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- ART. I.—1. *Cours de Littérature Française*. Par M. Villemain, Pair de France, Membre de l'Académie Française. Tableau de la littérature au Moyen Age, en France, en Italie, en Espagne, et en Angleterre. 3me édition. Paris, 1841. 2 tomes, 8vo.
2. *Allgemeine Geschichte der christlichen Religion und Kirche*. Von Dr. August Neander. Fünften Bandes Zweite Abtheilung. Hamburg, 1845.

THIS new volume of Neander gives us occasion to say a little about the school-divinity of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries; and in attempting this, we must premise that it will be impossible, without such an admixture of bad Latin with our English, as cannot fail to be annoying to those squeamish persons, who are troubled at ancient quotations. The truth is, every new science makes its own language, and the schoolmen made a Latinity which would have been to Varro or Cæsar what Scotch dialect is to us. We may, perhaps, be allowed to say a little on this point—the decay of Latinity—before proceeding to our principal topic.

Taking M. Villemain as our guide, then, we observe that the classic Latin was difficult, even for those who spoke it, and this gave rise to many treatises on grammar. When this language spread itself everywhere, with the conquests of

heaven and the new earth are not described as developed by a natural law, from the present system, but the idea seems to be excluded by the declaration, that the first heaven and the first earth pass away. The New Jerusalem, the future abode of the blessed, is represented as coming down from God, and of course is not formed out of the present material creation, but produced by the direct agency of the Creator. "For the former things are passed away. Behold I make all things new." When, then, the barriers of this stage of existence are to be passed by man, when the frontier of time is to be crossed, and the vast theatre of eternity with its solemn realities, is to be entered, that the whole process should be effected by a natural law (cause?) or that natural law should have any agency in the great work, such as making a body for the enfranchised soul, is to our minds an outrage upon common sense, and wholly at variance with the special teachings of Christianity as well as the whole tenor of the scriptures.

ART. III.—*The Elements of Morality, including Polity.* By William Whewell, D.D., Author of the *History and the Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences*. In two volumes. Harpers, New York. 1845.

WE do not think that this work will add much to Dr. Whewell's fame, and we greatly doubt whether it will "find its way to the next generation." In the preface he says, "The reader will perceive that this work is not described in the title as having Moral Philosophy for its object, but is entitled *Elements of Morality*. Morality and the Philosophy of Morality differ in the same manner, and in the same degree, as Geometry and the Philosophy of Geometry." From the few remarks of the author in regard to this distinction, we are led to infer that he has not a very clear conception of the objects and the province of philosophy, whether physical or moral. The questions with which the Philosophy of Geometry, according to his view, is concerned, belong rather to the philosophy of scholastic metaphysics; we are not therefore much surprised to find

in this connexion, the equally imperfect statement that the peculiar business of Moral Philosophy is "to inquire what is the nature and evidence of moral axioms, and what are the faculties by which we know them to be true," inquiries which belong quite as much to the domain of mental as of moral science.

The whole work is divided into six books; the 1st is devoted to Elementary notions and Definitions; the 2d to Rights and Obligations; the 3d to Morality; the 4th to Religion, Natural and Revealed; the 5th to Polity; the 6th to International Jus. Its contents are given in the form of a series of propositions, so that the work has very much of a geometrical look; but beyond the outward garb, we must confess that we are unable to discover in it that analogy to geometry, which the author fancies to exist. We have neither the clear definition, nor the lucid order, nor the close reasoning of that noble science.

In proof of this statement we might adduce numerous passages from the first book—of Elementary notions and Definitions. Dr. Whewell affects indeed, great exactness and precision; but unfortunately while labouring hard to be clear, he becomes obscure, partly from his attempting to explain what every person understands, and partly from an excessive fondness for coining new names, which is displayed in the work before us, and still more in his history of the Inductive Sciences. For instance, he rejects the term "principles of action," because it is used equivocally, and adopts instead of it, "springs of action," as if the latter term were not quite as equivocal in meaning as that for which it is substituted. Again, after a needlessly minute explanation of certain mental operations, he observes: "Of the processes which have been mentioned as belonging to the reason, some are also ascribed to the understanding, but not all. The Reason and the Understanding have not been steadily distinguished by English writers. The most simple way to use the substantive understanding in a definite sense, is to make it correspond in its extent with the verb understand. To understand any thing, is to apprehend it according to certain assumed ideas and rules; we do not include in the meaning of the word, an examination of the ground of the ideas and rules, by reference to which we understand the thing. We understand a language, when we apprehend what is said,

without reasoning about the etymology and syntax." Here surely is the proper place for a clear statement of the distinction—overlooked by most English writers—between the understanding and the reason, but no such statement is given by the author. From the remarks which he does make upon the subject, his readers would naturally infer that he uses the term reason very much in the sense of reasoning; we find, however, in other parts of this same chapter of definitions, occasional statements which show that a great deal more is included under the term, but, how much, we are left to guess. Thus he says, "the reason is employed both in understanding and in reasoning;" "our desires and actions are influenced by our knowledge, that is by our Reason;" "the Reason is the light of man's constitution, which reveals to him himself, and enables him to choose between different objects." Now it must be owned that these varying if not conflicting definitions do not come with a very good grace from one who affects to use mathematical exactness in his investigations of moral subjects. If we might hazard a conjecture, we should say that Mr. Whewell, when penning the paragraph first quoted, had his eye upon the modern German distinction between the understanding and the reason; but whether he has actually adopted it (so far as his English mind would admit of his comprehending it) is a point which we are quite unable to determine.

Pascal, in his fragment "De L'Esprit Geometrique," has an observation to this effect, "that there are some things which it is worse than useless to define, or to attempt to prove; Geometry does not attempt to define all the terms employed in its investigations, nor to prove all the truths with which it is conversant." If this had been kept in mind by Dr. Whewell, while preparing his chapter of elementary notions and definitions, this part of his work would have been very considerably abbreviated, and very much improved.

But we pass to that portion of the work in which the elements of Christian Morality are discussed and laid down. Here indeed we meet with many sentiments with which we cordially concur; but looking at the system as a whole, we must confess that we are utterly amazed to find such a scheme of Christian morals put forth by one who says in his preface, "I am desirous that the reader should understand that though

I do not speak of my work as a Philosophy of morality, I have tried to make it a work of rigorous reasoning, and therefore, so far at least, philosophical." Yet this system of Christian morals, rigorously reasoned out, embraces such topics as the following: Christian ordinances, consecrated places, funeral rites, Christian ministry; and under each of these heads, doctrines are asserted which no one but a prelatist will for a moment admit to be true. It seems rather out of place for the Moral Philosopher, as distinguished from the Theologian, to discuss such points as, the observance of Easter and Whitsunday, the consecration of churches, catholic tradition, the power of the church in matters ceremonial, liturgies, and prelacy; but we could easily forgive the philosopher who thus goes beyond his appropriate sphere, if he can only make good his pretensions, and furnish us with an argument rigorously reasoned out, whose conclusions therefore must forever settle those vexed questions of church-order and government, which have occasioned so much debate and division in the Christian world. Dr. Whewell might justly hope that his book would "find its way to the next generation," and to many succeeding ones, if for no other reason, at least for the sake of its theological achievements, effected by means of the application of geometrical reasoning to questions in morals.

If he does not mean, that all his statements on all the points before named rest upon the firm basis of "rigorous reasoning," we do not know what the import of his language is. His work consists of a series of propositions numbered from 1 to 1216, which he declares to be intimately and logically connected, as an analogous series of propositions in geometry, and among these, we find the peculiar tenets of prelacy respecting the constitution, government, and worship of the church. With most persons, we apprehend that the simple statement of this fact will be sufficient to fix the character and value of the work. But let us look a little more closely into this system of Christian morality which claims to bear the stamp of a rigorous logic, particularly that part of it which treats of Christian ordinances.

These, in addition to Baptism and the Lord's Supper, are said to be "the appointment of sacred times, as the Lord's day, and other Christian festivals; marriages and funerals may

be also looked upon as Christian ordinances ; oaths likewise, in a Christian community ; finally, the appointment of an order of men for religious instruction ; and the mode of admission into this order." These things may be called Christian ordinances, in a loose sense, and so may all the customs prevalent in the nominal Christian world, that is to say, they are ordinances observed by professing Christians ; but such is not the commonly understood meaning of the phrase. A Christian ordinance is an institution whose observance is binding upon Christians in virtue of a divine command made known in the divine word. Dr. Whewell virtually admits that no outward institution deserves to be regarded as a Christian ordinance, unless it be invested with divine authority ; but having made so many things ordinances, he very naturally, though unwarrantably observes that the will of God respecting them must be gathered from other sources than the word of God ; "the rules of Christian duty with regard to ordinances cannot be collected from scripture in the same manner as the precepts of Christian morality, hence we must collect the will of God respecting ordinances from other sources, viz. natural piety, early revelation, apostolic institution, and catholic tradition."

This is a strange sentence considered merely as an expression of the author's opinion, but stranger still, when we remember his pretensions on the score of reasoning. Dr. Whewell surely cannot be ignorant, that there are thousands of Christians who deny and utterly protest against his doctrine that the will of God respecting Christian ordinances is to be looked for not so much in his own word, as in catholic traditions. Yet he does not bring forward even the shadow of an argument to sustain his position. What light, we ask, is to be obtained from "natural piety," or any sources to which he says we must look respecting the forms of marriage, funerals, oaths, and ordination, or the observance of Easter and Whitsunday, and the like ? The decisions of the apostles on any of these points, we confess, would have great weight, if we only had them, but, where are they to be found ? Dr. Whewell, as usual, asserts what it is impossible to prove, that "Easter has been observed from the first." "Pentecost was adopted into the Christian church, and bears the name of Whitsunday." "Set forms of worship, or liturgies have been in use in the

Christian church from its origin;" all this is mere assumption. The learned Suicer* declares that all the festivals, which Dr. Whewell would have us believe are to be numbered among Christian ordinances, were introduced into the church, not by divine but by human authority, and among other testimonies, he quotes that of the historian Socrates, (Lib. v. cap. xxii.) who says expressly "there is no law either of the Saviour or his apostles, enjoining the observance of these days."

As to liturgies, Dr. Whewell does venture upon a show of reasoning, but it has much more show than substance. He states the considerations so often urged by the advocates of their exclusive use, that they secure decency in divine worship, and guard against heresy; considerations, however, which have been proved to be of no weight, by the experience of liturgical and of non-liturgical churches. But he adduces no evidence to show that "liturgies have been in use in the Christian church from its origin," and for the very good reason that no such evidence exists. Mr. Palmer,† the most eminent ritualist the church of England has produced for a hundred years, confesses that the public services of the primitive church were all performed *ex tempore*, or *memoriter*, and that not one office was reduced to writing till the 4th century.

Under the head of "Christian ministers," Dr. Whewell says, "it is an ancient requirement of the church that every minister must be ordained to a special local ministry. The priest was ordained as the pastor of a particular place." If he had said the bishops were ordained, &c. the statement would have been correct; but in the sense in which its terms are used by the author, it is as unfounded as those on which we have already commented. We have looked through the earliest collections of canons, and we have not been able to discover the least trace of any such requirement respecting priests. Blackstone‡ shows that no such law was known in England for many ages; "how ancient," says he, "the division of parishes is, may at present be difficult to ascertain, for it seems to be agreed on all hands, that in the early ages of Christianity in this land, parishes were unknown, or at least signified the

* Thes. Eccles. sub 'Εορτη.

† Origines Liturgicæ vol. i. 9-12.

‡ Commentaries vol. i. 3.

same that a diocese now does. Mr. Selden has clearly shown that the clergy lived in common without any division of parishes, long after the time mentioned by Camden" (A. D. 630). This account of the primitive ecclesiastical condition of England, by the great expounder of English law, exhibits a state of things which appears to us to be perfectly inexplicable on the supposition that prelacy was the original form of church government, at all events it proves that in England, Dr. Whewell's "ancient requirement" was unknown for centuries.

One of the most shocking things (at least to an American) connected with the Anglican church, is the sale of church livings. Dr. Whewell has a few words upon this topic, and comes to the conclusion that the sale of advowsons, next presentations, &c., is quite in accordance with sound Christian morals. He admits, indeed, that it "may appear to be at variance with the prohibition of the sale of spiritual offices. But this is not so. The right of private patronage implies rather a sacred aspect in property, than a secular aspect in the ministry." We venture to think that to any other than an English patron, or an English dignitary, such sales will wear no other aspect than that of an intolerable abomination.

As might be inferred from what has been already said, Dr. Whewell is a decided advocate of the union of church and state, though not in the sense in which that formula is used by such men as Dr. Chalmers. He has not a word to say respecting the supreme dominion of the Lord Jesus Christ, or the duty of nations favoured with the gospel to recognise the truth and the law of God, in a way consistent with the rights of conscience, and the spiritual independence of the church. What he pleads for is a magnificent establishment, a splendid hierarchy amply endowed, bishops clothed with civil power,—in a word, a church converted into the mere tool and slave of the state. In order to prevent "an ecclesiastical supremacy," in other words, the spiritual freedom of the church, "an established church must be placed under Royal Supremacy, or in some other way subjected to the sovereignty of the state. The sovereign, who is the head of the state, must also be the head of the church, so far as its government on earth is concerned. He must convoke and dissolve the legislative assemblies of the

church, as of the state. He must be the supreme judge of appeals.”—“Bishops must be connected with the state, and associated in the government. They must possess places in the executive or legislative councils; they must have the aid of the civil power in enforcing the sentences they pronounce as ecclesiastical judges; they must have maintenance and rank suitable to the place thus assigned them in the business of the state.” That is to say, things as they are in England, are just as they should be. We can make great allowance for one who, educated under such a system as that which obtains in England, simply pleads that it may be endured, that there is no imperative necessity for its removal; but we cannot listen with any degree of patience to the man who exhibits this system, with its notorious Erastianism, its enslavement of the church, its lay patronage, its sale of church livings—as one which is not only sanctioned by Christianity, but which should be adopted by every Christian nation.

With all the defects of Paley's Moral Philosophy—and these are very serious—the work before us does not deserve to be compared with it, either as an academic text-book, or as an exposition of morality for the use of the general reader. The very form which Dr. Whewell has adopted, Paley justly and strongly condemns. “It has,” says he, “become of late a fashion to deliver moral institutes in strings or scores of propositions, which, by crowding too fast upon the mind, gains not sufficient hold upon the attention.” Paley's views on various important principles of morality are radically unsound, but no one can be at a loss to know what he means. “No writer,” as Dr. Chalmers observes, “ever had less nonsense about him;” for clearness of vision, strong sense, the art of making abstract things plain, of condensing an argument, and bringing it down to the level of the common understanding, he is almost unrivalled. His work possesses undoubtedly great excellencies, but it also labours under radical defects; and when we think of the unsound principles which it inculcates, and some of the worst of these are adopted by Dr. Whewell, we cannot refrain from saying that its introduction into our colleges, and for many years its universal use as a text-book is much to be deplored.

The question has often occurred to us, of what use is this

whole class of books? What good purpose do they serve; or are they designed to serve? They relate, indeed, to one of the noblest branches of human knowledge—the science of man's duty; their authors are professedly expounders of morality, yet are we inclined to believe, that in the general mass of readers, it would be difficult to find a single person who has ever thought of taking up any one of our many systems of moral philosophy with the view to learn the nature and extent of his moral obligations, or to determine a particular question of duty. The truth is, that beyond the precincts of the college and the academy, these works are practically unknown, or to say the least, they are used by no one, except the speculative moralist. And even within our educational establishments, we fear that their use as text-books has been designed, not so much to fix in the minds of students the eternal principles of truth and justice; but rather to give a sort of moral colouring to the system of education. Doubtless there are exceptions, but in too many of our colleges, this branch of study has been deemed and treated as a purely intellectual one, or else the moral instruction imparted has amounted to nothing more than the dry, bald statement of particular virtues contained in the text-book, a statement producing no impression upon the student's heart, and perhaps forgotten almost as soon as learned. Hence, among the hundreds of young men who go forth every year from our academic halls, how few can be found who look back to the class-book of moral philosophy as to the place where they learned many of the most valuable and influential lessons of collegiate life. If any one who takes a just view of the nature of moral science, must admit, that we are entitled to look for rich results intellectual and moral, from the study of it by those who resort to our seats of learning; certainly, for far richer results than have been produced by that system of education of which it forms a component part. Whence this comparative failure of precious fruit? Shall we find the cause of it in the nature of the tree itself, or in the method of its cultivation? These inquiries appear to us to be worthy of deep consideration, and before we close our article we beg to say a few words on the subject to which they refer.

Dugald Stewart observes "that it is from the school of Grotius that most of our best writers on ethics have proceeded.

But in Britain, for more than a century, there have been two distinct schools, or we should rather say, two distinct methods of treating moral philosophy, viewed as one of the branches of an academic education. There is the Scottish school, of which Hutchinson was, in one sense, the founder, a school with which are associated some of Scotland's most illustrious names. But with all the fame acquired by Smith, Ferguson, Reid and others, rich as was the lustre which they shed for so many years upon the universities of their native land, a careful examination of their history will show, that as moral teachers, their labours were fruitless. They, no doubt, gave to Scottish intellect a mighty impulse in a direction in which it had never before travelled: they did much for the literature of Scotland, and for the cause of metaphysical philosophy; but when it was asked what moral fruit did they bring forth, we are compelled to answer, none at all. With all their eloquence, and many of these men possessed an uncommon share of it, the great lessons of morality were cold and unimpressively enforced; their aim appears to have been, not to make their students virtuous, not to educate and elevate their moral nature, but to teach them how to speculate about virtue, to sharpen their intellectual faculties by means of the investigation of those deep moral problems which, in all ages, have engaged the attention of thinking minds. Hence, in the Scottish universities, the Moral Philosophy class, has long been regarded as *the* class, not so much because of the moral lessons which were taught in it, but because of the eminent intellectual advantages with which it is associated.

We are not disposed to deny that the study of those ethical problems which moral philosophers have laboured so hard to solve, affords a fine field for the exercise of the mental powers, but as respects the cultivation of the heart, the improvement of the moral affections, we believe that their discussions, whether carried on in the professor's chair, or in the pulpit, is perfectly valueless. Take, for instance, Bishop Butler's sermons at the Rolls; who that reads them, can believe that the learned lawyers before whom they were preached, went away from their chapel, either with any newly awakened desires after virtue, or with conformed resolutions to strive after it. Sir James McIntosh tells us, that the chief result of his labours as

a moral philosopher, was the strengthening the basis on which Butler built his doctrine of the supremacy of conscience. Viewing the matter in a merely scientific light, we may admit the necessity for this, which McIntosh affirms to have existed: but looking at it as a practical doctrine, we very much doubt if there is one among the readers of the fine speculations of that eminent man, who has been impelled by them to listen to the voice of conscience with a deeper reverence than before.

In the English universities a very different method of conducting this branch of education has obtained. Practical ethics have been there most in vogue. The kind of ethics taught, as well as the manner of teaching, may be gathered from the work of Dr. Paley, who was an instructor in this department in the university of Cambridge for many years previous to the publication of his *Moral Philosophy*. As our collegiate system is of Anglican origin, the early and very general adoption of Paley's work as a text-book, is not surprising. Is this, however, the kind of morality which is desirable for our young men to carry with them from college? Even supposing that Paley's system were purged of all its unsound principles, is it reasonable to expect that, in the use of that or any similar text-book, all those intellectual and moral ends can be attained which should be proposed? In other words, may not a far higher and nobler use be made of *Moral Philosophy* in the business of collegiate education, than has been made of it in past years? Reform has become of late so much a cant word, that we are almost ashamed to use it, yet we cannot forbear saying, with reference to the question just proposed, that in our judgment there is great room for improvement in most of our colleges, if not in all of them. We believe that the study of *Moral Philosophy* if rightly conducted, and its true aim be kept steadily in view, could scarcely fail to imbue the student's mind with noble principles, to give a proper form and complexion to his character, and at the same time would be an admirable instrument for developing his powers of investigation, reasoning and judgment.

We have no desire that *Moral Philosophy* should be taught in our colleges after the fashion of the Smiths, the Reids, or the Stewarts, of Scotland. They made quite too much of its intellectual element. The history of Scottish Philosophy proves,

that where such a system of instruction prevails, there is great danger of its putting into the hands of the student, an intellectual power which he will almost inevitably abuse, because of the absence of its appropriate guardian—a sanctified heart. Still we believe that a method of study may be so framed, including a well proportioned combination of the speculative and the practical, or the mental and the moral, as to make it a most fit means of expanding, and educating the whole of the student's higher nature. Christian morality and Christian theology though closely connected, are not identical: no one can desire or expect the teacher of the former to do the work of a professor of divinity, but inasmuch as morality and the philosophy of it form an integral part of the collegiate curriculum, we do wish most earnestly, that this branch of knowledge shall be so taught, that our educated young men may carry with them from our seats of learning, not a few barren notions about virtue, but the true morality: that they shall be imbued not with the philosophy falsely so called, which begins with speculation and ends in scepticism; but the "true philosophy, baptised

In the pure fountain of eternal love."

This department of study affords the teacher many fine opportunities of bringing the grand verities of the Christian faith to bear upon the student's mind, of doing it in a very impressive way, and without awakening any prejudice; surely these opportunities ought not to be neglected.

In order to attain this end, the Moral Philosopher must be content to take for the basis of his system, the morality of the scriptures; his "elements" of morality, as distinguished from its philosophy, must be derived from the sure testimony of Him who made man what he is—who knows his frame—his whole nature, with all the circumstances of its condition, and who has revealed to him a perfect rule of action, in His holy word.

We look upon that portion of Dr. Whewell's work for example, in which he treats of natural morality, as in a great measure useless, at least in a text-book designed for the instruction of the young. To us it seems to be little better than a waste of time and labour, to analyze the moral nature of man,

for the purpose of deriving from that nature the laws by which it should be governed, or in other words, a natural morality, when we have a moral code resting upon divine authority, embracing every thing that pertains to practical ethics, pointing out as well the proper motive of action, as the proper rule. Favoured as we are with "the Law of the Lord which is perfect," what possible reason can we have for endeavouring to "determine what man's business is, or what conduct he is obliged to pursue, by inspecting his constitution, taking every part to pieces, examining their mutual relations one to the other, and the common effect or tendency of the whole." *

Such researches into the constitution of human nature were very proper in the schools of antiquity, destitute as they were of those lively oracles which we possess; but why should we take up their feeble lamp, after the Sun of Righteousness hath arisen upon us; why should we resort to the oracle of human nature, when a divine voice is heard declaring, in terms plain and peremptory, "what his business is, and what conduct he is obliged to pursue." Admitting that Moral Philosophy, by her researches into the nature of man, could learn what he should do, there is still one most essential element of true morality which she can neither discover nor teach, the *spirit* in which he should do it. The utmost that she can attain in the way of discovery, is a law; but more than this is needed, we want a power to render it operative.

The justness of this view of the subject is confirmed by a due consideration of the actual state of man as blinded and depraved by sin. In all his researches as a Moral Philosopher, he is at once the investigator, and the subject of investigation; how then can he be expected to make a complete and correct analysis of his own moral nature, unless in God's light he sees light! In fact, among all the systems of morality constructed in this way, we cannot call to mind one which is not positively erroneous, or materially defective. We do not remember to have seen in any one of them, for example, a just statement of what may be called "the law of faith;" by which we mean, to use the language of Cudworth, "not the mere believing of historical things upon inartificial arguments or tes-

* Ency. Brit. Art. Mor. Philos.

timonies only, but a certain higher and diviner power in the soul that peculiarly correspondeth with divinity." Dr. Whewell introduces this subject when he comes to treat of Christian ethics, and has many excellent observations respecting it; but there is not a word of it in his natural morality. We repeat it then, that the philosophy which aims to discover moral rules for the guidance of human conduct is, to say the least, useless, because we have a code of moral law established by divine authority, and therefore the very code that would result from a complete and perfectly accurate analysis of human nature, if we were able—which we are not—to make it. What then is the proper business of Moral Philosophy? We answer not to discover laws, but adaptations; not to find out rules of conduct, but to show the perfect fitness which exists between those moral laws which God has enacted, and that moral nature which he has given to man the subject of these laws. A nobler field of investigation is thus opened for the Moral Philosopher, and in the prosecution of his researches, he will find, especially if he is an instructor of youth, that there is ample room afforded for the exercise of all his intellectual powers, and that the stores of a varied learning will be called into requisition. The study of man in this point of view is as profitable as it is interesting; for if it be rightly prosecuted, the student will get at every step not only a clearer insight into the mysteries of his own being as God made it, and of that condition into which sin has brought it; but also fresh discoveries of the glory and the goodness of the great lawgiver, and of that immutable law whose essential elements are love, faith and justice; full scope will be afforded for bringing into use, the attainments of the student in every other branch of knowledge. To explain more clearly what we mean, take the divine law of property, "thou shalt not steal," and let us suppose that the youngest student of moral philosophy is required to solve the problems which this law suggests, or in other words, to show the necessary conditions of such an enactment, and their exact fulfillment in the nature of man and in the constitution of society; we ask whether such an exercise would not be productive to him of far greater advantage intellectual and moral, than to go over the rules of a dry and barren morality, or to study those metaphysico-moral problems which, even if solved, in

the present state of man, could produce no practicable good. It seems to us that any one who begins the study of the rights of property from the stand-point of the divine law will be compelled by the spirit of true philosophy to conclude, that the regeneration of society, or even the diminution of existing evils by means of the socialist scheme, in any of its forms is a simple impossibility, for that scheme is equally contrary to the law of God's moral government, and to the nature of man, who, whether we view him individually or socially is the subject of that law.

It would be needless to multiply illustrations. What has been already said, although by no means doing justice to the subject, which merits a full and thorough discussion, will at least suffice to show what we mean by the assertion, that Moral Philosophy considered as an instrument of intellectual and moral education, admits of a higher and better use than has commonly been made of it.

There is another branch of Moral Philosophy which deserves the attention of those who are called to teach the science; for want of a better name, we may call it comparative morality. By this we mean a comparison of the moral systems which obtained amongst the most enlightened nations of antiquity, with the perfect law of God, in two points of view, as systems of rules, and as systems of motives. The classical reader cannot but be deeply struck with particular sentiments in the moral writers of Greece and Rome, e. g. in Cicero *De Officiis* and *De Legibus*. But compare the most perfect body of moral rules with which they were acquainted, with the law of God, and how great the difference; how many virtues are omitted. But even supposing it to be complete as a code of moral laws, how destitute of power to enforce them. On the other hand how grand, how mighty the motives which the Christian moralist can employ. We need not point them out; we shall only observe, that while the study of comparative morality would bring the collegian's classic stores into requisition, it would afford his teacher an admirable opportunity of inculcating some of the most distinctive and important truths of the Gospel.