that piece of money is sufficient to purchase in fact. But his selfishness comes to associate all these possible pleasures with that coin, until it becomes, in the miser's thought, more valuable than either or any one good thing he could exchange it for. Hence his reluctance to exchange it for either. Dr. Thomas Brown modifies the explanation thus; he builds on this feature of the case. The pleasure for which the coin is exchanged is consumed in the enjoying of it. But the coin continues to exist, now, unfortunately, the possession

of another man. The miser has, therefore, to compare the pleasure that he has annihilated, and which is forever lost to him, with the money which still exists, but the possession of which now rejoices another man. This thought puts him on the stool of repentance for having made the exchange; and it is the bitterness of this repentance which is associated with the mere idea of parting with money which makes it hateful to him. Doubtless this ingenious description is true of some instances. But that it is not true uniformly appears from this. In consuming a material good there is both pleasure and pain: pleasure in enjoying it; pain in seeing the enjoyment terminate. Now, suggestion might renew either. Why should it always renew the pain only? Even selfishness will not make it do so, for indulgence is as sweet to the selfish imagination as privation is bitter. This memory and suggestion might as naturally associate the pleasure with the idea of exchanging money for the good which money buys. The prodigal does make that very association, and he is as truly, perhaps as intensely, avaricious as the miser.

#### Associations Too Often Repeated Chafe.

I incline, then, to think the first explanation truer than Dr. Brown's. The prodigal and the miser are both avaricious, perhaps equally. The one of the two who happens to be of the more cautious, reflecting temper remembers that the piece of money may purchase one of several alternative pleasures. He compares the preciousness of these several purchasable pleasures; he deliberates; he hesitates, until, by association, the coin grows more precious in his imagination than either of the possible pleasures. He enjoys the possible exchange in the future by a species of anticipation and prefers to postpone the actual use of the money in the present. But I am persuaded that another important law of the associating faculty must be added to complete the explanation. The oftener a preferred train of thought is allowed to occupy the mind the more power of suggestion it has to occupy it again.

But when any image or emotion is presented too often, it becomes morbid. The mind is like the living flesh, which chafes under a friction too often repeated on the same spot. The image, too frequently recurrent, excites an exaggerated and unhealthy feeling. This law, we may remark in passing, explains the power of brooding melancholy, to enhance itself and to poison the peace of the mind, perhaps with the image of trivial evils. It also suggests the appropriate remedy, diversion of the morbid chain of association by new images and new feelings and duties. Now, we must remember that the thoughts which first stimulate thrift and saving are usually those of the evils of want and the miseries which destitution inflicts. Hence, the idea of spending comes to be associated with those possible future evils. As age approaches and the existence of the thrifty old man becomes more monotonous, these ever-recurrent thoughts of the evils of want which will be incurred by spending; of the blessed security against destitution which is gained by not spending; an evil and a happiness over which his thoughts have been brooding for a lifetime—these thoughts become morbid, and the reluctance to spend becomes irrational. It is a real monomania.

It has been often said that avarice is the old man's vice. In the form of miserliness it is; and the reason of this coincidence is given in the remark just made. But the young are not impervious to it. The proper safeguard is in the steady and systematic performance of the duties of beneficence and charity, not in luxury or profuseness. The prodigal may be intensely avaricious; the charitable man never.

## CHAPTER VII.

## THE SOCIAL AFFECTIONS.

## I. Nature of Love.

The word "love" is used in many varied senses, and it appears complicated with many other feelings. Many writers use it, evidently, in the sense of desire, as in the phrases: love of money; love of fame. But when I name it in this chapter as an original and elemental affection, I mean the social affection which fixes on human beings, or at least on rational beings, as its objects, and unites them in a benevolent social bond. Many selfish emotions usurp the name of love, but, properly speaking, it is that disinterested sensibility by which we feel an immediate delight in some sentient and rational creature. It is of the essence of this feeling to be both unselfish and happy. The flow of the sensibility makes us happy, but the anticipated happiness is not the prime cause of its flow; if it were, it would cease to be love and be a mere modification of selfishness. It is not self-calculation of our own advantage which originates the affection, but the power of Nature instituting a relevancy between our disposition of soul and the qualities of the object loved.

## Philanthropy.

To understand the wide range of this all-important affection, you must recall the fact I established at the outset. Feelings may be very calm and yet essentially feelings. Thus there may be many degrees or phases of love, varying widely in equanimity or violence. The rightly constituted mind feels a true, though quiet, love for all men as men so far as known to him, in so far as the affection is not counterbalanced by opposing causes. The mere fact that they are men, sentient

like ourselves, capable of the bliss of a happy existence or the anguish of an evil one, clothed with the admirable gifts of reason, conscience and emotion, this should allure our interest to them, even irrespective of the blemish of their moral defects. This is that philanthropy which animates the good man, the John Howard, the Morrison and Judson, to labor even for the welfare of foreigners and heathen antipodes, the noble reflection of that divine philanthropy which made the Son of God "so love the world." The noblest human souls are least confined in their philanthropy by artificial limits. But love appears in warmer degrees for fellow-citizens, for neighbors, for friends, for near kindred, for benefactors, for husbands and wives, for children. These phases of the affection are marked by other elements of feeling which mingle with them, but we must delay their description until the simple affection of love is more fully analyzed.

#### The Resulting Appetency Benevolence.

Love, as the immediate sensibility of delight in its object, like so many other of our sensibilities, reacts in its appropriate appetency. This takes here two closely connected forms: one is the desire of the welfare of the object loved; the other, the desire of response from the object loved. These characterize love as benevolence (*bene volens*), the beneficent affection. How closely and unavoidably they spring out of the instinctive delight we take in the object appears from a moment's thought. Can one delight in a friend and not crave to have the friend delight in him? Or can he have this immediate, disinterested delight in this friend and not crave to minister happiness to him? The two must go together. The benevolent affection then finds its natural, active expression in seeking to confer some happiness on the friend it loves, and this ministry of beneficence is the means Nature selects to awaken the loving response which love craves. There is the beautiful rationale of the complex affection. The loving mother finds her chief and most spontaneous joy in providing

joys for her child, and the enjoyment of these love-given blessings is the chief stimulant to the heart of the ingenuous child to love his mother again. But let us not think that this labor of beneficence on the mother's part finds its primary motive in the calculated and selfish desire to purchase the coveted response of the child's heart. This would be to invert the facts of consciousness and put the effect for the cause. The blessed commerce of the affections is not a sordid barter and sale of this kind. No, the mother craves to bless her child simply and directly because she loves him. The recompense of his love is indeed precious to her when it is returned, but its sweetness would be all dashed and soured to her heart by the thought that she had bought it with a mercenary motive and that it was bestowed from a mercenary motive in his heart. The proof is that this mother will go on, sadly indeed, yet no less diligently, in the labor of blessing for the child she loves, notwithstanding his cruel refusal of his gratitude and love to her. If love is mercenary, it is not love.

#### Spurious Loves Exposed.

This is the place to detect and to stigmatize those selfish counterfeits which often usurp the sacred name of love. Selfishness has fixed its hot eye on the object, as the bird of prey on its victim, and the pretender does from selfish, not from disinterested, motives covet to appropriate the affection and the exclusive possession of the object. Stealing the livery of true love, he does indeed pretend to the practice of all the acts of benevolence towards the object, and seems to be assiduous to minister to its happiness. But this is only the mercenary price he is paying for his own selfish end, the coveted possession and its selfish enjoyment. When it is safely his own, he soon teaches it, by his unreasonable exactions and unjust jealousies, that his feeling was selfishness, instead of love. Woe to the heart of the victim which lacks the wisdom necessary to detect the fiend in the angel's livery. So the response to disinterested love and its beneficence may be also a base

counterfeit. The recipient may mistake gratified vanity and selfishness for responsive love. He or she may value the friend's beneficence precisely as the greedy animal values the manger out of which it gets its food, as the avaricious man values the hoard which yields him the semi-annual gain, and may falsely call this selfish pleasure grateful love.

## 2. Love of Benevolence and Love of Moral Complacency; Gratitude.

I have said that the immediate delight in the object, which is the central sensibility in love, must presuppose some appropriateness or correspondence between the disposition of the loving soul and the traits in the object for which it is loved. To show this, it is enough to remark that no man loves indifferently any or every person, any more than he finds æsthetic beauty in any and every mass of matter. Now these traits which elicit love may be either natural or moral. Hence arises a necessary distinction in our affection which philosophers have marked by the terms, love of benevolence and love of moral approbation or complacency. The distinction is just and unavoidable. Here is a mother who has two sons, one ungrateful and reprobate, the other filial, righteous and devoted. She loves them both, but with a consciously different species of affection. She loves the reprobate son in spite of his ill-desert of her kindness; her heart yearns toward him, not because he has moral desert, but in spite of his moral ill-desert, because he is her son, because he has been the dear object of so many of her cares, because, perhaps, of the recollection of the many natural graces of body and wit which once pleased the maternal heart. But she loves the good son, not only with this kindness, but with the full moral sanction of the conscience for his virtues and deserts. We are compelled to carry this distinction even into the loves of God, or else make His own declarations contradictory. "God is angry with the wicked every day." "Do not I hate the workers of iniquity, saith the Lord." "God commendeth his

love towards us, in that while we were yet sinners he gave his Son to die for us." This hatred and this love must be of different orders. The hatred is moral reprehension for their sinfulness. The love is the love of benevolence, breathing kindness and pity in spite of their odious ill-desert. How different, again, must this phase of love in God be from the affection He feels for His own divine Son, who is not only a sentient object of kindness to His Father's benevolence, but the object of delight to His holiness. The distinction is just. Let us understand, then, by the love of benevolence, that beneficent pleasure which the loving heart feels in the object, and that desire for its well-being which is felt irrespective of moral approval for it, and by the love of moral complacency, that affection which, including the former, adds to it the delight of conscience in the excellent virtues of the object. Obviously the latter is the nobler affection. It satisfies the whole soul, the heart and conscience.

#### Gratitude Defined.

What, now, is gratitude? I answer, in its genuine form it is the answering love awakened by benefactions. In all continuing love gratitude mingles, enhancing the brightness and happiness of the mutual bond. How blessed is this structure of the virtuous affections, which not only gives us each separate act in the intercourse of benevolence to enjoy as it passes by us, but also adds that act to the treasury of incentives which yields us further revenue of happiness in the increase of mutual love. When we enjoy material goods, we consume them in enjoying them. The superior blessedness of the riches of the affections is that the same ministry of benevolence which we have enjoyed survives as a part of our capital stock, in the grateful memory, to yield its continuous increase. But the gold may have its counterfeit always. There may be a selfish pleasure simulating gratitude, which values and applauds the benefactor, not for his virtue of benevolence, but for his utility to us. Of this spurious plea-



ure the definition of the sarcastic Frenchman may be correct: "Gratitude, the pleasing expectation of future benefits." The correct analysis shows that ingratitude is an odious vice of the heart. It is supremely inequitable, for it denies to the benefactor a right to the return which he has purchased by his kindness. It is the most odious manifestation of selfishness. It is aggravated as a sin against another's love by the disinterestedness of the affection it injures.

#### Love the Fulfilling of the Law.

This practical value of the affection of love is seen in its natural appetency—viz., to seek the well-being of the object. "Love is the fulfilling of the law"; "Worketh no ill to its neighbor." Love extinguishes all practical ill-doing, and prompts to all right efforts for our fellow-men's good. Therefore could love only reign in full force, all the reciprocal duties of man to his fellow-man would be performed spontaneously. It is not supposed that all the right affections can be analyzed into love, so as to show that this is the sole element of all virtues. Our study of ethics will show us how preposterous would be the result of that sweeping theory. But in all the practical commerce of life, love would be the sufficient regulator if guided by intelligence and conscience.

### 3. Kinds of Love—Patriotism and Friendship, Conjugal and Parental Love.

As we rise now from the calm and diffused feeling of general philanthropy to the warmer and more special affections of patriotism, friendship, conjugal love, parental love, we find other elements combine with simple love. Friendship finds special stimulus in a congeniality of tastes, pursuits and moral judgments. Where it is not grounded in the love of moral complacency and in warm moral respect it is a counterfeit, which deserves to be called rather a confederacy in selfishness than true friendship. Patriotism is usually a very complex feeling. If it is not a total perversion of the

virtuous affection, it must be grounded in a feeling of disinterested philanthropy for our fellow-citizens. But if that were all, our patriotism would have to be cosmopolitan—*i. e.*, not patriotism—in order to be disinterested. Other active principles come in to limit and intensify the affection: similarity of language, race, and modes of thought and feeling; common interests; the ties of a thousand proud associations of country and ancestors; the local associations of the familiar and beloved scenery, the plains, the mountains, the streams, the homes, the cemeteries, to which our hearts are knit by a thousand tender bonds of suggestion. Doubtless the more impure elements of pride and ambition join with the others, in all but the purest souls. Our national pride makes us take pleasure in those who exhibit the same elation with ours, and thus gratify our sympathies. Their echo of the same national opinions with which our intellectual pride has connected itself, pleases us. These fellow-citizens are the persons from whom we hope for the boon of power and fame. Is patriotism then moral? There have been philosophers who professed so sublimated a creed as to answer, No. They argue that if the men who by accident of birth occupy the same soil with us receive any warmer share of our philanthropy than the rest of mankind, that warmer affection is robbery of those whom we love less because they are farther off. Thus we can only be patriots by being inequitable. This argument receives its whole plausibility from the criminal exaggeration of the virtue of patriotism so common among mankind, which hated other races, simply because they were not their own, and because they were separated from them by a language, a river, or an artificial boundary line. Such is too often the ferocious abuse which sinful men make of a legitimate affection, as the Greek counted all men *βάρβαροι* who did not speak their tongue; and as both they and the other ancients generally judged that the national relation between them and any other nation with whom no formal treaty or truce existed was one of warfare and plunder. Our philanthropy ought to

be cosmopolitan to the extent of rebuking and abhorring that perversion of patriotism; we ought to extend it sufficiently to adopt that code of sentiments and international relations which Moses was the first writer of the "law of Nature and nations" ever to enounce (Deut. i. 16; x. 18, 19); and that a thousand years before pagan philosophy ever conceived it. But the other extreme is unnatural, and therefore not reasonable. Man is a finite creature, and his affections must in some measure limit themselves. If he were as infinite as God, he might literally have cosmopolitan affections. To require us to love the men across the ocean as warmly as the fellow-citizens of our own commonwealth is a milder form of the absurdity, which should require us to love the children of all other men as tenderly as our own.

**Small States Most Patriotic: Why? Therefore Federation Is Best.**

The examination we have made of the nature of patriotism shows that it must be much more intense in smaller states than in large ones, and between homogeneous races than between heterogeneous. Nowhere did the flame of patriotism burn so hotly as in the little kingdoms and republics of Greece. Every element of patriotism is intensified by the compactness of the commonwealth, the feeling of nearness to one's fellow-citizens, the knitting of the associations with the natural scenery, the sympathy of common beliefs and interests. The Spartan could not remain patriotic out of sight of the mountains of Laconia and Arcadia, the Switzer when he has forgotten his Alps. Now warm and generous patriotism is the prime element of a state's strength, progress and glory. A people without an impassioned patriotism is but a gigantic horde, gregarious like the beasts, rather than social, welded together by tyranny or the mercenary greed for gain and material good, regarding their country as a good field for the practice of legislative plunder or of rapid money-getting, rather than a center of proud affections and loyalty. Here we have an argument in the very facts of philosophy for

preferring a confederated over a consolidated body of states. It has been the small states, Israel, Tyre, Greece, Old Rome, Switzerland, Holland, England, Scotland, Virginia, which have made their impress upon the world's history for good, and for free civilization. When Rome after the Punic wars became a large, consolidated democracy, she became the curse and incubus of mankind; and under her brute weight, the civilization of the old world fell crushed. Small states are the homes of efficient patriotism. But, on the other hand, the world has grown too large to make it desirable to have its system of nations formed of a multitude of little, separate, rival commonwealths, each pursuing its own interests without any umpire between them. The result would be too constant strifes. Here there is a vast dilemma. The solution is found in the principle of confederation. By this the commonwealth retains its sovereignty, its self-government and its vigorous patriotism; while its federal relations form a permanent bond of coöperation with its neighbors, and combines their common strength against foreign aggression. In such a happy federation the particular patriotism of the citizen for his own commonwealth must be first and warmest, even as the love of the most philanthropic parent for his own children and kinsmen must be nearer and warmer than the kindness which he feels for the children of others. But for this very reason he will be the more staunch and self-sacrificing in joining for the defense of the whole neighborhood. Both wisdom and justice make him know that when a neighborhood is assailed by an invader, the brave defense of all the families at once is the defense of each—and of his own. Thus in the earlier history of our federation, the citizens of the states evinced their loyalty to the whole Union by baptizing with their blood every battle-field which the common enemy invaded. But our fathers did not profess to detach their warmest affections from their own commonwealths, and to expand them equally to all the others, as designing men not seldom demanded of them while seeking the narrowest and most selfish local advantages, under the pre-

tense of universal and impartial patriotism. Compliance with such demands is impossible; it is forbidden by the philosophy of man's nature. Such an expansion of patriotism would practically mean the dissolution of its bonds. Were obedience to this insolent demand possible, the ulterior result would be to replace the impulses of the true, just and generous patriotism by the bonds of brute force and sordid self-interest, which feebly connect the parts of some huge, heterogeneous "*colluvies gentium*," which is one only in name and in power of oppression. Such imperial masses have represented in history rather the gregariousness of some vast horde of animals than the beneficent, enlightened and progressive society of civilized men.

**Fraternal Affection: Is It Instinctive? The Conjugal.**

The fraternal and filial affections are probably to be accounted for as friendships of exceeding closeness, cemented by early intimacy long continued, by close sympathies of opinion and habits of thought and feeling, favored by the common education and cohabitation and by the multiplied offices of beneficence begetting gratitude and natural love. It was long the fashion to teach that these affections, like the parental, included also a *στροφή* or instinctive, but infallible, animal attachment, propagated through the community of blood. I doubt whether psychology supports this. The *στροφή*, if it exists, is an instinct, which does not reason, which is modified by no provocation, and does not wait for benefits or attractions. So it is in the mother as to her infant. But the brother's affection for a brother is extinguished by absence or injury, as in the case of other friendships. The conjugal affection is distinct, even where it exists in its purest form, from all other friendships. It is reinforced by the peculiar attachment which attracts the sexes to each other. Doubtless the Former of our spirits has provided for the existence of the conjugal friendship also, by making the spiritual nature of woman complementary to that of man in so many respects; her tenderness supplying what was lacking to the ruggedness of his strength,

and the quickness and tact of her mind and feelings completing his slower reason. Each finds in the other what he lacks in himself. Add to this a perfect community of interests, consequent on their oneness before the law, their long association in ministries of mutual help, and in common anxieties and affections, and the supreme band of a joint parental love for their common children; and we have what ought to be, and what is, in virtuous, well-mated marriage, the strongest and happiest of all affections between equals.

#### Parental Love.

But it is in parental, and especially in maternal, love that the emotion appears in its purest and strongest earthly form. It is a *στροφή* as truly in the human as in the animal parent, a native instinct. It embraces the little stranger as soon as he appears, without waiting to ask any questions as to his attractiveness or merits; and that love cleaves to him through life, in spite of faults, with a pure disinterestedness, which asks no reward but the happiness of ministering to his welfare. The evident design of this affection has been seen by every thoughtful mind. It displays the intentional handiwork of a wise and benevolent Creator. In all the animals this "final cause" is seen, in that, whereas the young begin their existence in a more or less helpless state, their safety and growth are provided for by the maternal love and care. The animal has only a temporary, instinctive affection, which, as the offspring approaches maturity, dies down into unconsciousness and forgetfulness. But in the human mother the affection is both instinctive and rational; as sleepless and as continuing as the reasoning spirit, and combining all the might of the passionate instinct with the intelligence and consistency of mind. Note now that the human young, the little object of this love, is at once the most important of sentient beings born into existence, and the most helpless, the most completely dependent upon others' care for existence. As the mother's care and nourishment are more essential than the father's, her love is made

quicker, more vigilant and self-sacrificing than his. Did this strange concurrence come by chance? Does it act as invariably in every case by mere chance?

There is delight in loving. The sentiment not only seeks to confer delight on its object, but it is a delight to its subject. When we consider that love is the beneficent affection, we see a beautiful contrivance by which our Maker offers us this premium for doing good to our fellows.

#### 4. Sympathy.

We have already seen and discarded the attempt to resolve sympathy into the simple sensibility to pain and pleasure modified by association (page 9). We were convinced that there is an elemental sympathy, however associations of thought may combine with it and stimulate it. It is the instinctive glow of sensibility caused by simply witnessing another's feeling. It is the reflected warmth kindled in the soul by merely being set over against the original glow of another's soul imbued with feeling. One of the points whence we argued that sympathy was not mere association was, that we can sympathize with a form of feeling which we have yet not directly felt ourselves. Perhaps we are prepared to sympathize more warmly after our own experience of the affection, but, obviously, no man would sympathize with a feeling of which his nature left him incapable. The man whose blindness forbade his feeling the sensuous beauty of a rose might indeed be glad in a general sense that his friend was gladdened with the sight of that beautiful rose, but he could not expressly sympathize in that æsthetic pleasure of the friend with eyes. The word "sympathize" (*συμπάδίζω*), to be affected along with our fellow, expresses the nature of the sensibility. It is an immediate affection of the soul, having no other antecedent than our cognition, especially where mediated by the vision of the fellow-man's feeling. It is not even necessary that we have intellection of the rational cause of the feeling we witness, or that our own judgment concurs with

the other's as to the sufficiency of that cause, although these cognitions may strengthen and prolong the sympathy. Observation and consciousness confirm this. We should be saddened by tears we saw a helpless person shed before we learned their cause, or excited by a quarrel we witnessed before we understood its merits. The mother consoles tenderly the petty grief of her child while she smiles at its childish cause, justifying her concern with the maxim: "Little things are great to little men." This immediacy of the feeling brings it into close analogy to the sympathetic *στροφῆ* of the animals. Indeed, the horse and the dog evidently sympathize with their master's excitement.

#### We Sympathize with All Feelings.

Perhaps a more important thing is to show that the principle of sympathy includes, not only the feeling of grief, but all the other emotions which excite our fellow-men. We mislead ourselves by reason of the prominence of our sympathy with grief almost into forgetting that grief is not the only *πάθος* of the human soul. Let us ask ourselves if there is any reason why this sympathetic law should be limited in social beings to one excitement alone? Would it not be unnatural if it were? But the appeal must be again to consciousness, and that teaches us that we do sympathize, more or less, with all feelings. We enter a room where our friends are laughing, and we are ourselves smiling before we have received the answer to our question: "Friends, what is the jest?" We see two men on the street fighting; we share some of their excitement as we look on. We perceive that our friends are fearful; we become fearful by sympathy, and sometimes we share their panic without knowing for ourselves any object of panic so as to have a genuine "stampede." We have been looking at apprehended evils until our judgment tells us they will not fail to overtake us, yet the company of more hopeful friends consoles us with some sympathetic share of their hope, though they have no argument to change our



judgment as to the coming evil. Sympathy is a direct spiritual contagion; it may catch some degree of the warmth of any feeling which possesses our fellow.

**The Attendant Appetency, Desire to Help.**

The next important feature which we notice in this feeling is the appetency which follows the involuntary sensibility. This is an active desire to take part in and aid our fellow-man's emotion. If his emotion is grief, the appetency takes the form of the desire to succor him. If it is the ludicrous, we desire to laugh with him. When this desire to help has been gratified, it gives us a certain pleasure, in the relief of the sympathetic tension. Some false analysts hence argued that this foreseen pleasure was the cause of this whole sympathetic movement, and that, therefore, this feeling, despite its appearance of disinterestedness, is but a form of selfishness. Consciousness refutes this analysis, for it tells me that the motive which prompted me to succor the distressed was the simple desire to help a fellow, and not any regard to the advantage I should myself gain in having my sympathetic tension relieved. Reason confirms. For on this plan how could I have been moved to the first act of help before I knew by experience whether the result would be pleasing to myself or not?

Reflection will easily show us that this important feeling will appear in many modifications and in many interesting forms. Of course, we admit that sympathy may, by association, suggest kindred feelings, combined with them, and thus give rise to very complex emotions. The widow who was bereaved months ago, and who has found calmness in the consolations of time, we will say for example, has her sympathy first excited by the wail of a newly made widow. Then suggestion may revive, by the associative tie of resemblance, her own grief, and she may weep again, not only for her neighbor's, but for her own loss. So sympathy with the orator's emotion may serve as a suggestive step to the raising

of the corresponding emotion in the hearer, which would not have arisen at all, or only feebly, by the rational presentation of the appropriate object to the mind alone. The sympathy awakened by another's remorse may, by suggestion, start the spectator's own conscience and make him also feel for his own sins. Thus, sympathy is the orator's right arm in dealing with the feelings of his hearers. Hence, genuine and profound feeling in the speaker himself is the prime condition of his power. Horace: "*Si vis me flere, dolendum est primum tibi ipsi.*"

#### Emulation and Imitation Modes of Sympathy.

But there are two forms in which sympathy presents itself, which are so usually overlooked that I wish to call special attention to them, emulation and imitation. There is an emulation which Sacred Scripture speaks of as one of the evil works of carnality, a phase of envy, a complex of pride, selfishness and malice, which desires the failure and disparagement of our fellow. Is all emulation of this species? If so, it is always a criminal emotion. So not a few moralists have held; for instance, many parents and teachers have asserted that it is positively immoral to appeal to emulation as a stimulus in the young, by competitive prizes. But our common sense and consciousness refuse to concur in this. We hear the same Sacred Scripture advise Christians to "provoke one another to good works." We feel a species of emulation and witness it in the most amiable and ingenuous, which is not envy, and does not crave to pull our competitor down. The solution of this interesting problem is in this—viz., sympathy has communion with all the feelings, not with grief only. Why may we not sympathize with our neighbor's energy? This is the true analysis of that emulation or spirit of competition which is lawful. It is simply sympathy with exhibited energy. Sympathy is a legitimate, a benevolent, an impersonal and unselfish emotion. This form of emulation does not desire to pull its rival back, but to keep pace with

him and share his honorable triumph. It does not begrudge him his success, but craves to imitate it.

This suggests the other principle, imitation, which is so powerful an appetency in all human beings, and especially in the young. The main lever of education and the main incentive to new actions is this instinctive desire to do what we witness our fellows doing. A moment's reflection shows us that this is but one of the calmer forms of sympathy. As we saw, every human action betrays some feeling. The action is also an index or disclosure of the feeling which motives it. The calm temperature of feeling may infuse in the spectator a calm sympathy. As we witness our fellow's action we catch the infection of the motive that prompts him, and we imitate him. This is the simple solution. Perhaps no one has observed the phenomena of sympathy with more care than, or described them with as much fullness and elegance as, Adam Smith in his "Theory of the Moral Sentiments." Along with a multitude of ingenious observations on the forms in which sympathy appears, he gives us there his bold attempt to generate from it all our moral sentiments, to resolve all the emotions of conscience into mere phases of sympathy. Many have shown, as Dr. Brown and Jouffroy, that this analysis is faulty and even absurd. That most original and important and supreme set of emotions cannot be thus explained away; they remain, in spite of Dr. Smith's ingenuity, an independent and distinct power of the soul.

The final cause of sympathy is beautifully obvious in all its phases. It is to bind man in social beneficence, to multiply his joys, to provide a relief for his pains, to make beneficence pleasurable.

**CHAPTER VIII.****THE MORAL FEELINGS.****1. Elemental and Ineradicable Character of Moral  
Approbation and Disapprobation.**

Every feeling, as we saw, is conditioned on the presence before the intellect of an appropriate cognition. "Feeling is the temperature of thought." We have taught in the course of ethics, that the ethical judgment, which discriminates between the right and the wrong, is a rational one, an act of the intuitive intelligence. On this judgment immediately arises a peculiar feeling, a spiritual emotion, distinct from all the other elemental emotions. For want of an apter word, we call it by the Latin name of "approbation," and its antithetic feeling "disapprobation." The word may be expressive rather of the judicial function of the mind than of the emotive. But we mean by it the feeling which attends the judgment. The best way to settle the point as to our having such a moral emotion is to question our own consciousness carefully. Let us take a clearly pronounced case of virtue (or vice), that the mental affections may be distinct and strong. We will say that we witness an act of noble and self-denying probity, which costs the actor dear, and from which plausible temptations dissuade him; but he goes firmly to its performance. What says our reason of it? That he has done right, and is therefore well-deserving in that act. This, abstracted from all accessories, would be simply a judgment of a truth. But does it retain the coldness, the mere mental dryness of such a judgment as this: that in division increasing the divisor must diminish the quotient; that the magnet attracts iron; that gold is even heavier than lead? This question shows us the differ-

ence. We feel that the judgment of this noble action cannot remain cold and dry, like one merely logical; that there goes along with it an immediate, a warm, and an inspiring feeling also, by which we admire the man of probity. We *judge* him right, but *feel* him lovable. This rational emotion is a happy and elevating one. It is intuitively different from all our other emotions, even from the feeling of beauty, in that it is obligatory. If a man shows me a lily, or recites me a Miltonic sonnet, and I do not care to admire the beauty, there is no blame. But if I am insensible to that righteous action, and indifferent, I know that there is blame. My indifference is a moral defect; it is a subject of self-accusation and just reprehension. The ethical is the imperative judgment and emotion; the lawful (though not always the actual) queen of the reason and the heart.

**Moral Reprehension from the Same Central Principle.**

Our disapprobation of the evil or wrong action is the antithetic emotion; and let me repeat the truth, that its rise is due, not to a second disposition instinctive in the soul, but one and the same. This not only does, but must, act as an aversion to the evil, by the reason that it acts as an attraction to the good. It is like the magnetic needle, whose upper end is repelled from the south pole of this earth by the same magnetic energy which attracts it to the north pole. If a man were to tell you that on witnessing a noble virtue he did feel a glow of admiration, but that on witnessing the opposite crime he felt no reprehension whatever, that he was too amiable to feel so, you would reply that he was deceiving himself; that it was impossible to be so, as impossible as for the needle to be true to the north pole, and yet have in its north end no repulsion for the south pole. The emotion of moral reprehension is as purely disinterested as that of moral admiration. There is therefore a moral hatred which is pure and righteous.

**The Attendant Appetency Desire to Reward. Conscience What?**

The moral emotion in its first phase ranks as a sensi-

bility (the noblest of all), in that it arises immediately and involuntarily on the view of the object—*i. e.*, the virtuous action. Like the other sensibilities, it has its corresponding appetency, or active desire. This takes the kindred forms of desire to see the righteous duly rewarded, and the wicked righteously punished. The latter, if pure, is as disinterested and unmalicious as the former. The hungering and thirsting after righteousness and the aversion from evil-doing are one. Is there anything different in the emotions of conscience? I reply, No. You all know that we apply the term “conscience” to that power by which we judge our own affections and actions as right or wrong. It is very plain that the candid conscience judges its own virtue or sin by the same faculty as its neighbors’. The problem is of precisely the same kind; why imagine a different rational faculty to judge it? But one may say: Is not the emotional part different? Are not self-approbation and remorse far keener than the moral feelings for our neighbor’s virtue or sin? They are, usually; but this is sufficiently explained by these facts. I know that I am responsible for my own virtues and vices as I am not for my neighbor’s; and the emotions of desire for my own well-being (if I am a bad man, the perversion thereof, selfishness) combine their force with the moral emotions.

#### Conscience Indestructible.

The next important thing for the young to learn is, that conscience is indestructible. It may be seared, it cannot be eradicated. When the hand is seared, the cuticle above the nerves is thickened so as to protect the nerve-filaments from the sting of the susceptibility to heat. That is all. Are the nerves extirpated? Not in the least; they cannot die unless the organ dies. Let the blacksmith wear gloves until the skin returns to the natural tenderness, and he feels the anguish of the hot iron, just as when he was a child. The simile is just. A sinful will or habitude of sinning may dull the voice of conscience for a time; but when these circumstances are removed, conscience is felt just as before, only she has a longer

and heavier catalogue of sins with which to scourge the soul. This always eventuates so, because this moral faculty is a fundamental and constitutive power of the soul. It can only be extirpated by that Almighty hand which created and which alone can annihilate our spirits. A man may educate himself out of his old tastes and old habits. He can never educate away his conscience. "The worm dieth not."

## 2. The Moral Feeling When Combined with Others.

### In Ingenuous and Selfish Repentance.

As we should expect, the moral emotion combines in many ways with other feelings. It mingles with our natural desire of applause. It gives the element of our feeling of lawful resentment. It combines with a simple instinctive love, to generate the highest and best of the social affections. It seconds our instinctive sympathy, especially when the affection sympathized with is our neighbor's sorrow. It degenerates into pride. It appears as the main element in the grace of humility. But we have only time to trace it into two of its other manifestations, ingenuous and selfish repentance *μετανοία, μεταμέλεια* so often and so perilously confounded by us. That there is a selfish repentance, or rather, regret, after transgression, we all, alas! know too well. What is its nature? The central element is, no doubt, remorse, or the involuntary reprehension of self. Here, let me remark, appears the justice of our classing the primary moral emotions among the passive sensibilities, and not among the active appetencies of the will. For if remorse were not such, it would be impossible that we should exhibit the result which so unfortunately appears sometimes in our history. Remorse is pungently felt, and yet the appetencies and choice continue to go their ways after the very sins which awaken remorse. We feel the remorse not because we wish, but against our wish, because we are guilty and cannot help feeling our guilt. Were the feeling a voluntary appetency, it would surely have some power to expel the sin. The other elements which combine in this

futile after-regret are fear and shame: fear looking forward to anticipated penalty; and shame smarting under the supposed contempt of our fellows, which we know our sins tend to provoke. But fear and shame are both merely personal, or self-interested feelings; not therefore positively wrong, yet as thoroughly non-moral, as thoroughly devoid of purifying power, as hunger and thirst. This after-regret may then be wholly selfish. It implies no return to the good; it is but an unhealthy torment to the soul. Yet how often do we take solace and even credit to ourselves, because we feel this worthless sorrow after sinning! Let us examine ourselves and no longer cheat ourselves. In describing the true or ethical sorrow for wrong-doing, I shall not represent its subject as insensible to remorse or fear or shame. He would be unnatural if he were. But there is added another and an essential element. To the involuntary sensibility of self-blame is added the appropriate active appetency in both its forms of aversion to the evilness of his own wrong-doing, and desire for, and delight in, the contrasted right-doing. Thus the penitent feels a complacency in, and love for, the righteousness which he has disobeyed, and a true loathing for his transgression, not merely because it threatens him with danger and reproach, but chiefly because it is opposed to the right, in which he now delights. This is repentance; and its genuine element, being not merely an involuntary sensibility, but a voluntary and right appetency, is efficacious in extirpating former sins, not only outwardly, but in principle. It is the most appropriate and the most hopeful affection which can visit the transgressor's soul. But let us not commit the fatal mistake, because it is fit and hopeful, of making it a ground of merit or self-esteem, as though it had expiated faults and created a claim of reward. No just desert can be founded on an affection of soul whose central element is the profoundly sincere judgment and feeling of one's own ill-desert. This would be as though a man should claim to whiten himself by the energy with which he was



protesting his own blackness; if we are conscious of the true repentance, this is ground for hope, but not for boasting.

### 3. Resentment or Legitimate Anger.

Under the moral emotion is best discussed that of resentment, or legitimate anger; for to me it seems a modification of the feeling of moral reprehension, as combined with the desire of existence. Some writers would insist that resentment is an independent and original affection, not resolvable by analysis into any other. But this seems an unnecessary multiplication of the elements of human feelings. I would rather say that resentment is undoubtedly an immediate and instinctive feeling, because it is surely a combination or fusing together of two such feelings. If we ask our consciousness, What are the elements? we find two: a vivid reprobation of the assault made on us, as unjust and wrong; and the instinct of self-preservation, vividly excited by the presentation of that which endangers our existence, or, at least, our well-being. In lawful resentment, at least, the rise of the feeling seems conditioned on a moral or ethical judgment that the assailing agency is not only dangerous, but unjust. Thus, a falling limb of a tree may be as threatening as the blow of a human arm. But no one dreams that the falling wood is a proper object of anger. So if a rational agent has done or threatened something hurtful, when we perceive that the hurt was unconscious or unintentional on the agent's part, we judge no case for rational anger. I may be asked, How then does the rider become rationally angry with his vicious horse that bites or kicks? I answer: This affection, which we often unthinkingly allow, is to be accounted for partly by an illusion through which we slide into an ascription of morally evil intention to the irrational animal. We are cheated into the judgment which on reflection we know is false (that the horse is a person and is capable of personal wrong against us) because of the close analogy between the appearances of his hurtful act and that of a rational person. Again, the enter-

tainment of a **species** of resentment against the horse is rationally justified to some extent by another judgment—viz., that the horse, though not a person and a proper subject for retribution, is a **creature of habit**, which may be usefully deterred from attempting future hurt, by the retorted pain he is made to feel. May we not add, that a part of our excitement is accounted for by the law of sympathy; that we get a part of the animal's excitement by that infection, seeing that we are also animals? But do I hold that in strict reason injurious brutes are not proper objects of lawful resentment? The hurts they threaten do reasonably excite our desire for existence, but not our moral reprehension; and the more we are under the government of reason, the more do we place the biting dog or kicking horse in the class of the falling limb, toward which it is irrational to nurse resentment, although we do fear and shun the hurt, perhaps with keen feeling. In good reason are these beasts any more proper objects of resentment when they hurt us than the stone or block which the foolish child beats with rage when he has bruised himself upon it? I conclude that if we choose loosely to call the excitement of simple fear and pain, arousing the instinctive desire for being and for well-being, by the name of resentment, then we may speak of resentment against irrational animal agents, and against blocks that bruise us. But if we wish to use the word "resentment" in its rational sense, we direct it only against the rational unrighteous agents. It is a combination of two immediate emotions, moral reprehension and the desire to protect our own being and well-being, stimulated by rational fear of injury.

#### The Attendant Appetency and Final Cause of Resentment.

The well-known effect of resentment is to stimulate and strengthen the soul. Our powers of self-defense are roused and increased. The angry man is said to be far stronger even in muscle than the same man placid; so the will, intensely energized by the anger, communicates unwonted stimulus to the

very nerves. He is also much bolder, stopping less to count the risks of the action of defense and to hesitate at consequences. The immediate action to which the emotion of anger points is defense against the aggression. It is for this the soul is energized by resentment. One more remark is important. Even lawful resentment is painful. There is no legitimate pleasure in it. The rightly constituted soul, even when assured by conscience it did well to be angry, feels that it was a calamity to have been made angry. He joins in the experience of the plain countryman who was yet a true philosopher: "He made me so angry that it hurts me."

#### Resentment When Righteous.

Now of this feeling I remark, first, that it may be morally right. It is instinctive and ineradicable. It tends instinctively to a legitimate end, self-defense. Its two constituents are righteous moral disapprobation and desire of our own being and well-being. Hence the sin men commit in anger is in its misdirection or excess, or both. Jesus was correct in teaching that a man may "be angry and sin not." Remark also that lawful resentment may reasonably point to the unrighteous assault on our fellow-creature, because moral reprehension is a purely impersonal emotion, and sympathy concurs with it to make one feel a neighbor's injury. We have here another instance of the importance of this psychology of the feelings to our ethical conclusions.

The final cause of resentment is now plain. It is the wise Creator's plan to provide defense against unjust aggressions. It is adjusted to the foreseen fact that man is destined to live in a world of injustice. In a world of perfect holiness and peace the sentiment would have no play, except in its sympathetic forms as the blessed inhabitants might hear of the wrongs done some other creature in a less favored state. If we had been made without the sentiment of resentment in so unjust a world, the experience of wrongs working on our simple sense of fear would turn us into cowards; our passive

non-resistance would encourage violence, until the weaker would perish under the attack of the stronger, and until we were degraded by servile fears. Yet inasmuch as the legitimate scope or design of resentment is only defensive, and its practical tendency only to retort suffering (which, however just, is always a natural evil), a short rein is put on this feeling in order to bridle it within bounds. The subjective pain which attends the feeling warns us to harbor it no longer than necessary for the defensive purpose, and punishes us for extending it beyond that end. Thus, while we see that the good man may be angry and not sin, this inspection also tells him not to let the "sun go down upon his wrath." Lawful resentment must always be temporary; but the sentiment of moral reprehension is permanent. Whenever it degenerates into chronic hatred, it has become vicious, because it has outlived its lawful end, self-defense at the time of the aggression.

#### Evil Revenge Distinguished.

We have seen that resentment is a sentiment fitting us to live in an unjust world. But since we are also members of this evil world and infected with its sin, it is very obvious that resentment is a feeling exceedingly easy to abuse. There is, no legitimate emotion that needs more watching. For it combines very easily with the other feelings of pride, selfishness and malice. It forgets to go to sleep as soon as its legitimate end of self-defense is gained. Thus it is transmuted into the different emotion of revenge. This fell desire is condemned by all proper minds. It must be carefully discriminated from that righteous desire to see crime meet due retribution, which we found to be an element of, or at least an immediate sequel of, our ethical feelings. The right mind on witnessing crime, and especially great crime, has a proper, unavoidable judgment of the agent's ill-desert attending the judgment of his wrongness, and a distinct wish that the due retribution may follow the guilt. It righteously desires this, and feels an honest pain at the disappointment of this con-

sequence. When "the gallows is cheated," the virtuous mind feels real distress. But this is not revenge. It is a feeling purely impersonal and disinterested. The object of the feeling is not that a fellow-creature may suffer, for that result is always in itself distressing, even when that creature is guilty, but that righteousness may have its way, crime meet its reasonable desert, the majesty of law be vindicated and innocence protected against violence. Ask this virtuous man: Do you care to be the executioner of the penal suffering with your own hand? He will tell you, No. He is glad the law appoints its own executioner. But revenge desires to inflict the retaliation with its own hands, and this betrays most clearly its evil nature. It desires to do so because it is the expression, not of justice, but of hatred. It is not righteous and benevolent, but malignant. It is not equitably disinterested, but selfish. Here we have one of the grounds on which in ethics, we argue the duty of forgiveness and the sin of revenge.

## CHAPTER IX.

## SINFUL SELF-WILL.

## 1. The Evidence of This Appetency.

We now take up an appetency the very existence of which is overlooked and discarded by most psychologists; by all, indeed, whom I have read, except the profound Kant. But if we find in consciousness and observation the same evidences of this active principle as of any and all the others, evidence equally psychological and philosophical, we have a clear right to challenge this omission. By what plea is this chasm left in the enumeration of the elements of man's emotive system, and one whole principle of human action, as original as any other, discarded from the list? It is because the necessity of admitting this defect of our nature is humbling to our pride? The answer is plain. If prejudice is to dictate our conclusions instead of evidence, there is an end of philosophy. Or is the omission justified by the circumstance that the theologian, in the prosecution of his distinct science into anthropology, has met this same aversion to duty? This is no excuse, for our business is to treat it, not theologically, but psychologically, as a fact of consciousness. We are not to neglect a part of our proper ground because another science finds occasion to borrow conclusions from it. The theologian also discusses and employs the facts of the soul's immortality and spirituality, yea, all the facts of psychology which lie in the very domain of philosophy. It is our business in enumerating the powers of the mind to be faithful, complete and impartial; to recognize all that we ascertain upon correct examination, and to reject nothing from pride or prejudice.

**The Spiritual Disease Defined.**

Let me define. When I speak of aversion to duty as a feeling native to man, I imply that every rational soul has a cognition of duty and a judgment of obligation, not, indeed, complete and accurate, but intuitively certain as far as it goes.

Secondly, that this aversion does not express itself in all the same particulars of duty in all persons, any more than the æsthetic feeling in all persons fixes on the same instances of beauty and ugliness. In the case of the other appetencies, bodily and spiritual, we find that while they are in all men, and act in all, temperament, education, habits, associations, restraining motives arising out of other affections, check and modify the actions of the several appetencies in different men. So of this aversion to duty. I do not assert that it is felt by all men against all the duties revealed in their own judgments of obligation. To some of these known duties the will may accede very heartily and honestly: in the better individuals this may be the case as to the major part of the duties known; and yet, even in the best instances, there arise duties to which the will is invincibly opposed and in which it asserts with decision its lust of self-indulgence against the clear judgments of the person's own reason and conscience.

**But Partial Virtues Not Therefore Deceitful.**

Nor need we reason, as some do, that because this will is thus perverse in some intentional acts of resistance to conscience, therefore it is insincere and hypocritical in the instances of compliance. This argument runs thus: that obligation is obligation; that all the several obligations which urge the will intelligibly have the same authority, and the man knows this to be so; that hence, when he shows himself willing to resist any obligation, he thereby shows that his compliance with those he pretended to respect must be hollow and false. This argument is overweening and sophistical. It forgets that man is a finite creature, and therefore capable of inconsistencies. Of course, logically viewed, there

is an inconsistency when a man performs the duty required by moral obligation in one point and refuses it in another, urged by obligation of the same authority. But there are thousands of cases which show us that there can be logical inconsistencies in man without insincerity. Every man's consciousness bears me out; he knows he is sincere and disinterested in his intentional fulfillment of some obligations, while yet he discards others equally valid to his own reason. I thus carefully guard our proposition from exaggerations. The state of appetency which I affirm may be described with equal correctness thus: between the will and the dictates of conscience there is always some collision in some points in which the appetency, not conscience, is decisive and regulative of the action. This is true of the best human virtue. Many duties may be frequently and heartily performed by the person; some duties, it may be, uniformly; yet there remain some points on which the appetency of self-will against known duty is prevalent. Some duty which the reason recognizes is persistently neglected; some transgression which conscience confesses is persistently retained. For instance, one man shall be truthful, brave, sincere, just in many transactions, tender and affectionate to those he loves, faithful to friends, yet vindictive; another may have all these virtues and be sensual in some animal indulgence; another proud; another ambitious—such is the manifestation of the feeling.

#### Proofs of the Disease.

A sufficient proof of the truth of the statement is gotten by an appeal to consciousness. Let every man's own soul answer the charge. If the man has not some higher virtue than the human when the question is asked him: Is your present, full, decisive purpose to act up to every known obligation and immediately and finally to forsake every known transgression? then, if he is intelligent and honest with himself, he must answer: No. He thinks that for virtue in general he has a true regard, and that for virtue in general he has real



aspirations looking towards some future attainment in some undefined time. But against virtues in detail he ever has an aversion on some point, and from that duty he persistently excuses himself. Especially is this true of duties pertaining to religion. This is the sphere in which the aversion to the law of conscience is most seen.

Our observation of our fellow-men confirms the same position. We see defects in all. Many of these may be explained as occasional slips, occurring against the prevalent purpose of the man by the stress of some peculiar temptation. Such cases may be dismissed as not proving the existence of the appetency for self-will, although the question remains a just one, how it comes to pass, if the state of the will were in all respects what it ought to be, that men should be so weak against temptation and so often led astray by it. But is there any case of human virtue that presents only these unintentional slips from virtue? Is there a man under our experience, in his natural state, so virtuous that he does not also neglect some known duty with deliberation and claim the gratification of his will in some at least minor sins? The only man I ever heard of hardy enough to answer this question was a Boston Socinian, who, in a philosophic symposium of Joseph Cook, asserted that he had never deliberately slighted a monition of conscience from his youth to that day. To every fair mind his assertion was very speedily damaged by the revelation that in the Civil War he had volunteered to raise and command a negro regiment to invade his fellow-citizens, thus greedily running into the very wickedness charged against George III. by that Declaration of Independence which he professed to hold as his political creed. One might expect of such a boaster of his own sinlessness just the gross blindness of mind which would prevent his seeing the cruelty and iniquity of arming runaway slaves and semi-savages against their own civilized and Christian lawful masters.

## 2. The Primitive and Original Character of This Appetency.

Again, if we trace the aversion to duty back, we find its origin coeval in every case with the development of rational free-agency. There have been speculative people who hold that the disposition to sin in young children is an artificial result of some abuse of their spirits; either the imitation of bad example or the reaction of resentment or fear against the injustices of ignorant or vicious nurses and playmates. Hence they have hoped that the young child's nature might grow with full moral symmetry, if only entirely judicious moral training were given to it, with no bad example and uniformly consistent, equitable and benevolent treatment. Such speculatists always surrender their pretty theories, unless they are insincere, when they become parents themselves. They find out by stubborn experience that the appetency to sinful self-will and the aversion to the right are innate, and not suggested or imitated; that it develops from within just as surely as the growth of the plant from the seed; that the removal of nursery restraints would result in a growth of evil from within, making the child far more odious and wicked than the average adult. Indeed, the development of evil in the young is so much more the result of inward appetency than it is of mis-managed nurture that the average child left to its own expansion, without any moral restraint, would be far worse than the average child reared under the most faulty and erroneous nurture; so much worse that men would view him as a monster.

Proved by the Moral Traits of Infants.

We are continually estimating the evil of little children's nature under an illusion, thinking them small, and fondling them as "innocent dears," because their mental and bodily powers of executing their real appetencies are so small. I may help you out of that illusion by asking you soberly to form this picture in your minds. Take the moral traits of the

average infant: his petulance, his inordinate selfishness, his single, undivided will for his own sensual gratification, his vengefulness, his indifference to the fatigue and distress of his own loving mother and kindest nurses, his insubordination to all authority and obligation except physical force, his unrelenting cruelty; abstract your mind away from his infantile corporeal graces and the sympathy elicited by his utter helplessness. Suppose that very set of impulses I have described in him equipped with the intelligence and strength of a robust adult, without any corresponding increase of subjective moral restraints. You would have in him a monster from whom his own mother would flee in horror and dread. But, fortunately, while the native evil of the young human is at its greatest undisciplined strength, his mental and bodily strength are at their smallest. Providence thus subjects him to an ever-present apparatus of restraint and discipline, which, except in adult monsters, reduces his native appetency to evil within tolerable bounds by the time his faculties are mature. This picture of our nature is not flattering to ourselves, but it is faithful and true.

**Kant's Argument from the Immorality of States.**

In conclusion, Kant argues this native lawlessness of the human will from the conduct of sovereign states towards each other. He remarks, in substance, that while this sovereignty dominates the will of individuals and of smaller aggregates of citizens, over them there is no earthly restraint. Hence it is reasonable to see in their actions towards each other the clearest disclosure of the true will of mankind. Moreover, when men act in masses, they are under an illusion which diminishes their sense of moral responsibility. They imagine that its burdens are subdivided among their multitudes. It is in the customary conduct of states, therefore, that we shall find the real disclosure of human disposition. What is now that conduct? It may be justly characterized as that of beasts of prey. Is not this the ground upon which prophetic inspira-

tion uniformly selected the *Σηρίον* as the symbol of these "world-powers"? The description is true for all ages and under all civilizations and religions, not excepting the nominally Christian states. What is political and military history but a series of aggressions perpetrated or resisted? The attitude of each kingdom towards its neighbors is that of the watchful beast with claws and teeth ready for battle. No state trusts in simple justice in its neighbors for its safety. To do so would be considered as childish folly by all the worldly-wise. It trusts nothing to others' justice, but everything to its own enormous armaments, which it maintains perpetually at a cost crushing to its own citizens. In this policy the wisdom of the world has given us its own estimate of the unrighteousness of the human will.

Corollary.

Let the student take this corollary as he passes along: What is the absurdity and the inevitable failure of those theories of human right and government which, in their vanity, omit this native fact of the essential unrighteousness of the human will? Such is the folly of all the fashionable phases of Jacobinism and human perfectionism.

Now, how can the presence of an original and elemental principle of feeling be better proven than by the fact that we find at least some degrees or traces of it in every man; that it appears from the first in each individual and is developed along with his development, unless artificially curbed? Is there any other or any stronger mode of proof by which we demonstrate that the æsthetic sensibility, the sentiment of sympathy, of resentment, of love, is native to man, is a constitutive principle of his nature, and not an exceptional trait of some individuals or a factitious effect of artificial influences? I know of no other.

### 3. Dominance of This Appetency Proves the Congenital Dislocation of the Powers of the Mind.

One point more remains. This appetency to transgress conscience, or aversion to duty, operates with determining force and against all possible inducements. For instance, any intelligent mind can be made to see the argument of enlightened self-interest. The ethical reason is clear in its judgments that the right and the obligatory is indisputably the proper and the highest guide of life. It undoubtedly expresses the truest law of the rational being's welfare. It must certainly turn out that any sin will work in the final outcome subtraction from the highest good either in the present or in the future life. The way in which it will certainly do so is usually perfectly visible to our experience; the general analogy makes it practically certain that sin will turn out so in all other cases. "Honesty is always the best policy." "Let self-interest, then, be your enlightened guide and prompt you, O man, to perform all duty and eschew all sin." Will it prompt him? No. The appetency to sin will assert itself still against the clearest rational and admitted proof. This decisiveness or dominancy of the feeling exhibits itself specially in many cases in resisting and conquering inducements which, rationally, ought to be irresistible. The love of life is usually supreme. Here is a man who is indulging a sensual sin to the injury and destruction of life itself. He is clearly forewarned, but he does not stop. In another man avarice, in another inordinate ambition, is the dearest appetency of a permanent nature. Both fall into the practice of a sin which is known to be destructive of fortune or of position and fame, but this does not arrest the sin; it holds its place. The most terrible fears cannot deter the transgressor but for a time. We measure a force in mechanics by the resistance it can overcome. So I measure the energy of this appetency to evil by the rational resistance which it overcomes. There is in every natural human being some degree of this native, orig-

inal, determining appetency for evil, the preference of illicit self-will and aversion to some part of the yoke of duty.

But this is evidently a fundamental dislocation of man's nature, a congenital, psychologic disease. In the appetencies man's subjective spontaneity finds its expression. They inspire the will. They regulate the whole free-agency from within. But, on the other hand, the ethical reason is entitled to be the mistress and ruler of man's soul. Its judgments assert this with intuitive certainty. It is as impossible for a man to doubt that his own conscience, pronouncing on the side of duty when duly enlightened, is morally entitled to rule his conduct, as to doubt his own existence, or his identity, or any other immediate fact of consciousness. We have, then, this state of the case, the supreme faculty of the soul at war with the fundamental appetency of the free-agency! That, too, on the most important and vital of all the soul's concerns, duty! And that, too, on the very point on which the soul's destiny consciously turns! There has been a dislocation of man's powers somehow, just as clearly as there was war in heaven when Satan and his angels fought against Michael and his angels. Here is an abnormal strife going on in the firmament of man's spirit.

**What the Source? What the Remedy? Philosophy Cannot Answer.**

Has Nature been thus dislocated in any other of the laws of sentient existence? Is there any natural animal where organ resists organ, where the heart fights the stomach, or the liver the lungs, or the brain the arteries? No. Throughout all the rest of animated nature there is harmony between organs and powers, or else, when that concert is broken, we say that there is a disease. But in the soul this disease seems to have become nature. Shall we conceive of the Creator as capable of creating of His own accord this dislocation? That is forbidden by His wisdom, righteousness and benevolence. When and how, then, did this dislocation occur? How can it be completely remedied? These questions carry us beyond

the scope of philosophy. Human science and history have no answer for them. Every pretended reply they have arrogantly advanced has been put to shame by failure. The strife between the rebellious will and the condemning conscience, in spite of civilization, is still going on all over the world, as it has been from the earliest historical ages.

## CHAPTER X.

## CONCLUSION.

## I. Derivation of Composite Feelings.

Early in this discussion I noted and dissented from the inaccurate attempt to generate all our affections out of two simple elements, called pleasure and pain. I showed you that we feel many distinct pleasures and many distinct pains which are equally coördinate and original. Toothache is painful, obloquy is painful. Honey is pleasant and applause is pleasant. But neither the two pains nor the two pleasures are identical nor resolvable the one into the other. They have this resemblance, that the pleasures both give satisfaction to our natural dispositions, and the pains both take it away. I also showed you how false was the analysis which explained the original appetencies of the soul as rationally calculated modes of attaining experienced pleasures and of shunning experienced pains, because these appetencies begin to operate before all experience of pleasurable or painful results, and because that superficial philosophy puts the effect in the place of the cause, forgetting that the disposition which directs and energizes desires has the *a priori* determining power as to what objects shall be pleasurable and what painful. But this sound dissent from that shallow philosophy does not prevent our admitting that man is a rational creature, that he does remember experienced pains and pleasures, and that he does perform rational calculations as to means and results. Doubtless there do supervene upon the instinctive desires rationally calculated desires for the good which the fruition of the former taught us to value, and the derived feelings thenceforward combine with the immediate ones. The anal-



ogous illustration may be found in an instinctive appetite. The first craving of the infant to suck can not have been prompted by the rational calculation that by sucking it would enjoy again the previously experienced sweetness of the milk, for as yet the child does not know by experience that the milk is sweet. But after a time the embryo reason of the child begins to act, and then this calculation becomes possible and the desire to repeat the experienced pleasure may mingle with the prompting of natural instinct, and the two together may thenceforward form the child's appetency for its natural nourishment. So every pleasure known in our experience may become the object of a rational desire, every pain of an aversion. But there is no sufficient ground for elevating these into an original and distinct appetency of the soul. To say that we rationally desire pleasure is only to say that we desire pleasures, all pleasures, any pleasures, in the plural number; and these plural pleasures are but the ones which we have already inspected under the heads of the several elemental sensibilities and appetencies. Man desires pleasure. Is it the pleasure of possessing wealth? Then that is just the desire we have discussed under the name of avarice. Of solving his wonder? Then that is only the pleasure we have described under the name of curiosity. Of beholding beauty? That is no other than the æsthetic feeling. We have said nothing new. Nor do I see any ground to number gaiety or joy and sorrow or melancholy among original emotions. How do they differ from pleasure or pain? Only as they are permanent or abiding states of soul, while the others are usually evanescent. One element, no doubt, is the animal pleasure of existence and action, its presence contributing to gaiety, its absence to melancholy. The rest is done by memory and anticipation. It is the prerogative of reasoning man to know chronic joy and sorrow as spiritual affections. The animal which does not anticipate and forecast lives in the present, sorrows only so long as it is feeling some animal evil, and rejoices so long as it is experiencing an animal pleasure.

## Fear and Hope.

Fear and hope are admitted to be derivative; neither of them is an original affection. Fear is but the expectation of future evil, affecting the soul by anticipation, in virtue of man's forecast. Hope is but the expectation of future good, with desire. By virtue of the same rational trait of forecast the good that is before us, and that is probably to be realized, gives us in advance some of the pleasure which we meet in the fruition. To desire an object it is only necessary that we see or conceive it. Let us believe that object to be possibly or probably attainable, and we hope for it. As the rational evidence of its attainability increases from a low probability to a high probability, our hope is confirmed into expectation or joyful assurance. These two appetencies play a grand part in human life and feelings. The Scotch poet Campbell wrote a philosophic poem on hope, which turns the subject in every light. The emotion is as simple in its analysis as it is influential in its working.

## 2. Nature of Happiness.

All men speak of happiness as a continuing state of soul, and one which man rationally desires, and, according to the law of his disposition, cannot but desire. But what is happiness? This is a question of fundamental importance which philosophers much debate, and concerning which mankind usually make fatal mistakes. Everyone understands with perfect clearness that he desires happiness, as it is his nature to do, but most men seek in the wrong direction for it. They look without for its sources, instead of looking within. They usually have no clearer conception of happiness than that it consists in the outward stimulation of this or that sensuous sensibility, or in their possession of this or that object of appetency. Thus the gourmand thinks that a plentiful supply of meats and drinks is happiness. The votary of fashion imagines that costly equipage and raiment will be happiness. The covetous man is certain that the possession of much

money will be happiness. All are, in the main, disappointed, and they have to write upon their hopes the sentence: *Vanitas vanitatum*. This disappointment is explained by a correct psychology. The exposition given in our second lecture, of the nature of our pleasures and pains, should have taught them that they are determined from within, not from without; that their causes are subjective; their objects are only the occasions of them. It is the inward disposition and habit which determine our enjoyment; when these are wrong, the objects are as futile as harmonies to the ear of the dead.

That true happiness can never result from the stimulation of the senses appears very clearly from these facts. All the organs of sense, being material, find a narrow limit to their pleasurable or harmonious stimulation in the law of physical fatigue. A few moments of active excitement wearies them, and then, if the stimulus is continued, it becomes a pain. We have to remember next that the condition of their pleasurable excitement is previous appetites; but one constant element of our appetites is the painful sense of privation. So that for every sensuous pleasure some price has to be paid in advance, and that price is a pain, and its amount has to be subtracted from the total result of pleasure. Again, beings who seek happiness on this misguided plan are practically sure to practice excesses in the sensuous pleasures; and for these they must pay the penalties of torments exacted by outraged Nature. When we add the other fact, that man has no certain power over the objects of sensuous desire, but is ever liable to be stripped of them by the course of fortune, the demonstration is completed, that the man who relies upon sensuous pleasures for his happiness has built his house upon the sand.

#### The True Outward Source of Happiness.

Even the pagan Greek gave us a wiser definition when he said: "Happiness is virtuous energy." It is not the possession of meat or drink, pomp and equipages, or wealth or

power, but it is a right subjective state of soul. Our highest happiness means this, this only: that our souls be so conditioned as to put forth from within their noblest energies. Of these our sensuous capacities are the lowest; our intellectual faculties present a higher phase of energy; our moral faculties the highest. Consequently the gratification of the sensuous sensibilities contributes least to happiness; the exercise of the intellect contributes more; but the social affections and the sentiment of conscience contribute most. We do not forget or retract the truth stated at the beginning of these discussions, that the presence of a suitable object is requisite for the exercise of feeling. Hence we cannot assert that happiness may be absolutely subjective and independent of all objects, save in the infinite and self-existent mind. We admit that we creatures must have objects in order to be happy. The vital question is, what kind of objects we shall look to as the occasion and conditions of true happiness. The facts just stated give us a clear answer. They must be the objects which present the occasion for the nobler energies of the soul; they must be the objects least liable to contingency; they must be objects of which the soul can have secure possession; they must be enduring as the soul itself. There is but one object which completely possesses these requisites, and that is the God who offers Himself as the everlasting portion and inheritance of the good.

**Neither Indolence Nor Self-Indulgence.**

It follows, almost too clearly to need explanation, that they who suppose indolence and self-indulgence to be happiness make the most stupid mistake of all. If happiness is virtuous energy, the soul that is most infused with energy is the happiest. So the most self-governed soul is the happiest, because its self-government directs its energies away from lower to higher forms.

### 3. Desire of Well-Being and Selfishness: and the Derivatives of Selfishness—e. g., Envy, Malice.

Our natural and rational craving for our own well-being has been often called "lawful self-love." The phrase is inaccurate; for love, properly speaking, implies two persons, the one loving and the other beloved. Love in its simplest elements is delight in an object exterior to ourselves; and its connected appetency is the desire to be beloved by it and to confer enjoyment on it. It is only by a figure of speech that one can be said to objectify himself; for the real object is not self, but a concept of self. I presume no one would be willing to define self-love as an affection for the concept or mental image of self. It will be more accurate, then, to describe this affection as desire of one's own well-being. That it may be a derived feeling, generated by rational calculation, is evident from what was said above. But it also appears as evident that there is an immediate and instinctive desire for our own well-being, as that there is a similar desire for our existence. The two are very near together. To desire to continue to be almost implies within itself the desire for well being. Certainly, were the one feeling native to man and the other not so, his nature would be a great anomaly. Every man shares this double desire, and therefore hope is so pertinacious, and despair, the full surrender of hope, so utter a misery. No man ought to be without the desire for his own well-being; for the defect, if possible, would involve the guilt of potential suicide. Of course, then, this affection is lawful and virtuous. The man who says, under any stress of difficulty or pain whatever, "I do not care what becomes of me," sins: first, because he utters what is impossible to be true; and second, because it would be criminal if it were possible.

What then is selfishness? That affection which is so clearly sinful that all men attempt to hide and disclaim it, and that many moralists have treated it as the essence of all sin. Wherein is it contrasted with the legitimate affection for our

own welfare? I would answer, that evil selfishness, like pride, is necessarily a relative or respective emotion; it acts by comparison between self and another. When Adam was the only man on earth, he might feel the desire for his own welfare; he could not exercise selfishness as between himself and man, except in imagination by comparing himself with the mental image of some other possible man. When Cain and Abel were together, Cain could exercise selfishness toward Abel. I would say, then, that the essence of selfishness is desire for our own good become inordinate and inequitable. First, the forms of good desired are degraded, constituting not the man's true and complete well-being, but the lower forms of good, mere pleasures and prominently sensual pleasures. But, secondly and chiefly, he has come to desire these in deliberate preference to the good and the equitable rights of his fellows and of his God. He desires the mere pleasure so strongly and on such conscious terms as involve the injury of his fellows in their rights and happiness, and of his Maker in His rights. The only reason why selfishness does not pursue its gratification at the expense of the good God is, that He, happily, is above all possibility of injury or pain. Selfishness, then, is essential injustice towards man, towards God. Its spirit is the spirit of robbery. It wants its own share and my share too. It exalts illicit self-pleasing over duty and rights and benevolence. Hence it is always criminal, and is, in sinners, always a master sin. As we saw, the analysis was erroneous which made benevolence the only virtuous affection and the only essential element of all other virtues; and yet there is a practical sense in which "Love is the fulfilling of the law." So I will not say that selfishness is the only sin, or the whole element of sin, into which all other sin resolves itself; yet practically it may prompt any and every overt sin, from the first pulse of envy up to murder; it affiliates with every other sin. We found it in pride; in avarice; in revenge, which is but natural resentment perverted by selfishness; in ambition; and we shall find it in envy and malice. It is an idolatry. It poisons

the whole stream of human action. This criminal affection, when compared with lawful desire for our own welfare, presents the most striking instance of all, how a virtue may by its perversion and exaggeration become a vice.

#### Envy What? Why Criminal?

What is the emotion of envy? It is a bad feeling, as distinctly defined as pride, and yet, like pride, not an original and elemental one. Envy is only a modification of sinful selfishness provoked by the comparison of our own privation of a good craved with another's enjoyment of it. Consciousness, unfortunately, convinces us too clearly that this is the correct analysis. It has always been regarded as the meanest and most unamiable of feelings. It stands almost as much in opposition to benevolence as malice itself does, and to malice it is near akin.

#### Malice What.

In the language of the statute law, malice (*malitia*) means the deliberate and rational intention of doing anything which the law forbids. The man who should kill his neighbor intentionally to protect an illegal and imaginary point of honor, although he did it with a sincere pain and regret at the evil he was inflicting, and the pirate who should regretfully and reluctantly make a non-combatant captive (say an aged female) "walk the plank" for the purpose of suppressing her testimony only, would both be justly held by the law to have committed murder with *malitia*, with criminal intention. But in the language of psychology, malice is the feeling which is immediately pleased with the simple suffering of a fellow-creature. Of course it involves the most express selfishness, for how can such a pleasure at a fellow's cost be realized without the very essence of wicked self-love? As an appetency, it might also be ranked with benevolence by that law of contraries which connects contrasts. As benevolence is a delight in the well-

being of **our fellows**, so malice is a delight in their misery. It might be, **then**, a question whether it should be treated in a correct system under that head, or under this. But it is evident that **this** is the determining trait of hatred when that emotion appears as a wicked one. Hatred may be defined as resentment *plus* malice. As love finds pleasure in the presence or the thought of its object, so hatred finds pain in the thought of its object. As love desires to promote the welfare of its object, so hatred desires to promote the misery of its object, and in doing so finds a species of miserable and bitter satisfaction. Words are not necessary to show the essential wickedness of the feeling. This wickedness is so clear and so enormous that it prompts the doubt whether such a feeling as simple malice can exist in a human heart, a direct pleasure in inflicting misery. Unfortunately, the evidence is, in some cases, too plain. There are many persons among the vulgar who find an innate pleasure in torturing helpless animals. What is this but the instinct of pure malice? Again, what is the spirit of mischief which finds a pleasure which it calls "sport" in the destruction of conveniences belonging to unoffending neighbors, as fences, gates, flowers, fruit-trees? Look again at the instinctive pleasure often taken in teasing others, or in the "hazing" of inexperienced students. The enjoyment is evidently in the pure malice. The pretext that the hazing produces an innocent pleasure by the humor of the situation which attends it is too flimsy; for the stupid monotony of the barbarities practiced deprives them of every claim to any invention, wit or humor. The element of the pleasure can only be in causing distress to others. I have selected such instances in proof of the existence of this feeling because they do not contain the palliation of an offense committed by the suffering party, producing resentment in the persecutors and thus tempting to revenge. The victims in this case have given no provocation. The attraction to the cruelties practiced is the mere and pure pleasure in causing another's distress. This feeling is, of all others possible to man, the



greatest disgrace to his nature, and allies him most nearly to the devils. It is the blackest and most loathsome shade of human depravity.

#### 4. Final Survey—God's Final Cause.

I will close this discussion of the feelings of the human soul with one topic. When we examine our consciousness as to the beneficent and the malevolent affections, we find a contrast which goes through them all. The first class are naturally pleasant and happy in the exercise; the second class are, as naturally, bitter and miserable. Love, sympathy, charity, forgiveness, in all their manifestations, make him happy who feels them. Resentment (even when lawful), envy, hatred, malice, pride, are naturally a bitterness to the spirit which feels them. The crowning instance is in the sensibilities of conscience. Moral self-approbation is the happiest peace the soul can experience. Self-condemnation inflicts the bitterest pain which it can feel. Obviously the tendency of these contrasted facts is to deter men and warn them back from the malevolent affections, and to allure and invite them to the exercise of the benevolent. The direct practical end of the benevolent affections is to confer happiness on our fellows. But Nature has ordained that we shall find reward in the happiness which the feelings themselves contain. Such are the invariable tendencies. Has this arrangement happened regularly in all the generations of men at haphazard? as the work of blind chance? It is incredible. It is safe to conclude that, in so clear a case, the tendency which we see so regularly working is the final cause which our Maker had in view. Who can doubt it? But this conclusion involves another: that it is the will of this Maker that benevolence shall prevail and virtue rule; that He desires and plans the happiness and the righteousness of His creatures, and that He is Himself benevolent and holy.

I claim that to these principles all the feelings of the human soul in all their vast diversities can be traced. Com-

binations, **modifications** and variations in degree of these several **principles**, along with the influences of habit and associations of mental states, account for all the amazing diversities. I have thus given you an account of this all-important branch of psychology, simple, luminous and comprehensive.



## BOOK II.

### THE WILL.

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#### CHAPTER I.

#### THE FACULTY DESCRIBED.

##### I. Postulates of the Action of the Will.

The function of the human spirit now to be discussed is at once the final and the most unique of all. In it culminate the functions of all other faculties, whether of intelligence or feeling. In determining its nature I shall proceed by the same safe method of the observation of the facts of consciousness and experience which has guided us so faithfully in previous inquiries. We find in every human language verbs and nouns expressing both the acts and the faculty of the will. In the Greek, *θέλω* and *θέλημα* in the Latin, "*velle*" and "*voluntas*"; in the German, "*wollen*" and "*der Wille*"; in the English, "to will," "to wish," and "will," "volition," etc. A variety of other words is used by us to express, under different conditions, the same act of spirit, such as to choose, to elect, to decide, to determine, to purpose, to resolve; and the nouns choice, election, decision, determination, purpose, resolution; the phrase "to make up one's mind." We know that the movement of our bodily members is not volition, but is usually the result of volition, the obedience which those members render to the spirit, which is their mistress. These

bodily acts are thus the visible signs of invisible volitions in others; for by the strictest argument of analogy we have inferred that the bodily actions which we see in our fellows are like ours, executive of their inward volitions. The most obvious traits which our consciousness reveals to us in this class of our soul's actions are these two: that they are decisions terminating the previous acts and states which lead to them, and that they are our own, thoroughly the forthputting and the expressions of selfhood.

**Actions Are, (A) Automatic; (B) Semi-Automatic; (C) Consciously Voluntary.**

The acts which execute our will we are conscious fall under three classes. (A), Some are so immediately and so nearly the results of instinct that they may properly be called automatic; we perform them as the unreasoning animals do, without conscious intelligence of their final cause. Such are the descent of the eyelid when the eyeball is threatened, and the lifting up of the hand to ward off a blow. (B), There is the series of bodily actions, begun at the prompting of intelligent purpose, but then continued by the power of custom or habit without further conscious attention or repeated volitions, as the successive steps by which we continue to walk toward the spot we elected to reach, while the mind has its attention directed to other things, or is even absorbed in reverie. (C), There are the more important and deliberate volitions, which the soul emits with consciousness, intelligence and rational preference, and which are not too rapid and evanescent to be remembered by us, at least for a moment. Were our purpose physiological, we might study the first two classes as the zoölogist does, seeking to determine how far they are results of mere organic, automatic functions, how far the mere play of the afferent upon the efferent nerves may produce them without rising into the sphere of consciousness. But since our purpose is psychological, we ought to inspect volitions of the third class. For in them the spiritual function is fully ex-

pressed, so as to present itself distinctly to the observation of consciousness, and in them only. The botanist, seeking to know and classify a new plant, selects a specimen in full flower, not one dwarfed, mutilated or immature, because he wishes to see as plainly as possible the parts which mark its species. So it is proper for us to examine the most fully developed instances of volition.

No Volition without an Object, Which Must be Viewed as (A) Real;  
(B) Desirable.

First, then, it is equally simple and undeniable that whenever one chooses, he chooses something. One necessary condition of choice is, therefore, that it have an object, which must be seen in the intelligence of the spirit which chooses. But it is equally obvious that anything whatsoever which may be thought in the mind as attainable does not become an object of volition. Some things may become such objects, other things never do. On this point our common sense at once declares that people choose such things as they care for, or such things as they desire, or things for which men have natural appetencies. For instance, no hungry man chooses for the satisfaction of hunger, clods, or chips, or pieces of metal, or nauseous medicines; indeed, we say, "he cannot choose" such objects for such an end, by which we mean it is absolutely certain that he will never be inclined to their choice.

Reflection upon this class of facts results in this second postulate: that the thing which is the object of volition must be seen by the mind in the two categories of the attainable and the good. Let this be tested in any number of typical instances. Let one persuade his neighbor in this city to go with him into the neighboring mountains of cretaceous limestone and toil in digging for gold. His neighbor will say: "No; my geology teaches me that those strata cannot contain gold." The object does not appear to him in the category of the true and the attainable. Let us suppose the first to reply: "Nevertheless, let us go and dig, for we shall assuredly obtain a great store of rub-

bish and waste stones." Again his neighbor will refuse. The objects appear to his mind in the category of the true and the attainable, but not in that of the good. Now let the adventurer say: "Let us go to Colorado and dig for silver, for the ores of that metal you know to be there in great quantities." Now he may be persuaded, the object appears to him in the double category of the attainable and the good. Or let us take an instance still simpler. A student is sitting with his books in his lodgings when a dinner-bell rings; he is about to lay aside his books to go to the dining-room, when we assure him that the ringing is the hoax of a mischievous child. The student resumes his books; he perceives that dinner is not ready. The object of choice is not yet attainable. Another day the bell rings for dinner and he is assured it is a true signal. But he says: "I have smoked too much to-day, and have nausea." Again he does not elect to go. The object is now attainable, but is not, for him, a good.

**Only Some Objects Are Desirable: Those, Namely, Which Satisfy Disposition—Disposition is Native, Permanent, Spontaneous.**

Third, it is equally clear that every object is not to every agent a good, however clearly known in his intelligence. Some objects he apprehends as good, some as evil, and many as in themselves indifferent. The term "good" includes a great variety of objects and of mental operations falling under the distinct classes of natural good and moral good. What is the common trait which prompts men to class them in one concept? It is obviously this, that men apprehend them as qualified to gratify some appetency. Had their spirits no subjective appetency towards those objects, their intelligence would never judge them in the category of good things, and consequently their volitions never seek them. When further we observe these appetencies, we soon perceive that some of them are universal, and original, and natural to all men, as the appetites of the body and the spiritual appetencies for happiness, for applause, for power and for continued existence; while

others of them are personal and different in different men, being the self-produced results of habitual actions, or of different temperaments. These appetencies are all the expressions, either mediate or immediate, of the soul's own disposition (ἕξις or *habitus*). When we reach the fundamental notion of disposition, our analysis stops. We recognize disposition as an ultimate trait of ourselves and of all our fellow-men; for we are incapable of conceiving an active being not somehow disposed. We can think him as differently disposed from ourselves, but we cannot think him an active being not naturally disposed to some forms of activity rather than others. We are also conscious that disposition is an attribute equally permanent and spontaneous. External objects cannot determine it, because it is disposition which determines *a priori* whether and in what way those objects affect us. We equally know that we are spontaneous in the exercise of disposition; because the concept of a disposition imposed upon us from without, against our own spontaneity, is a self-contradiction.

## Resulting Truths.

Thus consciousness and common sense lead us to these results; our deliberate volitions are always conditioned on objects. Only such outward things can be objects to our volitions as have a relevancy to our own appetencies and are apprehended as attainable in our own judgment. Our appetencies are subjective. To sum up; our own rational preference (*libentia rationalis*), the conjoined function of judgment and of appetency, prompts our own volition. It is then neither the work of intelligence, nor of the feeling separately, but of the spirit acting in both these concurrent modes. This is nowhere more accurately expressed than by Aristotle, "Ethics," Lib. VI. 2. The action is either νόου δρεκτικὸς ἢ δρεξις διανοητικῆ And ὅπερ ἐν διαλογία καταφασίς καὶ ἀπόφασίς, τοῦτ' ἐν ὀρέξει δίωξις καὶ γυγῆ;



## 2. Sensualistic Definition of the Will, as Merely Desire, Dominant, False, and Destructive of Freedom.

The sensualistic psychologists, as Hobbes, Condillac and James Mill, virtually obliterate the will as a distinct faculty of the spirit by teaching that volition is nothing more than desire predominant. They remark correctly that oftentimes the antecedents of action are two or more desires, which sometimes concur and at other times compete with each other. When concurring desires flow unimpeded, that is itself volition according to them; in the other case, when one of the competing desires overflows its rival, this is also volition. These writers seem to be prompted to this erroneous analysis by their over-zeal for simplification. Having set out with the determination to account for every function of the spirit as "transformed sensation," they find themselves constrained to account for desire as sensation modified, and for volition simply as desire become dominant. Now the impressions made on sensibility by external objects are strictly involuntary. They are determined for us, not by us, by outward causes. The plain result of this analysis then is that it leaves the soul no true spontaneity in its volitions; dries up every subjective spring of action. Man becomes a sentient puppet, only moved by external causes. But since we are intuitively conscious of self-determination, this shows the analysis to be false. The same consciousness tells me that my volitions, while similiar to my subjective appetencies in their spontaneity, belong to a different species of spiritual action. Appetencies may subsist for an indefinite time, but remain indeterminate; whereas determination, decision, consummation is the very essence of my volition. Desires may hesitate, volition is what ends hesitation. This sensualistic doctrine also fails to account for instances, which frequently happen in our spirits, where desires, however predominant and concurrent, are yet held in check by the judgment. Thus the faculty of judgment seems to be left out of this analysis of volition, while it

has a **joint and equal influence** in it. The error of the theory appears also in this, that it does not even attempt any answer to this more vital question : Why and how does one species of desire come to predominate in a given man's spirit rather than another? There is the real knot of the problem. They leave it untouched. If objective causes have determined the dominancy of one desire rather than another, then free-agency has perished. If subjective causes, then what are they? The analysis is utterly superficial.

**Free Agency Proved by Consciousness, by Responsibility.**

We are free-agents; that is to say, wherever action is our own, we ourselves determine our volitions. Consciousness so clearly evinces this, that it is almost a truism. I know intuitively that my spirit is free—in other words, self-determined in every intelligent volition. To deny this is virtually to deny that the action is my own. As Cousin well declares, no pretended argument to prove that my volitions are fated or compulsory are valid; because the premise of such argument, be it what it may, cannot be as certain to me as my intuitive consciousness of free-agency. We infer our freedom again from our conscious responsibility. Conscience assures us that we are responsible for our intelligent volitions; but the reason also declares that our responsibility could not be just if we were not free-agents. I have preferred to declare this feature of our wills briefly but pointedly at this early stage of the discussion; because it is one of the traits immediately settled by that examination of consciousness proposed at the outset.

**The Word "Will" Is Used in Two Senses; One Specific, the Other Broad.**

The student should be advised that in the authors who treat this subject the word "will" is often used with a much greater latitude. If not aware of this, he will frequently be confused by statements which in the sense of their writers are correct. Thus far we have used the term "will" to name the specific faculty of volitions, the determining and executive

power of the spirit; but it is often used to include also the native dispositions and the appetencies and aversions of the spirit; in a word, all the functions of spontaneity. In that breadth of sense the word "will" is equivalent to the conative powers of Sir W. Hamilton, and the optative powers of Dr. McCosh. It is in this sense that the theologians speak of the "will" as morally corrupted by the "fall." And it is in this sense that many of those sound philosophers are to be understood, who distribute the powers of the human spirit under the three grand divisions of understanding, will and affections. For by "affections" they intend what the Latin philosophy meant by "*affectus*" or "passions"—that is, involuntary impressions on sensibility. By "will" they intend both the faculty of volitions and that of subjective dispositions, desires and aversions. Their disposition, while apparently three-fold, is really four-fold; and is virtually identical with that of Hamilton into faculties of intelligence, of sensibility, of conation and of volition. It thus appears that this philosopher has claimed more credit for originality than justly belongs to him; but he deserves the thanks of all for setting forth so clearly the all-important distinction between a sensibility and conation. Those psychologists who neglect that distinction, as Dr. Noah Porter, classifying the powers of the spirit as those of intellect, sensibility and volition, involve their readers in a helpless perplexity.

## CHAPTER II.

THEORIES CONCERNING THE FREEDOM OF  
THE WILL.I. Proper Meaning of the Phrases "Free-Will" and  
"Determinism."

The confusion which has prevailed so extensively here calls for the greatest care in stating and discussing the nature of free-agency. M. Paul Janet raises at the outset a question worthy of serious attention, whether the very word "freedom" has not been unfortunately chosen to express the predication. The word is obstinately involved in political ideas and associations. The most perspicuous minds probably have this conception of civic freedom, that it is the individual's privilege, as a member of political society, to execute without compulsion all the acts of will which he is morally entitled to form in his spirit. The simpler and grosser concept of the multitude is, doubtless, that man's freedom is his privilege to do whatever he chooses; but these notions of freedom in either sense are really very different from that which is involved in the question of our free-agency. For here the question is not whether volitions are to be met by objective resistances in their execution; but what are the laws and conditions of their rise in the rational spirit. A volition propagated by compulsion from without would not properly be volition at all. From this point of view, the question whether volition is free really has no propriety or meaning when the word "free" is thought in the popular sense. So the statement so popular among recent German philosophers, that determinism is, or is not, the correct theory of volition, is thoroughly ambiguous and deceptive. It involves in mischievous confusion two very different

doctrines, one of which is that the soul is self-determined; the other, that volitions are determined by causes from without the soul.

**Freedom Is Predicable Only of Persons, Not of Faculties—"Free-Thinkers" Self-contradicted.**

Another ambiguity still more mischievous is found in the current phrase, "the freedom of the will." Locke has very clearly raised the question of the propriety of this phrase, by asking whether freedom or liberty is not always thought as the attribute of a personal agent, and not of a faculty or power. This question discloses the confusion of the statement. It is the human spirit which is free in all its responsible volitions, and not the faculty of will. Were freedom ascribed to any other faculty or power of the spirit, the absurdity would be at once apparent. Who talks of the liberty of sense-perception, or of association and memory, or of deduction, or of the freedom of pain or pleasure? The only sense in which the question can be entertained whether "the will is free" is whether the person is free who wills. The only result which has followed from this deceptive statement is a deplorable confusion of two opposite theories, of which the one asserts the self-determination of the soul in its volitions, and the other asserts the self-determination of the faculty of volitions, as related to the other faculties in the soul. Well would it be for philosophy had the misleading phrase, "freedom of the will," never been written; and had all agreed to call this prerogative of the rational spirit "free-agency." This we propose to do henceforth. Turretin, indeed, while anticipating Locke in his objection, consents to retain the phrase "free-will," though under protest, because of its obstinate currency in philosophy. But he stipulates that it shall mean no more than the freedom of the spirit willing. Far better would it be to expel this fountain of errors from our nomenclature. The confusions of view it introduces are well illustrated by another favorite phrase, "free-thought." A certain class of

men profess to glory in free-thought. But common sense asks: Is thought free? or is it the man who thinks who is free? This very class of writers deny with emphasis that thought is free. For in passionately asserting their irresponsibility for their opinions (the fruits of their thinking), they always base that claim upon the doctrine that opinion is psychologically necessitated, and that belief follows the intellection of evidence by an inevitable law of the reason, which, they say, is as truly above the control of the will as the motions of the planets in their orbits. So, after founding their license in dogmatizing upon the assumption that rational thought is necessitated, they still boast in "free thought." This absurdity is no greater than the parallel one so often met with in the sophistical assertion of free-will. We will endeavor to avoid these murky fogs by discussing only free-agency.

**Supposed Fatal Dilemma in the Question: "Are Volitions Caused or Uncaused?" (Stated by Hamilton, Kant, Janet.)**

Are our volitions caused, or are they uncaused phenomena? Janet and Kant, with many others, profess to see in these questions an insoluble mystery. Kant exaggerates it into one of his pretended antinomies between consciousness and reason. Janet thinks either the affirmative or negative so difficult for the mind that he seeks refuge in the insoluble mystery of the subject; he intimates that either answer lies beyond the reach of the human faculties. He argues that if we say our volitions are efficiently caused, then they are effects, and effects cannot be free. But this conclusion conflicts with our intuitive consciousness of freedom and of responsibility. If we say that our volitions are not caused, then it is impossible they can have any order or method or rational quality, and man's action, in this, his consummate faculty, is made to appear so absurdly confused as to leave no just ground for his claim for either reason or free agency. This answer also contradicts the universal and necessary intuition, that no new phe-

nomenon can begin without efficient cause. No one has pushed this dilemma to a greater extreme than Sir William Hamilton does in following Kant. It is his strong instance under his favorite theory of the conditions of thought, in which he represents our primitive judgments not as the results of faculty, but of impotency of mind. He supposes the reason finds itself shut up between two contradictory judgments, both of which can not be false, and yet both are unthinkable. In this quandary he supposes the mind is entitled to adopt that one of the two unthinkable judgments which coheres best with its consciousness. While, then, it is equally impossible for us to see how our volitions can be caused or uncaused, yet, inasmuch as the refusal of our minds to believe that a new phenomenon can begin uncaused is merely the result of a limitation of thought or an impotency, he advises us to adopt the opposite absurdity, that our volitions are uncaused, for the reason that this better explains our own consciousness of free-agency.

## 2. Difference between Physical and Spiritual Causation.

I have stated in another place the grave objections to this theory of our cognitions, and have shown that Sir William Hamilton, by making our fundamental judgments of truth the results of impotency rather than faculty in the human spirit, pushes to the verge of absolute scepticism. But I am persuaded that these writers have unnecessarily created this dilemma for themselves by their own oversight. They begin by confounding physical causation with mental determination. They say, as we all believe, that the physical cause, if suitable conditions of action be granted, produces its effect with an absolute necessity which admits no freedom in that body which is the recipient of its power. Thus, for instance, fire explodes gunpowder without at all asking the gunpowder's leave if the suitable conditions of dryness and contact are present. Then these philosophers infer that if volitions are efficiently caused, the agents cannot be free. But then, *per*

*contra*, they refer us to the imperative intuition, that no new phenomenon can arise without cause; so that if volitions are such, their rise uncaused would violate this necessary law of thought. Now I reply, that if casual motives in the spirit were physical causes, then the dilemma would be insoluble. But must they be physical causes and act like them? That is the vital question. The affirmative of it is assumed most heedlessly. These writers in doing so have really begged the whole question which is in debate. By this heedless presumptive postulate they give away in advance the very point to be subjected to investigation. That point, I repeat, is this: They admit with us that spirits differ from material bodies essentially and substantially. Then may not their powers differ essentially in their modes of action from physical bodies? These exist by aggregation of parts; human spirits are monads. Consequently, all physical actions are of bodies upon other bodies, or, if within one body, they are actions of one part thereof upon another part of the same, which parts, though not separate, are substantially distinct. But our spirits have no parts. Yet, indisputably, they have interaction of faculties. We reach, then, this simple conclusion: that while such interactions do take place, they can not be actions of parts upon other parts. That is to say, they can not have all the characteristics of physical or material causations. But the essential point of inquiry remains. Do not determinations of psychical actions take place within the soul according to regular spiritual laws, one faculty determining another faculty to certain actions? The plain answer is, Yes! A given sensation determines the intelligence to a given sense-perception. A certain set of *a priori* judgments determine all our derived cognitions. In logic the axioms of pure thought determine all our forms of inference, and a pair of premises related according to those axioms determine all our conclusions with a rigid necessity. A given tie of association, according to the primary and the secondary laws of suggestion, determines what idea or emotion shall next occupy the spirit. Subjective disposition determines



sovereignly what outward objects shall be attractive and which shall not be to our sensibilities and appetencies. It is the disposition, for instance, which has determined that ripe fruit shall be inducement to the palate and appetite of the healthy child, and that chips and gravel shall not be; that applause shall be inducement to the spirit of the aspiring youth, and that oblivion or contempt shall not be. Let any man deny these determinations; he has virtually made free-agency impossible and a science of psychology impossible. May, then, the mental products and processes which result from these determinations be called effects, and their determinants causes? In the sense of a regulative efficiency, they may; in the physical sense, they may not. Thus, a simple and just discrimination removes the supposed antinomy, before which Janet and Hamilton, with so many others, profess to stumble. The human spirit is not subject to physical causations from external things in those processes wherein it is free and responsible. The human spirit, like everything else the all-wise Creator has made and now controls, is subject to laws of action regulative of its faculties even in their freest processes. "Order is Heaven's first law." Of course rational spirits, the highest sphere of creation, are not exempted from that principle of order. If they were, I repeat, there would be neither mental science, rationality nor free agency. There must be a sense, then, in which our doctrine, explaining the rise of volitions, will be "determinism," and yet it will be the doctrine of the spirit's self-determination.

**Faculties Not Limbs, but the Monad's Modes of Function.**

Kant in one place gives a brief but profound hint suggesting the solution which I have just attempted to explain. He asks himself how the indisputable fact, that the human spirit acts always according to laws may be reconciled with our indisputable consciousness of freedom. His answer is, that the reconciliation is given in the fact that our spirits are monads. Let us expand this. Faculties do act efficiently

upon faculties, and that according to their regulative laws, as thought upon feeling and judgment, and appetencies upon volitions. But faculties are not parts or members of the spirit; the spirit has no parts. What we call thought, if not a mere abstract notion, is the soul thinking; feelings are the soul feeling; judgments are the soul judging; appetencies are the soul craving, and volitions are the soul willing. But this soul is all the time the indivisible unit. Thus I can say with perfect good faith that motive (by which I mean the soul's combined judgment and desire) determines volition, and that the soul is self-determined to volition, and therefore free.

**Spontaneity and Disposition Ultimate and Determining.**

Is it objected that this likens the soul to a pair of scales, which sink to the right or left, according to the mechanical force of the heavier weight? I reply, No; the analogy is utterly misleading. The soul cannot be a pair of scales because it is an absolute unit, and the supposed weights are not weights because they are just as truly the soul's self as is the motion determined. Janet insists, in view of the imagined dilemma, that all analysis of volitions must end in an insoluble mystery. There is a sense in which I deny this, for I think I have explained his mystery away. But there is a sense in which I fully admit it. It is this, that in analyzing the determinants of deliberate volitions we reach these two ultimate facts of man's spiritual nature, rational spontaneity and native disposition. Here are the spring-heads of all the streams of free-agency. Analysis can go no further. These ultimate sources, then, must remain mysterious for us in the sense that they cannot be traced higher or resolved into anything simpler. I repeat, these two energies of spirit are most strictly subjective, and the noblest argument for the correctness of our analysis will appear when we shall have shown that it is only by tracing our volitions to these sources that we at once save man's free-agency and reconcile it with regular spiritual laws and divine providence.

### 3. Theory of Cousin Refuted.

I prefer to mention next the curious intermediate theory advanced by M. Cousin, because it illustrates so well the important assertion made above, that the processes and products of some faculties are determined by other faculties. He admits that every deliberate volition is preceded by motive; that every such motive is a complex of some judgment in the intelligence concerning the preferable, and some feeling. He also admits emphatically that this judgment of the preferable is metaphysically necessitated, inasmuch as it is efficiently determined by the soul's laws of thought acting upon the facts of perception and sensibility given to it. He almost flouts the opinion that such an act of the intelligence could take place, undetermined by these laws of thought and these objectives. For, he argues, if these judgments could thus arise, the mind would virtually have no laws and no rationality and there could be no science of psychology. He thus strips the faculty of will, as effectually as any necessitarian, of all self-determination upon the intellectual part of its own motive. Yet he persists in asserting the self-determination of the will, and regards it as essential to the assertion of man's proper freedom. Now, to save this point, he teaches that the chasm of spiritual causation lies between the volition following and the soul's emotion towards the object which the intellect has recognized as the preferable. The will has a mysterious power to reject the sway of this motive. Thus, he supposes, its self-determination is saved. To state his view popularly, the will is subject to the motive of the head, but is not subject to the motive of the heart. I reply, in every case of rational emotion the heart feels as the head sees. The act of intelligence coöperating with subjective disposition determines the act of feeling. In every deliberate volition the emotion must be rational. If, then, the faculty of will is to assert its self-determination in Cousin's mode, it must be at the cost of its rationality. In rejecting the sway of the precedent emotion, the will must also reject the direction of the accompanying

judgment of the preferable. This reduces M. Cousin's theory to this ridiculous position, that our wills, in order to be free, must be foolish. The will, in order to retain its own self-determination, must reject the guidance of its own intelligence. If any one thinks such a free-agency as this worth defending, I am entirely unable to sympathize with him. The obvious fact is that M. Cousin, in admitting that the soul's laws must determine its judgment of the preferable, has admitted that our deliberate volitions are not contingent, but determined.

**Theory of the Theological Fatalist: Erroneous.**

Three other theories about volition remain to be noticed. One is that of the theological fatalists, with whom should be ranked all consistent pantheists, as the stoics and Spinozists. Their theory is a denial not only of the self-determination of the will, but of free-agency. They argue that the unchangeable foresight of every event by the Almighty, and more especially His eternal, efficient foreordination of them, must imply that their rise is psychically necessitated. For, since every volition of every creature is thus foreseen and thus foreordained, it must be obliged to happen just as predetermined. Or, if we state the result with the pantheists, every being whom we call an individual creature is but a modal manifestation of the absolute One, and every act of every such supposed creature is but a pulsation of the universal action of this One. But, as its self-existence is necessary, so every one of these pulsations is necessitated from eternity to eternity. Hence, on either scheme, creatures have no real free-agency: there is but one Being in the universe who is a real cause of events. Our apparent consciousness of free-agency must be illusory. We originate no acts of spirit of any kind, and consequently no effects, but we and our seeming acts of spirit must be only dependent links in chains of effects, all running back to the one sole Cause. As man's soul is dependent for its being, and not self-existent, so it must ever be dependent for its actions, and not self-determined.

How closely this conclusion seems to be connected with its theological premises appears from the historical fact, that those who (properly) seek to defend our free-agency frequently suppose that they can only do so by totally denying divine foreordination. This point of debate, then, calls for careful inspection. Must the denial of free-agency follow from the admission of divine foreordination? Can foreordination be successfully denied? The discussion of the latter point draws us out of our present sphere into another science, that of theology. It is not necessary to our present purpose to make that excursion, for we are able to deny the inference of the previous question. We assert that the testimony of our consciousness to our own free-agency is valid and conclusive, for it is as immediate and intuitive as any of the judgments from which any theological postulates are drawn. If we may not believe consciousness testifying to our own free-agency, we need not trouble ourselves with the testimony of so unfaithful a witness to any other principles of thought. The pantheistic premises all sound philosophy utterly rejects. The inference from the premises of a rational foresight and foreordination to the denial of our free-agency is a very shallow sophism. Of course, if the act of a creature's will be either infallibly foreseen or foreordained, there must be a sense in which the occurrence of that act of will in the future must be certain. But can not an infinite mind provide and arrange for the certain occurrence of that act of will, without any compulsion upon the will of the creature? That question is very blindly overlooked by this notorious sophism. In other words, is it not possible for a ruler of infinite resource and intelligence to influence his rational creatures to a given act of free-agency, with certainty, and yet without compulsion? Common sense answers: Yes, clearly! For we who are limited in power and intelligence thus influence our fellows with certainty to determinations in which they are yet entirely free, in multitudes of instances. What are all the instances of our moral government and control? In multitudes of cases we

are able to see beforehand the certainty of our control, yet we know that the persons controlled by us are free-agents. We form contracts of business and service with our free equals, in which, by presenting inducements, we expect to secure their punctual compliance. We plan our own steps beforehand with unquestioning reliance on their punctuality, and usually we are not disappointed. The mistress, for instance, expects confidently that the servants will have dinner prepared at the stipulated time; she is not mistaken; yet she knows that if she were afterwards to refuse these servants their wages, on the argument that because the acts of service had been foreseen and foreordained, therefore the servants were not free-agents, and, not being free, could not deserve reward, they would know the plea to be dishonest. Surely this is too familiar to need expansion. Now the argument is, *a fortiori*, that if we who are finite can so often influence free-agents to acts which we foresee and foreordain, without at all infringing their free-agency, so much the more can the infinite Ruler do the like. We thus detect in the fatalistic argument a suppressed premise whose truth would be necessary to the conclusion. It is this, that the Almighty can not have any means except such as are compulsory, to guide with certainty the actions of free-agents. But when we drag this proposition into the light, we find it to be absurdly false. Thus, in order to reject the fatalistic inference, it is not at all needful for us to track the methods of an omniscient Providence in their details. It is only needful for us to know that He can have abundance of such methods, inscrutable to us, perhaps, but devoid of compulsory violence and thoroughly consistent with our conscious free-agency.

#### 4. Theory of the Sensualists Refuted.

The next theory of volition which we have to reject is that of the sensualistic psychologist, represented by Hobbes, Hume, Condillac, the Mills, and many others. Their maxim is the old scholastic one, "*Nihil in intellectu quod non prius in sensu,*"

and they apply it in its extreme sense. Their effort is to account for all the processes and products of the human faculties as either immediate sense-impressions or as combinations or modifications thereof. Thus with them everything must be empirical. This sweeping analysis, when applied to the feelings of the soul, virtually reduces them all to functions of sensibility. There is no room in their psychology for truly subjective desires and aversions, for these would point us necessarily to subjective dispositions determining from within this kind of products of the spirit's activity. Thus their maxim would be overthrown, that the spirit is *tabula rasa* prior to impressions. According to this analysis, every emotion and desire of man's spirit must be either the direct sense-impression, continuing and decaying, or it must be a reflected modification thereof, related to it as the motion of the rebounding ball is to the forward motion which preceded the rebound, or as rays of light reflected from a mirror to the direct rays projected from the sun. In either case the efficient cause of the feeling is objective; the spirit does not act, but is acted on. Let these psychologists add, as they usually do, the fact taught by common sense and consciousness, that motives always prompt deliberate volitions, and it needs little reflection to see that the soul's self-determination is gone. Let any typical case be examined. For instance, a ruffian, coming behind a peaceable but spirited man, strikes him with a bludgeon. The immediate effect is bodily pain in the portion of the body smitten. With reference to this pain, the victim has no more free-agency than over the motion of the earth in its orbit. He did not even know that he was to experience it. The next effect of the blow is resentment in the victim's spirit, which consists of the direct impression which the blow propagated through the nerves on the sensibility and the necessary reaction against the injury. In this resentment also the victim's spirit is simply passive, and is determined from without; but the resentment will, by psychological necessity, produce some desire or tendency to retaliate the blow. Now let it be held

that his desire is the determining or efficient motive of the volition to strike back, and the doctrine leaves no more real free-agency in that volition than there is in the motion of the fifth link in a piece of chain, of which the first link is dragged forward by an external force. The more consistent sensualists avow this result expressly. John Stuart Mill recognizes his father's avowal of it, and says that it would be inevitable but for the intervention of another sensualistic doctrine. One part of this is the refusal to recognize efficient power in any case of causation. He denies that the mind is entitled to see any other tie between cause and effect than immediate, invariable antecedence and sequence. The other is to obliterate the distinction between true cause and attendant occasion. He teaches that the proper conception of every cause is a bundle of immediate, occasional antecedents. For instance, gunpowder is exploded by fire; there must be other antecedents besides which are equally conditions *sine qua non* for the explosion, as dryness in the gunpowder, for instance. He asserts that this dryness is just as much entitled to be called part cause of the explosion as the fire itself. Having thus, as he supposes, emptied all efficiency out of all causations, he thinks that his father may assign these feelings determined by objective sources, as the casual motives of volitions, without being a fatalist. Good common sense decides that the evasion, if it were true, would be a very sorry one. For it would still leave our volitions on a par with physical events as to the mode of their determination. But we know by an intuitive consciousness that they are not. If the acts of my spirit are moved in the same way with the ball propelled from the cannon or the wave pushed before the wind, then, however Mr. Mill may sophisticate our notions of these effects, I am no free-agent, but a helpless, animated puppet. The careful arguments by which Dr. Thomas Reid has proved that free-agency is inconsistent with the action of such feelings as causal motives of volitions will never be refuted.



**This Error Gave the Pretext for the Scotist Theory—Viz., That Volitions Are Uncausèd, the Will in Equilibrio and Contingent.**

To me it appears perfectly obvious that it was the perception of this result which led a famous school to excogitate still another theory of volitions many hundred years ago. Let me call this, for convenience sake, the Scotist theory, because it received the support of the learned Duns Scotus and of the whole sect in the scholastic philosophy which followed him. (For the same reason the rival theory was for centuries called the Thomist theory, because it received the vigorous support of Thomas Aquinas, the great master of the scholastics, and of his school.) I am persuaded that the same imagined stress is the active cause which has kept alive the Scotist theory, notwithstanding its fatal defects, to this day, and which now gives it the support of a multitude of earnest thinkers. This is their dilemma, namely: Common sense seems to say that motives determine all our deliberate volitions. But the current sensationalism which dominated philosophy taught that the feelings, the vital elements in these motives, are determined by objective causes. Then we are not real free-agents. But consciousness declares that we are. At what point shall they break this fatal chain of proof, which seems to drag us all to the slavish conclusion? The Scotist decided that it must be broken at the first link; that he must deny the causal relation of motives to volitions. Such was the only escape from fatalism which he saw from the sensualist's point of view. Did his own consciousness declare that his motives did determine his deliberate volitions, and declare it with a distinctness equal to its assertion of our freedom? The Scotist concluded that he must trample on the one intuition in order to save the other, and so he devised the doctrine that our volitions are not effects at all. When he was reminded of that necessary law of thought, *Ex nihilo, nihil* (No new phenomenon or being can begin without efficient cause to begin it), he attempted to plead that this universal truth does not apply to volitions. This one class of events he made a peculiar excep-

tion. He endeavored to believe that they may arise uncaused. No previous movement of affection or appetency in the spirit, no judgment of the preferable in the spirit's own intelligence, however clear, has determining influence on the rise of volitions. These so-called motives, the Scotist allows, may often be the immediate antecedents of volitions. He will even admit that they may constitute the occasions, the conditions, *sine qua non*, under which volitions occur. But yet they are not their causes; the will remains *in equilibrio* after these have exerted their utmost action in the free spirit.

The volition may often happen to be in accordance with these antecedents, but the will, the faculty of volitions, always retains its prerogative of rejecting their influence and of uttering the volition which is contrary to them; so that our most deliberate volitions are still contingent events. It does not satisfy them to be told that we grant the spirit to be self-determined in its volitions, and therefore free. They demand also that the will, the special faculty of volitions in the spirit, shall be self-determined. It must be free not only from powers external to the spirit, but from the determination of the other powers of the same spirit. All this we must grant them, or else all real free-agency is betrayed.

**The Sensualistic Stress Resolved by the Distinction between Sensibility and Appetency.**

Now upon this extreme theory I remark, first, that the stress which seems to require it is imaginary and emerges from an erroneous psychology. The sensualists are mistaken in regarding all feelings as mere sensibilities, propagated from external sources. Man has another and distinct class of feelings, the appetencies and aversions which are from a subjective source. Impressions on his sensibility may furnish the occasion for the latter class of feelings, but not the cause. Their rise is determined by the soul's own subjective dispositions, not by the objects which impress the sense. This all-important distinction has been stated and demonstrated by us in our

First Book with a fullness which requires no repetition here. Every analysis in that book shows how each class of feelings divides itself into the objective, or passive, and the subjective, spontaneous and active. One object of the care there bestowed now becomes apparent. It is this (true) psychology which alone enables us to understand the relation of motives to volition. When once the proper distinction is apprehended between feelings of sensibility and feelings of conation, the whole argument of the sensualist against our freedom in our volitions is utterly enervated. There is no longer any necessity to resort to the extreme hypothesis of the Scotist to defend our intuitive consciousness of freedom at the cost of rejecting our equal consciousness of motives prompting volitions. Both intuitive convictions are saved by being made consistent with each other. Motives do determine our deliberate volitions, but passive sensibilities are not motives. The feelings which combine into our judgments of the preferable are subjective, spontaneous ones. We can assure the Scotist, with Dr. A. Alexander, that we are as staunch and sincere friends of free-agency as he is; that we are sincere in holding the self-determination of the soul in all its responsible volitions, although we cannot assert with him the self-determination of the faculty of will with all its objectionable consequences.

### 5. The True Theory.

#### Distinction between Inducement and Motive.

The objects which only occasion volitions are so frequently and mischievously confounded with the appetencies which cause them, that it is very desirable to separate them henceforward by a fixed nomenclature. Let it be agreed then that we call the objects of human desire which are the occasion for stimulating the sensibility *inducements*; while we reserve the term *motive* for the subjective appetencies and aversions. The etymology of the word "inducement" might indeed be misleading, since it would give it the meaning of instrument

of drawing or attracting. For our argument will be that the objective thing does not in fact draw or attract the agent. But since this is the word already established in the use of philosophers, and since another word might probably be found liable to some other ambiguity, we may as well retain this term while we strictly limit it to its technical meaning of the object which the soul tends to draw to itself. Now it is exceedingly common to hear language thoughtlessly used which calls the inducement the motive. This is all erroneous. The money is called the motive of the thief, the wine is called the motive of the drunkard. Such objects are often heedlessly described as attractive, persuasive, enticing, tempting; all of which is erroneous. It is not true that such objects literally attract, draw or tempt the human spirit. (James i. 14.)

**Inducements Not Motives—Proofs : (A) Objects Passive.**

The appeal here is to common sense and consciousness, both of which show at a glance that these propositions are but vicious metaphors. To attract one is to project upon him a spiritual activity; unless the word means this, it means nothing. But the objects of human appetency and volition are often dead material things; they have in them absolutely nothing spiritual which they may project. They are related to the human spirit substantively, only as being known in sense-perception. In this relation to man they are simply passive, absolutely incapable of self-movement, and therefore still more incapable of projecting movement into a rational spirit. These objects, in this whole business of desire and volition, are simply victims of human agency, and not agents at all. The money does not draw the thief, it is the thief who draws the passive money. The wine does not attract the drunkard, the drunkard attracts to himself the helpless wine. From another simple view, which has been already suggested, I draw another demonstration. I raised this question: Is any object whatsoever inducement to any being whosoever? Of course not; chips and clods are not inducements to a boy's appetite, luscious fruits

are. Oblivion and ignominy are not inducements to the spirited youth, fame and power are. The questions and answers are so easy and plain that men overlook their significance.

**(B) The Spirit Has Decided Which Objects Can Be and Which Cannot Be Inducement.**

I ask again: Here is a given thing which is found to be an inducement to one class of beings: will it therefore be inducement to all other classes? Again, No. What is inducement to one is indifferent or even repellant to another. Men say in their erroneous phrase that they can attract a hungry horse with fragrant hay. Will it attract a hungry school-boy? He perhaps draws to the hot beefsteak; the horse turns from it with shuddering disgust. The bully is "attracted" to the brutal prize-ring; the pure woman goes far out of her way to avoid it. Now the cardinal question is, What determines which object shall be and which shall not be inducement to a given being? The obvious and only answer is, That being's subjective disposition. It is the natural disposition of the child's palate which has decided *a priori* that he shall draw to the fruits and not to the chips or clods when he perceives them. It is the natural disposition of the young man's spirit which decides *a priori* that he shall crave fame and dislike oblivion. All this is self-evident. This fact again teaches us that the agency over human desire and volition does not flow from the object to the soul, but from the soul to the object. For have I not shown that it is the soul's subjective attribute, disposition, existing before all perception of the objects, which decides what shall be inducements and what shall not? The effect does not determine its own cause. The cart does not move the horse which draws it.

**Like Causes, Like Effects.**

That the objects of human volitions are not its motives I prove again by an appeal to the axiom, that like causes must produce like effects; for the same objective inducements often result in opposite ways upon different persons, when all the

other circumstances are identical. Thus a heedless guest at a hotel twice left a purse containing gold upon his table, when he went out to spend the day. On one day a servant came alone to arrange his apartment, he saw the gold, he paused and considered that here were opportunity, secrecy and impunity; but instead of stealing the gold, he provided for its return to its lawful owner. On the other day a different servant came to the same task, saw the gold with opportunity, secrecy and impunity, and ended by stealing it. Now had the gold been the cause of the choice in either case, like causes should have produced like effects in both cases. The gold was not the cause of the thievish volition in the one servant, but cupidity, as probity (or prudence) was the cause in the other servant of the volition to restore the purse. These two opposite attributes qualified the two spirits before either of them saw the gold. In either case the gold, as an object, presented only the occasion, not the cause of the two volitions.

## 6. The True Theory Continued.

*Distinction between Popular and Philosophic Meanings of Necessity.  
i. e., between Compulsion and Certainty of Action.*

Here is suggested one more point in the correct theory of volition, which must be scrupulously cleared from misconception. This question raises it: Does not my account of the rise of volition still represent it as determined, not indeed by objective inducement, but by man's own disposition regulating his subjective motives? Volitions, then, are necessitated, and how can that which is necessitated be free? Where men are obliged to act in a certain way, freedom is gone.

The solution of the cavil requires us to separate between the philosophic meaning of the word "necessity" and the popular. In the popular sense actions are said to be necessitated when they are compelled by some force from without, and there is left to the will no choice to do or not to do them. This is the meaning which the term bears in the cavil just

stated. A necessitated act in the philosophic sense is simply one which is certain to occur. Let the student be assured that this is the whole scope of the philosophic term, and that it is never designed to name an external controlling force as the ground of that certain occurrence. Thus even Jonathan Edwards, whom many supposed to be an extremist in his doctrine of the will, expressly declares that by the necessity of volitions he means nothing but their full certainty. So declares Dr. Alexander, so Turretin, so Hodge, and all the masters of that school. Dr. A. Alexander is so zealous in asserting this meaning for the word, and in clearing himself from every notion of compulsion in the rise of volitions, that he declares he wishes the words "necessary" and "necessity" had never been applied to them by anyone. I would rather say that I wish that a heedless and ignorant modern usage had never wrested those good words from their etymological, their recognized, and their invariable usage in the Latin philosophy. According to that etymology and usage, *necessarium* never could and never did mean the compulsory, but strictly and only that which is certain of occurrence. For *necessarium* is simply *quod non cedit*, the unfailling. The modern abuse of the word has become so perverse and obstinate that it is really hard to beat the popular mind off from its delusion about it. Let me ask the student what he means by "incessant" actions when he speaks of an incessant day's rain or an incessant talker. He knows that he means simply actions certainly continuing, actions not failing or ceasing. Now let him remember that in Latin *ne* and *in* are both negative enclitics with the same meaning. "Incessant" and "necessant," were the latter in classic use, would mean precisely the same thing; only *necessarium* appears in classic Latin instead of *necessans*. In fact, the stubborn confusion of thought which has given such currency to the cavil would never have troubled philosophy, had not a blundering popular usage wrested her characteristic word. If one may surmise how this miserable confusion came about, it seems to

have been suggested by this point of analogy, that when a compulsory external force produces an effect, it also makes it certain of occurrence. And, this last notion, which is all that the word *necessarium* carried, has then been stupidly mixed with the other notion of compulsion.

But here I ask, May there not be phenomena of the rational spirit which are not compulsory, and yet have full certainty of occurrence? All must answer, Yes; as I shall demonstrate anon. Then it does not follow that the spirit has lost its freedom in the production of such phenomena. The cavil which advanced with so haughty a claim of self-evidence is found to be merely a misconception. The question remains open for debate, whether our deliberate volitions may not arise with full certainty, as being results determined by precedaneous subjective processes of the spirit itself, and the spirit yet be entirely free in willing.

#### Full Certainty Entirely Consistent with Freedom—Instances.

Such is the question fairly stated, and the argument in the affirmative will be short and triumphant. Consciousness affirms it; the moment we look within, we find in ourselves many determinations, the tenor of which we know to be fully certain beforehand, and yet we are conscious of full freedom in them. Let it be supposed that one says to me: "You, sir, will receive to-morrow a proposal to join in an enormous crime, which will be very profitable and followed by entire impunity; what will you answer?" I reply that I shall refuse it. He questions: "Are you certain that you will?" I reply: "Yes, I shall certainly refuse it." What now will the man of common sense think of this logic: "Then, sir, you will not be a free-agent in refusing it, for the learned Scotists argue that if a volition is necessitated, it cannot be free." It is supreme nonsense. My consciousness assures me that I shall be free in refusing. Again, we all frequently exercise a human providence in procuring future volitions from our fellow-men, the occurrence of which we regard as certain, for



we foresee them and count fully upon them. Yet we judge those fellow-creatures to be free and meritorious in putting forth those very volitions. Again, we have such knowledge of men's characters that we foreknow absolutely what choice they will exercise concerning certain proposed actions. Let it be imagined, for instance, that a corrupt quartermaster proposed to Gen. Robert E. Lee to join him in plundering his own military chest. We absolutely foresee that the patriotic choice will be an indignant refusal. Here is a necessitated volition—*i. e.*, of certain occurrence. Is Gen. Lee then not a free-agent? Again, if Holy Writ is to be believed, there are numerous beings of indefectible rectitude, as the human Jesus, heavenly saints, and holy angels. Of course righteous volitions must be of absolutely certain occurrence in all these. They are therefore not free-agents. Of all the created, they are the most nobly free. Once more, if either philosophy or Holy Writ is to be believed, there is a Heavenly Father who is sovereign First Cause, and who has these two attributes, perfect holiness and necessary immutability. Then all His moral volitions are necessitated from eternity to eternity, and yet His free-agency is the most supreme of all in the universe.

The sum of the matter, then, is clearly this: that the human spirit lacks freedom only in such of its phenomena as are necessitated by compulsion from without. In such others as are determined and certain, but determined only by antecedent, subjective, and therefore free functions of the spirit itself, it has true free-agency. For this spirit is a monad. The processes which determine its volitions are as truly its own and are as truly functions of its spontaneity as its volitions are.

#### Causal Motive Defined.

The thesis which I uphold, then, is this, that while objective inducements present only the occasions of our volitions, subjective motives are the determining causes. Motive in its simplest form is always a complex of at least two functions

of the spirit, some movement of its disposition in the form of an appetency, and some judgment of its intelligence concerning the practically preferable. These two processes of spirit imply, of course, some object before it, which, while no cause of them, is yet a condition requisite for them. We saw that the spirit always apprehends this object under the two-fold aspect of the true and the good; otherwise it is no object to the soul. So correspondingly, the soul's spontaneous movement towards this object involves the two-fold elements of inclination (or aversion), and of a judgment of practical truth.

## CHAPTER III.

## THE ARGUMENTS WHICH SUPPORT THE PREFERRED THEORY OF VOLITIONS.

Consciousness, their rationality, our foreknowledge of them and power of influencing them, the bias to the *summum bonum*, the analogy of other just beings and of God, all prove that the will is determined by motives and subjective determination or free-agency.

## The Thesis Restated.

Let this theory be restated in another and possibly a simpler form. It is, that whenever we deliberately choose, it is because we have a motive for our choice. This motive is the soul's own feeling and judgment of the preferable, which to it seems the strongest at the time of choice. We do not assert that this motive is always truly and rationally entitled to weigh as the strongest, but that the soul always receives it thus, at the time of choosing. Without such motive no choice would have taken place. This motive, then, is in that sense cause; it is the determining antecedent to the volition. Thus only is man an agent, both rational and free.

## Why So Litigated.

We are here entering upon an argument litigated and of wide extent. There are certain influences and dependent questions which have made it for ages the center of the battleground in the contests of philosophy. A notable cause of this prominence is the fact that the rival theories of volitions unavoidably became essential premises to cardinal doctrines held for centuries by the great rival schools of revealed theology. But this fact is the concern of the theologian and

not of the psychologist. Our business is to examine the arguments dispassionately by the lights of philosophy. Whither they lead us we must candidly follow, discarding all partisanship. My attempt will be to digest into a moderate compass an account, sufficiently full and fair, of the arguments and objections bearing upon my position.

#### Argued (1) From Consciousness.

I claim that consciousness, when properly consulted, always sustains it. Whenever we choose we are conscious of having a motive for our choice. This men frequently call the reason for their choice, thereby indicating their recognition of the psychology of common sense, which explains motive as a complex of rational judgment with subjective feeling. My assertion is not that the spirit always stops to consider and remember this motive or reason for its choice; excitement, haste, an intermingling of mental processes with the force of customary habit, often render a part thereof very evanescent in our consciousness. But, as we know in a multitude of other cases, this by no means proves that the evanescent parts were not there, and there as essential links of the processes. Thus the animated fencer does not consciously remember every parry and thrust of his combat, nor the rapid thinker every idea in his trains of association. But if we will take the pains to watch ourselves, we shall perceive that every action, even the most hasty, which is not automatic, has had its motive. We became conscious in every case that we should not have willed had we not supposed that we had a motive to will. I confirm this by reminding the student that if anyone should charge him with having made a motiveless choice, he would certainly regard this charge as disparaging to him in the judgment of his common sense as unbiased by any perverse theory of free-will. The response of his intelligence to the charge would immediately be, that this was the insult of charging upon him a silly and irrational action. I confirm my point by this observation also, that whenever we hear a

child or other willful person declare that he is exercising a motiveless volition, that is to say, one for which he can give no reason, we at once judge that his is a case of mere humorsomeness and petulance worthy of chastisement, or that he is consciously concealing the truth.

**2. Volitions Otherwise Not Rational, Nor Responsible.  
Nor Morally Appraised by Their Intentions.**

On any other theory, how can volitions be rational? What makes our volitions rational? The plain mind can only answer: "The reasons which determine them." But in this popular expression reasons mean rational motives. If, according to the Scotist theory, volitions arise from the self-determination of a will *in equilibrio*, against the prompting of the prevalent motive, then they must be as merely irrational as a sneeze, or cough, or yawn. But further, how can an agent be held responsible for a volition thus irrational? Who holds men responsible for sneezing? If we inspect the judgments of mankind as expressed in their judicial transactions, we find that they always construe the moral quality and responsibility of actions by the quality of their intentions. All are aware that by this judicial term, "intention," men do not signify the meaning or connotation of a concept, but precisely the subjective motive, as tending towards its object. This is the judgment of universal common sense, that the innocence or guilt of the volition depends on that of the intention. But if motive does not decide volition, how can the intention impart its quality to it? These judicial conclusions of universal mankind furnish us with an excellent image. Let us compare the human spirit to a court of justice: the practical intellect is the judge; the will is the sheriff or executive officer. The sheriff does not determine the cases on trial, but simply executes the judgments of the court. The legality and validity of his acts depend solely upon their conformity to those judgments.

### 3. Otherwise Actions No Indices of Character, and Past Character No Guarantee of Future Actions.

We all believe that we have insight into the character of our fellows with whose actions we are acquainted. We say: "I know that man well; he has a good character." How do we know he has? Is there any window in his breast through which we have peeped and seen the lineaments of character? None whatever. We are inferring it solely from his actions which we can see. The logic of our inference is simply that his visible actions are indices of the volitions in his spirit, and that these are indices of his character. But what do we mean by character? We may not know that this is a Greek word, whose primary meaning is, something permanently cut into a tablet of stone or metal with a graving tool. But we all know that we use the word to signify a permanent trait, qualifying the soul subjectively, and holding a radical, determining relation to its outward manifestations. We always think of character as something that abides and that may be relied on to influence actions regularly. Does one ask you if he may trust your friend in the future. You answer, "Yes, you may trust him; for have I not said that his character is good?" This, if it means anything, means that you expect your friend's good character, or something which he has possessed in the past, will certainly regulate his volitions in the future, and you expect the enquirer to think on that point as you do. I find in these practical judgments of common sense a double argument against the Scotist theory: First, if men's subjective motives do not determine volitions, then the actions of our fellows which we observe are no indices of their character. The hands on a church clock give no indications of the movements of the machinery within if they are merely blown around by the breezes, and have no efficient connection with the wheels and axles. If the will determines itself, we might watch the tenor of a man's actions for a lifetime, and not thereby know his character. Second, if the will is self-determined, even after we had recognized a man's

right character, we should not trust him as to the tenor of his future acts. The faculty of will would resemble some (impossible) species of weathercock, which, though exposed to the winds, yet had in itself a capability of pointing at any time across them. I need not argue whether such a weathercock ever existed or could exist; the only point I make is, that the wind might blow steadily from the north, and yet the instrument might not point north.

#### 4. From Every Instance of Effective Persuasion.

We all endeavor to influence our fellow-men in the ways of education, government and business, and we succeed with more or less certainty. Let us examine this custom of ours. In many cases we make the attempt to exert influence, and even to mould character, while uncertain of our own success. Were there no possibility of succeeding, we would not endeavor. In many other cases we expect success in directing our fellow-creatures with certainty. Now what can we do with them compatibly with their free-agency? Simply this: we can present objective inducements to action. But whether our fellow-men will respond to them depends entirely upon the *a priori* condition of their dispositions, desires and aversions—that is, upon their prior characters. It is when we are certain we perceive their characters aright, and know we have the power to present some inducement relative thereto, that we expect to succeed in influencing them with certainty. If we know that our insight into their characters is doubtful, we think our success will be doubtful. Now this expectation which is so often realized proceeds upon the postulate, that the known disposition of our fellow-creature will regularly determine his volitions. The result which we practically foresee and determine is, that this fellow-creature will move to some given inducement, which we are able to present; and that he will move to it freely. Were the objective inducement itself the sole cause of his volition, he would not be free. Yet the foreseen success of our plan to influence him shows that

there must be some connection marked by certainty between our inducement and his action. How can this be? Objective inducement, I repeat, is not the determining cause of his volition; but his subjective disposition which we have ascertained is the determining cause why such and such things rather than others are relevant objective inducements to him; and we expect this, his disposition, to regulate with certainty his volitions. The Scotist theory has no solution for the problem; it labors hopelessly between the two contradictories of denying the free-agency of the men we thus influence, or denying that we ever influenced them with a foreseen certainty. But we know that they are free agents and that we do certainly influence them in multitudes of cases. Our theory solves the problem and saves both truths, which it does by postulating the doctrine, that men's motives always regulate their volitions.

##### 5. From the Certainty of Our Choice of Happiness per Se over Misery.

No man's will is *in equilibrio* in respect of his *summum bonum*. He always chooses his own happiness in preference to his own misery, when he has to choose between the two upon their own merits. The virtuous man not seldom chooses suffering, not for its own sake, but as a necessary condition of a higher good; as he rejects enjoyment, not for its own sake, but because it is involved with some moral evil, or with some greater natural misery. Let the issue between the two choices be disencumbered; let natural good or natural evil be elected for their own sakes, and every man in the world certainly chooses the good. Let moral good or evil be presented to be chosen for their own sakes exclusively, and every virtuous man chooses the good. Nowhere is man more free than in this choice between happiness and misery. Yet in it he is absolutely determined by his own dispositions. The force of this point of argument is in the question: Why may not the determination of our volitions be everywhere con-



sistent with freedom, since it is indisputably consistent in every one of this important class of our volitions?

#### 6. From the Certainty of Will in All Other Moral Agents.

I find this overwhelming objection to the Scotist theory of free-agency, that were it true of us natural men, it would not be true of any other class of rational beings known to us from any source of information. There are, for instance, human beings whom society practically designates as reprobates. They are known to have gone so far in the direction of some vice that their continuance in it is regarded as absolutely certain. No man pretends to expect their reform. They are spoken of as "lost men," as "hopeless cases," and bondslaves to their vices. When their fellow-men thus predict their future career, they obviously judge upon this ground, that these men's evil appetencies and habits will infallibly continue to determine them to the same evil volitions. Yet they are regarded as free. Their fellow-men continue to blame them, and often to punish them judicially. But if they were not free, they would not be responsible. Men do not confine them in lunatic asylums. Here, then, is an unfortunate class, in whose vicious actions a real free-agency coexists with an evil certainty of volitions. Sacred Writ informs us that there is also a class of fallen angels whose moral condition is reprobate. The state of their wills is described as only evil, and that continually. For them there is to be no repentance or reformation forever. Yet they are still free-agents, for we are distinctly told that God will continue to hold them responsible for their transgressions; and His justice would prevent such judgments upon creatures who had ceased to be responsible by ceasing to be free. We are told upon similar authority that there are two blessed classes of creatures in the upper world, holy men and holy angels, who cannot sin. Their pure and happy state is assured. There is in their future no contingency of sin, of back-sliding or of apostacy. Their principles of rectitude are perfect, and are confirmed

forever. Yet they have not ceased to be free-agents, inasmuch as they continue to render to their God a joyful and willing rational service, and enjoy his continual moral approbation and reward. It is pleasing to notice that the analogy of our own experience confirms this representation, in that, among the many evil men whom we meet in this world, there are at least some happy instances, the stability of whose virtues foreshadows this heavenly condition. They have derived (from what source it is not necessary to decide for the ends of this argument), a moral strength which renders them superior to temptation, with a clear mental vision as to duty. Everyone expects them to continue in the path of virtue, in which they have advanced so far. They are not regarded as absolutely perfect, but they are regarded as having decisively conquered at least some vices, and established themselves in some virtues. To those vices we believe they are impervious; we say they cannot be led into them. But these good men are still free agents, yea, of all men are they most nobly free. What is the explanation of this moral condition? It is that their right principles will continue with full certainty to determine their own volitions. In all such, therefore, free-agency and determinism unquestionably meet. The crown of this head of our argument is presented by the human history of Jesus. Here was a man whose biography has been subjected for hundreds of years to the most searching criticism, until the historical picture which remains is recognized as authentic by all intelligent men of all schools of thought. It is a picture of moral perfection, and shows us a life absolutely without sin. The most searching temptations found no lodgment in him, and could not find any, because of the perfectness of his wisdom and rectitude. Surely all his volitions must have been determined to holiness. Surely there was no equilibrium of will here. Indeed, the absolute certainty of his continued right choice had been predetermined before he began to live, by the very purpose of his existence. The very mission which he came into the world to fulfill turned decisively upon

the point, that he should complete his earthly existence without a single sin; and the blessed results of this mission had been the subjects of promise and prediction centuries before. Yet was he most completely a free-agent. So he declared concerning himself; such he is proved to have been by the merit accorded to him by earth and heaven.

Lastly, we are compelled to believe that God combines supreme freedom with the most absolute certainty of volition, for He is unchangeably and necessarily holy, and yet is first cause and supreme ruler of all things. We have thus gone around the whole known circle of rational beings, and we have found that this conception of a will *in equilibrio* and of contingent volitions as the condition of true freedom is inapplicable to every species. If it were the correct description of man's free-agency, it would be the strange exception from the order of all the rest of the moral universe. To argue, then, that these conditions are essential to free-agency in the present mixed state of us men is infinitely absurd.

#### The Evasion of the Scotists.

There is, indeed, an attempted evasion from this crushing blow of argument, which I will candidly explain. The Scotist endeavors to reply that the cases in which we find responsibility and merit or demerit combined with determinism in volitions are to be accounted for in this way: The states of determination, either to good or to evil, have themselves been the results, under the law of habit, of the trains of right volitions or wrong volitions put forth by these persons while as yet they had the perfect freedom of contingency, and beginning from wills *in equilibrio*, the continuance of responsibility after the state of contingency has ended is simply a result of the righteous moral law, that rational creatures are responsible, not only for their immediate actions in a state of freedom, but for all the regular consequences of such actions. This instance presents fairly the nature of their plea: A commonwealth is engaged in a righteous, defensive war. It

is the duty of all citizens of military age and sound bodies to serve in arms when called to her defense. An able-bodied but cowardly militiaman, foreseeing his draft into the active army, takes his ax and intentionally chops off the fingers of his right hand. When the draft comes, he presents himself to the inspecting officer and claims exemption on the ground that he is physically incompetent to load and fire a musket. Now, this is literally and corporeally true, and yet he is responsible and guilty in failing to serve his country in her need because his incompetency was self-procured. So, it is argued, the reprobate soul is still responsible and guilty after it has sinned away its own equilibrium of will and become determined to evil, because the incompetency to good has been self-induced. Thus, too, the virtuous spirit, which by a long train of right volitions emitted from the equilibrium of its will has confirmed its habit of right choice into a final determination to the good, still merits approval for his right volitions, because this fixed state of will was self-induced by him.

Replies: (A) The Evasion Futile as to Angels, Jesus and God;  
 (B) The Moral Essentia Not Changed by Sinning Habit.

The justice of the moral law here referred to is unquestionable, but it totally fails to explain the cases which I adduced. In the three most illustrious of those instances, that of the "Holy Child Jesus," that of the holy angels and that of the eternal Heavenly Father, the certain determination to holy volitions which we found coëxisting with freedom and merit, was not self-induced, but was original. This state of will in God has been from eternity not only original, but absolutely necessary and immutable. In these three cases, then, the argument of evasion utterly breaks down. For it has no application. In the remaining case, of reprobate men and angels, it is wholly fallacious. Every such creature's consciousness refutes it; no such change as is implied in the argument is known by them in their own experience. They

are conscious of no such revolution from a previous competency to duty to an essential incompetency therefor. In the members of the delinquent soldier described, a real, corporeal inability has occurred. He has now no fingers with which to handle his musket. He now has no free-will to do so, however earnestly and sincerely his whole soul may be bent to do his duty to his country. The guilt of his future derelictions from that duty must be carried back in our judgments and all attached to the one decisive act by which he then disabled himself. But is there anything corresponding to this in the reprobate soul? Nothing whatever. Consciousness tells him that it is not a corporeal inability which he has inflicted upon himself. If only his soul were sincerely and rightly inclined to duty to his God, he knows there would be no obstruction to its performance. He is conscious that his freedom is the same as before, and that he is as truly self-determined as ever to choose the evil, which he certainly chooses. He knows that the ill-desert of his successive wrong volitions is not to be carried back in judgment and attached wholly to the previous evil choices, like the helpless bodily consequences of some past crime against himself, but that this responsibility is present and continuing, qualifying his present wrong volition just as immediately as his past sins.

#### **7. Argued from God's Prescience—This Attribute Proved.**

Revelation assures us that the infinite mind has a universal prescience of what all men and angels freely choose to do; and natural theology confirms the claim. A few of the advocates of the Scotist theory, foreseeing the deadly blow which their favorite philosophy must receive from this position, have endeavored to deny it. They have asserted that God does not foresee all future actions of His creatures, but only some of them; and these, not by the intuition of an infinite understanding, but by the sagacity of an exceedingly perfect, though finite, inference. The least tincture of scriptural knowledge is sufficient to show that this is in the

teeth of the claims of Holy Writ, for it represents God as claiming universal prescience, and as predicting centuries beforehand numerous and minute actions of men not born. Sound philosophy cannot refrain from confirming the whole claim. For it asserts the inner connection of prior and subsequent events as causes and effects, under regular natural laws. The subsequent event cannot occur regularly except through the occurrence of the previous ones, which are its remoter or nearer causes. Whatever ignorance or uncertainty exists, then, in a given mind, concerning the occurrence of one event, must involve an equal uncertainty or ignorance concerning all the subsequent events down to the end of the train, causally dependent upon that one,

For instance, was the divine mind unable to foresee with certainty whether the vicious horse, Bucephalus, would throw and kick to death young Alexander of Macedon, as he had done two previous riders? Then God must have been in the same uncertainty whether this youth would succeed Philip of Macedon, whether he would complete the subjugation of the Greek republics, whether he would cross the river Granicus and invade the Persian empire, whether he would capture Tyre and its navy, whether he should conquer Egypt, and whether the great city of Alexandria should have an existence and a history, whether he should conquer Darius at Arbela, whether the Græco-Macedonian empire should be established, whether through its means the Greek language would become the common language of the civilized world and thus the vehicle of the Holy Scriptures of the Old Testament, whether the New Testament should be written in Greek, whether the Christian Church should receive its actual historic form, and, in short, whether an ever-widening stream of vast events should exist, which is flowing to-day, and will flow to the end of the world. For all this depended directly or remotely upon the life of the boy Alexander. Let this instance serve. Or let us ask, did God foreknow whether Julius Cæsar would choose to cross the Rubicon after long hesitation? If He did

not, of how much else must He have been in doubt, occupying the largest part of human history to this day? Obviously, if we deny God's universal prescience, we deny to Him all efficient providence, and we find ourselves in the virtual atheism of Democritus and Epicurus. But it is not even necessary to assert a universal prescience of the volitions of creatures in order to give us an argument. If God has a foresight of any of them, these will be so many instances refuting the proposition, that certainty of volitions is incompatible with free-agency.

#### •The Argument.

The argument is very clear and short. If a correct mind has certainly foreseen that an event is going to occur, then its occurrence must be certain. For the mind which entertains a belief in a thing not in itself certain is a mind misled and erroneous. Next, no event is certain except it is brought to pass by an efficient antecedent. The mind here inevitably recurs to the intuition, *Ex nihilo, nihil*. If there be no cause, there can be no effect; if there be only a contingent or doubtful cause, there will be only a contingent or doubtful effect. If events are to arise in accordance with regular natural law, their certain futurition can only be foreseen by a correct intelligence in the efficiency of their causes.

#### The Trilemma.

Thus we prove by a short and adamant chain that if God has a certain foresight of His creatures' volition, He must foresee it as determined by some efficient antecedent. Where shall we seek this antecedent? There are but three imaginable quarters. It must be found either in the immediate and efficient impulse of the divine power upon the creature's spirit, or in some physical efficiency of some objective thing, or in some subjective psychological function of the spirit itself. Now the Scotist should have, of all men, the most unconquerable opposition to the first two suppositions. If he adopts the first, it involves him in the doctrine of foreordination in

its most **extreme** and offensive form. If he adopts the second, it **will** land him in an abhorred mechanical fatalism. Nothing is left for him, then, but to adopt the third, which is the true answer. The divine intuition foresees the certainty of the creature's volition in the efficiency of that creature's subjective motive, determining it. God foresaw that Julius Cæsar, after hesitation, would elect to cross the Rubicon, because He had foreknown the ambitious disposition and appetencies of the man; and knew that these would, by psychological law, determine Cæsar's volition in that way, when the objective circumstances presented themselves. It thus appears that the view I propose is the most moderate and conciliatory one, as well as the consistent one. It enables us to save the omniscience of God, which we must save, or become virtual atheists; it enables us to save the intuition, "No new event without its efficient cause," which we must preserve as a universal truth, or cease to have any philosophy at all, any sciences, or even any rationality; it also saves for man a practical free-agency by representing his spirit as self-determining in its own volitions, inasmuch as they are determined by their own antecedent principles of disposition and desire, which are subjective and spontaneous activities. I assure the Scotist that he must stop with me, or else "go farther and fare worse.'

#### Molinism and Scientia Media.

A notable attempt has indeed been made to evade this argument. It marked one of the epochs of the struggle of the scholastic philosophy. Every student should be acquainted with it, not only because of its fame in the history of philosophy, but because it is so excellent an instance of the profundity and exhaustive thoroughness of those debates which it is now the fashion among many to despise. Let me digress here to say, that he who has mastered the discussions of the realists and nominalists, of Scotus and Aquinas and their successors in the two rival schools of thought, will have learned nearly all that is possible for the human reason, on the great prob-



lems of metaphysics. The party of Aquinas crushed the theory of the Scotists asserting the contingency of volitions, by this appeal to the universality of the divine omniscience. Their defeat seemed final. At length the Scotist Molina attempted to retrieve the point by ascribing to the divine mind his famous invention of a *scientia media*. He would avoid the virtual atheism of the audacious sect which cut the knot by denying the divine omniscience. He expressly admitted that the prescience of the divine mind is infinite and universal, and includes a foreknowledge of all rational volitions in His creatures, just as truly as of all material phenomena. But, he said, God foreknows His responsible creatures' volitions by a mediate species of cognition, different from those by which He knows the infinite content of His own consciousness, and foresees all the events destined to arise in His physical creation under the regulation of natural law. The description of this *scientia media* is as follows: God's intuitive omniscience enables Him to foresee every disposition which exists and every feeling which may arise under any possible impression of objective circumstances, in every man's spirit. The same infinite intuition foresees what sets of objective circumstances are destined to present themselves at each moment of time to each man's attention. God is able, says Molina, by combining the various items or parts of these two infinite trains of His cognitions, to foresee what will be the self-determination of each creature's will upon the presentation of each set of objects. Thus by a mediate process of inference he supposes that God has foresight of what will be the contingent volitions of each creature at each moment, without imposing the least influence of His own foreordination upon any of the functions of their spirits, while yet exercising that foreordination to direct the presentation of the objective inducements which were to be the occasions, but not the efficient causes, of his creatures' volitions. Thus, to use the instance so frequently cited by these old philosophers, God did have full foreknowledge of Judas' decision (reached by him perhaps after much hesitation) to

betray his Lord. But God foresaw this, not by virtue of His sovereign foreordination of Judas' act, nor by virtue of the Aquinist doctrine that volitions can be caused and yet responsible; but thus: God had infinite insight into Judas' selfish and covetous disposition. He foreknew just how the Jewish rulers would display their glozing sophisms and their glittering coins before Judas. By foreknowing both these He was enabled to foresee that Judas would freely choose to take the bait. Thus He was enabled to include the futuration of Judas' contingent volition in His own comprehensive and beneficent plan for man's redemption through the death of our Lord.

**Scientia Media Examined and Rejected.**

This ingenious scheme will be found to contain a half-truth combined with error, but entirely worthless for the purpose for which it was invented. One useful grain of truth contained in it is the proposition that objective inducement is not causal motive. Molina showed that this discussion of free-agency had now borne this fruit; the rejection, namely, of that mischievous sensualistic confusion which mistook the objective for the efficient of our volitions. Molina might be justly taxed, however, with error in representing this department of God's cognition as mediate. Philosophers had already settled (what all still continue to hold), that God has no mediate cognitions; that the infinite intelligence carries not to draw any inferences; that such a position would be incompatible with its infinitude and its eternity; that every cognition of God is therefore immediate and intuitive. But our main objection is more vital. When we examine this supposed process of mediate foreknowledge in the divine mind, we see at once, that if it is valid at all, it can only be so by virtue of the suppressed premise that God judges the creature's dispositions and appetencies to be causally efficient of his volitions. But that is precisely one of the propositions which the Scotists abhor; for it destroys their theory of the will. That is precisely my position, and the corner-stone of my rival theory. I

repeat, if God, upon foreseeing the objective temptations which would be displayed before Judas' cupidity, was enabled to foreknow, by His insight into the nature of that cupidity, what Judas' choice would be, then the premise of this judgment in the divine mind is clearly this, that such a cupidity will, in the presence of those objectives, certainly and efficiently determine Judas to such a volition. Deny this judgment, and no premise remains for the supposed inference of the divine mind. Molina's theory proves suicidal to his own cause. Let the formal test of logic be applied. The supposed process of the *scientia media* must be stated in this *sorites*. Disposition efficiently determine volitions, relevant inducements being present. God knew that Judas' disposition was covetous. God foresaw that the temptation would offer itself. Consequently God foresaw that Judas would make the covetous choice. It is the opponent of the Scotist who is entitled, if any one is, to employ this conception of God's foreknowledge of human volitions. Deny the first premise, as the Scotist doctrine does, and the validity of the inference becomes impossible. It is vain for the modern Molinist to plead, that while this refutation is valid for finite minds, it is inapplicable to the infinite reason; that God, because infinite, may have cognitions under conditions where cognitions would be impossible for man. I reply, that no doubt this is often true of God. But it is wholly another thing to ascribe to any rational being the formation of a valid inference when the only possible ground for that inference, the necessary premise, is denied him. Were any man to insist upon asserting such an inference at the same time that he denied its necessary premise, he would be thought to display, not a nobler power, but an infirmity of intellect. Our logical faculty sees the ground of dependent propositions only in the truth of the judgments on which they depend. To assert this truth without such ground would display in us, not a negative limitation of thought, but a positive vice of thought. Is this logical law, which our Maker impressed on our spirits when He framed them in His likeness,

true or false? If it is true, how can it be that the greater perfection and range of His intellect should make it false for Him? No; the Scotist theory of volitions cannot be made consistent with God's universal prescience of them. From this long circuit, into which we have been led by the attempted evasions, we are brought again to our starting-place, that His certain foresight of our free choice must prove our choice to be determined and not contingent.

#### 8. Argued by a *Reductio ad Absurdum*.

I will close my affirmative argument by briefly stating the famous *reductio ad absurdum*, which was employed centuries ago in the scholastic discussions. The key-note of the Scotist doctrine is that the will, the faculty of choice, is self-determined. Now, that faculty, as viewed separately from the other faculties whose actions precede it, is endowed with but one function, the single function of choice. If, then, it has determined itself to choose a given object, it must have been by choosing to choose. But now this prior act of choice must be accounted for as self-determined by my will. This faculty, then, will have chosen to choose this prior act of choice. But the same demonstration may be again repeated as to that prior choice. Thus we have an absurd *regressus*, to which there is no consistent end. In order to account for this volition of to-day, we should have to suppose it the last of an endless prior series of volitions, of which consciousness tells us nothing. It may be that this renowned argument is better fitted to silence than to satisfy an opponent. It is given for what it is worth, as a specimen of this old debate.

#### The Summary.

When we are asked to collect into a single point the main force of our argument, we present it thus: Whenever man's action is responsible, it is because it is the action of a rational creature and is the spontaneous expression of that creature's character. If we represent our volitions as determined by

our own subjective motives, they are true to that description. If we represent them as self-determined and capable of arising wholly without motive, then they are not rational and are not expressions of the agent's character. At this crowning point of view let common sense decide the question.

#### Various Objections Met—The Sum of the Discussion.

##### (1) That It Makes the Mind a Balancing Machine.

But, before we dismiss the topic, the customary objections should be noticed. It has been often urged that this theory of free-agency leaves man after all but an animated weighing machine—a pair of scales. The heavier weight deposited in either scale compels the balance to turn to that side, and the true conception of free-agency is lost. For answer, I repeat that the objection is founded in a false analogy. The mind is not a machine of any kind, but an intelligent monad. Its motives are not external weights deposited upon it, but are as much a part of itself as its volitions are.

##### (2) That There Must Be a Power of Contrary Choice.

Again, it has been often objected that there can not be true freedom except where there is at the same time power of contrary choice. But if the will were efficiently determined, it would no longer have a power of contrary choice. We must conclude, therefore, that it is left *in equilibrio* at the time of choice.

Where there is but one thing to be done, and no alternative, there is no choice. But even in the simplest possible case there remains at least the alternative of doing or not doing the one thing, and between these the will must still have the power of choice. Serious as this reasoning appears, it will really be found as trivial as the jocular replies sometimes made to it: that had Sir John Franklin succeeded in reaching the North Pole, and found the temperature of the air too chilly for his comfort, upon this reasoning he would not have been free to travel away, because he could only have

traveled southward; or that if a tramp who had taken refuge from the north wind on the lee side of a wall had afterwards found the wall growing red-hot, he could not have been free to save himself from roasting by walking away, because it was impossible to walk through the solid wall and there was but one direction for him to choose, that, namely, to leeward. Does one exclaim that this is jesting and not logic? I reply, that it is at least as respectable as the argument, which is but a pair of verbal quibbles. One of these is wrapped in the word "power" (of contrary choice). Power to act may mean two very different things. One is the possession of the faculty appropriate to the performance of the actions unobstructed by external compulsion; the other is, capacity according to the law of the being's nature, to feel the appropriate subjective motive to the action. How different these two senses of the word "power" are appears from the fact that this tramp had power to stay or to depart, and in the other sense had no power to stay. For the first, he had legs which he could use or not, according to his choice; for the other, he had no power to stay and be roasted alive uselessly—that is to say, it was impossible his human nature should entertain a desire or preference to experience that gratuitous destruction. In that sense he had no power to stay, because it was impossible he should desire to do so. Yet he was perfectly free in resolving to go away. Here, then, was a case of free choice without a particle of power of contrary choice; in the second sense of the word "power." But if his legs had been cut off, he would not have had free choice to go or stay. In that first sense of the word, alternative power is necessary to freedom of choice. But the admission of the proposition in that sense does not at all serve the objector's purpose. His sophism claims it in the other sense, in which it is evidently false. The other ambiguity is involved in the phrase "contrary choice." Must the agent be endued with this power of opposite choices at the same time, or at a previous and a succeeding time? To say the first is a self-contradiction. Were the spirit *in equilibrio*

in the very instant in which it has decided, it would not have decided. I repeat, decision of will and equilibrium of will at the same time and as to the same object are logical contradictions. The power of contrary choice at a previous time we admit—that is, supposing the soul then capable of entertaining the opposite determining motives; but in this sense the proposition is worthless for the objector's purpose. In fine, God is supremely free, yet He has no power of contrary choice as to speaking truth, for He is the God that cannot lie.

(3) That Subsequent Repentance Implies Contingency of Will.

The third objection that I notice is nearly akin to the second. It is argued that whenever we have freely made a wrong choice and come to see our error and repent, this repentance implies that we are conscious that we had the power of contrary choice. This is the very condition which is essential to our blaming ourselves. Had we been conscious that we could have chosen no otherwise than we did, we would no more blame ourselves than we would for being wet when rained on, or chilled when blown upon by the north wind. This objection again repeats the same sophism of confounding the two distinct senses of the word "power." Of course we do not repent of having done that which we had no power to avoid, when by no power we mean entire lack of the faculty requisite for the avoiding act, as external compulsion overriding our most decisive desire and volition to act otherwise. But it is utterly false to say that repentance for a given act is not obligatory because we performed it under the impulse of a motive wholly determining and overriding at the same time the competing motives. When one man says, "I repent my action," he means that he repents having had the motives which prompted the action. When he says, "Were it to do again, I should choose the opposite," he means that were the new emotions which now animate his repentance, and which are the opposites of the ones which animated him before, still present in him, he would do the opposite. He knows per-

fectly well that were the old emotions still prevalent as they were at the time of the former decision, he would act just as he did before.

(4) That There Could Be No Choice between Equal Objects.

The famous cavil, that on our theory the mind could never decide between two precisely equal inducements, is really so irrelevant as scarcely to deserve exposure, when once that theory is rightly conceived. Its illustration has been, ever since the scholastic ages, the supposed hungry donkey standing equidistant from two bundles of hay of equal size and goodness, and yet unable to choose either. The only gleam of sense in the illustration is the selection of the stupidest of animals to be the actor in it; the dilemma would only be possible for a donkey. The objection proceeds on the false assumption that the objective inducement is the motive. To us, who have taught a hundred times that objective inducement is not motive, the cavil has no application. Our theory has no concern in it. Nor is it any part of our doctrine that the objective inducement positively determines any part of the judgment or appetency which constitutes the real motive. Let me repeat once more, the objective inducement only furnishes the occasion, the condition *sine qua non*, for the rise of the motive and of the consequent volition. Let this at last be understood. Hence, the equality of two objects seen by the mind does not imply any necessary equality between the views and the emotions tending toward them respectively. Even if such equality existed for an instant, when the objects were first seen, these subjective exercises would begin to vary the next moment; for man's emotions are ever in a state of pulsation and flow. Only an instant would pass before some subjective influence, possibly minute, possibly a fanciful one, would give preponderance to the appetency tending to the one or the other object, and the election would take place between them. Let us analyze the most serious instance which is usually advanced. A beggar asks money from a benevolent gen-



tleman. He thrusts his hand into his pocket and takes out two coins, which to the touch seem to be shillings. But he perceives them upon sight to be two guineas. Nevertheless, he does not withdraw his hand, but says to the beggar: "I cannot spare you two guineas; you may take either one of them you prefer." Now the beggar knows that neither coin can be of more value than the other, for the work of the English mint is almost miraculously accurate. Does he, therefore, have any difficulty in choosing one of the guineas? None whatever. In the first place, he has an active and potent motive in his need and desire for taking one of them. Should any hesitancy arise as to a selection, it must be on a ground infinitesimally weak, because any possible difference between the two coins is infinitesimally small. Therefore, it may be overcome by any infinitesimal preponderance in the beggar's feelings. This might be suggested by the trivial fact that one lies nearer to him than the other, or that the one was newer and more glittering than the other, or by any, the merest whim of the beggar's fancy.

The sum of the discussion, then, is this: Man is consciously a free-agent; but his free-agency, like every other energy in the creation of God which is not diseased, operates under the regulation of rational, spiritual laws. The will, the special faculty of choice, is not, and cannot be, *in equilibrio* when the act of choice emerges and is determined by the prevalent antecedent motives. Yet the spirit of man is self-determined, and is, therefore, free and responsible. It is not claimed that this account of the matter explains away all the mystery of volition. The fact remains testified by consciousness, that this active and intelligent monad, the human spirit, is not like a material organism, which merely acts as it is acted on, transmitting in the form of reaction only the energy which it received from without; but it is a true cause, a true subjective fountain of new activities, which are its volitions. The mystery which remains after the consciousness has accepted this ultimate statement is simply the mystery which

attends every last analysis. It gives us results which admit of no further explanation, because, being finally simple, they permit no further simplification. If the student rejects this view, then man's freedom becomes to him abnormal, irrational and uncontrollable, except by irrational force. Human agency becomes a factor impossible to be reduced under any scheme of a moral and rational providence. The human person becomes a little god, a pettish god, irrational and irresponsible. If the student adopts our view, he is able to conceive man at once as a rational free-agent and a subject of a rational system of moral influences and providential government.



## **BOOK III.**

# **THEORIES OF THE ETHICAL SENTIMENTS.**

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## **CHAPTER I.**

### **THE ETHICAL FUNCTIONS DESCRIBED.**

- 1. A Priori Character of the Intuition of Right and Wrong, etc.; The Comparison of Contrary Theories.**

#### **The Method Followed.**

The Practical Philosophy passes by clear and easy transition from the doctrine of the will to that of the ethical sentiments, because it is the decisions of the will which conscience claims the prerogative to regulate, and in which we perceive the ethical quality. Our first task must be to name and describe those functions of our souls to which we give the title, moral or ethical; so that the student shall apprehend clearly of what we speak, even before he understands their psychology. Concerning these there has been in the history of philosophy an amazing amount of theory and debate. Of these we shall next attempt a brief but intelligible description and discussion. The aim will be, by a process of exclusion, to reject the erroneous theories of man's moral sentiments and to establish the true ones. We shall then be prepared to apply

the authority of conscience to the various relations and duties of life.

Description.

The moral sentiments are those expressed in the following terms, which we hear everywhere and which all of us use. We speak of feelings and actions which are right, and of others which are wrong. We say that we approve the former while we blame the latter. We contrast virtue with vice, or righteousness with sinfulness. Some men we call good, and others evil. We speak of loving the former and disliking the latter, sometimes with stronger emphasis, as despising, or hating, or abhorring them. We call the good man deserving, and the evil undeserving, or positively ill-deserving. We call the one class meritorious, and the other guilty. We speak of our rights, by which we seem to mean possessions and privileges to which we are morally entitled. To respect these rights we call justice; to disregard them we call injustice. We speak of duty and obligation, duty being some action which is due (*debitum*), and obligation a species of binding (*obligare*) to the conduct which is due. We say of right actions, that we feel bound to do them. We use of these actions the verb "ought" and of their opposites the negative "ought not." We often speak, as of a faculty of our spirits, of our consciences; and while the word is from the same Latin *conscientia* from which we derive our term "consciousness," the subjective faculty of universal apperception, by which the soul knows every distinct process, whether of cognition, feeling or volition, which has place within it, we limit the term "conscience" to this moral consciousness. By it we mean this particular faculty which judges of all the concepts and sentiments described above. We speak of our consciences as commanding us, as obliging us, as constraining us, as forbidding, as approving, or condemning; we speak of the whole class of its judgments as a law. We intuitively expect reward when conscious of doing right, and punishment for doing wrong. We always impute to our

fellow-men a title to the one or the other, as we judge their feelings and actions to be right or wrong. Here is an exceedingly large and all-important class of human sentiments. You have all thought and felt every one of them. The recollection of your own consciousness of them is their best definition. You perceive also, that they are closely connected and dependent in thought. For it is the feelings and actions which we judge right, and these alone which we deem obligatory and approvable, and virtuous and meritorious of reward; and the wrong feelings and actions are the logical contraries to those, and are what we deem vicious, forbidden, blameworthy, and deserving of punishment.

**The Question of Origin—Are They Distinct Products of an Intuitive Faculty?**

The questions concerning these sentiments, which have been discussed for ages, are those of their nature and source. Is there an original moral faculty in the human spirit, one of the fundamental constituents of its *essentia*? Are these moral sentiments the immediate products of such a faculty, and our simpler moral judgments primary intuitions thereof? Or, are these moral sentiments derivative modifications of some other and lower functions of our spirits, which have been described in our previous psychology, as, for instance, of our self-love, or pride, or love of applause? In a word, are these moral sentiments made up of such elements, modified and combined by habit and association, reappearing under apparently new and more impressive forms? The first answer is the one which appears clear to the unperverted common sense as almost self-evidently the true one. Had there been no histories of perverse philosophies, sensible people would ask: Why not accept it at once and without question? Our consciousness seems to tell us that our primary moral judgments are as rational, as intuitive and as immediate as our other axioms of thought; and the moral feelings which imbue them as evidently distinct as any other classes of feelings. Especially

does this familiar but commanding judgment of obligation seem to stand by itself, differing in one respect from all other judgments, and superior to them all in that it carries a universal imperative. Has not all our psychology proceeded on this obvious postulate, that when we find in consciousness a class of mental processes which are not modifications of some other known class, we assign them as products to their own peculiar faculty in the mind? And if they are universally found in all men's experience, we judge the faculty which produces them a fundamental and constitutive part of man's nature. Thus, we are conscious of acoustic phenomena and of visual phenomena; and the one class cannot be resolved into the other. Melodies and harmonies are not modifications of light and color, nor lights and colors modifications of those; accordingly every body assigns to normal minds a visual faculty and a hearing faculty, and we find in the human body their separate organs. Why have not all men then simply settled this moral question, by concluding that the moral sentiments are the distinct products of an original moral faculty in souls?

**Sensualism Makes the Whole Trouble—Locke and Price.**

The real cause of difference and doubt here has been the prevalence of the sensualistic psychology. Here, as everywhere else in philosophy, it has been a mischievous obstruction and misleader. I will now show the student how naturally and unavoidably its ruling postulate compels its advocates to reject the obvious theory, which I have propounded, and to ex-cogitate an artificial one. Its maxim is the old scholastic, *Nihil in intellectu quod non prius in sensu*; and this it holds in the extreme sense. It says the mind is initially *tabula rasa*, and its only faculties are capacities to receive impressions in the twofold departments of sensibility and cognition; and to reproduce, associate, combine and modify these. It holds that nothing in the mind is valid except what comes from the experiential source; and it recognizes no such source for either

cognitions or feelings other than sensations. Let any man adopt that theory of the mind, and of course he cannot accept the correct conclusion, that our moral judgments and feelings are distinct and original. For, indisputably, this quality of rightness and wrongness, given in our moral judgments, is not known by sense-perception; the contrast between them is not cognizable to any sense-faculty. Virtue is not any pleasing quality of figure, brightness or color perceivable by eyesight. Nor is it any pleasing quality of melody or harmony perceivable by the ear. Nor is it any pleasing quality of coolness or warmth or smoothness or softness or titillation perceivable by the sense of touch. Nor is it any quality of savor perceivable by the gustatory nerves. Nor is it any fragrance made known to us by the olfactory nerves. Nor is its opposite, vice, any visual ugliness of figure or color, nor a discord, nor a tactual roughness or pain, nor an ill savor in the mouth, nor an ill odor in the nostrils. Yet every man thinks he perceives the quality of virtue or vice in certain classes of human feelings and actions. Now the sensualist has declared that man has no faculties besides the perceptive, from which to get the elements of his moral processes. He says accordingly, that all these moral concepts and feelings must be modifications in some one way or another of the elements of ideas gotten by self-perception, and of feelings arising from sense-perceptions. It is the only thing he can say; it is the only solution left for him by his false and superficial psychology. Here is the key to all the erroneous theories of ethics, which have vexed the history of philosophy. Let the student grasp this, and all will be clear to him. It is the most eminent merit of Dr. Richard Price that he, of all the writers of the eighteenth century, saw and enounced this most distinctly. He shows us that the sensualists' denial to the mind of powers for the intuitive perception of abstract truths is the source of their whole perversion, and that the ethical theory can never be reinstated upon a proper basis until the correct psychology is established by demonstrating the *a priori* rational powers of



the intelligence. This he then proceeds to do with irresistible force and with a philosophic insight equal to that of Butler, or Reid, or Kant. It is not necessary to burden the student with many citations from the sensualistic psychologists in order to justify the representation I have given of them. Let one suffice, which I purposely take from the pious and amiable Locke, the most moderate and least erroneous of them all. He declares in substance that he can get no intelligible account of the moral good, the object of our feelings of obligation and approbation, except as it is derived from our experiences of the naturally advantageous and pleasurable. "If this thing is done in the green tree, what shall be done in the dry?" If Locke's defective first-principle drove even him to this false source for the elements of our moral sentiments, what are we to expect from a Hobbes, a Helvetius, a Hume, a Mill, a Spencer?

#### Different Imagined Sources of the Moral Idea.

Man's sense-impressions give him several different classes of pleasurable and painful sensibilities. We anticipate accordingly that one of these theorists will adopt one or another of them as giving the original elements of our so-called moral sentiments. But their theories will all have this common structure. Some of them will be far less odious than others. But they will all prove mischievous by degrading, more or less, the beauty of virtue and the authority of moral obligation. In each one of them their erroneous first principle will compel them to discard the essential distinction between the general concept of natural good and that of moral good, as between natural evil and moral evil. They will all be found explaining this highest and noblest concept of the moral good by reducing it to some combination or reproduction of some of those sense-impressions which make up our concept of the natural good, brought about by some jugglery of association, habits, self-interest, love of applause, sympathy, or some other non-ethical process.

## 2. The Natural and the Moral Good.

### Description—Their Connotations Opposite.

This, then, appears the appropriate place to raise and settle the question: Are the two general concepts essentially distinct and of opposite elements? Our concept of the general natural good is so perspicuous that there is little danger of mistaking it or differing about it. Various impressions on our sensibilities, both corporeal and spiritual, are consciously attended with instinctive pleasure. The opposite impressions are usually attended by instinctive pains. All of each class of impressions, when experienced or remembered, present upon comparison the one striking common attribute of pleasure or pain. This is the mental ground of that classification of them which every human being is sure to make. He calls well-flavored food and drink, euphonious melodies and harmonies, forms and colors, possessed of æsthetic beauty; the clothing and shelter which minister pleasurable bodily sensations or shield from painful ones, the money which may purchase these, the jests which give the pleasure of the ludicrous, the sympathetic aid which relieves pain, the applause which gratifies the love of fame, the wealth and power which minister to ambition, good things. All the privations of these he calls evil things. Here good and evil connote qualities which confer natural gratification or which take it away. But the things which furnish us the general concept of the moral good are generalized upon a totally different common attribute. Let us ask our own consciousness; we perceive that we have gathered into this concept several voluntary principles of action and a multitude of various voluntary acts. In this sense of the word we say that benevolence is good, that disinterested rational sympathy is good, that forgiveness is good, that acts of justice are good (the direct tendency of many of which is to inflict pain), that honest actions are good (though they often cost the agents more pain than they excite pleasure in the object), that truth-telling is good (while often the truth

told excites acute distress), that courage is good (which may manifest itself by inflicting wounds and death and by incurring them), that prudence is good (which often denies gratification to the agent and others), that conscientious martyrdom is good (which, at one stroke, cuts off the agent from all natural good). Here are things exceedingly diversified. What is the common attribute which colligates them? I assert that no man would ever dream of saying that the common attribute was the same with that which appears in the natural good if his common sense had not been sophisticated. I ask the question of every plain mind: Do you think that the goodness you see in a virtuous action is the same with the goodness of a peach or a melon? Do you mean that the evil you perceive in falsehood or injustice is the same with a bad apple or with bad weather? Let the student pursue these contrasts in numerous pairs of cases, and his consciousness will tell him throughout that they are wholly different. I claim that this simple appeal to our own common sense is the best possible argument to decide the case.

**Next, Pleasure Never Essential; and Last, Obligation Always  
Essential in the Concept of the Moral Good.**

But here are in addition two facts which forever separate the two classes of sentiments. When we perceive the quality of moral good in an affection or an action, we never think that this quality depends on any immediate pleasurable result of that action; such result may follow it, but still we regard it as only the incident and not the essence of the moral good. This argument is sealed when we observe that we often ascribe moral good in a high degree to actions which are only painful or laborious to both agents and objects. The other fact is, that the sentiment of the moral good is always conjoined with and re-enforced by that of obligation, while that of the natural good never is. And here let not the student cavil against the universality of this proposition on the ground that obligation sometimes impels us to acts which are also pleasurable. For

when we reflect on the cases, we find that it is not the pleasantness of such actions, but their rightness, which is the ground of obligation. Here is the decisive fact, which no sophistry can obscure. Every right soul feels that to the moral good it is obligated. To the natural good it is not. You may eat the luscious fruit if you please; you may leave it if you please. No obligation is met or is violated by doing either, provided the bounds of temperance be observed. But there is no such option of indifferency as to practicing or neglecting the moral good. No man, except an idiot or lunatic, will say that he felt the same kind of self-rebuke for neglecting the luscious fruit which he felt for neglecting known duty. I defy all the juggleries of psychology to confound these feelings.

**Method of Discussion.**

But my object at this place is to do little more than give a clear indication of the true theory of the moral sentiments. I propose now to refute the most notable of the perverse theories one after another. This will be the best method for establishing the student in an intelligent conviction of the true one.

## CHAPTER II.

## THE SELFISH SYSTEM OF MORALS.

## 1. General Refutation of Self-Interest as the Source of Moral Distinctions.

The selfish system, presenting itself in many varied forms, from Hobbes (natural desire of enjoyment the only motive), through Mandeville (the desire of being applauded is the moral motive), down to Paley, has always this characteristic: it resolves our idea of virtue into self-interest. Its most refined form, perhaps, is that which says: Since acts of benevolence, sympathy, justice, are found to be attended with an immediate inward pleasure (self-approbation), that pleasure is the motive of our moral acts. We discuss the several phases together.

## (A) No Concept of Moral Good.

I remark that on the selfish system the notion of duty, right, obligation, free-agency, could never have arisen and could have no relevancy or meaning. Let man frame this proposition: That which furthers self-interest is right; the very employment of the word "right" betrays the fact that the mind recognizes a standard other than that of self-interest. Any analysis of the notion shows that it is utterly violated and falsified when made identical with self-interest. Thus Hobbes says, each man's natural right is to pursue his own natural self-interest supremely. But, according to his own showing, this "right" in a man implies no corresponding duty in him, and no obligation in his neighbor to respect it, and no recognition on the part of any other. Anybody has a "right" to prevent this man from having his "right." Queer right this!

**(B) No Moral Standard.**

If **interest** is the whole motive, then, when the question arises, **whether I shall do or omit a certain action, you can not consistently expect me to consider anything but this, whether or not the doing of it will promote my own advantage, and that in the form I happen to prefer.** If I say, "This result will most gratify me," the argument is at an end; my proposed act is, for me, right; there is no longer any standard of uniform moral distinction. The same remark shows that the judgment of obligation to a given act is then baseless. Attempt to apply any of those arguments by which Epicurianism interposes an "ought not" between a man and any natural indulgence, as this: "This sensual indulgence will, indeed, promote animal, but hinder intellectual pleasure, which is higher. And since pleasure is the rational chief good, you should prefer the more to the less." The sensual man's reply is: "Animal joys are to me higher than intellectual," and the ground of obligation is gone. If no indulgence is less or more virtuous than any other, then no possible argument of obligation can be constructed in the face of an existing preference for refraining from any.

**(C) Free-Agency, Merit and Demerit Are Lost.**

If the sensualistic psychology is true, from which the selfish scheme proceeds, then desire for natural good, which they make the only moral motive, is a passive affection of the soul. It is no more voluntary when the object of desire is presented than is pain when you are struck or a chill when you are deluged with cold water. Where, now, is the free-agency which we intuitively feel is rudimental to all moral action and responsibility? Man is no longer self-directed by subjective rational motives, but driven hither and thither like a puppet by external forces. But if not a free, he can not be a moral agent. Of course, also, there is no longer any basis for the judgment of merit or demerit in acts or any moral obligation to punishment. Penalties become mere expedients

of the stronger for the protection of their own selfishness. And as this is as true of the future, all religious sanctions are at an end.

(D) Puts Effect for Cause.

This theory teaches that this selfish pleasure apprehended by the mind in acquiring an object must always be the motive for seeking it. The analysis is false; desire must be instinctive, otherwise man could not have his first volition till after the volition had put him on the way of experiencing the pleasant result of the fruition. Many desires are, obviously, instinctive—*e. g.*, curiosity. Now, since the self-pleasing can not be the original element of the desire, it can not be proved that this is the element of rightness in classifying our desires. See, now, how this analysis would assign the effect as the cause of its own cause: A does a disinterested act. The consciousness of having done it disinterestedly gives A an inward pleasure. "This after-pleasure, proceeding from the consciousness that the act was unselfish, prompted the act." Thus the effect caused its own cause! The absurdity of the scheme is further proved by this: If the fact that a disinterested act results in inward satisfaction to him who did it proves that act to have been a self-interested one in motive, then the fact that an action resulted in pain to the doer would, by parity of reasoning, prove that act to be disinterested and generous. But this is notoriously false. Many actions, as, for instance, acts of malice and revenge, reflect back acute pain into the hearts of their agents; yet everybody knows that these acts are entirely selfish and also sinful. By this simple test Bishop Butler has shown the absurdity of this inference.

Dishonest Advantage Would Be Merit.

If the selfish theory of action were true, the adaptation of another person's conduct to confer personal advantage on us should be synonymous with merit in our eyes. The villain who shared with us the reward of his misdeed, to bribe us to aid or applaud him, would evoke the same sentiment of grati-

tude as the mother who blessed us with her virtuous self-sacrifice, and there would be no generic difference between the hollow flattery of the courtier for the monster on whose bounty he fattened and the approbation of the virtuous for patriotism or benevolence.

**Most Hackneyed Would Have Most Vivid Moral Ideas.**

If our notion of good acts is nothing but a generalization of the idea of acts promotive of our self-interest, he who has most experimental knowledge of human affairs (*i. e.*, he who is most hackneyed in the world's ways) must have the clearest and strongest apprehensions of moral distinctions, because he would most clearly apprehend the tendency of actions. He who was wholly inexperienced could have no moral distinctions. Is this so? Do we not find that the most unsophisticated have the most vivid moral sympathies? The ignorant child in the nursery more than the hackneyed man of experience?

**The Selfish End Seen Excludes Merit.**

But the crowning absurdity of the theory appears here: that our consciousness always teaches us that in our moral acts toward others the pleasure we have in well-doing depends wholly upon our feeling that the virtuous act had no reference to self, and the moment we feel that self-pleasing was our prime motive, we feel that our moral pleasure therein is wholly marred. Indeed the best and the sufficient argument against this miserable theory would perhaps be the instinctive loathing and denial uttered against it by every man's soul who is rightly constituted. The honest man knows by his immediate consciousness that when he does right, selfishness is not his motive; and that if it were, he would be utterly self-condemned. As Cousin nervously remarks, "Our consciousness tells us that the approbation we feel for disinterested virtue is wholly disinterested, and it is impossible for us to feel it, unless we feel that the agent for whom we feel it was disinterested in this act." Thus a thousand things in the acts, the



language and the consciousness of men are utterly irreconcilable with this hateful analysis, and show it to be as unphilosophical as degrading. Our crowning objection is found in its effect on our view of the divine character. That which is man's finite virtue must be conceived, when raised to the infinite, as constituting the virtue of God (if there is a God). His holiness must be only sovereign self-interest!

## 2. Refutation of Dr. Paley's System: That of Expediency.

Dr. Paley's type of the selfish system may be said to be equally perspicuous and false. That such a specimen of impotency and sophism in philosophy should come from a mind capable of so much justice and perspicuity of reasoning as he has exhibited in the kindred field of natural theology, and in the admirable criticisms of his "*Horæ Paulinæ*," is one of the most curious facts in the history of the human mind. The most probable solution is that the speculations of this divine were warped by the influences of Bacon and Locke, with their sensualistic leanings, then so dominant in England. If there are any who still think that the study of philosophy and psychology is unpractical, such persons would be effectually cured of their delusion by acquainting themselves with the practical effects of Paley's moral philosophy. Among a large part of the English-speaking races it held a powerful sway for half a century, and wherever it has been followed it has stamped its baleful character upon the moral and social traits, the political opinions, and the theology of the people. Paley's is the morality of expediency; only it is qualified by this trait, more poisonous than the doctrine of expediency itself, that he professes to hallow and justify it by the sanction of our holy religion. It is very true, he tells his pupils, that their practical rule should be the precepts of God, which are righteous altogether, and many of his distinctions concerning the details of moral action are perspicuous and just. But One wiser than all philosophers has warned us that "A little leaven leaveneth the whole lump." Dr. Paley has placed that

leaven at the beginning of every moral process. Its tendency has ever been to pervade the whole moral system of those who follow him, and substitute a cunning egotism for every essential principle of true morals.

**His Definition of Virtue and Obligation.**

Paley, after having succeeded to his own satisfaction in proving that there is no sufficient evidence of moral intuitions existing in the human soul, gives his own definition: "Virtue is doing good to mankind according to the will of God, for the sake of everlasting happiness." Moral obligation he defines as nothing else than a "forcible motive arising out of the command of another." In other words, this is Dr. Paley's conception of the class of actions called virtuous. Their common mark is utility to mankind, or fitness to promote the natural advantage of one or more of our fellow-men. (It is therefore virtually a utilitarian scheme.) The formal rule of virtuous actions is the revealed preceptive will of God. The sole motive of moral actions is the agent's selfish desire for his own future happiness, which he expects God will give him as a reward. Dr. Paley's conception of moral obligation is the authority of mere force emanating from a superior will and compelling compliance through the self-interested motive. That this scheme should ever have seemed even plausible to Christians, and should have been so much favored by their divines and teachers, can only be accounted for by the fact that we intuitively feel, when a God is properly apprehended, that His will is a perfect rule of right, and that it is moral to do all His commands. These misguided divines were flattered and deceived by the apparent honor done to the Christian Scriptures, and to the supposed religious motive, in making the one the exclusive rule, and the other the spring of all moral actions. But when we raise the question, why God's precepts are our universal and authoritative rule, the answer is: Because His will, like His character, is holy. To do His will, then, is not obligatory merely because an Almighty has commanded

it; but He has commanded it because it is right. The distinction of right and wrong is intrinsic.

**First Objection: Its Moral Motive Radically Selfish.**

The objections to Dr. Paley's system are patent. He himself raises the question, wherein virtue on his definition differs from a prudent self-love in temporal things. His answer is: The latter has regard only to this life; the former considers also future immortal well-being. Dr. Thomas Browne well observes of this, that it is but a more odious refinement upon the selfish system, defiling man's very piety, by making it a selfish trafficking for personal advantage with God, and fostering a more gigantic moral egotism, insomuch as immortality is longer than mortal life. George Eliot (Miss Evans), in one of her keen essays in the *Westminster Review*, scathes this doctrine with a keen but just satire, which Spencer in his "Principia" has neatly plagiarized from his sister infidel without acknowledgment. Miss Evans had doubtless heard too often Christian ministers pressing upon sinners the desire of welfare after death as though it were the gospel motive, and stigmatizing all who neglected it as worldlings. What then, she asks, is such a religion but "other-worldliness"? And pray, Mr. Preacher, if the worldliness of this world is so evil, how comes it that this other-worldliness is so good? The only possible ground of the contrast must be in the postulate, that the most astute and far-reaching selfishness is the most supreme virtue. Then the selfishness of the poor sinners of this world would appear to be sinful only because less inordinate and persistent than that of the sanctified. The friends of true Christianity have to confess that its ministers, blindfolded by Paleyism, have given but too much pretext for this biting comment. Let the tenor of average sermons be recalled. Is it not true that in urging the gospel upon men, they allow themselves to be understood as presenting it solely *pro bono utili*, and rarely or never *pro bono honesto*? The hearer brings away a very distinct impression that the preacher holds out

the Christ as offering a very precious boon to our faith. But what is his apprehension of that boon? Simply a selfish escape from physical evil, and the securing of a future personal advantage. The sole argument by which the preacher exalts the preciousness of the boon is the enormous amount and duration of the evil escaped, and the splendors of the selfish enjoyment secured. Let church-goers testify whether this is not the practical *residuum* of the impression at which the "awakening" preachers seem to aim.

#### The Paleyite Gospel Criticized.

But this is not the gospel of the Holy Scriptures. Their Messiah is ever held up, not as the minister to a selfish immunity from just penalty, but as the minister of holiness. "His name is called Jesus because He saves His people *from their sins*;" not merely from deserved penal sufferings. He manifests his love for His people by "giving Himself for them to redeem them from all iniquity and to purify them unto Himself, as His own possession, a people zealous of good works." He "purifieth their hearts by faith." Every one who is entitled to have hope in Him "purifieth himself even as He is pure." Deliverance from the curse of the penal law is ever represented in the true gospel as the incident and secondary result of the redemption from sinfulness, a result valuable indeed to man's natural foresight and legitimate desire for his own welfare, but ever subordinated to the true principle of virtue, which is a "hungering and thirsting after righteousness" for its own sake. The only result of such preaching as has been adverted to is to propagate that "temporary faith" which the Redeemer condemned as the worthless elation of the stony-ground hearers, and the worldly sorrow for sin, the complex of mere shame, remorse and selfish fear, which the apostle solemnly declares "needeth to be repented of." So far has this heedless presentation of the gospel spread, that it has brought a fatal eclipse upon the evangelical churches themselves, clouding their theology with defective views of

the divine attributes and plan of redemption, and crowding their communion-rolls with members who have a name to live, but are dead. Yet these preachers hold the Scriptures in their hands! How is it that they thus misrepresent the gospel, by presenting in place of it a maimed and disfigured half-truth? The answer is, doubtless, to be partly found in the selfishness and remorse natural to the human heart, inclining us all to give an overweening attention to that aspect of the gospel which appeals to self-interest; but a part of the answer is to be found in the prevalence of the shallow ethics of Paley and his followers.

**(2) It Omits Duties to God and Makes Man the Chief End.**

All the objections leveled by me against the selfish system apply, therefore, justly here. This scheme of Paley is equally false to our consciousness, which tells us that when we act in all relative duties with least reference to self, then we are most praiseworthy. It may be urged in the next place, that his definition seems to leave no room for moral duties of which God is the immediate object. He describes virtue as "doing good to mankind." It is true that he then refers to the divine will as enjoining such utilitarian action. But he seems to imply that this is all the divine will enjoins! Do we then owe any duties to God directly, in the performance of which our fellow-creatures have no interested concern? Apparently Dr. Paley thinks we do not. Other important questions receive at his hands strange answers here. Does the omniscient mind recognize any higher concept of the good than the natural good? Apparently it does not, for the natural advantage is the only essential attribute recognized in the matter of the virtuous act, or in the ends of the agent's moral motive. Does God conceive of any other virtuous principle than benevolence? Apparently not; for the only expressions of the virtuous principle recognized are acts of beneficence. And last, who is the real final end of Dr. Paley's system of virtue? Apparently it is only man; for it is his advantage

which is sole matter and end of moral action. But this virtually makes man the god of the system, and reduces Jehovah to the relation of a very splendid and useful servitor to humanity.

(3) **The Concept of Moral Obligation Totally Lost.**

But we may add more especially that on Paley's scheme of obligation it is hard to see how he could deny that there may be, in some cases, as real a moral obligation to do wrong as to do right. A company of powerful outlaws overpower me and command me, on pain of instant death, to burn down my neighbor's dwelling. Here is "a forcible motive arising from the command of another." Why does it not constitute a moral obligation to the crime? Paley would reply, Because God commands me not to burn it, on pain of eternal death, and this obligation destroys the other, because the motive is vastly more forcible. It seems, then, that in God's case it is His might which makes His right!

(4) **Pagans Could Have No Virtue.**

Once more: on Paley's scheme there could be no morality or obligation where there is no revelation from God, because neither the rule, nor motive, nor obligation of virtue exists. They do not exist, indeed, Paley might reply, in the form of a revealed theology, but they are there in the teachings and evidences of natural theology. "The heathen which have not the law are a law unto themselves, their consciences, etc." But if there are no authoritative intuitions given by God to man's soul of moral distinctions, then natural theology has no sufficient argument whatever to prove that God is a moral being, or that he wills us to perform moral acts. Let the student consider the several lines of argument by which natural theology seeks to prove that God has moral attributes and a moral will; he will find them falling under these two heads: the arguments from the experimental appearances of a moral administration over men, and the direct argument from the testimony of conscience in ourselves. Now, without the support of this last head the former remains altogether unstable

and invalid. Crossed, as it is, by the numerous instances of the prospering of the wicked in this life, and the final triumph of successful injustice, it could give us no more than a feeble, uncertain probability that mankind may be under some moral regimen. But the latter head only becomes conclusive on condition that we hold our moral judgments to be immediate and intuitive, and the distinction between the moral good and the natural good essential.

Grant that such is the nature of our moral judgments and you give us a perfect argument from the existence of this essential moral attribute in the creature to the essential moral attribute of the Creator. But all the sensualistic schools of psychology strip man of the essential moral attribute by explaining all his moral functions as the modifications of some lower attribute of sensibility and association. Thus, they destroy the only solid premises from which to prove any essential moral attribute in God. I repeat, then, that on Paley's definition of morality there could be none among men, except where a revelation of God's moral will had been given. This is contrary to the universal consciousness and history of the pagan world.

(5) **God Himself Could Have No Virtue.**

My last objection is that, according to Paley's definition, God himself must be incapable of feeling any moral motive and of acting under any moral obligation. Dr. Paley says that the moral motive is the hope of adding to our own future well-being by doing acts of virtue. But since God is sovereign, all-perfect, all-blessed and absolutely unchangeable, no addition nor diminution can take place in His well-being; so that it is impossible for Him to feel the moral motive. Dr. Paley says again, that moral obligation is simply the forcible motive arising out of the command of a superior. Now, God has no superior; so that in this scheme He can be sensible of no moral obligation. But a being who knows no obligation, and is incapable of feeling any moral motive, can-

not be a moral being; he can have no virtue. Such is the result equally indisputable and astounding! The very being who is the original and external exemplar of virtue, the Creator, whose forming act alone communicates the virtuous attribute to his creatures, the Law-giver, whose sole will is the standard of virtue for all other beings, is found to be himself incapable of virtue! How can the exposure of this worthless analysis be made more complete?



## CHAPTER III.

## THE UTILITARIAN, THE HEDONISTIC AND THE BENEVOLENCE THEORY OF MORALS.

## 1. Refutation of the Utilitarianism of Hume, Bentham and H. Spencer.

Our next step in the history of ethical theories brings us to a cluster of speculations, less grovelling and more plausible. These are the ethical theories named in the title of this chapter. In their pretensions they claim to differ from the mere selfish systems and also from each other. But the student will find them all marked by the same traits. Their construction is dictated by the stress of the same fundamental principles of sensualism. Since the human spirit is initially *tabula rasa*, all its valid processes can only be modifications, near or remote, of its functions of sensibility and empirical perception. The reflective functions themselves have no materials upon which to work except these. But since we have no empirical perception of the abstract notion of the moral good, of course we can have no immediate sensibility to it. Sense-perception and sensibility can give us only the general concept of the natural good or the natural evil, by combining our remembered sensitive pains and pleasures. Hence the supposed concept of the moral good must be explained as a deceptive and artificial product of some natural sensibility fostered by habit, association and public opinion. These are the false principles which guide the genesis of all these theories.

## Hume's Ethics.

Thus, for instance, Mr. Hume generates his utilitarian scheme. He holds that the common mark or attribute of all

the acts which men hold virtuous is their utility to man. By the utility of an act he means its fitness to promote human pleasure or advantage, or the natural good. This concept is immediately derived from the action of our empirical perceptions and sensibilities. Reflection easily colligates them into the concept of the pleasurable and the desirable. The natural pleasure we experience from those acts is joined by association with the acts themselves. This is what men call the sentiment of moral approbation. Rational self-interest, of course, leads them to applaud and foster the utilitarian actions by the voice of public opinion; and this opinion, formulated in law, becomes moral obligation. Thus natural good is the only supreme end known to man's reason; virtue is to him nothing but the utility which promotes that end; and obligation is no more than the rational judgment that this end should be pursued by the preference of the useful means. Mr. Hume claims this honorable distinction between Hobbes' selfish scheme and his own, that his is equitable and disinterested. For whereas Hobbes ruthlessly proposed each man's personal advantage as his rational supreme end, Mr. Hume proposes the common advantage of mankind as the proper end. He thinks that the utility of an action to the many, and not to the agent alone, is the test of its virtue. This system, of course, pretends to give us nothing higher than the morals of expediency. The most truly expedient—that is to say, the set of actions which appears most widely expedient to the largest intelligence—is the most virtuous; and it is so simply and solely because it is the most expedient.

**J. Bentham's Scheme: Virtue the Greatest Good of the Greatest Number.**

Passing over numerous writers who have adopted and amplified this theory, I will mention only J. Bentham in the earlier part, and Herbert Spencer in the latter part of the nineteenth century. Bentham makes the standard of right in actions "the greatest good of the greatest number." The

good which he intends is the natural good. The two maxims by which he says the righteous man may guide every action of life are: "Minimize the evil and maximize the good, as far as it is possible;" meaning still only natural good and evil. It is obvious that these principles are simply those of Hume. There is no shade of difference except in the masterly terseness with which Bentham has expressed them. The great currency which Bentham's principles have enjoyed has been due in no slight degree to this literary art in their striking expression. They have received currency also from the fact that beneficent acts are virtuous, and that more extensive benefactions are more praiseworthy than the less extensive, provided their motives are right. Bentham has also availed himself adroitly of the circumstance, that the greatest good of the greatest number is so often the suitable practical end of civic legislation. On this subject Bentham wrote largely, and with much sagacity. His keen intelligence and success in tracing the bearings of statute laws upon general welfare seems to have misled him into this confusion between a large experience and essential justice. In truth, while the civil magistrate is a moral agent, and essential morality should guide his every act supremely, he is not the supreme and ultimate rewarder of virtue and retributor of crime. Those final ends the Almighty reserves to Himself. The righteousness of the civil ruler is largely concerned in the guardianship of the common welfare, and in this limited sense he should propose to himself the greatest good of the greatest number as his proximate end under the restrictions of intrinsic righteousness. But if even he shall say, "Let us do evil that [this larger] good may come," his damnation is just. The active and sagacious mind of Bentham has doubtless presented the utilitarian scheme in its most plausible form.

H. Spencer's Scheme Dictated by His Evolutionism—His Reply to Carlyle Worthless.

Mr. Herbert Spencer in his "Data of Ethics" only reproduces the same theory. He finds his motive and point of

view in his devotion to the evolutionism of Darwin. This makes him a materialistic monist. He can recognize but one substance, matter, and one species of energy, material force, in man and the universe. The human spirit is to him nothing but a more refined development of that vital force which is seen with its animal sensibilities in the lowest living creatures. Of course, then, he is, of all men, under the most imperious necessity of confounding the moral good with the natural good. To him there can be no good but sensitive pleasure, no evil but sensitive pain. He frankly declares that to his reason the good of a comfortable pair of boots is identical with the good of a virtuous action. The good of a morsel of savory food is identical with the good of gratitude, truth or justice. The main argument on which he rests this astounding conclusion seems to be this, that every kind of action of human beings to which the higher moralist attaches the quality of virtue, he will show has the common trait of being advantageous or promotive of pleasure. Whence he infers that there cannot be any quality except this tendency which makes it virtuous. When Mr. Carlyle with his rugged justice characterized this as a mere pig-philosophy, Mr. Spencer defied his critic to assign any other or higher end of man's existence than happiness. Hence again, he argued that there can be no other characteristic of virtuous actions than their tendency to promote happiness. Mr. Spencer's inference needs only to be clearly stated in order to evince its sophistry. The fact that every individual thing in a given concept has a given mark is no proof whatever that this mark gives us the essential connotation of the concept. For this mark may be *accidens*, not *attributum*. It so happens that all rational creatures known to us are bipeds. Is this any proof that having two feet is the essence of rationality? Again, Mr. Spencer manifestly uses his word "happiness" to mean simply continuing natural good. But every real philosopher knows that this is no definition of happiness. More than two thousand years ago the pagans, Plato and Aristotle, repudiated the grovelling conception and de-

finer true happiness as virtuous energy. Human experience is perpetually refuting Mr. Spencer's conception, by showing us men who possess all the means of natural good and yet are drenched with wretched ennui and remorse; and other men who, while deprived of almost all natural good, are happy and blessed in their virtues. Let the supposition be made that there is an essential distinction between natural good and moral good, then it will obviously follow that the attainment of the moral good will bestow its own peculiar form of happiness, just as truly as the attainment of the natural good will bestow pleasure; while the two forms of happiness shall be as essentially distinct as the two kinds of functions which produce them. Now, Mr. Spencer has no right to reason in a circle, as he has done in this case, by first assuming unwarrantably that there is no happiness except pleasure, and then inferring therefrom that there is no distinction between the natural good and the moral good. He has begged the whole question, assuming his conclusion as the premise from which to draw it. Once more, it is surely a position entitled to be debated, that there may be a supreme moral and providential Ruler, who, being both benevolent and holy, has provided, while making virtue man's obligatory end, that it shall also be the means of his highest enjoyment. I say that this is a proposition at least entitled to be debated; for it is precisely the one which has commended itself as true to all the thinking minds in the world, except atheists and positivists. But should that position be found true, then this practical coincidence of virtuous actions with happiness utterly fails to prove Mr. Spencer's conclusion. It does not prove that human actions are virtuous solely because expedient; it only shows that the supreme Ruler who directs human affairs is both benevolent and righteous.

#### Man's Chief End—Single or Dual ?

Let me avail myself of this juncture in the discussion to say a few words upon this vexed question of man's supreme

end. **The ancient moralists generally attempted to proceed thus: Let us first ascertain what is man's chief rational end. We shall then have the sure guide to the right answer of the questions, What kinds of human actions are virtuous? and What is the essence or nature of virtue? They assume as obvious that man's virtue can be nothing else than the pursuit of his rational chief end, and that consequently all the actions are virtuous which tend to promote it. Now M. Cousin very sensibly raises the question: Has it been proved that man's existence should be directed to a single end? This has been heedlessly taken for granted without any proof whatever. Who shall say that the true ends of man's existence may not be, while harmonious, dual or plural? This philosopher accordingly shows us that the proper ends of man's existence are dual, the one subordinated to the other. If the statement must needs be given in a single proposition, it will be, that man's end is the attainment of happiness in the attainment of virtue. M. Cousin, as a Romanist, was almost surely ignorant of the labors of the Protestant Westminster Assembly. But his sound reason led him virtually to their famous proposition, that "Man's chief end is to glorify God and to enjoy Him forever."**

## 2. Refutation of the Benevolence Scheme of Jonathan Edwards and Others.

I am compelled to group with the utilitarian schemes the theory of certain English and New England divines, which teaches that virtue is identical with benevolence. The latter is practically synonymous with the two former. For the practical expression of benevolence is beneficence. This theory of virtue is a natural offshoot of Jonathan Edwards'. This great and good man would probably be shocked to have his speculation as to "The Nature of Virtue" classed with those of the infidel, utilitarian school. But the historical development of it since his death proves the justice of the charge.

It is moreover so interesting an exposition of the unavoidable tendencies of the "benevolence theory," and has relations so important to existing errors in philosophy, that I must ask you to pause a moment to consider Edwards' view.

**J. Edwards : Virtue is Benevolence to Being in General—His Proofs.**

As suggested by the Rev. Robert Hall, Edwards was probably impelled to this piece of false analysis by his love of simplifying. His desire was to unify the ultimate principles of the rational spirit as much as possible. Hence, instead of regarding virtuous acts and states of soul as an ultimate and independent category, he teaches that they all most essentially consist in benevolence to being in general—meaning, of course rational beings—or love to being in general. This love, which is the essence of all virtue, he expressly defines as the love of benevolence only, as distinct from the love of moral complacency. This is essential to his system; for, as he himself argues, the love of moral complacency must imply moral beauty in its object. The perception of moral beauty generates the love which is moral complacency. If the love which constitutes moral beauty were that moral complacency, Edwards argues that we should make a thing its own parent. Of this more anon. He then proceeds: "The first object of virtuous benevolence is being simply considered;" and hence, "Being in general is its proper object." That to which its ultimate propensity tends is "the highest good of being in general." From this conclusion Edwards draws this corollary: There may be a benevolence towards a particular being which is virtuous because that particular being is a part of the aggregate, general being; but the affection is virtuous only provided it consists with the "highest good of being in general." Again, that being who has the greatest quantum of existence must attract the largest share of this benevolence. Hence we must love God more than all creatures, because He is infinite in the dimensions of His existence; and we ought, among creatures, to love

a great and good man proportionally more than one less able and full of being. The grounds of proof on which Edwards seems to rest his conclusion are these: Every judgment of beauty of every kind is analyzable into a perception of order and harmony; but the most beautiful and lofty of all rational harmonies is the concert or benevolence of an intelligent being to all being; the Scriptures say, "God is love, and love is the fulfilling of the whole law" between man and his neighbor; and this theory explains so well the superior claims of God to our love, over those of creatures.

#### Hopkinsinism.

The transition between this plausible but most sophistical speculation and the utilitarian scheme and ethics of expediency, which underlie the New England philosophy of the next age, is found in the writings of Dr. Samuel Hopkins and the younger Edwards. In their hands love to being in general becomes simply the affection of benevolence; and the theory becomes this: that benevolence is all virtue and all virtue is benevolence. I have already disclosed the affinity of this theory to the utilitarian, by the simple remark that beneficence is the practical expression of benevolence. Hence, when he who has defined virtue as benevolence comes to treat of virtue as a practical principle, he makes nothing else of it than Jeremy Bentham's "greatest good of the greatest number." We shall detect Dr. Hopkins adopting this and even the most thoroughly selfish theory of virtue in carrying out his benevolence scheme, with an amusing candor, simplicity and inconsistency.

#### Edwards' Scripture Texts Examined.

Proceeding to the refutation of Edwards' scheme, I begin with his Scriptures. The same logic which infers it from the expression "God is love" would infer from the text, "God is light," that He is nothing but pure intelligence; and from the text, "Our God is a consuming fire," that He is nothing but



vindicatory justice. All Scriptures must be interpreted consistently. Neither can we overstrain the declarations of our Savior and the Apostles, that "love fulfills the whole law" between man and man, into the theory, that benevolence is the whole essence of virtue. The proposition of the Scripture contains a beautiful practical fact, that the virtue of love (which in Scripture nomenclature includes far more than benevolence) prompts to all other virtues. I exclude the overstrained inference by simply referring to the other passages of Scripture which assert other distinguishable virtues in addition to love: "Now abideth faith, hope, love; but the greatest of these is love." (I. Cor. xiii. 13.) "Add to your faith virtue, and to virtue knowledge, and to knowledge temperance, and to temperance patience, and to patience godliness, and to godliness brotherly kindness, and to brotherly kindness love." (II. Peter i. 5-6.) When the Scriptures declare love to God the great commandment, they mean a very different thing from Edwards' benevolence to being; "a propensity to its highest good." The supreme object of holy love in the Scriptures is always God's holiness. The affection is as distinct from mere benevolence as adoration from kindness. The love of the Scriptures, in which all man's holiness centers, is the attraction of the whole soul, in all its active principles, towards all that is pure and venerable and righteous and true, as well as good, in the divine character.

**The Moral Order Intuitively Distinct from the Logical and the Æsthetic.**

To Edwards' speculative grounds I reply, first, his grounding of moral virtue in a harmony or order perceived is utterly invalid as a support of his theory unless he holds that æsthetic beauty, logical propriety and moral praiseworthiness are all generically the same beauty, differing only in degree. For if not, the order and harmony whose perception gives the feeling of virtuousness are of a different kind, and Edwards, as much as I, is bound to answer the question: In what does moral beauty differ from the æsthetic and the logical? I can answer

consistently, in conformity to a peculiar, original intuition—that of conscience. Indeed, the fact that every sane mind intuitively perceives that difference is, of itself, a sufficient refutation of Edwards' and of every other false analysis of the moral sentiment.

#### Edwards' Paradox.

We have seen that Edwards regards the love of benevolence, not the love of moral complacency, as the primary essence of virtue, and I showed you the argument which led him to this consistent conclusion. The love of complacency, then, is love to a rational agent on account of his love of benevolence, and the former is not primarily of the essence of virtue; that is, it is not virtuous to love virtue. It is true that on a subsequent page he retracts this absurdity, availing himself virtually of a theory of sympathy between the virtuous (or benevolent) agent and the approving spectator to argue what he had before disproved. This is but the anticipation of the vicious analysis of Adam Smith. By a parallel process Edwards' principles should lead him to conclude that disinterested gratitude is not virtuous. Saith he: "The first benevolence cannot be gratitude. For the first benevolence must regard its object simply as being, not as beneficent. Hence for me to love a being because he has been a benefactor to me is not virtue!" Edwards, in a subsequent chapter, resolves gratitude into self-love, but he is not thereby designing to depreciate the affection, gratitude, for in the same chapter he analyzes the judgments and the emotions of conscience into the same self-love!

#### An Abstraction Not the Object of Virtue, but a Person—Absurd Corollaries.

We have seen that Edwards makes the essence of virtue to be love to being in general. Another fatal objection to this is, that it assigns us, as the object of every virtuous affection, a mere abstraction, a general idea. Whereas, if conscience tells you anything clearly of your moral sentiments, it is that

their objects must be personal. Only a person can oblige us to a duty. Only a person can be the object of a right. Pantheism, as we saw, abolishes morality by abstracting the personality of God. Edwards' speculation would do it as effectually in another way. Again says Edwards, love to a particular being is compatible with the definition of virtue, as consisting in love to being in general, provided the particular affection is compatible with the highest good of being in general. But I object again, this proviso is one which can not be practically ascertained by ordinary moral agents in one of ten thousand cases in which they are called to act morally towards a particular object. The motive of the peasant mother may be virtuous when she forsakes the industrial vocation which she was pursuing, promotive of the public good, to nurse her own sick and dying child, provided she has successfully calculated the preponderance of the resultant general benefit of the nursing over the industry. I object, farther, that this theory might lead a man to the breach of a nearer and therefore more obligatory duty, for the sake of one remoter and therefore less obligatory. The son would be bound to rescue a great and gifted stranger from fire or water in preference to his own father, because the great man presented to his love a greater *quantum* of existence.

**Neither the Dead nor God Would Be to Us Objects of Duty.**

I object again, that on Edwards' theory it might be impossible to explain how it is our duty to honor a dead man for his virtues. He is beyond the reach of our benevolence; he can be neither benefited nor pleased by our plaudits. And especially is it impossible on this theory to include God directly in our virtuous affections. Remember, the essence of all virtue with Him is that simple love of benevolence whose propension is to promote the highest good of being in general. But God is infinitely blessed. His good cannot be promoted by creatures. Does this not obviously exempt Him from our benevolence? Edwards answers this laboriously, by

pleading that our homage can promote God's declarative glory; the Scriptures exhort us to love, adore and praise Him. This is true, but the Scriptures ground these duties of love and adoration expressly upon God's moral perfections. It is these, not existence, which constitute Him the object of our moral homage. This fact alone overthrows Edwards' whole speculation.

All benevolent schemes tacitly assume the validity of the *a priori* moral institution with which they propose to dispense. For, suppose an adversary of the sensual, selfish system to demand of their advocates: "Why is it my duty to make the greatest good of the greatest number my chief end, instead of my own personal good?" The respondent could find no answer without resorting to the original distinction of advantage from right and the obligation to the latter.

**Edwards Derives Conscience Viciously—Corollary.**

The most mischievous part of Edwards' scheme I conceive to be his derivation of the judgments and emotions of conscience itself from general self-love. As that direct and simple love of benevolence which is the pure essence of virtue is harmony with general being as being, so self-love, according to Edwards, is a propension towards the harmony or unity of one's own being. The former principle tends to unite the individual with general being. Hence, the consciousness of an affection tending to break that benevolent unison disunites the man's own being within itself. Self-love, then, produces the judgment and pain of remorse; for this pain is nothing but the sense of the breach of that self-unity, which is self-love's main object. Thus, it follows that the sentiments of conscience (like gratitude) are only of secondary rank in ethics. By this ill-starred logical jugglery is that imperial faculty degraded whose intuitions and affections are the very spring-head of all the ethical acts of the human soul, and made an inferior consequence of the virtuous principle, a consequence of its defect, a modification of self-love. It would

follow, of course, that the perfect man might be too virtuous to have any conscience at all.

**So, Self-Love and Sin Would Be the Same.**

It is simpler reasoning still to conclude, as many of Edwards' followers have done, from his premises, that as simple benevolence is virtue, self-love is sin. And thus would come about that marvelous interpretation, which is one of the most recent triumphs of the New England philosophy, when, in expounding Genesis iii., it tells us that Adam and Eve acquired a knowledge of moral distinctions only by their fall. For conscience is a development of the principle of self-love, as Edwards teaches, and self-love is the essence of sin, as the moderns say; whence it follows that man acquires his moral nature only by his immorality.

**Benevolence and Self-Love Not Antithetic.**

These fatuous absurdities Edwards was too shrewd to adopt. He does not teach, as his premises should have taught him, that self-love is sin. Indeed, in a part of his treatise he adopts the correct analysis of Bishop Butler as to this affection. Inform yourselves of that analysis in his sermons from the 11th to the 14th. He there teaches us, with his customary profound simplicity, that the true testimony of our consciousness is that benevolence and self-love are, in fact, distinguishable, but not opposite, affections of the soul (as is so often popularly assumed); that, instead of being universally opposed, they often cooperate as motives to the same act; that the act thus educed may be either virtuous or vicious, according to its conditions; that both benevolence and self-love are so far in the same moral categories; that, notoriously, some acts of simple self-love (as when a man directly seeks his own calculated, but lawful or obligatory, personal good) and many acts of benevolence are virtuous, and that many acts of self-love (as when a man prefers his own mischievous animal pleasure) and many acts of disinterestedness (as when a man deliberately

injures himself for the sake of revenge) are vicious. From these clear statements it follows, obviously, that the benevolent cannot be exalted into the universal essence of virtue, nor the selfish into that of sin.

#### The Scheme in Reality Selfish.

The utilitarian schemes of ethics profess to stand in contrast to the selfish, because they profess not the selfish good of the agent, but the well-being of mankind, as the element and test of virtue. But they would really involve, as Jouffroy argues, the vice of the selfish systems if consistently carried out to their last result. For when the question is raised, Why do men come to regard the *utile* as the right? the answer must be, Because well-being (natural enjoyment) is the properest end of men. But thence it must follow that desire of natural good is man's properest motive of action. Thus the moral motive is as effectually left out of the analysis as by Hobbes and Helvetius themselves, and the same absurd psychology is assumed, which makes desire for natural good the result of experienced good, whereas the desire must act first or the good would never have come to be experienced. But more, if desire for natural good is man's properest motive of action, it must follow that his own personal good must always be the properest end of moral action, because this must always be the nearest, most immediate object of the natural desire. These schemes make aggregate humanity the supreme object of moral action, the true-God. But the individual agent is a part of that aggregate; part of his own God! And as he is the most attainable part—the only part for whose natural welfare he can labor effectually—I see not how the practical conclusion is to be avoided, that he is his own properest supreme end. Thus we are led back to the vilest results of the selfish system; and such, experience teaches us, is the practical tendency. While the utilitarian schemes profess great beneficence, they make their votaries supremely politic and selfish.

## Dr. Hopkins' Admission.

I now redeem my promise to show how Dr. S. Hopkins, the great American advocate of the benevolent scheme, deduces this conclusion and justifies this practical selfishness in each individual, while professing in the abstract to banish it from morals as always essentially sinful. With him virtue consists in love for general being, but none the less he concludes that each man has a right to pursue his own selfish interests supremely, provided in doing so he does not consider himself as self, but only as one portion of impersonal general being. A nice distinction truly! and one very likely to be scrupulously regarded by a creature with a sinful nature; but hear him: "He who has universal benevolence will have a greater regard for the inhabitants of the nation to which he belongs, and be more concerned for their interests, than for those of other nations. He will have a greater regard still for the inhabitants of the town and neighborhood in which he lives, all other things being equal. Consequently his benevolent care of the members of the family to which he belongs will be exercised in a higher degree and more constantly and with greater sensibility than towards those of other families; especially if he is the head of it. And as every man is nearest to himself, is most in his own view, has opportunity to be better acquainted with his own circumstances, and to know his own wants, his merits and enjoyments, etc., and has a more particular care of his own interest than of that of others, and is under greater advantage to promote his own happiness than others', his disinterested, universal benevolence will attend more to his own interest, and he will have more and stronger exercises of it respecting his own circumstances and happiness than those of others, all other things being equal; not because it his own interest, but for the reason just given. And were the case reversed, and if the circumstances, wants and interests of others were more in his view and more under his care than his own, he would pay more regard to them and have greater concern for them and their interest and happi-

ness than for his own, all other circumstances being alike." (Section IV., Chapter IV., Part II., Vol. I., page 474, of Dr. S. Hopkins' "System of Divinity.")

### 3. General Refutation of the Utilitarian, Inclusive of the Benevolence Schemes.

I have showed that all the utilitarian hypotheses have been dictated by the sensualistic theory. The method of proceeding is essentially vicious. The real nature of our moral sentiments can only be ascertained by a careful examination of consciousness. The ultimate facts thus given us must govern all theories. Psychology should pursue the same process here which guided us to safe results in our contention with sensualism, concerning the first principles of thought. That theory asserted that they were empirical, the deduction of experience from our various individual sense-perceptions. When we questioned consciousness, she replied that they were not, but were the *a priori* and intuitive *dicta* of the reason, pronounced by her whenever these individual sense-perceptions gave occasion. Let the same method of inquiry be applied concerning these moral judgments. Let us diligently look how they lie in the consciousness, not of one man, but of universal men; not of the man prejudiced by his own theory, but of natural unsophisticated men. I assert that the result of this wide and impartial examination will be the following: All men see the moral distinction between right and wrong actions. They do not naturally imagine them to be derived from some other sort of judgments, but regard them as immediate and intuitive. All men accept the judgment of obligation as necessary. It is as impossible for them to question its rational authority as to question their own identity, or the superior magnitude of a whole body over one of its parts. In a word, we find the three essential marks of *a priori* judgments all belonging to these inward sentiments. They are self-evident, they are necessary, they are universal.



Confounds the Moral with the Natural Good—Hume's Evasion Refuted.

I also subject to the verdict of consciousness the question, whether our concept of the moral good is not essentially distinct from that of the natural good. We judge that savory viands are good, and that justice is good; that flattery is pleasant, and that disinterested charity is pleasant. But does consciousness perceive an identity between the two goods and the two pleasures? No; she inevitably announces them to be distinct and even contrasted in everything, but that both classes please us, yet in different ways. I assert that no unsophisticated mind would think of confounding the two judgments and sensibilities. Every one perceives their distinctness as immediately as the distinction between the sweetness of honey and the sweetness of music. If our empirical perception of natural good were the source of our moral judgments, then we should conclude that anything and everything which tends to promote natural enjoyment is, therefore, virtuous and meritorious. We ought to conclude that the flatterer who gives pleasure by titillating our vanity, the prodigal who gratifies our senses with a share of his dishonest gains, the useful milch-cow which gives the pleasure of satisfied hunger, the convenient piece of furniture which subserves our ease, are as truly virtuous and deserving agents as the patriot who defends us and the mother who blesses us by her voluntary self-sacrifices. But we do not and we can not judge thus. Again, in the moral duty we always recognize obligation; in the mere natural good, never. Not only is there, to the right mind, a pleasure in the practice of virtue, but there is the high imperative of the reason to seek it. In the savory viand and the luscious fruit there is a different pleasure, but no man recognizes a moral obligation to seek it. His judgment tells him he may indulge in that pleasure if he chooses, provided temperance does not forbid; but if you told him that he violated an obligation by foregoing it, he would think you insane. Here is an essential, yea, an immense difference, that to the concept of the mere natural good we never attach the judgment

of obligation, while to that of the moral good we always and necessarily attach it. When Mr. Hume was reminded that were mere utility the element of our conception of the virtuous, we should think of the useful cow or the comfortable bed as such—which we never do—he attempted this feeble evasion, that these are irrational and involuntary agents of pleasure: we only think such agents virtuous as minister pleasure by intelligent intention. On this I remark, first, that if it were true, it would be a virtual surrender of his theory; for it is an acknowledgment that we find the element of the virtuousness not in the utility, but in the rational intention of the agent. I reply, second, that it is not true. No man adjudges virtue to all the agents who minister pleasure with rational intention. This is precisely what the flatterer does; but all know that therein he is vicious. Extensive utility has resulted from some rational, intentional actions for which no man ever awarded any moral approbation to the agents. For instance, the invention of the automatic movement for opening and shutting the escape-valves of the steam-engine has been literally of immense utility to mankind. History tells us that it was made on this wise: The rude steam-engines employed in the eighteenth century in the collieries of the north of England lacked this feature. It was necessary that a workman should stand beside the cylinder all day long, and with his hand push the lever backwards and forwards, by which the valves were opened and shut at the opportune instants. One day a lazy, hulking lad was set to this irksome task at an engine. He longed to quit it, contrary to his duty, and to join his idle comrades in their games of marbles. His laziness whetted his wits, and he noticed that the movements he was required to make in the lever were coincident with those in the great pitman near by. He conceived the idea of connecting the two. So when his machine was stopped at recess, he found the handle of a discarded shovel and fastened it with cords as a connecting rod. Thus he made the machine do his own work and went off to his truant game. Here, now,

was an invention whose utility to man has been as vast as that of the steamship or of Stephenson's locomotive engine. Was this idle lad correspondingly virtuous for making it? No one judges so. We are amused at his lazy ingenuity. We accord him not a particle of merit for its results. For his motive was wholly unmeritorious, being simply idle and selfish.

*Would Confound the Æsthetic with the Moral.*

It is astonishing that the advocates of utilitarianism have not been brought to a stand by the impossibility of reducing the æsthetic sentiments to the moral. These are pleasurable, and every correct psychologist has recognized them as standing in one respect nearer to the moral sentiments than the mere pleasures of sensations. For there is a rational judgment involved in them and conditioning the pleasures which attend them: the judgment, namely, of the harmonious relation of the parts in the beautiful object. Yet is the gulf firmly fixed in every correct consciousness between them and moral sentiments. No one feels that his pleasure in natural beauty is identical with that which he feels in the approbation of virtue. No one believes that an object is virtuous because it is beautiful. Even the human person is not judged meritorious because of its beauty or grace. But more, we never connect the judgment of obligation with mere beauty. When we read the portraiture of the character of Jesus of Nazareth, while we are filled with moral admiration, we intuitively recognize our obligation to imitate and to endeavor to become perfect even as He is perfect. But when we read of the beauty of Adonis, no one ever thinks that he is morally bound to be beautiful like him, or that he is delinquent because he fails to become so. Thus the æsthetic sentiment obstinately separates itself from the moral. Now, according to the definition of Mr. Hume and Mr. Spencer, the æsthetic quality is as strictly utilitarian as any beneficent human actions are; it is promotive of natural enjoyment. On their theory it ought, therefore, to be virtuous as they are. But this is a conclusion which common sense absolutely rejects.

#### 4. Refutation of Hedonism, the Root of All Utilitarianism.

##### Fatal Epicurean Corollary.

The root principle of all these schemes is Epicurean, in that they all, like Epicurus, make natural good man's whole rational end. That concept of natural good, I again remind the student, resolves itself into the simple aggregate of all pleasures. But when they thus make pleasure the good, they must meet the question which Epicurus had to meet: How then can there be such things as immoral pleasures? If enjoyment is man's rational good, why are not all enjoyments virtuous? These modern Hedonists can not possibly give any other answer than the one Epicurus gave: that since enjoyment is man's proper rational end, his reason instructs him so to regulate his actions as to secure the largest aggregate of enjoyments; that some enjoyments are more worthy of the rational mind than others, because more refined and elevated, as the pleasures of friendship and literary taste are more refined than those of gluttony; and where these clash with each other, man ought to forego the grosser in order to enjoy the more refined; but especially that excess in all these grosser pleasures diminishes the aggregate of natural enjoyment by inducing satiety and disease, and thus disqualifying the powers for their higher gratification. This answer was plausible, but worthless. It is said that Epicurus himself lived a temperate life, preferring the enjoyments of music, art and society to those of animal sensuality. But let us suppose that any disciple to whom he was applying these arguments for self-restraint had replied thus: "Master, different men have by nature different faculties, dispositions and temperaments. Now, it so happens that to me your elegant pleasures are no pleasures at all, but dreary bores. The only pleasures to which my nature is susceptible are those of gluttony, drunkenness and prize-fights. These, therefore, constitute my virtue." To this there is absolutely no reply on the principles of Epicurus;

they are thus shown to be devoid of any moral standard and of any rational restraints upon the vilest lusts. That which each man prefers most is each man's largest pleasure. Since utilitarianism makes the largest aggregate of enjoyment the most rational end, if it will be consistent it must make each man's wicked preference the most proper standard of his own virtue.

**Utilitarian Argument for Altruism Worthless.**

But they exclaim, that they make the greatest good of the greatest number, and not of the selfish individual, the proper rational end. And when the rational man observes how invariably evil consequences to himself and to others are connected by natural law with certain short-lived pleasures, they are seen to be forbidden by the utilitarian law. All virtuous, rational action is directed not merely to one's own gratification, but to the greatest good of the greatest number. When one is about to act, he must take into account the whole ulterior and remote consequences of the proposed action, not only upon his own welfare, but upon that of all other men. This consideration will dictate all the prudence, temperance, probity and philanthropy which are required by the purest Christian morality. This pretty reasoning contains sundry fatal chasms.

**(A) Hedonism Simply Egoistic.**

First, how shall Mr. Hume or Mr. Spencer, after assigning natural enjoyment as man's supreme rational end, convince any of his followers of any rational obligation to consider anybody's enjoyment but his own? The very conception of the proposed end is purely egoistic. Mr. Spencer's follower is entitled to say: Another man's pleasure is not pleasure to me; it is my enjoyment of it which makes it pleasure. If, then, I can enhance my aggregate of enjoyment by neglecting or impairing that of other people it is most reasonable for me to do so. It is my right.

(B) Such Altruism Will Be Deceitfully Applied, Except Justice, an Alien Concept, Come in.

It is obvious to common sense that every utilitarian mind, upon hearing Mr. Spencer's plea for altruism, will be sure to make a deceitful use of it. He will say to himself: Yes, undoubtedly, in the general course of nature, honesty will prove the best policy on the whole; and, therefore, I shall require all my fellow-men to act upon that honest policy toward me. But I am sagacious; one who sees as deeply as I do into the laws of social nature and their ulterior results will be able to surpass his fellows in foresight and acuteness; I can break the general law and still circumvent the injurious effects in my own case. This, therefore, will always be the most preferable and expedient rule of action for me: to instruct all my fellows in their dealings with me to observe the rule that honesty is the best policy, while I secretly reserve to myself the privilege of practicing any dishonesty which my superior cunning will render safe for me. Thus will every other advocate of expediency argue for himself until the whole society declines into a company of hypocrites, each one recommending to his neighbor the moral rule which he himself intends to break. For each has as his starting-point the principle, that advantage is his most rational end of action; so that when he proceeds to combine the first principle with the general deduction, "honesty on the whole the best policy," the practical work will be the vile one I have described. Now, I defy Mr. Spencer to refute this conclusion of his pupils without borrowing some other principle than that of utilitarianism; without borrowing, in fact, a higher principle of moral conscience. Will he instruct his follower that "egoism," where enlightened, rises into "altruism"? Will he bid him remember that, by whatsoever motive he himself craves his largest natural good, by parallel motives each one of his fellows also craves his own, and that, therefore, the equitable, rational order should prompt us to regard all our fellows' natural good along with our own? The pupil will ask, What makes this

conception of society the equitable, obligatory one? We will see that Mr. Spencer has introduced a new principle, that of justice as the moral order, which is wholly distinct from the principle of egoism and for which a superior authority over egoism is now claimed. Whence does this newer and higher principle come? Not from utilitarianism manifestly, but from the higher intuition of conscience.

### 5. Moral Distinctions Founded on Consequences Impossible.

#### The Maxim of Utilitarianism Untrue.

But, waiving this fatal objection, I pass to a second. Unquestionably this theory requires a large practical experience of the ulterior consequences of actions as a requisite for having any intelligent moral judgments of them. If the rightness of the act consists in its tendency, according to the widest laws of human experience, to promote the longest and widest aggregate of advantages, then the agent must have all that experimental knowledge in order to judge whether the act will be right or not. But here arises a series of fatal objections. If this scheme is true, the young person unhackneyed in the ways of the world ought to be found nearly incapable of moral judgments and sentiments. The experienced old worldling should always be found to have them in the most correct and vivid forms. But the facts are just the opposite. Inexperienced young persons usually show the quickest moral judgments, whose correctness gains far more from the vividness and simplicity of their intuitions than it loses by their lack of experience concerning the causes and consequences of actions. Experienced men are the ones whose moral perceptions are confused and enfeebled. Again, an honest person could not decide between competing duties except after he had correctly compared the utilitarian results of preferring the one and neglecting the other. Who believes this? Who ever tried to discover the path of duty by such comparisons,

except some insane pedant? Here, for instance, is a mother whose hireling trade is that of a weaver; her little child falls ill; shall she quit her loom to nurse the child of her own body? According to this fine scheme, she cannot do so intelligently and morally until she has settled the question, whether the products of her loom or the alleviation of her child's sufferings will be of the larger utility to society. The mother's virtuous heart scorns this grovelling arithmetic. She obeys the intuition of her soul by preferring the welfare of her child to all else. Indeed, I see not why all the extravagances of Godwin's "Political Justice" should not follow from this scheme. Why, for instance, a shipwrecked son might not be morally bound to let his own father perish in order to rescue from the waters any stranger whose life happened to be of more importance to the commonwealth.

**Bentham's Maxim False.**

I also deny that the actions which promote the greatest good of the greatest number are therefore the right actions. A multitude of exceptions is found in actual life; other multitudes of exceptions can be described as liable to occur. For instance, there was a merchant owning \$150,000.00 worth of property, who brought to his town \$30,000.00 worth of useful goods, and sold them on short credit to one hundred families of limited income. The dates of his credits in New York and of their credits with him are about to expire. All the hundred families refuse to pay their bills. The consequence is that the merchant, in order to avoid the ruin of his credit, sells \$30,000.00 worth of his own real estate to pay his notes in New York. He is now poorer by \$30,000.00, but he has \$120,000.00; so that neither he nor his family experience any serious inconvenience. But, if each of the one hundred families with limited incomes had been required to part with \$300.00, the aggregate of inconvenience, and even of suffering, would have been very great. The Benthamite must therefore conclude that in this instance it was wicked for the rich



merchant to require his just dues, and right for these hundred families to break their word to him and plunder him of his property. What honest mind can grant this? Our opponents have indeed an evasion, but it is worthless. They plead that in estimating their greatest good, not only the proximate and immediate results of an action must be taken into account, but also the remote consequences and whole tendencies thereof, even down into subsequent generations; that while the refusal of these hundred families to pay their bills does indeed save them from considerable present inconveniences, their breach of punctuality will produce in themselves bad habits and will set to the community and to future generations a bad example, of which the aggregate evils will ultimately far outweigh their present gains; and that this is the reason why their refusal to pay their just debts is wrong, though proximately advantageous. I sweep away this wretched sophism by these replies: First, no honest conscience is satisfied with this reasoning; any man who has begun to seek the distinction of right and wrong in this way has already departed from rectitude. Second, should any circumstance happen, just after the dishonest transaction above described, to obliterate the memory and evil effects of it in that community, as, for instance, a conflagration or a pestilence in the town, then this wholesale roguery would become honest. Third, the debtor who did not have experience and sagacity to foresee the ulterior inconveniences of his example would have no means of knowing that he did wrong in breaking his word and robbing his neighbor.

#### The Objects Not Mechanically Equal.

It is obvious that this theory of right entirely omits the different moral significance of different persons. It reasons of them as though they were mere arithmetical integers like the individuals in an assorted herd of swine, each of which needs the same allotment of food; or the posts in a fence, each of which is entitled to so many ounces of paint. The more swine are fattened, the more posts are protected with paint,

just so much the better is the result. But sound morality says, that different rational persons have their different degrees of moral merit, and consequently different rights. Where the more deserving man receives less well-being than he deserves, and the unworthy man more than he deserves, the results may be mechanically equal; but in a moral point of view they are flagrantly unequal. Consequently the question of right is not the greatest good of the greatest number, but the greatest good of the most worthy, who may be the fewer.

#### 6. The Possibility of a Valid Theory of Punishments on the Utilitarian Basis.

My last head of refutation against these utilitarian schemes will be to bring them to the test of this question: How can they justify the punishment of offenses in civil society? Let it be remembered that these schemes propound natural good as man's whole practical end. Now all penalty is, of course, a natural evil. It would seem then that every infliction of natural evil—*i. e.*, of penalty which is voluntarily made—must be a sin against Nature; for it violates man's practical end, which is to enjoy as much and suffer as little as fate permits. These schemes deny all other intrinsic grounds of desert. Hence they have left themselves no other way to explain the penalties inflicted by civil government than to say that they are a necessary, prudential expediency to which the magistrate must resort (in view of the liability of some persons to transgress), in order to secure the greatest good of the greatest number. On these schemes the magistrate treats transgressions, not as criminal, but as mischievous. They injure the welfare, first, of the transgressor, and, second, of the community. Hence the magistrate has to employ penalties as a prudential expedient to minimize these mischiefs. The pains inflicted are medicinal to transgressors by promoting their welfare through their reformation; and they limit the mischiefs

of the evil examples by deterring other citizens from imitating them. These are the only motives which can justify the civil magistrate, upon any utilitarian scheme, in voluntarily inflicting penal evils on his fellow creatures, and subtracting from their natural welfare; thus violating the rational end of their being.

**This Rationale of Penalty Worthless: (A) Because Involving the  
"Social Contract."**

My argument is in this assertion, that this theory of civil penalties is worthless and false. For first, all consistent utilitarians must derive the rights of civil government from the theory of a "social contract." Having denied the essential distinctions and intuitions of morality, they have no other source from which to infer the right of civil government. But on the theory of the social contract this prudential expediency cannot be justified; there being no intrinsic criminality in breaches of the rules, the optional consent of the transgressor to his own punishment would be necessary to it to justify it. This consent he would never give; and, in fact, the government never waits for it. Especially would all capital punishment be unwarrantable upon this theory; for they are not remedial, but destructive; in the hand of the utilitarian, they are as though a kind father should cut off his child's head in order to cure his toothache. And further, civil society can not derive a right to destroy human life from the free consent of the individual, because no man's life belongs to himself; it is the property of his God; and none can bargain away what he does not own.

**(B) Because It Would Equally Justify the Prevention of Pestilence  
by Penalty.**

This theory of a prudential expediency appears again to be worthless, because if it were valid it would equally justify the destruction of the murderer and of citizens afflicted with pestilence, and even of the hopelessly decrepit. Murder is

mischievous, and as such only can expediency cure it by penalties. But pestilence is often far more mischievous. One yellow fever or small-pox patient may be the means of destroying more lives in one season than all the murderers of a commonwealth in a whole generation. The presence of the hopelessly infirm and insane is also a natural evil, for it consumes many values and the labors of many efficient citizens without utilitarian results. Now, much the surest way to prevent the spread of pestilence from the first yellow fever patient would be to burn him up in his sick-chamber. This, then, would be the most justifiable expedient. Why not? But every right heart revolts against such cruelty towards an innocent sufferer as abominable. Why is the penal means of repressing the one set of mischiefs just and the same means of repressing the greater set of mischiefs so unjust? For this burning question I have a good answer: It is because the murderer is not only mischievous, but intrinsically criminal; while the sick man, though very mischievous, is not criminal, but innocent. Utilitarians have no business with this answer, for they deny the intrinsic distinction between natural good and moral good.

**(C) The Punishment of an Innocent Person, if More Efficient, Would Be More Moral!**

Their theory of penal expediency appears worthless, in the third place, from this inference: that if the whole motive of punishment is prudential prevention, then, of course, the most efficient preventive is the most justifiable. This needs no arguing. But there have been many cases in which the punishment of an innocent person, tenderly related to the actual culprit, would have a much more deterrent effect upon the latter than his own punishment. Then that expedient would be the more justifiable. Here is a termagant and debauched female, who has been several times brought before the magistrate of a town. He has endeavored, vainly, to repress her disorderly conduct by the milder penalties of reprimands, fines and detentions. She has again outraged good

morals. The magistrate now threatens to curb her by more painful and infamous penalties. He endeavors to scare her with the whipping-post and with hard imprisonment. She mocks at his threats. What terror have the disgraces of the whipping-post or the jail for her who has sounded all the depths of social infamy already? Prison fare and the prison bed will be but luxury to one whose ordinary pillow has been the curb-stone. What does she care for the pain of stripes, who is accustomed to receive curses and cuffs and stripes and wounds from the drunken comrades of her orgies, and whose soul is scourged with the keener lashes of remorse and desperation? She defies the threats of the law, and the magistrate is at his wits' end. Now there steps forward a policeman, who informs him that there is still one impressive spot in the heart of this lost woman; that she has a youthful daughter, who, unlike her mother, is pure and attractive, and is still tenderly beloved by her. He proposes that this innocent girl shall be arrested and brought into court; that her naked shoulders shall be torn with the lash in the presence of her mother, and she shall be sternly told that the same consequence shall follow every time she commits a disorder. Now, when the wretch sees the blood trickling from the innocent flesh of her darling child, she will relent; she will kneel with streaming tears before the magistrate, and will promise everything. And she will keep her promises. The scourging of the child proves to be the successful expedient, where the punishment of the guilty mother was wholly futile. The former, therefore, is the justifiable expedient, for it gains the whole ends of punishment; but why does every right soul revolt against this conclusion as abominable? Because the child is intrinsically innocent; because, in other words, just punishment is not an expediency, but is grounded in essential and eternal justice; because, in short, the utilitarian theory of punishment is worthless.

(D) Because Futile to Explain Divine Penalties.

Once more, this theory displays its futility when applied

to account for the use of penalties in the divine government. God is not only just and benevolent, but sovereign and almighty. Hence, if this preventive expediency were the whole motive of His policy, His perfections would surely prompt Him to employ His gracious power for the prevention of sin instead of penal evils. Especially would He choose thus in view of the fact that He sees severe penalties so often ineffectual in deterring from transgression. Surely He would prefer the more effectual means of suasive grace, to which His power and wisdom make Him so competent, to prevent His creatures under temptation from electing to sin, and to prevent the innocent from imitating evil examples. But especially would God's everlasting punishment of the obdurate fail of all justification upon these theories of expediency. For these victims of endless punishments no remedy is proposed; their pains are designed not to heal, but to destroy. The consistent utilitarian, then, must refute whatever of authority there may be in the teachings of sacred Scripture concerning God's punishments in order to substantiate His speculations.

Every family and every commonwealth in the world justify the punishment of transgressors in some form or other, and all but atheists admit the retributive justice of God. The utilitarian schemes have been shown to be superficial and unsatisfactory when they attempt to account for penalties. They must, therefore, be rejected. In this chapter I have tested them by eight successive *criteria*. Each of these tests is sufficient by itself to decide the validity of the schemes. In the presence of each one they have failed hopelessly.

#### The Antinomy between Hedonism and Disinterested Virtue.

The close of this discussion brings into view two fundamental truths, which now obviously demand a fundamental adjustment. The one truth is that Hedonism can give no solid ground of moral distinction, even in the most plausible form. We see that conscience must be supreme, and virtuous actions are only those which are done because they are right,

and not merely because they are profitable. But, on the other hand, we have admitted the principles of action expressed in the maxim, "Self-preservation is the first law of Nature." The instinct is also primal which prompts man to preserve his existence and to seek legitimate welfare therein. How, then, can a rational creature be rationally prompted to preserve a line of action which will make him irreparably miserable, contrary to this prime intuition of rationality? The instinct has been implanted by his Creator. How can there be a moral obligation to violate it finally? Does it not appear that there is a sense in which the "greatest happiness theory" has just force? Here there is an apparent conflict between man's end and the moral demand for self-sacrificing, virtuous acts.

Again, what is the rational judgment of obligation? Is it merely a judgment of abstract truth having its sole law in the rational consciousness? Nay verily! It is moreover a categorical imperative. This shows that it is a judgment of personal relation.

Obligation always implies an obligator. The reason finds none adequate until it ascends to God. The radical adjustment of the antinomy above disclosed is not found until we recognize God as the moral legislator. This is the grain of truth mixed with Paley's errors. The ultimate moral principle of action can be nothing less than rational confidence in the attributes of God.

#### The Conciliation Is in God's Joint Holiness and Love.

On page 219 we saw that man's supreme rational end is not single, but dual; it is neither simple pleasure nor simple compliance with the law, not happiness, but blessedness—*i. e.*, happiness in holiness. We found that true happiness is virtuous energy, and not a mere series of gratifications to appetites and appetencies. Such a series may constitute the happiness of a pig, but not of a moral rational creature. All mere Hedonists have found that for such beings it is *vanitas vanitatum*, the "crackling of thorns under a pot." It is not mere-

ly the arbitrary legislation of the Maker which ordains that true happiness cannot be found by man apart from holiness; it is equally a law of natural necessity, as unavoidable as the material law that a body which has a top must also have a bottom. Let us now add, that amidst the attributes of God prompting His commandments, benevolence is as essential as righteousness. He commands us to obey His holy will as much because He would have us supremely happy in that will as because that will is holy. When we ascend to this supreme view of God's attributes, happiness and holiness practically merge into one; and in this holy submission to the divine will we find a glorified Hedonism. That filial trust in God out of which all true and honest obedience springs rests upon our assurance that He is at once so infinitely loving and so infinitely pure that He will infallibly make our complete submission our complete happiness.



## CHAPTER IV.

## SENTIMENTAL THEORIES OF ETHICS.

## I. Refutation of the Theory of Hutcheson.

I do not employ the term "sentimental" with the design of disparaging the theories of morals next to be stated. The student who has read attentively the early part of this treatise will have learned that I regard the legitimate sentiments of the human spirit as the noblest of its functions; and when I shall proceed to expound more fully the true theory of our ethical processes, I shall be found admitting a sentimental element as an essential part of them. But it appears just to characterize the schemes next to be described as sentimental, because they seek the root of our moral judgments in a spiritual sentiment rather than in a rational cognition. Justice, however, requires us to add, that these schemes are of far loftier and purer tendencies than those which we have discussed and dismissed, and that they are consistent with the most disinterested impulses of virtue. Their authors have rendered invaluable assistance in refuting the grovelling theories of their predecessors.

## His Scheme Defined.

Dr. Samuel Hutcheson, professor of philosophy in the University of Glasgow, convinced himself correctly that our moral processes are original functions of our spirits. He refuted and discarded the superficial schemes of the selfish and utilitarian moralists who had preceded him, and proved that no modifications of these lower feelings of mere natural good could account for the judgments and affections of conscience. So far he proceeded in the right direction. He next argues

thus: There is then a moral faculty, as original as any of the other faculties or perceptions or feelings, and as essentially constituent of our spiritual powers. It is the direct operation of this faculty which gives us our moral sentiments and judgments. What species of faculty is it? He says it is the "moral sense." Elsewhere he calls it an "internal sense." By this he seems to mean that, unlike our bodily senses, it has no external organ, and that it does not reveal to us any material attribute of its objects, such as size, figure, color, but the moral quality, *a priori* rightness in human actions. Yet it is a sense in this, that it is primarily a faculty of sensibility rather than of judgment; not of organic, but of a spiritual sensibility; but yet, like our organic senses, which give us primarily sensation and then perception by means of that sensation. So in this moral sense the first impression of the moral object is an awakened sensibility of the soul, and the consequent one a moral perception and judgment. Dr. Hutcheson has obviously left a strong impression upon our popular English speech, for there is scarcely a term in the mouths of the people that is more frequently used to name the moral faculty than this phrase, the "moral sense." This theory presents a great and valuable advance upon the mischievous speculations of the sensualistic philosophers, in that it establishes in the soul a moral faculty upon its own independent basis, and recognizes the essential distinction between our moral sentiments and all the lower sensibilities of pleasure, pain and self-interest. When we consider the age in which the author made this new departure, we accord him high praise for courage and perspicacity.

**The One Error Is Hutcheson's Putting the Sentiment before the  
Cognition.**

Yet we are compelled to dissent from his doctrine in one point. We cannot admit that our moral processes, like those of our bodily senses, begin in a sensibility and afterwards end in a perception and judgment of the intellect. When we re-

member that the conscience is a rational faculty, and that it perceives, not concrete objects, but only a peculiar relation between the agents and the objects upon which they act, we are compelled to reverse Dr. Hutcheson's order, and to teach that the moral intellection must first take place in order to the stimulation of the moral sensibility. To us it appears that this analysis is strictly conformed to all the other analogies of the rational spirit, as Dr. Hutcheson's disagrees with them. It may be true that the eyeball and the optic nerves feel in order to see; but the mind in its pure spiritual processes must see in order to feel. This doctrine of a moral sense also appears to us incorrect in setting up the moral faculty as a different one from the reason. The conclusion of Dr. A. Alexander, and of Price and Butler, appears the correct one, that the moral faculty is no other than the reason itself with its peculiar spiritual sensibility to moral beauty annexed to it.

**The Reason the Moral Faculty—The Objection: Its Solution.**

We hold that our moral judgments upon all simple and elemental cases are but intuitions of the reason; even as all our derivative moral inferences in the complex cases are but logical deductions of the reason. Some writers have indeed urged this objection, that the one function of the reason is the judgment of truth in propositions either primary or derived. But they ask us, whether we are willing to accept the conclusions of Drs. Clarke and Wollaston and their followers, which reduce all moral distinctions simply and nakedly to logical distinctions, and teach that right actions are such because conformable to truth, and that wrong actions are wrong solely because they are grounded in false premises. When we answer, No, we reject this conclusion; then they argue that it is inconsistent and erroneous in us to ascribe moral judgments to the faculty of reason. But we reply, that their definition of this faculty is imperfect and too narrow. The reason is more than they represent it; it is the faculty of intellectual comparison; its function is to judge all relations, not merely those of

logical truth, but those of moral agents to the objects of their actions. Consciousness and reflection tell us that in every moral judgment what the mind perceives is a relation lying between some agent and his object. We cannot think the concepts of right and wrong without thinking both agent and object of the affection or action to be judged. We can never perceive the moral quality of an action while abstracted from the object upon which it intentionally terminates. If I pronounce to the student the proposition, "He strikes," and require him to assign a moral quality to this act of striking, he immediately asks, "He strikes what?" Until the object is supplied to the striker, the student properly feels that no moral judgment can take place. Every moral judgment, then, is a judgment of relation. When we define the great faculty of reason as the one which cognizes relations, all our moral judgments are brought within its sphere.

**Argued.**

We argue again that we are justified by this general fact, that no creatures have moral judgments except those which have the faculty of reason. Our horses and our dogs possess several bright faculties, as perception, memory, sensibility, volition; but they lack the higher faculty of reasoning, and consequently they are incapable of moral judgments and are subject to no responsibility. So all men believe that when any of their fellow-creatures lose for a time the exercise of reason, by lunacy, they lose to the same extent the moral faculty, and are no longer subject to its responsibility. Our point here is, that whenever reason is present, we find the moral functions present; and whenever reason is absent, we find them absent. This is a demonstration that the two functions are invariably dependent the one on the other, and it shows a strong probability that they are identical. We argue the same conclusion from the fact that the grounds of every right action are rational. Every subjective motive includes, as one of its elements, a judgment (the other essential element being an

appetency). When we see an agent perform an action, before we can judge its morality we ask him his reason for doing it, and if he avows that he had no reason, then, however correct the action may have been in form, we cannot give him our moral approbation for it; we regard it as merely automatic or morally indifferent. In this sense, again, the moral judgment is a rational judgment. In fine, if the moral faculty were a distinct and independent faculty from the reason, how comes it that these never conflict with each other? Such opposition frequently arises between our other faculties which are distinct the one from the other. The touch contradicts and corrects the eyesight, teaching us that what we had supposed to be a real orange is a yellow globe of plaster. The sense perceptions correct our rational inferences, teaching us that what imperfect reason taught us to expect is not really present. If the reason and the moral faculty were two, similar instances would be liable to occur. We should have the one faculty opposing and correcting the other. But this never occurs. The reason invariably leads the conscience, and, if the reason is misinformed, the conscience inevitably concurs in its erroneous judgment, and cannot be corrected save through the correction of the reason itself.

## 2. The Sympathetic Theory of A. Smith.

The ingenious scheme of Dr. Adam Smith ("Theory of Moral Sentiments") may be seen very conspicuously unfolded in Jouffroy. This scheme is by no means so mischievous and degrading as that of Hobbes, Hume or Paley. But it is incorrect. The fundamental defect is that in each step it assumes the prior existence of the moral sentiment in order to account for it. For instance, it says: We feel approbation for an act when we experience a sympathetic harmony of emotion with the sentiments in the agent which prompted it. But sympathy only produces the same emotion; it does not transmute it; so that, unless the producing sentiment in the agent were moral, it could not by sympathy generate a moral senti-

ment in us. It supposes conscience comes thus: we imagine an ideal man contemplating our act, conceive the kind of sentiments he feels for us, and then sympathize therewith. But how do we determine the sentiments of this ideal man looking at our act? He is but a projection of our own moral sentiments. So, in each step, Dr. Smith has to assume the phenomenon as already produced, for the production of which he would account. Another fatal objection to Dr. Smith's scheme is, that the sympathetic affection in the beholder is always fainter than the direct sentiment in the object beheld. But conscience visits upon us stronger emotions than are awakened by beholding the moral acts of another, and approving or blaming them. The sentiments of conscience should, according to Dr. Smith, be feebler, for they are the reflection of a reflection.

### 3. Refutation of the Theories of T. Brown and H. Lotze.

The ethical lectures of Dr. Thomas Brown, of Edinburgh, are marked by great acuteness and general nobility of tone, and he has rendered gallant service in refuting the more erroneous theories. He makes moral distinctions, original and authoritative, and yet allows the reason only a secondary function in them. The whole result of his analysis is this: when certain actions (an action is nothing more than the agent acting) are presented, there arises immediately an emotion called, for the want of a more vivid term, moral approbation, without any previous condition of self-calculation, judgment of relation in the reason, etc. This immediate emotion constitutes our whole feeling of the rightness, obligation, meritoriousness of the agent. As experience gathers up and recollects the successive acts which affect us with the moral emotion, reason makes the generalization of them into a class, and thus derivatively forms the general idea of virtue. Man's moral capacity, therefore, is strictly not a power of intellection, but a sensibility. The reason only generalizes into a class those

acts which have the immediate power of affecting this sensibility in the same way. Brown's system deserves, even more than those which he so ably refutes, to be called the sentimental system. The moral sentiment is with him strictly an instinctive emotion.

#### H. Lotze's Virtually the Same.

The celebrated H. Lotze, if we comprehend him aright, adopts virtually the same theory as to the formation of our concepts of the moral good and evil. He seems to derive them from our feelings of pleasure and pain. He does this with such emphasis and frequency as to almost persuade his readers that he belongs to the utilitarian or Hedonist sect. Yet he disclaims this construction as not containing the whole of his theory. In his conclusion he asserts for the soul a permanent and rational standard of distinction between the right and the wrong. The only way in which we can construe him so as to make him consistent with himself is this: that when he speaks of our feelings of pleasure or pain as being the sources of our moral concepts, he means not only those natural sensibilities whose satisfaction or injury gives us the concept of natural good and evil, but also, and above these, an ethical feeling, or species of moral æsthetic, which finds its higher, rational satisfaction in the perception of beneficial actions. Giving him the benefit of this construction, we find him advancing virtually the same theory with Dr. T. Brown.

#### Jouffroy's First Objection.

Now it does not seem to me a valid objection to say with Jouffroy, that thus the moral emotion is made one among the set of our natural instincts; and there is no longer any reason why it should be more dominant over the others out of its own domain than they over it (*i. e.*, more than taste or resentment or appetite). For the very nature of this moral instinct, Brown might reply, is that it claims all other susceptibilities which have moral quality as in its own domain.

**A Truer Objection, That Cognition Is in Order to Rational Feelings.**

The truer objections are, that this notion does not square with the analogies of the soul. In every case our emotions arise out of an intellection. This is true in a lower sense even of our animal instincts. It is perceptions which awaken appetites. It is the conception of an intent to injure which gives the signal to our resentment, even when it arises towards an agent non-moral. In all the more intellectual emotions, as of taste, love, moral complacency, the view of the understanding, and that alone, evokes the emotion in a normal way. The soul feels because it has seen. How else would reason rule our emotions? Surely this is one of our most important distinctions from brutes, that our emotions are not mere instincts, but rational affections. Note especially, too, that if our moral sentiments had no element of judgment at their root, the fact would be inexplicable that they never, like all other instinctive emotions, come in collision with reason. Again, Dr. Brown has very properly shown in overthrowing the selfish systems of human action that our instincts are not prompted by self-interest. He seems, therefore, to think that when he makes the moral emotion an instinctive sensibility, he has done all that is needed to make it disinterested. But an action is not, therefore, disinterested, because it is not self-interested. Then would our very animal appetites, even in infancy, be virtuous. The truth is, in instinctive volitions the motive is personal to the agent, but not consciously so; in selfish volitions the motive is personal to the agent, and he knows it. Only when the motive is impersonal, and he knows it, is there disinterested virtue.

**Brown Can Have No Moral Standard.**

Lastly, if Brown's theory were correct, moral good would only be relative to each man's sensibility, and there would be no uniform standard. An act might be good to one, bad to another, just as it presented itself to his sensibility, as truly as, in the sense of natural good, one man calls oysters good



and another considers oysters bad. Whereas, the true doctrine is that moral distinctions are as intrinsic in certain acts as truth in certain propositions, and as eternal and immutable. Even God sees and calls the right to be right because it is so, and not *vice versa*. Dr. Brown foresees this, and, attempting to refute it, is guilty of peculiar absurdity. Why, says he, does it give any more intrinsic basis for moral distinction in the acts (or agents acting) to suppose that our cognizance of them is by a rational judgment, than to say it is in the way they naturally affect a sensibility in us? The capacity of having the intuitive judgment is itself but a sort of rational sensibility to be affected in a given way, and in either case we have no ground for any belief of an intrinsic permanence of the relation or quality perceived, but that our Maker made us to be affected so; thus he betrays the whole basis of morals and truth to a sweeping scepticism. Does not intuition compel us to believe that reason is affected with such and such judgments, because the grounds of them are actual and intrinsic in the objects? Dr. Brown goes to the absurd length of saying, that the supposed relations, ascertained by reason herself, are not intrinsic and exist nowhere except in the perceiving reason; *e. g.*, the relation of the square of the hypotenuse. Says he, Were there nowhere a perceiving mind comprehending it, it would have no existence, no matter how many right-angled triangles existed. Is not this absolute scepticism? Is it not equivalent to saying that none of the perceptions of reason (*i. e.*, human beliefs) have any objective validity? There need be no stronger refutation of his theory than that he should acknowledge himself driven by it to such an admission.

**CHAPTER V.****RATIONALISTIC THEORIES OF THE NATURE  
OF MORALITY.****1. Refutation of the Theory of S. Clark and Wollaston.**

I now desire to present to the student a few representative specimens of a more refined class of moral theories. I have ventured to call them rationalistic. In naming them thus I do not design to stigmatize them as harboring a leaning towards infidelity, which is the accusation I should make against theological rationalism. For some of the advocates of the theories now to be stated are very devout believers in Holy Scripture. Further, while I can not regard these theories as giving the correct analysis of the moral functions of our spirits, they worthily exalt and honor these functions, and their practical tendencies, unlike those of the selfish and utilitarian schemes, are healthy and ennobling to the character. They agree with what I regard as the true analysis in making the moral judgment thoroughly a supersensuous function and strictly rational. But while their authors thus stand in strong opposition to the teachers of the sensualistic psychology, they seem to me to remain, in one curious particular, under the influence of their central mistake. The sensualists (as so often stated), having first declared that the elements of all our spiritual processes must be found in the products of sensation and perception, and having seen that moral distinctions are certainly not directly perceivable by any sense, very naturally conclude that our moral sentiments must be analyzed into some other known elements of thought and feeling, which they, of course, assert to be the empirical ones. Now, the excellent writers whom we are about to mention thoroughly

discard these elements of sensualism, and yet they seem to write under the impression that the moral functions need to be analyzed and to be accounted for by some other faculty than an original moral faculty. Thus, while they approach very near to the simple and correct theory, they still stop somewhat short of it; they treat these moral functions as though somehow they needed to be accounted for by something further.

Of these rationalistic schemes I mention, first, that of Dr. S. Clark, the eminent philosopher and theologian (the contemporary of Newton), and of his follower, Dr. Wollaston. They seem to reduce the moral judgment simply to a judgment of logical truth. They teach that the reason why the wrong action is wrong may be found in the fact that it virtually predicates a logical error in its premise. When the pickpocket, for instance, appropriates another man's watch, his action implies that he regards the watch as his own, whereas in truth it is another man's. When a lie is uttered, the immorality consists simply in this, that the liar professes to hold a proposition for true which is not true. And by a like process wrong action is analyzed into an erroneous predication. Thus all distinction is sought to be abolished between moral error and intellectual error, and virtue is represented as simply correct credence. Whatever plausibility this analysis has appears to arise from these facts, that lying is one large class of sins, as truth-telling is an important virtue, and that preference for and delight in the truth for its own sake is a virtuous disposition of soul. In criticizing Dr. Hutcheson's doctrine I admitted and urged the close affinity between logical truth and morality, and showed that there is no praiseworthy moral motive which does not involve some correct intellection of truth. This is what justifies the expressive language of Holy Writ when it describes the righteous man as one who "doeth truth and acts truth." Thus the analysis of Dr. Wollaston appears to be a recoil from that of Dr. Hutcheson, and presents to us the opposite extreme.

## Arguments against This Extreme.

That it goes too far, I argue thus: First, no rational mind perceives the moral quality in propositions simply because of their logical truth. Multitudes of propositions are strictly true, but not therefore morally beautiful; and the assertion of them is mentally correct; but not therefore virtuous. If the theory criticised were true, it would appear that the multiplication table ought to be regarded as a morally admirable document, and that every person who utters his own correct mental credence is meritorious in doing so, whether he has a moral motive or not. But these assertions no one will venture to make. Next, the account which the theory gives of the wrong element in a thief does not answer at all to the consciousness of the thief at the time. Was it said that the stealing of the watch was wrong because it implied the conviction that it was the property of the pickpocket, and not of another? I answer, that it was not the pickpocket's belief at the time that the watch was his own property. He knew perfectly well that it was not. Such erroneous judgment had no causal relation whatever with his sin, because it had no existence whatever in his mind. The act of appropriating the watch was sinful because prompted by a corrupt subjective motive—namely, unjust cupidity. Now, if we carry our analysis back to this motive, we still fail to find its evilness in any logical error as to the real ownership of the watch; for from the first faint flush of that cupidity in the pickpocket's soul, he had a perfectly correct knowledge as to the fact of ownership. I urge, third, that we cannot find the first element of moral evil in the mind's intellectual credence, because this, when abstracted from attending elements of appetency, is involuntary. Every man's intuition tells him that the moral element must be a voluntary one; responsibility cannot extend further than spontaneity. But when a proposition is once seen in the mind along with demonstrative evidences supporting its affirmation, credence follows involuntarily. Even in instances where the mind is honestly mistaken as to the

validity of evidence, as long as that evidence appears to it valid, it has not the least suspicion that it is mistaken, and therefore does not in that particular choose to remain in error. For it thinks it has the truth, and not error. We do indeed hold that such a mind may be responsible for its erroneous convictions; but we attach this responsibility to some previous voluntary states of soul, which prevented the proper evidence from reaching the understanding effectively, such as enmity to truth, pride, prejudice, or indolence of spirit. Hence, I argue, immorality, which must be spontaneous, is not correctly analyzed into another function of soul which essentially is not spontaneous.

## 2. Correction of the Theory of Kant.

### His Categorical Imperative.

Kant, in his critique of the practical reason, gives an account of morality which is very subtle, and at the same time very elevated and noble. He shows that the judgment of moral obligation is always a "categorical imperative," while all other judgments of relations between actions and ends are but conditional imperatives. If a given end must be attained, then the essential occasion, means or cause must be employed. Such only is the extent of that class of judgments. If it has been determined that a given man must rear corn, then he must employ seed and soil. But it does not appear that every man is obliged to rear corn. So that if a given man is one of the class exempted from the obligation, then he need not employ the seed or soil. But the grand difference of the moral judgment is that it involves no "if." The moral end once seen, the judgment of obligation to pursue it and employ its necessary means is seen unconditionally. It is categorical. The moral end once seen, this absolute judgment of obligation must necessarily arise by virtue of the regulative law of the reason. The evil inclination or will may indeed neglect it, or disobey it, but the reason must still inevitably judge

that wrong has been done in disobeying it. Every such judgment of obligation is therefore an imperative; it not only says this or that is true, but it says "thou shalt" or "thou shalt not." This appears to us to be the same doctrine with that taught by one greater than Kant, Bishop Butler, where he says that if conscience could exert all the authority to which reason entitles her, she would be absolute mistress of the world.

#### The Moral Rule and the Right Will.

Kant, who thus asserts the rational intuitive of the judgment of obligation, of course believes that the rule of morality is permanent and essential. There is an eternal moral law which never changes in its essence, however its applications may be modified by new circumstances, whose binding propriety is seen by the right reason. Morality consists in acting according to this rule, and for the sake of the rule, to the exclusion of all personal, self-interested ends. The virtuous man does the things which the moral rule dictates, simply for the sake of the rule, without any reference to self-interest, or advantage, his own or his fellow-man's. The will which freely elects the rule, and elects it for its own sake, is the good or righteous will. This is high doctrine; the only question is, whether it may not be too high in these respects, that it seems to disparage some good acts done for the sake of one's own legitimate welfare, and out of philanthropic regard to the happiness of our fellows, and also a very noble class of actions prompted by instinctive impulses.

#### Kant Seems to Exclude Duties Done to Self and Those Done Impromptu and with Full Consent.

As to the former class, we cannot but regard the teachings of Bishop Butler as much more just, as they are more moderate. Reason says, that both we ourselves and our neighbors have our legitimate claims to welfare. Hence when we pay regard to such claims, our motives do not cease to be moral. It is this overstraining of the essential law of obliga-

tion which seems to have provoked such philosophers as Lotze to recoil from our simple, rational theory, even at the cost of embracing a qualified Hedonism. As to the second class of virtuous actions which Kant seems to disallow, as morally indifferent, I would remark that he here overlooks too much the essential seat of morality in the right disposition and will. These may have their virtuous *habitus*. Indeed, it is but the conformity of their *habitus* to the moral law which characterizes them as a good will, and as the source of virtuous acts. Suppose now, that in a given case, suddenly presented to the spirit, the affections and will should act under the impulse of this right *habitus*, so promptly as to outrun conscious reason; is the generous act therefore not virtuous, but indifferent? Who can believe this? Here is a faithful mother, who is startled by suddenly seeing her child fall into deep water. Under the impulses of her maternal affection, she has leaped into the water, endangering her own life to save her child's, without taking time to think whether the law of reason and of God required her to do so. As soon as rational thought comes, it justifies her act to her, and pronounces that rational imperative which she has obeyed without waiting to hear it. Shall Kant condemn this as the act of a mere animal *στοργή*? Surely he should not, when the agent is rational, the form of the act virtuous, and the end just what the rational moral law would have dictated. It has also been justly objected to Kant that his system is too austere in this, that he makes the pain of self-sacrifice the invariable condition of moral action. He requires that the motive shall be always impersonal; but as man always instinctively craves his own welfare, he must always be conscious of this pain of self-denial in order to act virtuously. Here Kant almost justifies the popular representation of his austerity: that he seems to think that whenever a man pleases himself in his own action, he must sin. That his view is here overstrained appears by a very practical test. The perfectly holy soul, being absolutely conformed to the moral law, will of course comply with it, with a complete conscious

harmony of affections and desires. This perfect *habitus* of will precludes self-denial. For the action which the moral law requires is precisely the one in which he finds the most complete and spontaneous delight. And this is certainly our highest conception of holy action. But according to the overstrained view, being without inward struggle, it must be without conscious self-denial, and therefore it must be without virtue. Thus the best morality of the universe would be condemned as not moral. Such instances actually exist in the persons of the angels and heavenly saints, of the Messiah and of God himself, the supreme standard of excellence.

Kant's "Maxim" of Action.

But the question remains to be answered, how the moral rule shall be recognized by reason in each case. Kant gives this answer: Let the man, when proposing to himself a certain action, raise with himself this question, how the "maxim" of his intended action would work if allowed under similar circumstances to all his fellow-creatures. If his reason said it would still work well, he may effectuate it. If ill, then the act is forbidden to him. Kant is fond of using the terms of known nomenclatures in his own peculiar senses. By "maxim" he seems here to mean the prevalent subjective motive of the intended act. Let us suppose, for instance, that the question is: May I, a poor man, greatly promote my own comfort by swindling a very rich man, who will suffer no practical inconvenience by the loss of what I get from him? The poor man must ask himself this further question: What will be the result of that maxim and plan of action when equally allowed to every poor man in the land? Obviously the result will be bad. Then the "maxim" of my proposed action is wrong, and the action would be wicked.

This appears to the plain mind but a more cumbersome way of stating the Golden Rule. Kant, with an amusing *naïveté*, intimates that his way of stating the moral rule is better than that of Jesus. But the question arises, On what prin-



ciple does he proceed when he tests the morality of my maxim of action by asking whether it would be allowable to all my fellow-men? Does he apply the criterion of the equitable moral order? Why is it that those actions are righteous which consist with this equitable mutual order? One answer will be (and this we suppose to be Kant's), that the reason has intuitively seen the mutual equitable order to be the one moral and obligatory. Then the final result of the analysis is the one we reach more simply, that the reason apprehends the distinction between right and wrong by its intuitive moral power. Or does Kant decide such an action to be right merely on the ground that it discloses a logical symmetry? Then his scheme after all, is but the rationalistic one.

### 3. Jouffroy's Scheme: Its Analytic Defect.

This seems to be in substance the scheme which Jouffroy presents in more perspicuous detail. His theory is: First, that in the merely animal stage of existence the infant acts from direct uncalculating instinct alone. The rational idea of its own natural good is the consequence, not origin, of the experienced pleasure following from the gratification of instinct. Secondly, thus experience presents the occasion upon which the reason gives the general idea of personal good; and the motives of self-calculation begin to act. But thirdly, the child also observes similar instincts, resulting in its fellow-men in natural enjoyment to them, and as it forms the general idea of its own good (satisfaction of the whole circle of instincts to the greatest attainable degree) as its properest personal end, reason presents the general truths, that a similar personal end exists for this, that, the other, and every fellow-man. Here then arises a still more general idea, the greatest attainable natural good of all beings generally, the "absolute good," or "universal order"; and as soon as this is reached, the reason intuitively pronounces it the moral good. To live for this is now seen to be man's proper end; and rightness in acts is

their rational tendency to this end. This is rather a subtle and ingenious generalization of the result of our moral judgments than a correct account of their origin. The generalization, as made by the opening mind, suggests the notion of symmetry or utility, as belonging to the absolute order. But surely that of moral obligation is an independent element of rational perception. If the idea of rightness and obligation had never connected itself in the opening mind with any specific act having a tendency to man's natural good, how comes the mind to apprehend the universal order as the obligatory moral end, when once the reason forms that abstraction? It seems to me that the element of moral judgment must be presupposed, to account for the result. Again, the proposed process is inconsistent with a correct idea of the generalizing process. This does not transmute, but only colligates, facts which it ranks together. The general attributes which make the connotation of the general term are precisely the attributes which it saw to be common in all these special cases grouped together. So that if a moral order has not already been apprehended by the reason in the specific acts, the mere apprehension of the universal order would not produce the conviction of its morality. Experience would strengthen the moral idea. But usually the most unhackneyed have it in them most vividly. But it is right to say that Jouffroy, notwithstanding this peculiarity of his theory, deserves the admiration of his readers for the beauty of his analysis and the general elevation of his views.

#### 4. Correction of the Theory of Paul Janet.

M. Paul Janet, in his last great work, writes like an enlightened, rational moralist, and gives his pupils, along with sundry over-refinements and perverse subtleties, much precious truth and many acute analyses. Yet he, even at this late day, seems to labor, in one point, under the old hallucination which arose first from the sensualistic psychology, that our general concept of the moral good must be accounted for by

analyzing it into something other than itself. His expedient is to explain it by another concept, that of self-perfection. He teaches that the reason recognizes moral obligation and the moral end, in their last analysis, as the perfection of one's self in the highest and truest sense. This principle will then be applied as a guide for the conscience in the following way: Whatever appetency and action have a prevalent tendency to perfect one's nature are virtuous and obligatory; whatever have the opposite tendency are vicious and forbidden.

#### The Obvious Criticism.

Against this ingenious scheme there lies this obvious objection. Before his rule is applicable, the author must also define which kind of perfection he intends as our ultimate moral end. As soon as he attempts this definition, his reader will find his proposed analysis to be defective and, indeed, futile. There is a sense in which corporeal youth, strength and beauty are perfections of the human person. There is a sense in which all the manual dexterities, those of the rifle-shot, the pianist, the fiddler, the billiard player, the ball-player, the various artisans, are perfections of the human person. There is another sense in which genius and dexterity in the fine arts are a perfection in the human person. Certainly, intellectual vigor is such a perfection. Now, common sense asks: Is it my obligatory moral end to become a dexterous fiddler, or billiard-player, a rapid pin-maker, an accurate landscape-painter, in the same sense in which the improvement of my virtue is my obligatory moral end? The affirmative would be absurd. Again, it is reasonable and proper that different men should cultivate different dexterities. For instance, here is a man to whom Providence clearly allots the honest and praiseworthy occupation of a yeoman farmer. Such being the case, it is eminently proper that he should perfect himself in the use of the plow, the hoe, the axe, the scythe. But it is hardly consistent to require this honest man to perfect his horny fingers in manipulating the keys of a piano, or the milliner's cambric needle

and silk thread, or the artist's pencils, with all the dexterity of these experts. Similar instances may be suggested, to the reader's weariness. But the fundamental moral rule should be universal and invariable, as M. Janet himself teaches. If we are to adopt his formula, then, we must limit it by saying that it is our moral perfection which we are always bound to pursue, along with such other attainments as tend essentially thereto. And the obligatory claim of this latter class of attainments arises solely out of their relation to the supreme moral end as essential means thereto. But then we have thus defined the perfection which we are always bound to seek as our moral perfection only. We have introduced the moral concept which we were attempting to analyze away. We immediately provoke the just question: What is our moral perfection? Wherein does it differ from other species of perfection? Thus the attempted species of analysis has moved in a futile circle and returned upon itself. The concept of virtue is still unresolved into anything else.

**Summary—The Object of Our Historical Review.**

The labors of the student in studying the various theories of morals which have now been passed in review have not been superfluous, though many of these theories have now no avowed followers. He has been acquiring familiarity with moral reasonings, and training his own powers of thought. He has been acquiring a broader knowledge of moral problems, by viewing them from many sides and in various lights. But all along I have been aiming at another and a capital end. I have been pursuing the inductive process of exclusion; I have been shutting up the student towards the true theory of morals by shutting him out from the various defective theories which have been proposed.

**The True Theory of Morals Generally Adopted.**

One more theory remains; and notwithstanding the many perversities of speculation which we have reviewed, and notwithstanding the reputation of their advocates, I assert that

this remaining theory is the one which has always been dominant in sound philosophy—the theory of Aristotle in his *Nicomachian ethics*; of all the better scholastics, as of Anselm, of Turretin, of Des Cartes, of Leibnitz and Kant, of Bishop Butler, of Reid, Stewart and Hamilton, of A. Alexander, of McGuffey and Thornwell.

I would assist your mental grasp of this theory in its simplicity by pressing that plain question to which the influence of the school of Locke so strongly blinded the eyes of his followers: Why suppose that the moral concept must be analyzed into anything other than itself? No student of any science attempts the analysis of that which is elemental; the plainest common sense tells us that such attempts must be futile. Has the chemist gotten hold of a mass of chloride of gold? This is a compound, and hence he can separate the chlorine gas and the metallic gold. But the gold can be analyzed into nothing simpler. The final end of that train of investigation is reached. Gold is gold and nothing else. It only remains that we learn its properties. This useful illustration leads us further. How does a chemist ascertain which are the simple substances? By the failure of his repeated attempts to analyze them. He has tried all his appliances of science to reduce this gold to simpler parts—his reagents, his furnace heat, his electricity—but without effect. The gold remains simply gold. Hence he concludes that it is an elemental substance. It can combine with other substances to form compounds; it is itself the result of no modifications. Such I assert to be the case with our moral concepts. The business of the next chapter will be to establish the originality and intuitive source of our moral judgments.

## CHAPTER VI.

## THE RATIONAL THEORY OF MORALS.

## I. Moral Functions.

## The Correct Method of Discussion.

What is the true account of our moral processes? should be a psychological question; and, like all such, it should be settled by the impartial testimony of our consciousness. That we are conscious of many moral processes of thought and feeling is admitted by all. In every other case, when we find in consciousness a class of operations of the spirit which cannot be accounted for as modifications or combinations of other known processes, we always assign them to their own faculty. We conclude that the spirit must be endowed with such a faculty, distinct from the other faculties and equally original and essential with them. Otherwise this class of products would never have appeared in the mind. We have, for instance, many visual perceptions; these cannot be accounted for as modifications of those derived from the other senses. The soul, then, must have a distinct visive faculty. Again, we have pleasures of taste arising upon the contemplation of literary beauty which cannot be accounted for as mere associations nor confounded with organic animal pleasures. The spirit then must have a supersensuous sensibility to mental beauty, that, namely, called by modern psychology the æsthetic. Once more, we find in our mind judgments of logical dependence, which pronounce that such a premise or pair of premises authorizes such a conclusion. These judgments are not cases of mere association, or recollection, or imagination, or accidental sequence, or products of any other faculty. Accordingly we recognize in the mind a logical faculty, the understanding,

the faculty of reasonings, which we are certain is a distinct faculty from the others. Let us follow this safe method in our inquiry concerning the moral processes. The attempt has been made, as we have seen, to account for their presence in consciousness by referring them to one or another of the known faculties or sensibilities. All these attempts have failed. Then the soul must have its moral faculty. Did not such a faculty produce these modifications of mind, they would not appear in consciousness at all, any more than in the consciousness of a brute.

**Their Elements a Rational Judgment and a Consequent Feeling.**

When we ask ourselves, What is the uniform nature of these moral functions? we perceive that they always involve a judgment of the intelligence, which judgment is usually imbued with a peculiar feeling. In our criticisms of H. Lotze and Dr. Thomas Brown we proved that the order of production of these two elements was this: the judgment precedes, and the feeling is its consequence. In our criticism of Dr. Hutcheson we showed that this judgment is always a judgment of relation, and is therefore to be assigned to the reason. The peculiar feeling which imbues a moral judgment is not the same with the product of any animal sensibility, nor of any other spiritual sensibility, such as the æsthetic sensibility or the sensibility to applause or self-love; it is always impersonal and disinterested. It must then be referred to its own peculiar rational source. It has been well remarked that this moral feeling has been somewhat unlucky in the name which it has received in our English speech. We call it approbation and its counterpart disapprobation. The etymology of the term (*ad probare*) suggests an almost judicial calmness. But we know that the feeling is often warm, and sometimes vehement. Nor does our language wholly lack terms to express this warmth. We speak of our pleasure in beholding a virtuous act as our gratification, and even our delight. The counterpart feeling provoked by the evil act we sometimes call

indignation, and even abhorrence. If the student will recall the truths established in Chapter I. of Book I., concerning the manifold gradations in the warmth of our feelings, from the calmest temperature up to the heats of vehement emotion, he will be ready to accept the account here given of the moral feeling. We may say of it as of the others, in its coolest moods it is true feeling superadded to mere intellectual judgment. In the more impressive cases of moral action it may glow with vivid warmth.

**Our Simple Moral Judgments Are Intuitive—i. e., Immediate,  
Universal, Necessary.**

It is, perhaps, more important to assert that the judgment of the reason, which distinguishes the right from the wrong, is, in simple and elemental cases, intuitive. The best proof of this is an appeal to consciousness. We know that in these cases of moral action the rise of the judgment is conditioned on no premises. It is true there must be an intelligent apprehension of the relation between agent and object. But when this is seen, the mind pronounces its verdict immediately. For instance: Does A hold to B the relation of a generous benefactor to his beneficiary? If he does, then the mind knows intuitively that B's injurious act against A is evil, involving the sin of ingratitude. Here I cite again the assertions made in the third chapter of this book, that there are some such judgments concerning the simpler cases of moral action which are universally found in all human beings whose minds have rational developments, of all ages, religions and races, and that the judgment of obligation is in these cases necessary. Thus we prove by the three tests of primitive intuitions of the reason which are recognized by all sound psychologists—primariness, universality, necessity—that our simple moral judgments are intuitive.

**Others Are Deduced from Premises—Important Corollaries.**

Here it is all-important to add another statement which completes the exact analogy between our moral judgments



and those merely rational: that as there are in reasoning a few primitive judgments whose truth is ever seen without any premises, and numerous deduced judgments whose truth is only seen by the application of these original premises, so in morals men have some immediate and intuitive judgments of moral *principia* (those, namely, which arise upon simple and elemental cases), and a multitude of inferential moral judgments whose truth can only be seen by the help of premises. This analogy is invaluable. Both consciousness and experience prove its reality. Hence it follows that a mind may have full power of intuitive moral judgments and yet be unable to decide upon the morality of many actions, because it is not informed of the premises from which their moral quality is to be deduced. How obvious is this. Such cases are parallel to what happens in the exact sciences. Here is a youth whose reason has intuitively accepted the truth of all the geometric axioms. Some of these are applied as premises to prove the deduced truth, that the angles at the base of an isosceles triangle must be equal. But the youth has not been taught what the word "isosceles" means. Consequently he does not grasp the logic. Is he, therefore, idiotic? Shall we say, Here is a mind which lacks the apprehension of axiomatic truth? Define the concept of an isosceles triangle to him; then, if he chooses to attend, he grasps the deductive logic. This just view at once dissolves numerous objections to our doctrine grounded in the asserted facts, that many moral judgments which are clear to us are unknown to, or rejected by, other men and races. They wish us to infer, hence, that there are no uniform and universal moral judgments, and that all such as men make are derived; in other words, that there are no moral intuitions.

**Dr. Paley's Test Frivolous.**

I assert that in all these cases of discrepancy the dissenting minds are either swayed by prejudice and passion or lack the knowledge of the necessary premises. At this point of

view the test of the question in debate proposed by Dr. Paley is seen to be exceedingly frivolous. He refers to the description of a wild savage who had grown up in the woods of Hanover among the brutes, and he supposes an odious case of filial ingratitude and parricide to be narrated to him from the history of the Roman triumvirate. Dr. Paley asks with triumph: Would this savage apprehend the wickedness of the son's action? Of course not.

There is no need to resort to the explanation of Dr. A. Alexander, that the complexity of the problem and the nice competition between parental duty as a son and his duty as a citizen would embarrass the judgments of the wild man. The better reply to Dr. Paley is, that the moral problem was in no proper sense brought before the mind of the savage. He was ignorant of the whole relation between parents and children. He did not even know the meaning of the words which expressed it. The description of the case was to him utterly meaningless. The savage cannot judge the case, because his mind has not seen it. The proposed test is as unfair as though Dr. Paley should charge that a certain child was blind, because he did not pronounce upon the shape of a body which had never been shown to him.

The all-important distinction has been pointed out above between the mind's apprehension of moral *principia*, where it intuitively and immediately perceives the moral principle involved in a case simple and elemental, and its inferential moral conclusions, for deducing which premises are necessary. The instructive analogy was also pointed out between these laws of moral judgment and the parallel laws of intellectual judgment, the intuitive and the inferential.

#### The Moral Judgment Always a Judgment of Obligation.

Let me conclude this discussion by recalling to the student this fundamental truth: That every moral judgment contains an intuitive recognition of obligation. This, indeed, is the all-important, the grand distinction between moral judgments

and judgments merely logical. These affirm "this or that is true"; those affirm to the hearer in addition "thou oughtest." For example, let me announce to this class the logical truth, that in arithmetic an increased divisor must give a decreased quotient, the dividend remaining the same. Do you see it to be true? Yes. What then? Nothing, unless some arithmetic or algebraic task is incumbent on you.

I now announce this proposition: Your former generous benefactor lies in yonder jail, unknown, destitute, sick, and falsely accused. I establish the fact to your credence. What then? Your conscience says: "I ought to go and succor him." Here at once emerges obligatory action, self-evidently, immediately; you inevitably sin if you voluntarily neglect it. This judgment of obligation is an essential part of the moral judgment. To the question, why the action judged moral is obligatory on me, no answer is needed, and none can be given, except that the action is moral and relates to me. In the noble words of Bishop Butler, "Were this judgment of obligation in the conscience as influential over men's actions as they know it is rationally entitled to be, it would be the empress of the world."

## 2. Illustration of the Nature of Inferential Moral Judgments.

### One Premise May Be Non-Moral.

This prepares us for another statement equally important. Of the two premises of an inferential moral judgment, one may be a moral principle and the other a non-moral proposition. That is to say, the latter may be any kind of truth which has been proved to the mind, a fact of sense-perception, or a truth of physical science or practical life. I will exemplify this in two instances. The moralists of the Middle Ages, misunderstanding Moses, taught that if the lender exacted any hire for money lent, under the name of usury or interest, he committed the sin of extortion. Modern moralists

all teach the opposite, holding that reasonable interest is as justly required as a reasonable hire for any work or instrument of work. Now this contradiction of conclusions is at once accounted for, by the fact that the two sets of moralists have adopted opposite opinions upon a question merely economic: whether money is or is not operative in the production or creation of new values. The scholastics denied; the moderns affirmed. The argument of the former was that observation shows us that coins (the species of money then used) are as barren as the gravel of the Sahara. Plant your seed corn in a box of coins, and all the watering and tillage in the world will never produce a single new grain. But the moderns reply, this observation is merely superficial. Of course money does not reproduce values, as a box of fragments of stamped metal; but money is the exchangeable form of capital, and capital is a true and powerful agent in the creation of new values. The question here is not moral, but economic. But into each of the moral inferences made by the two parties, the opposite answers enter as minor premises. On the major premise the parties are agreed. It is this: He who takes from his fellow-creature something for nothing extorts. The scholastic's minor premise was: Money lent yields nothing in the way of creation of new values. Their conclusion was: Therefore he who takes hire as interest for money lent extorts. The syllogism of the moderns would be: (Major premise) Grant that he who takes from his fellow something for nothing extorts. (Minor premise) But money lent does not yield nothing in the way of creation of new values. (On the contrary, money lent is capital, which is a powerful co-agent along with the borrower's industry, in creating new values.) Inference: Hence he who takes hire or interest for money lent does not extort. This instructive example, when stated in logical form, shows us that, though the major premise be the same, a difference in the minor premise, which may not be a moral proposition at all, will unavoidably lead the two parties to two differing moral conclusions. We thus find that moral

judgments may combine with other judgments not moral, but true, in the same process of inference. This fact confirms the assertion, that our moral judgments are as really rational functions as our logical. We see also that the premise which is not moral, yet true, has as much influence in controlling the moral conclusion as the moral premise itself.

Another instance is presented by the opponents of drunkenness; the extreme advocates of total abstinence from wine argue this as a universal duty (except in sickness), and assert that the swallowing of any alcohol is sinful, except as medicine. More moderate persons teach that it is only the excess in the use of alcoholic drinks which is sinful. The two parties argue from the same major premise, and reach their opposite results by adopting opposite opinions on a physiological point. Both agree that to poison one's self is a breach of the Sixth Commandment; that, if the poisoning is fatal, the sin is that of suicide; but if the poison only injures without destroying life, the sin is of a less enormous grade. The one party asserts that the alcoholic fluid is never assimilated, and never acts as nutriment to any human tissue, but produces only toxic effects. The other party says: Nay, this fluid is not only a healthful stimulant in many cases to the nerves and capillary blood-vessels, but is assimilated in moderate quantities, and becomes actual nutriment, especially to the nerve-tissues. Now, this is purely a pathological question, not a moral one. But the opinion adopted on the one side or the other combines as a minor premise with the moral judgment that all grades of suicide are sinful, and leads to contradictory moral conclusions. This explains a multitude of cases in which our opponents deem that the differences of the moral judgments are irreconcilable with our assertion of a universal moral intuition. The differences exist to almost infinite degree. They prove nothing against our doctrine, because the diverse opinions and grades of knowledge of men, concerning propositions which are not moral, account for all these results. Concede to mankind, as we claim for them, a universal moral

intuition. Yet we should not expect universal agreement among them in all their moral inferences of the deductive order, unless they were omniscient and infallible in every practical point of human knowledge.

### 3. Further Examinations of Objections Based on the Contradictions of the Moral Judgments of Men.

#### The Very Instances Objected Prove the Presence of the Intuitions and Their Originality.

Now, then, we have reached the proper point of view for examining a famous class of cavils against the true doctrine. These are urged with much confidence and with many arrogant taunts against us, by such writers as Hume and Paley and the host of sensualists and utilitarians. They urge that where men have intuitive judgments, these, being necessary, will be found harmonious among all. But men's moral judgments are found in fact endlessly diverse and contradictory. They are completely modified by religions, by race, by grades of civilization, and even by geographical divisions. The Christian nations now regard several actions as atrocities which the ancients and the modern Indians regard as heroic virtues. Public opinion virtually makes the conscience of most people. Many Hindoo mothers religiously believe it to be their duty to drown their female infants in the holy Ganges. The Christian English woman believes it to be her sacred duty to preserve all her infants at every cost. Say our opponents, that it is so far from being true that men have uniform principles of moral judgments, the people on opposite sides of a narrow river have been found honestly holding contradictory views of duty. Thus the German Palatinate, a Presbyterian province, was separated from France, a popish country, by the river Rhine. On the east side it was regarded as a monstrous cruelty to punish a man for Protestant opinions. On the west side it was regarded as religious and meritorious. Now it is simply ridiculous, they say, to claim, amidst such contradic-

tions, that there is any uniform principle of morals. If the student has understood my analysis of these differences, he will see that this objection is as weak as it is arrogant. For, in the first place, there is always much less difference between men's moral judgments than between their actions. When men are encouraged by erroneous public opinion, they allow themselves to do many things of whose rectitude they are not convinced, and many other things which they very well know to be wrong. Second, I have shown that uniformity of moral judgment is to be expected only in the primary and elemental cases of action, while in the inferential cases ignorance and mistakes concerning other truths are ever liable to cause differences and error. I now assert that there are moral questions upon which all men are agreed, and upon which every human conscience speaks alike, as soon as their terms are comprehended. Among all races, civilized and savage, cowardice is considered disgraceful. Treachery towards friends is seen to be wicked. Filial obligations of children to their parents are recognized as binding. Evil appetencies, evil customs, superstition, self-indulgence, an evil example, may have concurred to mislead the moral judgment; yet in the fundamental rudiments it has ever remained steadfast. I show, in the third place, that even the strongest contradictions in the moral conclusions of different nations have proceeded from the same moral principles. No more violent case can be presented than the contrast between the Hindoo and the Christian mother. Yet both are acting upon the same moral major premise, that a parent ought to pursue the best welfare of her child at the cost of her own pleasures and inclinations. This is the principle which instructs the conscience of the Christian mother to preserve and nourish her infant at every cost. But now let us suppose that this conscientious mother had been taught to believe these dogmas in addition: that a female child is naturally more corrupt and degraded than a male; that her sole chance for a blessed immortal destiny depends on her marriage to a husband who is the heir of such a destiny (a

privilege which the mother knows to be of very doubtful attainment); and that every human being, male or female, who dies in the holy Ganges makes sure of a happy hereafter. This is precisely what the Hindoo mother has been taught to believe. If the Christian mother believed all this with equal certainty, would she not feel morally bound to make sure of the inheritance of glory for her beloved babe? Most probably we should find her nerving herself to the sacrifice as a moral duty, though with the same tender grief and reluctance which many Hindoo mothers manifest when they make it. I assert therefore that the kind of discrepancies which we observe in men's moral judgments, instead of refuting our theory, are in strict accordance with it, and are best explained by it.

**Paley's Next Objection Fatal to Himself.**

Dr. Paley also objects against the originality of our moral intuitions, that no author has succeeded in analyzing our moral judgments into any simpler type. But he thinks that were they original, such a common type or single element ought to be found, into which they all may be analyzed. The objection is singularly inept. The history of these failures of analysis should have taught him just the opposite conclusion. They are the best possible evidences that our moral judgments are incapable of such analysis, because they are original and intuitive. Thus speaks common sense. All the chemists who surmised that gold was an alloy or composition of other substances, and who attempted to analyze it into lead or brass and a "powder of projection" have failed. What do we conclude thence? That gold is simply gold, and nothing else; no alloy, no combination, but an ultimate and simple metallic substance. Analysis has come to its final end with this conclusion. It is strange that Dr. Paley did not bethink himself that by the same notable argument he could also prove that every, the most ultimate and simple, function of the human spirit is not simple. Let us apply it to our concept of truth. What is truth in propositions? Into what simpler concepts can it be



analyzed? Into none. We can say no more but that truth is truth. Therefore, according to Dr. Paley, truth is not a simple concept of the human intelligence, and the intuitive power of apprehending it is not an original power of the reason. But everybody argues the opposite. Our conception of truth is ultimate and simple, and the mind's power of apprehending it is original, because the concept can be analyzed into nothing simpler. The same doctrine is true concerning our moral faculty and its products, moral judgments. If one insists on asking, then, why a right action is right and obligatory, I retort the question: Why is a true proposition true? When he answers my question, I will answer his.

**Conscience an Innate Power of Judging, Not a Previous Rule in  
Consciousness.**

It has also been objected, that, if our doctrine were true, we ought to be able to point to some moral rule innate in the mind and preëxisting in our rational consciousness, by the application of which we should find ourselves determining the moral character of each proposed action. As the clothier knows whether his clothes are of honest or dishonest measure by applying his yardstick, so we ought to know whether any action is right or wrong by applying our moral rule. But we are conscious of having no such rule. I reply, that this is correct. But neither is it necessary that we should have such a rule innate in the mind. It is not by that species of means that any of our mental discriminations are made. I begin with the lowest case. A child's palate distinguishes the sweets from the acids. Is it necessary for this that he should carry in his mouth an assortment of samples to compare with the newly tasted morsel? This is ridiculous. The gustatory nerves are endued with their native power of perception. This power is latent; that is to say, it attracts no attention from consciousness until the savor of some morsel applied to them provokes their verdict. So in the sphere of the reason, man's primary intuitions are regulative of all his judgments.

They are not written in the mind as a set of conscious logical rules, but the power of apprehending intuitive truth is innate in the reason. When the suitable rational problem is presented, the action of that rational power is evoked upon the specific case. The power proves regulative of all the lower faculties of cognition, not because it carries in the consciousness a prearranged bundle of rules, but because it is an essential power with which the Creator has permanently endowed each and every mind when He makes it in His own image and likeness. It is the same with the moral faculty of the soul. The consciousness carries no bundle of innate moral rules, but the soul is endowed by its Maker with the innate power of moral judgments, which acts consistently, where it is not disturbed, upon each moral question as it arises.

#### 4. Involution of the Intuitions of Good and of Obligation.

##### Analogy between the *Æsthetic* and Moral Sentiments.

They are equally unfair who require us, upon our theory, to furnish some reason why an action which is judged to be morally right is also obligatory. Does one ask why I am morally obliged to do what is right? Simply because it is right. There is no other answer, and this is but saying that the rational apprehension of obligation is not a deduced conclusion, but is as intuitive as any judgment concerning what is right. Yea, the judgment of obligation is not only invariably combined with the intuition of right, but is the most universal and categorical part thereof. It is the supreme law of the reason that every action which the mind sees to be right it also sees to be obligatory. There is, indeed, a limitation which must be observed upon this last proposition, but which does not mar its integrity within its proper scope. The word "right" may bear two senses in our moral predications. In its wider sense it is an adjective, and describes everything which is morally righteous and approvable. But when I

speaking of "my right," it is a noun, and bears the stricter sense of some thing or action, to the enjoyment of which I have a positive moral title. Thus God's mercy to sinners in redemption is right; His action therein is not only allowable, but morally approvable. Yet the sinner has not a right to redemption. Here, then, is an action which is right for God to take, but which is not obligatory upon God in the sense of our having a right to require it of Him. This illustrious specimen shows us that there is a class of actions to the performance of which the object has not a moral right, and yet their performance by the agent is moral and approvable. Yea, such an act may involve a higher, more refined and magnanimous virtue by reason of the very fact that it is not obligatory in the sense described. One reason why we applaud the mercy of God in redemption as so splendid an exhibition is, that it was a mercy to which sinners had no moral claim. Is there, then, a class of actions which are of good moral quality, the performance of which is yet optional with the agent? Has he discretionary freedom to do or omit those actions as he pleases, without any blameworthiness and with entire rectitude? If we grant the affirmative, have we not allowed a class of actions which are moral, but not obligatory, thus contradicting our previous assertion, that the judgment of obligation is necessary and universal? The answer is, that there is but one moral agent in the universe of whom this admission can be true in any sense, who is God. His infinitude, self-existence and supremacy make Him an exception to a certain extent; He is not bound in the same universal sense in which His rational creatures are bound, because He is the Supreme. But we may say even of Him (who is certainly not bound to any law-giver other than Himself), that He is bound to His own complete moral perfections and to His own highest glory, which is His own ultimate end, to elect not only all such actions as He has given His moral creatures a right to expect of Him, but also such optional acts of holiness and beneficence as may yet more splendidly illustrate His character and bless His creation. As

to us creatures, there may be moral actions to which the human objects thereof have forfeited their righteous claim, as when the insults and wrongs of a beneficiary towards his benefactor render him personally unworthy of further favors. Yet this benefactor may still be bound to his God, though not to the ungrateful object, to continue his long-suffering. For the rule of obligation which binds us all to our Heavenly Master is, that we love and serve Him with all our heart and soul and possible strength. If, then, the benefactor's continued mercy towards this ill-deserving object is promotive of God's honor and agreeable to His will, this creature is under obligation to continue the same virtuous actions, not to their human object, but to his God.

Having cleared up this embarrassing and litigated point, I return to the assertion, that the judgment of obligation is a primary and intuitive part of every moral judgment. When my reason sees that a thing is the right thing for me to do, it also sees as a self-evident truth that I am bound to do it. So that if my will rejects or neglects the doing, I am therein inevitably guilty. Here is the grand peculiarity of these rational judgments of duty, distinguishing them from all our other rational judgments of mere truth, that they are essentially not only apprehensions of truth, but commandments. Let the student reflect upon this fact and run out this contrast between the ethical and the merely logical judgments in numerous instances of his own selection. He will find this immediate intuitive command their uniform and essential peculiarity. Well did Kant term it "the categorical imperative." In this we find both the supreme law of the moral reason and the practical law of conduct. Here, then, our analysis must stop, until we advance from psychology to the higher inquiries of natural theology.

**The Æsthetic and the Ethical Alike a Judgment Plus a Sentiment.**

Dr. A. Alexander, with other good writers, finds an instructive analogy between our moral sentiments and the higher

æsthetic or sentiments of rational taste. The latter are grounded, first (in the order of thought), in an intellectual apprehension of order and harmony, or the propriety in the parts of the beautiful object; and then this judgment is imbued with the warmth and pleasure of a peculiar rational sensibility. As the solar ray carries heat in its light, so the judgment of taste carries pleasure in its intellectual apprehension. The case is parallel with the moral sentiments. First in the order of thought is the rational judgment of rightness; but this is immediately imbued with the rational sensibility of pleasurable approval or moral delight. Again, we have the caloric of feeling conveyed in the light of intelligence. But again the feeling is peculiar; it is self-evidently as distinguishable from the pleasure of taste as, in the lower sphere of sensation, the pleasure given by beautiful colors, through the eye, is distinct from the pleasure of sweet odors in the nostrils. But the all-important distinction between the two functions, the æsthetic and the moral, is that the latter alone includes its judgment of obligation, its imperative.

##### 5. Conscience, and Obedience Due It.

What, then, is conscience? I answer, it is simply the moral reason. Its etymology (from *conscientia*, *con-scire*, cf. Greek *συνείδησις*) imports that conscience is not only a subjective function, but one reflected back upon the mind's own moral principles and actions. Some moralists seem to have felt the constraint of this etymology so much that they think it necessary to set up in the soul a separate faculty for these moral self-judgments, as though a man must have one faculty by which to estimate his own virtues and vices, and another faculty for estimating other people's virtues and vices, though both pairs are generically identical. It is true that when the moral reason acts upon our own conduct reflexively, the sentiments it produces in the soul are peculiarly impressive. This, I suppose, is the circumstance which has caused the application of this subjective term, "conscience," to describe the

moral faculty. It is only as we have judged ourselves impartially that we are qualified to judge others. Is it supposed that the greater vividness of self-approbation and remorse, as awakened by the inspection of our own conduct, justifies our referring them to a different faculty from that which judges and is pleased or displeased by the conduct of others? I reply, by no means. Our nearness to ourselves, our legitimate self-interest in our own conduct and destiny, our peculiar responsibility for our own conduct, not to say our sinful selfishness, are abundantly sufficient to account for the keener pleasures of self-approbation and the keener anguish of remorse. For it is inevitable that these active principles will combine with our moral sentiments concerning our own conduct, as they cannot combine with our moral sentiments concerning others. The explanation is too clear to need more words.

**May One Sin When Obeying His Own Conscience? The Paradox.**

From the doctrine of the universal and necessary imperative of conscience arises another question, which has often been supposed to contain a hard paradox. Thus, if my judgment of obligation is intuitive and universal, it would seem that I am bound to do whatever my own conscience dictates, and that if ever I fail in this, I sin. On the other hand, if my conscience is fallible or partially uninformed, it may possibly command me to do a thing which is wrong. Now, since the distinction between right and wrong is essential and unchangeable, my erroneously thinking a wrong action to be the right cannot have changed its moral nature. He who would assert this would be consistently led on to the denial of every distinction between right and wrong, since there is probably not a single crime, of any class, which some man's conscience has not sincerely, though erroneously, justified to himself. Hence, it is demonstrable that the man who has done a wrong act, under the mistaken judgment of his own conscience, must also have sinned. Now, then, if conscience is supreme, and yet also fallible, this paradoxical consequence results: that

in the case of a sincerely mistaken conscience, the man must sin if he disobeys it, and must also sin if he obeys it. He is placed in a desperate quandary. This paradox has constrained many moralists to deny the second proposition. They say the only solution is, that the man does not sin when he does an act essentially wrong under the sincere dictate of a mistaken conscience. This is the same as saying that men are not responsible for the correctness of their opinions on moral subjects, but only for their sincere adoption at the time. This perilous doctrine we shall test and reject at the proper place. My purpose now is to show that we are under no necessity to resort to it. The proper solution of the paradox is this: The conscience, as I have shown, is intuitively certain of its judgment only in the primary cases where it apprehends the moral *principia*. In such cases only are we perfectly sure that it goes right, because in them it is the regulative faculty which the Maker himself has imparted to us to direct our moral judgments. But in all cases of deduced moral inference some second premise may combine, which may not be a moral truth, to lead the mind to an immoral conclusion. Whence it follows, that we cannot expect the conscience to be infallible in all its moral inferences unless the mind were omniscient. Again, not only may ignorance mislead the deduced moral judgments, to which every finite creature is more or less subject, but his pride, selfishness, evil appetencies, spiritual laziness and cowardice are liable to blind the moral judgment, both in its primary and its secondary action. "A deceived heart turneth them aside." "They are hardened through the deceitfulness of sin."

#### The Solution.

Hence follows another truth, that no rational man can ever be led into the sincere adoption of the judgment that an action really sinful is virtuous, with entire innocency. Somewhere in the mental and emotional processes bringing him to that unfortunate conclusion, he has done some sin, either of

omission or of commission; he has spontaneously abused some faculty or feeling of his own soul. The proof is this: that a holy God gave him his constitutive powers of moral intuition, making them his rational and imperative guide in action, and that one of the obligations which has been made intuitively clear to him is the obligation of never venturing to act until he was certain he was right. The degree of guilt attaching to that abuse of his own principles of moral judgments, out of which his error of conscience has arisen, may be very various in different cases. In some the guilt may be comparatively slight. But the error which puts darkness for light and light for darkness, in the moral sphere, can never have been wholly innocent. This, then, is the link in the history of the case to which the sin and guilt attach, when a man obeys his own conscience, and yet does a thing intrinsically wrong. The sin is not in that he obeyed his conscience. Could that link in this moral chain be wholly abstracted from its moral antecedents, it would be in itself perfectly right. But the man was wrong at that previous link of the process where he allowed or assisted his reason to go astray.

#### Two Inferences.

If we recur again to the instance of the pagan mother committing infanticide, and admit the fact that her conscience instructed her at the time to drown her infant, we blame her not in that she obeyed her conscience, but in that she had allowed her conscience to be led into this dreadful error. Does any one exclaim, Poor woman! It was simply impossible for her intellect to escape the conclusions of this current theology of her race, dreadful though they be, seeing they were enforced on her mind by every influence of prescription, education, habit, public opinion, and a total ignorance of that better theology, a foreign one to her, which would have corrected her errors, had she learned it. I reply, No; though the influences of her national religion were very formidable, and produced a strong likelihood that she would be misled by them, it



was not impossible for her to have listened to the better thoughts which conscience and native affection doubtless suggested at times, as a protest in her own mind. Had she listened to them, while her moral protest would not have taught her the facts of that foreign religion, Christianity, it should at least have brought her judgment to a stand. It should have at least made her refuse the unnatural sacrifice on the ground of this sufficient moral intuition, that no one is bound to act until he is certain his action will be right. Some sinful spontaneous feelings were unquestionably at work in her soul, obscuring and smothering this righteous protest of her own nature; at the least, mental indolence and moral cowardice. This is the point to which her guilt attaches itself. It may have been very small in comparison with the guilt of conscious murder, but to that extent this mother was not blameless. From this analysis I draw two valuable inferences. It teaches us the accuracy of that rule which, while it appraises a sin of ignorance at a much lighter rate than a sin committed against knowledge, does not represent the error of ignorance as entirely blameless, unless the ignorance is inevitable. The superficial judgment of the many upon the two cases would probably be this, that the servant who sinned against knowledge was worthy to be beaten with many stripes, but that the servant who sinned in ignorance did not deserve to be beaten at all. We have seen on what grounds the latter half of the verdict is to be rejected. The divine Teacher, led by His infallible insight, has given us the matured result of the philosophical investigation. The other inference is that man as a responsible agent has an imperative need of an infallible rule of conduct. Since all men are fallible, such a rule can only come from supernatural revelation. I have claimed that the human reason has an original and an intuitive power of judging with certainty some moral relations. But the power acts with universal certainty only in those simple cases which contain the elemental *principia* of right and wrong (and even then only when undisturbed by evil concupiscence). These

cases are the few. In all the mixed cases of moral deduction, second premises must enter, which may come from any department of human knowledge. Hence it follows rigorously that the moral judgment cannot be expected to act with certainty in every case, unless the mind is omniscient and infallible as to all these departments of knowledge. There is no such human mind. Hence, if the soul is ever to attain to complete virtue, it must be guided to it by a superhuman standard or code of moral precepts. This follows without taking into account the other fact, that every human soul is swayed more or less by evil concupiscence. We conclude, then, that while the judgments of conscience are authoritative, the natural conscience is never man's sufficient guide to virtue. Let human experience attest this reasoning.

#### 6. God's Will and the Right.

Is God's will the sole rule of right? Some have seemed to find this question very intricate, if we may judge by their differences. Let us discriminate clearly then, that by God's will here we mean His volition in the specific sense, and not will in the comprehensive sense of the whole conative powers. The question is perspicuously stated in this form: Are the precepts right solely because God commands; or does He command because they are in themselves right? The latter is the true answer. Let it be understood again, that God's precepts are, for us, an actual, a perfect and a supreme rule of right. No Christian disputes this. For God's moral title as our Maker, Owner and Redeemer, with the perfect holiness of His nature, makes it unquestionable that our rectitude is always in being and doing just what He requires. Let it be understood again, that in denying that God's volition to command is the mere and sole first source of right, we do not dream of any superior personal will earlier than God's and more authoritative than His, instructing and compelling Him to command aright. Of course, we repeat, no one holds this. God is the first, being the eternal authority, and is absolutely supreme.

Does any one ask: Where, then, did this moral distinction inhere and abide, before God had given any expression to it, in time, in any legislative acts? The answer is: In the eternal principles of His moral essence, which, like His natural, is self-existent and eternally necessary.

Having cleared the ground, I support my answer thus: First, God has an eternal and inalienable moral claim over His moral creatures, not arising out of any legislative act of His, but immediately out of the relation of creature to Creator, and possession to its absolute owner. For instance, elect angels owed love and honor to God before He entered into any covenant of works with them. This right is as unavoidable and indestructible as the very relation of Creator and rational creature. This moral dependence is as natural as the dependence of their being. It is indisputable that there is here a moral title more original than any perceptive act of God's will. Second, we cannot but think that these axioms of ethical principle are as true of God's rectitude as of man's: (a) that God's moral volitions are not unmotivated, but have their (subjective) motives; (b) that the morality of the volitions is the morality of their intentions. We must meet the question then as to God, just as to any rational agent, What is the regulative cause of those right volitions? There is no other answer but this: God's eternally holy dispositions, His necessary moral perfections. Now then, if a given precept of God is right, His act of will in legislating it must be right, and must have its moral quality. If this act of divine will is such, it must be because its subjective motives have right moral quality. thus, we are, perforce, led to recognize moral qualities in something logically prior to the preceptive will of God—viz., in His own moral perfections. Third, otherwise this result must follow, which is an outrage to the practical reason: that God's preceptive will might conceivably have been the reverse of what it is; and then the vilest things would have been right and holiest things vile. Fourth, there would be no ground for the distinction between the perpetual

moral and temporary positive command; all would be merely positive. But again, the practical reason cannot but see a difference between the prohibition of lying and the prohibition of eating bacon! Fifth, no argument could be constructed for the necessity of satisfaction for guilt in order to righteous pardon; so that (as will be seen) our theory of redemption would be reduced to the level of Socinian error. And last, God's sovereignty would not be moral—His might would make it right.

## CHAPTER VII.

## THE EXTENT OF MORAL OBLIGATION.

## I. Statement of the Scotist's Position.

## The Refutation of; An Appeal to Consciousness.

Two questions arise here which are of profound importance and also much litigated. One is, whether obligation and responsibility extend only to acts of will, or also to the dispositions and desires which regulate such acts. The other is, whether responsibility attaches to erroneous mental convictions upon moral questions where such opinion is sincerely held. The two questions are nearly related, and so are the several answers given by the competing parties in the history of morals. The one class of writers may be indicated with sufficient correctness by the term Scotists (followers of the early scholastic, Duns Scotus), whom we saw advocating the theory of equilibrium and self-determination for the particular faculty of volitions.

The Scotist Argument, That Only the Voluntary Can Be the Responsible.

These hold that obligation and responsibility attach only to acts of the will, and not to any dispositions or desires which precede choice. The student who remembers the Scotist's argument will see that this answer is perfectly natural for him with his peculiar definition of free-agency as essentially requiring the self-determination of the will, free not only from compulsion, but free also from any psychological causation of the agent's own views and feelings. With such a definition of voluntary action, a Scotist cannot answer this moral question in any other way. Let us understand his position fully. By

limiting our responsibility to acts of will he does not mean to limit it to volitions actually effectuated by bodily actions. He knows very well that it is volition which constitutes the action of the soul, whether or not the matured purpose has yet been executed by the bodily members, and that the soul is the part of the human person to which moral responsibility attaches. If we propose to the Scotist such a case as this, he will decide upon it precisely as we do. Here is a man whose purpose and choice are made up to murder his neighbor maliciously. The form of the purpose is to do it to-morrow morning at sunrise by shooting him from behind a covert; he even charges his rifle for that purpose. But the murder does not actually occur, because he learns in the evening that his victim has gone on a journey; or it may be, because when he takes his stand in the ambush his victim travels to his ordinary place of business by another road. Is not this man morally evil and guilty of a degree of the sin of murder? Here the Scotist will answer with us, Yes, of course, he is wicked and guilty. For, though his fingers have not discharged the murderous rifle, his soul had knowingly chosen the wicked act. But the Scotist says, that responsibility and moral quality do not enter until the soul has acted by some volition. He argues his conclusion thus: Men are only responsible for what is voluntary in them. In stating this premise he says, that he is appealing to a self-evident intuition of the conscience. He is ready to give a thousand illustrations of the injustice of holding men responsible for what is involuntary. For instance, what would be thought of the cruelty of a parent who punished her child for some catastrophe to its clothing which she had commanded the child to avoid, when it appeared that the poor child was equally unwilling to this catastrophe and was striving to avoid it? The Scotist then proceeds to argue that his opponents must grant with him that all dispositions and desires are involuntary, because these opponents hold that such dispositions and desires are the causes of volitions. Now, all causes

must precede their effects. Therefore, such motives preceding volitions must be involuntary.

**Resolution from the Ambiguity of the Term "Involuntary."**

The sound of this famous argument is so specious that it should be dissolved before we proceed further. The solution is, that the predicate "voluntary" is used ambiguously and involves two distinct meanings in the premises and conclusion, so that the syllogism is a worthless "quadruped." There is a sense in which just responsibility is limited to such functions of the soul as are spontaneous; to such, namely, as take place without compulsion from without by reason of the soul's own subjective determinations. This, and no more, is the extent of the intuition which is claimed as the major premise. What the conscience self-evidently sees is, that it is not just to hold a man responsible for what occurs in him or occurs to him *against his will*. The function must, in this sense, be "voluntary" in order to be responsible. But is that the same thing with saying that the function must be itself a volition, or the result of a volition, in order to be voluntary and responsible? No; here is foisted in wholly another meaning, and altogether a narrower meaning, of the word "voluntary." In the true sense of this major premise, "voluntary" means a much wider and a different concept, which is, of functions uncompelled or spontaneous; and the real affirmative intuition is, that men may be responsible for any functions of their spirits which are voluntary in this wider sense. It is perfectly true that the Augustinian cannot assert those dispositions and desires which, on his theory, cause volitions, to be the after-results of their own effects. That, of course, would be absurd. But in this argument it is frivolous. The only real question is, whether the subjective dispositions and desires which prompt volitions in a free-agent are not themselves spontaneous and free? I have persistently taught that they are. Consciousness teaches the same. A short and simple argument is this: Whenever my own disposition discloses its leaning, and my own appe-

tency or aversion warms toward or against its objects, I know my soul does all this of itself, and solely as self-prompted. I know it by this proof, that if these dispositions and desires were compelled in me, they would not be mine, but only those of the compeller; that nobody makes me feel them, but that I feel them of myself as fully as, when I will, I will of myself. Such being their real spontaneity, it is as reasonable that they be within the scope of moral responsibility as any other free products of my self-hood. The field is open, then, for discussion, whether rational grounds do or do not appear for holding us responsible for our dispositions and desires as justly as for our volitions. I take the affirmative.

**That We Are Responsible for Feelings: (1) Consciousness Affirms.**

My first argument is an appeal to consciousness, which I make in concrete cases, whereto she will answer intuitively. I perceive that my neighbor is irritated against me without cause. His confidential friend informs me that he is feeling an unjust anger and a certain craving to assault and beat me; but that the angry man, while avowing such feelings, has candidly said that his mind was not yet made up whether or not to inflict the drubbing. Is my reason satisfied with the moral attitude of this angry man toward me? Does it remain thoroughly satisfied thereupon up to the moment when I learn that his hesitation is ended and his volition matured that he will beat me? By no means! From the moment I learn of his causeless anger, I feel hurt. I know that he wrongs me. The very misconception of my innocent conduct which excited him is a wrong to me. I am certain that his unjust feelings are not innocent. Again, let us change the relation of the parties, and suppose that it was my neighbor who was unconscious of wrong toward me, innocent and friendly, but I have become unjustly embittered against him. My mind is imbued with an envy and hatred which I know to be groundless. I am tempted by an inclination to assault and wound him, an inclination not yet ripened into any definite purpose. Now,



at this stage would I be as willing as not that he should look into my breast as through a window and see every thing that festers there? Am I willing that a holy God should see it all? By no means. The very thought of their inspection makes me ashamed. I instinctively practice concealment. Why is this? It is because my own conscience condemns my own dispositions and desires, though not yet formed into any volition. Here are two cases which show, as a thousand similar ones do, that conscience intuitively sees such feelings of the soul to be evil and responsible.

(2) Sins of Omission Demonstrate.

My second argument is, that the Scotist is unable on his own theory to account for the ill desert of any "sin" of omission. For the nature of such sins is that volition has not taken place when it ought to have taken place. The soul has not "acted" when it ought to have acted. If, then, sin can consist only in sinful acts of soul, sins of omission cannot be sins at all. But this is absurd. Let a concrete instance make this clear. A fop is sauntering by the margin of a placid but deep stream, when he sees a playful child trip herself, fall in, and sink. The fop is a swimmer. The thought of a rescue is suggested to his mind, but he also reminds himself of his fine clothes which would be spoiled, and of the unpleasantness of the wintry bath. These competing thoughts hold him vacillating for a minute or two, during which space the child rises, and sinks to rise no more. As the bereaved mother receives the little corpse to her agonized bosom, she learns all about the presence of the fop, his skill as a swimmer, and his hesitation. Thereupon she charges him with the murder of her child, and her charge is not wholly unjust. Let us suppose the fop endeavoring to meet her reproaches thus: "Madam, I am blameless, for my friends, the Scotists, argue that sin consists only in sinful acts of soul; and I solemnly assure you that my will had not yet acted a volition to let your child drown, inasmuch as I was still hesitating when rescue came

too late. You see, madam, there was no act of soul, and therefore no fault whatever." Does one suppose the mother's common sense would have found any difficulty in exposing this sophism? She would have exclaimed: "But why did you hesitate? It was because your feelings at the time were those of a heartless, selfish fop, not those of a virtuous man—with such an one hesitation would have been impossible. In that you hesitated you were accessory to a murder. For this hesitation had a cause—namely, your own selfish dispositions and desires, and to them attaches your guilt."

(3) *Argued from Our Imputations of Abiding Moral Character.*

My third objection to the Scotist theory is, that it is unab'le to account for the judgments of common sense concerning permanent moral character. Let it be remembered: That theory is, that sin consists only in sinful acts of will. But every one regards the bad man as permanently qualified by his bad character at such times as he is not acting. Let us say, for instance, the series of evil acts done by the man is one of numerous thefts; to each theft and each purpose of theft matured in the mind, but not executed, bad moral quality, responsibility and guilt attach. So far goes the Scotist. But we contemplate the man at this time, when he is neither stealing nor plotting theft; he is, we will say, eating his dinner, or he is amusing himself, or he is fondling his own child. Do we still judge him to be a man of bad character? Unquestionably, we do. Common sense imputes to him an evil quality, which inheres in his spirit continuously; even at times when he is neither purposing nor executing evil acts. When we see him repeating his thefts again, common sense will say, that this evil quality, character, is again prompting him. The new sin is the result of the character. "Concupiscence, when it hath conceived, bringeth forth sin." Now is the daughter akin to the mother? Again common sense answers, Yes. When it speaks not only of the series of acts as evil, but of the inherent quality of the agent as also evil, it intends to

ascribe a moral trait to the one as truly as the other. I cannot account for this ascription, unless moral quality and responsibility attach, not only to acts of soul, but also to dispositions and appetencies of the soul. The Scotist cannot account for it.

(4) **Actions Are Morally Appraised Only by Their Intentions.**

In the fourth place, this is still more powerfully demonstrated by the manner in which all men judge of actions. "We judge them by their intentions." When we see an act virtuous or vicious in form, we are not at all certain that it is so in quality until we have ascertained the agent's intention in performing it. The justice of this rule of judgment is most powerfully confirmed by this fact, that it is by the agent's intention that the law always judges his innocence or guilt. The law is but the collective expression of the general conscience. Has a homicide been committed? Has A slain B? The slaying is proved, and even admitted by A. But the law by no means proceeds thereupon to hang A. It cannot judge him until it has ascertained his intention. If it is proved that A acted with no other intention than that of lawful self-defense, he is pronounced innocent. If it is shown that the feelings which prompted the killing were no more than a heat of violent anger, unlawful, yet not premeditated, and arising upon provocation, A is adjudged guilty of murder in the second degree. But if it is proved that his motive was conscious premeditated malice, this makes his act capital murder, and he is condemned to be hung. All reasonable men judge all actions in this way. By the intention of the act they mean its subjective motive, the complex of mental view and feeling which decided the volition. Now, in thus judging, mankind virtually say, that so far from finding the moral quality in the act of the will alone, they cannot find that quality there at all, until they have searched for its source in the precedent character, dispositions and desires of the agent. Whatever of moral quality is found in the act is derived solely from these ante-

cedents. It is the moral quality of the motive which alone determines the moral quality of the volition. Indeed, if the special act of volition be abstracted from all its antecedents and results, and viewed separately from them, it has no more moral character than the manual act which follows it. As the latter is the mechanical part of the volition, so the volition is the merely natural physical result of its motive. We see a man on two different occasions striking with a staff. At one time he is beating off a vicious dog from a child; at the other time he is beating an unoffending friend. Everybody sees that the first act is justifiable, and the latter is wicked. But there is nothing whatever in the manual motions to discriminate the two acts; for the motions are identical in both, striking downwards with a staff, using the same muscles in the same way. We must go further back than the corporeal actions to distinguish the right from the wrong. So the two volitions to use the arm and the staff are also the same when abstracted from their antecedent motives; for the volition to effectuate the same actions is still the same volition, while viewed as merely the special function of the will. It is only when we apprehend the different objects of the actions, and the different motives of the soul, that we find any ground for the distinction of right and wrong action. Thus the psychology of common sense shows that the moral quality and responsibility do not primarily attach to the volition. The Scotists say that they cannot attach to dispositions and desires, because these precede volition. The consequence would be, that both right and wrong are banished off the earth, and the distinction is to be found nowhere.

**The Modification of the Scotist Position Evasive and Ineffectual—General Conclusion in Regard to It.**

This argument is so irresistible that most Scotists now relinquish a part of their leader's ground. They admit that not only acts of will have moral quality and are responsible, but also such dispositions, habits and affections as the agent

has superinduced upon his own soul by previous courses of voluntary action. They concede that even though the agent's present bad character should determine him to bad actions, he may still be justly held responsible, because he himself made his character what it now is. They grant that the responsibility that he then incurred by the free acts of will which superinduced his present bad character is justly projected forward upon his present bad actions. Their conception is exactly represented in this concrete case. There was a robust citizen of military age in a commonwealth which was wickedly invaded and was waging a defensive war. The commonwealth was calling for such citizens to defend her as soldiers. This man, upon drawing a soldier's lot, determines that he will not perform his righteous duty in defending his country. So he disables himself by chopping off the fingers of his right hand. His disqualification is now physical and real. He cannot load and fire a musket with precision. Thus he escapes the conscription. But does he escape the demerit of a coward and a bad citizen? By no means. Though his inability be real, he will be blamable in each successive delinquency when he should have been present to defend his country; for this inability was produced by himself and voluntarily. Thus these ingenious reasoners admit that responsibility may attach, not only to acts of will, but also to such dispositions of will and habitudes of desire as the agent has procured for himself by his own previous free and intelligent acts of will. They continue, however, to deny that any moral quality and responsibility could attach to congenital dispositions and affections original in the man's nature, or to acts of will certainly determined by them; because the man has had no free option in selecting that disposition or nature, but it would have been imposed upon him prior to his first act of choice.

**Common Sense Blames Men for the Fruits of Original Dispositions.**

This intermediate position is plausible but invalid. Certainly the common sense of mankind rejects it. Here is a

notorious thief whom all men condemn. Suppose they be told that this man's parents were thieves, that cupidity was hereditary in him, and was naturally strong, so that it had shown itself in the earliest acts of his childhood. Would his fellow-men therefore acquit him of all blame? By no means. Provided they found him not idiotic nor lunatic, they would judge him as, for that very reason, so much the more wicked. Men believe that bravery is congenital in the average Briton and vengefulness in the American Indian. But none the less do they approve the English soldier for his hereditary courage, and abhor the savage for his murders.

**Original Traits as Freely Preferred by Their Subject as Any Superinduced Trait.**

I urge, in the second place, that this speculation overlooks one of the plain facts of the case. The free-agent's preference for a quality in himself which is original and congenital may be as absolutely free and voluntary as for any new quality which he has intentionally produced in himself. Here is a handsome youth whom Nature has endowed with a smooth complexion and dark silken hair, but he admires these beauties in himself. He prefers them just as freely as though Nature had not given them to him before he knew how to choose. Thus it is with men's natural disposition towards moral objects. They are not one whit less free and spontaneous in their preference for their own dispositions than if they had produced them for themselves by recent acts of their own choice. And therefore, if there is moral evil in these dispositions, men are still responsible for that evil. Let us again illustrate: Should this youth to whom Nature had given dark and silken locks be seized with a sudden whimsy and dye them carrotty red, everyone would condemn his good taste. But suppose there was another to whom Nature had given carrotty red hair, and who was as vain of his locks as though they were beautiful (such cases are not rare). Does not everyone equally condemn his bad taste? And should his friends plead that he

was not to be condemned, because Nature had given his locks that odious color, and not his own subsequent act; everyone's common sense would reply, that still his taste is to be condemned because he is pleased with ugliness. It is none the less his own taste, freely exercised, and therefore bad taste. The parallel needs no application.

**Angels Would Have No Merit, Because Their Right Disposition Was Original.**

A more damaging objection appears in this truth, that upon this theory the holy angels could have no merit nor virtue, though perfectly free from sin, for they were created holy. They received their correct dispositions from their heavenly Father in the very act which formed them in His image. And since their moral dispositions were perfect from the beginning, there was no room for them to superinduce upon themselves any new and additional dispositions. But if no moral credit nor responsibility can attach to original traits of nature, of course none should attach to the series of actions determined by these traits. Thus we are led to this remarkable conclusion, that because the angels had always been virtuous, therefore they could deserve no credit at all for their virtue.

**God, Above All, Would Be Non-Meritorious.**

But the theory breaks down most utterly when applied to explain the holiness of God himself. He is self-existent, eternal and unchangeable. Consequently, all His moral principles must be from eternity. It is impossible that He can have acquired anything or changed anything in the direction of right character. It is impossible that He should ever have exercised an option in choosing any new virtue or new course of virtuous actions, since all His principles are not only eternal and original, but eternally necessary. He never passed out of any previous state into any state of positive holiness by any act of free election, for His eternal state was one of perfect holiness. Hence, God's holy dispositions are not voluntary in the sense of the Scotist's theory. Consequently on

that theory they are not positively meritorious. But since disposition determines the moral quality of volitions which it prompts, none of God's actions proceeding from necessitated dispositions should have any moral merit. But this is profane. Its premises must, therefore, be given up.

Last, the *Reductio ad Absurdum*.

Indeed, upon the Scotist's theory it would be as impossible to ascribe good moral character to any acquired habitude of right action as to any connatural one. The demonstration is very short. A habit propagated by the repetition of a series of like acts having no moral merit would be a non-moral habit. But the acts prompted by a state of disposition devoid of moral quality could have no moral quality. The Scotist assert that an original connatural disposition could not have positive moral quality, because not voluntary in the sense of being the result of a volition. Let us suppose, then, a rational creature setting about this fancied task of the acquisition of a moral character by his election of moral actions; then, according to our opponents' own hypothesis, there would be nothing moral in the *a priori* dispositions prompting those first acts of choice. Consequently those acts could not have any positive moral quality. Consequently, again, any habit which might result from the repetition of such acts could not be a moral habit, any more than the habit of whistling or of whittling. So that this scheme for securing the genesis of a right moral character commits logical suicide upon itself. The plainest and shortest method for settling the point in debate is to ask the question, What effect would a temptation to evil concupiscence have upon a disposition perfectly and unchangeably holy like that of the man Jesus? Manifestly there could be no response; the mere intellectual apprehension of the natural pleasure attending the forbidden act would be present. The holy agent's power of conception will produce so much in his mind. But it would remain mere thought, and would never catch in his holy soul a single degree of the heat of unhal-



lowed feeling, even as the particle of iron struck from the steel by a flint in a vacuum could never become a spark of fire, because there was no oxygen present to second the mere heat of friction produced in the abrasion, and thus to begin any combustion. Every man's common sense apprehends this in reading the temptation of Jesus. The fixed and perfect holiness of His soul must preclude even the rise of unholy desire. Consequently we judge that where the faintest gleam of such desire has begun, sin has entered.

We are thus taught, that in appraising the morality of any regulative disposition of soul it is useless to inquire concerning its source. The only question is, whether it is the agent's own, and whether he exercises it spontaneously. If he does, it has moral quality, and he is responsible for it.

**Thus Is Explained Mixed Moral Quality in a Single Volition.**

Another instructive corollary follows from this demonstration. A moral action may have a mixed moral quality. It may be prevalently right and good and yet involve moral defect. This statement corresponds exactly with the dictates of our common sense and with the practical judgment of mankind. If the Scotist's definition of righteousness and sin, as consisting exclusively in right or wrong acts of will, were correct, then every act which is prevalently right must be perfectly right, and every act involving any wrong must be utterly wrong. This consistent inference is, in fact, avowed by the more advanced members of the school. The reason is plain. Every act of the will is marked by unity when abstracted from its antecedent motives; it is an absolute determination; it is wholly the one thing or the other; for absolute simplicity it compares with all the other functions of the soul as the spiritual monad compares with complex organisms. Hence it must be absurd to ascribe to the one act of will two contrary moral complexions. If a volition is to be morally appraised apart from its antecedents, then it must be found wholly good or wholly bad, which is contrary to common

sense. But let the correct analysis be adopted, which finds the moral quality not primarily in the executive volition, but in the subjective motives which prompt it, and then the judgment of men's common sense is justified. For the motives of single volitions are rarely single; they are usually plural and complex. Two or more subjective appetencies concur in prompting action. Of these, the prominent and prevalent one may be noble and pure; a subordinate one mingling with it may be unworthy, and thus the action which receives the moral complexion of its motives may be prevalently good and yet defective.

## 2. Refutation of the Doctrine That Responsibility Does Not Attach to Opinion and Beliefs.

The remaining question concerning the extent of moral obligation is still much debated. Are men responsible for erroneous thinking and opinions upon propositions involving moral quality? May they be held blameworthy for such opinions, though honestly adopted at the time? Multitudes answer, hotly, No. These include, of course, all infidels and so-called free-thinkers, and, unfortunately, many others of better tendencies, in the denial. We find, for instance, even Lord Brougham, in his "Discourse of Natural Theology," asserting the negative, and that on the grounds familiar to infidels; and even Lord Macaulay, in his "History," intimates the same doctrine. The arguments are these: Opinion is the product of the merely intellectual faculty of judgment, which is not a moral faculty of the soul, and therefore its psychological results cannot be subject to moral responsibility; credence is metaphysically necessitated, arising as it does upon the mental apprehension of propositions and any valid evidence sustaining their copulæ, inasmuch as the view of such evidence leaves to the mind no option or freedom in yielding its assent. Suppose, for instance, a student of geometry has been made to apprehend the meaning of a given theorem, and to comprehend the logic supporting its truth; then he has no more

freedom or option to withhold his mental assent than the man struck with a bludgeon has to reject the feeling of pain. But inasmuch as moral responsibility cannot extend beyond the freedom of the agent, we cannot attach it to his credence of propositions sincerely embraced under the light of evidence, be they true or false, moral or non-moral. If men grant such responsibility, they are robbed of the glorious prerogative of freedom of thought, the exercise of which must include the liberty to embrace either side of questions considered, free from every species of compulsion; and in allowing such responsibility, the justice of "persecutions for opinions' sake" is inevitably conceded. For one prominent end, for the sake of which the magistrate is armed with the penal power, is to protect the community from the losses and mischiefs which unchecked crime always inflicts. Now, erroneous moral and religious opinions may afflict a community with mischief as real and great as any prevalent form of crime. Thus some erroneous opinions have done more harm than the most flagrant outbreak of horse-stealing. If it is right for the magistrate for this reason to punish horse-stealing, and if men are responsible for such errors, why should the magistrate not punish them as he did the horse-thieves? There is no way to escape the conclusion, unless we assert that erroneous beliefs are not responsible, where not combined with conscious falsehood. Else we shall have to justify all the enormities of religious persecution in the Middle Ages, which are now abhorred by all right consciences of all creeds. Such is the imposing array of arguments; yet I shall show that every point in them is a sophism, and that the free-thinker's conclusion leads by necessity to intolerable absurdities.

#### The Free-Thinker's Self-Contradiction.

Let me pause here to note the inconsistency of these men in claiming that they alone are the "free-thinkers." I do not dwell so much upon the inaccuracy of all such modes of expression as "free-thought," "free-will," in that they attempt to

predicate freedom of subjects to which that attribute is utterly irrelevant. Rational persons alone are free or not free. The phrase, "free-thought," is in fact as meaningless as the phrase, "blue melody," or "liquid bravery." But is it not strange that men who deny their responsibility for their moral opinions claim the title of free-thinkers, when they themselves have just founded their claim of irresponsibility upon the flat denial that thought is free? Their very argument is, that thought is metaphysically necessitated as to its whole result—viz., credence. Yet the title of free-thinkers is constantly and arrogantly usurped by them in the face of this violent contradiction. It is I who am the free-thinker, for I hold that my thought and its result, my credence, take place under the guidance of my will. Will is the faculty of free-agency. It is these men who are the "slave-thinkers," since they say that their thought is not free, but necessitated.

#### The Liberal's Boast Criticised.

When we shall have completed the proof that we are accountable for our moral opinions, we shall be ready to make a similar criticism upon another meaningless phrase frequently in the mouths of these parties; it is, "liberal thought," "liberality of opinion." This claim will appear equally groundless and dishonest, when we consider that truth is not our property, but God's. We are only stewards of truth. One may show his liberality by giving away what is exclusively his own. But we have been taught to believe that the steward who gives away his lord's property without his leave is not a generous person, but a thief. Let us discriminate between this unfaithfulness towards error and the excellent virtue of charity towards the persons of the erring.

#### Refutation: (A) Conscience Claims Control of All Powers.

The folly in their first point is transparent. The faculty of logical judgment is indeed not specifically the moral faculty. There is but one such faculty in the soul, which is the

conscience. If the fact that the logical faculty is not specifically the moral one proves that its mental products are not responsible, then the same inference must follow as to the products of every other faculty except the conscience. The acts of conscience would be the only responsible ones. This conclusion is supremely preposterous. For the very nature of the conscience is to be the judging faculty: Its sole business is to judge the morality of actions and principles. And yet, were the sophism true, it would have nothing to judge; it would be a king without any subjects at all. The pretended reasoning is parallel to this: The magistrate is the functionary whose business it is to judge all the pickpockets in the community; therefore the magistrate is the only person among them capable of picking pockets or stealing horses. The plain statement of truth is this, that the several faculties are not limbs or separate parts of the soul, seeing it is a monad; that the acts of all the faculties are equally acts of the monad; that it is the monad always which is the subject of responsibility, the unit-soul itself, and not any divisible part thereof, responsibility being a relation always personal; that consequently the soul may be responsible for any of the actions it emits through any of its faculties, bodily or mental, intellectual or emotional. And the special moral faculty, or conscience, is the one appointed to judge all these actions of the soul through all its faculties, including also its own.

(B) *Credence Rarely the Simple Result of Evidence Seen.*

Second, it is falsely assumed that the mind is metaphysically necessitated in yielding its credence to propositions, and does so without any exercise of its own affections and freedom. This is never true concerning an adoption of moral propositions. In these results the affections of the will always combine as elements of the mental determination reached. Had our opponents selected any other specimen for this illustration except that of a geometrical theorem, they would have been obliged to see their own glaring mistake. There is a

limited class of questions which are well represented by mathematical propositions, into the decision of which we do not bring any voluntary elements. In these, we may say, where the proposition is understood, and valid evidence sustaining the copula is apprehended, credence is necessitated, partly because the nature of the subject defines the predication with absolute distinctness, partly because the evidence is in its nature categorical, instead of probable; but very much because our hearts and their desires cannot be in anyway interested in affirming or denying the truths. But when the mind is called to accept or reject a moral proposition, nearly everything is different. The evidence often belongs to the class of probable arguments instead of categorical. It does not all appear to be on one side. But considerations *pro* and *con* have to be balanced against each other, and these are often various and complicated. But, above all, the heart is ever interested in these questions. They either favor or oppose some native dispositions of the heart, some warm appetencies, or aversions, or affections of the soul. Do our opponents urge that nevertheless, when the conclusive evidences for a proposition are arrayed in the understanding, its assent to the truth is unavoidable, unless it lies to itself consciously? The reply is: Aye, but these dispositions and appetencies ever interfere with that array; they always operate to interpose some cloud, some darkness between the judgment and the evidences which they dislike. The heart ever influences the head. So notorious is this that the universal mind of man recognizes it in such maxims as this: "The wish is father to the thought." Any man who should assert that he was never influenced in his judgment upon propositions involving his own pride, prejudices, desires, aversions, emotions, by any of these feelings, would be laughed at by his fellow-men. I repeat the argument that, since conscience is God's own law written upon the human heart, it would never pronounce a positively wrong judgment were it not in some way wrongly biased. It is, indeed, the faculty of

a finite being, and therefore not omniscient. It may be liable to meet many novel cases, concerning which it would have to confess its doubt or its ignorance. But it would never put positive wrong for right unless it had been misused. Now then, just to the extent to which the voluntary elements of disposition and desire preclude any evidence of moral truth from its due weight with the mind, to that extent the man is responsible for the error he adopts. I freely admit that his demerit in this instance is not as great as that of consciously false assertion. What I assert is, that some demerit must ever attach to errors of moral belief. So weighty are these considerations that Des Cartes, the founder of modern philosophy, assigns belief as a function of the will rather than of the intellect.

(C) *This Responsibility Is to God Alone, Not to Civil Authority.*

I am as invincibly opposed to all persecutions for opinion's sake, by civil pains and penalties, as any man. But it is not necessary for me to hold the free-thinker's absurd position in order to justify this, my opposition. Its true ground is here: Men are responsible to God for evil moral opinions, but not to any fellow-man or magistrate whatsoever. That this distinction is obvious and may be proved tenable appears very clearly, thus: Civil government, with its pains and penalties, is designed and fitted to restrain certain forms of sin, but not all forms of sin. Indeed, the species of transgressions with which the magistrate can deal beneficially through his punishments are comparatively few. For the larger number of the sinful principles and species of actions customary among men are of such a kind that the penalties of civil government are utterly irrelevant to them, and the attempt to apply them would be utterly absurd and mischievous. There is not a moralist or legislator upon earth, of any school, despotic or liberal, of any religion or of no religion, who does not admit this obvious truth. Hence, when the free-thinker insists upon drawing the inference that, because we believe that men are responsible to God for their moral

opinions, we must also hold that they are responsible to their fellow-men, their logic is simply ridiculous in its superficiality. It overlooks a distinction so broad and notorious that nobody is absurd enough to overlook it when dealing with any other topic. I repeat, that man's responsibility for his moral opinions is to his God, and not to any fellow-man. We make the same judgment here which every man makes concerning a hundred other species of sin. There are many forms of conjugal petulance, for instance, or of parental neglect, or of bad economy in the use of income, or of indolence in the use of time, which are responsible and morally evil, and yet the civil magistrate has nothing to do with their reprehension. No sensible man in any country would tolerate his attempt to punish these sins, because his powers are neither designed nor fitted to deal with such sins beneficially, and his attempt to do so would destroy liberty and almost infinitely aggravate the mischiefs he pretended to cure. These are just the grounds upon which all men of sound thought argue the unrighteousness of persecution for opinion's sake. We shall return to them in the proper place and show their solidity.

(D) **What Is Man's Just Liberty?**

Whether our responsibility to God for our moral opinions infringes liberty of thought will turn upon one's definition of liberty. If he asserts the liberty of the atheist, "each man's privilege to have and to do whatever he wishes," then this responsibility does restrict it. And every righteous man rejoices that so absurd and wicked a license is restricted. For it is not liberty of thought, but wild license. It is not the rational liberty of the intelligent, responsible agent, but the liberty of the hawk, the wolf and the tiger. I shall show, in the proper place, that no rational creature of God can have such liberty as this. The only liberty which is appropriate to a creature or to his relation to civil society is freedom to do and have everything to which he has a moral right. God, the perfectly righteous and omniscient Father, is at once the most



beneficent and infallible judge as to what things His creatures have a right to. He is also their rightful sovereign proprietor. Hence His righteous will is the proper limit which must define every liberty and prerogative of His rational creatures. Hence the claim is transcendently absurd, that a creature can be entitled to freedom of thought, as between himself and his God, to assert a proposition which his God infallibly sees to be both false and mischievous. (And every falsehood is immediate or remotely mischievous.) Man's liberty of thought, as between his God and himself, is to pursue all truth and to assert it, unrestrained by any compulsion from earth or heaven. It is impossible that such compulsion can proceed from heaven, because God also delights in all truth. If it proceeds from any power on this earth, the compulsion is wicked and is a real infringement of liberty of thought. And this proposition must also imply that no power on earth shall dictate to us by the force of civil pains and penalties that a given thought of ours shall be prohibited to us by it on the ground that it thinks it is an erroneous thought; for the earthly powers are fallible themselves. Hence, any liberty of thought, as between me and them, is not safe until I assert my prerogative to think, even what they deem erroneous thoughts, unrestrained by their penalties. Such, and no more, is the extent of this high and sacred right of the individual soul.

**The True Doctrine Enforced: (A) By the Argumentum ad Hominem.**

I begin my proof that man is responsible for his moral opinions by an appeal to the consciousness of my honest opponents. I will show them that, in fact, they do not believe in their own doctrine, except when it is applied in their own favor. Agnostics, for instance, make assertions against theism and the Holy Scriptures, vilifying the attributes of the God therein revealed, which sincere Christians regard as not only mistaken, but reprehensible. Sincerely believing their reprehension to be just, they are, of course, prompted to utter them, which the doctrine of liberty of thought, as held by the

agnostics, certainly entitles them to do. And if the reprehensions of these sincere Christians are sometimes severe, they are certainly justified on that theory by the extreme aggressiveness of the agnostics' attack upon their God. Now, then, if men are not responsible even for moral errors sincerely held, the agnostics ought to receive the severest reprehensions of the Christian with perfect equanimity and good temper; they ought to feel towards them with perfect good nature as merely innocent mistakes. The Christian's reprehensions are, indeed, erroneous from the agnostic's point of view. But the doctrine of the latter is that erroneous opinions are not morally responsible. The Christians, then, have made an innocent mistake only in condemning the agnostics' insults to their God. Now, do these free-thinkers ever submit to them as such? Never! They retort these reprehensions with an eloquence and an anger which prove that they regard them, not as innocent differences of opinion, but as injuries. They think they do well to be angry. They unquestionably view the Christians' reprehension of themselves as sins against the rights of free thought, justifying their own high resentment. Now, on their doctrine, this is very ridiculous. They attack the God of the Bible with what they claim to be pure logic. The indignant Christians reply that these attacks are not logic, but impiety, if not blasphemy. On the free-thinking theory, this burning difference of opinion should be entertained by free-thinkers with the same impersonal nonchalance with which a difference concerning the superior fragrance of a tea-rose or a damask-rose should be discussed between two ladies. But they do not receive the answer thus. It is impossible that they should; their theory is an absurdity. Or will they say that the reason why they resent this reprehension of the Christians is, that they know the Christians are consciously dishonest in uttering it? This would, indeed, be an instance of bigotry, surpassing in its folly and arrogance anything ever found in Christian zealots. By what standard of sincerity can the free-thinkers claim that virtue for themselves, and yet deny it to all decided

Christians? However obnoxious the latter may be to the charge of undue severity, they prove their sincerity to all their fellow-citizens by a thousand acts of integrity, philanthropy and self-denial, which at least show them as well entitled to claim that virtue as the free-thinkers are.

(B) From Analogy.

Next, I argue that every analogy found in the laws of Nature and of society corresponds with our doctrine that man is responsible for his moral opinions. Nature invariably holds men responsible for whatever evils attach by natural law to their mistakes of judgment, with whatever sincerity they may have been believed. Nature never discounts a single one of her regular penalties for error on that excuse. For instance, the traveler who rides into a quagmire, sincerely thinking it is solid ground, is engulfed just the same as though he had known its treachery. The farmer who exposes his crop to the frost, guided by his erroneous prognostics of continued mild weather, incurs just the same loss as though he had done it from criminal rashness. The patient who swallows morphia, really supposing it to be quinine, is poisoned as inevitably as if he had deliberately committed suicide. The judgment of society is the same. It expects men to be held responsible for the natural consequences of their mistakes, though sincere, and the conscience of mankind does not regard these results as unjust. It may extend some compassion to the farmer who lost a valuable crop in consequence of his overweening opinion about the fair weather, but it refuses to condemn the natural system under which the loss occurred as in itself unjust.

(C) From the Usages of Civil Law.

The argument from the usages of civil law is equally strong. The courts allow no man to take advantage of his own misunderstanding of the statutes. If he erroneously construes a property law, so as to place his money where the law does not intend to protect it, he must lose it. If he misreads the murder law of the commonwealth, so as to imagine that

he only commits justifiable homicide in slaying his neighbor for some contumely not involving any serious danger to life or limb, he must pay the penalty of murder. Now, this secular law is the embodiment of the enlightened conscience of men. Every theist knows that this "order of Nature" is but another name for the government of Divine Providence; that it is but one of the two forms in which God gives expression to His wise and righteous will, the revealed precepts being the other form.

The argument presented by this analogy is, therefore, to the theist perfectly demonstrative. God here shows Himself in the natural order invariably holding men responsible for the established consequences of their mistakes, however sincere. It is the same God who legislates and rules in the realm of Nature and of revelation. He is a consistent and unchangeable being. Hence He will certainly proceed upon the same principle in the one sphere which we see Him always employing in the other kindred sphere. An agnostic might say, "This analogy is without force to me, for I do not admit that the natural order gives any expression whatever of a personal divine will." I reply, that he cannot escape the grasp of my argument by that evasion. It clutches him even more firmly than it does me. If he is right in his agnosticism, then no man has any evidence that there is in the universe any other order than this natural order. The systems are reduced from two to one. The order of Nature presents the only government which ever has to do with man in the present or future. We now know nothing of any distinguishable personal government under the hand of an intelligent and righteous God. The system of Nature is the all. But in that system men are invariably held responsible for the natural consequences of their mistakes, however sincere. Thus the argument, which to me as a theist is an argument by analogy, must be to the agnostic an inference from identity. It is but a proposition equivalent to the result of man's universal experience to say that we are responsible for our moral opinions.

(D) The True Doctrine Further Enforced by the *Reductio ad Absurdum* of the Contrary Thesis.

The sound common sense of mankind finds a very clear argument for the same truth in this inference: that if a man may innocently hold a given moral proposition to be true, then, of course, he may innocently perform the action to which that proposition logically leads. Everyone judges that our actions are to be guided by the truth: therefore the action to which the truth, as seen in our minds, leads us, is for us the proper action. How can any man discard this guidance without acting irrationally? To act against reason is to act improperly; and each one's own reason must be his guide. Again, conscience is the imperative faculty, and cannot be innocently disobeyed. But our examination of the nature of moral judgments showed us that conscience must always command according to the light of truth, and that truth, of course, such as is seen in the mind itself. So that the deduction is indisputable: if we may not hold a man responsible for his erroneous moral belief, we must not hold him responsible for any action consistently dictated by that belief. Thus we shall be compelled to appraise as mere innocent mistakes many of the most monstrous crimes that ever polluted the earth. Since pagan mothers are frequently sincere in their belief of their superstitions, which call for infanticide, we must justify these unnatural murders. We cannot doubt but that St. Dominic, Torquemada, the popes, the Duke of Alva, and Philip the Second of Spain, with his consort, "Bloody Mary" of England, sincerely believed that Protestantism was a capital crime. Therefore we must justify all the horrors of the Albigensian persecutions and wars; all the fiendish tortures and murders of the Spanish Inquisition; and the butcheries of Holland and Smithfield. The zealot, Ravailiac, who foully murdered Henry IV., and the assassins of the second Russian Alexander, and of the two American presidents, Lincoln and Garfield, believed beyond a doubt that they were doing right. Therefore they should not be condemned; believing

as they did, they only made innocent mistakes. Yea, the Christian world should reverse its condemnation of Annas and Caiaphas for putting to death the Lord of Life, and Divine Providence has perpetrated a gigantic injustice in bringing national ruin upon that generation of Jews; for unquestionably they had convinced themselves that Jesus had committed an offense, that of religious imposture and seduction, which by the laws of Moses was capital. All the decent advocates of this license of thought concur with us in limiting mental liberty to the right of free-thought and free-speech. They say with us, that when the man in error proceeds beyond his right of thinking and advocating his wrong opinion to criminal actions, then it is right that the hand of Justice should arrest him with her pains and penalties. But in consistency they ought not to admit this, since moral action is the rational corollary of wrong thinking; where the wrong thinker is sincere, the government ought to allow him the same liberty of criminal action which she allows of erroneous thinking. For instance, since the Mormon's right of free-thought entitles him to believe in and preach polygamy, it is wicked and tyrannical in Congress to punish him when he perpetrates bigamy. Such is the consistent inference. The Mormons claim it stoutly. But every honest man sees that this way of reasoning would annihilate all restraints on crimes, and turn society into a hell.

(E) Proved from Men's Repentance for Wrong Dogmas.

Such are the unavoidable conclusions, but they outrage every right heart in the world. Their premise, therefore, must be false. I sustain this appeal to human nature by citing these further facts, that whenever men who have been honestly misled by moral error come to the knowledge of the truth, they confess their sin with deep and sincere repentance. Their conscience, when properly enlightened, refuses to take the benefit of this plea, even in their own favor. They condemn themselves with sincere contrition for their evil acts and

the mistakes of conscience which led to them. Thus Saul or Tarsus "verily believed that he was doing God service" at the time he persecuted the Christians. Afterwards he condemned himself for doing this with profound repentance, and found in his own crime the strongest argument for admiring the mercy of God towards himself. Now, I suppose that human nature is not inclined to repent too much. The self-love and self-esteem natural to man prevent that exaggeration.

**(F) Has A the Right to Inveigh B's Right?**

This refutation is carried to a still more conclusive height when we remember that two men oftentimes adopt contrary conclusions concerning a single supposed right which is contested between them. Let us call two such men A and B. A has convinced himself that this right belongs to him. If the free-thinker's doctrine is true, this, of course, justifies him in possessing himself of that right by any means not expressly prohibited by the law. B has also convinced himself that the right is his; whence he infers his right to take the opposite course. But if A has a right to possess himself of the thing in debate, then any action by B which obstructs it must be wrong. But the theory under discussion gives B an equal right to make that obstruction. What astonishing rights are these, which authorize men to perpetrate wrongs upon each other reciprocally!

**(G) Truth Would be Non-Essential—Conclusion.**

In conclusion, were this theory true, it would follow that correctness in moral reasonings and conclusions has no practical value. Error sincerely held would be of the same worth to a moral agent as the truth. The only rule which could claim any importance would be, not that we should ascertain the truth, but only that we should cultivate the superficial species of sincerity which persuades itself to believe at the time in accordance with the declarations of the hour. Such are the intolerable consequences which I promised to show

are involved in this spurious theory of free-thought. The conclusion of the whole matter is, that we are responsible, not indeed to our fellow-men, but to God, for our moral errors of thought; and this responsibility attaches to those spontaneous elements of disposition, prejudice and evil appetency, which have disturbed the actions of our minds, and without which we should not have brought ourselves into any positively sinful beliefs. We are justly responsible because the elements which perverted our moral judgments were voluntary. Had all such spontaneous perversion been absent, the intuitions of conscience, which the Creator has given us, which, though finite, are correct, might indeed have often left us in partial ignorance of the more intricate duties, but would never have led us positively astray. We should have seen that we had now reached places where the light of duty was lacking to us, and our next obligation was to stop and search for it. The righteous man is always entitled to so much delay as is really requisite for finding the needed light, provided he uses due diligence in seeking it. Until that light is reached, his proper action is to do nothing.

#### The Doctrine of "Probableism" False and Corrupt.

I have now virtually announced another moral principle which has been and will again become of fundamental importance in ethics. It is that so tersely expressed in the words, "he that doubteth is condemned if he eat." As long as the agent entertains any doubt concerning the moral propriety of an action, he must refrain from committing it, as strictly as though its sinfulness were demonstrated to his mind. The argument is clear. As I have just proved, this agent incurs no sinfulness by postponing the act in question until he has a sufficient time, using due diligence, to clear away all doubt as to its rightfulness. On this side, then, he is sure of innocency. But if he hastens to act, while a doubt of the rightfulness of his action remains, he takes an intentional risk of sinning. And he takes that risk causelessly; by which I mean that he is



not impelled thereto at this time by any stress of moral obligation whatever. But as man never acts intelligently without some motive, it follows that this agent is actuated by some personal motive of a lower grade than the moral, by some appetency, that is either selfish and criminal, or, at the best, morally indifferent and non-obligatory. When a man acts at the prompting of criminal desires, it need not be said that his act is criminal. On the other hand, he always has the moral right to withhold the gratification of such appetites and desires as are morally indifferent and non-obligatory. For instance, the appetite of a healthy man for beef-steak is morally indifferent, whence it follows, that if he eats beef-steak (temperately), he does nothing which is *sin per se*. But it also follows thence, that if he chooses to deny himself the beef-steak, there cannot possibly be any sin in refraining from it; because the appetite is non-obligatory. Therefore, he who acts with moral doubt betrays this immoral state of soul which prefers a causeless and gratuitous risk of sinning for the sake of a selfish gratification, rather than the alternative course of unquestionable innocency accompanied by some legitimate self-control. Such a preference is intrinsically sinful. The virtuous soul prefers the moral right as the chief good; but this action betrays the fact that the agent loves self-gratification above virtue. His is therefore a vicious soul. This central argument is also practically reinforced by such considerations as this: that man owes it to his Divine Judge, and to his own virtue, to cultivate purity of conscience and the habit of careful action. He also owes it to his fellow-creatures to set them an example of strict conscientiousness, because imitators are always prone to go much further in the wrong direction than the questionable action has gone which they make their pretext. When this gives them an inch, they take an ell. But the crowning practical argument is this: We have seen the difference between the clear-cut, categorical evidences of geometry and the probable and complex qualities of the arguments upon which ethical propositions rest. The human judgment is always fallible,

and the human heart prone to self-indulgence in its natural state. Combining these facts, we see that multitudes of people will always perceive some ground of doubt concerning a great many moral questions. Indeed, there will scarcely be a crime so self-evidently wrong to the righteous, but that a number of the evilly inclined will persuade themselves to doubt its criminality. Now, then, if we allow men to act while doubting the righteousness of the action, we shall scarcely have any moral law practically left. On that loose principle all true delicacy of conscience is destroyed out of the world; and numbers of people will be found justifying to themselves the commission of all sorts of crimes, even the foulest. I have, thus briefly but thoroughly, refuted the famous Jesuit doctrine of "probableism," which has filled so large a place in the casuistry of the popish clergy. The debate of the great Paschal against it has been so famous that no intelligent student should fail to acquaint himself with it. The testimony which he bears of the enormities justified or permitted by that deceitful doctrine sustains my last point, that the surrender of the true maxim will be the letting loose of the flood of immorality.

#### Morality Supreme.

The general result of this discussion of ethical theories is to show that our moral sentiments are entitled to hold the supreme place over all other functions of rational spirits. They are, therefore, what most ennobles the human person. Correct moral sentiments and hearty conformity of soul to them should be the highest aim of our efforts. It is this which is at once the supreme rational good and happiness. Integrity of conscience is better than logical vigor. To will nobly is more excellent than "to find out knowledge of witty inventions." The pure in heart, though their acquired knowledge be as scanty as that of the peasant, are greater and more admirable than all the immoral sons of genius and learning.

I find the greatest confirmation of the justice of this philosophy in this supreme fact, that it harmonizes precisely with

that picture which Holy Scripture gives of God's system of providence over His rational universe. In this, everything is subordinated to the moral. Truth is perpetually defended as precious, but it is truth as the condition of virtue; it is the moral which is everywhere held up as destined to dominate all else in the end. The last scene in the prophetic drama is to be a universal assize, at which the final destiny of every rational creature in the universe is to be distributed to him in precise accordance with his morality. And thenceforward the completed and everlasting reign of God is to consist in these two results: virtue eternally exalted and rewarded, vice conquered and punished.

## **BOOK IV.**

### **APPLIED ETHICS.**

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#### **CHAPTER I.**

##### **FIRST PRINCIPLES OF SOCIAL ETHICS.**

###### **1. The Natural Good and the Principles of Sympathy and Love.**

As soon as man has generalized his own experiences of the pleasurable and advantageous, and has become conscious of his own instinctive and subjective desires for them, he has the concept of the natural good—the general object of his desires, whether instinctive or modified, and general means of happiness. The last is his natural personal end, rational, self-calculated, but neither essentially sinful nor virtuous. On the one hand, the agent is conscious that no blame attaches to his pursuit of that end, under proper limits; and on the other hand, that he can claim no moral merit or title to approbation in the pursuit of that end.

###### **The "Golden Rule."**

But, as man exercises his observation and comparing power, he learns that each fellow-man has similarly his natural good the object of his desires, means of his happiness, and thus equally his self-calculated end. By whatever reason I am entitled to possess those means and pursue that end, by

the same reason (*ceteris paribus*) that fellow-man is equally entitled to pursue his. As soon as the reason has made this judgment, it has the concept of the equitable moral order, as between man and man. Its premise is of self-evident equity. What entitles me to my end? The same reason entitles my fellow to his end. If I may rightfully obstruct his end, he may obstruct mine; but the latter I judge to be a natural injustice. From this point of view conscience intuitively pronounces a judgment of right and wrong, and so of obligation. The only premise needed is, that my fellow-man has the same generic rational nature as I have.

Further I see, on exploring my and my fellow's nature, the active principles of sympathy and love. Both these are innate and constitutive. This shows that they are the implantation of our Creator. Sympathy is the "*con centus*" we instinctively feel with our fellows. It concurs not only with our fellow's grief, but with all the various forms of his emotions. Its natural promptings are, to "weep with them that weep and rejoice with them that rejoice."

But when we sympathize with our fellow's sufferings, the instinctive impulse which follows immediately is, to aid in relieving them; and the instinctive reward for having done so is, happiness in our fellow's relief. Of this reflex enjoyment, moral self-approbation is an ennobling element. Such is the natural history and anatomy of the affection.

Let us now consider what is the Creator's "final cause" in making these two principles a part of the soul's constitution.

The only safe and modest way for the creature to learn the Creator's "final cause" in any of His works is, to ask what result follows efficiently and uniformly from that structure of His creative or providential handiwork. Since He is prescient, sovereign and omnipotent in all His operations, we are authorized to infer that the results which uniformly follow from them are the ends He designed, and so disclose His "final cause." We are sure then that the aim of our Maker in establishing the affections of sympathy and love in man is, to

prompt us to all feasible acts of charity and benevolence. This confirms the rational argument first given. Add that the legitimate actions to which sympathy and love prompt are intuitively applauded by conscience, and the opposite affections of callousness and hatred are intuitively condemned.

2. The "Golden Rule," Rationally Interpreted, Is the Principle of All Duties between Man and Man.

This examination, then, both of our rational and emotive processes, discloses to us the will of the Creator, the practical rule of obligation enjoining all the duties of the social relations. The whole argument is crowned at this theistic point of view by the fact, that the Sovereign Creator who endowed me with being, capacities of desires and happiness, and a natural right to pursue my destiny, also endowed each of my fellows with similar ends. That he shall possess his right, as I legitimately crave to possess mine, is then God's *fiat*. The equitable relative moral order is thus established, as obligatory on all. This argument shows that the rule of all relative duties is substantially the "Golden Rule": "Whatsoever ye would therefore that men should do to you, do ye likewise even so to them." The Divine Moralist tells us that on this rule hang all the law and the prophets. He is correct. This proposition gathers into a single expression all the varied duties which bind man to man. But it must be construed aright. It does not make any desire of my soul which I may entertain capriciously, unwisely or wrongfully, the rule of my action to my fellows, whenever the relations between us are reversed. My rule can only be found in such desires of my own as I may legitimately entertain. When I was a silly boy, I may have desired holiday every day in the week. Were I under pupilage now, self-indulgence might still prompt the same wish. But it by no means follows that since I have become a teacher, it is therefore my duty to give my silly pupils holiday all the week. The wish was an improper one

when I entertained it. It is an improper one in them now. Two wrongs never make a right. Were I a criminal justly condemned to die, it is very possible that my horror of an infamous and violent death would prompt my wish that the sheriff would accept a bribe to deliver me from the gallows. Does it follow thence, that when I become a sheriff, I shall be morally bound to accept bribes to help guilty felons to "cheat the gallows"? This is too absurd. I repeat, it is not my capricious wish, but my proper moral wish, which gives the moral rule of my conduct towards my fellow-men. Unless we take the "Golden Rule" in this acceptation, it ceases to be a moral principle and becomes merely a jingling antithesis. Such was the false logic of Abolitionism, when arguing that the very relation of bondage was unrighteous, from the "Golden Rule." Masters were reminded that were they bondsmen, they would desire their liberation without price; and were required to infer that it was their immediate duty to liberate their bondsmen without price. But it is perfectly plain that the argument is worthless until it has been proved that this wish for liberation on the part of the bondsmen is founded in moral right, and not merely in self-interest.

Thus the whole ethical question in debate was left untouched by this silly sophism. Yet self-righteousness and fanatical zeal made it pass for real argument with multitudes.

**Its Application Active as Well as Negative.**

Thus the foundation is laid for all our duties to men as men.

By whatever argument we are bound to seek our own good, by the same we are bound to seek their equitable good. The obligation is not only negative, such, namely, as binds us to refrain from injuring their well-being; but it is also positive, binding us actively to promote their welfare in all ways proper for us. If one says, "I fulfill all my obligations to my fellows, by this 'let alone' policy towards them"; I answer, Where would he be if they all had pursued the same

“let alone” policy towards him? Ere now he would have perished. Social interdependence is the ordinance of God, as appears from every fact in the natural order. The due performance of social duties is as essential to each as his food and drink.

By the equitable rule, your fellow-man is equally entitled to have all social duties performed, which are equitably promotive of his welfare. The foundation principle of right, which grounds the negative duty of refraining from injury, equally grounds the affirmative duty of helping our fellow's welfare. What is that foundation? The benevolent and righteous will of the Maker, that each of His creatures shall realize that happiness which is his natural end, at least, until he makes himself unworthy of it. Hence it follows, that when proper ways offer for our helping the welfare of our fellows positively, the divine end as truly requires us to use them for our neighbor's lawful advantage as it requires us to refrain from hindering it.

#### The Subsequent Method Proposed.

The modes in which this obligation may bind are as various as the relations, general or special, temporary or permanent, into which one may fall with his fellow-creatures. Different writers have given different classifications of these various duties by taking up different grounds of division. One proposes that we shall consider our neighbor's bodily, mental and moral well-being; but this would only lead us to repeat the same principles with unimportant variations. Sundry of the Greek and Roman moralists proposed to classify all duties under the heads of Prudence, Fortitude, Temperance, and Justice, which is also Bentham's division. But this is partial and inaccurate. For instance, is not temperance (*ἐπιφροσύνη*) much more nearly akin to fortitude than the great class of duties of benevolence which is omitted is akin to either of the others?

Others propose to divide duties into those which man owes to himself, to his immediate family, to his common-



wealth, to mankind in general, and to his God. I do not propose to follow out either of these divisions. The best of them is less scientific in reality than in appearance. A complete discussion of all the duties of practical ethics under any such plan would require far more space than I can command, and would result in much unprofitable virtual repetition. The distinct principles of morals are only of a definite number; but their applications are endlessly diversified by the varying circumstances of different men. All that any limited treatise can really do is, to signalize a certain number of these applications discreetly chosen out of the vast field of personal, social and religious obligations. For thus the student will be instructed and trained in the spirit and principles of morals, and the right method of their application to any case, however novel to him.

## CHAPTER II.

## DUTIES OF CHARITY.

## I. Duties of Succor and Almsgiving.

The word "charity" has received in our modern popular speech a sense much too limited. In this sense it suggests almsgiving; and by the charitable man is understood, one who is prone to give of his substance to human wants. But *caritas* (from *carus*, dear) is in philosophy the Latin equivalent of *ἀγαπή* which is the generic term for the whole social affection in its rational and moral aspect: The general duties of charity, or *ἀγαπή* have been sufficiently defined in our last chapter. This amiable principle should prompt every man to do everything which is righteously and reasonably in his power to promote the welfare and happiness and to minimize the misery of any fellow-man within his reach. The closer relations of social life, of course, contribute a higher phase of obligation to the duties of benevolence towards these nearer objects. Several of those particular duties will be reserved for discussion under subsequent heads. This general duty of charity is exceedingly comprehensive. "Love worketh no ill to its neighbor." There is, therefore, a sense in which "Love fulfilleth the whole law." When examining the affection, we saw that its immediate practical prompting was to do something to confer well-being on its object. Therefore the man who is intelligently actuated by love, strives to perform all duties of benevolence, and refrains from every act of malevolence. But that conduct practically includes every social duty to our fellow-creatures.

I propose to signalize three special classes of these duties of charity or love, because they are so frequently misunderstood and so often neglected by persons claiming morality.

**Duty of Succor.**

The first is the duty of active succor of our fellows in distress. We have seen the impulse prompting these duties in the instinctive affection of sympathy. Its obvious final cause discloses God's will concerning this class of duties. The "Golden Rule" also applies as a ground of obligation. If any one were in distress and were refused sympathy and the fruit of sympathy, the effort to relieve, he would judge himself maltreated; he would think himself deprived of that species of right which moralists term "an imperfect right." The word is ambiguous. But their meaning is correct; for these are such rights, which are not enforceable by legal compulsion, and yet are true moral titles in the sense that they cannot be withheld without wrong. Or, thus, sympathy solaces and alleviates misery. But it is our duty to reduce the aggregate of misery, and increase that of happiness, in all legitimate ways.

Under this head comes the duty of almsgiving, implying in the destitute object an "imperfect" or unenforceable right. For as money is an instrument of relief, the duty of sympathetic aid includes the gift of money to our suffering fellow-creatures. The best commentary on the importance of this obligation is the degrading and imbruting effect of withholding it in the presence of suffering, and the pure and ennobling pleasure of disinterested almsgiving.

Most people, in judging the duty of almsgiving, harbor an obstinate but gross mistake as to the extent of their title to their own possessions. They claim absolute ownership of them; and then they stubbornly ask, "May I not do what I will with my own?" Now, in fact, no one except God has absolute ownership of anything, as we shall prove in the proper place. There is not a man in the world who, in this sense, owns an inch of land or a penny of money. They are all but life-tenants under God, the absolute owner. So that while the title which He has given each one holds perfectly good against all intrusions by his fellows, it does not in the least diminish his responsibility to the Divine Landlord.

This being true, the question, What are the proper uses for the life-tenant to make of his trust? turns wholly upon this other question, What are the sovereign proprietor's designs in entrusting him with the property? These are always equitable and beneficent.

Every selfish use of the trust, then, instead of being justifiable, on the principle that a man may do what he wills with his own, is a double sin, the sin against our suffering fellow and a sin against the Master of our stewardship.

## 2. Duty of Forgiveness.

The second duty is that of forgiveness under injuries. Resentment, the emotion which opposes forgiveness, is evidently instinctive and implanted; therefore, it must have some legitimate scope. When we inspected it, we found it to be simply the feeling which reacts against injustice, and not against mere pain. It is properly a moral emotion, for it does not arise against the agent who unintentionally hurts us, though our pain be just as great. It is peculiarly the energizing emotion which prompts directly to resistance, invigorates us for it, and makes us, for the time, oblivious of prudential dissuasives. Its final cause is to enable and inspire man for self-defense. It was implanted by the Creator for this purpose, with evident reference to the fact that we have to live in a world containing many aggressors. Resentment must, therefore, have some legitimate scope. So St. Paul implies in the precept: "Be ye angry and sin not." Christ's perfect holiness did not forbid His being angry. If any one affects such benevolence as to feel no resentment, I ask him, Have you any emotion of moral delight in right and good acts? If not, you are immoral. If one says that he has, then moral indignation at bad acts is necessarily implied; for righteousness and injustice are antithetic poles of the moral magnet. Or if he says, "I am so philanthropic that my moral indignation only arises at witnessing my neighbor's wrong, not my own," I answer that the moral quality of the injustice is not altered a particle by the

circumstance that you are the object of the wrong instead of your neighbor. Our principle only requires you to love him as yourself, not more than yourself. These goodish people who profess insensibility to the wrongs done themselves are usually persons who do not know themselves, and when aroused, prove the most vindictive of all. This inspection of the final cause of resentment and its nature shows what the limits of its indulgence are. It must be restrained strictly within the purposes of self-defense. The moment it goes to retaliation it becomes sinful. Suppose, then, that the wrong you have received is punished and the aggressor has ceased to attack, then resentment must cease and retaliation be foresworn. The love of benevolence (not that of complacency) must revive toward the person of the injurer; for the obligation to this affection does not suppose innocency in him who is the object of it. For all are sinners, and if we refused all love on that ground, there could be no benevolence. Certainly we could not claim to be the objects of any. Again, this love of benevolence is obligatory, and its very nature is to seek the good of the object, not on account of his moral merit, but in spite of his demerit.

#### The Duty of Forgiveness Defined—Its True Ground.

This, then, is the duty of forgiveness, to forgive, or remit the retaliation, and suppress the active impulse thereto, and give back to the injurer the love of benevolence, but not that of complacency until he repents. I assert that this duty to forgive is not grounded in the belief that unjust aggressions deserve no retribution. They do deserve it always by their strict moral desert. Otherwise how could God judge the world? The ground of our duty of forgiveness is that the retributive function does not belong to the creature, but to the Creator. Does not the magistrates' retributive function make an exception from this position? No; because it is merely delegated from God. Retribution belongs only to the Creator. For, first, all sin is ultimately against Him, so that He is mainly concerned in its

adjustment; and the creature must not meddle with His prerogative. He, as proprietor and sovereign ruler of all, has the exclusive right to decide how their final deserts shall be meted out to them. Second, we creatures have not knowledge enough; omniscience is requisite to appraise all the aggravations and palliations, so as to apportion retribution accurately. Third, we are all culprits ourselves, indebted to divine forgiveness for all our welfare. This is the beautiful argument of Matthew xviii. Fourth, the duty of forgiveness is farther reinforced by the thought that sinfulness in the object should not stay it, else it would find no place on earth, since all men have sinned. Benevolence aims, of course, to minimize natural evil, provided no higher consideration calls for its endurance. Hence, any natural evil retorted on the injurer, after the purposes of self-defense are satisfied, is a gratuitous increase of the suffering, which the doer, however just and moderate we in our heat may deem it, will very surely judge excessive. So he will feel justified by your act to retort it. When will this course of mutual retaliation stop? The only sure way to arrest it is to forgive the first injury.

In our analysis of the feeling of resentment we always find an element of pain. Even the righteous mind feels it in exercising the resentment most consciously justifiable. Since this pain is instinctive, it is the constitutive work of our Creator. What does it mean? It is evidently a restraint which He imposes upon the continuance of resentment. This is its "final cause." It intimates to us the will of God: "Let not the sun go down upon your wrath." It teaches us that resentment ought to cease as soon as it has subserved its purpose of self-defense.

#### To What Forgiveness Extends.

Let us, in conclusion, ascertain what it is that we properly forgive. Inspecting any act of injustice, such as robbery, for instance, we find that it includes in its results, first, a loss to the injured party (*damnum*); second, an increase of the foul,

subjective character in the agent (*macula*); third the obligation to just penalty (*reatus*); and fourth, the excitement of natural resentment in the person aggrieved. Let it be carefully observed that the first and the fourth results are personal to that party.

These, therefore, he has both the right and the power to dismiss.

These, accordingly, are what he properly forgives or remits.

The second and third results are not personal to the aggrieved party. Hence, he has no more concern or right to give them away than to give away other people's property. The second element can only be removed by the true repentance of the wrong-doer, with its "meet fruits." Not until these are exhibited is the injured party bound, or even allowed, to disregard the character of the culprit, or to withdraw his moral disapprobation therefor, or to withhold any of its requisite expressions. The third element, guilt, is met by penal satisfaction, which is the affair of God and His magistrate, not of the injured person. I conclude, then, with the sound old moralists, that the proper object of forgiveness is only a person liable to suffer for his guilt, and not his evil principle or conduct. For the latter the good man has no charity; for the former, unfailling charity.

### 3. Responsibility for Influence.

The third duty of charity, which I briefly expound, is our responsibility for our influences. If your act, which is morally requisite, occasions (it cannot cause) a stumbling-block

*σκάνδαλον*) to a fellow-man, you are not responsible. If your morally prohibited act either occasions or causes *σκάνδαλον*, you are responsible. And the evils of your influence are added as an aggravation to the guilt of your transgression. If an act is morally non-essential and you persist in doing it for needless, though innocent, self-gratification, thereby occasioning *σκάνδαλον*, you are guilty for the mis-

chief you do, because you were not bound to have the self-gratification. You are always bound to try to prevent the avoidable sin and misery of others by all the legitimate means in your power. The argument is based upon the natural principle of example and imitation. These are described in our first book. The propensity to imitate was found to be instinctive—a native phase of man's social quality. Its final cause is that it may be a lever of training, and influence for good. Of course, then, we are responsible for all the influences we thus wield. This is confirmed by the law of equitable relations enounced at the outset. Influence is my personal emanation. For scarcely anything else am I so directly responsible. If, by my words, I seduce one to a crime, the law itself makes me an accessory before the fact. Influence by example is my emanation as strictly as is my speech.

**It Is Wrong to Induce Our Fellows Needlessly to Courses Injurious to Life or Morals.**

Again, I am bound to refrain from any system of business or pleasure, which is not morally obligatory, that has a regular tendency to degrade the moral character of my agents or instruments therein. For to pursue these occupations or pleasures is to sin against the equitable law of love, by preferring my non-obligatory pleasure or profit to their moral welfare; this is the essence of the sin of selfishness. This argument condemns the frequenting of circuses, theatres and dram-shops, even within the bounds of temperance, for experience shows that the regular tendency of these pursuits is to debauch the character of the agents. Nor is the argument weakened by the fact that these are such agents by their own voluntary consent; for they have no right to give such consent. The hired agent of a murderer accepts the bribe by his own free consent; yet he and the man who bribes him are both assassins.

So it is a sin against our neighbor to induce or compel him to any vocation injurious to health and life, not morally



obligatory, or to prefer larger profits by unhealthful methods to smaller by healthful ones. Again, their consent does not authorize us, because they have no right to give it. Generally it will have been our injustice or cupidity, that has created the dilemma, which tempts them to self-injury.

We must, hence, infer that if man is immortal, and is under any probation for his future state, then these obligations all apply to impel us to promote our fellow-men's spiritual interests, with a force as much greater as eternity is longer than earthly life.

## CHAPTER III.

## DUTIES OF THE FAMILY.

## I. Parental Duties and Rights.

Specific social relations fall under three heads—the Family, the Church and the State. All these are both natural and ethical institutes, and man's subordination to either is not artificial or optional, but original and natural. Yet the second enforces this obligation only by moral influence, because its ends are solely spiritual, are met only by hearty and spontaneous action, and force is wholly irrelevant and impotent to produce it.

Under the family relation stand, first, the parental and filial duties. The light of Nature reveals these in two facts. The first of these is, the notorious and complete dependence of children on parents. Parents determine instrumentally the very existence of their children. They are bone of their bone and flesh of their flesh. They have the whole welfare of their children under their power, certainly for evil, probably for good. The second fact is, that this enormous power is counterpoised by a peculiar affection—the parental, usually the strongest, certainly the most disinterested, in the human breast. It is certainly instinctive, including, at least as one of its elements, what the Greeks called *στοργή*. This proves it to be a divine implantation. Its final cause is obviously to provide for the preservation and moral nurture of the young. To this dependence filial affection responds, which, though not as powerful or permanent as the parental, is one of the strongest. These facts disclose the precept of God to the conscience and reason, that parents are bound to preserve and train their children, and children to obey their parents in

all their lawful commands. Duties and rights are reciprocal.

The mental and moral culture, up to the highest limit of the parents' ability, is, of course, as much more obligatory than the bodily nurture as the soul is above the body and immortality longer than life. The neglect of moral training is monstrous, involving an outrage of the clearest sentiments of Nature and flagrant injustice to the offspring. What right had the neglectful parent to endow the child with the responsible and perilous boon of existence, if the donor is so to act as to make it a curse?

**The Duty of Moral Training Transcendent—Especially Seeing That Parents Transmit Depravity.**

This is fearfully enhanced by the experimental fact that the parents are instruments of transmitting to the child, along with the boon of existence, the congenital moral disease of a tendency to sin. This is powerfully enforced by the parallel of congenital bodily disease. The parent who knew himself the instrument, though unwilling, of implanting in the body of a beloved child the seeds of a formidable disease, would feel the tenderest and most solemn obligation to use the remedies suited to subdue or to palliate it.

Even the first Napoleon with his iron heart recognized this obligation. When he found himself dying at St. Helena with cancer of the stomach, and recognized the risk that his only son might inherit the dread disease, he exacted a pledge of his Italian physician, Dr. Antomarchi, that, after his own death, he would return to Italy and watch over the young Prince's health. How savage must be that nature which, after transmitting to that offspring it professed to love the moral curse of a perverted will, neglects any means for its remedy! The obligation is also enforced by the fact that the child's period of youth, which is perforce spent under parental authority, is the forming period when character is moulded, usually decisively, for good or evil. Parental neglect is therefore likely to be irreparable.

**Responsibility for Influence Greatest in Parents.**

I recall what was argued of our responsibility for influence over any fellow-man whatsoever. Influence is potent in proportion as the subject is near, and is softened by affection to receive the impress. When the influence projected is that of a parent over his own children, he is bound by additional obligations, the solemnity and tenderness of which cannot be exaggerated, to make sure that it is all on the right side. Thus it appears that he is even more bound to teach by example than by precept.

**Parental Rights.**

We saw that the general proposition, that rights are always correlative to duties, needed qualification. But it is usually true; and here these parental obligations unquestionably evolve corresponding rights. These are, to control and govern their children in the Lord; to direct their education, and enjoy their help in need. No argument is needed, but to say that without these powers parental duties could not be performed.

Against this inherent right to direct the children's government and education, the theory of compulsory State education sets up a rival claim which puts the commonwealth on the parents' throne.

**The State's Claim to Educate.**

The plea is that parents often neglect that duty, and this entitles the State to provide for her own existence by insuring herself against untrained citizens. The theory is a pagan one, appearing in history first in the much-bepraised but cruel and corrupting legislation of Sparta. It has only a show of justice in as far as parents manifest themselves to be incompetent to the safe education of their own children. Its illogical character as a basis for the general claim is readily made apparent. The parental relation and family institution are as much natural, original and authorized as the State itself. The parent's prerogative is even prior in date and superior in necessity to

that of the magistrate. The family was before the commonwealth: it must exist and produce its results before there can be any commonwealth. Consequently the family has a higher right to exist and to protect all its legitimate functions than the State has. Does the State plead, that some parents are derelict to their children's training in such a way as to jeopardize the well-being of the commonwealth? And is this made the pretext for the State's usurping the powers of all parents over their children, though guaranteed to them by God and Nature, with an authority more original and sacred than that of the State? The counter-plea of the parents is far more logical, that this intruder, the State, is jeopardizing the safety and purity of the family institute, by mismanaging the parental functions which it has invaded. The latter plea has more basis of facts; for more mismanagement of the delicate tasks of education is sure to result from the State's intrusion than from the partial delinquency of some parents, which results when the task is left where Nature and Reason have placed it. The adoption of this Spartan theory by the forward liberals of our day presents an absurd instance of incongruity. They always profess to be the ardent advocates of personal rights. But this extreme theory of State education belongs to a system of iron despotism. The State should exist for the behoof and welfare of individuals. This pagan, Greek theory makes the individuals exist for the behoof of the State. True republicanism represents the body of independent citizens as the sovereignty, and magistrates as their servants, holding none except delegated powers, and these expressly limited by the constitution, while all others are reserved to the people.

But this educational theory represents the commonwealth as the all in all, for the sake of which all the people exist; and its magistrates as entitled to the assumption of every social function which they may suppose promotes the strength of the all-engrossing corporation. It is the theory of Hobbes' Leviathan. This is confirmed by its history. It first appears

in full working in the constitution of Sparta, which was an iron despotism, as foul as it was ruthless and bloody. It was introduced into the politics of the nineteenth century, theoretically near the end of the previous century by the Jacobins of the Reign of Terror, but practically by the tyrant Napoleon and the despotic King of Prussia, and for the same political ends. But now we see it the cherished idol of professed liberals. This, however, is precisely the practical commentary which should be expected upon the essential affinity of the radical and the despotic theories. The latter sacrifices the inalienable rights of individuals to an absolute king or oligarchy; the former to the will of what happens to be the major mob.

#### A State Religion Logically Involved in State Education.

Again, the logic is refuted by the reflection, that its steps lead us still more surely to the doctrine of religious establishments. What are those steps? Since the commonwealth is entitled to exist, it is entitled to take all the powers necessary to secure its proper existence. Ignorant citizens endanger that end. Therefore the State is entitled to assume the function of educating all the citizens. I proceed by the same steps, but with stronger premises. Since the State is entitled to exist, it is entitled to take all powers necessary to secure its proper existence. Immoral citizens endanger that end. But the influences of the Christian religion alone furnish a sufficient basis for morality. (Thus testifies all history, and more expressly the fathers of our country, as Washington and Patrick Henry.) Therefore, the State is entitled to assume the function of Christianizing all its people. This conclusion, of course, would authorize the State to appoint a Christian pastor for every neighborhood, and tax the people to pay him, precisely as the commonwealths which hold the Prussian theory of education now appoint and pay schoolmasters. Every man who uses the premises to deduce the one plan and refuses to

deduce from them the other plan, a State religion, is glaringly inconsistent.

This charge is sustained by the whole of modern history.

First, every statesman of the Reformation epoch who, like John Knox, argued the right and duty of the State to educate the children, also argued State religion as an imperative duty from the same premises. Not a single leader of opinion can be found for two hundred years so absurd as to assert the one inference and discard the other. Every one of them would have rejected such a proposal with indignant contempt, as both foolish and wicked. This assertion is true, also, of the fathers of those New England commonwealths whom we now hear quoted in favor of a coercive system of State education without a State religion. Were they to return to life, they would repudiate such perversions of their authority as thoroughly deceitful. These modern advocates are especially fond of quoting the principles and the measures of the great Knox. Were that iron man to return to the earth just now, and to hear these pretended successors to his creed quoting him as authority for the educational rights of a State which they have stripped of all Christian character and of every right of Christian inculcation, one can imagine the thundering disclaimer which would come from the roughest side of his rough tongue. He would declare that such a State, giving such an education, was a conception of the devil himself. [Let the reader note that I do not say that this verdict of Knox is mine.] But next, it is a fact, very difficult for our recent theorists, that nearly all the statesmen in the world, at this very day, judge as the reformers did, concerning the inseparable conjunction of a State religion with a State education. In all Protestant Europe, there are but two commonwealths which, pursuing a State education, have abandoned a State religion. Ireland and the little canton of Lausanne in Switzerland. The departure of Ireland from the old doctrine has been the result of no consistent logic whatever, but of the political strategy of a prince of demagogues. Even free-think-

ing France, under a republican government, which regards the prevalent religion (popery) with suspicion and fear, in upholding the State education, still upholds her State religions. Thus sweeping is the current of enlightened opinion in the world on this point (overlooked in America, with an obtuseness almost insensate), that if the premises authorize a State education, they must also authorize a State religion. For every instructed mind sees that an agency which has inhibited itself from being Christian has thereby disqualified itself essentially from being an educator.

#### Education a Soul-Function.

The thing to be developed by an education is a soul, a monad endued with several faculties, among which the moral and spiritual must hold the ruling place, or else the result is a spiritual wreck and an immortal destiny ruined. The educator who cannot develop these ruling faculties can do nothing effectual. The training which he gives is merely a perversion, and not an education. Such is the testimony, not only of all the divines and moralists, but of all true statesmen and philosophers. Education is a soul-function. The modern American State is a political corporation. "Corporations have no souls." Can there be a greater solecism than to assign the training of souls to agents which have no souls? Does any one argue that the motherly cow, which supplies nutriment for the child's body and leather to shoe his feet, is therefore a suitable agent to train his mind and morals? She gives excellent milk, but none the less will she steal the growing corn of her master's neighbor, and, unlike the child, lack all rational knowledge that her theft is sin. Again, the weapon which the State wields by the authority of God and natural reason is force. Its emblem is the sword, the instrument of wounds and death. By its nature it has no other power of control. The sword is no implement with which to train a child. The proper implements of a teacher are light, love and conscience, sustained by parental authority, tempered



with parental tenderness. Does one reply, that this is a rhetorical trope, and not logic? Then I drop the figure and point to the fact, that when the State assumes as her own the immense function of all the parents, she places herself inevitably in this dilemma: either she lets her work go "at loose ends," to the ruin of the children's habits and principles, or she must organize a discipline of rigid system, and enforce all its details with military precision, by her one legitimate instrument of force. But this presents a system harshly unfitted for training the tender souls of children. and destructive of mental freedom.

**But Worse, Politicians Will Abuse the Function.**

Thus far the argument has proceeded on the supposition that the State will not intentionally pervert her educating power to corrupt ends. A sorrowful experience teaches us that the supposition is never safe. The modern "practical politician," like the mythical Harpies of Virgil, aims to grasp everything for his voracious appetite, and pollutes everything which he grasps. His one dominant thought is, how he may wrest the policy of the State, converting every object, commercial, industrial, military or judicial, to his partisan or pecuniary ends. Can we trust him to refrain from wresting this mighty but sacred educational function? Let the intelligent student look around and observe for himself.

**The State's Relation to Education Ancillary.**

On these grounds the extreme claim of the Spartan theory must be rejected. What, then, is the proper attitude of the commonwealth towards education? I reply, it is an ancillary and coöperative attitude. It is true that the education of the young is a concern of grand import, and that the State has much at stake in it. But it is also true that the family is a circle of social jurisdiction more strongly entitled to exist than the State itself; that the Creator and the light of Nature point out the parents as the proper heads of the family, clothed with

a higher and more inviolable authority over their children than any magistrate has over his fellow-citizens; that since it is wrong to do evil that good may come, no professed expediency can justify the usurpation of the parents' prerogative by another and a lower power; that such usurpation is as inexpedient and needless as it is unjust, because the best educational results are always obtained where the State recognizes the rights of parents and of individual citizens, and assists and encourages them in their all-important duties. Upon this position some may perhaps remark: "Well, such is the theory upon which multitudes are zealously supporting the actual measures of State education, and if others of its advocates really hold the more extreme and erroneous theory, since they concur practically in the same measures, where is the harm?"

I reply, that an erroneous theory is never harmless. Man is essentially a logical creature; while capable of much short-sightedness as to the ulterior outcome of his own opinions, and even capable of much intentional inconsistency in refusing to apply them squarely, he ever tends to work out the corollaries of his own theories. The erroneous theory may have stopped just now at inoffensive measures; it will not tarry there. If it is not refuted, it will be sure to advance to other measures, despotic and mischievous.

#### Correlative Filial Duties.

There are filial rights and duties, as those of obedience, of respect and gratitude, which are very sacred, and their breach very monstrous. Especially is the son bound to good parents by a great and tender tie of gratitude, because the boons he has received from his parents are so great (including existence itself), and have cost them so dear. This duty is peculiarly sacred in the parents' age and decrepitude. The children evidently have a right to subsistence, affection, justice in rule, and education, as far as the parents are able. Arrival at majority, of course, modifies filial duties. The child then becomes a civic equal to his parents, no longer subject to

domestic autocracy; but all duties of affection, respect and grateful recompense remain.

## 2. Nature of Marriage and Parentage.

The other main branch of the duties of the family is the conjugal and that of maintaining our own and others' chastity. Marriage was made by the popes a sacrament of the gospel. That marriage is not a sacrament is proved by the facts that it symbolizes no gospel grace, and that it is valid between unbelievers and even heathens. A true sacrament can never be extended beyond the pale of the gospel Church. Luther, roused by these arguments, went to the other extreme of teaching that marriage is a merely secular contract which has no more concern with the gospel or Church than any other civic co-partnership. This doctrine has borne bad fruits in Germany. So the atheistic republic in France adopted this principle, which is perpetuated in the present law, making the civic marriage at the "Mairie" the only form necessary to determine all the marital rights and the legitimacy of the offspring. But the ecclesiastical ceremony is permitted to follow for such as desire it. In our country the conception of the contract is evidently mixed. The commonwealth licenses it; the minister of the Church usually solemnizes it.

### Marriage More Than a Civic Contract—a Religious Bond.

The true conception of marriage must be sought either from the Scriptures by those who have sacred Scriptures, or, by those who have them not, from the light of reason and conscience, explaining the original and fundamental facts. To comprehend these is our present task. These facts are two, very obvious and simple, but very important. First, "Male and female made He them." Second, He made only one mate for the first man. And wherefore one? "That he might seek a godly seed." The race exists divided into sexes, a radical distinction, as much emotional, moral, social and intellectual as physical. The instinctive social affections point to

the conjugal union as their natural, safe and beneficent goal. By the same argument by which the fork calls for the knife, the one blade of the scissors for the other blade, the left-hand glove for the right-hand, Nature points us from sex to marriage. As any being is personally the better for being able to fulfill its whole natural end, so the man and the woman are, generally, the better, healthier, happier, more amiable and nobler by the union to which Nature points.

#### Sex Points Usually to Marriage.

Marriage is, therefore, always morally proper when the requisite conditions of suitable age, experience and means of support have been gained, and usually it is then a duty. But not seldom there are vocations to which individuals feel themselves called by the impulses of conscience, and with the successful fulfillment of these the marriage tie would be incompatible. Thus judged concerning themselves the pioneer missionary, Henry Martyn, and the heroic Christian soldier, Charles Gordon. All such persons are perfectly right in remaining unmarried. Every one is entitled to exercise his own discretion in deciding whether he has received such a vocation. All the appetencies which the Creator implants as constitutive of our nature must have somewhere their suitable scope. These adaptations and appetencies find their virtuous scope in marriage.

#### Parentage a Spiritual and All-Important Relation.

There is another grand natural fact, that of parentage, whose significance can only be understood when we remember these truths: First, man is not only an animal being, but a spiritual, rational, responsible and immortal being, "made a little lower than the angels." Next, since this is so, of course the responsible and immortal results of his existence constitute his true higher end, transcending all mere earthly ends as much as the powers engaged are higher and the existence longer. Third, when the Creator endued human beings with

the power of reproduction, he must have had chiefly in view, not its animal and temporal, but its rational, spiritual and eternal results. The debate between the traducianists and creationists whether parents generate the rational souls of their progeny as they do their bodies, or whether these souls are each created as directly as Adam's, may remain one of the most perplexed and unsettled in philosophy. But in whichever way it may be decided, the fact will still remain that the Creator has made the parents the proximate and responsible instruments of giving existence to a whole man, animal and spiritual. Thus human parentage institutes a new immortal destiny. It evokes out of *nihil* an immortality, henceforth inalienable, capable of a misery or blessedness that tends to the infinite. It lights a new star, which must burn on with a light, either benign or lurid and self-consuming, when Sirius and Arcturus shall have gone into eternal darkness. This is the most stupendous thing which has been done on earth since God fashioned the first man in His own image (except the life and resurrection of Christ); a continuation, indeed, and repetition of the august miracle of creation.

#### Superior to Any Angelic Function.

To appreciate this, let us for a moment compare the method of the angels' existence with man's. The angels are single integers. They do not multiply themselves. Their number can have no increase, except as God might add to it by new creative acts. So many angels remain just so many to all eternity, each one earning for himself one destiny for weal or woe, and no more. But for man's race the Creator devised a more splendid thing, the power of indefinite self-multiplication; so that a unit-man, having secured his own destiny by the right use of his free-agency, had the prerogative of instituting other destinies, coördinate with his own, not only of the first, but of the second and many successive generations. It is his grand task to give, by his virtues and efforts, the favorable direction to these new destinies also, as

well as to his own, thus multiplying beings, blessedness and glory to endless ages. The elect angel Gabriel is blessed, but he remains one only; the elect father of believers, Abraham, surrounds himself with a multitude, "as the stars for number," happy as himself. Perhaps when the heavenly spiritual beings saw the Creator proceed to endow His new rational creature, man, with an animal nature, they were amazed. They questioned. "Has He thereby degraded the creature made in His own image? Has He not now allied man to the beasts of the field, His destined slaves?" The solution is, that by thus giving the human person animality God was providing for man this new and astonishing glory of the reproduction of immortal souls. Reproduction had hitherto been only of the vegetable or the animal, "of the earth, earthy." By this new expedient, reproduction came to include the beings next to the angels in rank. This lifted the function for rational man out of the mire of earthiness, and ennobled and sublimated it.

#### Marriage the Lawful Sphere for Parentage.

Marriage is the sphere, defined and marked off by God and Nature, for this prerogative of mankind. Within this sphere it is, for parents who purpose to perform their duty, legitimate, honorable and spiritual; outside of it, and for profane and neglectful parents within it, the function is earthly and animal, and when prompted merely by sensuality, is wholly brutal and brutalizing. The function, holily exercised within this sphere, with due parental fidelity following, raises the race towards heaven and the angels. Selfishly exercised outside of this sphere, or with neglect of parental responsibilities, it covers with guilt, pollutes, degrades and draws down the transgressors towards the mire of bestiality. The man who willfully selects the animal side of the function, discarding the spiritual and eternal, therein does what in him lies to inflate, to exaggerate the animal that is naturally in him, until it overshadows and crushes down, yea, buries the

spiritual and leaves him a beast, without, alas! the beast's privilege of returning to mere dust.

**The Institution, Therefore, Spiritual as Well as Civic.**

This view settles the question, of course, whether marriage ought ever to become a merely secular or earthly institute. It can only be made merely secular by neglecting its main end. It is designed to "seek a godly seed." Its solemnization, then, while not a sacrament, is appropriately made religious. Yet the commonwealth cannot wholly release it from civic control, because it is also a contract of citizens and involves secular rights as to subsistence and questions of successions of property. As the Christian family is the constitutive integer of the Church, so the legal family is the constitutive integer of the State. That training function which is the chief duty of the family is also the main instrumentality to prepare the young to be good citizens.

**Monogamy—Mormonism.**

The only righteous law of marriage is doubtless monogamy, the faithful and life-long union of one man to one woman—"They twain shall be one flesh." This is argued, first, from the fact that the Creator made the first man but one wife. So argues Malachi, chapter ii., and Jesus Christ. It is to be inferred, next, from the remarkable providential fact that nearly an equal number of males and females are born by ordinary generation. This fact is as uniform as it is inexplicable by physiological science, and it appears most significant when compared with the inequality of the ratio between the sexes among the lower animals. It thus appears that the Creator is still providing but one woman for one man. Third, the natural instincts and affections of both sexes are evidently adjusted to monogamy. They persistently demand each one a whole object. The division of conjugal affection to more than one is an unavoidable cause of jealousies, which are unappeasable until they are choked down by moral degrada-

tion or misery. The man or woman who does not feel them fails to feel them only because he or she is debauched or degraded in soul. This natural jealousy is as natural to one sex as to the other.

Hence, that state of society which claims for the male the privilege of outraging this jealousy, but denies the equal privilege to the female, is unreasonable and unjust. Unless the man reconciles himself to polyandry, he has no right to expect his wife to reconcile herself to polygamy. Hence, any other marriage than monogamy is immoral, because it virtually reduces the wife from the honored state of man's helpmeet to that of his plaything or slave.

Witness history. The Mormon women are practically the slaves of the husband (except the pet of the season), retained as much for their domestic and agricultural labor as for the playthings of his passion. Last, all unions except that of monogamy fail fatally of that which is the main end of marriage, the "rearing of a godly seed." Moral education cannot go on aright in a polygamous family. The father is not in the right relation to his children of the different mothers. Their divisions must divide the family. The young grow up in the midst of strifes. They are often too numerous to receive enough of the father's care. But as the neglect of the duties naturally due to one's progeny is a monstrous sin, a sin against Nature, so is polygamy. The statute laws of all civilized states, therefore, most righteously make bigamy a felony.

Let a word here be introduced as to the Mormon muddle. The fact that these felonies are not at once effectually abated by the strong hand of the law is a disgrace to America, a sin against civic morality and decency, and brings a fearful curse on the country, which some day will present the alternative of barbarizing the whole, or of blood. The folly of all such partial dealing as the earlier legislation of Congress, only disfranchising continuing polygamists, is that it virtually legislates a connivance at what other laws of the country stamp as felony. The half measure was like the anti-duelling article



in the constitution of Virginia. The statutes say that duelling is murder. If so, the only consistent thing to do with the duellist who has killed his man is to hang him out of hand. All the seconds should also be punished as accessories before the fact to murder. But the special anti-duelling article in the constitution disfranchises them. The commonwealth thus publishes expressly that she expects the defiance of her own statutes and provides partial impunity beforehand therefor.

Two follies have complicated this Mormon question in the Territories. One is the plea of liberty of conscience. Plurality is a doctrine of their religious creed, which they say is conscientiously held. Hence, it was weakly inferred that any penal law against their bigamy would be a persecution for conscience sake. The true doctrine of mental freedom grounds no such inference. That doctrine is the following: While man is under a moral obligation to his God to think aright on all moral subjects, and, in the sphere of that divine obligation, has no liberty of erroneous thoughts, in the sphere of human authority each man must be his own judge as to the correctness or error of his own thinking, and no human authority in Church or State can rightfully infringe that freedom. But it does not follow hence, that the erroneous thinker has liberty to put his free thoughts into effect in actions prohibited by the laws of his country. I repeat, the earthly authority may not punish him for thinking as he pleases, but it is authorized to restrain him from effectuating erroneous thoughts in erroneous actions. Let the reader consider that if he is allowed to do this, there is virtually an end of civil government, since the most destructive crimes would claim impunity. For, as we have seen, some men actually persuade themselves that they are right in executing every form of transgression. Some one may ask: May not the authority of the State or Church so conflict with the authority of God that it becomes the freeman's duty to appeal to the principle that "we ought to obey God rather than man"? I reply that such a case may arise. But it arises only when

the act or omission required of individuals by the human authority would be essentially sin *per se*, when obedience to the human would be unavoidable, positive disobedience to the divine authority. When this extreme conflict occurs, the free citizen must obey his conscience and resist even such human authorities as were legitimate up to that point. When a State lays her prohibition upon a given action, the dissentient must be able to show that the mere omission of that action would be sin *per se* for him; else he must conform his action to the State's judgment against his own judgment.

This obligation follows from his duty of allegiance as a private citizen to civil government, as the ordinance of God, Reason and Nature, for the common peace and order. Now, if we conceded the sincerity of a Mormon, the utmost that could be inferred would be that it was allowable for him to have a plurality of wives, provided there were no civil law against it. It would be mere impudence for him to infer that he must necessarily commit a sin against his God, even upon Mormon principles, by contenting himself with one wife.

They pretend to claim the authority of the Hebrew commonwealth, though even this erroneously. The utmost that could be made of this inference would be that the plurality of Jacob was allowable. It would be mere insanity to infer that the monogamy of Isaac was criminal. The issue, then, between the civil law and the Mormon is this: The law says that plurality is the crime of bigamy. The Mormon dare not say that monogamy is any crime at all. Hence, when he pleads his pretended conscience against this law, he is preferring crime to innocency—and that by his own pretended standard of judgment. For in obeying the civil law he would be entirely innocent, by his own standard; whereas, in disobeying it in such a case he is criminal by that admitted standard of duty which requires of all obedience to the powers that be.

The other sophism, which for a time perverted the federal legislation, was a misapplication of the doctrine of States'

rights. It was actually argued in Congress that because the laws against bigamy were State enactments, and the constitution of the United States contained no article forbidding it, Congress had no authority to legislate concerning bigamy in a Territory which was the common property of the States. The strong advocate of States' rights, if clear-headed, would have inferred the opposite from that very doctrine. The States, as sovereigns, were joint owners of the Territories, the federal government was the common agent, or trustee, charged by the constitution with the administration of these Territories, for the equitable behoof of the owners. Hence it followed, that the constitutional fidelity of Congress should have been to execute the trust, according to the common mind of those sovereigns, legalizing among the people of the Territories all the rights conceded by the laws of any State to its citizens, and prohibiting to those people whatever the sovereign owners all concurred in prohibiting to their own citizens. Now, every State had prohibited bigamy to its own citizens and made it a felony. Congress should, therefore, have made it a felony, from the first, in the Territories.

Thus this poisonous plant would never have gotten root upon the American soil, to the disgrace of our people and our institutions.

The paltering policy dictated by those sophisms, and pursued by the demagogues for their selfish, personal intent, has encouraged this foul and monstrous growth until it creates the alternative of extensive bloodshed in the future, or of the corruption and barbarizing of the whole country.

### **Polygamy Not Legalized by Moses.**

The odious claim of the Mormons, from the polygamy of some of the Old Testament patriarchs, makes it necessary for me to teach the student, at this place, the historical truth upon that subject. This is the more requisite because sundry interpreters of the Scriptures themselves so strongly misrepresent the Hebrew laws on this point. Students may be

embarrassed when told that many of these interpreters, who claim to be both Christian and learned, concede the statement that Moses legalized polygamy. But when we find the reasons which sway such writers to this groundless concession, our minds will be disabused of their influence.

One explanation is, that there have been in America and Europe schools of Bible criticism which are pleased to approach the laws of Moses with the contemptuous postulate, that his writings are merely mythical, and the productions, moreover, of barbarians. Of course such critics, beginning with this insolent assumption, are prejudiced against the documents they profess to study, and are eager to find in them the most odious blemishes. But there are not a few among other schools of Bible criticism, professing reverent faith in the Hebrew Scriptures, who yet fancy that they must needs echo the pretended conclusions of the infidels, in order to share their reputation for advanced learning. Again, there are noisy and aggressive schools of theology whose peculiar dogmas create with them a strong polemical tendency to blacken the institutions of the Hebrews. The Socinian theory, for instance, necessitates the widest possible contrast between the elevation and purity of the New Testament ethics, and of Jesus their teacher, and what they suppose to be the imperfection and grossness of the Old Testament ethics and Moses. For after denying to Jesus all divinity, and all sacrificial and expiatory actions, they have no way left to account for the preëminence claimed for Him among inspired teachers except by saying that it was a moral preëminence. Hence it is the polemic interest of the Socinian to blacken the morals of Moses and to find in him as many errors and impurities as he can.

The abolitionist has a similar polemical interest. He passionately concluded that all human bondage was sin *per se*. But he was answered by the irresistible reply, that Moses unquestionably legalized such bondage. His attempted escape from this refutation was to cry, "But Moses' code was immoral in several respects." Thus he also had a corrupt motive to

search out black spots in Moses' laws, and so he naturally adopted the Socinian libel as one of the desired blemishes, that Moses legalized polygamy also, which all know to be immoral.

I assert *quicumque vult*, that Moses never legalized polygamy. Let us see what the Old Testament really contains on the subject. It does narrate the polygamy of several of the unquestionably godly patriarchs, as Abraham and David, not of all. Isaac, purest of the patriarchs, never practised it, nor Moses, nor Aaron, nor Samuel. It is to be hoped no student is so superficial as to imagine that the candid narration of the sins of good men by the sacred writers is meant to authorize our imitation of them. This is too preposterous. The prophets also narrate the lies of Abraham and a murder perpetrated by David. This impartial honesty in describing their heroes is a signature of truth which goes far to show that their writings are not mythical. It is a much more reasonable supposition that the bad acts of men otherwise good are narrated for our warning, not for our imitation. And this is powerfully confirmed when we notice that the sacred historians in every case describe to us some miserable domestic strife, pollution or crime in these families of these polygamous patriarchs, as intentional specimens of the evil fruits of the sin. See the histories of Abraham, of Jacob, of Elkanah, of David, of Solomon: Or is it argued that surely polygamy must have been then legitimate, because else these godly men would not have lived in the relation in such calm unconsciousness? The inference is worthless. Do not both sacred and profane history, down to our own day, show us other evil acts, practiced by some godly men, seemingly without compunction? The Puritans of old and New England were conscientious supporters of the African slave-trade. The venerable and holy John Newton was master of a slave-ship for some time after his conversion, left that employment purely from domestic considerations, and to the day of his death in the venerable odor of sanctity continued to assert that the traffic was righteous. Seventy years ago the most pious Protestant farmers of Amer-

ica were habitual distillers. To-day tens of thousands of British and American Christians, possessed of commercial riches, are living in the habitual practice of enormous luxury and prodigality, and are applauded therefor by their clerical sycophants. Distinguished members of Protestant churches habitually appropriate great sums under the pretext of campaign funds, to what they know to be briberies, expressly condemned by the laws of God and their country. These facts do not argue that any such acts are lawful. They are solemn illustrations of a truth which it behooves every virtuous man to lay to heart, that corrupt opinions, custom, evil example, wealth and abundance, and unsuspected concupiscence, have a fearful power to blind the conscience, even of good men.

Having cleared away misapprehension, I now argue that the Old Testament never legalized polygamy. First, the sacred writer in the fourth chapter of Genesis, compendious as that narrative must needs be, paused to detail the criminal origin of the practice. He traces its beginning to the apostate family of Cain and to the murderer Lamech. Second, in accounting for that prevalence of iniquity which so prevailed in the human race as to require an avenging deluge, he describes the connivance of the professors of the true religion, and their borrowing this vice of polygamy from the apostate "sons of men." The prophet indicates that it was the wicked progeny of these corrupting marriages, who chiefly spread the evils which provoked the divine justice. Third, when the flood destroyed the evil race, and reduced the human species to the God-fearing remnant, we find one wife and no more preserved for each man. God thus gave the same inculcation in favor of monogamy which He had given by the creation of one wife for the first man. Fourth, in Deuteronomy the law of the kingdom is provided, by which the future king must regulate his conduct. He is forbidden to multiply wives unto himself, and in the same place he is prohibited greatly to multiply horses unto himself. The natural meaning of the first prohibition is, that the king should content himself with a single wife: but our

opponents construe it to mean, that when he becomes a polygamist he shall content himself with a moderate number of wives. This is clearly a forced construction of the word "multiply." When we remember that the original allotment to Adam, Noah, and his sons was one wife to each, the increase of the number to double appears obviously a multiplication. I find another reason for this construction in the fact that when Moses would express the idea of a large multiplication, he uses in the same verse a different phrase, "he shall not greatly multiply horses." If I am right, we have here an express Mosaic prohibition to the kings, which *a fortiori* forbids it to subjects. But two cavils are advanced against my construction of the precept. One is, that if polygamy were already unlawful for private citizens, the prohibition is so superfluous we cannot suppose Moses would have wasted space upon it. I reply, it is by no means superfluous, because Moses knew that polygamy was an abuse to which the future kings would be peculiarly tempted. Like other immoral luxuries, it was doubtless the usage of the rich and the great; for the narrow incomes of the poor would be a sufficient preventive with them, as it is now in Turkey, and thus the indulgence would come to be employed as the especial prerogative and signature of high rank. So that, supposing polygamy already unlawful for private persons, its express prohibition to kings in this place was most wise and timely. The second objection is, that had an express statute against royal polygamy existed, it would have been incredible that so conscientious a ruler as David would have lived in violation of it. But this is worthless, for David did live in violation of other express statutes. He broke the sixth and seventh commandments in the case of Uriah. He even broke this royal prohibition of royal polygamy in the sense of the objector. For not only did he have more than one wife, but he proceeded to a considerable multiplication of wives and concubines. The inference is therefore vain, that such prohibition could not have been known to David as in the Statute Book. The proper inference is this,

that we are here warned how fearfully brilliant successes, fame, riches and unlimited power tend to debauch the conscience even of a man who is striving to live righteously, which gives us a solemn caution against ambition.

My fifth point is, that in all the Mosaic legislation authorizing and protecting marriage, the word "wife" is used, and not "wives." It is this in the tenth commandment, in the law directing the manner of the high priest's marriage, and in other places. So that the letter of the law authorized monogamy, and not polygamy. Sixth, Malachi, in his second chapter, expressly prohibits polygamy, and argues against it from the original constitution of the human family. His position as an inspired prophet of the old dispensation makes it simply impossible that he should have prohibited what the dispensation originally legalized. The relation of all the prophets to Moses was simply that of expounders of his institutions, not of repealers. That their business was only to develop, never to revolutionize the Mosaic principles, is avowed even by Jesus, the great prophet of the new dispensation, when He assured the people that He came not to destroy the Law and the Prophets, but to fulfill, and that He should never repeal one jot or one tittle of them, sovereign though He was. Last, I am now led to my crowning argument, that the Lord Jesus expressly prohibited polygamy, and, referring to the history of Paradise, taught as Malachi had done, that monogamy was God's law for the race at the beginning. If, then, Moses, in his subsequent legislation, legalized an act which was sinful before his day, and would be sinful again after it, he was certainly not inspired. For moral truth and right are eternal. But this same Jesus endorses Moses' inspiration. If He endorsed an impostor, He must himself have been ignorant or dishonest. The inspiration of Moses cannot be attacked without involving that of Christ. They stand or fall together. The charge of this blot upon the Mosaic institutions, thus tends directly to infidelity.

It is admitted that the general opinion of the people of



God, partially corrupted by the example of the pagan world around them, and of their own great men, had probably come to regard these unnatural marriages with far less disapprobation than was proper. They were tolerated by church rulers, just as several things are tolerated in the churches of to-day which the more correct opinion of the future will condemn as unlawful for Christians. There was also a sense in which a long-suffering God winked at that ignorance and forebore for a time to chastise it, just as He is now forbearing the punishment of certain evils in modern Christianity. The man who, misled by the opinion of his day, entered into a regular marriage with a second and a third wife, during the life of the first, was wrong. But he was less wrong than the fornicator and far less guilty than the adulterer of our day. He, at least, attempted to extend to the accomplices of his sin all the protection and permanent rights of a wife, a home, a subsistence, a reputable social status. He aimed to confer upon the progeny of these wives all the rights of legitimacy, a regular home, an education, a name and an inheritance. He acted with a misguided humanity and justice, compared with which the customary conduct of the modern adulterer appears a monstrous inhumanity; for he leaves the accomplice of his illicit desires, often without a home or subsistence, and always without any legalized title to them, without name and without character. He visits, too, the same curse upon his innocent progeny.

#### Marriage of Minors.

All legislators and moralists assign to parents some control over the marriage of their minor children. By the Mosaic law, a contract of marriage made by a daughter in her minority, without the knowledge and consent of her father, was void. The New Testament, by clear implication, ascribed to the father the direction of the daughter's marriage. The Roman civil law did the same, as did the canons of the early Christian synods. In France the consent of the parents or

guardians is necessary to valid marriage, not only by the female, but by the male also. In Great Britain and the American commonwealths, which sprang from her, a legal license for the marriage of minors cannot be obtained without the father's consent; and the clerk issuing such license and the minister solemnizing the marriage are liable to punishment by heavy damages. Such is the law. But in America a freedom of usage has grown up, supported by romantic and illogical sentiments, which makes many of the young forget this just restraint.

No Christian moralist extends this parental authority to claiming for the father the right to force a distasteful marriage upon his child. This is always a grand injustice. Nor do any justify an opposition prompted only by churlishness, selfishness or stubborn prejudice. After children have passed their majority, parental control over their marriage must be limited to advice, entreaty and moral influences. The just rule is this, that as it is immoral in a parent to force any marriage, however desirable he may deem it, against the free option of his child, so it is immoral in the child to contract an engagement to marry, or to execute it against the father's consent, during minority.

The proofs are the following: Children owe obedience to their parents in all things which are not sin *per se*. But temporary postponement of marriage is not sin. In no case can a parent's right to obedience be more justly founded than in this, because the marriage of his daughter involves himself, his other children and his fortune in very momentous new relations. All these interests, it is his duty and right to direct and control, as it is his sacred duty to guard the welfare of a heedless daughter against an ill-advised connection, which he sees is likely to ruin her happiness. In proper marriage the parents acquire a new son; the children acquire a new brother; the father is presented with another heir to his estate in the person of the son-in-law; and the social relations and status of the whole family may be vitally modified.

Surely, the father has a right to a voice in the institution of all these new relations! But the disobedient daughter has either usurped the title to impose all these upon her parents and family, against their rights and wishes, or the alternative must be that her marriage shall be also her exile from home and friends. The latter she has no right to inflict on herself, as she has no right to inflict on them a bereavement virtually equal to her death. Another argument is found in the value of a parent's caution, experience and judgment in assisting the young to select a proper mate. These often lack such qualifications for choosing wisely, and in their heady self-confidence and heat of overweening affection they make mistakes fatal to their own happiness. It is true there are such things as churlish, prejudiced and mercenary fathers, who may set themselves against worthy suitors because they are not rich. But, in the general, the disinterested affection of parents for their children and their superior experience make them the safest directors. Young persons not seldom plead the sanctity of a lover's devotion, as though it were both impossible and evil to resist it. This romantic plea is usually no better than a cloak for headstrong self-will. It is too often refuted by the fickleness of the young person herself, and the speedy death of an affection which she had declared to be eternal, to claim this title of sacredness. But even if the attachment is honorable and steadfast, it is the duty of such a young person to remember that self-denial and the restraint of all our impulses, however powerful, are the conditions of every virtuous life. The mother's parental love for that young person was, in fact, an affection more profound and disinterested than hers for her lover, but had not the mother often curbed even that holy affection, this child would have missed the blessing of a virtuous mother's care. What right has she to demand exemption from the common law of righteous living on the petulant ground that hers is an attachment of a romantic complexion? What, then, is a young woman to do who is conscious of a steadfast devotion, and believes that it is well placed, not-

withstanding a father's dissent? She should postpone an engagement of marriage, and, of course, marriage itself, until her majority. She should require her suitor patiently to stand this test of his constant loyalty, and to give to her family this honorable proof that she had rightly judged him worthy. The suitor who would refuse such delay would thereby betray the unworthiness of his feeling, as either unmanly or designing.

#### The Villainy of Mercenary Designs in Suitors.

As for the man who plans to entrap an inexperienced minor into such a marriage, by profession of ardent attachments and admiration, from mercenary designs on her patrimony, he is little better than a swindler. His calculation is, that however the disapproving father may resent the connection, parental love will prevent his disinheriting his daughter, so that the husband will come, in spite of opposition, into the virtual enjoyment of another's wealth. Whether a father has a right to dispose of his daughter's hand or not, he certainly has a right to dispose of his own property. The method employed to rob him of it against his will has been as dishonest as any other fraudulent conspiracy, and is aggravated by the pretenses of affections through which it was executed.

#### Divorce.

Divorce is the annulling of the marriage tie. The Christian law unites the spouses "until death shall part them." The contract is life-long, and cannot be otherwise without crime in one or both parties. For the affection on which it is founded ought to be unique and inalienable. The rights and relations instituted are such as death alone can rightfully terminate. The tasks for the sake of which marriage is appointed are life-long tasks—the founding and governing of a family, the education and training of children, the mutual help and consolation of the parties in declining life. A copartnership formed for the express purpose of jointly executing a given work cannot be justly dissolved until the work is complete.

There are two distinct cases under the nominal head of divorce. First, where disqualifying circumstances preëxisted at the time of the contract, as previous marriage to a party still living, lunacy or idiocy in a party, infancy disqualifying for making such a contract, natural impotency to fulfill it. The law rightfully decides that here marriage never has existed; the pretense of marriage has been null and void from the beginning. Yet the party entering the union ignorantly in good faith (as the woman marrying a bigamist, really supposing him single) is innocent of the crime. The second cause of divorce is, where a marriage, lawful when made, is dissolved by the crime of one of the parties, and that crime is adultery, the violation of the marriage vow, or such obstinate and final desertion as implies adultery, or at least is an irreconcilable repudiation of the marriage tie. (See Christ, Matthew xix. 8-9; Paul, I. Corinthians vii. 15.) These crimes do destroy the bond, and it is a principle of equity, that a contract destroyed by one party cannot longer bind the other. The adulterer or adulteress should be as though dead to the innocent party. Hence, righteous divorce must be final. (See Deut. xxiv. 1-2.)

#### Enormity of the Sin against Married Vows.

The justice of this verdict, and also the capital guilt of adultery, are argued from its consequences—*e. g.*, the mortal anguish and sense of wrong in the innocent party; the undermining thereby of the family, with all its sacred interests, virtues and benefits; the infamy entailed on the innocent children; the attack thereby made on the welfare and even existence of all society; for the tendency of the adulterer's example is to reduce human society from all the order, happiness and virtues founded in the pure family down to the universal license, bloodshed and bestiality of brutes. Moses did wisely and justly in making it a capital crime. Modern laws in England and the commonwealths derived from her leave the grade of the crime in a state of uncertainty. If

retribution is sought by the law, the injured party receives pecuniary damages, which are, in theory, a compensation for the loss of the domestic services of the absconding party. The father of an unmarried daughter may seek similar damages from her seducer. But, by a curious legal fiction, juries are encouraged by the judges to make those damages as large as the fortunes of the culprits will allow. Although the real loss caused by the absence of the wife or daughter was equal to but a few dollars, the damages may be appraised, if the seducer is rich enough, at tens of thousands. Thus the best reparation provided for the wounded honor of a husband or father by these commonwealths, which claim to be so chivalrous, is a sum of money! But if the husband personally avenges the wrong by the death of the adulterer at the moment of detection, and in heat of blood, it shall be excusable homicide. This is thoroughly inconsistent, for it virtually admits the capital guilt of the crime, which the law elsewhere appraises as only a misdemeanor, punishable by fine. It is also worthy of remark, that we have here, under the full blaze of nineteenth century civilization, the ancient principle of Goelism, or the personal right of the avenger of blood, recognized in our laws. Its retention in the laws of Moses is, therefore, charged by us upon that code as a barbarism with very poor consistency.

Most modern laws, and many moralists, teach that the guilt of the adulteress is much worse than that of the adulterer. They argue that her sin tends to corrupt the blood of the family. This unjust discrimination is refuted by the question, Has not the adulterer been taking an equal chance of corrupting the blood of the family of somebody else? Moses punished male and female alike. This was right. The modern claim is but an attempt to have the male's superior might make his right. Another fact usually makes the male's guilt the greater, that he is often the first suggester, tempter and seducer.

**The Wickedness of Seduction.**

The guilt of the seducer is of the greatest and meanest, because the evils in whose production he has the larger share are so enormous—social ostracism, remorse, degradation, a probable career of sin leading towards perdition, and the immediate loss and sundering of happy ties; because these fiendish cruelties are wrought for ends purely selfish and vile; because they are perpetrated through a treason, the most loathsome—the assumption of the beneficent emotion of love and the abuse of a real and generous, though misguided, love in his victim, aggravated by subsequent desertion and contempt. The seducer is meaner than the murderer, and hardly less mischievous.

**No Righteous Divorce Save for the Scriptural Cause.**

All divorces for causes less than the destruction and forfeiture of the marriage vow are immoral, and all legislation providing for it is also immoral and alarmingly mischievous to society. Infirmary in a party by no means justifies divorce. The Church rightly made them take each other "for better, for worse." For the unafflicted partner would doubtless feel that conjugal help and sympathy would be all the more valuable to him were he suffering with bodily disease, and the only rule for him is, that he should "do unto others as he would that they should do unto him." I ask again: Should an unfortunate sufferer be forsaken by all his kind, because he has become decrepit or infirm? This would be the savage morality of the Fejee Islanders or Comanches. But if somebody is morally bound to stand by the sufferer, which individual is so much bound as the hale spouse, who is one flesh with her, and who has almost engrossed the help, affection and utility of the afflicted partner while she was strong?

Neither decline of love nor developed incompatibility is just cause of divorce. The former plea is unjust, because the party making it was to blame for having his love decline. Does he urge that the other party has become less lovable in

herself? If she has been depreciated by the influence of his unkindness or evil example, he cannot claim this excuse, for the evil is of his own making. If the possession of faults forbade love, nobody would be loved. The favorite sophism is, to plead that love is not under the control of volition. In one sense this is a psychological fact; but, none the less, men are responsible for the decay of an affection which they spontaneously professed; because, first, the coldness, if actual, always grows by gradual steps of their own neglect, or petulance, or provocation, from which they could have abstained; and second, love is always attracted or restored to the object for whom we habitually perform beneficent offices. The honest hospital-nurse invariably comes to love the foundling which she nurses with fidelity. If the husband had faithfully fulfilled the offices of beneficence to the wife, as he had vowed, and as he could have done if he had chosen, he would have continued to love her with all her faults. When parties plead an incompatibility of temper, they are to be reminded that they have themselves to blame for mistaking each other's characters. The sin of rashness was their own. No one is entitled to take an advantage from his own wrong. The laws which allow divorce to developed incompatibility propose a wicked premium to the discontented party to produce the antagonism by his own neglects and cruelties, of which he will then avail himself. Such laws virtually propose to the fickle husband, that he shall treat his wife with such injustice as becomes intolerable to her, and then advance this natural result of his own wickedness as entitling him to cast her off.

Is cruelty, and especially bodily assault, just ground for divorce? It may justify separation and a demand for alimony. It is to be remembered that the marriage does not enslave a woman, nor deprive her of the rights of a free citizen. If she judges it necessary for her safety or happiness to withdraw from her husband's abode, the law will not play slave-captor to force her back. If the husband can show that her withdrawal has been capricious and without sufficient grounds, the



law may judge between them so far as to release him from the obligation of her support and to restore to him the control of his children. But it goes no farther. It leaves her to exercise her choice of separate abode unless the husband can secure her voluntary return by renewed evidences of affection and justice. But the marriage still exists. There will be but few cases in which practical difficulty will arise concerning the justice of divorce on the plea of bodily assault. Men will very rarely be found to proceed to this extreme who have not prepared the way for it by previous adultery; and this gives the abused wife a righteous release.

#### **Many Present Divorce Laws Immoral and Perilous.**

The present complexion of divorce laws and the frequency of divorce in some States of America are a fearful portent. They attack the family, which is the corner-stone of society, morals and civilization. They are the expression of, and also the incentives to, a general corruption of heart and manners. Let any man of experience only bethink himself how the rearing of children, for instance, must be affected by these disruptions of families, and he will conceive what is to be the character of the next generation in those places where the divorces average one in every eight of the marriages. Has American society sufficient wisdom and courage to abate this nuisance? On the answer to this question turns the other, whether the American civilization is to perpetuate itself for any good or noble end, or to fall, according to the prognostics of unfriendly Europeans, into putrescence.

#### **Duties of the Conjugal Relation—Chastity in General.**

The duties of the conjugal relation are very easily deduced from the above discussion, and need little more than a statement. First and chiefest, for both parties, is the duty of love, the faithful nurture and cherishing of their mutual affection. Of course, their obligations involve a strict fidelity, in thought and deed, to the marriage vow. They owe to each

other a diligent coöperation in maintaining all the common interests of the family and children, mutual sympathy and help in all trials, concurrence in the moral training of the children. It is the husband's duty to put forth the sturdy effort and self-denial of the bread-winner, which is incumbent on him as belonging to the stronger sex. It is the wife's part to yield the free and affectionate obedience due to him who has to confront all the sterner responsibilities of their joint lives, and to be the protector of her and her children from all perils, even at the cost of death. Again, the law of the land holds the husband sternly responsible for the support of his family and payment of its debts. What the wife expends he is compelled to pay for. Hence he must be entitled to the authority of deciding what shall be expended. The wife who should claim irresponsibility in this matter would inflict a flagrant injustice and would virtually reduce the husband to the relation of a slave to her caprices and a helpless victim of her tyranny. The party who is bound to pay has the obvious right to decide for what he shall be bound.

#### The Ultimate Authority Is in the Husband.

In a life copartnership the right of decision must be in the leading partner. Every copartnership which is equal must, in common justice, be terminable at the suit of either of the equals. Either, then, the wife must obey the husband in the sense of conceding to him the final decision of joint domestic questions, within the bounds of her higher duty to God and conscience, or the husband must obey the wife, or the marriage is virtually annulled. If we may believe the witness of the New England clergy, this reasoning is already verified by hard facts in that section. They tell us that in administering the marriage vow they have ceased to ask a promise of obedience from the brides, because the women of New England have generally come to spurn the obligation. But that is the section in which this frightful license of divorce for frivolous causes is mostly found. The logic is al-

ready working itself out; the copartnership of full equals unavoidably tends to be temporary. This principle is so firmly fixed in the law and equity of mere business copartnerships between full equals, that, if marriage came to be regarded as an alliance in which the duty of obedience is no longer required of the wife, then, by an inevitable logic, marriage will tend among us to become a temporary cohabitation. Let us suppose a business copartnership between three merchants, A, B and C, for the defined purpose of trading in groceries. The "in-put" of each is not equal; A may have put in twice as much money as either B or C. The net annual profits of the firm will be divided between them in that ratio. But each partner enters the firm as an equal, free citizen, and his equitable rights in it are equal to the others'. Now the compact which they voluntarily signed may have stated with the utmost clearness that the copartnership is to endure thirty years; but let us suppose that at the end of five years C comes to believe that his partners are abusing and usurping his rights in the firm. He may go before a court of equity and demand, as his only adequate remedy, the immediate termination of the copartnership and distribution of the assets by the decree of the court. The court is obliged to listen to C's plea, and if, on judicial inquiry, it finds it just, to grant him that immediate remedy. The stipulation in the contract, that the copartnership should endure thirty years, becomes, in that case, utterly invalid. The copartnership dies, so far as C is concerned, whenever he shows any, even the least, grievance. Even if his grievance is quite unessential, the court of equity will release him, and will allow A and B no power to keep him in against his will, and will tell them that if C's withdrawal has done them a wrong, their only remedy is a suit for damages. These rules of equity are just. They should and must apply to grant relief in all such contracts. If, then, marriage is to become a business contract between full equals, this equity will sooner or later apply to it by an irresistible force of truth and logic.

**The Wife the Fatal Loser by This Claim of Independence.**

In the correct biblical theory of marriage it is the wife who is not made full equal in the copartnership, but is made subordinate, in a limited degree, to the affectionate authority of the husband. Hence, a superficial person may think that women would gain by substituting the infidel Jacobin theory of marriage for the true one. But this is a huge practical mistake. It will ever be the women who will incur the chief calamities from this instability of the marriage relation. The history of six thousand years has shown that the only fortress for the safe defense of the rights, dignity and happiness of woman (who is practically the weaker vessel) is scriptural and life-long monogamy. The sure tendency of all lower forms of union is to corrupt the offspring, to barbarize the male sex, and to reduce the "weaker vessel" from the honored place of wife to that of a toy of man's lust, and then the slave of a superior brute force. Will our shallow, conceited age utterly refuse to learn from history? Where else has woman escaped practical enslavement, except in the lauds where she is a scriptural wife?

The sum of the matter is, that the American woman who seeks this liberation from the rightful authority of her husband is clutching at a shadow, but letting slip the vital substance. The woman commits treason against her own self-respect who consents, from some sensuous or mercenary motive, to enter into this high and sacred union with any man whose character she does not respect enough to promise him willingly a wifely obedience in the Lord. If she enters the marriage relation refusing all subordination and insisting upon full equality, then she must take her chance of finding the union a temporary copartnership, terminable at any time, by the suit of either party. She has her Jacobin freedom, but she has sunk herself from the wife to the concubine.

**The Golden Rule the Law of the Family.**

In conclusion, all these parental, filial and conjugal duties

are tenderly enforced by the common principle that we must do as we would be done by. We have seen that this binds us to all our fellows simply as men. How much more to those who are so tenderly and specially united to us.

A few words as to unchastity outside the family relation. The preservation of our own and our fellow-creatures' purity is a peculiarly important duty, because all breaches thereof have a tendency to undermine the family—the corner-stone of earthly welfare; because sins against purity are so clearly connected with other sins, as concealment, selfishness, evil company, drunkenness, obscenity and homicide; because experience shows (Paul, I. Cor. vi. 18) that this sin is peculiarly imbruting and corrupting. Hence, the clear duty of preserving purity in dress, deportment and gesture, language, reading and thought. There is a school of literature, so called, once under the ban of all decent people, which now claims that the portraiture of sins against purity is a legitimate branch of art, inasmuch as the true mission of literature is to portray all commanding human emotions. I answer: Just so much as the concocting of the poisoner's "hell-broth" is a legitimate branch of cookery! All such portraitures in language, painting, statuary and theaters is perilous and criminal. Was He mistaken who said: "Keep thy heart with all diligence; for out of it are the issues of life"? If not, I am right.

#### Thoughts to Be Addressed Specially to Males.

There is no sin so gross as that of unchastity, which is so nearly tolerated in males, by public opinion, partly because so seldom discussed—teachers being deterred by a theory of delicacy. Hence the necessity that all the sins be rebuked. But it is also common to speak of the animal impulse to these sins as one so strong that it is scarcely reasonable to expect its control; and, indeed, to regard their uncontrollable strength as rather an element of praiseworthy manhood. The shameless impudence of this is sufficiently rebuked by naming such

men as Lee and Jackson, men as chaste as Dian, at whose mess-tables, though surrounded only by rough, battle-stained men, no word was ever heard or tolerated that would have tinged the cheeks of their pure and venerated wives and daughters. Had these heroes full manhood? Were they less men, because scrupulously chaste, than the creatures whose chosen trait of manhood is the one which most assimilates them to the ass and the goat? Faugh! He is most the man who can always govern himself. He who cannot is, to that extent, an imbecile.

Many young men delude themselves by joining in the stern condemnation of seduction of the innocent, and then claim that indulgence with those already abandoned is no sin, or a venial one, and the partner of the sin is made no worse. All this is a deplorable sophism. In that first, they are imbruting themselves, and all the more as the paramour is more reprobate. (Paul, I. Cor. vi. 15-16.)

This poor woman is so degraded, forsooth, as to be beyond reform, and beyond hope as well; that is the body of moral putrescence of which you make yourself a member!! Second, if somebody else pushes her into the mire of vice, you will help to hold her down in it until she is smothered to death; that is the palliation! Third, you say: God forbid that the ladies of the South, whose purity is the glory of our land, should ever lose one shade of their chastity, however I may indulge my "heat of youthful blood." But you are doing the very thing which has the regular tendency to debauch them, because the habits of young men ultimately become known. These ladies must either forego marriage, their natural lot, or marry those whom they know as rakes. Their minds must be debauched by this.

**A loose male sex ultimately results in a loose female sex.**

## CHAPTER IV.

## CIVIC ETHICS.

## 1. Refutation of the Theories of Social Contract.

Passing now from the social morals of the family to the general ethics of social duties, we meet the fact that civil government is the appointed regulator and guardian of all these. Hence, these duties take the form of civic morals, and our rights and duties as citizens meet us at the front. The discussion naturally begins with the question: What is the moral ground of my obligation to obey the magistrate, whom, yesterday, before he was inducted into office, I would have scorned to recognize as my master, to whom to-day I must bow in obedience? Three opposing theories have been advanced, in our day, in answer to this question. The first answer is, that I am bound to obey him solely because I have covenanted to do so. This is the theory which founds government in a "social contract"; which, first stated by Thomas Hobbes, of Malmesbury, was made popular among English Liberals by John Locke, and, introduced to the French by Rousseau's famous book, *Le Contrat Social*, became the ruling philosophy of the French Jacobins. This apprehends men as, at first, insulated individuals, human integers, all naturally equal and absolutely free, having a natural liberty to indulge each one his whole practical will, as a "lord of creation." But the experience of the inconveniences of the mutual violences of so many hostile wills, with the loss of so many advantages, led them, in time, to consent voluntarily to a surrender of a part of their wills and natural rights and independence, to gain a more secure enjoyment of the remainder. To effect this, they are supposed to have conferred and to have entered into a compact with each other, covenanting to submit to cer-

tain restraints upon their natural liberty, and to submit to certain of their equals elected to rule, in order to get their remaining rights protected.

Subsequent citizens, entering the society by birth or immigration, are supposed to have given their sovereign assent to this compact, expressly, as in having themselves naturalized, or else impliedly, by remaining in the land. The terms of the compact form the organic law or constitution of the commonwealth; and the reason why men are bound to obey their equal, or possible inferior, as magistrate, is simply that they have bargained, and are getting their *quid pro quo*.

Many writers, as Bulemaqui and Blackstone, are too intelligent to suppose or claim that any human persons ever rightfully existed, in fact, in the independent state described, or that any commonwealth actually originated in such an optional bargain. But they teach that such a non-existent compact must be assumed as implied, and as virtually accounting for the origin of civic obligation. Thus, Blackstone, L. I. Introd. E. 2, p. 47. But to us it appears that this species of legal fiction is a poor basis for a moral theory, and is no source of natural right and obligations.

#### The Theistic Basis.

The second theory may be called the theistic, tracing civic obligation to the will and ordinance of God, our Creator. It answers that we are bound to obey the civil magistrate, because God, who has the right as Creator and Sovereign, commands it. This command is read by all Christian citizens in sacred Scripture, which says: "The powers that be are ordained of God," and, "Whosoever resisteth, resisteth the ordinance of God." It is read again in the light of natural facts and reason. These facts are mainly two: That God created man a social being, which is so true that without social relations man would utterly fail of reaching his designed development and happiness, and, indeed, would perish; and that man's personal appetencies ever tend to engross to himself the



rights of others. Selfishness is ever inclining to infringe the boundaries of equity and philanthropy. Hence it is the ordinance of Nature, that man shall live in society and must be restrained from injuring his fellows. And there are no other hands than human ones to wield this power of restraint. We are thus taught as clearly as by Scripture itself, that the Creator ordained civil government and wills all men to submit to it. The same argument may be placed in this light: Men are rational, moral and responsible creatures. Righteousness is their proper law. But personal selfishness tends perpetually to transgress that law; hence arises the necessity of restraints. Thus the only alternatives are, submission to civil government, which is such restraint, or an ultimate prevalence of aggression, which would destroy the very ends of existence. Witness the wretched and savage state of all human beings who are wholly without any form of government.

**Objected That a Theological Fact Should Not Have Place in a Natural Inquiry.**

Here we are met by a cavil which is expressed by some, and which has evidently embarrassed many other moral writers. This is, that God ought not to be introduced into this discussion, because God and His will are theological facts; but since this inquiry is concerning natural right and secular relations, it ought to be decided exclusively upon natural data, without importing into it other premises from the alien field of theology. To this I answer, that in reality there is no fact among the data of moral science so purely natural as God. As soon as the mind begins to reason on the phenomena of Nature and experience, it is led in one direction to God, at least as immediately and necessarily as it is led in other directions to gravity, causation, conscience, free-agency, or any other natural fact. God is not only one proper factor, but the prime one, in the philosophy of our moral nature, seeing He created it, and His nature is the concrete standard of moral perfections; and His preceptive will, the expression of that

nature, is the practical rule of all our obligations. He is, therefore, not only the first, but the most essential and most natural of all the factors in every question of natural right. To attempt to discuss those questions omitting Him and His will is just as unreasonable as it would have been in Newton to discuss planetary astronomy and the orbital motions of the planets, leaving out all reference to the sun. And this is justified, last, by the remark, that in constructing our theory of civic obligations, we introduce God not in His theological relation of Redeemer, but in His natural relation of Creator and Moral Ruler. I am happy to find my position thus sustained by the great German statesman and philosopher, Dr. Julius Stahl (quoted by Dr. Chas. Hodge, "Theol.," Vol. III., page 260): "Every philosophical science must begin with the first principle of all things—that is, with the absolute. It must therefore decide between theism and pantheism, between the doctrine that the first principle is the personal, extramundane, self-revealing God, and the doctrine that the first principle is an impersonal power immanent in the world." It is the Christian doctrine of God and of His relation to the world that he makes the foundation of legal and political science. He controverts the doctrine of Grotius, that there would be a *jus naturale* if there were no God; which is really equivalent to saying that there would be an obligation to goodness if there were no such thing as goodness. Moral excellence is of the very essence of God. He is concrete goodness, infinite reason, excellence, knowledge and power in a personal form; so that there can be no obligation to virtue which does not involve obligation to God.

#### God's Revealed Will Immediate Source of Civic Obligations.

The theistic scheme then traces civil government and civic obligation to the will and act of God, our Sovereign, Moral Ruler and Proprietor, in that He, from the first, made social principles a constitutive part of our souls, and placed us under social relations that are as original and natural as our

own persons. These relations were first of the family and then of the clan, and as men multiplied, of the commonwealth. It follows, thence, that social government in some form is as natural as man. If asked whence my obligation to obey my equal, or possible inferior, as civil magistrate, it answers; Because God wills me to do it. He has an infinite right. The advantages and conveniences of such an arrangement may illustrate and even reinforce the obligation; they do not originate it. Civil government is an ordinance of the Maker: magistrates receive place and power under His Providence. They are His ministers to man.

#### The Legitimist Theory of Divine Right.

This theory, pushed to a most vicious extreme by the party known as legitimists, is the third which has some currency. These advocates of the divine right of royalty teach that while government is the ordinance of God, its first form was the family, in which the father was the sovereign; and this is the type of all larger commonwealths. Every chief magistrate should, therefore, be a king, holding the same sovereign relation to his subjects which fathers hold to their children. As in the patriarchal clans of Scripture the birth-right descended to the eldest son and carried with it the headship of the clan, so the right to reign is hereditary in the king's eldest son. To deprive him of it is to rob him of his rightful inheritance. Subjects, if discontented with their king, have no more right to replace him by another chief magistrate elected by themselves than minor children have to vote in a new father. If the monarch becomes oppressive, the only remedy for the subjects is humble petition and passive obedience. There is no right of revolution; oppressed subjects must wait for release by Divine Providence. And in support of this slavish theory they quote the precepts of the Apostles (Romans xiii.; I. Peter xi. 13-17).

#### Refutation.

**This servile theory I thus refute: Men in society do not**

bear to rulers the proportion that minor children bear to their parents in weakness, inexperience or folly, but are generally the natural equals of their rulers. Nor are the citizens the objects of an instinctive natural love in the breasts of kings, similar to that of parents for their children, powerfully prompting a disinterested and humane government of them. The pretended analogy is utterly false. Second, whereas divine authority is claimed for royalty, God did not give a regal government to His chosen people Israel; but His preference was to make them a federal republic of eleven cantons. When He granted a king at their request, he was not a hereditary one. The monarchy was elective. David was not the son of Saul, but was elected by the elders of Israel. It is true that the prestige of his heroism enabled him to nominate his immediate successor, Solomon, who yet was not his eldest son. After Solomon, the elders of Israel were willing to elect his son Rehoboam, but, upon ascertaining his tyrannical purposes, they elected Jeroboam. And the reader must note that they are nowhere blamed in Scripture for this election, nor for their secession; and Rehoboam, who had been elected by two tribes, when proposing coercion, is strictly forbidden by God. So Jehu, elected by divine direction, was not a successor of the house of Ahab. Third, the New Testament does not command us especially to obey kings, but "the powers that be." Scripture thus makes the *de facto* government, whatever may be its character, the object of our allegiance within the limits of conscience. And it is fatal to these advocates of the divine right of royalty that the actual government which St. Paul and St. Peter enjoined Christians to obey was neither regal nor hereditary. It was the recent usurpation in the bosom of a vast republican commonwealth, still retaining the moral forms of republicanism. Julius Cæsar and his nephew, Octavius, carefully rejected the title of king. The latter selected that of *imperator*, the constitutional title of commander-in-chief of the active armies of the republic. He held his executive power by annual, nominal reëlections to the offices of *ponti-*

*fex maximus* and consul, both republican offices. He was, in a word, what the Greeks expressed by the name *τυράννος*. Octavius Cæsar was not the son of Julius, Tiberius was not the son of Octavius, Caius Caligula was not the son of Tiberius, Nero was not the son of Caius. So that the fact is, that the very government to which the early Christians were commanded to submit was a revolutionary one, and was not regal. So unfortunate have the legitimists been in claiming the authority of Scripture against the right of revolution and in favor of royalty. In a word, their theory has not a particle of support in reason or God's Word. Yet the obtruding of it by so many divines, as the theistic theory, doubtless did much to prejudice the right view.

**Political Rule Delegated from the Commonwealth.**

On the contrary, the power of magistrates, as between them and the citizens, is only a delegated power, and is from the commonwealth, which is the aggregate of citizens, to them. God has, indeed, by the law of Nature and revelation, imposed on all the citizens and on the magistrates the duty of obedience, and ordained that men shall live in regular civil society, under laws. But he has not given to magistrates, as such, any inherent rights, other than those belonging to other citizens. As persons, they are equal to the citizens, and of them; as magistrates, they exist for the people, not the people for them. "They are ministers of God to thee for good." They personally have only the common and equal title, which their fellow-citizens have, to good, as being of one race, the common children of God, subject to the Golden Rule, the moral character of republicanism.

**Social Contract Refuted.**

Having rejected the theory of legitimacy, or divine right of kings, we now return to complete our evidence for the right theory, by refuting the claim of a "social contract."

First, it is notoriously false to the facts: civil government is a great fact. It must find its foundation in a fact, not

in a legal fiction. And the fact is, men never existed rightfully for one moment, in the independency which this theory imagines. God, their Maker and original Ruler, never gave them such independence. Their civic responsibility, as ordained by Him, is as native as they are. They do not elect between civic subordination and license, any more than a child elects his father, but they are born under government. And the simple practical proof is: that were any man to claim that natural liberty, and the option of accepting or declining allegiance, every government on earth would claim the right to destroy him as an outlaw.

Second, the theory is atheistic and unchristian. Such were Hobbes and the Jacobins. It is true that Locke tried to hold it in a Christian sense, but it is none the less distinctly atheistic in that it wholly discards God, man's relation to Him, His right to determine our condition of moral existence, and the great fact of Moral Philosophy, that God has formed and ordained us to live under civil government. So, in the insane pride of its perfectionism, it overlooks the fact, that man's will is ever disordered and unrighteous; and hence cannot be the just rule of his action.

Third, it also virtually discards original moral distinctions. So did Hobbes, its author, teaching that the enactments of government make right and wrong. It infers this consistently; for if a man's wish made his natural right, and he has only come under any constraint of civil law by his optional compact, of course, whatever he wished was right by nature. And, moreover, government, being a restraint on natural right, is essentially of the nature of an evil, to which I only submit for expediency's sake to avoid a greater evil. Civil society is, herself, a grand robber of my natural rights, which I only tolerate to save myself from other more numerous robbers. How, then, can any of the rules of civil government be an expression of essential morality? And is this scheme likely to be very promotive of content and loyalty?

Fourth, the social contract lacks all basis of facts, and is,

therefore, wholly illogical. It has no claim in *foro scientiæ*, to be entertained even for discussion. For the science of natural rights should be inductive. But this theory has no basis of facts. Commonwealths have not historically begun in such an optional compact of lordly savages. Such absolute savages, could we find any considerable number of them, would not usually possess the good sense and the self-control which would be sufficient for any permanent good. The only real historical instances of such compacts have been the agreements of outlaws, forming companies of bandits or crews of pirate ships. These combinations realize precisely the ideal pictured by Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau. Did ever one of them result in the creation of a permanent, well-ordered, free commonwealth? The well-known answer to this question hopelessly refutes the scheme. Commonwealths have usually arisen, in fact, from the expansion of clans, which were at first but larger families. And true historical research shows that the primitive government of these clans was usually presbyterial, a government by elders who had succeeded by suffrage to the natural and inherent authority of the first parents.

Fifth, certain most inconvenient and preposterous consequences must logically follow from the theory of the social contract. The righteous "swear to their own hurt and change not." No matter, then, how the lapse of time may have rendered the old compact unsuitable or mischievous, no majority could righteously change it, so long as any minority claimed their pledges. Again, unless the commonwealth has a formal constitution, who can decide what are the terms of the social contract? England has no written constitution. Again, if the ruler violated the essence of the contract in one act, this would release all the citizens from allegiance to him. The contract broken on one side is broken for both. But so sweeping a release of all the individual citizens of the commonwealth from their allegiance, whenever any essential article of the social contract had been violated, either by a ruler or a greedy majority, would lead to intolerable anarchy.

There is a noted government which historically and actually originated in a social compact—that of the United States of America. It was a republic of republics; a government of special powers, created by a federal compact between sovereign states, or little contiguous, independent nations. The contracting integers were not citizens, but states. The logical result was, that the infringement of any essential principle of the constitution, which was the compact, released each contracting party from the bond. This result inhered inevitably in the nature of this federal government, as was admitted by juris-consults of all parties; by Josiah Quincy, President Fillmore and Daniel Webster, as fully as by Jefferson, Madison and Calhoun. A government formed by a social compact is *ipso facto* dissolved by the breach of that compact, into the integers which composed it. In the case of the United States, these integers were sovereign commonwealths. Hence the exercise of their constitutional rights of secession could not result in anarchy, for the original commonwealths survived, exercising all the authority necessary to that civic order enjoined by natural obligation.

Last, law properly arms the magistrate with some powers which could not have been derived from a social contract of individuals, because the individuals never possessed those powers. Life, for instance, is God's. No man can bargain away what does not belong to him. Nor can they plead that the commonwealth's existence justifies her assuming a power of life and death. For the commonwealth, on their view, has no existence to preserve as yet, until the social contract is completed. Again, how does the commonwealth get power to take the life or property of aliens who never contracted with it? The theory represents independent men as surrendering certain natural rights to society, in order to secure the enjoyment of the rest. But I deny that any right can be mentioned morally belonging to any man, of which he is stripped when entering a just government. The one most frequently named is the right of self-defense. But what is meant by it?



The privilege of making one's self accuser, judge, jury and executioner at once to avenge any supposed wrong in any manner suggested by one's own resentment? I deny that this was ever a right of any creature of God in any state of existence. It is always a natural unrighteousness. Is it the right of an innocent man, when the arm of the law is not present, to protect himself by his own personal force, even to the destruction of the assailant if necessary? Then, I deny that just government strips any citizen of this right. The laws fully recognize it.

This impotent and infidel theory sets out, like an atheist as it is, without reference to the fact that man's existence, nature and rights sprang out of the personal will of a Creator. It sets out without reference to our original responsibilities to God or to His moral essence. It quietly overlooks the fact that man's will, if he is the creature of a personal moral Creator, never could be, in any circumstances, his rule of acting. It hides away the stubborn fact, that the human will is depraved, and, for that second reason, cannot righteously be man's rule. It falsely assumes a state of nature in which the individual's will is independent and makes his right, whereas no being except the eternal and self-existent God has a right to that state for one instant. But all these are facts of Nature, involved in this case of civic obligation, discoverable by reason and experience. All, then, must be included in our construction, if we would have a correct, or even a rational view. The state of facts is simply this: Man, being a creature, enters on existence the subject of God. This he does not only by force, but by moral right. Moral distinctions are essential and eternal, having been eternally personated in God's subjective moral principles, and authoritatively legislated for creatures in all precepts, to utter which God is prompted by those immanent principles. Moral obligations on the creature are, therefore, as native as he is. They are binding, not by the assent of the creature's will, but by God's enactment. So that man enters existence under social obligations, as is indi-

cated by his being, in so many constitutive traits, a social creature. Civil government is nothing more than the organization of one segment of those social rights and duties. This civil government is God's natural ordinance. Once more, the rule of action enforced by just governments is the moral rule. This is approximately true even of the government which we deem relatively bad. So that a thoroughly just civil government, if such could be realized, would enjoin on each order of citizens only the acts which were morally right for them to do and forbid only those which would be wrong.

**What Is Man's Natural Liberty? What His Civic?**

We have seen the social contract, defining the individual's natural liberty as the privilege of doing whatever he chooses, and his civic liberty as that remainder of his natural liberty left after his voluntary surrender to society of a part thereof. The first definition we have seen to be absurdly and wickedly false; the second is incorrect. Man's natural liberty is this: privilege of having and doing those things only to which the individual has a moral right. Consequently the natural liberty of two men in the same commonwealth may be different, because, under Providence, their natural endowments and relations may differ. Were it possible to frame a government thoroughly equitable, each person's civic liberty would be identical with his natural: the privilege of having and doing all those things, and those only, to which each has a moral right. But imperfect man never frames a perfect government. The best comes short, therefore, of securing to any of its citizens absolutely the whole of his equitable civic liberty.

**The Theistic Theory Free, the Social Contract Tyrannical.**

Some free citizens may shrink from this theory of government, grounded in God's absolute authority over man, and denying to man any absolute natural independence, from the apprehension that it may lead to arbitrary civil government. To such I reply: Is it not far more likely that tyrannical con-

sequences will be drawn from the other theory, which discards God, the eternal standard and pattern of pure equity and benevolence; which postulates the sinful creature's licentious and unjust wishes as the ultimate measure of his rights; which represents the natural rights of the ruler and ruled as a very different quantity from his civic rights; and which discards the essential distinction between justice and injustice, *a priori* to legislation? Is not this the safer and freer theory, which founds man's inalienable rights, as his duties, on eternal and holy moral distinctions, and holds rulers and ruled responsible to the judgment of an equitable Heavenly Father, with whom is no "respect of persons"? "By their fruits ye shall know them." I require the student to look at Hobbes deducing with his iron logic, from the theory of the social contract, his conclusion, that government must be Leviathan, the irresistible beast among all the weaker animals. He proves that, on his theory, government ought to be absolute. For the theory recognizes neither allegiance nor responsibility to a common Heavenly Father, perfectly impartial and benevolent, the ruler of rulers, the protector of all His children, who will call all their oppressors to a strict account. To the Jacobin, the commonwealth is the only God, beyond which there is no umpire, no judge, no avenger. Again, upon this theory the supreme rule of this commonwealth's action has no standard whatever of intrinsic righteousness and immutable justice, embodied first in the moral perfections of the Heavenly Father, and then in the universal and indestructible judgment of the right human conscience; but the ultimate standard of right is the mere will of each greedy and unrighteous creature. For this system there is no morality to enforce duties or guarantee rights except the human laws, and these are merely the expression of the cravings of this aggregate of licentious, ruthless, selfish wills. This reasoning, of course, makes the will of the majority supreme, and says, *Vox populi vox Dei*. But it must be remembered that this majority is only the accidental major mob, in which the wicked will of each citizen

is his supreme law, so that the god of Jacobinism, whose voice receives this sovereign expression, may at any time reveal himself as a fiend instead of a benignant Heavenly Father. The practical government which results from this theory is simple absolutism, differing from the personal despotism of a sultan or a czar only in this one particular, that its victims have that "many-headed monster," the mob, for their master, always liable to be more remorseless and greedy in its oppressions than a single tyrant. To this deduction history gives the fullest confirmation. The democracies infected by this theory have ever turned out the worst despotisms. Such was the government of the Jacobin party in France a hundred years ago, expressly deduced from the social contract, and yet a government guilty of more oppressions, stained with more political crimes and murders of the innocent, more destructive of public and private wealth, than all the despotisms of Europe together, annihilating in one decade forty-eight billions of francs of the possessions of the French people and drenching Europe in a universal, causeless war, and rendering itself so loathsome to the nation that it was glad to escape from it into the military despotism of Napoleon. The favorite motto of this democracy is "*Liberté, Egalité, Fraternité*," of which the practical rendering by the actions of the Jacobins was this: "*Liberté*," license to trample on other people as they chose; "*Egalité*," similar license for the "outs" when they could become "ins"; "*Fraternité*," all brother rogues. So all the worst oppressions and outrages experienced by the people of the United States have been inflicted by the same Jacobinism, masquerading in the garb of republicanism.

#### All Men by Nature Equal—In What Sense?

The Declaration of Independence teaches as self-evident that "all men are by nature equal." The proposition is highly ambiguous. We need not be surprised to find the Jacobin party claiming it in their sense: That every sane human being, namely, has a moral right to a mechanical

equality with every other in every specific privilege and franchise, except where deprived of them by conviction of crime under the laws; so that if any man or class in society is endowed with any power or franchise whatsoever, that is not extended to every other person in the commonwealth, this is a violation of natural justice. This famous document is no part of the constitution or laws of the United States. With all its nervous pomp of diction and political philosophy, it involves not a few ambiguities and confusions; and the enlightened friends of freedom have no concern to assert its infallibility. But this often-quoted statement has another sense. There is a natural moral equality between all men, in that all are generically men. All have a rational, responsible and immortal destiny, and are inalienably entitled to pursue it; all are morally related alike to God, the common Father; and all have equitable title to the protection of the laws under which Divine Providence places them. In this sense, as the British Constitution declares, all men, peer and peasant, "are equal before the law." The particular franchises of Earl Derby differ much from those of the peasant: The lord sits in the Upper House as the peasant does not, inherits an entailed estate, and if indicted for felony, is tried by the peers. But the same laws protect the persons and rights of both. Both, so far as human, and as subjects of human society, have the same generic moral right to be protected in their several (different) just franchises. Here are two meanings of the proposition which are historically perfectly distinct. If there are those who profess to see no difference, it is because they are either inconsiderate and heedless or uncandid. The difference was perfectly palpable to the English Liberals who dethroned the first Charles Stuart; for that great Parliament on the one hand waged a civil war in the support of the moral equality of all Englishmen, and at the same time rejected with abhorrence the other Jacobin equality, when they condemned the leveller Lilburn and caused his book to be burned by the common hangman, which contained precisely that doctrine.

I assert that it is incredible that the American Congress of 1776 could have meant their proposition to be taken in the Jacobin sense; for they were British Whigs. Their perpetual claim was to the principles and franchises of the British Constitution, and to no other. Their politics were formed by the teachings of John Hampden, Lord Fairfax, Algernon Sidney, Lord Somers and the Revolutionists of 1688. I should be loath to suppose our great men so stupid and ignorant of the history of their own country as not to understand the British rights which they expressly say they are claiming.

Second, their English common sense showed them that the statement is false. In the Jacobin sense men are not by nature equal. One half of them differ by nature from the other half in the essential qualities of sex. There are countless natural differences of bodily vigor, health and stature, of natural faculties and moral dispositions. Naturally, no two men are equal in that sense.

Third, it is impossible that Congress could have intended that sense, seeing that every one of the thirteen States then legalized African slavery, and not a single one granted universal white suffrage. No application was made by any of those States of this supposed Jacobin principle at that time to remove these inequalities of franchise. Were these men so nearly idiotic as to propound an assertion in which they were so glaringly refuted by their own action at home?

#### The Pretended Equality Works Unjust Inequalities.

The extreme claim of equality is false and iniquitous. For out of the wide natural diversities of sex and of character must arise a wide difference of natural relations between individuals and the State. To attempt to bestow identical franchises upon all thus appears to be unjust, and, indeed, impossible. It is but a mockery to say that we have bestowed a given franchise upon a person whom Nature has disqualified for using it. It is equally futile to boast that we lift all men to the same identical relations, when their natural differences have

inexorably imposed on them other relations. Of what avail would it be for me to declare that all women have the same natural right with myself to wear a beard and to sing bass, when Nature has decided that they shall not? What is the use of legislating that all the lazy fools shall acquire and preserve the same wealth with the diligent wise men? The law of the universe ordains that they shall not. I urge further, that the attempt to confer all the same franchises to which the wise and virtuous are competent, upon the foolish and morally incompetent, is not only foolish and impossible, but is a positive flagrant injustice to all the worthier citizens. For when these unsuitable powers are abused by the unworthy, all suffer together. The little children in my family have not an equal right with their parents to handle loaded revolvers and lucifer matches. If we were so foolish as to concede it, the sure result would be that they would kill each other and burn down the dwelling over their own and their parents' heads. So it is not equal justice to clothe the unfitted members of society with powers which they will be sure to misuse to the ruin of themselves and their better fellows under the pretense of equal rights. Such pretended equality is, in fact, the most outrageous inequality.

#### **Its Dangerous Corollaries.**

I argue again, that the Jacobin doctrine leads by logical consequence to "female suffrage" and to "women's rights." The woman is an adult, not disfranchised by due conviction of crime. Then by what argument can these theorists deny to her the right of suffrage or any other civic right enjoyed by males? By what argument can they require her to submit for life to the domestic authority of a male, her absolute equal, in order to enter marriage? Especially have American Jacobins armed this logic with resistless force against themselves by bestowing universal suffrage on male negroes. By what plea can the right of suffrage be withheld from the millions of white American women, intelligent, educated, virtuous and patriotic, after

it has been granted as an inalienable natural right to all these illiterate semi-savage aliens? In the point of this argument there lies a fiery heat which must sooner or later burn its way through all sophistries and plausibilities unless the American people can be made to unlearn the fatal premise. But the concession of all equal rights to women means simply the destruction of the family, which is the corner-stone of the commonwealth and of civilization. Will permanent marriage continue after it becomes always possible that every man's political "enemies may be those of his own household"? Further, the moral discipline of children becomes impossible where there are two equal heads claiming all the same prerogatives, unless those heads are morally perfect and infallible. What will be the character of those children reared under a government where, when the father says, "I shall punish," the mother has an equal right to say, "You shall not"?

Once more, I have shown at a previous place, that if marriage is reducible to a secular copartnership of equals, the principle of equity will compel this result, that it shall be terminable upon the plea of either party. This theory thus destroys the family, and reduces the relation of the sexes to concubinage, when carried to its logical results. Facts confirm the reasonings. Such were its fruits in Jacobin France, and in those Swiss, Italian and German cities which adopted the revolutionary philosophy.

#### Particular Rights Common to All.

But among the inalienable natural rights of all are these: privilege to pursue and attain one's rational and equitable end, virtue, and that grade of well-being appropriate to the social position of each for time and eternity; and for adults, liberty of thought, inquiry and belief, so far as human compulsion goes. The former is an inalienable right, because it attaches to the boon of existence, which is God's gift. Hence all restraints or institutions of civil society which causelessly prevent this are unrighteous. But, even the title to existence must



give place to the commonwealth's right of self-preservation; as when she calls upon even her innocent citizens to die in her defense from invasion, or when she restrains capital crimes by inflicting the death penalty. "The greater includes the less." Hence the same principle justifies the commonwealth in restricting the lesser rights when the safety of the whole requires it. The right of free-thought is inalienable, because belief is the legitimate, and ought to be the unavoidable, result of sufficient evidences; whence I infer that it cannot be obstructed by violence without traversing the rights of Nature. Second, responsibility to God (as we shall prove in the proper place) is unavoidable and cannot be evaded. Hence the natural iniquity of intruding another authority over thought, between the individual and God, when the intruder is unable to take his penalty for wrong belief off his shoulders. Third, no human government, either in Church or State, is infallible. Rome professes to meet this objection by claiming that she is infallible. She is consistent, more so than a persecuting Protestant. Hence the conclusion, that civil government has no right to interfere with thought, however erroneous, until it embodies itself in acts violative of proper statutes. For instance, the State refrains from meddling with the Mormon's polygamous opinions, not because he has a right to such erroneous opinions; he commits a sin in entertaining them; but this sin is against another jurisdiction than the State's—that of God. If he puts it into practice, he is righteously prosecuted for bigamy—a felony.

#### **Immoral Statutes Must Be Disobeyed.**

But suppose the statute is immoral, requiring of the citizen an act of omission properly a sin; how shall a free conscience then act? I answer: It asserts its higher law by refusing to be accessory to the sin. If the conscientious citizen holds a salaried office, one of whose functions is to assist in executing such sinful laws, he must resign his office and its emoluments. To retain its powers and emoluments

while still refusing to perform its tasks, on plea of conscience, is hypocrisy and dishonesty. Having thus resigned his executive office and its salary, the citizen is clear of the sin involved in the evil law; except that he, like all other private citizens, has the right to argue and vote for its amendment. But if this sinful act is exacted by the State from its citizens, not as its executive officers, but as its private subjects, they must refuse to obey, and then submit without violent resistance to whatever penalty the State inflicts for their disobedience, resorting only to moral remonstrance against it. The latter part of my precept may appear, at the first glance, inconsistent with my doctrine of free conscience. Ardent minds may exclaim: If it is righteous in us to refuse complicity in the acts which the State wickedly commands, then it is wicked in the State to punish us for that righteous refusal; whence we infer that the same sacred liberty which authorized us to refuse compliance should equally authorize us to resist the second wrong, the unjust penalty. I reply, that if civil government had no better basis than the pretended social contract, this heady argument would be perfectly good. It is equally obvious that it would lead directly to anarchy; for the right of resisting penalties which the private citizen judged iniquitous must on these premises rest exclusively upon his sovereign opinion. The State could not go behind the professed verdict of his conscience, for upon this theory the disobeying citizen's freedom of thought would be gone. But now I remind these overweening reasoners that anarchy is more expressly forbidden to them, by the will of God, than unjust punishments of individuals are forbidden to magistrates; that anarchy is a far greater evil than the unjust punishment of some individuals, because this universal disorder strips away defense against similar unjust wrongs, both from themselves and all their fellow-citizens. Or, my argument may be put thus: My right to refuse obedience to a civil law only extends to the cases where compliance is positive sin *per se*. But my submission, for conscientious reasons, to a penalty which I judge

undeserved is not my sin *per se*. My sufferings under it are the sin of the erroneous rulers. Hence, while I must refuse to make myself an accomplice in a positive sin, I submit peaceably to the penalty attached to such refusal. Thus, when "the noble army of martyrs" were required by the pagan magistrates to worship idols, they utterly refused. The act was sin *per se*. But when they were required to lose goods, or liberty, or life, as the penalty of their refusal, they submitted, because these losses, voluntarily incurred in a good cause, were not sin *per se* in them, however evil on the part of the exactors. Even Socrates, though a pagan, saw this argument so clearly, that when means of escape to Megara from an unjust death-sentence were provided for him, he refused to avail himself of the escape, and remained to drink the hemlock (see Plato's "Phædo"). Thus judged the holy Apostles and the Christian martyrs of all ages.

#### Where, Then, Is the Right of Revolution?

It may be asked now, If the individual righteous citizen may not forcibly resist the injustice of the State, how can that aggregate of citizens, which is only made up of individuals, resist it? Does not this refute the right of revolution, against even the most usurping and tyrannical government? That right is correctly argued, against legitimists, from these premises: First, that the will of God, as revealed by the light of Nature and Sacred Scripture, does not make a particular form of government obligatory, but some form; the rule for the individual is, that the *de facto* government is authoritative, be it of one kind or another. Hence, the sin of rebellion does not consist in changing the form, but in resisting the government as government. Second, that as between rulers and ruled, the power is delegated from the latter to the former. Rulers exist for the behoof of the ruled, not the reverse. Whence it follows, to make a crime of the ruled (the masters) changing their rulers involves the same absurdity as making the parent rebel against his own child. Third, that hence

there must be in the ruled a right to revolutionize, if the government has become so perverted as, on the whole, to destroy the ends for which a government is instituted. This right must exist in the ruled, if anywhere; because Providence does not work relief without means, and the righteous means cannot be found in external force according to the law of nations. The divine right of kings is no more sacred than that of constables.

But the difficulty recurs—if it is the duty of each individual citizen to submit to the government's wrong, how can the injured body of citizens ever start the resistance without sin? Since the existing offices of state are in the hands of the oppressors, of course the initial action of the resistance must be private and unofficial. Even grant that, when once a patriotic "committee of public safety" has been organized, that may be fairly considered as clothed with delegated and official power; the getting it organized must be unofficial private action. All this is true, and it gives us the clue to find the dividing path between unwarrantable individual resistance and righteous revolution. If the outraged citizen is moved to resist merely by his own private wrong, he is sinful. If his resistance is disinterested, and the expression of the common heart, outraged by general oppressions, it is patriotic and righteous. There is the dividing line.

#### Revolution, When Justifiable.

It is common to say with Paley, that to justify forcible revolution, the evil which the body of citizens are suffering under the usurpations of the existing government must be manifestly greater, on the whole, than the evils which unavoidably accompany the revolution. This seems correct. And that there must be, second, a reasonably good and hopeful prospect of success. This I dissent from. Some of the most righteous and noble revolutions would never have begun on such a calculation of chances of success. They were rather the generous outbursts of despair. Such was the resistance of the Maccabees against the Syrian domination. Such was the rising of

the Swiss against the House of Hapsburg. But these were two of the most beneficial revolutions in history.

**Persecutions for Opinion's Sake Unjust: True Reasons Why.**

An all-important corollary of the liberty of thought is, that neither Church nor State has a right to persecute for opinion's sake. A part of the argument may be seen above. It may be supposed that this is too universally held to need any argument. I answer: It is held, but very much on unintelligent and sophistical grounds; so that its advocates, however confident and passionate, would be easily "dumfounded" by a perspicacious opponent. The history of human rights is, that their intelligent assertors usually learn the true grounds of them "in the furnace of affliction"; that the posterity who inherit these rights hold them for awhile, in pride and ignorant prescription; that after a while, when the true logic of the rights has been forgotten, and when some plausible temptation presses them to do so, the next generation discards the precious rights bodily, and goes back to the practice of the old tyranny.

Thoughtful minds need not seek far to find historical instances of such inconsistent treason, in a subsequent generation, to precious principles which a previous one had purchased for them with their blood. You may deem it a strange prophecy, but I predict that the time will come in this once free America when the battle for religious liberty will have to be fought over again, and will probably be lost, because the people are already ignorant of its true basis and conditions. For instance, the heedless granting of tenures in mortmain. As to the latter, for instance, the whole drift of legislation and judicial decisions touching the property of ecclesiastical corporations, is tending like a broad and mighty stream to that result which destroyed the spiritual liberty of Europe in the Middle ages, and which "the men of 1776" knew perfectly well would prove destructive of it again. But the statesman who should now propose to stay this legislation would be over-

whelmed by a howl from nearly all the Protestant Christians of America.

### Religious Liberty Argued.

In Book III., Chapter VII., in arguing men's responsibility for their moral opinions, we saw and refuted the erroneous grounds on which many advocates of freedom claim it. I showed you that upon their ground our right of freedom was betrayed to the advocates of persecution. For these succeed in proving that men are responsible for their beliefs, and then add the inference that, since erroneous beliefs are mischievous, the errorist should be responsible to the penalties of the civil magistrate. When we object by pointing to the horrors of mediæval persecutions, they reply that these admitted excesses no more disprove the right of magistrates to punish error wisely and moderately, than the Draconian code of Britain, which once punished sheep-stealing with death, proves that theft should not be punished at all. The only way to refute these adroit statements is to resort to a truth which radicals and liberals are most prone to forget, that the State is not *τὸπαν* of social organization, but is limited by God and Nature to the regulation of one segment of social rights and duties; while the others are reserved to the family, the Church and to God. It is well again to repeat, that while the citizen is responsible for erroneous beliefs, his penal responsibility therefor is to God alone. The wickedness of human intrusion here is further shown by the following considerations: No human organization can justly usurp the individual's responsibility to God for his powers of thought and will, because no human organization can substitute itself under the individual's guilt and penalty, if he is made to think or feel criminally. Now this is more especially true of the State than even of the organized Church, because the State in its nature is not even ecclesiastical, much less a spiritual institute, being ordained of Nature simply to realize secular (yet moral) order. Orthodoxy or spirituality are not qualifications requisite for its mag-

istrates, according to the law of Nature, but only secular virtue and intelligence. Witness the fact, that the rule of Mahomedan magistrates is morally valid in Turkey; and of pagan, in China. And the magistrates to whom Romans xiii. enjoined allegiance were pagan and anti-Christian. Now, how absurd that I should be required to devolve my spiritual personal functions and responsibility on an institute utterly non-spiritual in its nature and functions, or even anti-spiritual and how practically absurd that institutes which are disagreeing (as to religion) and contrary to each other and the truth, throughout most of the world, should be selected as defenders of that truth which not one of them may hold!

Again, if the fallibility and incompetency of the State for this task be waived, persecution for misbelief, by either Church or State, is wicked, because it is a means utterly irrelevant to produce the professed good in view, right belief, but has a violent and mischievous tendency to defeat it, and hence is criminally impolitic. Thus, first, a right belief must be spontaneous; force is a compulsory measure. It is as though one should whip a sad child to make him glad. His sadness may be sinful, but a punishment which he feels unjust will certainly not help matters. Second, it is so natural as to be unavoidable, that a creed must be more or less associated in men's minds with their apprehension of its supporters. True, a cruel man may by chance be the professed advocate of a right creed. None the less do I associate a creed and its advocate, and infer that if the advocates are wicked, the creed is wicked. What, then, is the insanity of trying to make me love the creed from which I had dissented by giving me most pungent motives to hate its special advocates. So history teaches that persecution for mere opinion's sake, unless annihilating, as of the Lutherans in Spain, only makes the persecuting creed odious and the persecuted one popular. Thus the persecution of the Scotch Covenanters by the Prelatists made Prelacy odious to the Scotch nation for centuries. The brief persecution practiced against immersionists by the

colonial government of Virginia has made that creed popular ever since in the old counties of the State. Third, persecution helps the error persecuted by arraying on its side the noblest feelings of human nature—sympathy with weakness and suffering and moral indignation at injustice. Fourth, persecution, if practiced at all extensively, is frightfully demoralizing: (a) By confounding faults, which, if faults at all, are lesser ones, with the most enormous in the criminal code. A sincere mistake about a mysterious doctrine is punished more severely than rape and murder. (b) Persecution always uses and rewards, as it must, the vilest and foulest of the community as its delators and tools, thus putting the rascality of the community in place of honor. It breeds hypocrisy wholesale; professing to punish a mistake in theology severely, perhaps in the person of a very pure and benevolent woman or old man, while the current sins of cursing, drinking, lust and others go rampant. Eras of persecution have always been eras of foul and flagrant moral laxity. Last, persecution, if not annihilating, always inflames religious dissensions and multiplies sects. If annihilating, it produces, as in Italy, France and Spain, of the eighteenth century, a dead stagnation of infidelity under the mask of orthodox uniformity.

#### Union of Church and State.

The American constitutions now all deny to the States the right to establish or endow any form of religion, true or false. That right, almost universally believed in out of America until our generation by all statesmen of all creeds, was argued from two different points of view. One, which I may call the high prelatie (as in Gladstone's "Church and State"), makes the State the *πόλις* of human aggregation, charged with all associated functions whereby man is advantaged for time and eternity; teaches that this omnibus organ, State, is moral and spiritual, has a conscience, is, as an organism, responsible to God for propagating His true religion, as well as Christian morals, just as much as the two other institutes of God and



Nature, the family and the Church. Hence it is obligatory that the State shall herself profess a religion, and that the true one, through her chief magistrate; shall apply a religious test-oath to all her officers, judges and legislators, and shall actively support and propagate the true religion through the ministry of the orthodox church. This extreme theory is refuted thus: If it is to do all this, why not persecute also? Let the student consider the question. The State is not, by its nature, either a spiritual or ecclesiastical institution, but a secular one. The same argument would prove that every gas company or telephone company was bound to profess a company religion, have a test-oath, evangelize its employees and patrons.

The second modern theory, advanced by Bishop Warburton, Dr. Chalmers, Macaulay, Patrick Henry and such men, argues thus: They repudiate the (absurd) prelatial theory of the State, and hold that it is only a secular organism, appointed by God and Nature to realize secular order. First, but by reason that it is entitled to exist, it is entitled to use all means essential to its existence and the fulfillment of its natural ends. This is granted. Second, they proceed to say, that popular morality is essential to its existence and the fulfillment of its natural ends. Third, there is no adequate basis for popular morality except the prevalence of some form or forms of reasonably orthodox, evangelical Christianity. Fourth, but experience shows that no voluntary denomination of Christians can succeed in sufficiently evangelizing the masses without State aid. Hence the conclusion, that it is the State's right and duty to select some one or more denominations of Christians, reasonably orthodox, evangelical and pure, and endow and aid them to evangelize every district and the whole population.

This theory is much more plausible and decent. No experienced man contests either of the first three propositions. We contest the fourth, and also argue crushing difficulties in the way of the States reaching the desired end in the way of

church establishment. Experience shows that free and voluntary effort of the denominations, all wisely and equitably protected by the government, but left independent, will come nearer evangelizing the whole society than any one endowed. The United States is the best example. For when we consider the rapid growth of its population, we see that the voluntary efforts of the denominations have done relatively more than any churches enjoying State aid in other lands.

The following arguments are to be added against the more moderate theory we are discussing; they apply, *a fortiori*, against the higher prelatiic theory: (a) That the State's patronage will usually be benumbing. For, since the State is, and must be, a secular institute, its individual magistrates are likely to be anti-evangelical. "The natural man receiveth not the things of God, for they are spiritually discerned." "The carnal mind is enmity against God." These earthly rulers must, therefore, be expected to lean to the patronizing of the least evangelical ministers and denominations. And the office-seeking temper will debauch the ministry just as it does the other office-seekers. (b) Again, since the State pays the salaries of the preachers, her duty to the tax-payers will not only justify, but demand, its supervision of the functions paid for, by claiming the appointing power over pastors or in some other appropriate way that shall be efficient. Then, how shall the endowed church maintain its spiritual independence, or its allegiance to King Christ? This was strikingly illustrated in Scotland in the collision of the Free Church with the government in 1843. The British government claimed for secular patrons the "right of advowson" (or right to nominate a minister to a parish). Dr. Chalmers claimed that the ordination, installation and discipline of ministers were spiritual functions of the Church, over which she could recognize no control whatever, except that of her Divine Head. But the government rejoined, that this secular control over the religious teachers was the just corollary from the support which the secular government furnished to them. Dr. Chalmers' party

attempted to evade this argument by a distinction. They admitted that secular aid must justify a certain secular control over religious functionaries, *quoad temporalia*, but not *quoad sacra*; as to these, the authority of the Church under Christ must be exclusive and supreme. The government replied, in substance, that the distinction was impracticable; when the *temporale*, for instance, was a manse or endowment or a moneyed salary furnished by the commonwealth, as her compensation for a certain religious teaching, it was impossible for her to exercise the control over her money, without also exercising a virtual control over the function for which the money was paid. Dr. Chalmers' distinction appeared as vain as though a plaintiff in the civil court, who had sold a horse, the health of which he warranted, and who was now sued for the purchase-money, should raise the plea, that while he admitted the jurisdiction of the court over the money, he should deny its competency to decide upon the health of the horse, on the ground that it was a court of law, and not a veterinary surgeon. The court would answer, that its jurisdiction over the purchase-money must inevitably involve its right to judge the horse's health; jurisdiction over the *quid* must carry jurisdiction over the *pro quo*. I conceive that against Dr. Chalmers, who still asserted the duty of the State to endow the Church, this reply was conclusive. The mildest form of State establishment must logically result in some partition between the State and Church of that spiritual government which Dr. Chalmers rightly taught belongs exclusively to the Church, under the laws of the Lord Jesus Christ. And this suggests, finally, that any State establishment of religion must tend to involve Erastian inferences as to church discipline of private members also. See this powerfully confirmed by the difficulties of Calvin in Geneva. For will not the unchristian citizen say that this pastor is a public servant? How, then, can he convict his own master for acts not prohibited by the State, his employer? The consequence is logical, that since the religious functionaries are but a part of the State administration,

magistrates alone should have the censorship of manners and morals, unless they are to surrender that whole function to the clergy. But the latter would be absurd and impossible. If the magistrates are not entitled to correct the crimes and misdemeanors of the people, there is nothing to which they are reasonably entitled. If, now, another censorship of manners and morals is allowed to the clergy, the citizens are subjected to an *imperium in imperio*—to double and competing authorities. Where then will be their rights or liberty.

The Protestant reformers did not at first evolve the doctrine of religious liberty, or separation of Church and State. The former was taught by Milton and John Owen, and the latter by Jefferson and Madison. Virginia was the first commonwealth in the world which, having sovereign power to do otherwise, established full religious liberty, instead of toleration, with independence of Church and State, and which placed the stamp of crime upon the African slave-trade. The latter law she enacted in October, 1778, in the midst of the throes of a defensive war, thirty years before it was done by the government of the United States, and forty years before the over-praised and tardy action of Great Britain.

### The Suffrage.

From the view we have given of the basis of the commonwealth and of rights under it, it is obvious that the right of suffrage and eligibility to office is not an inalienable, natural franchise, but a function of responsibility entrusted to suitable classes of citizens as a trust. The opposite theory, which claims suffrage as an inalienable right, is inconsistent, in that it does not extend the claim to women; and it should either extend it to aliens also, or else refrain from all jurisdiction over them and their property. That theory is founded on the social contract theory, by implication, and so falls when it is refuted. That theory represents man as absolutely free from all obligation to government, save as he comes under it by his optional assent to the social contract. It is supposed that this

assent is only given by suffrage. Hence, it is argued, no man owes any allegiance except he be clothed with the right of suffrage. But we have seen that God and Nature bring men under the moral obligation of allegiance, and not their own optional assent. Hence the duty of allegiance does not imply the right of suffrage. The extremest Jacobins do not deem it right to extend suffrage to minors. Why not? The answer must be: Because they lack the knowledge and experience to exercise it safely. They are human beings; it would be absurd to disfranchise them, merely because they are of a certain age. The argument must be, that this immature age is the sign of the disqualification for the function. Now, if a class of persons over twenty-one years of age are marked by a similar incompetency, why should not the same exclusion be applied to them? To give to the incompetent a power which they will abuse to their own injury and the injury of their fellow-citizens, is not an act of right, but of injustice. That claim leads to unreasonable and self-destructive results, for should it be that a class of citizens in the commonwealth are of such a low grade of intelligence and virtue (yet not in the class of condemned felons) as to use their suffrage to destroy their fellow-citizens' rights and their own, Reason says that the commonwealth is entitled to self-preservation by disfranchising them of that power. One of the maxims of the Whigs of 1776 was, "That all just taxation should be accompanied with representation." They meant that a commonwealth or *populus* must be somehow fairly represented in the parliament which taxes them, or else there is injustice. Modern democracy claims that it is true of individuals. Certainly those great men did not mean it thus. The historical proofs are that in that sense the maxim is preposterous. For, first, then no females, however rich, could pay a cent of taxes unless they voted; nor, second, wealthy minors; nor, third, aliens, holding much property protected by the commonwealth; and last, since even Jacobinism does not propose to have babies, idiots and lunatics vote, all their property must remain un-

taxed. As the moral duty of allegiance does not spring out of the individual's consent, but is original and natural, so the duty of paying taxes, which is one branch of allegiance, does not arise thence. This, of course, does not mean that a government has a moral right to tax an unrepresented class of citizens inequitably. And for equitable protection of the taxed against their own rulers clothed with the taxing power, it is enough that the taxed be represented in the law-making department by enough of the classes who pay taxes to make their just will potentially heard. And experience proves that to clothe all, including those who have no property, with suffrage, leaves property practically unprotected.

### Slavery.

#### All Bondage Not per Se Unrighteous.

Among the questions of civic rights and duties, that of the recent domestic slavery in the United States holds a very interesting place. It is not debated with any view to restoring that form of labor; no intelligent man among us expects or desires this under existing circumstances. But we should understand it for three reasons. The first is, that the disputes concerning the relation of bondage, whether it is righteous or intrinsically unjust, involve and illustrate the most vital principles of civic morals and legislation. The second is, that the assertion of its intrinsic injustice now so commonly made involves the credit of the Christian Scriptures; and the discrepancy disclosed has become the occasion of widespread and perilous scepticism. Unless we are willing to give up the authority of the Bible as God's word, it is unspeakably important that this supposed discrepancy shall have a better adjustment than it has yet received. Nothing is more certain than that in its essence human bondage, which is the involuntary subjection of an inferior part of the human race to the will of superiors, has not been abolished and never will be until the Millennium; but the relation will reappear in civilized society under many new names and forms, often less benefi-

cent than the one lately overthrown. But African bondage under that name belongs to the past. Notwithstanding, our educated young men cannot but feel a living interest in the question, whether their honored fathers lived and died in a criminal relation. And this is the third reason which demands this discussion.

Definition.

Every debate should begin with an exact definition of its issue. This is more essential here because a false definition is usually given by all opponents, and insisted on with a pertinacity which is as arrogant as it is ignorant. They insist upon representing American slavery as essentially the same with that of the pagan barbarians. They love to quote Aristotle, defining the *δοῦλος* as *χρῆμα ἐμψυχον*, an animated utensil. They ring the changes on the assertion that our institution made a man, a rational, responsible, immortal person, a "mere chattel." They represent the claim of the master as the assertion of his personal right to subjugate his weaker fellow-creature, his natural equal, at his own will, and to employ and exhaust the victim's labor and existence for his own selfish behoof, in opposition to the very principle of the Golden Rule. Such is the substance of the definitions usually given by all their lexicons, encyclopedias and ethical writings, and when we attempt to assure them that no such institution ever existed by law in America, that every article of every statute concerning the Africans refutes this conception, that no Southern writer of any merit ever accepted it as a thing to be defended, that such a conception of their power as masters was never harbored in a single intelligent and virtuous Southern mind, they refuse to listen and stubbornly republish the absurd definition the world over. Of course, after defining slavery thus, it is an exceedingly easy task to argue its unrighteousness. It is but arguing the self-evident. To erect one's own "man of straw," to blacken it to one's heart's content with his own pitch, and then to knock it down and trample it is a very pleasant affair to that species of

people who are certain that they are wiser and more righteous than their neighbors. Assailants should have known that the perverted definition had no foundation whatever in modern history, law, philosophy or fact. It has been discarded for fourteen centuries, even by the Roman law; for the *Codex Civilis*, the foundation of modern European jurisprudence from the days of the Emperor Theodosius, had discarded it and recognized the human personality of slaves. Dr. Paley, a stout anti-slavery man, was yet well enough informed to define slavery in a manner entirely different: "I define slavery to be an obligation to labor for the benefit of the master without the contract or consent of the servant." But the true definition of American bondage is this: That the commonwealth by law instituted property in the involuntary labor of Africans in the persons of masters, implying also such measure of control over the persons and movements of the bondsmen as enabled the master to possess such property in their labor.

#### The Two Definitions Opposites.

The first grand division between the real and the imaginary definitions is this: that whereas the assailants invent the picture of a stronger individual enslaving his fellow-creatures at his own personal will, the actual bondage of the American States was ordained by the solemn legislative act of the commonwealth itself; and the action of an individual acquiring a slave in the imaginary method of our opponents was made, by the same laws, a felony, that of kidnapping. The second difference was, that whereas the false picture assigned greedy selfishness as the sole motive of the relation, the law established it for purposes of public polity and general good, including that of the bondsmen themselves. The third extravagance was, that the bondsman's personality, soul and responsible destiny were reduced to a chattel, the mere property of the master, whereas the thing made the master's property by the law was involuntary human labor only, which our statute then classified with personal property, as distin-



gushed from fee-simple property in real estate. The fourth vital blunder was in ascribing to masters irresponsible power over their bondsmen, whereas the actual laws restricted the master's power within limits supposed to be proper and just, by the sternest penalties. Here is a contrast indeed! Yet we are often told that it is a distinction without a difference, only invented by us to evade just condemnation. Whether there is an actual and visible difference may be tested by two facts: That it was so plain to the minds of our legislators as to ground the wide contrast in their laws between legitimate slave-holding and felonious kidnapping; and that the difference was so plain to the eye of God, that while He authorized the slave-holding which we have defined, by the hand of Moses, of Christ and of the Apostles, He has also condemned the other species of slavery now falsely imputed to us. For I point to the indisputable fact that the thing which our assailants describe as the essence of our slavery is precisely the crime condemned by Moses under the term of "man-stealing" (Ex. xxi. 16), and by the Apostles as *ἄνδραποσία*; and Moses, while authorizing domestic slavery, puts man-stealing in the very short list of his capital crimes, and the Apostles rank it among the most enormous sins (I. Tim. i. 10). These Scriptural facts are cited to make two points at this place. The first proves that the two definitions of bondage are substantially different, and are not a distinction without a difference. The second proves that the Holy Scriptures, even when most squarely construed as authorizing slavery, are not guilty of authorizing the abominable thing which abolitionists call slavery, so that this pretext of their scepticism for disparaging the Bible is baseless.

#### Our Laws Did Not Make the Bondman a Chattel.

But the main question is one of fact. Which of the two forms of bondage above distinguished was the one established by law in the American States? I answer: Only the latter as described in my own definition; the former, as a legalized

American institution, was as purely imaginary as cannibalism. I prove my assertion thus: First, every slave law of Virginia, which was the mother and exemplar of the slave States, dealt with Africans as rational and responsible persons, not as chattels, addressing to them the rational motives of rewards and punishments, transacting with them therein, directly and personally, and not through their masters, and guaranteeing to them, in every case, judicial trials, with professional counsel to defend them, before punishment. Second, these laws protected their limbs, chastity and lives against their own masters, declaring the forcible invasion of their chastity to be rape, the maiming of them to be felonious mayhem, and the killing of them to be murder, punishable by the very same penalties, in each case, as though the masters had done those crimes upon free white persons. Third, the law protected the Sabbath of the Africans against their own masters, by the same penalty which restrained employers from intruding into the Sabbath of their apprentices. Fourth, the law guaranteed to the Africans a subsistence out of the earning of their own and their masters' industries, and even against the estates of deceased masters. So that actual cases arose in which estates under administration were sued by law officers of the counties on behalf of neglected slaves, and small annuities were recovered for them. But the master's interest in the preservation of his bondsmen was usually a better warrant than any suit at law against his neglecting their supply of necessaries. Fifth, a special statute enabled every African in Virginia to bring suit against his own master for his own freedom, upon the plea that his bondage was illegal; and the slave so suing was immediately taken by the law from his master's control, and put under the care of an impartial guardian *pendente lite*, and his costs and counsel provided for him at the public expense. I ask emphatically: Did our laws, dealing personally with the Africans in all these ways, and enabling them to do all these things, reduce them to mere chattels? But my crowning proof is drawn from the Constitution of the United States, the supreme law of the land.

This was the work of learned lawyers and statesmen, who perfectly knew whereof they were legislating. They had occasion to define the exact concept of African bondage as then existing by law in all the thirteen States, in words exact, clear-cut and accurate. The words are these: "Persons held to service or labor in any State" (meaning, of course, so held by the laws of such State). Let the reader note, here, that this legal definition, which is of final authority for Americans, names the African bondsmen as "persons," and not chattels, and describes their relation to society as being held to service or labor by State law. That is all. If ignorance and prejudice can allow anything to be settled, this settles the complexion of the American institution.

#### The Real Question Affirmed.

The issue is now cleared for discussion. The question is not, whether we are to defend the imaginary monster of the Abolitionists. Nor is the question, whether we shall defend the abuses which bad men wrought upon a legitimate institution. Bad men abuse God's best institutions, even the conjugal and parental. But the question is, whether it is universally *sin per se* for a commonwealth to authorize and limit by law, and for citizens to hold, this Scriptural relation to bondsmen, whose low mental and moral condition and alien race disqualify them for using the franchise of full citizenship safely for themselves or society; that relation being precisely this, and nothing more: the master's legal title to the involuntary labor of the bondsman for life, with such control of his person as is limited by the laws. I assert that this is not *sin per se*, but may be a legitimate relation, in the same sense in which defensive war, the disqualifications of minors, the punitive measures of civil government, and the restraints of government itself are legitimate, in view of the imperative need for all of them, created by human selfishness, ignorance and sinfulness.

This, and no more, is what the Holy Scriptures authorize.

Should the laws of the commonwealth consign to this relation of bondage a class of human beings whose general moral condition was, in fact, too high to need its restraints, the legislation would be wrong. But the citizens holding righteous ownership under it and using it humanely would be innocent. Whether the Africans in America were, and are, below or above that moral grade, is a question of fact, merely, to be decided without prejudice against them, or a fanatical enthusiasm for them.

**Involuntary Human Labor May Become Another's Property.**

Does one argue that a human's involuntary labor cannot properly be made a commodity in which property can vest? Hardly! When we come to study political economy, we shall see that labor is the most primitive of all "values," the source and measure of all other values. It is as literally bought and sold, contracted and paid for, as wheat and potatoes are in every act of hiring, to-wit. Or will it be said that human labor can be a commodity or salable property only to the person himself? This, I suppose, is what is meant by the false proposition, "Every man owns himself," which, in the sense of the argument, is flagrantly erroneous. For, first, every man is absolutely owned by God; and hence, if God has conveyed property in his labor, or a part of it, to any other, as to a parent or the State, the conveyance is as valid, and the property of that other as perfect, as my bill of sale of the mule I raised. Second, it cannot be made true that the man owns himself, unless the extreme denial be made of his existing under any social relations. For, if any such relations bind to that extent, his own ownership of himself is limited. Or, this sophism may be reproduced under this form: that it is the making labor property, which is involuntary with the laborer, that constitutes the essential injustice. Then the absurdity of this position appears, thus: Every human and divine law gives parents property in the labor of their minor children without the children's consent. This labor is as

much vendible and transferable as the labor of a mule or a cotton-gin. Second, every human law gives husbands and wives property in each other's labor; yes, involuntary labor. The wife can sue and recover alimony out of the husband's wages of labor as literally as out of her mule's! One may exclaim, "But the matrimonial alliance was optional in its inception." True in a sense; the law allows men and women to keep out of it if they choose to do so at the price of discarding the primal instincts and sacrificing the prime ends of social existence! How voluntary is that? Again, every State in the world claims of every citizen in its ownership in their involuntary labor, in the form of services on roads, juries, in warfare and of taxes. And the only way to escape this case is to plead the "social contract," which we have exploded. Now, our point is this: Here is case after case, where, by God's and man's laws, property in a human's involuntary labor, with so much control of his person as is necessary to the use of that property right, is found to be righteous. Then that feature of slavery cannot be, *per se*, unrighteous.

Bondage, as thus defined, is one strong form of government over human beings; nothing more. But government cannot be *malum per se*. Why, then, should bondage be? Different grades of human beings require different degrees of restraint in government. The more intelligence and conscience in the mass of the citizens, the less restraint of force is necessary, and *vice versa*. It may be, that for the gross and unprincipled masses of Russia the British Constitution would prove unsuitable, and mischievous license would result. If such be the fact, that larger amount of forcible restraint which constituted the autocracy of Nicholas may be righteous for Russia, while to impose that amount on an enlightened Christian people would be an injustice, because unnecessary. Nobody but *Sans-culottes* and Nihilists are insane enough to contest these truths. Well then, if there is a class in a commonwealth whose ignorance, unfitness for freedom and vice go so far as to require the further amount of restraint which con-

stitutes a life-long minority, and if no less degree of restraint will save the class and the commonwealth from the mischiefs of their indolence, vice and disorder, the commonwealth is entitled to impose that degree of restraint. Thus the complaint, that the bondsman is disfranchised without cause, or at the caprice of his fellow and natural equal, is all exploded. For it is not the selfish individual who imposes that restraint. This, by the law of the commonwealth, was the felony of man-stealing. To assign this grade of restraint to the class which the commonwealth deems needs it is a sovereign function of the commonwealth itself. If it assigns the restraint causelessly, the commonwealth (not the master) is unjust. If the class of people is really in the mental and moral condition of minor children, while adult in passion and physical strength, then the commonwealth has acted justly in assigning it to a life-long minority under somebody.

**Is It Objected the Needed Control Should Be Public and Not Personal?**

Well then, the objector exclaims, let the commonwealth herself be the righteous guardian of these life-long minors through her magistrates. But when she confers the arbitrary power of owning the labor and directing the slave's person on the private individual, erecting him into master over slaves, this is the point at which the iniquity comes in. And the plausible theory, that slavery is but a form of government, or righteous, needful restraint, is forsaken. I reply, No. In the question, Who shall exercise the function of guardianship most wisely, humanely and well for all three parties concerned? practical wisdom and experience must guide. Thus, for instance, the law erects private individuals other than magistrates into guardians of minor whites, with parental powers (under legal restraints, of course). Is that arrangement *malum per se*? Now, if it be found that the bondage of the class necessarily disfranchised to the State directly, with certain State officials for proximate masters, is the harshest, the

most wasteful, the most cruel and grinding, the most demoralizing form of restraint; if it be found that the giving of the restraint into the hand of a personal owner, establishing a domestic tie and especially awakening the powerful principle of self-interest for the bondsman's protection, results in a control over the necessarily disfranchised, at once most humane and efficient, most economical and orderly and merciful; if the domestic master's mercy and thrift usually stand in bright contrast to the heartless, remorseless neglect of the mere office-holder, whose government combines the most wasteful perversion of labor and consumption of public wealth with the most cold-blooded indifference to the miseries of the State's bondsmen: then the State has legislated wisely and righteously and mercifully in delegating the ownership to the citizen of the higher or enfranchised class.

And this contrast is borne out by every fact. Witness the English work-house system over their white slaves, who are indefinitely enslaved for no fault but the calamity of not finding work. The fiendish inhumanity of the system is equal to its corrupting effects and the miserable futility of its pecuniary results. Witness the result of the penitentiary in hireling States; grinding, yet profitless. But in domestic bondage the master's self-interest usually combined with his sense of personal responsibility to secure the welfare of the bond-people and the good industrial results at once.

#### **Abolitionism Leads to Communism and Anarchy.**

This abolitionist dogma, carried to its legitimate results, is the extreme of communism. Its argument is founded on the "leveler's" theory and the Jacobinical contract theory. The premises must lead to female suffrage and to woman's rights. The extremity theory of human equality on which it builds must, of course, destroy the subordination of the family. Abolitionism leads by an inevitable logic, as it has led in fact, to negro suffrage. How can the men who have applied this Jacobin theory to the ignorant and semi-savage negro

refuse to apply it to the virtuous and educated white woman? The force of this corollary will inexorably lead to this. Fanatics are capable of proposing any degree of logical inconsistency. But logical consistency will in due time assert itself, in a case so flagrant as this. The American people will find that, ultimately, they must either repudiate the abolition logic, or establish universal female suffrage. It has even been applied logically to subvert the filial relation. It is only the precursor to that fell communism which will assail all restraints of government and all species of property. Time will show.

#### All Relations Abused.

Of course, some slaves experienced great abuse under the perversion of the master's power. Then the masters were wicked. But the reply is as trite as just, that if every relation that is abused must be itself condemned for its abuse, then all relations on earth must be condemned. The marital is often abused by wife-murder or tyranny; the parental, by child-murder.

#### Comparative Facts.

It having been shown that the essential immorality of the relation of master and bondsmen does not inhere, then the question as to the propriety or humanity of the system, as one of connecting labor and capital, and of protecting civil society against the abused license of its own vicious classes, is simply a question of fact and testimony. And when these facts were justly arrayed, they constituted a splendid vindication for the Southern master. Fanatical minds, excited by occasional instances of hardship and cruelty, turned their eyes studiously away from the actual results of the other, the hireling system in their own country, refusing to see the frightful mass of oppression, vice, destitution and hopeless depression prevailing generally among laboring peasantry of all the hireling countries of Christendom. In 1861 the agricultural Africans of the South were, unquestionably, the best fed, best clothed, healthiest, most increasing, most contented and cheerful, most



religious, most courteous, most reading, most church-going, most well-bred peasantry in the world; and low as their moral tone was, especially in chastity, probably the most moral peasantry in the world. This is stubborn fact. "By their fruits ye shall know them." The practical result of the forcible emancipation of 1865 confirms the argument. This has been, on the whole, a great curse to the Africans, physically and morally. A few black men have, indeed, acquired property; such, namely, as had been trained to business by intelligent masters under the old system. The blacks about Southern towns and villages make quite a display of schooling and Sunday clothes, but the general condition of the mass is deplorable. They now suffer far more destitution of shelter, clothing and fuel, are far more idle, eat far less meat and less even of bread, are a prey to a great access of diseases, are much less religious in fact, though not in pretension. Marriage is far less regarded. Pagan fetichism is in places returning like a wave of the tide. There is a great outbreak of theft and social crime. The right of voting is almost universally either sold for a paltry bribe, or directed by mere brute intimidation.

One form of labor may suit one society with its stage of advancement in morals and civilization; another may suit another. When a given commonwealth had best pass from the bondage relation to that of hiring labor is a mere administrative question of policy, which that commonwealth has the right to decide for itself. Slavery should pass away whenever the evils for which it is the legitimate remedy have passed away; just as we cease to use physic (the wise and righteous remedy of sickness, though in itself a thing never desired for its own sake) as soon as the sickness is gone. Against such emancipation the science of Social Ethics has not a word to say. But against the ultra-abolition dogma our science objects, that it is built on perilously false dogmas, which regularly lead to conclusions disorganizing of all society and of the family; to Jacobinism, to Communism.

**The Extreme Dogma Is Infidelity.**

The other grave evil we wish to combat is the collision of this dogma with the credit and authority of the Christian Scriptures, leading directly to infidelity. The dogma pronounces all slavery essentially *sin per se*. The Scriptures unquestionably authorize some slavery. Therefore, the Sacred Scripture is not all true; therefore, not the word of the infallible God. The expedient adopted by abolitionists, who also wish to be held Christians, is as follows (Wayland and even the amiable Scott): that God and Christ do disapprove of all slavery as involving a sin of oppression; but seeing that it was entwined with all the passions and interests of ancient life, and that the open attack of the institution would array all the world against the gospel, nay, plunge the Roman Empire into a servile war, Christ adopted the plan, first, of at once retrenching the cruelest abuses of slavery; and second, of setting to work for the rest general principles of equity and benevolence which would gradually undermine slavery. That is, to speak plainly, Christ's policy towards the sin was one of partial correction, partial connivance and final suppression, "on the sly." If the Mosaic laws were cited, not tolerating, but clearly authorizing bondage, many made this answer: that Moses' code was, in part, barbarous and evil, and his inspiration therefore imperfect. In the New Testament, they say, the better law of the Golden Rule reverses all this.

**The Attempted Reconciliation with Scripture Deceitful.**

Now, as to the Mosaic legislation, we answer: first, unfortunately for this scheme, Moses enounced the Golden Rule as clearly as Christ (Matt. vii. 12); second, Christ indorsed the inspiration of Moses; so that, if Moses legislated error, Christ is implicated as clearly as he is. In giving up the Old Testament we have to give up the New. As to the scheme of excuse for the Apostles and Christ in the New Testament, it is, first, pointedly false in fact. Polygamy, uncleanness and idolatry were even more entwined than slavery with pagan

society, and more passionately defended. Yet the Apostles attack them inexorably. Second, both Christ and His Apostles repudiate this scheme of connivance. "I came not to send peace, but a sword." "I have not shunned to declare unto you the whole counsel of God," and am, on that ground, "clear of the blood of all men." Third, the express legislation in the New Testament goes farther than such politic connivance. It clearly authorizes the fully creditable standing of masters in the Church, commands Christian slaves to respect that standing; commands them to fulfill their duties as bondsmen, from conscience; defines the proper and righteous modes in which the relation should be maintained. So that the excuse of the Christian abolitionist is grossly uncandid. Fourth, the plea proceeds on the unworthy supposition that God is intimidated by the sin and passion of His own creatures, and consciously lacking in the resources of omnipotence. Fifth, it dishonors God by representing Him as practicing a concealment and proceeding uncandidly. Hence, all perspicuous minds see this plea to be weak and insufficient; and if they retain the extreme dogma of the abolitionists, they throw away their Bibles as an imposture. The heated pressing of this new-fangled, modern dogma (unknown to all the moralists and divines of all the ages) has sown infidelity broadcast. That is my practical objection to it; not any bearing on the politics of the State.

#### Civil Punishments.

Another ethical question as to the commonwealth is, its right to punish transgressions. Contradictory theories of this right are advanced. Hence the discussion is vital. (1) There is no valid answer to the question, How comes the magistrate, only my natural equal as an individual, to be clothed with title to punish me? except this: Because God has delegated it to him under limitations as we saw above. Vengeance or retribution is a divine function. Hence the creature can only hold it by delegation from God. As we saw, also, the "Social Contract Theory" fails to account for this power in the magis-

trate, especially as to capital penalties. (2) The benevolence or eudæmonic theory of ethics argues: that since penalty is pain, and all pain is evil, the righteousness of penalty can only be defended on the remedial theory. That is, it is allowable to inflict on transgressors a penalty, though it is a natural evil, as a kind parent gives medicine (bitter and griping) to a sick child. The "final cause" is, after all, the transgressor's greater good (natural good). But this sorry theory breaks down very easily under the objections advanced by us in Chapter III., Book III. This remedial theory of penalty is so damaged by these objections that its true friends have to mend it and advance it in this form. True, the remedial advantage of the culprit himself may not be the sole end of the penalty, as it cannot be an end at all of capital punishment. But the example of transgression is mischievous, and has a tendency to make others transgress and jeopardize all persons and property. Hence penalty, even on the culprit that is too reprobate to be amended, is still remedial in this sense, that it is an expedient of safeguard for the whole society. And this benevolent result is what justifies hurting a fellow-creature with the natural evil of penalty. But this is obnoxious to most of the points made above. I add, first, that it raises the question: If the transgressor has not acquired a natural desert of penalty by his bad act, what entitles the ruler to make a sacrifice of his welfare for the public convenience? The same argument would justify burning the small-pox patient alive. Second, if the punishing of an innocent friend of the culprit (as, for instance, the lovely and beloved child of a reprobate, callous and reckless about himself) would have a better deterrent effect than his own punishment, this would justify the cruelty.

#### The True Theory of Civic Penalties.

This theory of punishment therefore breaks down. The true theory is: that punishment is just, because God has delegated a modicum of His retributive function to the magistrate, His representative; and that this modicum of retribution is

just, because the transgressor deserves it. It satisfies the supreme demand of justice. As the well-doer deserves by his virtue the reward of well-being, so, by parity of reason, the ill-doer deserves suffering. This account of the matter is simple, and is true to the imperative intuitions of the conscience. For instance, when you catch the murderer of your own family, red-handed, the intuitive impulse is to retribution. Is it wicked? No. Malignant? No; but just. Are you thinking of policies and preventive tendencies? No; reason and heart simply and directly call for satisfaction for ill-desert.

But is not penalty preventive? Is not the policy and advantage properly looked for by the magistrate in punishing? Yes, as a subordinate end. But if mere preventive policy is thrust into the place of first and sole ground, excluding the intrinsic ill-desert of crime, and claim of justice for satisfaction, then punishment ceases to be a glorious justice, and degenerates into a trickery. The magistrate sits as, first, God's representative and vicegerent, charged to maintain, so far as his function extends, the essential justice of God. He sits, second, as appointed guardian and protector of order and the common welfare; hence his penal administration (as his penal legislation) is bound to be, first, strictly just, rewarding and punishing each, so far as he can without divine attributes, according to his desert; and second and subordinately thereto, penalties must be, framed and used as to be most protective of the common virtue, order and welfare. Thus, suppose that the theft of a sheep might be equally rewarded, so far as desert goes, by so many stripes or by so much imprisonment. But the magistrate perceives that the stripes will have a good deal more deterrent effect with that kind of people than the jail. This would not justify the magistrate in inflicting either the stripes or the jail unjustly, but it would justify him in inflicting, on the really guilty sheep-stealer, the just stripes in preference to the just imprisonment. In favor of the exact and regular administration of justly ascertained penalty, both these relations of the magistrate, the essential claims of just-

ice, the subordinate, prudential, repressive policy, argue powerfully. On the latter point, note that invariable regularity and certainty of penalty are best for the deterrent effect, satisfying the reason and conscience of the community, and even of the criminal class (otherwise outraged by partialities of administration), and leaving no flattering hope of impunity to allure to transgression. For a modicum of hope that one may, like previous transgressors, sin and escape, counts with the tempted for much more, probably ten-fold more, than it is worth. Irregularities in punishing are therefore, practically, premiums on crime. To yield to mere kindness here is to favor the very man (culprit) who does not deserve the magistrate's favor at the expense of those (law-abiding) who do deserve and are entitled to it. The chief magistrate who pardons causelessly is therefore unrighteously attacking and punishing the innocent for the sake of the guilty. It is best, therefore, that the pardoning power be limited to such cases as have been unjustly convicted, or on inadequate evidence of evil intention; and such as, by reason of some new circumstance, as chronic sickness, would suffer under the literal execution of the verdict more than the judge who pronounced it intended or claimed.

## CHAPTER V.

## THE MORALS OF INDIVIDUALS IN THEIR CIVIC ACTIONS.

## 1. Responsibility of the Citizen in the Exercise of Every Civic Function.

There is scarcely any chapter in Ethics which more needs sound discussion than the political morality of citizens and officials. Unfortunately, experience shows us that the temptation to looseness of conscience in official transactions, and in the dealings of individuals with the commonwealth, are far more insidious and dangerous than in the relation of man with man. One explanation is, that in associated actions men erroneously suppose that this responsibility is divided, and thus the evil is concealed. The shame is evaded when many join hands in the sin. The visible evils inflicted by the sin on fellow-men are secondary, or indirect, or remote. The responsibility seems divided out among many, so that each individual's share seems small.

Now the first thing to be done is to show that all this is an illusion. If the arithmetical figure be appropriate at all, responsibility is multiplied, not divided, in associate action. Were the divine or human rule to allow such a principle of morals, all that transgressors would have to do to secure absolute license for iniquity would be to combine in sufficient numbers. That would be simply absurd. The statute law rightly discards that illusion; for if twelve, or twelve times twelve, men were to combine to murder one man, each individual would be indictable. Though only one murder has been perpetrated, the law makes twelve full murderers. This

is the just principle, and it explodes the plea of division of guilt.

**In Associated Actions Responsibility Is Higher and Honor Should Be More Scrupulous.**

In fact, civilized men come under a just obligation to cultivate a higher, more intelligent and scrupulous righteousness in associated actions, the more refined and beneficent the civilized forms of association have become. It is but an application of the just principle, that "to whom much is given, of him shall much be required." For why do we use those refined and more complicated forms of social organization? Because we think they are productive of higher social advantages, and they multiply man's social power for acquiring natural good. If we did not think so, we should content ourselves with the simple and rudimental forms of government of a primitive people. Our more intricate social and business organisms are, then, good gifts to us. Then, their enjoyment imposes an obligation to be so much the more nice and scrupulous in our integrity. Their intricacy also multiplies the ways to commit a cunning and covert injustice on our fellow-man. Hence, instead of taking license from those complications of social methods to act selfishly, the modern citizen and office-holder are under higher obligations and in danger of deeper guilt. The simple integrity which might guide aright the herdsman in primitive society is not enough for us. We are bound, in our social actions, to cultivate a still more scrupulous and intelligent honesty. Every man is bound to acquire the competent knowledge of these methods of government, powers and functions which will suffice to guard him against wronging his fellow-men ignorantly, by means of these; or else he is bound to refrain from using them. Or, having learned all their workings, direct and indirect, upon the interests of his fellow-men, he is bound to employ them with a scrupulous impartiality, proportionate to their complicated powers of good and evil. If any man is not willing to do this, all these refined methods of



civilization should be to him forbidden expedients. There is an exact parallel between the wickedness of their use by ill-informed or unscrupulous agents and the use of intricate but powerful implements of the arts by ignorant scholars. Here, for instance, is a chemical laboratory, containing many articles of value, and occupied by a number of students. A certain chemical process offers the convenience of rapid results, but it is complicated, and in ignorant hands is liable to generate a noxious gas, which will impair the health and endanger even the lives of all the innocent persons in the room. Any student who, to save himself trouble, dares to employ that process, without being sure that he understands the chemical reactions he is about to set in motion, is little less than a murderer. Certainly his teacher and comrades would expel him from their company with high indignation, as a heartless scoundrel. Or again, there is a factory filled with costly machinery and driven by a fearful motive power. An apprentice, in order to save himself some labor and to increase his own wages, employs a powerful machine, of whose workings he is not thorough master. He knows that, for his own selfish ends, he is incurring a risk of breaking his employer's property and of injuring the limbs of fellow-workmen. Whether the catastrophe resulted or not, such a fellow would certainly be expelled from the factory upon detection. Modern society, with its high material civilization, is a similar structure, filled with social machinery, which is both costly and powerful, intricate and exerting remote and various reactions. No man is entitled to handle it who is not, first, sufficiently instructed in these actions and reactions; and, second, of as strict integrity concerning its most hidden and remote reactions as he is concerning his most overt and direct and personal transactions. The man who is willing to take the risk of perpetrating a wrong upon his fellow, for the sake of his own advantage, is already dishonest.

**Political Society Is an Equitable Joint Stock Company.**

The equitable point of view, as between citizen and commonwealth, or official and commonwealth and fellow-citizen, is this: Civil society is an equitable copartnership between citizens (not all having equal capital stocks, but) pursuing in their political action certain common ends, in which each and every shareholder is entitled to participate (not equally, indeed, since each one does not contribute an equal capital stock, but) equitably. In their individual, private or domestic actions, the citizens may pursue their private lawful ends. But in their political actions all are bound to pursue no other object but the common weal of the whole, and that equitably. The just analogy is found in the commercial morals enforced by public sentiment and the civil law, especially in its equity proceedings. Several merchants voluntarily combine into a copartnership to pursue some branch of commerce. The covenant or agreement between them stipulates that each member of the firm shall contribute so much capital to it. Neither of these merchants, we will suppose, contributes all his wealth to his firm, nor does he pledge to its service all his working hours. Each one of them still has his own store or warehouse, in which he is conducting his individual business for his own profit and the advantage of his family. It is proper for him to manage this individual business for his own behoof. But he must not carry these private ends into the management of the concerns of the firm, except as he aims to promote the equitable profit of his copartners along with his own. If he perverts any of his own actions as a member of the firm to his exclusive private gains at the expense of his partners' proportionable shares therein; if, for instance, he uses the cash or the credit of the firm to speculate on his own account in any commodity, keeping the profits of such ventures out of the common fund, so that they are not equitably distributed along with all the other profits among the partners: he is little better than a thief. There are no reputable merchants who, upon detecting such practices, would fail to re-

quire his expulsion from the firm. He would be a dishonored man, whom others would disdain to greet upon the merchants' exchange. Now, since civil society is an analogous, equitable combination of individuals for the common good, the same moral rule should apply. Each citizen is entitled in his private actions to pursue his own individual interests, provided he does it consistently, with justice and charity to others. But in every action which he performs as a citizen he is dealing for the copartnership, and is bound to pursue the common interests equally, seeking no more for himself than for all his copartners.

#### The Principle Applied to Voting.

The voter in voting (his main political power and action) is bound to set aside personal ends and vote for those policies alone which will be equally promotive of his own, his family's and all his fellow-citizens' rights and interests. For instance, is he a debtor, having become so by borrowing his neighbor's money when the currency borrowed was at par? Here is legislation which tends to depreciate the currency ten per cent below par. If he votes for that policy with a view of paying his debts in that cheapened currency, he has simply stolen one-tenth of his neighbor's money. Or, is the question in discussion the tariff protection of certain manufactures? Are public, equitable and common reasons urged in favor of that tariff protection? They may or may not be believed in by honest men. But if the voter who is engaged in or proposes to engage in that manufacture votes for that policy with the hope and design of compelling his fellow-citizens thereby to pay him an enhanced profit on his industry, more than he expects and wishes to pay them on their industry when he buys from them, he is a dishonest voter; he is, in God's sight, simply planning to steal.

**"Public Office a Public Trust."**

Does one exclaim: "This is a Utopian, Puritan standard; it condemns all!" I reply by asking him to show me a flaw

in my reasoning. The voter who cannot rise to this grade of common honesty in voting (it is no more) ought to be disfranchised. That is all. Office-seekers and office-holders are bound to regard their functions as trusts to be faithfully fulfilled for the public and common behoof, not as privileges. He who inquires, not whether he is qualified to fill the office, but whether the office will fill him, is a thief.

#### Rotation in Office Criticised.

The only just object for which officers are established and paid is the public service. The salary allotted should be the just equivalent for the service which the commonwealth exacts of each office-holder; and no higher compensation should be paid by the commonwealth than other employers pay for similar services, according to the prices current in the labor market. Since, then, the honest office-holder gives to society an equal value for the wages which he receives, he cannot regard his office as a prize of selfish advantage. Now, it has been often said that frequent rotation in office is a correct principle in democracy. I assert that it is utterly corrupting, as it is thoroughly illogical. It teaches aspirants, who under the wretched doctrine tend to become as numerous as the whole body of citizens, that office holding is a selfish spoil to be clutched, instead of a responsibility to be borne. What is the principle to which this pretended rotation appeals? It is evidently selfish greed. It regards the occupant of an office as the possessor of a selfish boon, from which it desires to thrust him away in order to grasp it for one's self. Thus the very idea of righteous responsibility for duty is lost in the squabble of concupiscence. The assumption in the false doctrine is, that the lucky man is to win the office, not for the public good, but to fatten his own cravings. What can be the result of such inculcation, except an indolent unfaithfulness in the service and dishonesty in grasping its emoluments? The same doctrine suggests to aspirants all the dirty arts of the supplanter. I repeat, that the office rightfully exists solely

for the benefit of the commonwealth, and not for that of the incumbent. The man who will serve the commonwealth best is the man who should keep the office. And if the evidence of fidelity and the experience acquired by long service give good guarantee that the incumbent will best serve the commonwealth, then he should hold the office as long as he retains his powers of usefulness. To displace him merely to satisfy the greed of some other aspirant is unjust to him, unjust to the commonwealth, and contaminating to the public morals.

## 2. Nature and Responsibilities of Conferring and Holding Office.

Equally polluting and perilous is the custom of rewarding partisan services in elections with appointments to public offices. As soon as this practice begins, it proposes to the citizen vicious motives for political actions instead of patriotic ones. It is, indeed, little less than a form of bribery, aggravated by the fact that it is the money of the people which is seized to pay the bribes. And since under such policy actual and prospective aspirants to office come to include nearly all the citizens, the moral seduction becomes so pervasive that disinterested political action almost wholly ceases, and the people become too venal, dependant and selfish to be capable of self-government. They need a master in the form of a despot. Such a master the system tends surely to produce. Then the successful leader of faction is empowered by this miserable invention to use the money of the citizens, exacted from them by taxation, not for the public service, but for subsidizing his "prætorian cohorts" of office-holders and office-seekers, the latter an army larger than the former, to blind, to excite, to mislead, to intimidate the voters of the country. Then pure freedom speedily departs. Pretended elections become farces, like those in which the Roman *imperator* was annually reëlected, along with one of his human jackals, consul of the Republic. If the people of a constitutional

government are either virtuous or intelligent, they will drive from power any party leader who proposes to succeed by this method, as a worse enemy of his country than any other possible heresy in political theories.

**The Just Reward of the Office-Holder—"Log-Rolling" Condemned.**

Further, the office-holder has no right to make out of his office anything more than his salary. If he sees, through his intelligence and efficiency, ways in which the public wealth may be economized and saved, what can be so saved he shall place in the public treasury, because the commonwealth bought just that official skill from him and paid him for it in salary, and he voluntarily covenanted to take that salary as the pay. So that whatever results from his official skill is the State's, not his.

All those bargains popularly called "log-rolling" in legislation are immoral. No bill ought to become a law which is not recommended by the equitable argument, that it will be promotive of the common and general welfare. Hence no argument ought to be urged by one legislator, or felt by another, to vote for a given measure, which is not conformed to this standard. Your fellow-legislator is urging a bill which he says will be equitably promotive of the general advantage. He ought not to be actuated by any other motive. If, now, you actually or virtually say to him, "I think your bill is for the common good," you ought not to wait for any other argument to vote for it. If you say, "Your bill is not promotive of the common good," then no other inducement whatever ought to persuade you to vote for it. If you have to say to your brother legislator, "Your bill is promotive of the common good," then this ought to be enough by itself to make you vote for it. To require him to vote in turn for your bill, in order to bribe you to vote for his, is immoral, because it tempts him to an immorality. "By their fruits ye shall know them." The obvious tendency is to remove the question, "Shall a law pass affecting the common weal?" away from

its merits and to have it decided upon dishonest motives. The side motives which such proposals bring to bear upon legislators for casting their votes are always improper and constantly tend to become grossly corrupt. It is probable that many whose political morals have not yet become profligate deceive themselves with this excuse. They say: "We, for our part, feel sure that the measure we propose is for the equitable common good, and perhaps of urgent importance. Our motives for advocating it are wholly public-spirited and honest. But here are fellow-legislators who cannot be induced to vote for it on grounds purely disinterested, without whose votes this good measure cannot be passed. It is therefore allowable to conciliate their egotism by bargaining that we will give our votes for their measure, provided they will give us their votes for ours. If their darling measure were iniquitous or mischievous, of course we would not promise to vote for it. But it appears to us harmless." I reply, that this is but "doing evil that good may come." It is but insinuating the thin edge of that wedge which, when driven home, as it always will be in the end, dislocates and utterly rends the moral principles of law-makers, and reduces the art of legislation from a moral procedure to a putrescent mass of trickeries. One has no more right to apply an illicit motive to a fellow-man for a responsible act than to apply it to himself. In fact, he cannot do so without besmirching his own conscience, for he intuitively knows that it is disingenuous to solicit his neighbor to act disingenuously. A commonwealth pays too dearly even for the best law when it is bought at the cost of corrupting her law-makers themselves. I am perfectly aware of the objection which the ordinary politician will raise against my reasoning: that one who is acquainted with the sorry complexion of American legislatures and congresses learns that scarcely any law could be passed without using this expedient, and that were my strict rule applied, the commonwealth would suffer for the want of necessary legislation. My reply is, that this remedy for such suffering is worse than the disease. It

Is unspeakably better that the temporary suffering should continue until the bulk of the people are so taught wisdom by it that they will arise and force their representatives to pass right laws in the right manner. If corrupt and trafficking legislators withhold their votes from proposed measures, obviously promotive of the equitable public good, in the hope of exacting this species of bribery, the proper remedy is to expose them to the public with a righteous candor, to make the people see why the wholesome measures do not pass, and to throw the responsibility where it justly belongs. If the people themselves, when thus truthfully instructed, have not the intelligence and morality to right their own cause by casting out such disobedient public servants, and selecting honest men who will serve the public weal from straightforward motives, then that people proves itself incapable and unworthy of self-government. No cunning, nor expediency, nor art can frame and preserve for a people thus unworthy the blessings of free and good laws; the attempt to do it by disingenuous means can only add, in the end, to the general depravity, and thus aggravate the radical evil.

To wield the prerogative of office for the behoof of a political party in the commonwealth, against the rights and interests of the commonwealth as a whole, is immoral. The only reason why parties are legitimate at all, in the sphere of Ethics, is that they are supposed to represent and advocate principles and measures conducive to the highest welfare of the whole State and all its orders of people. The party is allowable only as a means to an end, and morality binds the supporter to make that end the equitable common good. Let the two parties, for example, be Whig and Tory. The good citizen can only support the Tory party under conviction that its principles and measures do, on the whole and in the long run, promote the interests of the Whig citizens as much as of Tories. The moment that is perverted to press the advantage of Tory citizens, especially at the expense of equal rights of Whig citizens, it has become not a party, but a faction. The



same constitution which clothes elected legislators and rulers with their official powers, guarantees to every citizen the sovereign right to choose his own party. For what is this, in fact, but the simplest application of the sacred liberty of thought? Every citizen, I repeat, has as full a right to choose the party of the minority which has just voted against the elected president, as that president has to govern. Therefore, this citizen is not to be chastised for exercising his right of choice, by any species of oppression, or any limitation of any franchise or privileges attaching to him as a citizen, or by any subtraction from his equitable share of the general welfare. This president against whom he voted is morally bound to direct all his official acts to the promotion of these civic privileges, and this equitable welfare of the man who voted against him, precisely as he uses them in favor of the man who voted for him. If he fails of this, he is no longer a constitutional ruler, but a usurper and an oppressor. The student will probably exclaim: Then, indeed, has the recognized usage of "free America" gone far astray from just principles! I reply: Exactly so. And I wish the student to see here the plain experimental truth of my assertion that Jacobinism is absolutism, and that its government by the will of the mere numerical majority leads as directly to despotism as that of the Czar. For remember, that the commonwealth, as between citizen and citizen, is an equitable copartnership, in which each partner, however free to pursue his private and domestic effort for private ends, is morally bound to exercise his copartnership functions only for the common and equitable behoof of the firm. But if these perversions of power to partisan objects are immoral in the private citizen, they are far more so in an official. For the constitution and laws expressly make him the officer of the commonwealth, and not merely of a part thereof.

The right of every citizen to think for himself, and join either party he judges most patriotic, is guaranteed to him by the Constitution. Hence, the official servant of the common-

wealth has no right to disfranchise him for seeing fit to join the party opposite to his own.

**State Theft Most Criminal of All.**

It is more criminal to steal from the State than from an individual. For the property stolen is the property of all the citizens, who are individuals. And the commonwealth is often more helpless to protect itself against speculation than an individual is; so that stealing from it is like maltreating a woman, child or sick person. Hence, it is criminal to use the circumstance that the State is purchaser to charge it more than the market price for commodities or labor. All contracts with the State ought to be put at the same fair price at which the contractor would be willing to do the same species and style of work for an intelligent private person. Tried by these indisputable rules, the country will be found full of dishonesty. The way in which these ethical demands are often "pooh-poohed" away is itself dishonest. "Oh, that is all Puritanism. You will not find anybody to come up to that visionary standard." This is an attempt to cover a fraud by a slander. We do find men to come up to this standard. Did not Washington? Was he too moral? Righteous overmuch? Then the same standard is for you.

## CHAPTER VI.

## DUTIES TOUCHING LIFE.

## I. Murder.

Next among social obligations come those relating to life—our own and our fellow-men's. In discussing these we must recur to that Golden Rule which we demonstrated at the outset. By whatever motives we reasonably desire to protect and preserve our bodily welfare and existence, by the same we are bound to respect those of other men. If destroying life unjustly is wicked, then all the acts by which life is causelessly endangered, or the current of our fellow's life is impaired or diminished, are also wicked, though possibly in a less degree. If I am deprived, by violence, of a limb, one fraction of my bodily life is dead. If I am permanently deprived of health, a part of the volume of my life is dried up. Hence, to wound, cripple, or to maim causelessly, to injure my fellow-creatures' health for an unnecessary end, as by adulterating their food or medicines, deceiving them by quackery, forcing or tempting them, without a moral necessity, to perilous or unhealthy occupations, by rashness and recklessness in actions, means of transportation, and such like occupations or amusements: all these are sins of murder in the lesser degree.

**Murder the Supreme Crime.**

The crowning sin is, of course, malicious homicide. The very instincts of Nature point this out as the worst of crimes. To any man's natural feelings and judgments, death is the sum of all natural evils. If you are reasonable in so regarding your own death, then, by the Golden Rule, you are correspondingly guilty if you bring this supreme evil on your fellows un-

justly. It is a solemn fact that malicious murder is a crime for which a man never forgives himself. Nemesis pursues him. Said an old military chief: "If these young officers must needs fight a duel, you had better arrange such terms as will make it perfectly sure that both will be killed." They asked, all aghast: "Why so?" "Because I never knew an officer in my life, who had killed his brother officer in a duel, who was not a ruined man, and more miserable than if he were dead." Death is the sum of all natural evils, because it inflicts all that all these evils could inflict—robbery of property, rending away or bereavement of all friends, disappointment of all hopes, sending the soul out into the spirit world stripped naked of all. This suggests the crowning reason of the enormity of murder. "Whoso sheddeth man's blood, by man shall his blood be shed; for in the image of God made He man." The argument is, that the victim was a rational, responsible and immortal agent, with a vital interest for eternity in this earthly probation. Murder violently ends that probation, and does it with a remorseless disregard to the question, whether the probation, in the victim's case, has come to a safe issue. So far as the slayer cares or knows, the stroke that ends the bodily life may send the soul to an endless and irreparable perdition. This is an infinite cruelty. The natural intuitions of the soul are, therefore, true to the facts, when they continue ceaselessly to chastise the murderer. Shakespeare, whose delineations are so true to nature, has painted this result in the person of Macbeth and his wife.

*Macbeth.* How is it with me, when every noise appals me?  
 What hands are here? Ha, they pluck out mine eyes!  
 Will all great Neptune's ocean wash this blood  
 Clean from my hands? No; this my hand will rather  
 The multitudinous seas incarnadine,  
 Making the green one red.

—Act II., Scene 2.

*Lady Macbeth.* Yet here's a spot.  
 Out, damned spot! out, I say! . . . . Yet who would  
 Have thought the old man had so much blood in him?

The Thane of Fife had a wife. Where is she now?  
 What? Will these hands ne'er be clean?  
 Here is the smell of blood still. All the perfumes of  
 Arabia will not sweeten this little hand. Oh! oh! oh!

—*Act V., Scene 1.*

#### Capital Punishments Argued.

Murder, then, and the other acts involving it, as assault, aggressive war, treason, constitute the worst crime that man can commit against his fellow-man. Nobody will deny, then, that since there ought to be a just proportion between crimes and punishments, murder ought to receive the heaviest which the commonwealth inflicts at all. But, has the commonwealth the right to punish it (or any other crime) capitally? Some say, No; that capital punishment is itself a murder, perpetrated by the State; that life is an inalienable possession, forfeitable to none but the Maker; that the State could not derive a right to destroy it from the "social contract," because the individual's life is not his own, to be by him bargained away; that the example of capital punishment, instead of being wholesome and deterrent, is imbruting to spectators, inflaming the animal ferocity native to man, so that the more executions, the more homicides; that, as it ends the man's chances for repentance, it sends the criminal's soul to hell, thus visiting an eternal and infinite penalty on a temporary crime; that punishment, being a natural evil, can only be justified as a remedial means, whereas capital punishment destroys instead of amending. Such are the arguments. They are plausible.

On the theory of the "social contract," as we admitted, these arguments would be valid. But we have seen that theory false. The primary ground of punishing is not the utilitarian policy, but the high, holy, intuitive demand of satisfaction for justice. Here then, if the crime is infinite, the penalty may justly be infinite. Again, it is probable that when a man has gone to that extreme of depravity which destroys a guiltless neighbor, the certainty that he must go in a few weeks before the Divine Judge is the most hopeful means of repentance. If all the

gallows repentances professed were genuine, it would be far better than preaching. Besides, the argument from the impropriety of any creatures inflicting on the criminal the irreparable and eternal penalty, begs the question. For, if justice affixes the penalty and the magistrate is God's mere delegated instrument in administering it, then in truth it is the man himself who has doomed himself to perdition; and not the jury. The *lex talionis* seems essentially equitable. But we have seen that the central crime of the murder was, in that he, as much as in him lay, sent his victim to irreparable perdition. The argument from the imbruting effects of executions on spectators is good to conclude that they ought not to be public, and for this only. The affirmative argument is, that the magistrate is the appointed and righteous guardian of the commonwealth and all its innocent members. To them existence is the supreme earthly boon. Hence, to protect their existence is the magistrate's supreme duty; and to protect it at the cost of any means whatever that are necessary to do so. Thus the magistrate is bound to protect his commonwealth from invasion, even at the cost of the lives of patriot soldiers. Now then, when a guilty individual goes to such lengths of wickedness as to destroy his fellows, it is time for society to destroy him. By destroying innocent existences he forfeits the right to exist. He has committed a sin against Nature, so utter as to dehumanize him; he is a mad dog, or venomous snake. But this argument cannot be decided on any other grounds than those which laid down the theistic basis for civil government. Whether the civil magistrate is authorized to destroy the murderer must turn altogether on God's decree. He is the proprietor of life, and the judge to whom vengeance belongeth. He, beyond doubt, requires the capital penalty for willful murder, first, in the precepts of Holy Scripture. See Gen. ix. 6; Num. xxxv. 31-33. "Moreover ye shall take no satisfaction for the life of a murderer, which is guilty of death; but he shall surely be put to death. And ye shall take no satisfaction for him that is fled to the city of his refuge,

that he should come again to dwell in the land, until the death of the priest. So ye shall not pollute the land wherein ye are; for the blood it defileth the land; and the land cannot be cleansed of the blood that is shed therein, but by the blood of him that shed it." Deut. xix. 11-13: "But if any man hate his neighbor, and lie in wait for him, and rise up against him, and smite him mortally that he die, and fleeth into one of these cities: then the elders of this city shall send and fetch him thence, and deliver him into the hand of the avenger of blood, that he may die. Thine eye shall not pity him, but thou shalt put away the guilt of innocent blood from Israel, that it may go well with thee."

Shall we be met with the objection that this is but Hebrew legislation, now antiquated by the milder ethics of the New Testament? I have two answers. One is, that, whether this law were meant to be temporary or perpetual, local or universal, it proves that capital punishment for willful murder is essentially righteous, because a Holy God could not even temporarily establish an unrighteous law for His own people, whom He was choosing unto righteousness. The other is, that the New Testament still recognizes the justice of the law. Rom. xiii. 4: "For he beareth not the sword in vain:" (the sword, the emblem of the death power) "for he is the minister of God, an avenger to execute wrath upon him that doeth evil." In Acts xxv. 11 the Apostle avows the justice of the same law in these words: "If I have done anything worthy of death, I refuse not to die." God reveals His will, secondly, in the universal voice of Nature, which, even in benevolent minds, still says that blood alone satisfies for blood. So all nations with as without a Bible have hitherto judged willful murder worthy of death.

#### The Lesson of Experience.

American theorists seem to think, that as they live on a new continent, it is theirs to try all new principles, and to some of these speculators the fact, that one has been judged

by all mankind so absurd as to deserve no trial at all, seems the crowning inducement to try it. Capital penalties have been abolished in several commonwealths. But experience shows that murders have been multiplied so fearfully, that in some the necessity of restoring them has been recognized. God guards the life which He alone can give or take away righteously, with peculiar sanctity. To cultivate a sacred regard for life is the essential trait of a virtuous and civilized commonwealth, and to esteem it lightly and destroy it on small provocation is the blackest sign. The American people have a fearful reckoning here. It is inevitable that they must pay it in yet other national calamities.

#### Defensive War.

Defensive war is, then, righteous, and only defensive war. Aggressive war is wholesale robbery and murder. If the magistrate is armed with righteous power to destroy the domestic murderer, *a fortiori* he has a right to destroy these alien murderers, committing the crime wholesale. The "Peace Society" used to argue that all war is sinful, from the horrors of war. They are enormous. But common sense would rather argue from this the guilt of the perpetrators and the right of punishing it in some appropriate way. Who may do it if not the magistrate? But war should be only defensive. As soon as the invader is disarmed, his life should be spared; especially as individual invaders are usually private subjects of the invading sovereign, who have little option about their own acts as private soldiers. It is scarcely needful to add that the Scriptures of both Testaments expressly teach the righteousness of the patriot soldier's profession. The Apostle, in Heb. ii., teaches that the valor of the defensive soldier is one of the noble fruits of religious faith, a principle which he ascribes to the inworking of God himself. A moment's reflection shows that the rightfulness of capital punishment stands or falls with the lawfulness of defensive war. The inconsistency of those Americans who repealed capital penalties, and yet launched



eagerly into aggressive war against their own brothers, is sufficiently glaring. The American "Peace Society," of Boston, after arguing the essential wickedness of all war, and denouncing the advice even of a Washington, when he counseled prudent preparations for defensive war, held its last meeting just before the war between the States began. They then reached the conclusion, that against a war of this complexion their principles did not apply, urged its vindictive prosecution, and then adjourned *sine die*.

#### Suicide Is Murder.

If deliberate suicide is a sin at all, it is in one aspect peculiarly malignant, because, being the final act, it cannot be repaired by repentance. For any man to destroy his own life, then, is a clear and great crime against himself, unless he is entirely certain he has a right to do it. But that he has no right is clear from these points: First, arguments which have made his neighbor's bodily life the supreme value to him ought to make the suicide's life of equally supreme value to himself. But the law is: "Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself" (not better than thyself). He is as much bound to seek his own legitimate good as his neighbor's. Second, bodily life is a loan from the Maker, and therefore can never be lawfully thrown away, but kept faithfully until He revokes it. A man may say: Life is so conditioned now, for me, that it cannot any longer serve any useful end for God or my fellow, but only causes pain. I answer: This is the very thing which the creature cannot know. It may be, that the Creator wills us to live on, in captivity or helplessness, for this very end, that we may honor Him and instruct our fellow-men by the very submission with which we shall die the other death which He ordains for us. Third, we are under obligation to our fellow-creatures to live for them; we have no right to desert our stewardship. Fourth, Nature teaches us on this point, as on the guilt of murder, by the instinctive horror of self-murder. When we find an instinctive propensity so rad-

ical, native and universal, we are entitled to argue from it. It means something. It teaches us intuitively.

The duty to preserve our own and our neighbors' lives obviously leads, by a corollary, to all the duties of temperance and hygiene. To injure our own, as our neighbor's, health of body or mind, causelessly, is a sin against life. It is the impairment of life, which is as truly (not as greatly) murder as the destruction of life. Here is the argument which shows the sins of gluttony, drunkenness, excess, over-labor and rashness, and of all acts causelessly inducing our fellows to them.

## 2. The Demands of False and True Honor Distinguished.

### The Principle of Self-Defense.

That all the acts of violent retaliation for assaults, and yet more for mere insults, are sins of murder, follows from our discussion of resentment, and the duty of forgiveness. We saw that the legitimate scope of that emotion is self-defense alone. When it proceeds to revenge, it has become a usurpation of God's functions, or a gratuitous malignity.

The sentiment of personal honor, which we have inherited from the feudal ages, needs profound discussion. It is a curious historical fact, that the civilized ancients made no such application of it in the retaliation of insults, not even the military men, not a Judas Maccabæus, a Pompey, an Epaminondas. None of these men would have dreamed of any obligation of honor to retaliate an unjust insult, nor dreamed that their failure to do so reflected any reproach on their honor or manhood. They would have felt that they had done everything incumbent by retorting the insult. Of course I do not mean to say that they were not susceptible to anger and revenge. But had they cut the insulter down on the spot with their swords, they would have felt and judged, as the bystanders, that in so doing they had not satisfied their honor at all, but simply yielded, in a very natural way, to petulance or revenge. Now, this curious fact goes far to prove that the

modern sentiment of personal honor is factitious and illogical. For these ancients were as brave, as sensitive, and as truly endowed with moral intuitions, as we are. Honor claims a moral or ethical source and nature. It is obvious to remark, that if honor is to claim such origin, it must observe the metes and bounds of morals. Do moral principles confer on any man a right to act immorally? Hence, there is no more outrageous and wicked impudence than for the man of fashion to claim the right to "defend his honor" in any immoral method. Indeed, since the claim of "personal honor" is either an ethical claim, or else absurd, the "man of honor" is bound not only to defend his honor in strictly moral methods, but also to honor, in all his conduct, that moral system which alone gave him any rights to personal honor. In other words, only consistently moral men have any real honor. Therefore, only moral men have any right to claim honor or to protect it. We repeat, the claim is either ethical or baseless. For a man to enforce the ethical claim against his fellow-man, and yet disregard the equitable ethical claims of his fellow-men on him, this is the most burning, flagrant injustice. That man is not a man of honor, but a species of social pirate. The man who actually does tell lies, he at least has no right to demand satisfaction for his being proved a liar.

#### False Honor Analyzed.

When the sentiment of personal honor, as it exists in the unrighteous man, is analyzed, it is always found to be made up of elements either non-moral or positively criminal, as pride, vainglory, anger, revenge, selfishness. The sufficient evidence of this will be consciousness. Let such a man ask himself, what are the elements of that impulse he feels to retaliate? Conscientious sense of justice and ill-desert in the assailant? Love for intrinsic righteousness, leading him to desire to substantiate them? Value for his own good name grounded in a conscious moral title to it? Not at all. Consciousness would tell him, if he would listen, that he has no

moral right to a good name; that his assailant has simply wounded his pride and selfishness; that what he really wants is revenge; that for the real interests of truth and righteousness, as assailed by slander, he cares nothing whatever. For does he not wantonly attack those interests in other people whenever he is crossed? The demands of this so-called honor for satisfaction of the kind he claims are unjust and of no force. Some very just and instructive remarks on this unfounded claim of personal honor may be found in Dr. Paley's "Moral Philosophy," Book I., Chapter II.; and in Madame de Staël's "L'Allemagne."

#### True Honor Precious.

But do not suppose that I am disparaging the importance and sanctity of "personal honor" or the duty of its legitimate defense. This sentiment is one of the most important elements of our moral manhood. What is it? I answer, that the guiding principles of true personal honor are none other than the principles of morals. The true man of honor is simply the man who governs himself by strict moral principles in all things and under all temptations. If there is any difference between his honor and "common honesty," it is only that his honesty, truth, courage, fidelity, self-sacrifice, are more constant and scrupulous. And the value this man puts on his personal honor is simply the ethical sentiment, justifiable moral self-approbation, with the judgment of justice or injustice, as his fellow-man respects or assails it. The good name is, in one sense, therefore, just as valuable as virtue is; as proper an object of (legitimate) defense; or of grief when it is assailed.

#### Its Proper Defense.

But what is legitimate defense of it? I reply: First, the man injured in his honor has no more right to mere revenge than in the case of any other wrong experienced. He may properly feel the attack on his honor the cruelest of all attacks; but this does not make it an exception to the rule, "Avenge not yourselves." The injured man of honor is

entitled to self-defense, not revenge. Second, retaliation or revenge does not aid that self-defense, but rather prejudices it. For the reparation, in order to be successful, must consist in acquittal from the injurious charge, and acquittal comes by evidence. When the injured man resorts to violence instead of evidence, he suggests the plausible argument, that he does so because conscious of guilt and desirous to divert the just mind of society from the damaging proofs of it. Third, if it is moral for the injured man to listen to any extent to the plausibility of the *lex talionis*, he ought to be satisfied with that punishment which the accuser experiences in the recoil of the acquitting evidence upon himself, as the most exquisitely just, complete and sufficient application of that law. "You said that I lied. You have now to prove that I did; otherwise, you are the liar, not I."

#### The Duel—"Ordeal by Battle" Superstitious.

The code of honor and the *duello* (combat of two) are peculiarly modern usages, unknown to even the most military nations of antiquity, and a perversion of that usage of chivalry, the "ordeal by battle." This was provided by the common law for cases when no sufficient legal evidence existed to fix a fact of guilt. These feudal magistrates supposed that the ordeal by battle was an appeal to omniscient Providence to decide the question of guilt when too obscure for human judgment. They grounded the usage upon the Christian doctrine of a special Providence. Most of them, indeed, belonged to the clerical order, and their learning was partly in the canon law. Thus it was not unnatural that such magistrates should quote Sacred Scripture when, for instance, it teaches: "Are not two sparrows sold for one farthing? Yet I say unto you, not one of them falleth to the ground without the will of your Heavenly Father." They argued, if Divine Providence directs the fall of every sparrow, much more may it be relied on to decide the fall of the guilty champion in the ordeal of battle in accordance with the infallible, divine righteousness.

The doctrine is true, but the inference is false. These theologians forgot another premise, which should have been vital to their conclusions. The divine will does, indeed, regulate, permit and limit every occurrence. But are we authorized to hold that this Providence has disposed this given event with the intention of instructing us human beings in one of His secret judgments? No. God has expressly told us the contrary, that the "secret things belong to the Lord our God, but the things which are revealed to us and our children, that we may do all the words of His law." He there expressly inhibits us from prying into His motives for His own providential dispensations, except as He chooses to disclose them by His Word, and remands us to His revealed precepts as the only guide of our conduct. And this is reasonable. He does, indeed, exercise a universal special Providence. He has, indeed, a rational motive for every act of His own will regulating these occurrences. These motives are doubtless always infinitely wise and good; but they are a part of His own counsels, which He rightfully chooses to keep secret in large part, and which are often so comprehensive and profound that finite minds could not comprehend them even if they were made public. Therefore, the expectation that the issue of an ordeal by battle would disclose on which side of a doubtful case the right lay was erroneous. Modern duelists do not believe in Divine Providence even as held in the middle ages; and therefore their appeal to battle is the more absolutely irrational and unwarranted. The duelist's motive must be one of two: the simple thirst for bloody revenge, and that is the fell sin of murder; or, if he disclaims this, as most would, the other motive is the fear lest, if he fail to resent an insult in the way established by the custom of his class, he shall be deemed cowardly. So that this, the only decent pretext of a motive not malignant, is itself a fear, a species of moral cowardice! That is the best that can be said for the motive. But this is also silly, because sending or accepting a challenge under the stress of this moral cowardice is, experimentally, no evidence that a man is brave.

For many brave men, as Washington, have declined the duel; and many cowards have fought duels. The war between the States demonstrated not uniformly, but frequently, that our bravest were not our duelists.

**The Code Unreasonable.**

The code is also absurd, and therefore wicked, because it enables the man who professes himself aggrieved to force the exposure to the penalty on his opponent; thus making himself prosecutor, judge, jury and executioner in his own case. It professes fairness, in that it assumes to put a weak man equal to a strong one; yet, with a malignant ingenuity, it introduces a deadly inequality. Suppose me a duelist, exceedingly skilled with a pistol; and I know that my opponent could not "hit a barn door" with one. The code always provides for my putting some such indignity on him as to force him to challenge me. That gives me choice of weapons, and so I force him to meet me under a more enormous and wicked disadvantage than if I were a Goliath and he a tender child, to meet in the fist-fight. Does not this savor rather of the treachery of the savage's ambuscade than of chivalrous fairness? If I seek to put my opponent in jeopardy of his life, when I honestly believe that he has not done me a wrong worthy of death, I am clearly a murderer. If I believe that he has done me a wrong worthy of death, and that the case is such that it is just for me to inflict the penalty, then I am a silly fool for giving him, the criminal, whose life is forfeited to justice, the "equal chance" to execute a capital penalty on me, the innocent, yea, the aggrieved party. Why do not I put him to death as the sheriff does the condemned man?

**Its Pretexts.**

It is argued that "the code" is necessary to enforce scrupulous and respectful courtesy between gentlemen and chivalry towards females. This is a favorite plea. The answer is to ask: Is that true courtesy or chivalry which is enforced by fear? Is that a state of society to be boasted in as enviable,

whose best amenities are exacted as the obedience of the Turkish slave used to be, by instant fear of a knife, or bullet, or bowstring? And the second answer is to assert, just as the last argument would imply, that the facts are exactly against this claim. The most dueling and fighting classes are not the highest gentlemen. For instance, Irish society in the time of the famous "fire-eaters" was notoriously gross, sensual, loose, and dishonest. No gentlemen observe the civilities toward each other and the world with a nearer approach to courtesy than the ministers of the evangelical churches, who never do and cannot duel.

**The Truckling to Public Opinion Moral Cowardice.**

The extreme prevalence of dueling, supported by many citizens otherwise orderly, against clear statute law and inflexible logic, proving its absurdity and wickedness, is one of the strange instances of the mischievous power of a perverse public opinion. It is a pungent illustration of the power of these principles in human nature: pride, morbid fear of unjust obloquy, moral cowardice, lust of applause, imitative impulse (or the darker passions of malice, hatred and revenge). One of the blackest features of the code is, that, when in force, it clothes its votary with full opportunity and power, under its cloak, to perpetrate the most deliberate murder planned by fiendish envy. Such was the plot concerted by his Irish opponents against Daniel O'Connell. A number of them agreed that first one and then another should force a duel upon him, until he should be murdered. This was simply a plot to assassinate. O'Connell understood it as such. He accepted the first challenge in order to gratify the prevalent Irish sentiment, and wounded his enemy. The subsequent challenges he declined positively, explaining that his country had a better use for his life than to be made a target for successive assassins. Many men personally honorable plead: "What you say of the unreasonableness of dueling may be just in the abstract, and the public opinion that demands it of the gentle-



man insulted may be deplorably wrong. Were I omnipotent, I would gladly extinguish that opinion. But I cannot; no man can. It prevails; and therefore I do right in complying with it, and challenging my insulter." This sounds very plausible. But it is only a sophism. This man professes to perform an act of virtuous self-sacrifice in exposing his life to a risk to satisfy the code. Does he thus recognize the duty of self-sacrifice, and its nobleness? Well, the proper scope for that virtue is in enduring for the sake of the true and right, and in order to resist prevalent wrong. Again, how is this wrong public sentiment ever to have its bloody tyranny broken except by virtuous men's resisting it in spite of reproach? This is the first duty in such cases.

#### Self-Defense, When Righteous.

The right of forcible self-defense exists, even in private persons, under the following circumstances: When the law is not at hand in the person of its officer, to protect the innocent party; when the assailant evidently purposes malicious injury to life or limb or chastity; and when no forbearing representations avail to check him, then it becomes the assailed person's right to resist force with force, maiming with maiming, and death with death. For the aggressor has unrighteously created a dilemma which obliges either the innocent or the guilty to suffer or die on the spot. Of course, it is proper that the guilty cause of this dilemma should die, rather than the innocent. More; should the innocent even make the Quixotic choice of dying rather than his sinful fellow-creature, he is bound to suppose that his Quixotry will and must be futile. For the State will certainly exact the murderer's life; and then two lives are wasted instead of one. Hot resentment may be the legitimate emotion at the time. The law does not require the innocent man to slay his aggressor nonchalantly. No man could do so without being essentially brutal. But resentment must not deteriorate into malice and revenge. As soon as the aggressor is disarmed or disabled for offense, force

must be arrested and the duties of humanity resumed. Again, man ought not to take life merely to defend property from thefts which are clandestine and not violent. If the robbery is violent, then force may be met by force; and if the robber is slain, he has himself to blame. For the owner, in using a force short of mortal to defend his property against a force short of mortal, is but doing what he has full right to do. So that when the robber reinforces his violence, so as to jeopardize this defensive owner's life, he has now become murderous and may be slain, as now attacking not property only, but life.

## CHAPTER VII.

## DUTIES AND RIGHTS CONCERNING PROPERTY.

## Ethical Ground of Rights of Property.

The next class of social duties to be noticed is that relating to property. The question arises, first, What is the rational and ethical ground of this right of property which is here involved? For the establishment of the right is usually necessary to the intelligent inculcation of the corresponding duties. All civilized commonwealths, ancient and modern, have agreed in establishing the individual right of property in land, as well as in personal chattels. Poetical romance used to attack this institution as the consequence of selfishness and injustice. Since the days of Ovid, at least, it has sung of an imaginary golden age, when there were no landmarks and men held all things in common. The coming of the surveyor's line was deplored as the signal for human injustice and misery. Modern communists, no less imaginative than this childish pagan myth, now propose community of property, and especially community in land tenures, as the panacea for all social ills. The motto of French extremists is, *La propriété c'est un vol.*

This dissent forces on us a discussion of the question, Where is the rational ground for a just private title to property in land? The answer is contained in three lines of argument. First, the experimental and prudential; second, the Scriptural; and third, the logical and ethical. Discussing each of these distinctly as clear method requires, we find this order sufficiently convenient.

## The Lessons of Experience and History.

First, then, for some cause or other, the experience of all civilized men has invariably led them to the institution of

private property in land as essential to their welfare. Does not this grand historical fact indicate a fundamental principle in man's nature demanding this distribution? That principle is the superior force of personal and domestic affections and interests over the claims of general interests. If this is a fundamental principle, which legislation is impotent to change or to expunge from human nature, then a system which disregards it can only prove impotent for good and fruitful of evil. But the principle is fundamental; it is an essential trait of man's nature. So decides universal observation and every candid man's consciousness. Now, the general action of this human principle must be to make men more careful and zealous to preserve and to improve what is to remain permanently their property and their children's than a thing which is to revert to the common stock. Dr. Paley has illustrated the action of this principle so fully that repetition is needless for intelligent students. I will only detain you long enough for you to ask yourselves, In how many and multifarious ways must this private principle operate? Let one of you suppose that he was a member of that barbaric German commonwealth described by Tacitus, which changed its allotments of lands to its heads of families every year. Your allotment for 1889 will contain an extensive marsh, now barren from wetness, which, when thoroughly drained, would yield profuse crops for fifty years. But this work of drainage will cost more than any one year's crop; will you drain it? Assuredly you will not. Nor will any of your successors. Neither you nor they will waste an arduous labor for which the year's possession cannot compensate you, whose whole fruits would be grasped by strangers. Thus this piece of land, capable of so much production, remains forever barren, yielding nothing for you, for the commonwealth nor for anybody. Let this illustration be applied throughout the whole vast circle of productive agencies. We see at once that the scanty products of the spontaneous powers of Nature can never be increased until the institution of private property is made

permanent and sacred. The mythical poets were simply silly. Their age of community was not the golden, but the iron age, the age of squalid want and hard, savage misery. It is the institution of private property which brings the golden age, which fecundates the resources of Nature, making her yield her ever-increasing abundance for her happy and multiplying children and securing their enjoyment of her blessings. When the soil of Britain was held in common, it maintained a few myriads of painted Britons and Celts, whose chieftains hardly enjoyed such a share of physical good as now belongs to the British day-laborer. The same territory now sustains twenty-eight millions of human beings through the energy of the institution of private property, and provides for all these millions different grades of well-being, from that of the laborer up to luxurious comfort. Does the communist obtrude the abuses of individual wealth, the over-accumulations in the hands of the few, resulting in the poverty and misery of some? I reply: Such abuses doubtless exist, and they are great. Wise and just legislation should promote equality of wealth and the redistribution of excessive accumulations by every means consistent with the sacredness of private property. But these evils would be almost as nothing compared to the wholesale poverty and misery which would result from community of goods. The abuses of the institution of private property produce a small minority in each commonwealth of suffering poor people. Communism, by extirpating enterprise, would bring back barbarism and reduce all to the level of the suffering poor except the few cunning usurpers.

#### Successful Instances of Communes Deceptive.

But it is asked, May not the principle of self-interest and limited domestic affections be replaced by the spirit of enlightened patriotism and zeal for the common good? May not intelligence and democratic virtue be so improved that the members will have the same interest in the prosperity of the commune which they now feel in that of themselves and their

immediate families? I reply: No; not until external means can be relied upon to revolutionize the fundamental principles of man's nature. This would be as absurd as to expect the wind to direct the mind, or the child to control the hereditary traits of his own father. It is the fundamental dispositions and principles of mankind which determine, *a priori*, how men will respond to external means and inducements. Could communism regenerate the race, its logic might be something less than an absurdity. But it is asserted that there have been, and are now, communes, like those of the Shaking Quakers, which wholly discard private property, yet their members are very careful of the common interests, and the bodies are thrifty and permanent. I reply: Their success is purely an exception. Their membership is gathered from that minute minority which every great population contains, of eccentric, morbid and disappointed persons. The communes of Shaking Quakers, like the monastic, forbid marriage and family ties. Were these permitted, their managers well know that individual and domestic interests would grow up quickly destructive of their societies. Can all the world become celibates, in order to make general communism possible? These peculiar men are also usually inspired with an intense religious fanaticism. The universal prevalence of religion would be a feature extremely unacceptable to these theorists. These remarks make it plain that the small successes which a few communes have attained (where the larger number have been speedy failures) would disappear utterly when communism was extended to all the citizens of a commonwealth. As the society grew wider, the personal impulse to individual zeal and thrift would grow weaker, the all embracing commune would tend towards the hopeless laziness, indifference and misery of the savage tribe. In these we have the completed type.

**Communism Must Be Slavery.**

I argue, next, that communism must either fail utterly or develop itself into a rigid system of slavery. Let common

sense analyze its necessary workings. The powerful motives of self-interest and domestic affection are discarded. In their place communism proposes that the society shall have all things common, that every person shall labor for the common stock. Then, both necessity and justice will imperiously demand, that those who do not contribute their share should not draw out their share. The rule of the commune must literally be, "If any man will not work, neither shall he eat." This class of members, then, must either starve or be compelled to work. Compelled by whom? By the communes? But this is a corporation, an ideal person; it can only act practically upon its members, through its officers. Its theory is that of thorough equality. The compulsion which is exercised upon the many must be exercised upon all. The corporation must be absolute in its title to dictate to each member how much labor he shall contribute, in order to be entitled to draw out his share of good. For, when once the selfish estimate of individuals is allowed to decide that question, there will be an end of equity, an end of harmony, an end of plenty, and a speedy, final explosion. The result must be, then, that each member must be enslaved to the corporation; which is to say, they must be enslaved to the individuals who wield the official power of the corporation. Here we have a system of slavery far more grinding than the domestic bondage lately extinguished by force among us. For the official masters, owning no right of property in their million of slaves, and having no domestic ties with them, would be prompted to care for their welfare neither by self-interest nor affection. All true republican statesmen know, that in order to keep the civil government just and free, it should be clothed with as few powers and functions as possible—those, namely, which are necessary to social order and relative justice; while all the other functions of civilized life should be left as much as possible to the individual and the family. A paternal government can never remain a free government. By engrossing to itself so many powers and interests, it draws into its control too

much influence, too many prizes; irresistibly seductive to human selfishness and ambition, it corrupts itself, debauches its numberless subalterns, and becomes a gigantic engine of oppression to the people, under the pretence of paternity. Communism proposes to travel in a direction exactly opposite to this maxim of true and free statesmanship. It proposes that the commonwealth shall engross to itself, not only too many, but all functions of social existence; shall be, in a word, universal property-holder, employer, overseer, distributor, family ruler and master. What words can express the corruption and vice, the cliques, the factions, the official jobbery and office-seeking sycophancy, the oppression, which would grow up in society under these extreme conditions? Let the progress which these abuses have made in the American democracies answer. The result would be the most iniquitous and cruel slavery ever witnessed on earth. The successful demagogues would be the masters, their subservient office-holders would be the slave-drivers, and the citizens and their wives and children would be the slaves. I am well aware of the attempted reply, that the few successful communes among us by no means enslave their members; but whenever these deem the terms and rules of the society unsuitable, they are left free to withdraw. The rulers wield no penalty except simple dismissal, which restores the discontented member to his liberty. But this deceitful reply seeks to turn our eyes away from a cardinal fact, which, as soon as it is named, discloses its worthlessness. Communism seeks to make itself universal. It aims to possess the commonwealth, and to embrace all the citizens. Now when the commune is the commonwealth, whither shall this dissatisfied member be dismissed? To outlawry? That is the only result, for there is no rival commune in the same commonwealth to which the dismissed man may resort. The penalty, then, is either outlawry or banishment; and this, of course, must be accompanied by absolute poverty, for the all-embracing commune holds all the property. The penalty for



discontent will only be less severe than that of crucifixion inflicted by pagan masters on their slaves.

**The Bible Authorizes Property.**

Second, having seen what prudence and experience teach against this theory, I pause to say a word upon the Scripture doctrine. Neither the Old nor the New Testament made the society which they founded a commune. The Hebrew law distributed the lands to every family. The individual title of the parent to his land was made so strong that even his insolvency or his voluntary sale could not alienate it longer than the year of jubilee. The Apostles, after Pentecost, did not convert the Church into a commune. Voluntary love and liberal almsgiving for a time created a common fund, which was shared by all the needy. But private property was expressly recognized as still the Christian law. The Apostle Peter, in Acts, while rebuking Ananias and Sapphira for their pretentious falsehood, expressly tells them that they had been under no obligation to sell their land in order to throw it into the common stock; and that after they sold it, the money they received for it was still their own private property. The Apostles proceed afterwards to point out the duties appropriate to rich Christians and to poor Christians. Whereas, had they made communism their rule, there could have been none richer, and none poorer than their brethren. Church-members are mentioned with approbation as owning houses, lands and bondsmen. The Apostle Paul, in providing the revenues which were to supply the common charity fund of the Church, enjoins no other source than voluntary alms-giving, saying: "As every man purposeth in his own heart, so let him give; for the Lord loveth a cheerful giver."

**The Rational Ethical Ground.**

We proceed, third, to examine the logical ground of the moral right of property. The communist says that the State originates property rights. Property is the creature of her enactments. Personal rights exist in nothing except the citi-

zen's own faculties and their exertions. Any other property right exists only so far as, and so long as, the State chooses to delegate it to citizens. Especially say they, Does property in land owe its validity solely to the State's act? So the right to bequeath at death to successors is created solely by statutes, since naturally the title must expire with the owner's death. This theory is made plausible to some minds by the fact that the State does (unavoidably) legislate so much about property and define its rights and tenures so domineeringly by its statutes.

**Property Not the Creation of Statutes Nor of First Occupancy.**

But the theory is perilous and communistic. (Remark: Communism is the absolute despotism!) For it leaves all individual and family rights of property at the mercy of the State's will or caprice. It is absurd. If personal rights in property are communicated solely from the State, of course the property was all hers to give at first. Whence did she get it? From the "social contract" (which these men usually hold)? Then, the individual citizens must have given their property to the State when they contracted. The citizens, then, had it first. Whence did they get that title? Or, did God, in giving the earth and its things to aggregate mankind, give it to the State? Unless the theistic theory is held in the absolute legitimist form, this could not give the tenure of the gift to mankind to the State in any higher sense than as mere trustee and guardian for the citizens. But the title is in the beneficiary, primarily, and only by delegation in the trustee. This coheres exactly with the true theistic view of the origin of government, which, while it makes government a divine ordinance, holds that God ordained the government for the people, and not the people for the government. Lawyers often teach that property is the creature of the law. But they seek to "magnify their office." Others hold that property right arises naturally from first occupancy. At first, all the goods of Nature were simply common to men, as the grass of

the wilderness to the bison. But the individual who first occupied a given value claimed it as his, and the sentiment of ownership arose out of that. The reply is, that first occupancy is merely casual, and it does not appear how an accident can beget a permanent right.

**Third Theory, That Labor Bestowed Vests Property.**

More intelligent jurists teach, that the rational sentiment of ownership arises out of the expenditure of our labor on a gift of Nature; that my faculty and volition are myself; that thus, when I have put it upon a gift of Nature, I have projected a portion of my own personality upon that thing, and as I own myself primarily under God, I feel that I now own this portion of myself which I have combined in the form of labor with that natural thing, and thus the thing into which my labor (*i. e.*, myself) has been inseparably infused. This is better, but involves this defect: How did I acquire the right to select that natural thing with which to combine my voluntary labor? Unless that question is solved, all that the above theory could do would be to connect a joint right in that thing as improved by my labor, like that of the original owner of an iron ore and of the smelting furnace of another man. Whose is the pig iron? The seriousness of this defect is illustrated in the fact: the common law often, when a man has put personal labor on a thing to which he had not title, makes him lose the whole labor to the owner of the thing, as houses on land not mine. The question remains, How did the individual derive the right to take that natural thing for the purpose of combining his labor with it?

**Property Truly Arises from God's Gift.**

Our intuitions do tell us that absolute production would invest the producer with a complete and personal title to ownership. God is such a producer and owner. Hence, "The earth is the Lord's and the fulness thereof." But when man says he creates, it is only in the lower sense. The maker of a mill has done what? Borrowed some of God's stone, iron

and wood, combined them into a rational arrangement, and then borrowed, again, some of God's force of gravity deposited in a stream of God's water and turned it on his wheel. And then the man rises up dogmatically and says: "This mill is mine, because I made it myself." This would be good provided he has made good his title to the borrowed materials. The title in him to these can only come by gift from God, the absolute owner. We must, then, root our right of property in that truth, "The earth He has given to the children of men," first recorded by revelation and so fully confirmed by the course of Providence, by man's prerogative of rationality and responsibility and by our own moral and theistic intuitions. Here, again, we find that we can get no valid starting-place for our theory of rights without postulating God and our relation to Him as His creatures and beneficiaries. But the question arises, Is this gift of God to man individual or general? Is it the aggregate race that has received the whole mass in joint ownership? or does God bestow particular parts of nature on individual persons? If only the former, how does this divine gift derive to individuals any personal property? If the latter, how is the designation to particular persons made?

#### How Does the Gift Become Individual?

In answering this question I would premise that, "a gift to mankind in common" is much more deceptive than at first appears. Use is individual. Only when one comes to the individual does one find even the beginning of the use of a thing in which possession is consummated. Hence, there is a sense in which ownership is, and must be, only personal. And hence joint ownership of one possession by many in common is, after all, only an inchoate ownership, whose real meaning is, that this property is held by this community only in trust for the individuals who are to have actual use (*i. e.*, consummated ownership) of it, with some power and responsibility in the community to direct the distribution. It is from this point of view that we apprehend the rational ground of

that power which the State claims to regulate, by statute, individual citizens' property rights. The State does not create those rights in her citizens; God has created them by His donation. The State only gets the regulative power by the fact that the same God has appointed her to be the regulator of all secular rights, even to safety and life. Does this last imply that the citizen derives his right to live from the State? This would be an extreme absurdity. If, then, it is a function of the State to enact and administer laws, regulative and protective of our lives, while yet the right to live was never bestowed on us by the State, but by the Heavenly Father, the sovereign of us and of the State, the propriety of the State's enacting laws regulative of property does not in the least imply that we derive our right to property primarily from her. Nor has the State been left without an ethical and authoritative guide from the light of reason and Nature, in the function of regulating property rights. That guidance is in these facts: All men share that moral equality described in Chapter IV., p. 385. All, then, have an initial right (before its subsequent modification by subsequent merits or demerits, forfeitures and contracts) to "share and share alike" in Nature's bounties. Hence, what B finds unappropriated by A, B has as good an original right to appropriate as A had to appropriate what he has. Here is the grain of truth in Blackstone's theory, that prior occupancy generates the right. The individual right to appropriate an equitable share of Nature's bounty is put in each head of a family, by the divine donation. Now also come in those several grains of truth which exist in the theory above, that the imbuing of the thing with the person's labor, which is his personality projected upon it, originates ownership. It does confirm it. The natural thing first equitably appropriated, and now improved and changed by my personal effort, becomes individually mine, as against any other human claimant; and I rationally judge, that he who interferes with my possession does me a wrong and deserves penalty.

**Man Fitted for the Donation, by His Conscience and Reason.**

This mortal intuition is confirmed by natural facts and constitutive principles of human nature. Man is the only creature on earth endowed with reason, free-agency, and responsibility. He is made in God's image. Now, for what end do natural things exist? Supremely and ultimately to glorify and manifest their absolute Maker and Owner. But hence, it is most proper that the keeping and usufruct of them should be in the hand, not of the irrational, but of the rational inhabitants of the earth. This is the ground on which man is made lord "of the beasts of the field, and of the fowls of the air, and of whatsoever passeth through the paths of the sea." It is thus more morally appropriate that the man should drive the horse than that the horse should drive the man. Hence comes this corollary, that just so far as man derationalizes and imbrutes himself by vice, he has forfeited his right to dominion. I have seen the drunkard abusing his faithful, patient horse, and have felt that the horse had a far better right to rule him.

Again, desire of well-being is legitimate in man, yea, obligatory. But the use of natural values arms and equips man's natural powers, so as to endue them with a hundred or a thousand fold more efficiency for progress and the attainment of good. The animal can use the grass, the shade and the water, but in the one instinctive way, to attain the one and the same end, animal life. There is no progress. But the man can use the things of Nature so as to arm himself with all the splendid powers of civilization, culture and virtue which raise him above the naked animalized savage almost to a demi-god.

**Individual Property Justified by the Individuality of Man's Affections.**

Once more, God has done right in providing for individual appropriation, and the State, in authorizing it; because the principles and powers of human nature are such, that this and its result, permanent private property, are absolutely necessary to the ends of God's grant of nature to man. Nothing

but the personal and domestic interest, with the reasonable prospect of enjoying the results of his industry, with those he loved best, would ever stimulate man, he being what he naturally is, to preserve or improve the objects he appropriated. Common ownership would inevitably be common neglect and common waste; with an almost total loss to mankind as an aggregate of that immense store of good which industry stimulated by personal ownership now causes Nature to yield. Hence, whereas the communist says, *Propriété c'est un vol*; I say, The confiscation of property to the community would be a gigantic theft, and a worse theft from the community itself than from the individual owners violated. For it at once entails on the community this vast suppression and loss of fruit.

#### Relation of Private Property to Freedom.

Private property is the mother of material civilization and of constitutional freedom. Let me add a few words to confirm the latter assertion. The fundamental attribute of constitutional free government is, that it warrants to individual citizens the enjoyment and guardianship of personal rights; it makes the man his own master up to the limits of these equitable rights. The more numerous and important the personal rights, then, with which the citizen is endowed, the more constitutional liberty. The bulk of mankind practically feel that the larger part of their valuable rights fall under the two classes of rights of life and rights of property. If communism strips the individual of the latter, he is shorn of one-half of the circle of his liberty. The government has departed to that extent from her proper sphere of the equitable guardian of all men's independent rights, and usurped that of the master over slaves. True freedom is undermined. Again, communism professes to be extremely democratic; it protests that all citizens should vote. But no man can be relied on to vote with moral independence who does not possess domestic and financial independence. "The empty sack does not stand upright." No commonwealth should entrust the prerogative of suffrage

to persons who are dependent upon the will of others for the subsistence of themselves and their families.

**Absolute Leveling Means Stagnation.**

It is undoubtedly true, that great inequalities in property develop social evils of a grave nature. But no leveling system can give the remedy, because they paralyze those principles in human nature which cause production. Let us suppose the commonwealth sees a certain citizen making unusual gains from his labor and capital, so large as to threaten an over-accumulation in his hands. The evil cannot be prevented by confiscation of part of these legitimate earnings. For thus the man's very motive for industry would be paralyzed and his sense of justice outraged. Thus instead of regulating the distribution of the stream of wealth, it dries up its fountain. Nature makes different men unequal in faculties. Hence, to require them to advance alike (abreast) must be an arrest of progress. All leveling schemes, if they were faithfully carried out, would mean stagnation.

**Property in Land Righteous.**

These remarks have already answered the question as to the righteousness of private property in land. It has been argued that there should be none, because land is God's common work, made for all, like the sunlight and the air and the water, and therefore it should be free to all. But the answer (see above) is, that land as much needs to be fructified and improved by personal labor as an ore, a block of marble, or a trunk of timber. Hence it is as righteous to give property in it.

**Our Property Only That of Stewards.**

Because property is a right, theft is a sin. It is a corollary from the above view of the rights of property, that man only holds his possessions, *quoad* God, as a tenant or steward, not as an owner in full. God has full ownership in the human owner of the property. He is God's *doulos*. Now one



principle of law is, that the master, in owning the slave, also owns the slave's possessions. For the master had *a priori* property in the labor that created that possession. Thus, sound ethics are at one with Sacred Scriptures as to our relation as Christians to God, in the use of our property. *Quoad* our fellow  $\delta\tilde{\omicron}\tilde{\nu}\lambda\omicron\tilde{\varsigma}$ , we have firm rights, which the law may call, as respects them, full ownership, or in fee-simple. But *quoad* God, we are but tenants.

#### The Right of Bequest Valid.

It is debated, whether the personal right of property includes the right to bequeath it by will, and it has been said, that this right, at least, is factitious and created by statute; that property is strictly terrestrial, so that when a man goes out of this world, his right in his property terminates; that the right is personal, like talent (which acquired it), like responsibility (which uses it right), and that hence it is not transmissible to children, like complexion or hair, by natural inheritance. Hence, when the rich man dies, the State ought to take and distribute his property.

Now, in answer to this, it is remarkable that the common law is scarcely so scrupulous anywhere, in guarding personal rights, as in guarding this right to bequeath; that the ascertainment of the testator's personal, sovereign intention is the main exegetical guide laid down for the courts in interpreting wills; that to suppress a dead testator's wishes by destroying or secreting a will is made a felony. The interest of the community in the general welfare certainly argues this course, by the same kind of arguments by which it argues the individuality of property. For the love of children and the desire to have them enjoy the fruits of our labors are as pungent stimulants to production as self-love itself. The argument above stated is plausible—that ownership dies when the personal owner dies. It seems to claim the support of a Scriptural declaration that, "We brought nothing into the world, and it is certain that we can carry nothing out." Here, then, is need

for a discrimination of common sense. Beyond dispute it is true, that the possession and usufruct of our terrestrial property are limited to this life. But does it, therefore, follow that responsibility for it, and title to it, are necessarily limited by the same boundary of time? As soon as this question is asked, the sophism is disclosed. Notoriously, moral responsibility for our use of a thing does not terminate with its possession, nor even with our life. Indeed, our responsibility for our temporal use of our wealth continues indefinitely after death. Or, if death ends my right of property, to whom does it revert? To the God who gave it to me. The State never gave it. She has no right to the reversion. Then the only question is, What has God instructed me to do with the reversion when I die? I answer: He made the property of Hebrew parents hereditary in their children. All the other Scriptures virtually authorize parents to bequeath (justly and wisely) to their own offspring. It is equally true that the continuance of a title is not coincident with the time of the possession of any object. The minor infant may have full legal title to an estate twenty years before he acquires control of one penny of it. So, mental alienation of a citizen terminates his possession of his estate, but does not extinguish his title. If his mental health is restored, he resumes possession and full control. If, on the other hand, he sinks into dementia, for which there is no cure, so far as the usufruct of his property goes, he is civilly dead; but even then the title stands in his name. The argument I criticise, then, only proves that the personal direction and usufruct of earthly property are limited to this life. It does not prove that the moral title and responsibility for the property are thus limited. The latter point, especially, grounds an irresistible argument for the right to bequeath. Here is a man, who, by the exercise of high faculties and industry, has created a certain body of wealth. Being an immortal servant of God, he is forever responsible to Him for the good or evil which that wealth may work. For the wealth continues to be an instrument for good or evil, after he who gathered it

has died. Therefore, his responsibility for its direction is not finished until he has bequeathed it in such a way as to secure its righteous use to the best of his ability and knowledge. Were this rich man simply going on a long journey to the East, we should justly hold him criminal if he entrusted his wealth, during his absence, to stewards who would use it for vice and mischief. Is he not more blamable, then, if, upon going the "long journey," he entrusts it to mischievous agents? Certainly God holds the dying owner to this responsibility. Hence, it is cruel and unrighteous for man to prevent his doing his duty under it, by depriving him of the power to bequeath it.

**The Right to Bequeath Argued from the Folly of the Alternative Proposals.**

Again, if ownership did die with the owner, the property has not died; it is extant. To whom does it devolve? Not rightfully to the State, for the State did not create it nor confer it. God conferred it. The man enlarged it. The State was never anything more to it than its guardian. Does it devolve, then, to the populace in common? To the accidental first comer? Still less. The most natural answer is: It devolves to those whom the acquirer loved most, and for whose welfare he was first and most responsible while living. If there is any higher authority than the owner's, better entitled to decide to whom this property shall devolve, it can only be God's, the real supreme owner's. Does God authorize bequests? This question carries us either to the Christian Sacred Scripture, or to the intuitions of Nature. The answers there are clear. Sacred Scripture authorized wills. So do men's deepest instincts of conscience and affection. The subsidiary prudential argument is, that while many foolish wills are made, yet the power to bequeath and the law of descents make a less wasteful use of dead men's property, on the whole, than any other plan. Indeed, the only other plan would be to make the property of the dead men all escheats, so that the State should be the dis-

tributee. Any other plan would be anarchy and frantic waste. But think, now, of the flood of corruption and speculation which such a law would bring upon any modern commonwealth. Here is the hard-earned estate of an honest industrious citizen, pulled and plucked about, and eaten up by greedy State officials, or wasted in ambitious public expenditures, while the children, whom the honest dead man loved best, are starving. God and the common law are wisest.

The Right of Bequest Justly Limited by the Commonwealth, Especially from Gifts in Mortmain.

But the right of bequest should not be absolute in the parent. There are limitations required by the general welfare, which the State is entitled to define by statute. Thus, the State may rightfully decide that the bequest of property in mortmain shall be prohibited or restrained within very narrow limits. In the language of the canon and common law, the ownership of property by perpetual corporations was termed the tenure *in mortua manu*. The grasp of the corporation, like that of the dead hand, relaxes not from age to age. It was the ecclesiastical corporations of Europe and America which presented the most mischievous instances of this tenure. The privilege of bequeathing to them was unchecked by law. The consequence was that they gradually acquired an inordinate share of the wealth of most European commonwealths. The perpetual corporation, armed by law with the power of receiving and holding bequests indefinitely, is like the cave of Cacus in Virgil's fable. All the cattle went in, none ever came out. So that the peasantry around it were utterly impoverished. These corporations were immortal owners, ever empowered to receive and never required to distribute, because they never died. Hence, the tendency was to continuous and boundless accumulation. For wealth, when acquired, surely develops two influences: it is a powerful instrument in the acquisition of future wealth, and its possession whets the appetite for more. The result in the popish commonwealths was

actually what sagacious foresight predicted. Ecclesiastical corporations at last engrossed, in some states one-third, and in others one-half, of the whole real estate of the realms. The enormous mass of wealth was withdrawn from public taxation, was devoted almost entirely to uses unproductive of public wealth, and corrupted and debauched the members, until from useful servants of the State, they became its imperious tyrants and moral pests. Nor were the personal purity and excellence of the early Christian clergy any safeguard whatever against this tendency. It was this moral excellence and disinterestedness which first began to attract the gifts of pious men. The primitive church was poor in everything except its virtues. Selfish ambition could see no inducement whatever to seek admission to its ministry, when the chief rewards of the office were hard labor, poverty and probable persecutions.

#### The Corruption of Ecclesiastical Corporations Explained.

Hence, the men who sought the ranks of the primitive ministry were only such as acted from disinterested and religious principles. But as soon as this excellent body of clergy was endowed with permanent worldly wealth, men of the most sordid character saw powerful motives for seeking to join it. It was easy for them to simulate the unselfish professions of their predecessors. Thus, the endowments exercised an inevitable tendency to introduce gradually into the corporations a more and more selfish and ambitious membership. This membership, of course, employed the power of their wealth and their spiritual influences over the pious to acquire yet more wealth. Thus the corruption of the possessors, and their misuse of their endowments proceeded *pari passu* with the enormity of their accumulations. Thus the richest corporations in the world, by a perfectly natural law, became at last the vilest.

The moral causes of this result still exist, fundamentally, in human nature. Whenever they are allowed to work un-

checked, they will work the same accursed results. It is but childish folly to suppose that any differences of detail, such as a republican form of government, or other articles of religious belief, will prevent the same mischiefs. Hence, the power of bequest to every perpetual corporation, even the most religious and benevolent, should be sternly restricted by law. The common weal demands it. These historical facts also make it at least doubtful, whether it is not rash for the commonwealth to allow any perpetual corporation to exist for any purpose. Certain it is that to create such owners and clothe them with the indefinite power of increasing their estates, whether by inheritance or purchase, is little short of madness.

#### Limits upon Entails Are Just.

The same considerations justify the commonwealth in interfering with the unlimited right of bequest by limiting entails. The law of descents in the American States usually limits the power of entailing property to two generations after the testator. The personal affection, as the personal knowledge of an owner, cannot be expected usually to extend beyond his grandchildren. Hence, no legitimate motive can be pleaded for guaranteeing the riches of one's posterity, irrespective of their merits, beyond that degree. He who endeavors to do this for his later posterity, unknown to him, is personally actuated by an ambition and arrogance of family unfriendliness to the common welfare. It is also for public interest, that overgrown estates should not be permitted to enlarge themselves to dangerous amounts in hereditary hands, but should be redistributed by the natural increase of families and the equitable promptings of natural affections. For otherwise these permanent and enormous accumulations result in aristocracy, inconsistent with justice and liberty; and the result will be equally real whether this aristocracy be titled or untitled, recognized or unrecognized by the Constitution.

#### Sins against Property Multifarious.

"Money answereth all things." Property is the known

means, more or less direct, for attaining or preserving almost every interest of the human soul. Money cannot "buy true love"! True: but it can help us to fly to our loved, after absence; it can help to heal the beloved one in sickness, sometimes; it can purchase gratifications for them; it has its valuable uses even in evangelization. Hence, the emotions, rights and questions involved in property rights must be found multifarious and endlessly varied. Hence, the forms in which sin with property may be committed are protean. Practically, then, this is a very wide province of morals. Only a few prominent points can be touched.

#### All Desire of Property Not Covetousness.

If the instinct of ownership is not pure selfishness, but has a rational and moral basis, as we argued, and our rights of property are moral rights; then it follows, that desire of wealth is legitimate and moral. As properly felt, it may be but the laudable desire to enlarge one's own existence and multiply his powers, in order to do good and glorify God. The Apostle does not say that the money is the root of all evil: but the love of money is a root (one root) of all evils. Abraham's riches were the boon and blessing of God to him. Or, thus: Is it better that this nature, which God has given our race, remain barren, as in the hands of savages, or be fructified, as in the hands of civilized man? Of course, all affirm the latter. But that fructified abundance is wealth. Is it better again, more moral, that the wicked should have the disposal of it, or the virtuous? Then wealth cannot be itself morally evil. Only its unrighteous acquisition, and its abuse—these are the evils.

#### Covetousness Distinguished from Lawful Desire,

But covetousness is a work of the flesh, and it is the sin of idolatry. And the Apostles say, that he that will be rich (willeth to grow rich, *δέλει πλοῦτεῖν*) falleth into temptation and a snare. There must be, then, a broad distinction

between covetousness and that desire for and possession of wealth which is moral. It is to be found in these two points. The most legitimate object of desire must be desired and sought righteously, else the desire has become *ἐπιεικεία concupiscentia*. This sin includes all appetencies for immoral objects and all appetencies for attaining even innocent and righteous objects by immoral methods. We must not include more than this in the concept, else we condemn by inference the most legitimate efforts and acquisitions. Here is a benevolent physician who feels strongly the utility of a serviceable horse; the animal will greatly increase his efficiency in relieving human suffering. The horse which would exactly suit him is the property of a neighboring farmer. Now, a rational person does not pay away valuable money for an object which he does not desire. Unless, then, the physician desires another's property while yet in that other's possession, no purchase takes place. Shall we define concupiscence as desiring another's possessions? Must, then, a good man commit the sin of coveting in order to go rationally about the purchase of a horse? The negative is sufficiently plain. The physician does not commit the sin of coveting in desiring the farmer's horse, because his desire is righteously conditioned; he entertains the desire only in the form of equitable purchase, and does not permit the idea of swindling the farmer out of his horse without just equivalent to elicit the faintest spark of appetency from his soul, much less to induce a deliberate volition. This is sufficiently plain. I have chosen a homely instance because in pondering it the student will find the full definition of evil concupiscence. So desire for riches becomes a sin whenever it proposes to itself, even in thought, an unrighteous mode of acquisition. And here, as everywhere else in social ethics, the Golden Rule applies. If it is right for you to desire wealth, by that reason it is right for your fellow-man to desire it; and it is your duty to respect his lawful desire for it, as you lawfully expect him to respect yours. Second, the lawful desire for riches degenerates into the sin



of covetousness whenever the heart pushes it from the place of a means to that of an end. Man's proper *summum bonum* is the consummation of his full duty in his holy blessedness; the unification of the two in the happy, spontaneous subordination of the will to the infinite holiness. The objects constituting property are themselves as non-moral as a clod. Their legitimate value is solely in their being part means, and that always an inferior (though useful) means to moral ends. Hence, he who elevates them into an end, especially his chief end, has really committed the same gross idolatry with the pagan who worships a stone for his God. Again, as inordinate selfishness is a fundamental sin, so the desire for wealth is sinful whenever it is desired for the selfish end; as the use of wealth is a sin against God and our fellow-man, whenever it is used to gratify selfishness. Corollary: Covetousness is of the nature of theft. The covetous man is a virtual robber.

#### Wealth to Be Used as a Faithful Stewardship.

What are the righteous uses of wealth? This question can only be answered under the guidance of these two principles: The Golden Rule; and, To that steward to whom much is committed, of him shall much be required. These show that the rule of self-indulgence in anything allowed by law, and for which I can honestly pay the money, will never suffice for a virtuous man's guide. Behind the question, whether this proposed use of possessions is lawful, stands a higher question, Is it the best use? the use most highly promotive of the legitimate ends of possessions?

#### Unlimited Luxury Is Sinful—Arguments Pro and Con.

I shall pursue only one point under this head, because it has been so much misunderstood. Is it right for the very rich to expend their possessions in procuring and paying market price for the luxuries and pomps of life, and that to any degree within their means of honestly paying for them (after, of course, honoring the ordinary demands of charity and suffering humanity)? Many Christians and moralists answer,

Yes; that such expenditure by the rich is not only lawful, but praiseworthy. For they argue: It circulates money and encourages industry. Would you have the rich simple hoarders? What is baser or more injurious to the public welfare than this? Or, if they disburse their incomes, it is far better to do so in giving pay for work than charity to the idle, which, as it debauches the recipients, is not true charity. To encourage the poor to legitimate industry and pay them for it is in reality a wiser and better almsgiving than direct almsgiving for no work. But this implies, that as the purchase of necessaries calls for a very small part of the income of the rich, the rest is to be spent in encouraging the production of luxuries. For instance, here is a laborer; if he devoted his labor to producing wheat, he might get fifty cents per day, wages. Possibly not that, for the wheat market might be so glutted that wheat-growers would offer him no work at all. But the "millionaire" is building a palace, and pays him four dollars per day to carve stone for it, by which this laboring man's family is not only fed, but made genteelly comfortable.

This argument is plausible, yet hollow and even immoral. Of course, the half-truths included in it are admitted. It is wiser charity to a destitute man to encourage him to work for his own living, and pay him for it, than to support him by pure alms in a degrading idleness. Of course, the man who was enabled to raise his wages eight-fold by becoming a producer of a luxury instead of a necessary is glad. He feels that he and his family are individually benefited. But the inquiry is merely superficial. It has not been seen whether the gratification of the two interested parties, of the workman in his increased wages, and of the millionaire in his luxury, are not enjoyed at the expense of wider mischiefs. And first, luxury is itself reprehensible for its effects on those who enjoy it. The old moralists were not wrong in regarding luxury as really akin to vice. They made a mistake in endeavoring to abolish the vice by sumptuary laws. These are fated to be inefficient. We have seen this and dropped them. Hence

many people have run to the other extreme of saying, that the evil of luxury is no evil. They virtually reason thus: "Stroking with the king's hand does not cure scrofula; therefore scrofula is not a disease." But luxury is a moral disease in the teeth of the precepts, "Endure hardness as good soldiers"; "Keep under the flesh." Luxury does foster pride and arrogance, self-indulgence (which is selfishness), indolence, sensual appetite, softness. It does undermine the health as well as the morals. Modern civilization itself demonstrates the old doctrine; for it has to recruit the ranks of its efficient men continually from the classes not able to be luxurious. This is notorious. First, then, the expenditure of wealth in superfluities is immoral, not because it directly robs the producer of them, but because it debauches the consumer themselves.

And second, the clear, common sense of the old moralists was as little at fault in condemning luxury as wasteful. Not practically as wasteful as the simple hoarding of great wealth, but yet truly so. How is this waste evinced? Thus: The true wealth of the State is the labor of its people. Coin or bank-notes merely represent wealth. Labor, though not the sole, is an essential factor in the generation of all values. The expenditure of surplus incomes on superfluities becomes, then, a public curse, and therefore a great crime, not by robbing the laborer, but by misdirecting labor. To understand the doctrine, one must understand the difference (in political economy) of "productive and unproductive consumption of values." For instance, here is one-half ton of coal, worth four dollars. Some youths burn it in a bonfire to gratify an idle caprice. They have annihilated four dollars' worth of values and have no value left to represent or compensate it. A mechanic burns one-half ton of coal in his iron workings. The value is burned. True; but it reappears in a quantity of useful utensils of wrought-iron, worth, say, twenty dollars. The crude iron, let us say, worth five dollars; the coal, four dollars; the wages and use of tools, say five dollars; clear

profit, six dollars. This is productive consumption; for the value of the coal burned reappears in the enhanced value of the wrought-iron, plus a good profit, you understand. Now it is clear that while unproductive consumption destroys values, and thus diminishes the supply for the whole society, productive consumption increases them. Of course, when the whole stock of values for the whole society is diminished, some persons, somewhere, have to suffer destitution. Who shall suffer will probably be decided on the old rule, that the weakest are left in the rear. Add here, that the consumption of luxuries is mainly unproductive consumption. Add, also, that great quantities of human labor, which is the value vital to all, are collected in a few luxuries, and so are recklessly annihilated by the rich in a few moments of selfish enjoyment.

Hence the irrefragable conclusion: Every cause which tempts producers away from the creation of values for productive consumption, to the creation of those destined for unproductive consumption, ensures that other members of society in its lower strata shall suffer for the necessaries of life. The misdirection of that industry, falsely claimed to be encouragement of industry, is the criminal cause of the suffering of the innocent at the other end of the social scale. Of course this millionaire tempter, and this workman tempted by him to turn aside from producing wheat, to producing stone carvings, wine or flowers, are not the sufferers. They chuckle over their selfish gains. And it is equally true, that when a burglar and his accomplice conspire to rob a farmer's storehouse and divide the plunder, these two enjoy increased abundance. But the innocent farmer and his large family suffer famine. Let us analyze. This man, who had been a farm laborer, producing wheat, only earned one dollar per day, and he and his family had to live merely on the necessaries of life. But a year of his labor produced four hundred bushels of wheat, which is the bread of several human beings. But now has come the millionaire and tempted and enabled this man to spend a year's labor for unproductive consumption.

Two results must follow. Somewhere seventy humans lack bread; and this laborer's family, with its four dollars per day for doing nothing, is thus enabled to consume more (*i. e.*, to monopolize a larger share of the common stock of values), enhancing again somebody's destitution at the lower end of the social scale. Thus, this boasted encouragement of industry turns out to be a mischievous misdirection of industry, gratifying the superfluous desires of the stronger members of society at the expense of the greater destitution of the weaker. The hoarding of the surplus incomes of the rich, then, is mischievous. The expenditure of them on superfluities is also mischievous. The bestowing of them in alms on indolence is also mischievous. What, then, should we do with them?

#### The Proper Use of Surperfluous Wealth.

There is but one answer: Expend them on enlightened and truly useful benefactions. And among these are to be ranked high, perhaps higher than simple alms, the creation of industries promotive of productive consumption and solid values of utility. So all expenditures which promote true intelligence and virtue are true philanthropies, because these are sure sources of true, equitable welfare.

#### Vico's Fatal Cycle: God's Remedy.

We have now reached a point where we can understand the great historical argument for the duty of enlightened beneficence, especially on the part of the rich. Hitherto civilized society has always moved in this fated circle delineated by the Italian philosopher Vico. Poverty and hardship have trained the hardy virtues of thrift, industry, skill, perseverance. These have commanded success, and in time brought the sure results of wealth, public and private. This wealth, after being first employed to procure social energy and power, then becoming inordinate, has always been perverted to buy luxuries. This luxury has debauched and emasculated the ruling classes, producing self-indulgence, moral cowardice, arrogance, selfishness, tyranny. These vices have brought on calamity, civil

war and invasion, in which the misused wealth is burned up as in a vast conflagration, and the society has been again reduced to weakness, poverty and obscurity, while some other poor, hardy race takes its place to run in turn the same career of self destruction. This is the cycle of all past history—of Egypt, Israel, Athens, Rome, Spain and the French aristocracy. In which part of this cycle are the United States now moving? How shall the fatal train be broken? Not by communism. Nor by interfering with rights of private property or rights of acquisition and of bequest. The only solution is in the beneficent use of wealth by the rich. Here, again, let the student see another case of the law: "To whom much is given, of them shall much be required." It requires a highly cultivated intelligence to know which are the truly beneficent gifts. The mischievous sophism which I have just exploded concerning the beneficial encouragement of industry by luxurious expenditures is a sufficiently pungent instance of the necessity of high intelligence to prevent great wealth from becoming a curse to the owner and a curse to his fellow-men. For we see that miserable maxim currently adopted as the pet philosophy of the rich, and argued and approved even by a sycophantic clergy, who are, in profession, the ministers of a gospel of self-denial and humility. The falsehood of the doctrine has long been demonstrated by the experience of society and by the argument of great political economists, as Monsieur Say. Men who are capable of being deluded by this sophism have no right to incur the responsibility of wealth. Were they wise, they would rather shudder than rejoice at doing so, for the Divine Justice will assuredly hold them to account for the righteous principle which they willfully or ignorantly disregard. We must conclude, hence, that no man has a right to become rich and remain ignorant of the true moral and economic principles. One of the most repulsive and criminal spectacles is the stupid, vulgar rich man, who has not sense enough to know the mischief he is causing, and the true good and hap-

pinness he might get and bestow. Thus, giving is seen to be a duty of citizens, whose dimensions should grow, in an increasing ratio, as income grows; a duty of very high importance and obligation. Thus, the highest conclusion of social ethics drawn from science concurs with Sacred Scriptures in making giving an obligation and a high duty.

**The Laws Should Favor the Distribution of Wealth.**

In conclusion, while the State must not resort to any communism, or invasion of private rights of property, which must be sacred, yet the State has strong reasons to deprecate great inequalities in the aggregation of wealth. See the reasons above, both economical and moral. Hence, the legislation of the State should always be shaped to discourage large accumulations, and to favor equal and moderate fortunes. All legislation is mischievous which causelessly gives any indirect aid to these excessive accumulations, which make luxury feasible and apply the temptation to it. These indisputable conclusions show that the American legislatures, State and federal, practice an enormous and perilous folly in their prevalent class legislation, establishing corporations and protecting particular industries at the expense of others. Both species of legislation tend directly to exaggerate the accumulations of wealth in the hands thus favored by the government. I speak not now of the burning injustice of these practices in which we see the law, which should be the equitable guardian of all, clothing the few with means and powers to engross the earnings of the many; nor the glaring inconsistency of politicians, who, while asserting universal equality, even in the extremest form, enact this class legislation and create aristocracy in its most odious aspect. I wish to point the student to the social effects of these laws. They have already produced, in democratic America, diversities of conditions more gigantic than were found in the feudal monarchies, and our republican plutocrats flaunt before the eyes of suffering millions (the fruits of whose toils they exhaust by these legislative juggler-

ies) more than a ducal luxury and extravagance. Does any sensible man suppose that the permanence of a sound constitutional free government is possible under these conditions? Certainly the fathers of the Republic did not think so. Every change which they made from the English laws which they had inherited was designed to prevent these inequalities of condition and to secure decent competency for all, without excessive wealth for any. They knew that that was the only social basis upon which the ingenious and complicated political structure which they were rearing could remain permanent. Mr. Jefferson is usually regarded as the apostle of American republicanism. When the Federal Constitution was adopted, he was residing in Paris as the ambassador of the Confederacy. A political friend in Virginia sent him the contents of the Constitution and congratulated him upon its completion. Jefferson, in a reply almost stern and curt in its brevity, declined those congratulations, saying, that while he fully believed a republican constitution was best and happiest for a society of simple habits, moderate wealth and equal social conditions, such as the colony of Virginia had been, it was a problem yet to be solved, whether such a constitution was feasible for a society possessing great wealth unequally distributed; and a problem in whose favorable solution he had little faith.

#### Gainful Commerce May Be Righteous.

The next question touching the Ethics of Property is, how property may be exchanged morally and righteously. It must, of course, always be done under the equities of the Golden Rule. It cannot be right to make trading a mask for stealing, but to take away from our fellow a part of a value may be a small theft, as truly as taking the mass would be larger theft. This gives no pretext to this conclusion, that hence "there can be no gain in any righteous exchange. For what I gain, my neighbor must have lost. Hence all gainful traffic must be of the nature of theft. Hence no legitimate creation or increase of values can be made by com-



merce. Artisans or farmers may righteously increase values, but mere merchants create none. If they gain wealth by it, they are virtual thieves." The practical absurdity of this is seen in the question: How would a commonwealth of artisans and farmers alone ever get the righteous values for their products without merchants? This suggests the solution, that a just increment of value does take place in exchange. A value is an entity, material or immaterial, which is able to satisfy a human desire to some definite degree. This farmer has five hundred bushels of grain, which is four hundred more than his family can consume. These four hundred bushels, if they must be kept by him indefinitely, have but little value to him. But his family all need shoes, and so need them that each pair is worth to them two bushels of grain. There is a shoemaker who, in his year's work, has produced three hundred pairs of shoes. His family can only wear out one dozen pairs. As things to be indefinitely kept, the two hundred and eighty-eight pairs would have little value to him. But his family cannot eat shoes, and need bread. Hence, when this shoemaker and this farmer exchange wheat against shoes, at the rate of two bushels for one pair, both gain. The paradox, How can the one gain except what the other loses? is solved thus: Two new elements of value are created in the values exchanged, by reason of the differing desires of the two producers. The farmer's wheat is worth more to him to exchange for needed shoes than it is worth to him to keep; so of the shoes to the shoemaker. Thus, gainful barter is moral. Now add to this the other functions of commerce: so to transport commodities from the place where they are in excess to the place where they are more needed, as cotton from Texas to Lancashire; to preserve them until needed, as in stores and warehouses; to dispose them in amounts and shapes more convenient to the purchasers. To me, a small householder, wine in a tun would be almost valueless, because unmanageable. I can neither get enough money to pay for it, nor could I drink so much if paid for. Hence the retailer who disposes a small

part of this wine in bottles has, for me, given it a good deal more actual value. I pay him for this, in the enhanced retail price. Thus the reasonable profits of trade are consistent with the principle (which is the practical shape that the Golden Rule assumes here), that in getting the possession of another we are bound to give him an equitable *quid pro quo*.

**Dishonest Exchange is Taking Something for Nothing—Instances.**

Immorality in exchanges may be popularly defined as "taking something for nothing." That is, either a whole for nothing or a part of a value for nothing. To exchange eight *per decem* for ten is getting two *per decem* for nothing. This principle determines many cases.

First, labor is a value; and so may be subject of ownership, and of righteous exchange. He who hires his labor for a price is bound to labor faithfully, according to the ability which the parties apprehended him to possess, during the stipulated time. To idle is to steal. The employer has "bought his time."

Second, the current market price is usually the equitable price. Real values are not fixed, as the weight or bulk of the commodity is. Sixty pounds of wheat is worth more or less at different times and places. Who shall say how much more or less? The safest average standard for this is the price which the state of supply and demand has fixed as practically felt by the body of fellow-creatures making the exchanges at the time. For the reason why this same sixty pounds of wheat is worth more, really and fairly (say in Austin), in December, 1883, than in December, 1882, must be sought in those variations in the relation of supply and demand which Providence causes. And as to how much that variation ought to count for, in the questions of to-day's price, the safest, most equitable attainable answer is, what the average of wheat buyers and sellers feel to be right. Interest probably makes them as correct judges of this uncertain quantity as finite minds can become.

**Forestalling, Regrating and Cornering Are Thefts.**

Current market price is, then, the equitable standard by which honest men may exchange their values, provided the relation of supply and demand, which determines that price for the time, has come about naturally; that is to say, by the influence of Providence and unbiased public opinion. But if that relation has been covertly manipulated by one of the parties to the proposed exchange for the purpose of modifying prices in his own favor, then these prices are no longer honest standards of value. The reason is plain. The effect of these covert and deceitful practices upon market prices is fictitious and not real. The real quantity of the commodity thus practiced upon, in actual existence, relatively to actual demand for it, is not changed one whit. It is only concealed or falsified. The effect upon market price is therefore evanescent because fictitious. The buyer or seller does not exchange value received. He has therefore robbed his neighbor just to the extent which his covert artifice has caused an oscillation in the market price. This will be shown demonstrably by specifying cases. We will suppose that the whole quantity of a given commodity upon the market is, relatively to the natural demand for it, diminished one-tenth. Let it be, for instance, pork. The legitimate consequence would be a rise in the fair market price of pork. But now a conspiracy of dealers withdraws and conceals a considerable portion of the total supply of pork. This portion is not really consumed, nor is it the purpose of the conspirators to consume it, nor to export it to another market, nor to store it for a year of scarcity, but only to conceal it until a quick and excessive inflation of price has resulted from this fictitious diminution of supply. This pork is then thrown upon the market and sold to actual consumers or exported for the inflated price. Immediately the dealers in the commodity perceive that the real supply had not been diminished; and the correct market price falls back at once to its natural level.

Pork is now worth just what it was before the manipulation of the conspiracy. The only result is, that the buyers have been deceived into paying for what they purchased more than it was worth. So much of their property has been simply stolen from them without any equitable *quid pro quo*. The means of the theft has been an acted lie: a means always as immoral and infamous, at least, as the spoken lie. Or again, there is a mining company operating with a large joint stock capital. The directors wish to speculate in the shares of their stock. Their just market value depends, of course, upon the steady dividends which they will pay. These dividends depend upon the net average yield of the precious metals extracted from the mines. The directors suppress and conceal a part of this yield by some one of various expedients, such as concealing the ingots of metal, instead of bringing them steadily into the bullion market; or expending them without necessity, in extraordinary and continuous outlays upon new machinery or new shafts. The public naturally suppose that the mine is failing in production; the price of the stock declines, when the directors with their fellow-conspirators buy it. The concealed ingots are then brought out, and, along with the actual monthly yield of the mines, are thrown upon the bullion market. The public are now taught to believe that the mine is becoming permanently and greatly productive. The shares now rise rapidly in price, when the conspirators sell and pocket their plunder. They have stolen it by means of two acted lies; for the mine was really not less productive, nor more productive, and the shares of stock consequently neither more nor less valuable. The directors have been therefore simply thieves, and their guilt is aggravated by the element of treachery, for they have stolen from brother members, whose rights and interests they had engaged to protect, instead of plundering, when they assumed the office of directors. In other words, they are guardians stealing from their own wards.

The principle now demonstrated condemns all the practices known in law as monopolizing, regrating and forestalling,

and those expressed in "cornering" a commodity, or a "trust," or a "ring," or "bulling and bearing" prices. Both the common and statute law of England made these acts misdemeanors punishable by fine and imprisonment, and stamped the perpetrators as enemies of the public weal. Instead of allowing them to flaunt the wages of iniquity before the eyes of victims in coaches and palaces, or to occupy the "chief seats in the synagogue" of God's worship, it assigned them their places along with poachers and pickpockets, in the common jail. This sentence was just.

**These Sins Fearfully Prevalent.**

These conspiracies for theft have become, if honest men may believe the current reports, exceedingly frequent and gigantic in the United States. They are practiced by the "merchant princes" of the land, in the great railroad companies, mines, manufactories, stock exchanges and marts of agricultural products. Meantime the American legislatures are too cowardly or venal to apply any judicial remedy, and leave the wise laws of our English forefathers to fall into desuetude. These sins cannot be sins of ignorance. Their successful perpetration calls into exercise the most astute intelligence. The criminals cannot but understand the sin in which they glory and for the successful perpetration of which the multitude applauds them. The thoughtful mind viewing these facts may well ask, What grade of moral putrescence awaits American society?

**Advantage May Not Be Taken of a Neighbor's Necessity.**

If advantage is taken of an individual in extraordinary necessity or distress to force him to pay an inflated price for what he needs, this is theft, aggravated by uncharitableness. The seller ought to have been moved to help, instead of plundering, the fellow-creature in distress. As when a hirer of horses should demand an extravagant price for a horse's hire because his neighbor was in distress to send for a physician. It is no excuse to say that his extremity makes him willing to

pay it. So a highwayman's pistol may make him willing to hand over his watch. Or to say, "his extremity makes the horse really more valuable to him." In the fair commercial sense, it does not. Special urgency of a subjective motive in the one distressed man is not the equitable standard of a horse's hire at that time and place. The market price at the time is the standard. The other people of the town would not give that price then for that use of the horse.

**Advantage Not to Be Taken of the Ignorance of Buyers or Sellers.**

To take advantage of clandestine knowledge as to an approaching change in the relation of supply and demand which will cause a rise or fall of prices, resulting in an unforeseen and involuntary loss to the vendor or buyer, this is immoral. For there is an implied deception in it. The vendor knows that if the buyer knew that the commodity was likely to fall in price, as he clandestinely knows it will fall, he would not pay the high price he asks him for it. To say, "*Caveat emptor*," is not equitable, for he is encouraging him by the implication of his proceeding to take the false step. Were a mining engineer to whisper you that Farmer Jones' lands, which he hitherto valued only as farming lands, contained a secret and valuable mineral vein, and were you thereupon to go to him and buy his lands at the market price of farming lands, concealing your knowledge, the purchase would be fraudulent even in a chancery court. Is the advantage taken by secret knowledge of the markets really different? The law is but a rough and incomplete attempt to embody the principles of morality. We may always safely judge that its standard is not too high, nor the strain of morality too refined; its demands are always, for unavoidable reasons, rather below than above the requirements of an enlightened conscience. Yet these concealments are precisely of the nature of such land purchases, which the law plainly condemns and nullifies as frauds. The excuse pleaded is, that this superior knowledge of approaching changes in the markets is a portion of

the merchant's professional knowledge, to acquire which has cost him time and study, and perhaps much money. So that it is as legitimate for him to make gain of it as for the physician or lawyer to take fees for his professional skill. I am willing to accept this parallel so far as it exists. Its exact counterpart, I admit, is found in that illicit and disreputable branch of the medical profession which charges fees for patent nostrums whose contents they conceal. There is a species of commercial knowledge which is, in the proper sense, the professional acquisition of the merchant, the knowledge of currencies, the modes and costs of transportation, the qualities of commodities and their adaptation to the various markets of the world. It is the honor of the true merchant to have acquired much of this knowledge by study, and even by expense and travel. From such skill he is entitled to make legitimate, but not extortionate gains. The facts concerning approaching fluctuations of supply and demand do not fall under this class. The knowledge of them is not professional, but ought to be popular and common alike to buyer and seller. That it is not professional is proved by this simple fact, that a few days' lapse of time will make it the common property of the people without the cost of professional teaching. It is to prevent this natural diffusion of the knowledge that concealment is practiced. The professional man has a right to make profit of his professional knowledge. But he has no right to steal that species of knowledge which belongs in common to the producers of all other classes in order to make gain of it at their expense.

All misrepresentations as to defects of the commodity bought or sold, adulteration and deceptions, whether actual or implied, are thefts. For the seller makes his neighbor pay for more value than he gives him. This is true of all fraudulent weights and measures. Nor can the vendor cry, "*Caveat emptor.*" For the natural construction of his offer of the article at the market price is, that he presents it as a sound

article. He implies this, and the purchaser is entitled by him to infer it.

#### Gambling Is Theft.

To take your neighbor's property in a game of chance is theft, for you give no *quid pro quo*. Does one say that the loser surrenders his property voluntarily? The answer is, that his consent is one which he has no right to give, because it is prompted by an immoral motive, namely: the hope of plundering his rival. Or is it argued that the loser receives his expected and his fair *quid pro quo* in his sport? I answer: This is false. That is not the *quid pro quo* which either winner or loser really has in view. The real aim of both is plunder, not the sport. This is proved by the question: Why, then, do they not play for the sport without the bets? Another element in the sin is the insincere, and therefore profane, appeal made to Divine Providence in the lot. Chance is no cause, as the gamester ought to know. But the real cause is Providence. The practical proof of the immorality of gaming is, that all habitual gamblers proceed from "fair gaming," sooner or later, to tricks which even their own code condemns as frauds.

#### Speculation in Goods: When Moral?

Is speculation in commodities moral? I answer: Where the owner of paid-up capital uses it to actually buy and store, and preserve at his own expense and risk, commodities which are cheap then (because in excess of demand), and sells them afterwards at an advance (because they will then be more needed), he has acted morally. Because, by translating them in time at his own cost, he has as really enhanced their actual value as he would have done by translating them in space. And the cash which is engrossed for that time in carrying over the commodities is as really deserving of its wages as a work-animal. But, of course, if clandestine and illicit means are used, other than the course of Providence, to enhance the price of the commodity, the speculation becomes immoral. And all speculation, even when moral, is accompanied with



many temptations and liabilities to immorality, as the overcraving of sudden riches, covetousness and rashness.

**Dealing in "Futures" Is Gambling.**

The buying of "futures" is the pretended sale for a commodity, security or share of stock, to be delivered at a future day for a stipulated price. It is tacitly agreed that nothing shall be actually delivered; indeed, the thing nominally sold often has no existence. If the price has risen meantime, the vendor pays to the purchaser this increase of price and delivers none of the promised commodity. The basis of the settlement is the calculation that he would have lost just this sum by postponing the purchase of the goods pretended to be sold from the day of sale to the day of delivery. If the commodity meantime falls in price, the purchaser pays to the vendor the difference of price on the counterpart calculation, that were the goods delivered to him he must lose just that amount on their price. Each party deposits with the agent of the transaction a small part of the stipulated price as a guarantee for the payment of the loss. This deposit is called the "margin."

This practice is, therefore, simply a bet upon the possible rise or fall of the commodity in the future. It is therefore but gambling; and its immorality is proved by the same arguments which showed gambling to be a form of theft. Its evil tendencies reinforce the proof. The government has properly passed a special statute forbidding all bets upon the issue of election, because such bets when pending tempt the persons who make them to use illicit means to influence the result, thus corrupting the purity of elections. The parallel argument applies against this "dealing in futures." A heavy bet pending upon the rise or fall of prices presents a violent temptation to meddle fraudulently with the market. The weight of this consideration appears from this fact, that the ill-starred arts of bulls and bears never assumed their full proportions until this traffic in "futures" was set up. It is wholly devoid of those benefits which justify legitimate speculation;

for no transfer of commodities is made in either time or place from a point of over-abundance to a point of scarcity, so as to relieve the market of either injurious depression or inflation. The purchase and sale are wholly fictitious; nothing is exchanged or is intended to be exchanged, except the plunder gained by the winning gambler from the loser. The true interests of both producers and consumers of commodities is, that markets should be steady without startling advances or declines in price. The only general effect of this gambling in prospective prices is to keep the market feverish and fluctuating. The extent of the practice may be surmised from the statement made by the well informed, that the annual cotton crop of America is sold ten times. Eight of these sales are useless, fictitious and unhealthy. Lest anyone should suppose that this condemnation of trafficking in futures is an over-refinement of philosophy, I will add, that the judicial decisions in the courts of law confirm it, declaring the transaction to be nothing else than gambling.

#### Moderate Interest on Loans Is Righteous.

Is usury righteous? (*Usuria*, from *usus*, is the hire paid for a loan.) The answer is, that while eating usury is immoral, reasonable hire for capital lent is just. The moralists of the middle ages currently denied this, and taught that all usury is sinful extortion. They were misled by a wrong conception of the legislation of Moses, who prohibited Hebrews to take interest upon loans from brother Hebrews. But Moses did not forbid this because he thought such interest intrinsically wrong. The proof is, that the same Moses authorized Hebrews in the same statute to take interest from foreigners. It is simply impossible that God could have authorized wrongdoing, by the very legislation designed to separate His chosen people to Himself for the cultivation of righteousness. Many have indeed been so silly and irreverent as to say, that this is a specimen of the barbaric injustice of Moses' legislation; in that he, like a semi-barbarian as he and his people were,

authorized actions against foreigners, in the old spirit of tribal enmity, which would be unjust towards compatriots. But I reply, Are these the laws of Moses, or of God? Are we infidels, or do we believe in the inspiration of the Scriptures? Was the Heavenly Father semi-barbaric and perverted by the old evil spirit of tribal enmity? But my more express reply is, that Moses expressly disclaims this explanation of his restriction concerning usury. He commands that foreigners are not to be oppressed, that there shall be one law for the foreigner and the Hebrew, except in the restriction of the positive ordinances. This prohibition of usury from the brother Hebrews was such; a special, positive ordinance, exactly of the same kind with the prohibition against gleaning their grain-fields and olive orchards, against picking up the sheaf which dropped from the wagon in the highway, and with the permission to Hebrews to take from the land of a neighbor in passing whatever they needed to satisfy present hunger. The gleanings were to be left as alms for the poor and the orphans. These rules were specially grounded in the truth, that God claimed the ownership of the lands and its fruits, and lent them to the Hebrew people as life tenants, as a band of brethren; and these neighborly acts of lending without usury and giving away the gleanings were to be special marks of their fraternity.

The scholastic moralists also argued from the major premise, that it is always unrighteous to take something for nothing; and that money lent is not, like labor and land, an agent creative of new values. Said they, A box of coin, however assiduously tilled and watered, would no more produce an ear of wheat than the arid gravel of the Sahara. Hence they inferred that he who lent his land or his own labor or the labor of his beast of burden might righteously take hire for the loan, because all these coöperate to create new values. But he who exacts hire for money lent takes something for nothing and is therefore unrighteous. This sophism very naturally deceived the men of those unhappy ages, amidst

whose confusions and violencies productive consumption of capital was not understood and was so little practiced; and when money was most frequently borrowed by the reckless nobles for purposes of unproductive consumption. But a wiser political economy has exploded the minor premise of the scholastic argument. Capital lent is not unproductive of new values. A box of coin does indeed lack the vegetative and nutritive qualities of the soil. But money is the representative of capital. The wise borrower immediately exchanges the money lent him for some of those productive values which constitute capital. Capital is as true a co-agent in the creation of new values as are land and labor. He, therefore, who takes a reasonable hire for the capital borrowed from him is as just as he who charges similar hire for his land or his labor.

#### Effects of Usury Laws.

The iniquities and mischiefs of eating usury have always been such that all civilized commonwealths have restrained them by usury laws. These sought to fix a maximum price upon the hire of money lent. They added some species of penalty against the usurer who exceeded this maximum, such as the forfeiture of his interest, or the forfeiture of the whole loan. The utilitarian moralist, Jeremy Bentham, in his notable essay entitled "A Letter from the White Sea," attacked the principle of the usury laws. He argued that the traffic in money should be left to the beneficent influences of free trade and to the operation of supply and demand, as the experience and wisdom of governments now leave all other branches of traffic. He asserted that the usury laws fixing a maximum only operate to defeat their own ends. The rate of price fixed in a fair market by the relation of supply and demand is always the equitable price. When supply is diminished and demand is increased, prices must rise, by inevitable laws, and the attempt of the government to prevent it is only mischievous. The owners of the commodities thus rising in market value feel themselves wronged by the law, and are indignant.

They withhold and secrete their commodities, rather than bring them to what they feel is an unjust market; thus the scantiness of supply is only aggravated, and the purchasers suffer so much the worse. Thus, argued Bentham, the usury laws only make the supply of loans more scanty and the price of their hire more exorbitant. The borrower who must have a loan is then compelled to pay this inflated hire for it, and an additional element of cost in the form of a premium to the usurer to indemnify him for his risks of detection and penalty. Moreover, the usury laws hold out a dishonest inducement to borrowers to treacherous breaches of their own voluntary compacts with lenders, by releasing from payment wholly or partially.

Francis Gilmer, first professor of law in the University of Virginia, published a reply to Mr. Bentham, of London. Experienced jurists usually concur with him in recognizing the utility and necessity of these laws. They admit fully the wholesome doctrine of free trade. But they assert that even the widest and best founded principles of political economy must be restricted in some of their applications. For this is not an exact and mechanical science. It operates not upon wood and iron, but upon human minds and hearts, as qualified by their various desires, follies and weaknesses. Hence moral considerations must be introduced, to some extent, in the legal adjustments of these economic principles to human society. If any commodity can be of such a nature as to require and justify a modification of the influences of supply and demand, it is money. As the wise man saith: "Money answereth all things." It is exchangeable for all other values and thus becomes the focal abject of all the forms of human desire. It is the most portable of all values, and the most readily concealed. A given sum of money may command the possession of either one of a multitude of the objects of desire; and thus it is clothed, by a species of illusion, with multiplied value in the apprehension of the borrower. Hence it becomes very necessary that borrowers should be protected from themselves

and from their own illusions. Again, we have seen the vital interest which a constitutional government has in maintaining an approximate equality of condition among its citizens. A plutocracy is its natural enemy. But the peculiarity I have pointed out in money, if left to operate unchecked, will always enable the lender of money to obtain a recompense for the use of his capital out of all proportion to the profits which they can make in other industries from their capital. This expectation is confirmed by the well-known fact, that even the legal interest on loans, not to say the excessive usurious interest, is always greater than the average profits of the aggregate industries of the society. Hence unrestricted usury will inevitably tend to make the money-lenders richer, and all their fellow-citizens poorer. The nature of money also exposes it, more than any other commodity, to the abuses of regrating, forestalling and monopolizing. It appears, therefore, at least doubtful whether the law should lift its hand entirely off from the traffic in money and leave it to the unchecked influence of supply and demand. All economists and statesmen teach that the commonwealth alone should coin the money. Whence is the propriety of this, when the commonwealth does not claim to manufacture the other commodities of commerce? May not the same reasons justify her controlling the traffic in money?

#### **The Defaulting Debtor a Thief.**

As a debt is a loan, the man who buys on credit has virtually borrowed from the vendor the money value of the goods received. Hence, first, it is right for him to pay reasonable interest. Second, the non-payment, if not necessitated by a dispensation of Providence, is theft. No man has any right to make a debt beyond his certain ability to pay. If he uses any weakness or recklessness thereabout, he is stealing. Debt usually tempts to lying, cowardice and prodigality. No bankrupt law can release from the moral obligation of paying old debts, nor can any statute of limitations; nor can the debtor say, that though he has regained his property, his first duty is

to subsist his family. The truth here is, that the obligation to repay cannot be pushed so far as to starve the debtor to death in order to let the creditor have all the money that he earns. The self-preservation is first, and a dead debtor will never pay any more. But the subsistence which the debtor uses is out of the creditor's money. The debtor and his family are living as paupers upon his alms. Hence they are bound to live as paupers ought to live on other people's charity, until the sum saved out of their earnings pay off the debt.

**In America, the Laws Ineffectual and Demoralizing.**

Imprisonment for debt was instituted by the English common law. It has been abolished in America as too harsh a remedy. Indeed, it was long the hackneyed subject of debating-society eloquence, and the injustice of holding the debtor bound to pay his debts, and yet detaining him at the option of the creditor in a jail, where he could earn nothing wherewith to pay, evoked the eloquent invective of many youthful orators. Their mistake was, that they failed to understand the principle of the law. English law regarded debt, as in ordinary cases, not only an inconvenience, but a sin. This penal legislation was designed not only as a remedy for the creditor, but as a retributive penalty upon the debtor's criminality in taking his neighbor's goods without the ability and intention of repayment. The common law held that, excepting unexpected cases of providential calamity, it is the business of the borrower to understand his own ability to meet the stipulated payment. As he who borrows or buys with the intention of not endeavoring to pay is simply a thief, whose just desert is the penitentiary, so he who incurs a debt with a lazy inattention to the future payment and his ability therefor is half-way a thief, who almost always speedily grows into a full-fledged one. Both classes deserve punishment, while, also, their creditors have a right to payment. This principle of the common law is right. The only injustice in its application was in its neglect to provide for the few cases where the

default of payment was innocent, and in its giving to the injured creditor that prerogative of extending the imprisonment, which should have been reserved to the magistrates. Debt is a sin; it is expressly prohibited by the holy Apostles. (See Romans, chap. xii.) The English law was not only right in principle, but far more instructive of the public conscience than ours. The American statutes for enforcing the collection of debts have studiously expunged every reference to the criminality of unpaid debt, and treat it solely as a misfortune in the debtor, and an inconvenience to the creditor, whom it proposes to assist, and that by modes of remedy feeble and ineffectual. Indeed, as an eminent jurist has remarked, the tenor of these laws almost seems to imply that the creditor is the sinner and the delinquent debtor the specimen of virtuous and laudable misfortune, alone entitled to sympathy and aid. These laws are illogical, false and corrupting. They have doubtless done much to debauch the American conscience, and to make the traditionary British honesty almost an antiquated Quixotry among us. This species of maudlin legislation is as silly as it is immoral. It cloaks from the view of the popular conscience the great truth, that all heedless debt is near akin to theft. Moreover, the ultimate effect of all the influences which encourage heedless debt and place difficulties in the way of the enforcement of just payment is greatly to enhance the miseries of the poor and the hardships of the industrious workers. It is for the relief of these that the small demagogue professes to enact these soft statutes. But these are the very classes who are most vitally interested in the opposite system of short credits and punctual payment of all debts. Were not such legislators as silly as they are immoral, they would remember that the poor are not only debtors, but also creditors; they hold claims against richer fellow-citizens for services rendered which are often toilsome and poorly paid. Here the poor are the creditors. These debts are small; yes, but "Little things are great to little men." The dilatory or dishonest settlement of their little claims causes them more mis-



ery than thousands of "bad debts" cause to the rich. Again, the privilege of contracting heedless debt is the prime incentive to indolence and waste. But these are the prime mothers of poverty. If we would see the poor prosperous and happy in their humble sphere, we should frame all the laws so as to stimulate truthfulness, justice, punctuality and industry. For these are the parents of thrift and the creators of wealth, as well as the protectors of its enjoyment by the weak.

**Bad Debts an Unjust Tax on Honest Purchasers.**

Once more, every uncertainty which threatens the punctual collection of debts tends to cause the sale of all commodities at higher prices. Dealers know that these uncertainties of payment must, in the average, result in a heavy percentage of loss. Of course, no dealer, however honest, proposes to do business for nothing. He therefore assesses this percentage of loss by bad debts upon every commodity which he sells to honest customers. Thus industrious, debt-paying people have to pay for the goods which they need: first, prime cost; second, costs of transportation and storage; third, costs of retail; fourth the vendor's fair profit; and fifth, a ratable share of every commodity which the vendor shall sell to dishonest customers, rated at the highest retail prices. The four first items it is just that the vendors should charge and that the honest purchasers should pay. But the fifth is a villainous imposition, which these slack laws enable the dishonest makers of bad debts to lay upon their honest neighbors. The ultimate result of such laws is, to make life easy for the unworthy, the indolent and prodigal, and to make it grievous and hard for the deserving and industrious. Stringent debt laws are the poor man's best friend. The old common-law remedy against debtors appeared in the old States of the Union in a transition which was free from every imaginable charge of harshness. The delinquent debtor might be arrested and imprisoned on the plea of the creditor; but only until such time as the former made a truthful surrender of his assets to satisfy

the latter's just claims. If the debtor made this surrender upon oath that he had given in a full schedule of his possessions—one minute after his imprisonment began, or even before he entered the jail door, he was instantly released, however much his assets might come short of paying his whole debts. This was always the most perfect and the most moderate justice. For the debtor who conceals his possessions in order to avoid the payment of just debts is simply a thief, who deserves imprisonment as justly as any other thief. Why so many of the American legislatures have expunged this last feature of the common law, it is difficult to see, unless they wish to encourage these forms of virtual theft, now so common in American society, and unrebuked by a debauched public opinion.

## CHAPTER VIII.

## DUTIES OF VERACITY.

## I. Ground of Their Obligation.

Why am I morally bound to speak the truth? Paley, after the utilitarian argument from the impolicy of falsehood, says, Because I have virtually covenanted with my interlocutor to do so. It has come to be understood between us, that my act in conversing with him or answering his questions involves his right to the expectation to be told the truth and my avowal of that right in him. (Dr. Whewell modifies this by saying, the meaning of terms in human language must have been the result of a convention between men. Hence, when I use their language, I come under the implied obligation of a covenant to express by the terms what men have stipulated they shall be understood to mean.)

**Paley's Reasons Fallacious.**

These views might be ingenious as presenting subordinate illustration and confirmation of the ground of the obligation. They cannot give us that original ground, for when Paley says, I am bound to speak truth because my entering into speech with my fellow-man is a virtual promise to do so, he leaves this question unanswered which immediately arises: Why am I bound to keep promises? Keeping promises is but one form of the duty of veracity. Paley's explanation moves in a vicious circle. He endeavors to deduce the duty of speaking truth from the duty of keeping promises, which is but a part of the wider obligation, and, indeed, but the deduction from it. Moreover, if the duty of speaking truth requires an explanation, the duty of keeping promises equally requires

one. But Dr. Paley gives none. I reply to Dr. Whewell in a similar way. How did men settle by convention what shall be the agreed meaning of terms in their language? They must have employed some significations of thought to do so and the question returns: Were they not under moral obligation to employ those significations truthfully? Whewell also moves, then, in a circle. *E. g.*, Two savages forming their dialect make a convention that a certain monosyllable shall be understood as the name of the section of a tree branch. Some how thus: one holds out the piece of wood in his hand while the other says, interrogatively, "Stick?" Whereon, the first nods his head. Well, the duty of veracity must be already binding the two men as to the employment of the action and the nod, else no moral obligation would have arisen out of the convention that s-t-i-c-k shall mean such a piece of wood.

#### Expediency Does Not Justify.

Against the argument of mere expediency this objection also holds: that if a lie were practically harmless, directly and remotely harmless, its immorality could not be argued from that premise of expediency. But such lies are still sinful. The philosophy of expediency here, as usually, proves shallow and inadequate. A solid ground for the universal obligation must be sought deeper. The fundamental mistake of these reasoners is, that they began by overlooking the truth, that the virtue of veracity, like all fundamental and original virtues, is not only a practice, but a disposition; not only a *consuetudo*, but a *habitus*.

#### The True Ground of the Duty.

To State the same truth in another way: the radical motive of this virtuous practice must be sought in a subjective rational affection, an appetency of soul. This is the love of truth for its own sake. Just as all practical godliness is prompted by the love of God, and social righteousness by the love of our neighbors as ourselves. We understand: that the virtue of veracity includes a great deal more than merely the

uniform acts of shaping our declarations according to what we honestly think the real state of facts. I am willing to accept this as a correct definition of the virtue of truth-speaking. But veracity includes a spiritual and mental appetite for truth as truth simply; a real delight in truth as a desire to know; a sincerity and impartiality of frame and temper of soul. The virtue of veracity may find expression just as truly in the manner of receiving as of declaring propositions. Mental honesty is as essential a part of the virtue as truth-telling. I repeat, then, that this virtue is not, in its last analysis, an attribute qualifying the actions and words, but an active disposition qualifying the will itself, just as in any other class of moral acts. The act of truth-telling is moral, simply because of the active moral principle regulative thereof. The morality of a given declaration is not settled, as some seem to imagine, objectively, by its being the correct expression of a judgment about an object, but subjectively, by the appetency of spirit prompting the utterance of it. Immoral thinking and speaking may as really be done about an utterly unpractical question in pre-Adamite zoölogy as about rights or theology.

#### Truth Pabulum Mentis.

To those, therefore, who ask: "Why am I always morally bound to speak the truth, as to think it?" I would reply: The rational answer is, that it is the law of our mental nature; it is a fundamental, an ultimately simple datum of consciousness; in that the mind is made to know, it is made to value truth; for only truth is real knowledge. Truth is *pabulum mentis*. The mind is as originally, as essentially fashioned to embrace truth as the eye to receive light. Hence, the same argument which would prove that correct vision is the "final cause" of the eye, proves that truth is the final cause of the mind's structure. The theological answer is that God is absolute truth; in Him the affection and the practice are impersonated in their perfection. He commands us by the light of Nature and by His Word to imitate Him in this attribute.

**Truth Natural to the Rational Being.**

It has been correctly said, that truth-speaking is natural, and lying unnatural, to the human mind. It is, unfortunately, true that the moral weakness is natural which tempts man to violate truth under the pressure of fear or selfishness. But none the less, every person who yields to this temptation knows that in doing so he has violated the proper law of his own nature, and even the falsest naturally prefer to speak the truth when not prevented by some such temptation.

**Practical Confirmations.**

This primary argument is now illustrated and confirmed by these additional remarks: That only real communications are useful. Every practical concern of a man's life is with the real, not the fictitious state of things. Fictitious declarations are to us naught, or worse. They cannot direct to any beneficial end, but may injuriously, or even fatally, mislead; for instance, in medicine, agriculture, trade, government—everything. Even in works of fiction the mind demands *vraisemblance*.

Now, the practical duty of veracity is to observe truth in our declarations. Its importance appears from this: that far the larger part of every man's useful stock of knowledge is communicated knowledge. Lying undermines the value of this just so far as it goes, and its tendency is to destroy the value of all of it. But if all communicated knowledge must be discarded, each man is limited to the discoveries of his own personal experience. The acquired knowledge of others is naught to him; the knowledge of each generation dies with it. Progress and civilization become impossible. Religion, of course, would be impossible. Each man would live a helpless, insulated savage until he perished by his own ignorance. This is what the liar tends to bring mankind to.

**Falsehood Destroys Confidence, and so Love and Society.**

Lying tends to destroy confidence. But mutual confidence

is an essential to all social assistances. If a man could not trust his pilot, he could not sail; his cook, he could not eat; his driver, postman, neighbor, physician, where would he be? Truth is essential to all social affections and friendships; for these require confidence. It is essential to all government; for if the ruler could not confide in his agents, his authority would be limited to his bodily presence. It is also essential to all education; for, to teach, one must be believed. Not only is truth a virtue, but, in a certain sense, the condition of all other virtues. (Hence the accurately philosophic expressions: "The man that doeth truth," "Executed the judgment of truth.") No act can have moral quality except it be a reasonable one. But truth is the light of the understanding. The guide of the motives is only in truth. Only true inducement can be right inducement. Vicious inducement is always false. Even Christ says: "Sanctify them through Thy truth." That truth is in order to holiness is the supreme evidence on this point.

#### Falsehood Makes Savagery.

The limitations, poverty and misery of savage life illustrate precisely the practical evils to which lying tends. Why are savages poor, ill-housed, miserable? Simply because confidence cannot subsist between them. Superficial observers impute the poverty and misery of savages to other causes: to their small numbers, their ignorance, their lack of the mechanic arts, their stolid indifference to progress and comfort, their frequent destructive wars, and, above all, to their laziness. All these are intermediate obstacles, but they could not exist without a cause. What is the cause of their prevalence among savages? They have the same essential nature with prosperous Englishmen. They feel the sense of *meum* and *tuum*. They desire their own welfare as warmly as he does, and feel every impulse which he feels of self-interest and natural affection. "The savage is too lazy to work! and hence his misery." This is an utter mistake. He is the most industrious and persevering of men in such pursuits as his circumstances open

to him. The Kiowa did not exercise his industry in rearing crops of corn. True; because he had no ground of confidence that the Comanches would not rob him of the fruits. He reasoned just as we civilized men do: What is the use of laboring for naught? He knew and desired the advantages of plenty as well as we do. But in the manufacture of his weapons, in the chase and in war he exercised a skill and untiring energy which utterly wore out his civilized companions. It was the known prevalence of violence and treachery which paralyzed his progress in other directions. In its last analysis, savagery is sin, and mainly the sin against truth. The supreme illustration is in hell. That is the kingdom of him who was the inventor of lying, the world of lies, where neither truth nor confidence exists. To that awful condition lying tends to reduce mankind here. The liar is *hostis humani generis*.

#### Veracity the Basis of All Other Virtues.

These views show how truthfulness is the foundation of virtue and practically the basis of every other virtue. It should be the chief aim of education to teach and to cultivate the love of truth. The most commonplace and prominent duty of truth is truth-telling, veracity in our communications. Take the following rules, evident almost without reasoning, and given by all sound writers on morals.

#### Detailed Rules.

(a) Words are not the only signs or means of declaration, significant gestures, and sometimes even silences and non-actions, constitute a communication (*e. g.*, of course the obligations of veracity bind in the employment of them just as much as of words).

(b) The constant obligation of truth is, that if men use significations to their fellow-men, they are bound to use them in exact conformity to their own opinion and belief at the time as to the state of facts. But this sincere opinion may be in fact erroneous? Yes; there may be a communication true on the part of the utterer and yet not true to reality. Writers



used to express this by the logical terms, "formal truth," where the signification made corresponded faithfully to the utterer's real thought; "material truth," where it also corresponded with reality. The speaker or writer may, then, utter "formal truth" and be clear of the sin of falsehood in that utterance, and yet not utter "material truth." This latter failure may or may not be innocent. If faulty, its fault is not that of falsehood, but of mental laziness, prejudice, rashness, or some other blameworthy temper which prevented his possessing himself of the material truth.

(c) If significations have, or are supposed to have, any agreed sense (if they have not, they are not usable), the utterer is bound to use them in that sense which he ought reasonably to suppose the hearer attaches to them. That is, an Englishman, in whose ears the word "corn" always means, not Indian corn or maize, but wheat, barley, rye or oats, asks an American for a purchase of "corn," and the American says: "I sell you this corn for so much per bushel;" he is bound either to speak in the Englishman's sense or else undeceive him.

(d) I am not bound to convey all species of information to all men. If asked for a species of knowledge which I am morally entitled to keep to myself, it is always moral to decline to speak, or to speak so much as I righteously choose to disclose, and suppress the rest. I must speak truth so far as I speak, that is all. The argument is clear. Because the inquirer had no right to demand the disclosure, so that such refusal as does not infringe God's right as guardian of truth does the impertinent inquirer no wrong.

**Suppressio Veri Must Not Extend to Suggestio Falsi.**

But if the *suppressio veri* obviously causes a *suggestio falsi*, then sin is committed; *i. e.*, if the suppression of what you know is not only made in such form as to keep the inquirer in the dark as to the part he has no right to know, but to mislead him as to the part which you do seem and profess to give him. *E. g.*, Jeremiah's answer was lawful, for it was

*suppresio veri* without *suggestio falsi*, when the jealous princes asked him what he spoke of to King Zedekiah in their secret conference, and Jeremiah replied, that he had been begging the king not to remand him to the miry dungeon. In fact, Zedekiah had also consulted the prophet about the policy of treating for peace with the Chaldean. But the king had charged him to keep this part secret. It was the prophet's right and duty to obey this command of his chief magistrate, whence the noblemen had no right to be informed about it. (Note, *suggestio* here means designed prevarication through indirect significations.) That of the Delphic Oracle to Cræsus, "If you invade Medea, you will overthrow a great kingdom," was such a *suppresio veri* as was a *suggestio falsi* and a lie.

(e) The same principle applies as to which mental reservations are sinful. Of course, the exercise of the right just described (d) may be a mental reservation. But where a mental reservation is made in such form as to infringe my truthfulness in what I do declare (c), it is a falsehood. Such was the famous one of Galileo, "*E pur si Muore.*" These are charged by Paschal on the Jesuits. They add the sin of cowardice to that of falsehood, and, if the transaction is a promise or vow, also the guilt of perfidy.

(f) Some, as Paley, say that where the interlocutor has no right to the truth, it is lawful to deceive him. As, when the robber demands to know where your money is hidden. This does certainly justify the concealment allowed by our fourth rule (d), but Paley is illogical and dangerous. The obligation to truth does not bind to man only, but also to God. It is not founded on expediency. Besides, if the speaker were allowed to judge for himself whether the asker was or was not entitled to a true answer, and to act covertly upon that judgment, two results would follow. The speaker would judge erroneously and self-interestedly. Second, on this theory, human veracity might be worth nothing whatever, for the listener must, of course, bethink himself that the speaker claimed to be his own judge whether he (the listener) was "entitled to truth," and

if he judged he was not, would consequently claim the privilege to deceive him. Nor would any assurance of sincerity from the speaker remove this doubt; for the same judgment of the hearer's unworthiness to receive the truth which he claimed justified the first deception would also justify this farther one. Again, on this theory there would have been no Christian martyrs. Evidently, if there is any application of this theory, it must be only where it is understood that the hearer is rightly counted outside the pale of humanity.

**Are Any Intentional Deceptions Lawful? Arguments Pro and Con.**

Are there any cases, then, in which we may intentionally deceive, without incurring the sin of falsehood? *E. g.*, when a mother, seeing a murderer pursuing her child, deceives him to prevent the crime; or when a patriot general, like Washington at Long Island, deceives an unrighteous invader; or an innocent householder leaves a light burning all night in a vacant room to make the intending burglars think it is watched. Dr. C. Hodge, with many, say, Yes. They argue (*a*) as under previous paragraph, that the parties deceived, being engaged in an evil act, have no right to the truth. That the lesser duty (truth-telling) gives place to the greater duty, saving a child's life from unjust destruction; that the best men, as Washington, have done so, and the common conscience approves. That Bible instances of intentional deception are recorded of the saints, as Abraham, Gen. xx. 2; Samuel, I. Sam. xvi. 1-2; Elisha, II. Kings vi. 14-20; Joshua, Joshua viii. 3. That, in fine, cases arise in which to refuse to avail ourselves of the right to deceive the wicked would be a foolish and gratuitous throwing away of our own life and of others'.

Some of our best philosophers, however, as Kant, Fichte, Thornwell, McGuffey, say, that no lie is of the truth, in this sense. They argue in general, that the opposite license proceeds upon a utilitarian theory of the obligation. But that doctrine is false, and no finite mind can judge when the whole consequences of the truth-telling will be worse than the false-

hood. That the cases of Washington and Joshua, etc., may be but instances of the errors of good men under powerful and plausible temptations, and to be explained, as to the Bible instances, as recorded there for our warning, and not imitation. That their high position is the only one that gives any consistent and tenable rule of obligation. That, on the other plan, we have not a fixed moral principle, but a "point of honor," left.

It must be confessed that the latter party lean in the nobler and safer direction. We may add again, as we have pointed out before, that it is not universally true, that duties for us are correlated to rights in the objects of them. It may be my duty, before God, to give alms to one who had entirely forfeited his right to claim my help. Hence, it is not logical to argue that my hearer's right to receive the truth of me invariably conditions my duty to speak it to him. Let it be repeated, that God is the object to whom truth is due. The obligation to veracity binds immediately and universally to God, and only secondarily to the fellow-creature to whom we address our significations, as Dr. Thornwell shows. When Dr. Paley seems to condition our obligation to truth upon our own estimate of the hearer's right to enjoy it, he has, in fact, betrayed the whole basis of duty. Even upon his own low theory of expediency, all men's professions of veracity would become worthless upon this plan, and all confidence in human declarations would be utterly destroyed. For when I address a declaration to my hearer, how shall he know whether I judge him to be possessed of a right to the benefits of my veracity? Only by some other declaration of mine. But on this plan no such declaration of mine could be entitled to command any confidence, for the hearer would doubt whether I did not feel entitled to deceive him, because I secretly judged him not possessed of the right to my veracity.

**On the Lower View No Martyrs.**

These views of the better moralists are unanswerable.

Wherever an obligation of veracity binds us to God, that obligation must be kept at all costs, however unworthy or injurious the human objects may be to whom we speak, and however grim or deadly the probable consequence of our truth may appear to us to be. Truth must be held more precious than life itself. A conclusive practical argument against the lower view appears in this: that on that theory, there would have been no Christian martyrs. The vicious principles would have been applied by each threatened Christian so as to excuse him from the duty of bearing true testimony to Christ before persecutors who were certainly usurping and unrighteous. But if there is anything certain, it is certain the "noble army of martyrs" performed a plain duty in testifying to the truth at the expense of life, and did not perpetrate a gratuitous folly. In one word, the example of our Redeemer before Pilate and the Jewish rulers is of conclusive and supreme authority for us: He asserted the truth with constancy at the known cost of an immediate death, at once the most unjust and the most shameful and torturing which a good man could possibly suffer. Here is our obligatory model.

#### A Possible Solution.

Yet candor must admit that our higher view is attended with a difficulty. This arises from the scriptural fact, that not only some sincere servants of God, as Abraham in Egypt, saved their lives by deceiving their assailants: which proves nothing whatever in this argument, since sincere servants of God are capable of sometimes sinning under urgent temptation; but the Scriptures present two cases in which God himself instructed and therefore authorized His inspired servants to delude his own enemies worthy of destruction. One is that of Joshua before the pagan city Ai (Josh. viii. 2 to 8). The second is that of Elisha and the Syrians wickedly purposing his murder (II. Kings vi. 14 to 24). In the presence of these instances we must concede that as it is righteous for God to ordain some killings which are not murder, because they are

his just judicial sentence upon capital guilt, so it is just in God to authorize some deceptions which are not sinful lying, as just judicial penalties upon capital guilt. May uninspired men make these instances precedents for their own action in what they suppose similar cases of capital guilt? This is the difficult question. The safer and more consistent answer is the negative. But to this one apparent exception is to be allowed, which is not in reality an exception. It seems plain, that as rationality is the attribute necessary for understanding and practicing the duty of veracity, the objects of that duty must also be endowed with rationality. I presume no man would hesitate to deceive a mad dog in order to protect himself and his family from his deadly fangs. So it would appear the maniac who manifests murderous intentions may be righteously deceived in order to save life. His condition makes him incapable of either understanding or practicing the duties of veracity. He is outside their scope, like a conflagration or tornado. We do not suppose it is the will of God that we should attempt to make Him the object of their practice, since rational speech, the vehicle of truth, is as inapplicable to Him as to the storm.

#### Schopenhauer's Suggestion.

At this point another ingenious suggestion has been made, it is said, by the recent German Schopenhauer, which, if it could be supported, would wholly relieve the difficulty. His suggestion seems to be in substance this: that while God is always the supreme obligator, to the duties of veracity their proximate objects are only our fellow-creatures within the pale of social relations to us. Now, as the maniac is placed outside that pale by his frenzy, and is no longer any rational object for the duty of truth-telling, may not the capital criminal manifestly purposing the unrighteous destruction of the speaker or of those under his protection be also regarded as outside the scope of the obligation? Has he not temporarily dehumanized his rights? Actual murder, when proved, does this: the murderer has forfeited his right to live, and society

claims the right to destroy him. So the intending murderer delegates to the innocent man assailed the right of self-defense even unto death. May not the same obvious purpose of murder put the assailant equally without the pale of truth? The greater includes the less. The forfeiture of the whole existence includes a forfeiture of the rational right to veracity. He is *pro tempore* out of the category of rational man, a madman or beast. The advantage claimed for this view is, that it applies only to the extreme case of the man intending capital crime. And just as soon as the murderous attitude is ended, the right to truth, like the other rights of humanity, revives in full force, notwithstanding the object's (other) sinfulness. Thus, as a righteous general will kill, so he may deceive an invader while in the criminal attitude of purposed murder. Yet pending a flag of truce he will be as exact in all his dealings as if acting with his best friends, and among the hostile stratagems the displaying of a pretended flag of truce must by no means be used. This is base and inhumane reason. Because the usages of mankind have sanctified this truce flag as the blessed symbol of the cessation of murder and the reinstatement of peace.

**Fables Not Falsehoods: Why?**

(g) The employment of fables and parables is no breach of truth, because the pictures used in them are known on both hands as being significations, not of the literal things said, but of the truth forming the moral of the fable. When, for instance, in Judges, Jotham, the son of Gideon, spake his parable of the trees of the forest going forth to anoint a king over themselves, and recited speeches of the olive-tree, the vine, and the bramble, he spoke no falsehood; because all of the men of Shechem knew perfectly well that he did not literally mean to state that the vegetables exercised reason and speech; but meant to make the people see clearly the folly and impudence of Abimelech's claims. In order that a fable or other avowedly fictitious illustration of truths may be moral, the

thing that is necessary is the "poetic justice," as it has been called, of the representation; the fairness of the representation left after the pictorial dress is abstracted. Thus, a representation made through images wholly fictitious may be perfectly truthful, and one made by the perverse combination of facts, each authentic, in a sense may be sinfully false. Such was the gigantic slander of her countrymen by Mrs. Stowe.

**One May Slander His Fellow by Telling the Truth of Him.**

The sin of slander is usually well understood when false charges are circulated against a good man with the malicious purpose of injuring his repute. And the meanness of the sin is well appreciated by those who remember Shakespeare's famous "Who robs me of my purse steals trash," etc. But men need to be reminded that the sin of slander may be committed sometimes by circulating against our neighbors that which is true. The Golden Rule applies here. If an obligatory motive calls for (as the ends of justice) the warning of the innocent against the bad man's designs, the attack on his good repute made by true charges, the attack should be made. But if no right end is gained, then the wounding of his good repute and heart is a gratuitous evil. Remember, men do not cease to be objects of duty and charity because they really are bad. Again, all useless narration of sins is evil, because it needlessly familiarizes men's minds with sin.

"Vice is a monster of so hideous mein,  
As, to be hated, needs but to be seen;  
Yet seen too oft, familiar with its face,  
We first endure, then pity, then embrace."

These famous lines express an important law of habit. A soul is polluted by every unnecessary inspection or contemplation of polluting action. When a praiseworthy, moral motive dictates such inspection as when a righteous judge investigates a case of crime for the purpose of preserving virtue and order, the healthy motive preserves him from the moral contagion. But he who dwells upon the dissection of foul deeds with-



out such a righteous object exposes his soul to the infection of vice without the *prophylactick*. The benevolent surgeon inflicts pain upon numerous tender children and sick persons, but he does it to save life. The practice, therefore, does not render him cruel, but more benevolent. Yet the man who should practice as frequent inflictions upon his fellow-creatures without an obligatory object, for the sake of idle amusement, would make himself infamously inhuman. Let this parable be applied. Vice should never, then, be delineated, but be covered with silence except when its disclosure is necessary. This argument proves the gigantic folly and wickedness of all those publications, such as "police report," "criminal news" and vicious fictions which portray sin and crime to their readers. Their authors and agents deserve such reprehension as would be rightly visited upon persons who should sell fashionable ribbons and laces infected with the plague in order to gain money. Parents should expel all such publications from their homes as they would the clothing of small-pox patients. In America this evil has been allowed to grow to an enormous and shameless bulk. What need is there to inquire after the causes of that outbreak of commercial dishonesty and domestic vice which alarms the public mind, when so many import these fountains of pollution into the bosom of their families in the current newspapers and novels?

#### Rules for Promises, Vows and Oaths.

The two other chief duties of veracity fall under the heads of "promises" and "vows and oaths." The latter are more important than the former, because they especially invoke God's sanctity, omniscience and retribution. Of promises, the following points are to be stated:

(a) They must be fulfilled in good faith, *in sensu impo-*  
*nentis*, and without mental reservation. (See the reason in the third subdivision of the previous head.)

(b) A promise exacted by threats or penalties is volun-

tary; and therefore binding, unless the act covenanted to be done is sinful *per se*. Then:

(c) The maxim must apply, "The sinful vow is ill made and worse kept." The principle is, that one sin (the sin of making a promise or pledge, which the promiser had no right before God to make) cannot authorize another sin. Suppose that the promiser has received the consideration or *quid pro quo* from the promisee. When the promiser opens his eyes to the fact that he has made a sinful pledge, he must break the pledge and refund the consideration, no matter how valuable. Suppose the consideration is not refundable: as when a wayfarer, having been robbed by a highwayman, accepts release and bodily safety from him, on the pledge not to divulge his crime under any circumstances to the magistrate. But to bear witness against crime, when called to do so by the commonwealth, is a positive duty. Still the promiser must break the promise. It is very mean to do so and yet retain the advantage gained by making it. Yes, very; but a second sin will not mend the first. The promiser ought profoundly to repent of the cowardice and sin which caused him to commit the falsehood; he is not bound to repent of doing his duty to the commonwealth. But the shame and dishonor which unquestionably do attach to this shabby attitude of being caught between the dilemma of faithlessness to a promise and a worse sin of disloyalty to his country, should make every man think twice before he yields to fear or interest.

(d) The breaking of promises and pledges is more sinful than simple falsehood, especially after the valuable consideration is enjoyed; because it adds to the sin of untruth that of perfidy and injustice to a fellow-man. Here is the truth which misled Paley and others in deriving the obligation to truth simply from the implied promise.

A vow is a promise or pledge specially and formally made to God, and usually connected with some benefit for which we wish to thank Him, or some one we are seeking of Him. In the latter case it is virtually conditional (Gen. xxviii. 20).

The Bible is full of them, and since it also authorizes them and directs how to perform the duty, it must be an appropriate one. Modern Protestant religion presents a great contrast with Bible religion here. A vow is an act of religious worship, and of course must be performed only to the true God. It involves attributes on His part, and responsibilities on our part, which God alone can meet. All other religious vows are therefore idolatrous. In pledging ourselves to Him specifically we recognize His attributes of omniscience, omnipotence, holiness and benevolence as judges between us; so that vow-breaking is also profane. Vows should be: (a) not so frequent or arduous as to become entangling; (b) and never binding to acts of will worship; (Why?) (c) not of services or things trivial; (d) not of acts which God has not promised His enabling grace for; (e) of course not of things which are or may be sinful to do, not rash like Jephthah's.

Vows properly made on serious occasions and faithfully kept would result in these moral advantages: they would cultivate a peculiarly personal and practical sense of the real existence and nearness of God and of our relations to Him as our Father and God. It is literally doing business with God. Even prayer may be formal and empty.

The oath is a promise made to a fellow, the commonwealth or God, sealed by a distinct, deliberate appeal to the infinite attributes of God to act as umpire between the promiser and promisee, and as retributor in case of breach. It is a solemn act of worship. Hence, as our Savior teaches, only to be used in grave cases and when called for by God or the civil or ecclesiastical magistrate. The sin of perjury is the most enormous that can be committed against truth. It is a lie, a breach of promise, a shocking profanity near to blasphemy of God, and a sin against society little short of murder and treason. Civil governments apply oaths for this object, namely: to stimulate and bind citizens to the faithful performance of contracts and official duties and to truth in witness-bearing. Now, he who violates an oath of the former

species also violates contract. He who in witness-bearing swears falsely against the commonwealth or against his fellow-citizen outrages their rights to the full degree of wickedness possible in each case. Thus, is it the right to a large property, worth say \$100,000, which the commonwealth is adjudicating? Then the witness who swears falsely is endeavoring to steal all of the \$100,000, with the added wickedness of attempting to make Almighty God the accomplice of his villainy. Is the case an indictment for crime? Then the witness who swears falsely in favor of the guilty accused is doing what in him lies to defeat justice and to deprive society of all legal protection against crime. He who swears falsely against an innocent man tried for his life is endeavoring to murder his victim and make the Holy God accessory to his crime.

The sanctity of oaths is the final barrier which society has erected around all our rights and welfare. He who practices to weaken this barrier is setting at work tendencies toward universal wrong and wholesale destruction. Is any outlaw or murderer, then, a worse enemy of mankind than the perjurer? The supreme aggravation of his crime is the profane attempt to involve God in it. It is a sin so enormous that none but a practical atheist could commit it.

The prevalence of false swearing is shocking evidence of human depravity and of the perilously bad morals of our communities. Truth in witness-bearing is the highest and most crowning duty of veracity, especially when the oath is superinduced. Because it involves the rights and safety of the fellow-creature testified against. To refuse to bear witness against transgression when duly called to do so by the magistrate is a sin in itself. It takes the side of crime against order. Hence, all commonwealths properly claim the power to coerce witness-bearing, except in the case of husbands and wives and of a man against himself.

#### Lex Talionis.

The application of the *lex talionis* made by Moses against false witnesses was the most appropriate and equitable ever

invented. Whatever pain or penalty the false swearing would have brought on the innocent man maligned had the law followed the false witness unprotected, that penalty must be visited on the perjurer maligning him.

Let the student compare the admirable symmetry of Moses' provision with the bungling operation of our statute against perjury. He discriminates the different grades of guilt with exact justice. We punish the perjurer who swears away his neighbor's cow with imprisonment, and the perjurer who swears away his neighbor's honor and life, still with imprisonment.

## CHAPTER IX.

## RELIGION, OR DUTIES RELATING TO GOD.

## Our Moral Duties to God Grounded Immediately in His Being and Attributes.

Natural Theology, as it is the noblest and most sublime, is also the most important branch of Philosophy. Its rudiments are taught in this school in the proper place. I am able to present to you books treating that branch, so good and adequate that it would be surperfluous in me to detain you with my own discussion of it. This philosophy demonstrates beyond all doubt the existence of God, His creation of us and providence over us, with certain of His attributes showing Him to be a rational, personal and extra-mundane spirit, eternal, omniscient, almighty, true, benevolent and just.

## His Just Ownership.

In Chapter VII., section 3, I advance the self-evident statement, that absolute creation invests the maker with the most perfect of all titles to ownership. The rightfulness of our responsibility to God is also grounded upon His benefactions to us and the supreme excellence of His nature. He is best entitled to govern us because He is perfectly intelligent, wise and righteous. I will sum up this argument in a word by challenging the reflecting man to mention any consideration which proves the reasonableness of any rightful authority over us which does not support God's. Is it that of parents over their own children? God is our Heavenly Father. Or that of masters over their own servants? God owns us completely. Or that of superiors over inferiors? His superiority is immeasurable. Or that of magistrates over citizens? Human

rulers have no authority over us except as received by delegation from God.

**None the Less so Because Invisible.**

It is to be feared that multitudes permit themselves to forget this highest and clearest duty, because the authority is invisible and intangible. "He is high above, out of their sight." But when this pretext of their neglect is inspected, it is found utterly hollow. All men acknowledge the rightful authority of parents; well, these are sometimes very near to them, even in the same dwelling; but they often properly continue to govern from a great and invisible distance. But in the former case it is not the visible and tangible body of the parent to which the child's obedience properly attaches, but the rational spirit. And this is as invisible as God. If the parent became a hopeless maniac, obedience would no longer be due to him, although his person would be as visible as ever. It is the invisible rationality, which has flown, which carried the title to obedience. Again, the soldiers in a distant detachment, or the citizens of a remote province, are bound to obey the commanding general or the sovereign, a thousand miles distant, whom they never saw and never will see, whose existence and attributes are known to them only by rational evidence. We may be morally bound to reverence men long dead, who consequently now have only an incorporeal existence, and that in a distant world.

**Nearest to Us.**

How much more reasonably, then, are we bound to the Spiritual God, Who, though invisible, is always in contact with us by virtue of His ubiquity. Yet we see multitudes whose social characters are decent and who would highly resent a charge of deliberate recreancy to moral obligation, who deliberately neglect all duties to God, as much as though they were atheists. They unscrupulously violate the greater obligation, while they acknowledge the lesser. This practical atheism of the majority of Americans, children of a Christian

land, whose better knowledge of science, philosophy and revelation gives them so clear a proof of the being and rights of God, is made much more impressive by contrast with the pagan nations. They have far smaller means of knowing God, and are bound to Him by smaller benefits. Yet all pagans, of all ages and nations, except the most besotted savages, make conscience of their religious duties. To any of them, ancient or modern, Mohammedan or heathen, the ordinary procedure of the American "gentleman of the world" would appear shocking and monstrous. In these partially unenlightened nations, we have the testimony of man's rational instincts to the obligations of Natural Theology.

**Men's Common Neglect Proves Native Ungodliness.**

This extensive neglect of them among us, especially by persons who profess to regard moral obligation, proves the correctness of my statement in Book I., last chapter, that self-will towards God is as truly a fundamental disposition of man's nature as pleasure in applause or desire of happiness.

What are the duties indicated for men by natural theology, having God for their direct object? The answer should be very easy. God's rightful ownership of us entitles Him to our obedience. His will, therefore, should be our rule of action in all things. Since our obligation to Him is earliest and strongest of all, the desire to please and honor Him should always be our chief motive. This obedience should, therefore, be not only formal, but one of affection and principle.

**God's Perfections Entitle Him to Rule.**

The moral perfections of God, along with His attributes of omniscience, wisdom and power, entitle Him to our admiration and trust. Since we all transgress His will, the duty of sincere repentance follows as a necessary inference. That this repentance must prompt reformation, is too plain to need argument.

**Duties of Prayer and Praise Inferred.**

Our relations of dependence and benefactions ground the



duty of prayer, adoration and thanksgiving. These are implied in the very concept of religion, a relation binding us to God, and in the fundamental principles of our nature. A religion without worship on the part of the creature would be an example of that thorough paradox, a one-sided relation. While God held intercourse with man, man would hold no intercourse with Him. The creature's maintenance, under these arrogant circumstances, of proper sentiments towards his Maker, would be entirely incompatible with our natures as active beings. In us, the sentiment which has no expression is sooner or later extinguished. Thus Reason concurs with Revelation in the command, "Pray always."

#### Natural Theology Inadequate to Redemption.

The question is a famous one, whether Natural Theology contains, in itself sufficient means for man's true religious welfare. This resolves itself into these questions: First, whether it can answer the inquiry, "How shall man be just with God?" If the light of Natural Theology makes us certain of anything, it assures us of these two facts, that God is a righteous ruler, and that we are transgressors. Out of our transgressions, guilt must have emerged, enlarged by many aggravations. Does this ruler remit guilt? Or is his distributive justice as invariable as his own immutable nature? If he finally remits guilt to any, on what terms? To these questions human experience and reason give no answer. It has been argued that the various remedial processes provided by God in Nature for temporal ills disclose Him as compassionate, and that he who pities will also pardon. This argument is very infirm, both in its premises and conclusions. Pity in the judge often coexists with inexorable fidelity to the penal sanctions of the law. The most righteous and amiable human judges have been seen weeping while they pronounced the final sentence of death. Moreover, the inference from the natural alleviations of our penal evils here is fatally broken by the fact, that these reliefs are never more than temporary. In

spite of men's repentance and reformation, death comes at last; and conscience recognizes this as the supreme natural penalty. The last that we see of each mortal man, as he makes his exit from this world, shows him to us in the grasp of penal justice.

The other question is, Whence are the agencies to come for the healing of our subjective disorders of spirit?

In urging the gravity of this question, I do not dwell so much on the plain consideration, that a transgressor's efforts at self-reformation can scarcely be expected to succeed or to be sufficiently disinterested and energetic while this darkness and doubt still rests upon the question, whether "there is forgiveness with God that He may be feared" (with a pure and filial fear).

We must remember that conscious guilt has no tendency to remove self-love or to palliate these fears which enmity naturally excites in man's breast. These tend to drive the conscious breaker of law away from the offended but just law-giver.

But moral amendment absolutely demands that they shall meet together in amity and reconciliation. It is too much to expect of one already a sinner, that he shall approach with the affection of unfeigned love and submission that awful being whom his guilty conscience recognizes chiefly in the relation of avenger, however righteous the retribution may appear.

But there is a deeper obstacle. This is found in the disposition of soul towards self-will and the life of sense and carnality which I have recalled to the students' attention. To appreciate this difficulty, we must remember, first, what it is that constitutes a true moral reformation of the character and life. Let us read here the elevated and admirable discussion of Kant's "Critique of the Practical Reason," Book I., Part 1st, Chapter III. The moral reformation must be far deeper than a change of the outward conduct.

It must be the establishment in the free-agency of a spontaneous intelligent and hearty principle of moral duty; duty

to be done mainly for duty's sake, and not for the sake of advantage, either in this world or the next, a principle strong enough to dominate all forms of appetite and natural self-love. Any character short of this, though it may be formally moral, is still essentially evil. The adoption of such a new principle of life and fundamental moral reform issuing therefrom would be a thorough revolution. This revolution must be adopted freely by the soul's own preference; for were it only imposed upon it by a force from without, the reform would not be free, nor its own virtue. But can such a revolution in the very principle directing the stream of moral actions proceed from a will naturally and decisively determined in itself against this spiritual morality? Can the stream elevate itself above the level of its own fountain? In studying the law of free choice we found that every moral volition of an intelligent character must come from its own determining motive: How can a volition to turn permanently against sin find its determining motive in a character fundamentally disposed to sin? Kant admits that such a result is inconceivable for the human reason, while he yet very inconsistently says that it must be possible. This may be settled by a plain and practical argument. We saw in the doctrine of free-agency that while our volitions result from no efficient cause except our own subjective dispositions, they must have as their objective occasions some inducement. Man no more acts without an object than he would act without a subjective preference. We saw farther, that not any or every object is capable of becoming inducement to any agent, but only some species of objects. And it is the *a priori* subjective disposition which has already determined that some objects may be inducements to a given spirit, and that the opposite objects will not be, however present before its intelligence. Then, unless we can hope for effects to reverse their own causes, we cannot reasonably expect any objective thing to act as inducement to the mind to reverse its own disposition, when that disposition has already determined this object to be not an inducement, but a repel-

lant to the mind. Now we have seen that by the prevalent native disposition of men, duty to God for its own sake alone is not preferred, but disliked. The light of Natural Theology can do no more than present to the mind objects which, were the mind fundamentally moral, would attract it; but which naturally and in fact do not attract the immoral mind. What effective resource has Natural Theology, then, to work this moral revolution in which alone true reform and moral blessedness can originate?

**Ergo, Revelation Necessary.**

Whence, then, are the effectual remedies for guilt and immorality to come? Philosophy is silent; it has no answer. To ascertain the solution we must pass into the domain of Revelation, the inculcation of which is the function of the Christian Church. Here, then, our study must end. And this is the impressive proof of its inferiority to its elder and divine sister, Christianity, that Philosophy, after leading us up to the greatest and most urgent of all problems, and redisclosing to us our guilt and moral disease, is compelled to turn over the great question of the remedy to the recorded Word of God, and retire confessing her own weakness to heal and save. Has this long course of her training been therefore useless? No; it has trained our power of thought. It has shown us many truths which are valuable, though they may not claim the primal worth and infallible certainty of God's messages. And its best gift to us will be derived if we learn its closing lesson of humility and of reverence for the "more sure word of Prophecy."

**FINIS.**