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# WAR: ITS CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES AND CURE

# KIRBY PAGE

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ITS CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES
AND CURE

BY

# KIRBY PAGE

Author of "THE SWORD OR THE CROSS," etc. Editor, "CHRISTIANITY AND ECONOMIC PROBLEMS"

WITH AN INTRODUCTION BY
HARRY EMERSON FOSDICK



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WAR

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# INTRODUCTION

#### By HARRY EMERSON FOSDICK

Mr. Page has written for us one of the most challenging books that has appeared for many a year. Whether the reader agree with all his opinions or not, there is no better opportunity than this book affords for the Christians of America to face squarely the most crucial social issue of our day. Even though a man were to differ violently with Mr. Page, he would better read this book. He will find here a way of thinking that is disturbing the conscience and challenging the devotion of many of the best characters in the younger generation.

This warm commendation does not mean that I myself agree with everything that Mr. Page says. Entire agreement of that kind is rare, even when a man reads again books which he himself has written, much more rare when one independent mind reads what another has written. I probably should qualify, more than Mr. Page

would, the absolutist pledge to which in his last chapter he calls the churches. But this I do see clearly: that war is the most colossal and ruinous social sin that afflicts mankind today; that it is utterly and irremediably unchristian; that however armed conflict in times past may have served an evolutionary purpose it has now become not only futile but suicidal, and that recognition of this fact is necessary to the continuance of civilization; that the war system means everything which Jesus did not mean and means nothing that he did mean; and that it is a more blatant denial of every Christian doctrine about God and man than all the theoretical atheists on earth ever could devise. What I do see is that the quarrels between fundamentalists and liberals, high churchmen, broad churchmen, and low churchmen, are tithing, mint, anise, and cummin if the church does not deal with this supreme moral issue of our time: Christ against war.

For myself, while I recognize as more weighty than Mr. Page feels it to be, the difference between calling war wicked, futile, unchristian and unnecessary, and saying that on the stroke of the clock any nation can forthwith close its war office, scrap its army and navy, and at once adopt an absolutely pacifist policy, I must say that the more I consider war, its sources, methods, and results, its debasing welter of lies and brutality, its unspeakable horror while it is here and its utter futility in the end to achieve any good thing that mankind could wish, the more difficult I find it to imagine any situation in which I shall feel justified in sanctioning or participating in another war.

When the Great War broke, the churches were unprepared to take a well-considered Christian attitude. We, too, had been hypnotized by nationalism, had taken patriotism at its current values and had understood it in its ordinary meanings. We, too, had regarded as a sacred duty the loyal support of the country's army and navy in almost any task to which the government might put them. We, too, vaguely looking forward to a warless world, sometime, somewhere, nevertheless had looked on war as an easily imaginable, highly probable necessity of national action. In a word, behind the thin disguise of pious hopes for a day of peace and brotherhood, we had shared those ordinary social attitudes

which made war seem at times an imperious call to duty, a summons to self-sacrifice, a solemn challenge to devotion and, if need be, martyrdom.

When, therefore, the War broke and the nations, acting on the old premises, did the inevitable thing which the old premises involved, we found ourselves, as Christians, powerless to lift effective protest against the oncoming perdition. We had made ourselves part and parcel of social attitudes, from whose inevitable consequence we felt it immoral to withdraw. We had consented to the necessity of war and the righteousness of war too long to be conscience-clear in refusing to bear the brunt of it when it came.

For my part, I never will be caught that way again. I hope the churches never will be caught that way. If, however, when the next crisis comes, we are going to protest effectively against war, we must win the right to make that protest and we must win it now. Today we must make unmistakably clear our position against war, against competitive preparation for war, against reliance on war. We must make clear our certain conviction that, save for our corporate senselessness, war in the modern world is as needless as

it is suicidal, that only the folly and selfishness of diplomats and the stupid willingness of the people to be led like beasts to the shambles, make it seem necessary. Against foolish chauvinism, competitive armaments, secret diplomacy, imperialistic experiments, against endeavors to play lone hands, when, by cooperation, international agencies could be set up to solve the problems which war never solves but only makes the worse, we now must lift our protest and launch our crusade.

When, then, a new war threatens, sprung from insensate refusal to substitute reason for violence, we can wash our hands of complicity in the foul business. We can tell the diplomats who lead us to it that we will not follow them. We can refuse to hold our consciences at the beck and call of any government that happens to be in the saddle. We can put Christ above Caesar and dare Caesar to do his worst to us while we follow Christ.

For my part I propose to win the right to do that. I hope that the outlawry of war and the substitution of law for violence may make it unnecessary to do that. I hope that, by facing the

issue now, we may save civilization from the death-shock of another convulsion of brutal carnage. But at any rate, I never expect to bless another war.

Let a man read this book with an independent mind. No one would wish that more than Mr. Page himself. But let him not dodge its challenge. Mr. Page is engaged here in the high business of taking Jesus in earnest, and a more necessary Christian procedure just now it is impossible to imagine.

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WAR: ITS CAUSES,
CONSEQUENCES AND CURE

#### CHAPTER I

# WHY WAS THE WORLD WAR FOUGHT?

The ideal aims of the Allies in the World War were clearly proclaimed by President Wilson in his reply to the peace proposals of the Pope, in these memorable words:

"The object of this war is to deliver the free peoples of the world from the menace and actual power of a vast military establishment controlled by an irresponsible Government which, having secretly planned to dominate the world, proceeded to carry the plan out without regard either to the sacred obligations of treaty or the long-established practices and long-cherished principles of international action and honor; which chose its own time for the war; delivered its blow fiercely and suddenly; stopped at no barrier, either of law or of mercy; swept a whole continent within the tide of blood."

The Treaty of Versailles contains a section in which Germany is compelled to acknowledge sole responsibility for the war. On March 3, 1921, Mr. Lloyd George said: "For the Allies, German responsibility for the war is fundamental. It is the basis upon which the structure of the Treaty of Versailles has been erected, and if that acknowledgement is repudiated or abandoned, the Treaty is destroyed."

This idea of the sole guilt of Germany was throughout the war almost universally accepted in Allied countries. The war was regarded as a conflict between barbarism and civilization, between darkness and light, between wrong and right. The faults of the Allied nations were ignored or forgotten; those of Germany were emphasized in every conceivable way. To express even the slightest doubt as to the exclusive guilt of Germany was considered highly unpatriotic.

Multitudes of people still believe that Germany was solely responsible for the war. Other millions are unalterably convinced of the guilt of Germany, however many doubts they may have

concerning the question as to whether she alone was guilty. It is in this latter group that the present writer finds himself. The evidence of the guilt of the German leaders seems to be so complete and has been cited so frequently that it is assumed throughout this discussion.

It would, of course, be foolish to believe all the reports against the Germans which were circulated during the war. Many of the worst of these are now known to have been without foundation. In this connection ex-Premier Nitti of Italy says: "All the world believed for a time that the habitual exercise of the Germans in Belgium was to cut off the hands of babies. There was no truth in the story, and there are no more handless babies in Belgium than there are in England or in Germany. The news was false, but the most reputable papers published it; telegraphic agencies spread it broadcast, and thus nourished the mistrust of the world. . . . Lloyd George . . . sent me word that he had not been able to trace a single case of a child's hands having been cut off, in all Belgium. In spite of this,

the stupid and wicked lie continues to be spread about!"1

But after due allowance has been made for gross exaggeration and false propaganda, sufficient evidence remains to make impossible any doubt as to the guilt of the Germans. To say, as does a recent writer, that "the German Government's share of guilt in the matter is extremely small" is to ignore the facts in the case.

It is one thing to say that Germany is guilty, it is quite another thing to say that she alone is guilty. Concerning this latter point we can secure light from numerous quarters. What were the leaders of the Allied nations saying and doing during the decades prior to the outbreak of the war? What were these spokesmen secretly saying and doing during the war? What were they secretly saying and doing during the Peace Conference? What confessions have they made during recent months? To what extent do their private words and deeds agree with their public statements? Was there a serious discrepancy between the actual purposes of the Allied leaders

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> "The Decadence of Europe," p. 138, XXVIII.

and the motives of the rank and file of people who supported the war in these lands?

Recent diplomatic disclosures have shed light upon these questions. Numerous Belgian secret papers were published during the German occu-After the downfall of the old Russian pation. Government, the Bolsheviks exposed to public gaze a number of secret treaties and hundreds of diplomatic documents. Following the overthrow of the old Governments in Germany and in Austria, numerous important disclosures were made. Unfortunately, the full facts contained in the archives of Paris, London and Rome are not yet available. Numerous Allied leaders have, however, recently published memoirs which contain important new material. From the sources now available we are in a much better position to determine whether or not the Allied Governments must assume heavy responsibility for the war, or whether Germany alone was guilty.

President Poincaré and Mr. Asquith have recently published volumes dealing with the origin of the war. They present an abundance of evidence to substantiate their contention that the

German leaders cannot be relieved of very heavy responsibility for starting the war. These two books have intensified the widespread belief in Allied countries that Germany alone was guilty.

A careful analysis of these books, however, reveals conspicuous omissions. They deal at great length with the guilt of the Germans, and they are able to draw up a very heavy indictment. But both President Poincaré and Mr. Asquith ignore entirely or pass over lightly the guilt of their own countries. President Poincaré goes so far as to say: "However far back one may go in the policy that France has followed since 1870, however closely one may follow it down to the month of August, 1914, there will be found nothing, absolutely nothing, that—I will not say that would enable one to incriminate France—would justify one in reproaching her with even an involuntary fault."

Mr. Asquith reproduces a quotation from a speech which he delivered in the House of Commons in August, 1914: "If I am asked what we are fighting for, I can reply in two sentences. In

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Raymond Poincaré, "The Origins of the War," p. 75.

the first place, we are fighting to fulfil a solemn international obligation . . . secondly, we are fighting to vindicate the principle that small nationalities are not to be crushed, in defiance of international good faith, by the arbitrary will of a strong and overmastering Power." Mr. Asquith then says: "That was the British casus belli."

It would, however, be superficial indeed to say that these eminent pleaders have told the whole story as to why the war was fought. They have framed a tremendous indictment of Germany but have shed almost no light upon the question as to whether the Allied leaders must assume a share of responsibility for starting the war. If we desire to discover the whole truth, we must go beyond what these men have written and explore such realms as:

- (1) Economic Imperialism, (2) Militarism,
- (3) Alliances, (4) Secret Diplomacy, (5) Fear.
- (1) Economic Imperialism

In one of his addresses before the Institute of Politics at Williamstown, Professor Viallate, a

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Herbert Henry Asquith, "The Genesis of the War," p. 315.

leading Italian economist, said: "The Congress of Berlin (1878) closed a chapter of European history. From that date the relations between European nations were less affected by questions arising in Europe itself than by the struggle carried on outside of Europe for the possession of colonies and markets. It was no longer on the Rhine or the Danube, but in Tunis, in Egypt, in Nigeria, in Manchuria, that European chancelleries found the center of gravity of their diplomacy."

During the next thirty-five years all the major European powers were engaged in a bitter rivalry for colonies, spheres of influence, raw materials, markets and trade routes. Almost the entire African continent and large territories in Asia and the various islands were partitioned between them.

In 1875 only a small fraction of the total area of Africa was controlled by European powers. But the policy of partitioning was carried out at such a rapid rate that by 1912 only two small areas were still under native control. The follow-

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Achille Viallate, "Economic Imperialism and International Relations During the Last Fifty Years," p. 19

ing table shows which of the nations were most successful in this scramble for new territory:

|                      |              | Total Area in |
|----------------------|--------------|---------------|
|                      | Square Miles | Square Miles  |
| BRITISH AFRICA       |              | 3,701,411     |
| Cape Colony          | 276,995      |               |
| Natal and Zululand.  | 35,371       |               |
| Basutoland           | 10,293       |               |
| Bechuanaland         | 225,000      |               |
| Transvaal and Swa-   | •            |               |
| ziland               | 117,732      |               |
| Orange River Colony  | 50,392       |               |
| Rhodesia             | 450,000      |               |
| Nyasoland            | 43,608       |               |
| British East Africa. | 240,000      |               |
| Uganda               | 125,000      |               |
| Zanzibar             | 1,020        |               |
| Somaliland           | 68,000       |               |
| Northern Nigeria     | 258,000      |               |
| Southern Nigeria     | 80,000       |               |
| Gold Coast           | 82,000       |               |
| Sierre Leone         | 34,000       |               |
| Gambia               | 4,000        |               |
| Egypt and Sudan      | 1,600,000    |               |
| French Africa        |              | 4,086,950     |
| Algeria and Sahara.  | 945,000      |               |
| Tunisia              | 51,000       |               |
| Senegal              | 74,000       |               |
| French Guinea        | 107,000      |               |
| Ivory Coast          | 129,000      |               |
|                      | 2,00,000     |               |

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> "Encyclopedia Britannica," Vol. I, p. 351.

|                     | ~ ~~                      | Total Area in                           |
|---------------------|---------------------------|---|
|                     | Square Miles              | Square Miles                            |
| Dahomey             | 40,000                    |   |
| Upper Senegal and   |                           |   |
| Niger               | 1,581,000                 |   |
| French Congo        | 700,000                   |   |
| French Somaliland.  | 12,000                    |   |
| Madagascar          | 227,950                   |   |
| Morocco             | 220,000                   |   |
| GERMAN AFRICA       | • • • • • • • • • • • • • | 910,150                                 |
| East Africa         | 364,000                   | •                                       |
| Southwest Africa    | 322,450                   |   |
| Cameroon            | 190,000                   |   |
| Togoland            | 33,700                    |   |
| Belgian Africa      |                           | 900,000                                 |
| Congo State         | 900,000                   | ,                                       |
| PORTUGUESE AFRICA.  | · ·                       | 787,500                                 |
| Guinea              | 14,000                    | , |
| West Africa         | 480,000                   |   |
| East Africa         | 293,500                   |   |
| ITALIAN AFRICA      |                           | 600,000                                 |
| Tripoli             | 400,000                   | ,,,,,                                   |
| Eritrea             | 60,000                    |   |
| Italian Somaliland  | 140,000                   |   |
| SPANISH AFRICA      |                           | <b>§79,800</b>                          |
| Rio de Oro          | 70,000                    | ia. 0,000                               |
| Muni River Settle-  | •0,000                    |   |
| ment                | 9,800                     |   |
| INDEPENDENT STATES. | · ·                       | 393,000                                 |
| Liberia             | 43,000                    | 333,000                                 |
|                     | 350,000                   |   |
| Abyssinia           | 000,000                   |   |
|                     |                           | 11,458,811                              |
|                     |                           | 11,100,011                              |

The rivalry between the European powers for additional territory extended beyond the continent of Africa. Enormous territories in Asia were also acquired, as may be seen from the following table which shows the political control of Asia at the end of the first decade of the twentieth century:

|                               | Square Miles |
|-------------------------------|--------------|
| Russian                       | 6,495,970    |
| Chinese                       | 4,299,600    |
| British                       | 1,998,220    |
| Turkish                       | 681,980      |
| Dutch                         | 586,980      |
| French                        | 247,580      |
| Japanese                      | 161,110      |
| United States                 | 114,370      |
| German                        | 193          |
| Other independent territories | 2,232,270    |
|                               | 16,818,273   |

For three-quarters of a century the great powers of Europe have been contending against each other for concessions and spheres of influence in China. The story of their success has

<sup>&</sup>quot;Encyclopedia Britannica," Vol. II, p. 741.

been told by Professor W. W. Willoughby in a volume of 594 pages, entitled "Foreign Rights and Interests in China." A summary of the rights which have been seized by these foreign powers—many of them as a result of war, many others by threats of war, and still others by trickery—includes extra-territoriality, treaty ports, spheres of influence, mining concessions, control of railways, control of maritime customs and the salt tax, war zones, the right of stationing large bodies of foreign troops under foreign command on Chinese soil, etc.

The share of each of the foreign powers in this spoilation of China is indicated below:

Great Britain: Hongkong, Burma, Sikkim, Weihaiwei, spheres of influence in the Yangtsze valley, Szechuan and Tibet.

Russia: Amur region of Manchuria, Western Ili in Chinese Turkestan, Port Arthur, Dairen, spheres of influence in Manchuria and Mongolia.

Germany: Kiaochow, Tsingtao, sphere of influence in Shantung.

France: Annam, Tongking, Kuanchowwan,

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> See also M. J. Bau, "The Foreign Relations of China."

spheres of influence in Kwangtung, Kwangsi, and Yunnan.

Japan: Korea, Formosa, Liuchiu Islands, the Pescadores, Port Arthur and Dairen taken from Russia, spheres of influence in Fukien, Shantung and other parts of China.

Concerning the significance of this economic rivalry, Professor Carlton J. Hayes, of Columbia University, says: "Any one who is at all familiar with the 'arenas of friction' in Egypt, in China, in Siam, in the Sudan, in Morocco, in Persia, in the Ottoman Empire, and in the Balkans would be in possession of a valuable clew to a significant cause of every war of the twentieth century, particularly to the chief cause of the Great War."

# (2) Militarism

The full significance of the economic rivalry between the European powers cannot be understood apart from a realization of the extent to which all of them relied upon armies and navies

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> "A Brief History of the Great War," p. 2.

in seeking to gain a desired end. War was an accepted institution and military force or threats of military force were the usual means of obtaining desired territory. It was no accident that the era of colonial expansion which began in the eighties was coincident with the era of enormously increased expenditures for armaments. All the major powers were constantly preparing for war and most of them were engaged intermittently in warfare.

The Bankers Trust Company of New York City has recently issued an elaborate analysis of the war expenditures of the various countries. This report points out that "during the four decades which elapsed between the Franco-Prussian war and the great war, the nations of Europe expended forty and a half billion dollars, gold, upon their military and naval establishments;—an average of ten billion dollars a decade, a billion a year." The following table is taken from this book:

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> "French Public Finance," by Harvey E. Fisk, issued by the Bankers Trust Company, 1922.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid., p. 1.

THE COST OF THE "ARMED PEACE" TO THE LARGER EUROPEAN NATIONS, 1873–1913
(In dollars—000,000 omitted)

|                    | c Total     | Army     | Navy     |  |  |
|--------------------|-------------|----------|----------|--|--|
|                    | Armed Peace | Expenses | Expenses |  |  |
| 1. France          | \$ 8,568    | \$ 6,105 | \$ 2,463 |  |  |
| 2. Great Britain*. | 8,401       | 4,373    | 4,028    |  |  |
| 3. Russia†         | 7,581       | 6,150    | 1,431    |  |  |
| 4. Germany         | 7,434       | 5,782    | 1,652    |  |  |
| 5. Italy           | 3,010       | 2,163    | 847      |  |  |
| 6. Austria-Hungary | 2,774       | 2,478    | 296      |  |  |
| Total—41 years     | \$37,768    | \$27,051 | \$10,717 |  |  |

<sup>\*</sup> Deducting the cost of the Boer War, \$1368 millions.

That is to say, during these forty-one years France, Great Britain and Russia each spent more upon its army and navy than did Germany, while in amounts expended upon the army alone Germany ranked third. In naval expenditures Germany also ranked third.

The following table shows the expenditures for armaments by the major powers during the years from 1900 to 1913:<sup>1</sup>

<sup>†</sup> Deducting the cost of the war with Japan, \$1333 millions.

<sup>&</sup>quot;Fortnightly Review," April 1, 1913, pp. 654, 655. The figures for 1913 are taken from "The Problem of Armaments," by Arthur Guy Enoch, p. 186, with the exception of Austria-Hungary which are listed as in 1912.

|                             | W              | A    | $\mathbf{R}$ | : ]  | IT    | S    | C     | A     | U     | SE   | S     | A     | N     | D     | (     | CU    | RE                 |
|-----------------------------|----------------|------|--------------|------|-------|------|-------|-------|-------|------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|--------------------|
|                             | France         | Navy | 14.9         | 13.8 | 13.1  | 12.2 | 11.7  | 12.7  | 12.3  | 12.6 | 13.2  | 13.9  | 15.0  | 16.7  | 16.9  | 18.4  | 196.4              |
|                             | Fra            | Army | 6.98         | 98.9 | 20.3  | 28.8 | 8.9%  | 30.3  | 34.7  | 32.9 | 33.4  | 34.8  | 34.9  | 35.9  | 36.8  | 50.4  | 464.0              |
| ling                        | <i>sritain</i> | Navy | 20.5         | 31.0 | 31.2  | 35.5 | 36.8  | 33.3  | 31.4  | 31.1 | 32.2  | 35.8  | 40.4  | 42.9  | 44.1  | 44.3  | 499.5              |
| unds Ster                   | Great I        |      |              |      | 69.4* |      |       |       |       |      |       |       |       |       |       | 0.8%  | 568.1              |
| Millions of Pounds Sterling | ıssia          | Navy | 9.6          | 10.0 | 10.8  | 12.3 | 12.2  | 12.6  | 11.2  | 9.5  | 9.4   | 9.8   | 12.2  | 11.9  | 17.7  | 24.2  | 173.4              |
| Millia                      | Rus            | Army | 35.8         | 36.1 | 37.1  | 37.9 | 40.2  | 40.8  | 40.5  | 43.8 | 45.9  | 52.5  | 52.3  | 52.4  | 53.4  | 68.1  | 636.8              |
|                             | any            | Navy | 7.9          | 9.7  | 10.3  | 10.6 | 10.3  | 11.6  | 12.2  | 14.5 | 16.9  | 20.5  | 21.3  | 22.5  | 23.1  | 23.0  | 214.4              |
|                             | Germany        | Army | 32.8         | 33.9 | 33.5  | 33.0 | 32.3  | 34.9  | 37.6  | 40.3 | 41.4  | 43.4  | 42.6  | 40.4  | 47.4  | 58.0  | 551.5              |
|                             |                |      | •            | •    | •     | •    | •     | •     | •     | •    |       | •     | •     | •     | •     | •     | to 1913            |
|                             |                |      | •            | •    | •     | •    | •     | •     | •     | •    | •     | •     | •     | •     | •     | •     | Total 1900 to 1913 |
|                             |                |      | 1900         | 1901 | 1902  | 1903 | 1904. | 1905. | 1906. | 1907 | 1908. | 1909. | 1910. | 1911. | 1912. | 1913. | Tota               |

[30]

\* South African War.

# WHY WAS THE WAR FOUGHT? Nava 118.84 118.85 11.15 12.15 13.05 14.05 15.05 16.05 47my 21.0 24.0 25.0 26.0 27.0 28.0 29.0 20.0 20.0 20.0 20.0 20.0 20.0 20.0 20.0 20.0 804886607777999 2408867777999 88.3 47my 9.99 9.99 9.99 110.3 117.9 117. tustria-Hungar 282.5 Total 1900 to 1913 1900. 1901. 1902. 1904. 1905. 1908. 1910. 1912.

During these fourteen years the rank of the four major European powers in total expenditures for armaments was as follows:

|    |               | Millions  |
|----|---------------|-----------|
|    |               | of Pounds |
|    |               | Sterling  |
| 1. | Great Britain | 889.6*    |
| 2. | Russia        | 810.2     |
| 3. | Germany       | 765.9     |
|    | France        | 660.4     |

<sup>\*</sup> Not including 178 millions of extraordinary expenses because of the Boer War. The above figure includes an average of 28 millions for 1900–1903.

Not only were the nations heavily armed, they were constantly thinking and talking in terms of war. The whole world is now familiar with the arrogant war talk and rattling of the sword by the Prussian military leaders. It is not necessary to produce further evidence on this point. They were not alone in this practice, however. Lord Fisher, First Sea Lord of the British Admiralty, was accustomed to express himself freely. In 1910 he said: "If I am in command when war breaks out I shall issue as my orders: The essence of war is violence. Moderation in war is imbecility. Hit first, hit hard, and hit anywhere."

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> "Review of Reviews," February, 1910.

In his Memoirs published since the war, Lord Fisher records a suggestion which he made to the King: "Even in 1908 Germany only had four submarines. At that time, in the above letter I wrote to King Edward, I approached His Majesty, and quoted certain apposite sayings of Mr. Pitt about dealing with the probable enemy before he got too strong. It is admitted that it was not quite a gentlemanly sort of thing for Nelson to go and destroy the Danish Fleet at Copenhagen without notice, but 'la raison du plus fort est toujours la meilleure.' Therefore, in view of the known steadfast German purpose, as always unmitigatedly set forth by the German High Authority that it was Germany's set intention to make even England's mighty Navy hesitate at sea, it seemed to me simply a sagacious act on England's part to seize the German Fleet when it was so very easy of accomplishment in the manner I sketched out to His Majesty, and probably without bloodshed."1

Lord Fisher also quotes a letter which he wrote to Lord Esher on April 25, 1912: "Perhaps I

<sup>&</sup>quot;Memories and Records," by Admiral of the Fleet Lord Fisher, Vol. I, pp. 34, 35.

went a little too far when I said (at The Hague Conference of 1899) I would boil the prisoners in oil and murder the innocent in cold blood, etc., etc. . . . but it's quite silly not to make war damnable to the whole mass of your enemy's population. . . . When war does come 'Might is Right!' and the Admiralty will know what to do! Nevertheless, it is a most serious drawback not making public to the world beforehand what we mean by war."

In a letter to a friend written on April 20, 1904, Lord Fisher said: "And then, my dear friend, you have the astounding audacity to say to me, 'I presume you only think they (the submarines) can act on the defensive! Why, my dear fellow, not take the offensive? Good Lord! If our Admiral is worth his salt, he will tow his submarines at 18 knots speed and put them into the hostile port (like ferrets after the rabbits!) before war is officially declared, just as the Japanese acted before the Russian naval officers knew that war was declared!"

<sup>&</sup>quot;"Memories and Records," by Admiral of the Fleet Lord Fisher, Vol. I, pp. 209, 210.

2 Ibid., Vol. II, p. 171.

In a famous address at Manchester in 1912, Lord Roberts, a former Commander-in-Chief of the British Army, warned his hearers that "Germany strikes when Germany's hour has struck. . . . And, gentlemen, it is an excellent policy. It is, or should be, the policy of every nation prepared to play a great part in history (cheers). . . . For how was this Empire of Britain founded? War founded this Empirewar and conquest! When we, therefore, masters by war of one-third of the habitable globe, when we propose to Germany to disarm, to curtail her navy or diminish her army, Germany naturally refuses; and, pointing, not without justice, to the road by which England, sword in hand, has climbed to her unmatched eminence, declares openly, or in the veiled language of diplomacy, that by the same path, if by no other, Germany is determined also to ascend! Who amongst us, knowing the past of this nation, and the past of all nations and cities that have ever added the lustre of their name to human annals, can accuse Germany or regard the utterance of one of her greatest chancellors a year and a half ago, or of

General Bernhardi three months ago, with any feelings except those of respect?"

On February 2, 1905, in a speech delivered at Eastleigh, Mr. Arthur Lee, Civil Lord of the British Admiralty, said: "If war should unhappily be declared, under existing conditions, the British Navy would get its blow in first, before the other side had time even to read in the papers that war had been declared."<sup>2</sup>

For many years Colonel J. F. C. Fuller, D. S. O., of the British Army, has been writing books on war. Recently he won the Gold Medal of the Royal United Service Institution with an essay on the warfare of the future. In 1923 he published a volume of 287 pages, entitled "The Reformation of War," in which he says: "To anathematize war is to gibber like a fool, and to declare it unreasonable is to twaddle like a pedant. . . . Without war there would be no driving out of the money-lenders from the temple of human existence. Without it, customs, interests and prejudices would rot and putrefy,

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> "Lord Roberts' Message to the Nation," pp. 8, 9. <sup>2</sup> Quoted by E. D. Morel, "Diplomacy Revealed," p. 31.

and mankind would be slowly asphyxiated by the stench of its own corruption. . . . The present implements of war must be scrapped and these bloody tools must be replaced by weapons the moral effect of which is so terrific that a nation attacked by them will lose its mental balance and will compel the government to accept the hostile policy without further demur. . . . War is a great physician, a great medicine, a great purge. . . . The nation which depends for the security of its honour on some international police force has become but a kept-woman among nations. . . . If honour be worth safeguarding, war sooner or later becomes inevitable, for, in this world, there are always to be found dishonourable men, and if war does not range a nation against these, then must vice live triumphant."1

France also had her militarists and jingo press. The very titles of the books of Colonel Arthur Boucher, one of the most popular military writers in France, are significant: "Germany in Peril," "The Offensive Against Germany," "France Victorious in the War of Tomorrow." In 1913

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Ibid., pp. 14, 30, 41, 64, 282.

a French writer, Commandant de Civrieux, published a volume entitled, "Germany Encircled."

Concerning the French policy, the Russian Ambassador Benckendorff said: "When I recall Cambon's conversations with me, the words exchanged, and add the attitude of Poincaré, the thought comes to me as a conviction that of all the Powers France is the only one which, not to say that it wishes war, would yet look upon it without great regret."

On January 16, 1914, the Belgian Minister in Paris wrote to the Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs, as follows: "I have already had the honour to mention that it was Messrs. Poincaré, Delcassé, Millerand, and their friends who have created and pursued that policy of nationalism, flag-wagging, and jingoism, whose revival we have been observing. It is a danger to Europe—and to Belgium. I see in it the greatest peril that threatens the peace of Europe today. Not that I have any right to suppose that the French Government is disposed deliberately to disturb the peace—I am inclined to the opposite belief

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Quoted in Judge Frederick Bausman, "Let France Explain," p. 28.

—but because the line taken by the Barthou Ministry is, in my opinion, the determining cause of the increase of militaristic tendencies in Germany."

Not only were the nations heavily armed and constantly engaged in war-talk, the diplomatic documents which have thus far been revealed make it clear that practically all the European statesmen and military leaders regarded the outbreak of war as inevitable. From numerous English leaders we learn that there was general satisfaction with the state of the British fleet. In speaking at Bedford College on November 29, 1918, Lord Haldane, for many years Minister of War, said: "At the outbreak of war the fleet was in such a state of efficiency as never before, and we were two to one even then against the whole German fleet. . . . We mobilized at 11 o'clock on Monday, August 3, 36 hours before we declared war. Within a few hours, with the aid of the Navy, the Expeditionary Force was across the Channel before anybody knew it."2

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Quoted in "Diplomacy Revealed," p. 280. <sup>2</sup> Quoted by E. D. Morel, "Pre-War Diplomacy," p. 43.

Several important British leaders go further and admit that England was responsible for starting the race in naval armaments. address at Queens Hall on July 28, 1908, Mr. Lloyd George said: "We started it; it is not they who have started it. We had an overwhelming preponderance at sea which could have secured us against any conceivable enemy. We were not satisfied; we said, 'Let there be Dreadnoughts.' "1

At Manchester, on February 3, 1914, Sir Edward Grey, British Foreign Minister, said: "I admit that we had some responsibility originally for building the first Dreadnought. No doubt we are open to criticism that we set the example."2

France likewise expected war and prepared in every possible way. On May 8, 1914, the Belgian Minister in Paris, in a confidential communication to the Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs, said: "There is no doubt that the French nation has become more chauvinist and selfassured during these last few months. There

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Quoted in "Diplomacy Revealed," p. 136. <sup>2</sup> Quoted by Francis Neilson, "Duty to Civilization," p. 50.

are men, well informed and thoroughly versed in affairs, who two years ago expressed lively fears at the bare mention of possible difficulties arising between France and Germany. These same persons have now changed their tone, are proclaiming the certainty of victory, lay great stress on the improvements in the French Army (which is true enough), and declare themselves sure of being able at least to hold the German Army in check long enough to allow Russia to mobilise, concentrate her forces and hurl herself upon her neighbour on her Western frontier."

On August 4, 1914, in speaking before the French Parliament, President Poincaré said: "France was watching, as alert as she is peaceful. She was prepared, and our enemy will meet on their path our valiant troops." General Buat, a member of the French General Staff, in a book published in 1920, said: "One can say, then, that without taking any account of the Belgian Army or the four British divisions, France alone was at the beginning at least equal if not superior to

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup>Quoted in "Diplomacy Revealed," p. 292.

her formidable adversary in the number of the principal units."

The Russian army was by far the largest in the world. Only two weeks before the murder of the Archduke Ferdinand at Serajevo, a leading Russian journal<sup>2</sup> printed a notable article, generally attributed to the Russian Minister of War, which called attention to the state of the army: "Our yearly contingent of recruits has been increased by a late Imperial Order from 450,000 to 580,000 men. By this means we have a yearly increase of the Army of 130,000 men. At the same time, the service period has been lengthened by half a year, so that during every winter four contingents of recruits will be standing under colours. By the help of a simple arithmetical calculation one can establish the numerical statement concerning our Army, which is as large as ever a State has been able to show: viz, 580,000  $\times$  4 = 2,320,000. These figures need no comment. The great and powerful Russia alone can allow herself such a luxury. It may be mentioned, by

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Quoted in "Let France Explain," p. 157. <sup>2</sup> The Birshewija Viedomosti, June 13, 1914, quoted in "Pre-War Diplomacy," pp. 28, 29.

way of comparison, that the German Army, according to the last military law, had 880,000, Austria, 500,000, and Italy about 400,000."

The St. Petersburg correspondent of the London Times, on September 10, 1913, stated: "By general consent the Russian Army has never been in better condition. It is well clothed, well fed, and while the evidence as to the state of its artillery is inconclusive, its musketry training has been greatly improved."

## (3) Alliances

We have reminded ourselves that all the major powers of Europe were participants in the worldwide struggle for territories, raw materials, trade routes and markets and that all of them were prepared to use military and naval force to hold economic advantages already secured or to gain additional advantages. Not only were they prepared to use national armies and navies, they were constantly seeking to strengthen their position by forming alliances or entering into treaties with other nations. Germany and Austria entered into an alliance

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Quoted by E. D. Morel, "Truth and the War," p. 142.

in 1879. In 1882 Italy, after failing to resist French aggression in Tunis, sought and obtained an alliance with Germany and Austria.

In 1891 France and Russia entered into an alliance and in 1894 a military convention between them was ratified. "This Convention provided for combined and instant operations in case either of the parties was attacked by any of the powers of the Triple Alliance, for immediate mobilization without preliminary notice, and for forward movements to the frontiers. The number of men to be employed against Germany was agreed upon, future conferences were provided for, a no-separate-peace clause was inserted, the duration of the Convention was fixed at the life of the Triple Alliance."

In 1904 France and England entered into an agreement in which it was stipulated that France would allow England a free hand in Egypt, in return for which England would allow France a free hand in Morocco. This agreement soon ripened into an *entente cordiale* between the two nations. Indeed, the understanding between

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Chas. A. Beard, "Cross Currents in Europe Today," p. 16.

France and England went far beyond mere cordiality. In a volume published since the war, Lord French, Commander-in-Chief of the British Expeditionary Force in France in 1914, says: "It is now within the knowledge of all that the General Staffs of Great Britain and France had, for a long time, held conferences, and that a complete mutual understanding as to combined action in certain eventualities existed. . . . The area of concentration for the British forces had been fixed on the left flank of the French, and the actual detraining stations of the various units were all laid down in terrain lying between Maubeuge and Le Cateau. The Headquarters of the Army were fixed at the latter place."

In this connection, Colonel Repington, the distinguished English military correspondent, also says: "The Anglo-French military conversations, officially begun in January, 1906, continued uninterruptedly till the outbreak of war in 1914. They led to close co-operation of the British and French Staffs, and to the gradual working out of all the naval, military, and rail-

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> The title of this book is "1914," pp. 5, 8. Italics mine.

way projects for the delivery of our Expeditionary Force in France."1

Thus the major European powers did not depend merely upon national armies and navies but formed alliances and pooled their resources. This fact gives new meaning to the race of armaments indulged in during the two or three decades prior to the war.

The following table shows the comparative expenditures of the Triple Alliance and the Triple Entente during the years from 1900 to 1913, inclusive:2

|                          | Millions | of Pounds | s Sterling |
|--------------------------|----------|-----------|------------|
|                          | Army     | Navy      | Total      |
| Germany                  | 551.5    | 214.4     | 765.9      |
| Austria-Hungary          | 282.5    | 46.2      | 328.7      |
| Italy                    | 193.7    | 95.0      | 288.7      |
|                          |          |           |            |
| Total of Triple Alliance | 1027.7   | 355.6     | 1383.3     |
| Russia                   | 636.8    | 173.4     | 810.2      |
| France                   | 464.0    | 196.4     | 660.4      |
| Great Britain            | 390.1*   | 499.5     | 889.6      |
|                          |          |           |            |
| Total of Triple Entente  | 1490.9   | 869.3     | 2360.2     |

<sup>\*</sup> Not including 178 millions extraordinary expenditures in the South African War. The above figure includes an average of 28 millions for 1900-1903.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Colonel Chas. Repington, "The First World War," Vol. I, p. 14. <sup>2</sup> Summary of figures quoted on pp. 30, 31.

As a matter of fact, the situation was even more striking than this because Italy actually fought in the World War on the side of the Triple Entente. If, therefore, we transfer Italy's expenditures to the side of the Triple Entente, we get the following summary: Total of Germany and Austria, 1094 millions; total of Russia, France, Great Britain and Italy, 2648 millions. That is to say, during the years from 1900 to 1913 Great Britain and Russia were each spending more upon their armies and navies than was Germany, while the total expenditures of the four powers of the Triple Entente was more than two and a half times that of Germany and Austria-Hungary.

In the House of Commons on June 5, 1913, a member asked the Secretary of War "what additions had been made during the last two years to the peace strength of the armies of Russia, Austria-Hungary, Germany and France." The reply was as follows:

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<sup>1</sup>Quoted in "Truth and the War," p. 144.

[47]

| France |
|--------|
|--------|

| Additions proposed           | 183,715 |
|------------------------------|---------|
| Future peace establishment   | 741,572 |
| Germany                      |         |
| Additions made               | 38,373  |
| Additions proposed           | 136,000 |
| Future peace establishment   | 821,964 |
| Austria-Hungary              |         |
| Additions made               | 58,505  |
| Present peace establishment  | 473,643 |
| Future: not yet ascertained. |         |

The table on page 49 shows the comparative strength of the various navies in 1914.

## (4) Secret Diplomacy

In no European nation prior to the Great War did the members of Parliament have any adequate knowledge as to the actions of foreign offices. In this connection, a member of the House of Commons has written: "The destinies of the people are at the mercy of the Cabinet and of individual Ministers in the Cabinet. Foreign policy is formed without any regard to the wishes of the people. The people are simply not taken into account. They have to abide by decisions with the framing of which they have

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> "The Navy League Annual 1913-14," p. 353.

| Subma-<br>rine<br>Boats          | 36<br>11<br>26  | 73<br>97<br>102                                 | 55<br>            |
|----------------------------------|-----------------|---|-------------------|
| De- $stroy ers$                  | 144<br>18<br>48 | 210<br>248<br>83                                | 140               |
| Torpedo<br>Boats and<br>Gunboats | 54<br>84<br>109 | 247<br>122<br>168                               | 35                |
| Light<br>Cruis-<br>ers           | 49<br>13<br>13  | 75<br>92<br>11                                  | 119               |
| Armored<br>Cruis-<br>ers         | ೧ ೧ ೧           | 20<br>51<br>20                                  | 9 22              |
| Cap-<br>ital<br>Ships            | 48<br>20<br>20  | 88<br>89<br>34<br>89                            | 22<br>            |
| TRIPLE ALLIANCE.                 | GermanyItaly    | Total.  TRIPLE ENTENTE: Great Britain.  France. | Russia.<br>Total. |

had absolutely nothing to do. In the most important branch of its executive function—the control and direction of foreign policy—the Government of this country is no more democratic than was the Government of the Tsar or the Government of Germany under the old régime. This is literally true."

The manner in which European diplomats operate has been revealed by the publication since 1914 of large numbers of private documents from the Belgian, Russian, German and Austrian archives, and by the frank statements contained in numerous books of memoirs recently published.

In 1891 Russia and France entered into an Alliance for the purpose of maintaining the general peace. In 1899 this agreement was revised and strengthened. In 1912 an agreement was signed providing for naval, as well as military, co-operation in case of war. The French people did not know the exact nature of these agreements. As far back as 1896 members of the Chamber of Deputies sought in vain to learn the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup>E. D. Morel, "Diplomacy Revealed," p. ix.

extent of the obligations assumed by France. On numerous occasions the French Minister of Foreign Affairs declined to go into details and in each case was supported by the Chamber.

After a careful study of the documents which have recently been made available, Professor Chas. A. Beard says: "It is no doubt hazardous to draw conclusions from these documents, but two or three seem to be unavoidable. Russia decided early in 1908 on an active policy which could not fail to lead to a clash with Austria. France later gave her a free hand either without knowing what the program of St. Petersburg really was or with full knowledge of the policy and the consequences. There is no doubt that the French Prime Minister told Russia to take the initiative and promised active diplomatic support. It is clear also that the French Prime Minister was aware that this might lead to a general war by drawing in Germany and involving France. It may be that circumstances warranted M. Poincaré in following this line but one thing is certain: nobody in France outside of the diplomatic circle knew what commitments

were being made—commitments fraught with such agony for mankind."

During the decade prior to 1914 there were constant rumours concerning the nature of the agreement between France and England. March, 1913, Lord Hugh Cecil sought information from the British Government: "There is a very general belief that this country is under an obligation, not a treaty obligation, but an obligation arising owing to an assurance given by the Ministry in the course of diplomatic negotiations, to send a very large armed force out of this country to operate in Europe. This is the general belief." In reply, the Prime Minister, Mr. Asquith, said: "I ought to say that it is not true." Twice during the next year similar questions were asked and on each occasion the Government answered emphatically in the negative. The answer was technically true, but as we now know it was in reality false.

Lord French, Commander-in-Chief of the British Expeditionary Force in France in 1914, has since spoken very frankly concerning the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> "Cross Currents in Europe Today," p. 27.

agreement with France: "It is now within the knowledge of all that the General Staffs of Great Britain and France had, for a long time, held conferences, and that a complete mutual understanding as to combined action in certain eventualities existed."

Concerning these "conversations" Colonel Repington, who had an important share in their initiation, says: "The matter was not fully en train, of course, until the approval of the new Prime Minister, Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, had been secured. . . . It was arranged that a paper should be signed by Grierson and Huget stipulating that the conversations should not commit either Government, and this was done. C. B. (Campbell-Bannerman) was a fine old Tory in Army matters. He was a warm friend of the French, and quickly realised the whole position. How he explained matters to certain members of the new Cabinet I did not ask, and it did not matter. I believe that he considered it a departmental affair, and did not bring it before the Cabinet at all at the time. . . .

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Viscount John French, "1914," p. 8.

The Anglo-French military conversations, officially begun in January, 1906, continued uninterruptedly till the outbreak of war in 1914. They led to close co-operation of the British and French Staffs, and to the gradual working out of all the naval, military and railway projects for the delivery of our Expeditionary Force in France."

Technically these "conversations" did not commit either Government, but actually the General Staffs proceeded as if they were binding. France concentrated her fleet in the Mediterranean and left her western and northern coast line undefended. An entire plan of campaign was agreed upon and preparations were made for carrying it out.

Concerning the actual effect of these "conversations," Lord Loreburn, for many years Lord Chancellor of Great Britain, in a book published in 1919, says: "France was bound by a Russian Treaty of which we did not know the terms, and then France called on us for help. We were tied by the relations which our Foreign Office had

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> "The First World War," pp. 12-14. Italics mine.

created, without apparently realizing that they had created them. . . . When the most momentous decision of our whole history had to be taken we were not free to decide. We entered upon a war to which we had been committed beforehand in the dark, and Parliament found itself at two hours' notice unable, had it desired, to extricate us from this fearful predicament.... The original fault of Mr. Asquith and Sir Edward Grey lay in departing from the old policy in secret, and in allowing our Entente with France to develop imperceptibly till at last it was transformed into the equivalent of an Alliance, without the needful security and advantages that an open Alliance would bring with it. They had conducted our foreign policy on the lines of their own choice, without reference to, almost without regard to Parliament."

In 1907 Russia and England signed a treaty disposing of their differences in Southern Asia and Persia. During the next seven years strenuous efforts were put forth in diplomatic and financial circles to strengthen the ties between

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> "How the War Came," pp. 16-20. Italics mine.

the two nations. During a visit of King George and Sir Edward Grey to Paris in April, 1914, the French Government, at the suggestion of the Russian Foreign Office, broached the subject of a naval understanding between England and Russia. The success of the conference is recorded in a letter from the Russian Ambassador in Paris to his own Government, in which he said: "Sir Edward replied to M. Doumergue that he personally completely sympathized with the thoughts which had been expressed to him and that he was quite prepared to conclude an agreement with Russia similar to the one that existed between England and France." During May and June naval "conversations" were held between Russian and English naval staffs. German newspapers learned of these "conversations" and published a flaming account. The Russian Government then issued a flat denial. In the House of Commons in June, 1914, Sir Edward Grey was asked "whether any negotiations with a view to a naval agreement have recently taken place or are now pending between Russia and Great Britain?" To this question

he gave an evasive reply that there were no "unpublished agreements which would restrict or hamper the freedom of the Government or of Parliament to decide whether or not Great Britain should participate in a war." At this time the Russian Ambassador in London wrote to his own Government that Sir Edward Grey would "find it difficult to issue a denial and go on negotiating at the same time." Upon this point Professor Beard says: "The situation was indeed delicate and embarrassing, but Anglo-Russian naval preparations were not halted by the disturbances among the statesmen and politicians. When the war came a few weeks later all the two powers had to do was to order the execution of plans already prepared."

Secret negotiations between France, Russia and Great Britain did not cease at the outbreak of war. On the contrary a notable series of secret treaties were signed during the period from March, 1915, to March, 1917. The most important of these was the Treaty of London, signed on April 26, 1915, by Great Britain,

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> "Cross Currents in Europe Today," p. 50.

Italy, France and Russia. The terms of these treaties were unknown to the people of any of the countries concerned until they were revealed by the Bolsheviks following the overthrow of the Czar. It should be recalled that during the period these treaties were negotiated the Allied leaders were proclaiming the ideal aims of the war.1

These treaties reveal clearly the very wide divergence between the public utterances and the actual purposes of the Allied leaders. "Every clause of every treaty," says G. Lowes Dickinson, "dealt simply with the transference of territory from the enemy states to the allies, that the former might become weaker, and the latter stronger."2

According to the provisions of these treaties the Allied nations were to receive additional territory as follows:3

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup>These treaties were published in the official journal of the Soviets and in the Manchester Guardian. Later they were published in book form by F. Seymour Cocks under the title, "The Secret Treaties." A good summary is found in Ray Stannard Baker's "Woodrow Wilson and World Settlement," Vol. I, Chapter 3; and in "The Peace Tangle," by John Foster Bass, Chapter 2.

"War: Its Nature, Cause and Cure," p. 86.

"The Secret Treaties," pp. 93, 94.

Great Britain: Neutral zone in Persia, Southern Mesopotamia, Bagdad, Haifa and Akka in Syria, and a part of the German colonies.

France: Syria, Adana Vilayet, territory in Asia Minor, Alsace-Lorraine, Saar Valley, occupation of territories on the left bank of the Rhine, and a part of the German colonies.

Italy: Trentino, Southern Tyrol, Trieste, Country of Gorizia-Gradisca, Istria, Istrian Islands, Dalmatia, Dalmatian Islands, Valona, Islands of the Aegean, Adalia and territory in Asia Minor, extension of colonies in Africa, a share in the war indemnity.

Japan: Parts of Shantung, Pacific Islands, Roumania: Transylvania, the Banat, Bukovina.

Russia: Constantinople, Turkey in Europe, Bosphorus and Dardanelles, Sea of Marmora, Imbros and Tenedos, full liberty in Northern Persia, Ispahan and Yezd, Trebizond, Erzerum, Van and Bitlis, further territory in Asia Minor.

Serbia and Montenegro: Southern Dalmatian Coast, Spalato, Ragusa, Cattaro, San Gio-

vanni di Medua in Albania, possible annexation of Northern Albanian district.

In commenting upon these treaties, Mr. John Foster Bass says: "One reading of this wholesale distribution of alien territory will show the flagrant political immoralities and the fundamental disagreements with every public declaration made by the Entente statesmen to their parliaments and peoples. By these agreements the Allies each took its share of the domain of those it expected to conquer."

Concerning the effects of these treaties upon the negotiations of the Peace Conference, Mr. Ray Stannard Baker, who was entrusted by President Wilson with the secret minutes and other important documents and requested to prepare a history of the proceedings, says:

"When the Peace Conference began the same elements in each nation, often the same leaders who had made those secret treaties were still in power. Not only did most of them know and believe in that method of diplomacy—some of them had been schooled in it all their lives—not

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> "The Peace Tangle," p. 15.

only were they committed to the full use of the military method, which they also understood perfectly, but far more fundamental than either, these secret treaties represented the real views, the real desires, the real necessities of the various governments. . . . Nothing in the voluminous records of the Council of Ten and Council of Four at Paris is more impressive than the amount of time—invaluable time, priceless energy—devoted to trying to devise methods of getting around or over or through these old secret entanglements. There, and not in discussions of the League of Nations, was where the time was lost. . . .

"Such were, in general, the desires, needs, ambitions of the allied governments set forth in the secret treaties. So they intended, if they won the war, to divide up the world; so they actually tried to divide it up at the Peace Conference. Though outwardly they were combating imperialism as symbolized by Germany, they were themselves seeking vast extensions of their own imperial and economic power. They kept these agreements secret from their own people, fear-

ing their effect upon the great masses of the workers and liberal groups; they kept them secret also from their smaller allies, like Serbia, and they kept them secret from America, both before and after America came into the war. These treaties, partly disclosed in enemy countries through the publication of the Bolsheviki, and greatly exaggerated there, were powder and shot—army corps!—to the enemy, for they were used to prove the contention of the German war lords that the Allies were really fighting to gobble up the world. And finally they bore a crop of suspicion, controversy, balked ambition, which twice, at least, nearly wrecked the Peace Conference, poisoned its discussions, and warped and disfigured its final decisions."1

## (5) Fear

Foreign offices and war departments during the past several decades have appealed to the fears of peoples in seeking support for their policies. With the whole of Europe a huge armed camp and with the memory of not less

<sup>&</sup>quot;Woodrow Wilson and World Settlement," Vol. I, pp. 24-26, 79-80.

than forty important wars during the century, the fears of the people were aroused with great ease. That the writings of Prussian militarists and the war talk of the Kaiser and his generals had produced a panic of fear throughout France, Russia and England does not require further proof. The genuineness of this fear cannot be disputed.

The fact is sometimes overlooked, however, that the German people and many of the German leaders were likewise filled with fear. This fact was often admitted before the war and has been pointed out in recent speeches and books by several Allied leaders. Speaking at the Queen's Hall on July 28, 1908, Mr. Lloyd George said: "Look at the position of Germany. Her Army is to her what our Navy is to us—her sole defence against invasion. She has not a two-power standard. She may have a stronger Army than France, than Russia, than Italy, than Austria, but she is between two great powers, who, in combination, could pour in a vastly greater number of troops than she has. Don't forget that, when you wonder why Germany is frightened at alli-

ances and understandings and some sort of mysterious workings which appear in the press. . . . Here is Germany in the middle of Europe, with France and Russia on either side, and with a combination of armies greater than hers. Suppose we had a possible combination which would lay us open to invasion—suppose Germany and France, or Germany and Austria, had fleets which, in combination, would be stronger than Would we not be frightened; would we not build; would we not arm? Of course we should. I want our friends, who think that because Germany is a little frightened she really means mischief to us, to remember that she is frightened for a reason which would frighten us under the same circumstances."

In a letter written on March 21, 1909, to Lord Esher, Lord Fisher said: "The Germans are not building in this feverish haste to fight you! No! It's the daily dread they have of a second Copenhagen, which they know a Pitt or a Bismarck would execute on them!" Again, on September 20, 1911, Lord Fisher wrote: "I happen to know in a curious way (but quite certainly) that the

Germans are in a blue funk of the British Navy."

Colonel Repington, in the London Times in 1911, wrote: "The possibility of a war on two fronts is the nightmare of German strategists, and considering the pace at which Russia has been building up her field armies since 1905, the nightmare is not likely to be soon conjured away."2

In the Williamstown lecture, delivered in 1921, Viscount Bryce, one of the most distinguished of British statesmen, said: "The narrow avoidance of war on several occasions had left the governments and the military castes not more but from year to year less pacific in spirit, for there was no will to peace. Any spark was enough to fire the train. Fear, moreover, was added. Russia and Germany each feared the other, each dreaded a sudden attack by the other. Let us allow the Germans the benefit of that consideration. They really were in bona fide terror of what Russia might do and thought that their chance was to strike at Russia before the on-

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Quoted in "Diplomacy Revealed," p. 136. <sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 270.

slaught which they certainly expected from her had actually materialized."1

In 1920 Lord Haldane wrote: "It is difficult for us to understand how real the Slav peril appeared to Germany and to Austria, and there is little doubt that to the latter Serbia was an unquiet neighbor."2

Mr. Gerard, former American Ambassador in Berlin, has written: "To the outsider the Germans seem a fierce and martial people. But, in reality, the mass of the Germans, in consenting to the great sacrifice entailed by their enormous preparations for war, have been actuated by fear."

## (6) Immediate Causes

Perhaps we are now in a better position to understand the significance of the events following the murder of the Archduke Ferdinand at Serajevo. Professor Sidney Bradshaw Fay, of Smith College, after a careful study of the diplomatic documents made public by the new German republic, by the Austrian Foreign Office

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> "International Relations," p. 38. <sup>2</sup> "Before the War," p. 91. <sup>3</sup> "My Four Years in Germany," p. 92.

following the collapse of the old government, and by the Bolsheviks following the Russian revolution, published a notable series of articles in the American Historical Review in 1919 and 1920. Since these articles have generally been accepted as authoritative, it seems wise to quote Professor Fay at some length:

"It is curious to see how zealously each of these two men,¹ after studying one set of documents, assigns exclusively the whole blame to his own former government. According to Kautsky, Germany eagerly pushed a hesitating Berchtold into the attack on Serbia and a world war. According to Gooss, the unsuspecting Emperor William was the sacrificial lamb offered upon the altar of Berchtold's reckless perfidy and obstinacy.²

"Austria suspected in the spring of 1914 that Russia and France were secretly urging on the Pan-Serbian movement and encouraging the formation of a new Balkan alliance of which Serbia was to be the head and of which the purpose was

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup>Karl Kautsky was authorized to edit the German documents bearing on the cause of the war, while Dr. Richard Gooss had a like responsibility for the Austrian documents.

<sup>2</sup> "American Historical Review," Vol. 25, pp. 617, 618.

the uniting of all Jugo-Slavia under Serbian rule. . . . Thus the Kaiser and Bethmann chose their policy. They gave Austria a free hand and made the mistake of putting the situation outside their control into the hands of a man as reckless and as unscrupulous as Berchtold. They committed themselves to a leap in the dark. They soon found themselves involved, as we shall see, in actions which they did not approve, and by decisions which were taken against their advice; but they could not seriously object or threaten, because they had pledged their support to Austria in advance, and any hesitation on their part would only weaken the Triple Alliance at a critical moment when it was most needed to be strong. Bethmann and the Kaiser on July 5 were not criminals plotting the World War; they were simpletons putting 'a noose about their necks' and handing the other end of the rope to a stupid and clumsy adventurer who now felt free to go as far as he liked. . . . . 1

"On the whole, these new documents from Berlin and Vienna place Austria in a much more

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> "American Historical Review," Vol. 25, pp. 621-628.

unfavorable light than hitherto. They likewise clear the German Government of the charge that it deliberately plotted or wanted the war. Whatever individual militarists or Pan-German writers may have wished or said, there is no doubt that the Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg, as the official representative of German foreign policy, aimed at peace and better relations with Germany's neighbors in the period just before the war. . . . In a wider sense, however, these new documents do not in any way relieve Germany of the main responsibility. She is responsible for her negligence in giving Austria a free hand on July 5, and in not attempting earlier and more vigorously to reassert her control at Vienna. She is responsible—and here the responsibility rests especially on the Kaiser—in deliberately blocking several peace proposals. . . . In a still wider sense, also, Germany is responsible because one may say that militarism was one of the great causes of the war. . . . It is always at a time of diplomatic crisis, precisely when it is most difficult for diplomats to keep their heads clear and their hands free, that the influence of militarism

makes itself felt by hastening decisions for war, or even by getting the upper hand altogether. And for the growth of militarism in Europe, no country was so much responsible as Germany."

Concerning the immediate causes of the war, Mr. Philip Kerr, for several years Private Secretary to Mr. Lloyd George, says: "What was it that precipitated the Great War? . . . It was the military time-table. No sooner did Austria-Hungary begin to mobilize in support of her ultimatum to Serbia than the Russian General Staff felt bound to do the same, in order not to be caught at a disadvantage if the struggle spread. And no sooner did Russia begin to mobilize than Germany felt that she must do so also, for the plans of the German General Staff in the event of a European war were based upon the capacity of the German army to mobilize a few days faster than the French army, and to crush it before the Russians could take the field. Hence the frantic telegrams of the Kaiser to the Czar, imploring and commanding him to countermand the mobilization, once he realized, when it was too late,

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> "American Historical Review," Vol. 26, pp. 51-53.

where the policy of the ultimatum was hurrying with breakneck speed.

"Whether the Kaiser or any other responsible man ever deliberately pressed the button to start a general European war, I don't know. Personally, I doubt it. It was the terrible military timetable, the inevitable outcome of Prussian militarism and the division of Europe into a number of rival and separate national states, which made it almost impossible to stop the war once the first fatal step of mobilization had been taken. The Czar could not countermand mobilization unless Austria-Hungary countermanded it. And neither Berlin nor Vienna would countermand, after the fatal ultimatum to Serbia, because to do so would have meant an abject humiliation for the Central Powers far worse than that of Agadir."

With regard to the responsibility of the Russian Czar and his generals, Professor S. B. Fay has summarized the results of his examination of the available data as follows:2 "(1) About 11

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Philip Kerr and Lionel Curtis, "The Prevention of War," pp. 23, 24. Italics mine.

<sup>2</sup> "American Historical Review," Vol. 26, pp. 249–251.

P. M. on July 29, Russian 'partial mobilization' was in full swing. (2) This 'partial mobilization' had been caused by Austria's refusal of 'direct conversations' and by her declaration of war on Serbia. (3) The Tsar, influenced by the Kaiser's telegram, made a serious effort, though perhaps one impracticable on technical considerations, to stop mobilization of some kind. (4) But the Tsar was flatly disobeyed and deceived by the Russian militarists, who thereby rendered futile the Kaiser's efforts to check Russian military measures until he could effect a settlement by his mediation at Vienna . . . Germany's mobilization, on the other hand, was directly caused by that of Russia."

In 1917 the Russian General Sukhomlinov boasted: "I knew that the responsibility rested on me and I gave orders that mobilization should not be suspended . . . On the next morning, I lied to His Majesty . . . On this day I nearly lost my reason. I knew that mobilization was in full swing, and that it was impossible to stop it. Fortunately, on the same day the Tsar was convinced afresh, and I was thanked for the good

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execution of mobilization; otherwise I should have been in jail long ago."1

On December 23, 1920, Mr. Lloyd George said: "The more one reads memoirs and books written in the various countries of what happened before the first of August, 1914, the more one realizes that no one at the head of affairs quite meant war at that stage. It was something into which they glided, or rather staggered and stumbled, perhaps through folly; and a discussion, I have no doubt, would have averted it."

More recently Mr. Lloyd George has written: "The more one examines, in the growing calm, the events of July, 1914, the more one is impressed with the shrinking of the nominal rulers of the attacking empires as they approached the abyss, and with the relentless driving onward of the military organization behind these terrorstricken dummies."2

In this connection Mr. G. Lowes Dickinson, a distinguished English writer, says: "To understand the action of those who had power in Ger-

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> "American Historical Review," Vol. 26, p. 249. <sup>2</sup> David Lloyd George, "Where Are We Going?" p. 52.

many during the critical days it is necessary to bear in mind all that I have brought into relief in the preceding pages: the general situation which grouped the Powers of the Entente against those of the Triple Alliance; the armaments and counter-armaments; the colonial and economic rivalry; the racial and national problems in South-East Europe; and the long series of previous crises, in each case tided over, but leaving behind, every one of them, a legacy of fresh mistrust and fear, which made every new crisis worse than the one before. I do not palliate the responsibility of Germany for the outbreak of the war. But that responsibility is embedded in and conditioned by a responsibility deeper and more general—the responsibility of all the Powers alike for the European anarchy."1

In another place Mr. Dickinson also says: "You can, of course, say—as became the fashion when the Great War broke out—that Germany had been preparing not only war but THE WAR for ten years, forty years, a hundred and fifty years! There is nothing men and historians

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> "The European Anarchy," pp. 128, 129.

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will not say, and even think, when their passions are excited. But the fact is that all that talk is sheer nonsense."

Ex-Prime Minister Nitti of Italy has written as follows: "An honest and thorough examination of all the diplomatic documents, all the agreements and relations of pre-war days, compels me to declare solemnly that the responsibility for the war does not lie solely on the defeated countries. . . . When our countries were engaged in the struggle, and we were at grips with a dangerous enemy, it was our duty to keep up the morale of our people and to paint our adversaries in the darkest colors, laying on their shoulders all the blame and responsibility. But after such a war, now that imperial Germany has fallen, it is absurd to maintain that the responsibility belongs to Germany alone."

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> "War: Its Nature, Cause and Cure," p. 68.
<sup>2</sup> "The Wreck of Europe," pp. 31, 80, 81.

#### CHAPTER II

# WHAT DID THE WORLD WAR ACCOMPLISH?

In the previous chapter evidence was cited which revealed clearly the wide divergence between the professed aims and the actual purposes of the Allied leaders in the Great War. The rank and file of people in all the nations accepted at face value the idealistic expressions of their leaders. There is no room for doubt that the vast majority of people in all the belligerent countries sincerely thought they were fighting in defence of home, freedom and the higher values of life.

In attempting to evaluate the results of the Great War, we must, therefore, seek light upon two questions, viz., to what extent were the Allied leaders successful in accomplishing their real purposes in the war? and secondly, to what

extent were the common people successful in achieving the ends for which they fought?

## (1) Allied Gains of the War

The crippling of the economic power of Germany was one of the great objectives of the Allied leaders. The various sections of the Treaty of Versailles reveal the thoroughness with which this task was undertaken. In this connection, Mr. John Maynard Keynes, British representative at the Peace Conference, says: "The German economic system as it existed before the war depended on three main factors: 1. Overseas commerce as represented by her mercantile marine, her colonies, her foreign investments, her exports, and the overseas connections of her merchants; 2. The exploitation of her coal and iron and the industries built upon them; 3. Her transport and tariff system. Of these the first, while not the least important, was certainly the most vulnerable. The Treaty aims at the systematic destruction of all three, but principally of the first two."1

<sup>1 &</sup>quot;The Economic Consequences of the Peace," pp. 65, 66. Italics mine.

The first of these assets was almost completely obliterated by the Treaty. Germany was compelled to give up all the vessels of her mercantile marine exceeding 1,600 tons gross, and a considerable percentage of her smaller fishing boats and trawlers. She was compelled to cede to the Allies "all her rights and title over her overseas possessions." The Allies also asserted the right to expropriate the private property of Germans in the former colonies and in Alsace-Lorraine, and under certain circumstances even in neutral countries. The cumulative effect of these provisions, according to Mr. Keynes, "is to deprive Germany of everything she possessed outside her own frontiers as laid down in the Treaty."

With regard to the coal resources of Germany the Treaty is equally drastic. The coal mines of the Saar Basin were ceded outright to France. A considerable percentage of the best coal land of Upper Silesia was awarded to Poland. Furthermore, Germany is obligated to furnish a maximum of 45 million tons annually

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> "The Economic Consequences of the Peace," p. 79.

for five years to France, Belgium and Italy and a decreasing amount for another five years.

75 per cent of her iron ore, the main sources of zinc, important sources of potash, all commercial cables and large areas of agricultural land. Control of Germany's main river communications and traffic, together with her foreign trade, was placed in the hands of the Allies. In this connection, President Wilson in his St. Louis address, on September 5, 1919, said: "That Reparation Commission can determine the currents of trade, the conditions of credit, of international credit; it can determine how much Germany is going to buy, where it is going to buy, and how it is going to pay for it."

Finally, after destroying almost completely Germany's power overseas and having deprived her of a considerable proportion of her coal, iron and other raw materials, the amount due for reparation, or war indemnity, was set at the stupendous sum of \$32,000,000,000, an amount equivalent to more than one-third of the entire national wealth of Germany before the war.

"Thus the Economic Clauses of the Treaty," says Mr. Keynes, "are comprehensive, and little has been overlooked which might impoverish Germany now or obstruct her development in future." Ex-Premier Nitti of Italy says in this connection: "Thus Germany has lost the character of a sovereign State, and is controlled in every act of its domestic life, its economics and its finances, as no country in Europe ever was before—not even Turkey, when in the lowest depths of economic servitude."2

It is apparent that the Allied leaders were highly successful in their efforts to crush Germany's economic power. There are, however, grave reasons for doubting whether this will ultimately prove to be a real gain. Evidence along this line is cited in a subsequent section.

In the Allied countries, leaders and people alike agreed that the major objective of the war was the overthrow of Prussian militarism and autocracy. That these were a most serious menace to the peace of the world cannot be denied. At this point the war was an unqualified

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> "The Economic Consequences of the Peace," pp. 111, 112.
<sup>2</sup> "The Decadence of Europe," pp. 124, 125.

success. The Hohenzollerns have been deposed, the once mighty German Army has been reduced to a mere police force of 100,000 men, almost totally disarmed so far as the major weapons of modern warfare are concerned, and the German Navy is at the bottom of the sea.

The peoples of the earth were also greatly benefited by the fall of the Hapsburgs in Austria and the Romanoffs in Russia. In the overthrow of these three great sovereigns, autocracy was dealt a severe blow. Sufficient time has not yet elapsed to make possible an accurate evaluation of the gains for mankind as a result of the passing of these autocracies. It may be that future historians will agree that the destruction of the power of these ancient houses was one of the great events of the century.

The liberation of many millions of oppressed peoples from political bondage was another great gain. To the citizens of Poland, Czechoslovakia and other liberated regions, the achievement of freedom has made an enormous difference and is for them the supreme benefit of the war.

It is too soon to evaluate accurately the gains

from the smashing of many ancient traditions and the jolting of peoples and institutions out of deep ruts. The emergency of war was a great incentive to inventive genius and the world has been permanently enriched by some of the discoveries and inventions made under this stimulus. Unmistakable evidence was furnished of the latent capacities of heroism and sacrificial devotion to great causes on the part of multitudes of people in all lands. Millions of people were at least for the time being raised to new heights of unselfish living, where personal comforts and desires were subordinated to the common good. During these days many men and women gained at least temporarily a new and vital religious experience and not a few lives were permanently changed for the better.

# (2) Losses in Life

The appalling cost of the war in human life is shown in the table on pages 84 and 85.1

It is not possible for the human mind to comprehend the significance of ten million men and

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> E. L. Bogart, "Direct and Indirect Costs of the War," p. 272. The error in addition appears in the original table.

boys killed in the war. All of us have stood in line for hours as we watched some huge procession. No one of us, however, has ever seen a procession of a million men. A parade of ten million soldiers, marching from daylight to dark, ten abreast, with each line only two seconds behind another, would require 46 days to pass a given point.

As ghastly as these figures appear, they do not tell the whole story. Of the 5,983,600 men listed as "prisoners or missing," a considerable percentage were undoubtedly killed in action. It was officially estimated in England that 60 per cent of the missing were probably dead. The estimate in Canada was 56 per cent and in France 40 per cent. If, therefore, half those listed as "prisoners or missing" be presumed to be dead the total death toll is increased by 2,991,800.1

The above figures include only the casualties among the men under arms. There was in addition a very heavy loss of life among civilians as a direct result of the war, including deaths from

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> See E. L. Bogart, "Direct and Indirect Costs of the War," pp. 271–274.

|                                    |                   | Prisoners   | or Missing | 4,912         | 64,907        | 453,500    | 2,500,000 | 1,359,000 | 10,000   | 100,000 | 116,000  | 45,000  | 200       | ගෙ    | 4,653,522 |  |
|------------------------------------|-------------------|-------------|------------|---------------|---------------|------------|-----------|-----------|----------|---------|----------|---------|-----------|-------|-----------|--|
| $WAR^1$                            |                   | Otherwise   | Wounded    | 148,000       | 1,441,394     | 2,344,000  | 3,950,000 | 462,196   | 100,000  | 28,000  | *        | 30,000  | 12,000    | 206   | 8,516,497 |  |
| EAT WORLD                          | OWERS             | Seriously   | Wounded    | 43,000        | 617,740       | 700,000    | 1,000,000 | 200,000   | 40,000   | 322,000 | 200,000  | 10,000  | 5,000     | *     | 3,437,740 |  |
| CASUALTIES OF THE GREAT WORLD WAR! | THE ALLIED POWERS | Known       | Dead       | 107,284       | 807,451†      | 1,427,800‡ | 2,762,064 | 507,160   | 267,000  | 707,343 | 339,117  | 15,000  | 4,000     | 300   | 6,938,519 |  |
|                                    | Γα                | <b>34</b> √ | Country    | United States | Great Britain | France     | Russia    | Italy     | Belgium* | Serbia  | Roumania | Greece* | Portugal* | Japan | Total     |  |

<sup>1</sup>E. L. Bogart, "Direct and Indirect Costs of the War, p. 272. The error in addition appears in the original table.

| $(Continued)^{1}$ |               |
|-------------------|---------------|
| ORLD WAR (        | 7             |
| r World           | NIMBAI DOMINE |
| GREAT             |               |
| LTIES OF THE      | Tun           |
| CASUALTIES        |               |

|  |                      | -(manging) its in arms in transcript | minera)-              |                         |
|--|----------------------|--------------------------------------|-----------------------|-------------------------|
|  | THE CENTRAL POWERS   | Powers                               |                       |                         |
| Country  | Known Dead           | Seriously $Wounded$                  | $Otherwise \ Wounded$ | Prisoners<br>or Missing |
| Germany.  Austria-Hungary.   | 1,611,104<br>911,000 | 1,600,000                            | 2,183,143             | 772,522                 |
| Turkey. Bulgaria.  | 436,924              | 107,772                              | 300,000               | 103,731                 |
| Total  | 3,060,252            | 2,857,772                            | 5,485,542             | 1,330,078               |
| Grand Total  | 9,998,771            | 6,295,512                            | 14,002,039            | 5.983.600               |
| * Unofficial.  † Includes deaths at home and in Expeditionary Force. | ditionary Force.     |                                      |                       |                         |

The error in addition appears in the original Direct and Indirect Costs of the War," p. 272. ‡ Includes colonial casualties. \$ Exclusive of influenza deaths and those killed in Macedonia. \*\* Included in preceding column.

war diseases and pestilences, massacres, bombardments, air raids, submarine attacks, deportations, exposure, malnutrition, starvation, etc. After carefully examining a great mass of evidence, Professor Bogart says: "In conclusion it may fairly be estimated that the loss of civilian life due directly to war, or to causes induced by war, equals, if indeed it does not exceed, that suffered by the armies in the field. In view of the facts cited, such an estimate must be regarded as conservative." This would add 13,000,000 to the total death toll of the war.

The number of children left fatherless by the war is appalling. In France it was officially estimated that 887,500 French children lost their fathers in the war. Dr. Folks has estimated that 512,000 Italian children were left fatherless. If the ratio of French war orphans to French dead holds true of the other nations, 6,500,000 children were left fatherless by the war. If the Italian ratio is used this number will be nearly doubled. Since the French birth rate is among the lowest and the Italian is among the highest,

See E. L. Bogert, "Direct and Indirect Costs of the War," p. 282.

the actual number of war orphans is probably in the neighborhood of 9,000,000.1

In France the Pension Office had formal knowledge of 585,000 war widows on Armistice day. The total number was undoubtedly much larger than this. The French marriage rate is lower than in most countries. It is, therefore, probably conservative to estimate that from 40 to 45 per cent of the total number of men killed were survived by widows. This means that approximately 5,000,000 women were left widows by the war.<sup>2</sup>

Human misery and actual loss of life were enormously increased by reason of the fact that millions of people were forced by invasion to flee from home. In this connection, Dr. Folks says: "We have seen them walking footsore, burdenbearing, falling by the wayside. We know of babies born on the way, and of mothers carrying new-born babies for miles. We have seen refugees packed by main force into stifling freight-cars and slowly hauled, with many long interruptions, somewhere into the interior, hungry,

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Homer Folks, "The Human Costs of the War," pp. 142, 195. <sup>2</sup> Ibid., p. 141.

filthy, weary, depressed. This happened to 1,250,000 people in Belgium, to 2,000,000 in France, to 500,000 in Italy, to 300,000 in Greece, to, say, 300,000 in Serbia, to 2,000,000 Armenians (except that they walked out into the desert and most of them to death), to 400,000 in East Prussia, to huge but unknown numbers in Roumania, Russia, and Austria—all told, to some 10,000,000 people."

One of the most serious costs of the war is found in its biological aspects. The 13,000,000 dead soldiers included an extraordinarily high percentage of the best manhood of the nations. The weaklings and degenerates were rejected. The strongest, the keenest and the most upright, lost their lives in appalling numbers. It is too soon to measure the cost of this sacrifice of the best young life of the world.

Let us now gather together in a comprehensive summary the outstanding human costs of the war:

> 10,000,000 Known dead soldiers 3,000,000 Presumed dead soldiers

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Homer Folks, "The Human Costs of the War," pp. 254, 255.

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13,000,000 Dead civilians 20,000,000 Wounded 3,000,000 Prisoners 9,000,000 War orphans 5,000,000 War widows 10,000,000 Refugees.

This summary may be read in less than sixty seconds, but no human mind is capable of grasping its meaning and significance. Each one of us knows something of the tragedy of death in the home, a few of us are frequently called to console bereaved families, but no one of us has sufficient imagination to think in terms of millions of dead men.

The whole world was shocked and stunned when the Lusitania went down with the loss of a thousand lives. To equal the twenty-six millions dead in the war, it would be necessary to sink a Lusitania every day for seventy years, or one every week beginning nearly a century before the discovery of America by Columbus and continuing to the present hour. Or to express it in another way, the average loss of life was 16,585 for each of the 1,567 days the war lasted. This

is equivalent to blotting out every breath of life in a city the size of Ithaca, Marshalltown or Billings each day of the war; or destroying every human life in a city like Berkeley, Macon or Atlantic City every three days during the war.

We can enter into the sorrow of one widow and visualize the loss of one orphan, but millions of widows and orphans are beyond our powers of comprehension. We can suffer with one injured friend, but our sympathies are too narrow to include millions of suffering men. We can measure the human cost of war to one family, but our minds are too feeble to grasp its meaning for the whole of mankind. "The harm done to the white races by the war," says Dr. Folks, "is unprecedented, many-sided, deep-seated, incapable of exact measurement, but truly terrifying."

# (3) Material Losses of the War

It is now possible to estimate with a fair degree of accuracy the direct monetary cost of the war. Perhaps the most comprehensive studies in this regard have been made by Professor Ernest L. Bogart, and published by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, under the

| $\mathbb{R}^1$              | Net Cost<br>\$ 22,625,252,843       | 35,334,011,868<br>4,493,813,072     | 24,265,582,800<br>22,593,950,000 | 12,413,998,000<br>3,963,867,914 | \$125,690,476,497 | \$ 37,775,000,000<br>20,622,960,600<br>2,245,200,000 | \$ 60,643,160,600 | \$186,333,637,097 |
|-----------------------------|-------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|----------------------------------|---------------------------------|-------------------|--|-------------------|-------------------|
| THE DIRECT COSTS OF THE WAR | Advances to Allies \$ 9,455,014,125 | 8,695,000,000                       | 1,547,200,000                    | •                               | \$19,697,214,125  | \$ 2,375,000,000                                     | \$ 2,375,000,000  | \$22,072,214,125  |
| _                           | Gross<br>\$ 32,080,266,968          | 44,029,011,868<br>4,493,813,072     | 25,812,782,800<br>22,593,950,000 | 12,413,998,000<br>3,963,867,914 | \$145,387,690,622 | \$ 40,150,000,000<br>20,622,960,600<br>2,245,200,000 | \$ 63,018,160,600 | \$208,405,851,222 |
| SUMMARY OF                  | United States                       | Great BritainRest of British Empire | France                           | Italy. Other Entente Allies     | Total             | GermanyAustria-HungaryTurkey and Bulgaria            | Total             | Grand Total       |

[91]

title, "Direct and Indirect Costs of the Great World War." The table on the preceding page is taken from this book.

The total indirect costs of the war have been summarized by Professor Bogart as follows:

| Capitalized value of lives lost: |                   |
|----------------------------------|-------------------|
| Soldiers                         | \$ 33,551,276,280 |
| Civilians                        | 33,551,276,280    |
| Property losses:                 |                   |
| On land                          | 29,960,000,000    |
| Shipping and cargo               | 6,800,000,000     |
| Loss of production               | 45,000,000,000    |
| War relief                       | 1,000,000,000     |
| Loss to neutrals                 | 1,750,000,000     |
| Total indirect costs             | \$151,612,542,560 |
| Total direct costs, net          | 186,333,637,097   |
|                                  |                   |

Grand total costs of the war \$337,946,179,657

Here also we are dealing with figures whose magnitude surpasses our ability to comprehend. The total cost of the war is equivalent to \$20,000 for every hour since Christ was born. The average daily cost of the war was more than 215 millions, or 9 millions per hour. That is to say, one hour's cost of the war exceeded the amount

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> P. 299. The error in addition appears in the original table.

expended on the public schools of Detroit or Cleveland during an entire year, and is equal to the endowment of a great university like the University of California. The total amount raised by all the churches in the United States last year is less than three days' cost of the war. The total amount contributed by Americans and Canadians to foreign missions last year is less than five hours' cost of the war. Six hours' cost of the war is more than the total operating expenses of all the Young Men's Christian Associations in the world for an entire year. To earn an amount equal to one day's cost of the war, 2,150 workers, at an annual wage of \$2,500 each, would be compelled to labor for 40 years.

There is still another phase of the economic loss which must be taken into account, viz., the effects of the war upon the industrial machine of Europe. The population of Europe, according to Herbert Hoover, is at least 100 millions greater than can be supported without imports. These surplus millions are dependent upon the excess of exports over imports for their livelihood. Therefore, an efficient industrial machine

must operate continuously if the standard of life is to be maintained. Prior to the war the various countries of Europe were not independent economic units, but were parts of one vast industrial machine embracing that entire continent. The various currencies were maintained on a stable gold basis and flowed freely throughout Europe. There was a minimum of interference at frontiers, and tariffs were not, as a rule, excessive. Nearly 300 million persons lived within the three Empires of Russia, Germany and Austria-Hungary. In the economic life of Europe Germany occupied the central position. Upon the prosperity of Germany depended the prosperity of the rest of Europe.

Then came the war. Instantly the whole economic life of Europe was thrown into confusion. Exports and imports between vast populations ceased entirely. Millions of men and women were taken from productive pursuits and placed at the work of destruction. Four years of war on an unprecedented scale placed an enormous strain upon the industrial and financial life of all the belligerent nations. This was followed by

the collapse of Russia and Austria-Hungary and the destruction of the economic power of Germany. New states sprang into existence. The boundary lines of Europe were greatly lengthened. Nationalistic feelings were raised to new heights and each country hedged itself about with tariff walls and customs barriers. Taxation shot up by leaps and bounds.

After a period of artificial prosperity made possible by inroads into capital and natural resources, a terrific industrial depression swept over the whole world. Multitudes of customers were impoverished. This was followed by an enormous decrease in production. Famine and plague swept over Russia, Poland, Austria and the Near East. Millions of persons were kept alive only by the heroic efforts of the American Relief Agency, the Quakers and other societies. Tens of millions of able-bodied men were unable to find work. In England from one and a quarter millions to two million men have been supported by government doles during the past three years. Even in distant United States the number of unemployed rose to five millions. The

collapse of the foreign market for wheat and cotton caused great suffering among American farmers.

Currencies depreciated in value at an extraor-dinarily rapid rate. Nearly 300 millions of people in Russia, Germany, Austria and Poland now transact their daily business with currency which has little real value. The writer, during a recent visit to Europe, witnessed the fall of the German mark from 100,000 to the dollar to 60,000,000 within nine weeks. Prices are often doubled and trebled within an hour. International credits have been thrown into the utmost confusion.

All these factors combined have probably created more human misery than was occasioned by shot and shell during the war. And the end of this terrible chaos is not in sight. The available evidence seems to indicate that conditions are certain to become worse before the winter is over. Standards of living are being demolished and the movement for the abolition of poverty and disease has been set back a century and more. Millions of relatively innocent men, women and

children are doomed to spend their entire lifetime in hard toil with no reward save hunger, deprivation and a bare existence. A whole continent is being submerged.

# (4) Moral Losses of the War

The moral losses of the war are not as easily measured as are the physical and material losses. But there is an abundance of evidence that they are disastrous.

It has been well said that truth is the first great casualty of war. Deceit and falsehood are inherent in war. Not truth but expediency is the standard. The nature and extent of German war propaganda is well known in Allied countries. It was one of the chief factors in producing a feeling of revulsion against Germany, and is often cited as one of the reasons why the United States entered the war. The fact of Germany's guilt in this regard is too well authenticated to leave any room for doubt.

What the citizens of Allied countries do not realize sufficiently well, however, is that the people of Germany were equally well informed

concerning the war propaganda of the Allied governments. Since the conclusion of the war, several books have been written by Allied secret service men, which contain information concerning this propaganda. Sir Campbell Stuart, K. B. E., has published a volume entitled, "Secrets of Crewe House," which gives in some detail an account of the activities of Lord Northcliffe, Director of Propaganda in Enemy Countries, and his staff. Various chapters deal with "Operations Against Austria-Hungary," "Operations Against Germany," "Operations Against Bulgaria," "Inter-Allied Cooperation," "From War Propaganda to Peace Propaganda." In his Foreword the author says: "Much that was interesting and even dramatic can never be divulged."

War propaganda was not, of course, confined to enemy countries. Every government systematically deceived its own people. A rigid censorship prevailed everywhere. False reports concerning victories and defeats were constantly issued. Stories of atrocities committed by the enemy were grossly exaggerated or manufactured outright in some propaganda office.

Peoples were deceived by governments as to the real aims of the war. We wonder at the ease with which the German Government was able to deceive its people. We know now what was hidden from us at the time, that during the very period when Allied leaders were pronouncing the glorious aims of the war they were engaged in formulating a series of sordid secret treaties by means of which they planned to divide vast spoils of war among themselves.<sup>1</sup>

The writer is convinced that our own government cannot be justly accused of many of the excesses of Germany or even of the Allied governments. But our skirts are not clean. We had an efficient department of propaganda, under the direction of Mr. George Creel. It was known as the Committee on Public Information. "We did not call it propaganda," says Mr. Creel, "for that word, in German hands, had come to be associated with deceit and corruption." This Committee published and circulated more than 75 million books and pamphlets. "There was no part of the great war machinery that we did not

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> President Wilson and the American leaders were not parties to these secret treaties and seem not to have known of their existence.

touch," says Mr. Creel, "no medium of appeal that we did not employ. The printed word, the spoken word, the motion picture, the telegraph, the cable, the wireless, the poster, the sign-board—all these were used in our campaign to make our own people and all other peoples understand the cause that compelled America to take arms."

An examination of the literature circulated by this Committee—in the light of our present knowledge—reveals clearly the exaggerations and misrepresentations to which the American people were subjected. The weaknesses and crimes of Germany were emphasized in every possible way, often in a highly exaggerated form, while the Allies were pictured as paragons of virtue, intent only upon the destruction of militarism and autocracy, and the liberation of oppressed peoples. Almost everything good about Germany was suppressed, almost everything evil about the Allies was overlooked. The result was a picture which in many essentials was absolutely false.

A conspicuous illustration of war propaganda

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> See George Creel, "How We Advertised America," for details.

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is found in the exaggerations and falsehoods concerning the conduct of German submarine officers. In this connection, our own Rear Admiral Sims recently said: "Within the past few months, in speaking to various audiences on the operations of the German submarines, I have stated that their commanders, particularly those who operated in the open sea, were specially selected and thoroughly trained men, and therefore very dangerous enemies; that most of the accounts of atrocities popularly attributed to them were untrue; that, barring the case of the hospital ship, Llandovery Castle, I did not know of any case where a German submarine commander deliberately fired upon the boats of a torpedoed vessel; that the commanding officer and two other officers of the submarine that torpedoed that vessel were tried in Germany after the war and punished; that the submarine commanders generally acted in a humane manner in carrying out the orders of their Government, in some instances giving the boats of torpedoed merchant vessels food and water and a tow toward land, and sending out wireless signals giving their position.

. . . It may, of course, be assumed that the Allies reported for trial all cases of alleged atrocities. . . . But if the Allies could report but fifty-seven cases, this alone would appear to be conclusive evidence that there is no justification for the absurd belief, so universally held in America, that practically all the German submarine commanders were just devils in human form, capable of firing on defenceless men in open boats. As a matter of fact, this evidence shows that the vast majority were decent seamen. . . . If the war is of considerable duration and intensity, the relatively few cases of atrocities are multiplied by the inevitable popular hatred until a general belief is created that all members of the enemy's forces are just plain beasts."1

Throughout the war the peoples of the earth were fed upon lies, half-truths and misrepresentations. "All the trickery and subterfuge and war-wisdom of the ages brought up to date," says Captain Ferdinand Tuohy, himself a member of the British Secret Service, "intensified and harnessed to every modern invention and

<sup>1&</sup>quot;The Current History Magazine," June, 1923, pp. 357, 362. Italics mine.

device—such has been the latter-day intelligence.

. . . A Machiavelli, a Talleyrand or some other master schemer of the ages, come back to earth, would have thrilled to the amazing cunning and corruption of it all."

Throughout the period of hostilities a moratorium was declared on freedom of speech and press. All opinions that seemed objectionable to the authorities were banned, and offenders in this regard were threatened or jailed. This denial of civil liberties continued long after the war had ended. Under the wave of hysteria which swept over the world, national, state and municipal governments passed laws seriously abridging freedom of expression. Many of these laws remain upon the statute books and constitute an ever present menace to liberty of speech and press.

There were other moral casualties of the war. In the relations of the sexes there were heavy losses. War has always been accompanied by a tremendous increase in sexual immorality. This war was no exception to the rule. All along the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> "The Secret Corps," pp. 2-4.

line there has been a decline in moral standards and practices. The situation has been made much worse by the industrial depression and economic chaos in many countries following the war. England the volume of street soliciting has increased enormously. One competent observer goes so far as to say that there are ten times as many girls on the streets of London as before the war. In Paris and Berlin the situation seems to be even worse. It is a conservative estimate to say that in these cities hundreds of prostitutes may be seen within the radius of a few blocks. Nude dancing girls appear publicly in theaters and cabarets without interference from the authorities. Conditions were, of course, very bad prior to 1914, but there is no question but that the situation is now immeasurably worse than before the war. Evidence is to be found not only in the number of professional prostitutes but also in the increasing sex looseness among all classes of people. It may well be that in its ultimate effects upon humanity this collapse in sexual morality will prove to be the supreme cost of the war.

With regard to the total moral cost of the war, ex-Premier Nitti says: "The losses in human life and property, great as they are, are small evils compared to the undermining of morals and the lowering of standards of culture and civilization."

# (5) Religious Losses of the War

There were heavy spiritual losses also. It is impossible to estimate the number of men and women whose religious faith has been shattered by the colossal suffering and hideous injustice of the war. An unnumbered host of young men entered the war in a spirit of idealism and unselfish devotion to a great cause, only to return disillusioned and cynical as to the value of all ideals. Multitudes of people in all lands who responded to the supreme idealism of President Wilson were stunned by the actual decisions of the Versailles Conference and made skeptical concerning any ideals among statesmen. It will

¹ The writer is convinced that the betrayal of these ideals at Versailles was not primarily the fault of President Wilson. Indeed, he was the chief exponent of the ideals throughout the Peace Conference.

be exceedingly difficult to restore the faith of these disillusioned masses.

For the duration of the great conflict, hundreds of millions of people reverted to the worship of national war gods. Christians on different sides of the conflict prayed for precisely the opposite things. Each group believed that God was on its side and opposed to the enemy. The universality of religion was dealt a staggering blow.

The cause of Christian missions throughout the world was placed under a terrific handicap by the war. The already almost intolerable burdens under which Christian missionaries were compelled to labor, in their efforts to build a world of justice and goodwill, have been multiplied many fold. A native minister in India, in talking with a distinguished visitor from America, said: "You know that the educated people of this country look upon Christianity as a warring, bloodspilling religion." The shedding of rivers of human blood by opposing armies under the Christian banner will remain as a reproach and handicap to missionaries for generations to come.

Not least of the losses is the spiritual and

moral blindness which has been intensified as a result of the blessing of war by the forces of organized religion. Having once sanctioned the war, religious leaders were inhibited from denouncing the iniquities which are an inherent part of the war system. The German churches sanctioned war as a means of defending the Fatherland; they regarded submarines as essential to success; many of them were led, therefore, to justify even the sinking of the *Lusitania*. The Allied churches sanctioned war for the same reason; they regarded the blockade as essential to success; many of them were led, therefore, to justify the wholesale starvation of German women and children.

Having sanctioned the war, the churches were in no position to expose and denounce the falsehoods inherent in war. The situation is even more tragic than this—they were fed upon misrepresentation and falsehood with such effectiveness that many lost their ability to distinguish clearly between truth and falsehood. How many leaders of the churches in any of the Allied countries in 1919 had sufficient knowledge or insight

to realize that the Treaty of Versailles is a whole-sale repudiation of the terms upon which Germany had surrendered, and upon which the Armistice had been signed, and was a betrayal of the plighted word of the Allied leaders when they accepted the Fourteen Points and subsequent addresses of President Wilson? Here and there such a person could be found, but the overwhelming proportion accepted the Treaty as essentially just and reasonable. From what forces of organized religion in any Allied country was there any protest against the vindictive, barbarous and peace-destroying provisions of the Treaty?

By blessing war the churches have greatly intensified the widespread belief that force is the only effective means of dealing with wrong-doers, and have thereby contributed heavily to "the great pagan retrogression." The sanctioning of armed conflict by the churches has helped to shatter faith in goodwill and love as the greatest power in the world and has weakened the belief that it is possible to overcome evil with good. Their faint-hearted belief in spiritual forces and

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processes has inhibited them from an effective appeal to governments to abandon military force as a means of settling differences between nations.

# (6) Effects Upon the Future

The almost intolerable fact about the war is that, notwithstanding its stupendous costs—physical, material, moral and religious—it failed to end war. On the contrary, it scattered seeds all over Europe and the Near East from which future wars may emerge.

The war has created an appalling amount of hatred. For nearly ten years the creation of hatred has been one of the main tasks of governments. Hate has its uses in peace as well as in war, and governments have not been slow to arouse it when their objectives could be furthered in that way.

The greatest tragedy of all is that efforts along this line have not been confined to adults. Hatred has been systematically cultivated among children as well. Ex-Premier Nitti has written a disturbing paragraph in this connection: "Con-

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sider a little how national hatreds are being fostered. I have made a small collection of the books which have been widely disseminated since the war in French and Belgian schools, and if one cares to see with what industry the cult of national hatred is being encouraged, one could read nothing more instructive. For instance, there is a book written by a French directeur d'école for the schools, in the form of a history of the Great War entitled Pour Notre France. In it the Germans are described as hordes of savages, whose profession is war, who go about to despoil, to devastate, and to terrorize. There is a long series of statements made to kindle hate against them."

This kind of instruction is being given all over Europe. It is almost maddening to think intently upon the things to which millions of children and young people have been subjected during the past decade: bloodshed, violence, terror, exposure, exile, hunger, disease, homelessness, bereavement, hatred! And all these during the most plastic age, when impressions are most

<sup>&</sup>quot;The Decadence of Europe," p. XXVII. See Will Irwin "Christ or Mars" for further evidence along this line.

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lasting. In what way could an archfiend more certainly insure violence, bloodshed and universal catastrophe in the years ahead?

And to hatred must be added fear. It was fear more than any other factor that caused the war. And now the war has produced a new crop of fear. Never in human history has such a vast population been haunted by fear. Hatred is followed by fear. Fear in turn brings forth greater hatred. Fear and hatred together are blinding to reason and morality. Hence the dreadful spectacle of the present hour in Eu-Millions of people hungry and undernourished, governments bankrupt and unable to balance budgets, and yet half a million more men under arms than in 1913, that mad year of rivalry in armaments! And this in spite of the fact that two of the greatest of the old armies have vanished, those of Germany and Austria-Hungary. France has had a larger army since the war than Germany had when the Prussian sword-rattling was the loudest.

Economic rivalry between the various powers has been greatly intensified by the war. If for

no other reason, this is true because economic pressure is vastly more acute. Millions of people are dependent upon foreign trade for their very lives. Governments feel under greater obligations than ever to render all possible assistance to their traders and concession-hunters. This inevitably means a clash between two governments whose citizens are seeking the same prize. In the past such clashes have often led to war. Prospects in this realm are now very far from encouraging.

And then there are those millions who were defeated and crushed, who are sincerely convinced that the terms of the Armistice were regarded as mere scraps of paper by the Allies, who regard the Treaty of Versailles and other treaties negotiated at the end of the war as documents of iniquity and gross injustice, who are smarting under the military occupation of strategic sections of their country, who are compelled to provide of their countrywomen to satisfy the lusts of the invaders in brothels maintained out of their own taxes, who are by no

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> See ex-Premier Francesco Nitti, "The Decadence of Europe," p. 128, for details in this connection.

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means resigned to the loss of vast territories and millions of their former comrades—what of these embittered and suffering multitudes? If one Alsace-Lorraine could trouble the peace of Europe for a generation, what will be the ultimate consequences of a dozen such areas?

Mr. Lloyd George has recently enumerated some of the friction points in Europe and the Near East as follows: "There is the annexation of Vilna by force; there is the annexation of Galicia by force, by violence, by the use of arms against the will of the population. Elsewhere you have the German and Pole quarreling over Silesia; the Russian and the Pole over doubtful boundaries; the Czech and the Magyar; the Serbian and the Bulgarian; the Russian and the Rumanian; the Rumanian and the Magyar. There is the age-long feud between Greek and Turk. All have an air of biding opportunity, all are armed ready for slaughter. Europe is a seething cauldron of international hates, with powerful men in command of the fuel stores feeding the flames and stoking the fires."1

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> David Lloyd George, "Where Are We Going?" p. 38.

There is still another danger which must be faced: violent revolution, political and economic chaos in Germany. This is not likely to come unless masses of German people are driven to desperation by hunger and the hard hand of the invader. And yet one is made to feel uneasy by what he sees and hears in Germany. Multitudes of people are hungry now and the petty regulations, steady pressure, and occasional outrage in the occupied areas are galling beyond expression to these proud people. The writer has just returned from a visit to Berlin, the Ruhr and the occupied area. He had the opportunity of getting an expression of opinion from Germans of many different professions and points of view, as well as from influential foreigners. He was sorely troubled by the fact that almost every person with whom he talked felt sure there would be a communist revolution or a violent uprising of some kind before the winter is over. And then what? Can anyone predict what Russia will do?

These are some of the reasons why many careful observers are warning us that more possible

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causes of war exist today than in 1913 and that, judged by all visible evidence, we are nearer war today than in the early months of 1914. We cannot escape the fact that hatred, fear, huge armaments, desperate economic rivalry, coupled with the desire for revenge and restitution, are unstable foundations for an enduring peace.

# (7) Summary.

We have seen that the World War resulted in at least the temporary destruction of militarism and autocracy in Germany and Austria-Hungary. On the other hand, it cost 26 million lives, 337 billion dollars, the moral deterioration of whole nations, spiritual tragedies beyond computation, and the sowing of the seeds of future wars.

The war has gone much deeper into the life of the world than we can now realize. Some of its worst effects are just beginning to be felt, and its ultimate consequences will not be visible to this generation. We are able, however, to discern its true nature with sufficient clearness to reach certain definite conclusions concerning

it. We do not need any further proof that the war system creates an unworkable society. The war spirit makes impossible the degree of cooperation which is imperative in a world where peoples and nations are so dependent upon each other. The World War dealt western civilization a staggering blow. Many careful observers are warning us that another great war will result in the collapse of European civilization. One does not need to be an alarmist to say this. The lesson of history at this point is clear. Several great civilizations have already perished because of war. The ruins of Babylon, Egypt, Assyria, Persia, Greece and Rome constitute a solemn warning to present-day Europe. If the people of this generation are to escape a relapse into barbarism, the war system must quickly be uprooted and cast out of our social structure.

#### CHAPTER III

# HOW CAN FURTHER WARS BE PREVENTED?

Almost everybody in the world is eager to prevent war. The menace of war is so great that many of the best minds of the earth are now devoted to the task of its prevention. A multitude of remedies are being advocated. A list of these measures includes military preparedness, no-more-war parades, resolutions against war, exhortations to individuals to go on record as refusing to sanction or participate in any war, open diplomacy, popular referendums, disarmament conferences, arbitration treaties, the outlawry of war, the World Court, the League of Nations, etc.

The first conclusion reached by any serious student of international affairs is that there is no panacea for war. No single plan is adequate to prevent all wars. The situation is much too complex. The war system is too deeply em-

bedded in our social structure. Many different sorts of measures must be advocated simultaneously if war is to be abolished. For the purpose of this discussion, these measures have been grouped under five headings.

# (1) Abandonment of Economic Imperialism.

War cannot be abolished without the payment of a great price. One of the elements of this cost is the willingness of Governments to refrain from using national armies, navies and diplomatic influence to aid their citizens in gaining or maintaining economic concessions or other financial advantages in foreign countries. War is likely to break out at any time so long as present practices in this regard are continued.<sup>1</sup>

Economic imperialism is now finding expression through three main channels: (1) the securing of new territory and concessions; (2) the maintenance and enlargement of markets; and (3) the investment of capital in foreign coun-

The Federal Council of the Churches of Christ, the National Catholic Welfare Council, and the Central Conference of American Rabbis are now engaged in a joint research into the economic causes of war, and are planning to issue a series of bulletins, with regard to which information may be secured by communicating with Rev. F. Ernest Johnson, 105 East 22nd Street, New York City.

tries. There have been important recent developments with regard to the first of these. The various treaties negotiated at the end of the war provided for numerous transfers of territories and valuable mineral rights. Indeed, the major diplomatic struggles of recent years have centered around oil, coal and iron. Many of the most important provisions of the Treaty of Versailles deal with these three. Any doubt as to the strategic position of oil in current diplomacy will be removed by reading a recent book by a French writer, Francis Delaisi, "Oil: Its Influence on Politics." The significant fact in this connection is not that citizens of various countries are competing with each other for favorable access to supplies of oil, but that Governments are supporting them diplomatically, financially and with threats of military action.

A good illustration of the practices of Governments in this regard is found in the report of the Acting Secretary of State, Mr. Frank L. Polk, transmitted to the Senate on May 17, 1920, by President Wilson, from which the following quotation is taken:

"The policy of the British Empire is reported to be to bring about the exclusion of aliens from the control of the petroleum supplies of the Empire, and to endeavor to secure some measure of control over oil properties in foreign countries. This policy appears to be developing along the the following lines, which are directly or indirectly restrictive on citizens of the United States: 1. By debarring foreigners and foreign nationals from owning or operating oil-producing properties in the British Isles, colonies, and protectorates. 2. By direct participation in ownership and control of petroleum properties. 3. By arrangements to prevent British oil companies from selling their properties to foreign-owned or controlled companies. 4. By Orders in Council that prohibit the transfer of shares in British oil companies to other than British subjects or nationals." There is an abundance of evidence to show that Great Britain is not the only nation which follows such a policy.

Governments are also aiding their citizens to gain more favorable access to markets by subsi-

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Francis Delaisi, "Oil," p. 39.

dies, tariffs and preferential treatment in colonies and regions under their control. Since the precedent set by Lord Palmerton in 1850, Governments have also frequently collected debts in foreign countries for their citizens. Governments are constantly taking measures against other nations to insure the safety of investments which their citizens have made.

For these three reasons—to gain new territory and economic concessions, to widen markets, and to protect investments—innumerable wars have been waged and hardly a year has passed without the threat of war. Of course, the economic causes of war are never proclaimed boldly by Governments to their citizens. Support for such wars is gained by appealing to national pride, national safety and jealousy of other countries. International economic competition is growing keener and situations out of which economic wars may arise are much more numerous than ever before.

Prior to 1918 the United States played minor rôle in the struggle for territory, concessions and markets. We were a debtor nation,

the amount of foreign capital invested in our country being far in excess of the amount of American capital invested abroad. The World War, however, has changed all this. We are now the great creditor nation, international banker and money lender, and are inextricably bound up with the economic and financial problems of the whole world.

Let us notice some of the ways in which the United States is entangled in foreign problems. The Hawaiian Islands, the Philippine Islands, Guam, Porto Rico, Guantanamo, and the Panama Canal are under American control. Our customs system has been extended to Hawaii, preferential duties are granted to American commodities imported into the Philippines, Cuba and Porto Rico, and the products of these islands are favored when entering the United States.<sup>1</sup>

In 1902 Venezuela defaulted in payments due to foreign investors. The English, German and Italian Governments promptly blockaded the Venezuelan Coast. This in turn called for the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Professor Achille Viallate, "Economic Imperialism and International Relations," p. 70.

diplomatic intervention of the United States, and the trouble was ended pacifically. The incident, however, has great significance because of its bearing upon the Monroe Doctrine and the question of the responsibilities of the United States in protecting foreign investments in Latin America.

In his message of December, 1904, President Roosevelt said: "Chronic wrongdoing, or an impotence which results in a general loosening of the ties of civilized society, may in America, as elsewhere, ultimately require intervention by some civilized nation, and in the Western Hemisphere the adherence of the United States to the Monroe Doctrine may force the United States, however reluctantly, in flagrant cases of such wrongdoing or impotence to the exercise of an international police power."

This threat has since been carried into effect in several instances, and the Dominican Republic, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Haiti have all been forced to accept the "financial protectorate" of the United States.¹ The government of Haiti

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup>Professor Achille Viallate, "Economic Imperialism and International Relations," p. 66 ff.

is controlled by American Marines. Recently a loan of sixteen million dollars was negotiated with American bankers, with a provision for a considerable degree of American control for thirty years, the duration of the loan. Two groups of American bankers control the railroads of Nicaragua, as well as its customs and other finances. United States Marines are stationed in Guatemala for the purpose of safeguarding investments. Peru, Bolivia and other South American countries are also securing loans from bankers in the United States. Twice within recent years, United States troops have invaded Mexico for the purpose of protecting American lives and property. Disputes between American bankers and the Mexican Government are responsible for the long delay in recognition of that Government by the United States.

The United States is also entangled in world finance by the debts, aggregating ten or eleven billion dollars, owed by foreign nations. Fur-

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup>See Norman Thomas, "The Challenge of War: An Economic Interpretation," a valuable pamphlet, which may be obtained from the League for Industrial Democracy, 70 Fifth Avenue, New York City, for ten cents.

thermore, American investors now have very large holdings of European bonds—national, municipal and industrial. American corporations are also securing valuable mining rights and other concessions throughout the earth.

A conspicous example is found in the so-called Chester Concession. On April 11, 1923, the Turkish National Assembly awarded to the Ottoman-American Development Company, headed by Rear Admiral Chester, a retired United States naval officer, extensive concessions for the building of railroads, the exploitation of mines and the execution of other large projects. The fulfillment of this agreement would involve an expenditure of from \$200,000,000 to \$300,-000,000, and the exploitation of mineral and other natural resources valued at more than \$10,000,000,000. The oil fields of the Erzerum, Bitlis, Van and Mosul districts are estimated to have potentially over 8,000,000,000 barrels of oil; the Arghana copper mine is estimated to have 200,000,000 tons of high grade copper ore. These territories are also rich in gold, platinum, silver, iron, lead, zinc, mercury, cobalt, manga-

nese, nickel, antimony, coal and salt. The total length of the railways to be constructed is 2,714 miles. Three port cities are to be constructed. The duration of the contract is ninety-nine years.<sup>1</sup>

In this connection, The Nation said editorially: "Admiral Chester's concession in Turkey is as orthodox a forward step in imperialism as could be conceived. It grew out of an expedition for the protection of missionaries; it includes oil, copper, iron and railroads; it conflicts with claims advanced in behalf of the subjects of two other great powers, and has about as many possibilities of international squabbles hidden away in its clauses as could possibly be tucked into a single document."

These, then, are some of the ways in which America is tied up with the economic and financial problems of the world—which problems, let it be remembered, are the chief causes of modern wars: foreign territories, foreign protector-

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup>For the full text of this agreement, together with an illuminating discussion, see the New York Times Current History Magazine, June, 1923, p. 393 ff. See also E. M. Earle, "Turkey, the Great Powers and the Bagdad Railway," pp. 336 ff.

<sup>2</sup> April 25, 1923, p. 481.

ates, foreign loans, foreign investments, foreign concessions. In the light of these entanglements, it is supreme folly to talk of the United States following a course of splendid isolation. No war of the future—great or small—will fail to affect the financial interests of American citizens. "Once a great European war merely deranged our trade," says Professor Beard; "in the future it will disturb every investor in every village Main Street."

What is to be the policy of the United States Government when the investments and rights of her citizens in foreign countries are jeopardized? So far as Latin American countries are concerned our policy seems to be well defined—that of protection by military force. Wherein does this policy differ from that of European nations, which has so often led to war? Is the chief difference found in the weakness of the defaulting nations and the absence of any formidable rival in the Western Hemisphere? How does this policy affect American efforts to induce other countries to change policies which are a menace to the peace of the world?

It is obvious that the capital of more advanced nations is needed to aid in the development of more backward countries. It is in the exploitation of these backward nations that the danger is found. It seems clear that we may expect wars so long as economic exploitation is enforced by diplomacy and military power. The first step, therefore, in preventing further wars, is to abandon this fatal policy. Several plans for improving conditions in this regard have been offered. As far back as 1867 the Brazilian jurist, Calvo, maintained that foreigners had no right to expect their Governments to intervene either with military force or diplomatic action in purely financial disputes.

At the first Pan-American Conference in 1890 all the Latin American countries voted for a resolution maintaining that foreigners should have the same status as citizens and the same legal protection for life and property, and no more. The delegates of the United States refused to accept this declaration, and, in the words of Professor Viallate, "supported the custom followed by foreign governments of upholding

the claims of their citizens in instances of default, of forcing compulsory loans, and of committing other oppressive acts."<sup>1</sup>

In 1904, Luis Drago, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Argentine Republic, proposed "that the public debt cannot occasion armed intervention nor even the actual occupation of the territory of American nations by European powers." This proposal, known as Drago's Doctrine, came before the Hague Conference in 1907, and received the support of the delegates of the United States, but was defeated. It is interesting to note that the United States Government was unwilling to have European powers adopt its own well-defined policy in Latin America.

If the statesmen of the various nations desire to prevent further wars, it is imperative that they should quickly agree to some such proposal as that advanced by Calvo. The adoption and adherence to such a measure would be a significant contribution to the abolition of war.

Sooner or later the peoples of the earth will

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> See "Economic Imperialism," p. 65 ff.

find it necessary to formulate a plan of international control of raw materials. During the war the Allies adopted measures along this line. So long as the various nations continue their mad scramble for monopolization of the raw materials of the earth there is no hope of permanent peace or prosperity.

## (2) Disarmament

Armaments are the chief cause of fear between nations. Fear is the chief cause of war. War produces still greater fear. Fear in turn produces larger armaments. This is the vicious circle in which the nations have been traveling during the past century, with armaments piling higher and higher, and fear steadily increasing.

Moreover, huge armaments destroy confidence in other means of protection and of securing justice. The presence of large numbers of officers and soldiers—trained to think only in terms of force—has a profound influence upon public opinion, as we now know from the tragic example of Germany. Thus whole populations come to depend more and more upon armies and navies. This tends to perpetuate the deifi-

cation of physical force, which Benjamin Kidd justly calls "the great pagan retrogression" of Western civilization.

Armaments are the chief reliance of diplomats and traders in their exploitation of weaker peoples. The history of European diplomacy during the past century supports this conclusion. Without huge armies and navies the spoilation of Africa, China and other parts of the world by the great powers would not have been possible.

Armaments are the heaviest financial burden of modern Governments. Statistics leave no room for doubt at this point. The Bureau of Efficiency has prepared a chart showing the percentage of the total budget of the United States Government in 1922 expended for various purposes, of which the following is a summary:

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> See his "Science of Power" for an extraordinarily illuminating discussion of this point.

| Group II. Research, education and development                                     |     | Amount        | Per  <br>Cent |
|---|-----|---------------|---------------|
| work  |     | 55,530,280    | 2.0           |
| Group III. Public works   | _   | 162,852,690   | 6.0           |
| Total civil expenditures  |     |               | •             |
| (net)   | \$  | 386,569,219   | 14.2          |
| Group IV. Army and Navy<br>Group V. Pensions and care                             | \$  | 547,946,364   | 20.2          |
| of soldiers   |     | 702,139,116   | 25.9          |
| Group VI. Special activities pertaining to recent                                 |     |               |               |
| war   |     | 10,534,057    | 0.4           |
| Group VII. Interest Group VIII. Retirement of                                     |     | 721,286,130   | 26.6          |
| public debt   |     | 345,097,000   | 12.7          |
| Total expenditures to pay<br>for wars of the past and<br>prepare for future wars: | \$  | 2,327,002,667 | 85.8*         |
| Grand total net expenditures  | \$2 | 2,713,571,886 | 100.0         |

<sup>\*</sup>The Secretary of War has challenged these percentages and has issued a chart of his own, in which he uses *gross* expenditures. According to his chart the postoffice costs more than national defence, whereas the postoffice is practically self-supporting, while the army and navy cost more than 500 millions. See the Literary Digest, April 28, 1923, in this connection.

The percentage of war costs in other nations is also very high. For 1923, France is spending 23 per cent of its total budget to maintain its army and navy, Great Britain 15 per cent, and Japan 34 per cent, not to mention the large percentages for pensions and other World War costs.<sup>1</sup>

The enormous expenditure upon armaments diverts funds from more constructive uses. So much money was spent on armaments in the United States last year that only 2 per cent of the total budget was available for education, research, and development work. Numerous constructive tasks are left undone because the necessary funds are lacking.

The evidence is complete that armaments are not only an enormous burden upon the peoples of the world, but are the chief cause of fear, and, therefore, the chief cause of war. The vicious circle of armaments, fear, war, more armaments, must be broken if Western civilization is to survive. Fortunately, a wave of protest against

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> See Labour Research Bulletin, April, 1923, p. 13. See Arthur Guy Enock, "The Problem of Armaments," pp. 182 ff., for the percentages spent upon war by the great powers each year from 1900 to 1920.

huge armaments is beginning to sweep across the world. The response to the Washington Conference is an indication of the enthusiasm of the masses everywhere for reduction of armaments. This movement, if it is to have permanent success, must include all nations. The most likely ways to make progress in this direction are through the League of Nations, or through an all-embracing World Conference on Armaments. Public opinion should see to it that one of these methods is adopted in the immediate future.<sup>1</sup>

# (3) Abolition of Secret Diplomacy

The main reason why secret diplomacy has prevailed is because so many acts of diplomats will not bear the light of day. The chief reason why foreign offices are able to continue in their wrongdoing is because of the secrecy and irresponsibility of their movements. Here we have another vicious circle that must be broken. The abandonment by Governments of the practice

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup>For an illuminating account of the history of the movement for disarmament, see Dr. Hans Wehberg, "The Limitation of Armaments," which may be secured from The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, D. C.

of supporting their citizens in the economic exploitation of weaker peoples will largely remove the need for secret diplomacy. On the other hand, open diplomacy with full publicity of all major activities of diplomats will help enormously in securing the abandonment of imperialistic designs. It is essential, therefore, that simultaneous efforts should be made in these fields.

To this end, it is imperative that committees of Congress and Parliaments, composed of representatives of all parties, should have free access to all files and papers of the State Department and Foreign Offices. The Secretary of State should be compelled to print in full all treaties and understandings with other nations, and to make comprehensive reports of all dealings with foreign powers. The foreign policy should be subject to constant review by the duly elected representatives of the people. A greater degree of democratic control of the foreign policies of the various nations is one of the dominant needs of the hour.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> For a suggestive treatment of this point, see E. D. Morel, M. P., "The Secret History of a Great Betrayal."

- (4) Establishment of International Processes of Justice
- (a) The Outlawry of War.—Law and social organization are the alternative to war. Throughout human history disputes have arisen between individuals and between groups. These disputes have been settled by physical combat or by conference. Present day disputants, individuals or groups, may resort to force or reach a reasoned agreement. Centuries of experience has demonstrated that a basis of reasoned agreement must be established before individuals or groups will refrain from armed combat. This means law and social organization. And so through the centuries mankind has been building up, slowly and painfully, a code of law and appropriate machinery for the necessary legislation, adjudication and enforcement.

In no realm has this been easy or wholly successful. Strong and aggressive individuals have often successfully resisted all efforts toward social control. The same thing has been true with regard to strong tribes, strong cities, strong states, and conspicuously so in recent years

with strong nations. Gradually, however, in the face of gigantic obstacles and after many retrogressions, law and social machinery have replaced armed combat between individuals, cities and states within nations. Murders still occur, of course, and at long intervals civil wars break out. But these are the exception. The normal and universally accepted rule in civilized countries is to settle disputes between individuals, cities and states within a nation, on a basis of law and to depend upon social control for the securing of justice and freedom.

The one great exception to this procedure, of course, is found in the settling of disputes between nations. Here war is the universally recognized and legal institution. Mankind learns slowly. Even the holocaust of the World War has not caused nations to abandon armed conflict. Strong and aggressive nations still resist all effective efforts toward social control. Gradually, however, the light is breaking through the deep darkness. An increasing number of men and women everywhere are asking: If freedom, justice and the common good of individuals and

cities can best be promoted by law and social control, why is this not also true for nations? If armed conflict between individuals and cities should be outlawed, why is not this equally true of armed conflict between nations?

One of the ways in which this sentiment is finding expression in the United States is through the American Committee for the Outlawry of War. Mr. S. O. Levinson and the late Senator Knox began the formulation of a proposal to outlaw war by making it a crime among nations. Professor John Dewey, Judge Florence Allen, and Mr. Raymond Robins, are outstanding advocates of this plan. On February 14, 1923, Senator Borah incorporated this idea in a resolution which he introduced in the Senate.

The plan of the Committee for the Outlawry of War contains two provisions which seem to the writer to destroy much of the effectiveness of the movement, viz.: "National armaments shall be reduced to the lowest point consistent

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Full information concerning this movement may be secured by communicating with the American Committee for the Outlawry of War, 76 West Monroe Street, Chicago.

with domestic safety and with the necessities of international requirements. Maintenance of armies and navies for defense against imminent or actual attacks, but not for acts of aggression." As a matter of fact, all the great armies at the present time are justified by the respective nations on exactly these grounds. War is never going to be outlawed so long as huge armies are retained.<sup>1</sup>

The three pillars of this plan—proclaiming war to be a crime, the codification of international law, and the establishment of an international court with affirmative jurisdiction—are sound, and should be adopted by the nations. This may be done in one of three ways—through the Hague Tribunal, the League of Nations, or a world conference especially called for this purpose. Every citizen who is seeking international justice and good should throw the weight of his influence behind this proposal to outlaw war as a crime.

(b) The World Court.—During the nine-

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> For an interesting discussion in this connection see Walter Lippman's article in The Atlantic Monthly, August, 1923, and Professor Dewey's article in The New Republic, October 3, 1923.

teenth century there was a steady tendency toward arbitration between nations. Professor John Bassett Moore has pointed out that of the 136 cases of arbitration in that century, 117 occurred during the latter half. Several wars were prevented in this way. The Hague Conferences of 1899 and 1907 made a significant contribution in this realm. The Hague Tribunal as established has, however, none of the essential elements of a world court. It is really only a panel of judges, from which arbitrators may be selected by two or more nations to settle a dispute which has arisen. Since 1902 seventeen cases have been brought before it for decision. It has no permanent bench of judges. All attempts to give the Tribunal a permanent character have failed.

At the end of the War it was generally recognized that a permanent world court was imperatively needed. The Covenant of the League of Nations provided for the establishment of such a court. The Council of the League invited a committee of eminent jurists, including Mr. Elihu Root from the United States, to aid in formulating plans for such a court. After sev-

eral changes had been made, this plan was adopted unanimously by the Assembly of the League on December 13, 1920. The protocol of the International Court has been ratified by 31 nations, including France, Great Britain, Italy and Japan, of the major powers.

On Sepember 16, 1921, the following eleven judges and four deputy judges were elected by a majority vote of the Assembly and the Council: Altamira of Spain, Anzilotti of Italy, Barboza of Brazil, de Bustamente of Cuba, Finlay of Great Britain, Huber of Switzerland, Loder of Holland, Moore of the United States, Nyholm of Denmark, Oda of Japan, Weiss of France; deputy judges: Beichmann of Norway, Negulesco of Roumania, Wang of China, Yovanovitch of Jugo-Slavia.

At the present time the Court has a very limited jurisdiction. The recommendation of the committee of jurists—that in the last resort any nation should have the right to sue another nation for redress and compel appearance before the International Court—was not adopted. The

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> In 1923 Señor Pessoa of Brazil was elected to succeed M. Barboza, deceased.

Court is, therefore, competent to deal only with those cases where all parties to a dispute are willing to abide by its decisions. This is, of course, a very grave weakness which must be corrected if the Court is to be effective in dealing with those cases which are the greatest menace to the peace of the world. Eighteen nations have, however, adhered to the clause for obligatory jurisdiction. Thus far only matters of relatively minor importance have been brought before the Court. Another great handicap is the absence of any well defined code of international law.

The International Court is the latest step in the long march from armed combat to reasoned agreement. It is a beginning, not an end. It has serious limitations and flaws which will wreck its usefulness if neglected.¹ It can, however, be changed when the nations are so minded, and undoubtedly will be greatly modified during the next few years. The entrance

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup>For a very severe criticism of the International Court as now constituted see "The United States of America in Relation to the Permanent Court of International Justice of the League of Nations," a brief of 192 pages by Miss Frances Kellor.

of the United States would enable it to gain strength more rapidly.

(c) The League of Nations.—Courts are essential to the maintenance of peace and justice. But courts alone are inadequate for this purpose. There must also be legislation and administration. This is just as true with regard to international peace and justice as in the realm of municipalities and states. Therefore, not only is an international court needed, but international legislation and international administration are also essential.

At this point, however, we are confronted with gigantic difficulties, due to the fact that nations insist upon supreme sovereignty and refuse to admit that there is any higher law than their own interests and desires. This is the way tribes and cities formerly acted. For centuries barons maintained that their own will was sovereign and resisted all efforts toward national legislation and administration. Following our Revolutionary War, the thirteen states engaged in long and bitter controversy over their respective sovereign rights. Gradually, however, the

sphere of legislation, adjudication and administration has widened and now embraces states and nations. We happen to be living during the period of violent antagonism to the proposal that this sphere should be widened still further to include the international field as well.

Progress, however, is being made—although at a tragically slow pace. It has been a long time since Hugo Grotius, William Penn and Kant submitted their respective plans for world peace. Eighty years have passed since Tennyson wrote:

Till the war-drum throbb'd no longer, and the battle flags were furl'd

In the Parliament of man, the Federation of the world.

There the common sense of most shall hold a fretful realm in awe,

And the kindly earth shall slumber, lapt in universal law.

The League of Nations is, of course, the latest effort to establish a Parliament of Man. The fact that first impressions of the League in the United States were formed during an extraor-

dinarily bitter and abusive political campaign has proved to be a collossal misfortune for the whole of mankind. The fact that many people believe that the League was let down from heaven without spot or blemish, while others are equally sure it was fished out of the gutters of hell, makes it extremely difficult for Americans to reach a balanced judgment concerning its virtues and its faults.

The real significance of the League, as has been pointed out by Mr. Arthur Sweetser, an American member of the Secretariat, is that 52 nations—including all the major powers except the United States, Germany and Russia—"have solemnly signed a short, simple round-robin agreement, first, not to go to war without arbitration or conciliation, and, second, to work together for the general betterment of world relations."

There are five ways in which the League seeks to avoid war: (1) By referring disputes to conciliation or arbitration by a third party; (2) By providing for a delay in beginning hos-

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Quoted in Irving Fisher's "League or War," p. 66. Professor Fisher's book is an excellent discussion of this whole subject.

tilities, pending a recommendation or decision; (3) By second and third attempts at arbitration when necessary; (4) by providing for an economic boycott against any nation which refuses to yield to the judgment of the arbitrator; (5) by resorting to common military action, as a last resort, against a recalcitrant nation.

The League possesses six essential mechanisms for achieving its purposes: an Assembly, a Council, an International Court, an International Labor Organization, various Committees and Commissions, and a permanent Secretariat. The Assembly is a great conference, where representatives of the various nations gather to discuss all manner of international questions. Its discussions are given wide publicity and help to bring about a better understanding of world problems. Out of such discussions are emerging those common judgments of the nations which we call international law.

The Council is the executive committee of the League. It meets frequently and is subject to call quickly when emergencies arise which threaten the peace of the world. At the present

time the Council is far more powerful than the Assembly, and is dominated by two or three major powers.

The International Court has been discussed in a previous section. The International Labor Organization is composed of four representatives of each Member Nation, two representing the Government and one each representing employers' associations and labor organizations. An Annual Conference is held, at which draft conventions are agreed upon and submitted to national legislatures for ratification. Thus far the draft conventions submitted have dealt with the principle of an eight-hour day and a fortyeight-hour week, provisions against unemployment, the employment of women before and after childbirth, the employment of women during the night, the minimum age of employment of children in industry, the securing of a rest period of twenty-four consecutive hours for all workers in industry, etc. The International Labor Office has a permanent secretariat and is bringing about a better understanding of labor problems and is helping to lay foundations upon

which effective international labor legislation may be built.

Among the various Commissions and Committees of the League are the following: Governing Commission for the Saar Territory, Governing Commission for Danzig, the Upper Silesian Mixed Commission and various other Plebiscite Commissions, various Commissions of Inquiry, Permanent Mandates Commission, Permanent Armaments Commission, Committee on the Financial Reconstruction of Austria, General Committee on International Health, Committee on Intellectual Cooperation, Committee on the Suppression of Traffic in Women and Children, Committee on the Traffic in Opium, Committee on Repatriation of Prisoners of War, Committee on Russian Relief, Committee on Relief of Greek and Armenian Refuges, etc.

The Secretariat is a permanent civil service for the League. At the head there is a Secretary-General, assisted by a Deputy Secretary-General, two Undersecretaries, and a staff of 300 members.

Some of the chief accomplishments of the

League thus far are as follows: Assisted in the prevention of four wars—between Sweden and Finland over the Aaland Islands, between Poland and Germany over Upper Silesia, between Albania and Jugo-Slavia over a boundary line, between Poland and Lithuania—although it must be admitted that two or three of these settlements may not prove permanently satisfactory; the launching of the International Court; promotion of health, morals, education, labor legislation, and open diplomacy by the registration of treaties; the financial resuscitation of Austria.

The list is, of course, conspicuous for its omissions. It does not include the major problems which are threatening the very existence of European civilization. No friend of the League is justified in closing his eyes to the fact that thus far it has played a relatively minor part in international affairs. Such persons should give careful attention to the serious criticisms of the League which are being made by some of the ablest citizens of the United States and other countries. It is supreme folly to

ignore the kind of criticism advanced by Miss Frances Kellor, who maintains that "eight member states of the League of Nations have resorted to arms in violation of Articles XI, XII, XIII and XV of the Covenant, none having first submitted its dispute to arbitration; and no member state has been penalized under Article XVI. Three states, under the administrative control of the League of Nations, have grievances of a grave character which the League has not submitted to judicial review; in one other state the League of Nations has validated an alleged injustice without inquiry or knowledge. Four member states of the League of Nations are in dispute over territorial rights, in which disputes the League of Nations has not intervened to secure a settlement by arbitral methods."1

An evaluation of the relative successes and failures of the League to date is not, however, an adequate answer to the question as to whether or not it deserves and should receive the support of the citizens of the United States. Many

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> See Miss Kellor's brief for a relentless criticism of the League as constituted at present.

of the criticisms of the League are undoubtedly justified. It should be pointed out, however, that many of these are not really criticisms of the League so much as they are criticisms of the various Governments.

Critics of the League often fail to give adequate consideration to the manner of its birth and the tumultuous world in which its infancy has been spent. The years from 1914 to 1919 saw the hatreds and baser passions of mankind raised to new heights, whole populations were fed upon falsehood and misrepresentation, the military and economic collapse of the Central Powers gave an unparalleled opportunity to the forces of revenge and greed, nationalism was highly intensified by the patriotism of wartime, fear and suspicion abounded everywhere, faith in the power of persuasion and goodwill were shattered by years of violence and bloodshed. From one angle of the situation, there had never been an hour during the past hundred years more unpropitious for the birth of the League than at the close of the most destructive war in the whole history of the human race. The hatreds

and vile passions released by the war still exist; many of them are being intensified by the vicious treaty; which was itself the natural and logical outcome of violence and untruth.

The extreme sensitiveness of the various powers with regard to national sovereignty has been responsible for the withholding of necessary power from the League. This is exactly what has happened repeatedly in the evolution of law and government. It is the old story of individuals, families, tribes, cities and states being jealous of their sovereign rights and refusing to grant adequate power to social organization.<sup>1</sup>

An almost exact parallel to the present fear of the League by sovereign nations is found in the attitude of the thirteen free and independent States toward the Continental Congress, following our Revolutionary War. Mr. James Madison, one of the men who had most to do with the adoption of the Constitution, said: "The principal difficulties which embarrassed

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> See "The Prevention of War," by Philip Kerr and Lionel Curtis, Chapter I, for a most illuminating analysis of extreme national sovereignty as a cause of war.

the progress, and retarded the completion, of the plan of Confederation may be traced to first, the natural repugnance of parties to a relinquishment of power; secondly, a natural jealousy of its abuse in other hands than their own; thirdly, the rule of suffrage among parties whose inequality in size did not correspond with that of their wealth, or of their military or free population; fourthly, the selection and definition of the powers, at once necessary to the federal head, and safe to the several members. But the radical infirmity of the Articles of Confederation was the dependence of Congress on the voluntary and simultaneous compliance with its requisitions by so many independent communities, each consulting more or less its particular interests and convenience, and distrusting the compliance of others."1

In this connection, Professor J. B. McMaster has pointed out that "the state into which Congress had fallen was most wretched. Rudely formed amid the agonies of a revolution, the Confederation had never been revised and

<sup>&</sup>quot;Journal of the Federal Convention, kept by James Madison," edited by E. H. Scott, pp. 32, 34.

brought nearer to perfection in a sense of tranquillity. Each of the thirteen States the Union bound together retained all the rights of sovereignty, and asserted them punctiliously against the central government. Each reserved to itself the right to put up mints, to strike money, to levy taxes, to raise armies, to say what articles should come into its ports free and what should be made to pay duty. Toward the Continental Government they acted precisely as if they were dealing with a foreign power. . . . Every act of that body was scrutinized with the utmost care. The transfer of the most trivial authority beyond the borders of the States was made with protestations, with trembling, and with fear. Delaware and Georgia ceased to be represented. . . . The House was repeatedly forced to adjourn day after day for want of a quorum. On more than one occasion these adjournments covered a period of thirteen consecutive days. ... On the largest ballot the House could cast, six votes could make the question pass in the negative. It is not surprising, therefore, that Congress speedily degenerated into a de-

bating club, and a debating club of no very high order. Neglected by its own members, insulted and threatened by mutinous troops, reviled by the press, and forced to wander from city to city in search of an abiding place, its acts possessed no national importance whatever. . . . Congress possessed but the semblance of power. The States possessed the substance. Congress could merely entreat, persuade, suggest. The States could act."

The consequences of all this was described by Professor McMaster in the following words: "The newspapers were full of bankrupt notices. The farmers' taxes amounted to near the rent of their farms. Mechanics wandered up and down the streets of every city, destitute of work. Ships, shut out from every port of Europe, lay rotting in the harbors. The American name was insulted at every court. Would any person of sense declare, after beholding such a picture as this, that times were not hard, that the country was not upon the brink of ruin, that

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> J. B. McMaster, "A History of the People of the United States," Vol. I, pp. 130-134.

a new and vigorous Federal Government was not needed?"

Fortunately for the whole world, the thirteen states, after six dangerous years, recognized their mistakes and, by voluntarily relinquishing certain of their sovereign rights, formed a Federal Union with real power.

The nations of the earth are now facing exactly this same issue with regard to the League. The world is now a unit—politically, economically, hygienically, intellectually and morally. Therefore, corresponding world organization is essential. Four steps are imperative if the League is to function effectively: (1) The inclusion of all nations in its membership, with Germany and Russia assured an equal place with the Allied powers. (2) Less domination by the leaders of two or three great nations and an increasing degree of democratic control. (3) The outlawry of war and the demobilization of huge armies. (4) The willingness of the nations to strengthen greatly the powers of the League and to abide by its decisions.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> J. B. McMaster, "A History of the People of the United States," Vol. I, p. 425.

Criticism of the Continental Congress for not solving the problems of the thirteen states was just as reasonable as criticism of the League for not solving the major problems of the hour, such as the Ruhr, Reparations, Corfu, etc. The nations, by refusing to recognize that the world is now a unit, may withhold adequate power from the League and continue to disregard its decisions—as the thirteen states once treated the Continental Congress. But if they do, there can be only one outcome: continued hostility, further wars, and the destruction of civilization. There is, therefore, no alternative to the creation of effective international processes of justice—legislation, adjudication and administration—save war and desolation.

# (5) Creation of an International Mind

The prevention of war depends, in the last analysis, upon new attitudes of mind. No plan or process can prevent war if the nations are bent upon fighting. The really important task before us, therefore, is the creation of a new

state of mind which will transcend national boundaries.

We may take hope from what has already been accomplished in widening the area of law. It was not so many thousands of years agoindeed, only a mere fraction of the total duration of man's existence upon the earth—that the family and the tribe were the extreme boundaries of good will. Less than five hundred years ago it was the city, and in America little more than a century ago it was the state. And yet it is now universally admitted that loyalty to the United States Government does not in any sense make a man a less loyal citizen of the State of Ohio or of the City of Cleveland. Some of these days we shall learn a similar lesson with regard to international government. There is really no more reason why native-born citizens of Poland and Lithuania should hate each other than that Italian-born citizens of New York should hate Russian-born citizens of Pennsylvania. No section of Europe has a more diverse racial population than has New York, Pennsylvania or Illinois. Experience has demonstrated

that persons of different races can get along without fighting, if they are not spurred on by artificially created national antagonisms.

The task before us, therefore, is to widen the area of good will so that law and orderly government may transcend national boundaries and include all humanity. Some call this a dream, as men in other days called national unity a dream. But as men dream, so they achieve. Citizens of a vast republic stretching across a whole continent, coming as they have by the million from every corner of the earth, and achieving as they have an imperfect but truly marvelous national unity, should not find it difficult to dream of world unity; and, recognizing the manifold blessings of unity, should put forth every effort in seeking its realization on a world basis.

The concrete measures which should be adopted as means toward such an end are too numerous to receive detailed consideration in such a short discussion as this. Indeed, they are yet to be formulated in any comprehensive manner. Such an enumeration, however, would

surely include: a new evaluation of tariff policies; an equitable immigration policy, with scrupulously courteous and fair treatment of all alien peoples; especial consideration for foreign students in our colleges and universities; the removal from our histories of all national propaganda and efforts to discredit other peoples; the establishment of a Department of Peace, with a Secretary sitting in the Cabinet, and a large budget; private and governmental subsidies for foreign travel and study, after the precedent set by our Government in making available, out of principal and interest of a part of the Boxer indemnity, a fund of more than \$28,000,000 to be used for the education of from 50 to 100 Chinese students in American colleges and universities each year until 1940; the strengthening of the efforts of educators, doctors and missionaries throughout the world.

These, then, are some of the ways by means of which further wars may be prevented: the abandonment of economic imperialism, disarmament, abolition of secret diplomacy, erection of international processes of justice, including the

outlawry of war, a world court and the League of Nations, and the creation of an international mind.

If such measures as these are rejected, and the various nations seek to gain and maintain their own selfish interests by the assertion of military force, it is only a question of time until another world war breaks out, and concerning Western civilization the verdict of history will be handed down: Weighed in the Balances and Found Wanting!

## CHAPTER IV

# WHAT SHALL THE CHURCHES DO ABOUT WAR?

The effort to outlaw war legally is a step in the right direction, and should be continued until all war is declared to be criminal by the law of the nations. But history reveals clearly the improbability of this happening until the common conscience of mankind has declared all war to be wrong. That is to say, ethical judgments precede and are the foundation upon which legal judgments are based. Law is only a codification of customary habits of thought and action. In the last analysis, then, the outlawry of war is an ethical problem.

Because of the predominance of the ethical aspect of this question, our concluding chapter is devoted to a consideration of the attitude of the churches toward war. What should the churches do about war? Should they refuse to bless any future war?

Before attempting to answer these questions, it is well to remind ourselves as to the essential nature of our problem, and thus avoid confusing the main issue with other issues which are irrelevant to the present discussion, although they may possess great importance in themselves. The real problem is this: Should the churches turn away from war as a sinful method of dealing with other nations, that is, a method which no Christian should ever sanction or adopt?

Interesting byways which might be followed with profit are: Is the use of physical force ever justifiable? What should be our attitude toward police—local, national or international? These questions deserve more careful attention than they have received thus far. Whatever points of agreement there may be between the use of force, police, and war, there are so many points of serious difference that to reason by analogy in this discussion is to follow an ineffective line of thought, one that may prevent a clear judgment.

It is not necessary at this point to discuss the question as to whether or not all past wars were

sinful or to argue the matter as to whether some wars have resulted in greater good than evil. Upon these questions there is room for differences of opinion. We are here concerned with future wars.

If the sowing of hate and fear and armaments does bring forth another great war in a decade or a generation, what sort of war will it be? What weapons will be used? What will be the consequences?

Since the whole history of war reveals its progressive destructiveness, it seems clear that if there is another great conflict it will be vastly more destructive than was the World War. Indeed, many of the weapons and methods of 1914 were out of date by 1918, so rapid were the strides in military science. Several books have recently appeared which indicate some of the probable changes in wars of the future and enable us to get a glimpse of what is in store for mankind if another great war comes.<sup>1</sup>

There is general agreement that gases and

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> See Victor Lefebure, "The Riddle of the Rhine: Chemical Strategy in Peace and War"; Colonel J. F. C. Fuller, "The Reformation of War"; Will Irwin, "The Next War."

chemicals will play the dominant part in any future war. This was true in the closing months of the last one. Gas was the main reliance of the Germans in the great March assault in 1918, during which time the German guns were firing more than 50 per cent of gas and chemicals. During the war France produced 2,000 tons of mustard gas and 17 million gas shells. The total French production of chlorine and poison gas was 50,000 tons. The British produced an equal. amount. During the weeks just preceding the Armistice, the American government was producing vast quantities of gas shells and other chemicals for war purposes. Mr. Will Irwin has described our own Lewisite gas as follows: "It was invisible; it was a sinking gas, which would search out the refugees of dugouts and cellars; if breathed, it killed at once-and it killed not only through the lungs. Wherever it settled on the skin, it produced a poison which penetrated the system and brought almost certain death. It was inimical to all cell-life, animal or vegetable. Masks alone were of no use against it. Further it had fifty-five times the

'spread' of any poison gas hitherto used in the war." Fortunately, the Armistice came before there was time for this gas to be used in the last war. Research is still going on, however, and enormous strides in chemical warfare are being made every year.

A recent aeroplane trip from Cologne to London, during which we crossed the English channel in exactly thirteen minutes, enabled the writer to understand more clearly the part aeroplanes will play in any future war. Every year a more complete mastery of the air is being gained. It is already possible to manipulate aeroplanes by wireless. Tens of thousands of planes will be available for use in another great war. Civilian populations and soldiers alike will be within the zone of battle.

Colonel Fuller has painted a picture of a possible scene in the future: "I believe that, in future warfare, great cities, such as London, will be attacked from the air, and that a fleet of 500 aeroplanes each carrying 500 ten-pound bombs of, let us suppose, mustard gas, might cause

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> "The Next War," p. 37.

200,000 minor casualities and throw the whole city into a panic within half an hour of their arrival. Picture, if you can, what the result will be: London for several days will be one vast raving Bedlam, the hospitals will be stormed, traffic will cease, the homeless will shriek for help, the city will be in pandemonium."

It is quite possible that in a small war some of the most terrible weapons might not be used. But it seems unquestionable that even a small one would result in attitudes and practices which are a fundamental denial of Jesus' way of life. It should be remembered that the aggressive or more guilty nation has the power to determine which weapons shall be used. There is an abundance of evidence to indicate that the introduction of new instruments of destruction by one nation is usually followed by the adoption of similar weapons by all belligerents, matter how severely some of them may denounce the enemy for having introduced such diabolical methods of warfare. Moreover, there is always the danger of a small war becoming

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> "The Reformation of War," p. 150.

a great one. Insignificant incidents have often been the occasion for the outbreak of a great conflict.

The whole history of war seems to indicate that the next great war will be at least as destructive of physical and moral values as the last one, and in all probability will be even more calamitous. On a basis of the actual facts concerning the World War and in view of the probable nature of any great war in the future, what shall the churches do about it?

The writer believes that the churches should refuse to give their approval to any future war, for three reasons: (1) Because war is inherently and essentially a supreme violation of Jesus' way of life; (2) Because war is ineffective as a means of furthering Christ's Kingdom and is self-defeating in its very nature; (3) Because the absolute repudiation of war by individuals, groups and corporate bodies is the most effective way of compelling governments to abandon the war system and to discover more adequate means of securing safety and justice.

I

(1) War is inherently and essentially a supreme violation of Jesus' way of life. We are often told that it is useless to ask whether or not Jesus ever sanctions war, since he did not have to deal with this question, and the record of his teaching does not contain a single reference either in defense or in condemnation of war.

Is it true that Jesus never faced a war situation? Where did he live? What was the political status of his country? What were his fellow citizens thinking and doing throughout his lifetime? What were the outstanding national problems of his day?

During the days of Jesus, Palestine was a conquered province of the Roman Empire. After the days of his infancy, it was ruled by Roman procurators. Roman fortifications had been erected and garrisons of Roman soldiers were found throughout the land. The Roman

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> For an extraordinarily illuminating discussion of this whole question see Professor V. G. Simkhovitch, "Toward the Understanding of Jesus." Paper covered copies may be secured for 25 cents from Kirby Page, 311 Division Ave., Hasbrouck Heights, N. J.

authorities possessed full military and civil power. The Roman Procurator even had the power of choosing the Jewish High Priest, and possessed full control over the Sanhedrin.

Captivity was no new thing for the Jews. Their whole history is a record of an almost continuous struggle for freedom. During the three centuries preceding the birth of Jesus, they had been under the yoke of the Persians, the Macedonians, the Egyptians, the Syrians, the Idumaeans and the Romans. And yet no people have ever lived who valued freedom more highly and who resisted tyranny more vigorously. For a brief time under the Maccabees they gained their freedom, only to lose it again. They never became reconciled to bondage. There was constant agitation, followed by numerous riots and rebellions. In the year 45 B. C. Ezechias of Galilee and a large body of followers staged an unsuccessful revolt and were slain by the soldiers of Herod. In the year 6 A. D. Judas the Galilean led a revolutionary movement against the Romans. Concerning this band Josephus, a pro-Roman Jewish historian said: "These men agree

in all other things with the Pharisaic notions; but they have an inviolable attachment to liberty, and say that God is to be their only Lord and Master. They also do not mind dying any death, nor indeed do they heed the deaths of their relations and friends, nor could the fear of death make them call any man their master."

Josephus tells us that John the Baptist was put to death for purely political reasons, because Herod "feared lest the great influence John had over the people might put it into his power and inclination to raise a rebellion." Barabbas, for whose release the mob cried out to Pilate, was a revolutionist. Mark says: "And there was one named Barabbas, which lay bound with them that had made insurrection with him, who had committed murder in the insurrection."

The historian Mommsen gives the year 44 A. D. as the date of the beginning of the Jewish-Roman war. In this connection, Professor V. G. Simkhovitch, of Columbia University, says: "The rebellion of the Jews against Rome rather begins with the power of Rome over the Jews;

and in the same degree as the Roman power over the Jews increased, did the political reaction against that power, the revolution against Rome, increased and spread. The Jewish revolutionists against Rome were called by the Romans bandits or robbers. Later they were called scitarii, 'men with knives.' The polite Josephus followed the Romans in calling them robbers; but whenever he tells us about the constant warfare, about either the Romans' or Herod's exploits against the robbers, it becomes clear that they are religious patriots who are fighting and dying for their country. . . . It is obvious there that we are dealing not with mercenary bandits, but with political and religious devotees who prefer death to submission." Finally, in the year 70 after Christ, the temple was destroyed, Jerusalem sacked, and the population slain, crucified or sold into slavery.

It was in such a world that Jesus lived. The whole of his lifetime was spent during this period of lament or actual conflict with Rome. "At the given time," says Professor Simkhovitch, "there was but one problem for the Jews—a single, all-

absorbing national problem, that became under the circumstances the religious problem as well. It was the problem of existence, the problem of escape from certain annihilation. One was the problem, but the solutions were several. Clearly the Jewish nationalists and the Herodians could not possibly agree upon the same solution. Even the religious nationalists of the time differed considerably. Yet in spite of all their differences as to method, their hope was the same. This hope was the national salvation, and their reliance was upon Messiah, the Christ, the anointed King. . . . The entire literature of the time is a fragmentary expression of this quickened life of the nation. The records of every Messianic hope contain a preamble somewhat similar to the especially well phrased passage in the Second Esdras. 'And now, O Lord, behold these nations, which are reputed as nothing, be lords over us, and devour us. But we thy people, whom thou has called thy firstborn, thy only begotten, and thy fervent lover, are given into their hands. If the world now be made for our sakes, why do we not possess for

an inheritance our world? How long shall it endure?"

That Jesus regarded himself as the Messiah is clearly revealed in the Gospels. The great difference between Jesus and his contemporaries was in the interpretation of the nature and methods of the Messiah. The Jews were expecting One who should free them from the military bondage of Rome. In this connection, Professor E. C. Scott, of Union Theological Seminary, says: "This indirect evidence afforded by the Psalms of Solomon is borne out by the express words of Philo in a passage which evidently reflects the prevailing Jewish belief in his time: 'According to the prophets a man will appear who wages war and conquers powerful nations, while God sends the needed help to his saint.' Above all, we have unmistakable testimony in the numerous popular tumults, halfreligious and half-political, which took place in the time of the Roman procurators. Our chief authority for the state of popular feeling in the time of Christ is the New Testament itself. . . . To the people at large the Messiah remained

what he had been to Isaiah and his contemporaries—the Son of David who would bring victory and prosperity to the Jewish nation."

In the light of this popular expectation, new significance is given to many incidents recorded in the Gospels; such as the enthusiastic response of the multitudes to the message of John the Baptist concerning the imminent coming of the Messiah; and the triumphant entrance of Jesus into Jerusalem, with the masses spreading their garments in his path, and crying out: Hosanna to the Son of David!

It is impossible to believe that Jesus could have failed to consider seriously the proposal of the zealots and others of his followers that he should lead them against Rome. Many years ago, Dr. Lyman Abbott pointed out the real significance of one of the great temptations of Jesus: "This last temptation was the subtlest, and therefore the most dangerous of all. In the midst of a ruined world stands Jesus, the mournful spectator of its woes. . . . He finds a religious party expectant of a Messiah, anxious for a Messiah, and ready to cast the whole

weight of their prestige and influence in with any one who gives promise of restoring to the nation its ancient glory and will suffer them to be sharers in it. For the establishment of such a kingdom, Christ had many advantages. He had the grace which attracts men, the eloquence which arouses their courage and inspires them. A picture of a nation long enslaved, now disenthralled, restored, reformed, purified by his power—this is the picture the wily tempter presented to his imagination. Nor this alone. Alexander going forth from the little kingdom of Macedon, had vanquished the world. Already Greece had lost its vitality; already the power of Rome was passing away, although its apparent dominion was at its height. To a devoutly enkindled imagination it would not seem impossible that the conditions of the present might be reversed in the future. The kingdoms of the earth might yet be subject to a redeemed and ransomed Israel. The Jewish people expected it. The prophets seemed to most of their readers to promise it. The kingdoms of

the earth and all their glories were seen as in a vision."

Several explanations may be offered as to why Jesus turned away from such a proposal. But can there be any doubt that the real reason was that he saw the futility of the military method and recognized in it a fundamental contradiction of the way of life which he had chosen as his own? The whole of his teaching bears out this conclusion.

The unity of mankind in a great world brotherhood, with a common Father; the inestimable value of even the least of the children of men; the duty of love, even to one's enemies; the avoidance of vengeance and retaliation in the face of any provocation, as a substitute for the old law of an eye for an eye; the duty of unending forgiveness, even as often as seventy times seven; the persuasive power of sacrifice—can these be reconciled with the method of war?

With his great intellectual and spiritual vision, Jesus saw the futility of war, and not only its futility because of the impotence of the Jews

against the military power of Rome, but its utter incompatibility with his own way of life. There are many indications in the Gospel that Jesus foresaw the outcome of armed resistance against Rome: "And when he was come near, he beheld the city, and wept over it, Saying, If thou hadst known, even thou, at least in this thy day, the things which belong unto thy peace: but now they are hid from thine eyes. For the days shall come upon thee, that thine enemies shall cast a trench about thee, and compass thee round, and keep thee in on every side, and they shall lay thee even with the ground, and thy children within thee; and they shall not leave in thee one stone upon another; because thou knewest not the time of thy visitation."1

Were the wars of the first century more destructive or less destructive of the values which Jesus cherished most highly than the wars of the twentieth century? Is modern warfare more in accord or less in accord than ancient warfare with the spirit and teaching of Jesus? With the ex-

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Luke 19:41–44.

periences of the World War still vividly in our minds, we need have no hesitation in answering these questions. The weapons of modern warfare—machine guns, long range artillery, boiling oil, poison gas, air raids, submarines, starvation by blockade, propaganda of hate and falsehood—these are weapons which Jesus could not use without violating the deepest principles of his life.

"The Great War through which we have passed," says Winston S. Churchill, former First Lord of the British Admiralty, "differed from all ancient wars in the immense power of the combatants and their fearful agencies of destruction, and from all modern wars in the utter ruthlessness with which it was fought. All the horrors of the ages were brought together, and not only armies but whole populations were thrust into the midst of them. . . . Every outrage against humanity or international law was repaid by reprisals often on a greater scale and of longer duration. . . . When all was over, Torture and Cannibalism were the only two expedients that the civilized, scientific, Christian

States had been able to deny themselves: and these were of doubtful utility."

If the methods and weapons of modern war do not violate Jesus' way of life, then his words and deeds have no meaning and we are left without any idea as to what he taught about any subject whatsoever. Either Jesus was unalterably opposed to the method of war or we have no means of knowing what he approved or condemned.

Should the churches regard war as sin and refuse ever to bless it again? If by sin the Christian Church means an attitude or practice which is a grave violation of the spirit and teaching of Jesus and, therefore, should not be tolerated, it would seem to the writer that no other consistent course is open to it than to turn away from all future war as sin.

II

There is a second reason why this should be done: War is ineffective as a means of furthering Christ's Kingdom and is self-defeating in its very nature. That is to say, not only is war a violation

<sup>&</sup>quot;The World Crisis," pp. 10, 11.

of Jesus' way of life, it is a method which cannot be used successfully to build the kind of a world which he sought to establish. This is certainly true of any great war today, no matter what may have been the case with small wars in the past.

Christians have frequently had an uneasy conscience about war. They have usually justified it, however, on the ground that it was the lesser of two evils, and have hoped that its net result would be good, rather than evil. Is such a hope justifiable in this day? Consider the World War. It would be difficult to devise higher aims than those for which millions died in this war: the protection of the helpless, the destruction of militarism, the ending of war forever, and making the world safe for democracy. Not only were these the real aims of the multitudes, half the world poured out blood and treasure in seeking their realization. If war is a method by means of which these holy ends may be achieved, surely success should have crowned the sacrificial efforts of these millions. But did it? Did the war accomplish these things?

The evidence leaves absolutely no room for

doubt. Did military force protect the helpless? The answer is found in the summary given in a former chapter: 13 million dead soldiers, 13 million dead civilians, 20 million wounded, 9 million war orphans, 5 million war widows, 10 million refugees, untold millions doomed to hunger, malnutrition and sweated labor, a ruined continent, shattered morals, blasted faith, wholesale misery and despair.

Did the war destroy militarism and end war forever? It crushed Germany in a military and economic way more completely than has fallen to the lot of any other great nation in many centuries. But this did not destroy militarism. The evidence at this point is overwhelming. In the entire history of mankind there have never been as many men enrolled in peace-time armies as during the period since the close of the World War. Moreover, there has never been a time when more reliance was placed in military force or when more threats of war were made than during this same period.

Did the war make the world safe for democracy? Indeed, did the war make the world safe

for any of the higher values of life? Here also the answer is complete and convincing. "Recent events," says Lord Grey, former British Minister of Foreign Affairs, "have shown us with horrid clearness Europe sliding surely, though it may appear slowly, toward the abyss. Do we realize how far down the slope we have already gone? How does liberty stand in Europe today?—that liberty our generation was brought up to believe could be secured only by popular representative government? Russia is as far from it as ever she was-not even an elected Duma. Now Italy has practically a dictatorship. So has Spain. Germany is either under a dictatorship or in chaos." It has been a long, long time since the world was as unsafe for human life, democracy, truth or virtue as at this very hour.

Is it not supreme folly to say that a great war is the lesser of two evils? It is a combination of all the major evils of contemporary life. There is no sin of man that is not intensified by war. Dr. Homer Folks has well said: "We may select from all these other enemies of human life their worst features, combine them into one quintes-

sence of horror, intensify this to the *n*th degree, scatter it continent-wide, and that is war."

#### III

There is a third reason why it seems to the writer that the churches should henceforth renounce all war. The absolute repudiation of war by individuals, groups and corporate bodies is the most effective way of compelling governments to abandon the war system and to discover more adequate means of securing safety and justice.

There have always been two primary methods of seeking to abolish a practice or an institution which has come to be recognized as evil by individuals and groups. An excellent illustration of these two methods is found in the case of slavery. There were slave-owners who recognized that the institution was thoroughly bad and should be abolished, but who saw little value in freeing their own slaves until other owners were prepared to do likewise. Some of these men argued that they could be more effective in their efforts to abolish slavery if they did not alienate

themselves from their fellow slaveholders. They maintained that it was more effective "to work from within."

The other method was that of the abolitionists who were uncompromising in their repudiation and denunciation of the whole system of slavery. The length to which they went is revealed in these memorable words of William Lloyd Garrison: "I will be as harsh as truth, and as uncompromising as justice. On this subject, I do not wish to think, to speak, or write, with moderation. No! Tell a man whose house is on fire to give a moderate alarm; tell him to moderately rescue his wife from the hands of the ravisher; tell the mother to gradually extricate her babe from the fire into which it has fallen—but urge me not to use moderation in a cause like the present. I am in earnest—I will not equivocate -I will not excuse-I will not retreat a single inch—and I will be heard. The apathy of the people is enough to make every statue leap from its pedestal, and to hasten the resurrection of the dead."

In the struggle for the overthrow of slavery

we find a clear illustration of the two methods of social reform, (1) working from within, and (2) working from without. The writer believes that there is a place for both methods. In his opinion the test as to which method should be adopted in a given situation is found here: Have we reached the point where individuals and groups are certain that the given practice or institution is beyond reform and one that should be completely abandoned? If so, it seems clear that the method of the abolitionists is more effective than the method of the slaveholder who says that the institution is bad and should be uprooted, but who refuses to free his own slaves until there is a general proclamation of independence for slaves.

It is not often that a generation is confronted with a social problem where the issue is as clear cut as in the case of slavery. Social practices and institutions are not usually wholly black or altogether white. Light grays and dark browns seem to predominate. In the case of light grays or even light browns the method of working from within may prove to be more effective than the method of outright repudiation. In the case of

a social practice, which we feel certain is not gray or brown but *black*, it would seem that immediate repudiation and a positive refusal to sanction it or participate in it is not only the most consistent but also the most effective method to adopt.

In the life of Jesus we find both of these methods illustrated. He believed in working from within the Jewish Church. He came not to destroy but to fulfill. Professor Samuel Dickey reminds us that "on the whole, it may be said that Jesus not only apparently kept the law Himself, but commended it to others as a way of life." Yet he did not have the slightest hesitation in breaking with the Jewish leaders on fundamental questions. He was never willing to condone evil or compromise his message for the sake of living in harmony with his fellows. He refused to adjust his conscience to the traditions and prejudices of those about him. "It was said to them of old . . . but I say unto you . . ." He warned his disciples that loyalty to his way of life might cause a break with their families and friends. "He who loves father or mother more than me is not worthy of me."

Much of the weakness of the churches in this generation is due to the frequency with which they compromise with major social evils. "The greatest blot on the history of the Church in modern times," says Canon Streeter, "is the fact that, with the glorious exception of the campaign to abolish slavery, the leaders in the social, political and humanitarian reforms of the last century and a half in Europe have rarely been professing Christians; while the authorized representatives of organized Christianity have, as often as not, been on the wrong side." So far as great sections of the Church in America are concerned we cannot even make an exception in the case of slavery, although we do find other exceptions.

Can there be any doubt as to the imperative need for vision and courage on the part of the churches—vision to discriminate between gray and brown and black, and courage to repudiate immediately and utterly those attitudes and practices which are unmistakably black?

In the minds of an increasing number of men and women there is a conviction that we have now reached this place with regard to war. To

many of us war is not gray or even brown; it is dead black—it is a way of dealing with disputes between nations which is an absolute violation of the teaching and example of Jesus and is an institution which must be totally abolished if civilization is to endure.

As in the case of slavery, so with war today, two methods are open to those persons who regard it as black: they may think it more effective to work for the ending of war without alienating themselves from their fellows who believe in war as a means of defending home, liberty and the higher values. There is certainly much to be said for this point of view.

The other method is that of outright and complete renunciation of the whole war system and an absolute refusal to engage in it or to sanction it under any circumstances. The persons who take this position point out that the weapons of war instead of being effective means of protecting the helpless and of promoting the higher values of life are the greatest of all menaces to civilization. Can there be any doubt that the world would be a vastly safer place in which to

live if there were no armies or navies? Would not the security of the peoples of the earth be more adequately safeguarded if all armies were disbanded and all navies were sunk or converted into merchant ships, provisions for protection from bandits and highwaymen being assured by whatever extension of the police force is required?

The writer must be included in that group of people who believe that war is absolutely black, that is to say, it is essentially and inherently unchristian, is ineffective as a means of furthering Christ's Kingdom, is self-defeating in its very nature, and should, therefore, he completely abolished at the earliest possible moment. He is convinced that the most effective way to accomplish this end is for individuals, groups and churches to renounce the whole war system and seek immediately and vigorously to induce governments to adopt this policy.

To many persons this will seem to be a highly dangerous procedure. It may prove to be so. It is fair to ask, however, do armies and navies guarantee security and freedom from all danger? The fact of the matter is that there is no such

thing as absolute freedom from danger in the kind of world in which we are living. On grounds of relative danger the writer is convinced that armies and navies are a greater menace than they are a means of protection. One thing seems certain, if military force is permanently our most effective means of protection then humanity is doomed and all efforts to build an enduring social order will come to nought.

If we assume for the moment that the churches should renounce all war, how shall their leaders go about the task of getting this idea accepted by the rank and file of church members? Let us be under no illusions as to the enormous difficulties in the way. The war system is so deeply embedded in our social structure, peoples have so long depended upon war for protection and justice, and the whole question is so closely related to current conceptions of patriotism and loyalty to the state, that the task of securing popular approval for this proposal is perhaps the most difficult social reform which the churches have ever undertaken. The task of overthrowing human slavery or the liquor traffic presented

fewer difficulties than does this effort to renounce all war.

IV

There are four methods which may be used simultaneously to further the acceptance of this idea: Individual action, group action, corporate action, religious education.

(1) Individual Action. All social reforms have started with a few individuals. In the beginning, a few men and women think, act and agitate. There has been no other way of abolishing giant social evils. Individual action alone is inadequate, but it is the only foundation of social progress. So it was with the abolition of slavery and the outlawry of the liquor traffic. So must it be with the outlawry and abolition of war.

Therefore, every person who desires the overthrow of war should begin with himself. What is my attitude toward war? Am I willing to renounce all war and refuse to sanction or participate in any future war? Should I make a public declaration of such a decision? In what ways may I arouse my friends and persuade them

to take similar action? These are questions for personal consideration.

There are very great advantages in making a personal decision now. If we wait until the outbreak of war is imminent, clear thinking and wise action become much more difficult, if not impossible, in the face of false or exaggerated propaganda and the arousing of fear and the baser passions. All the facts necessary for the forming of an intelligent judgment are now available. It is not a question of deciding whether our own government is in the right in a given dispute and justified in claiming redress from another nation. That is not the problem. The question is this: Is war a method by means of which a justifiable end may be achieved? It is not a matter of making an abstract decision in the dark, without knowledge of a given set of circumstances. simply a decision concerning a concrete method of dealing with injustice, concerning which method we now possess full information. are convinced that this method is un-Christian, ineffective and tragically wasteful, let us say so now and make our plans accordingly.

This is exactly what a rapidly increasing number of men and women are doing. In every community are to be found persons whose decisions in this regard are known and who are seeking in various ways to persuade their friends to make similar declarations. One of the most prominent of these individuals was the deeply lamented William Austin Smith, the brilliant editor of the Churchman. In a notable address at Lake Mohonk only a few months before his death, Dr. Smith expressed his convictions concerning war in the following vigorous words:

"It would be as idle a moral pastime to repudiate past wars as it would be to repudiate our polygamous forefathers. Moral systems, we all know, are not handed down from Heaven in complete parcels. They grow. I am not contending that war was a sin five, ten or a hundred years ago. I am contending that henceforth war is a sin. It has now been fully revealed to us what war is made of, what are its unclean causes, its substance and its results. I maintain that if God has made anything clear to the mind of Christendom, He has revealed to us the sinfulness of war.

If the Christian Church blesses another war, its blessing and its curse will have no further authority and prestige for our civilization. There are tremendous risks and some baffling perplexities in such an attitude, but the perplexities are not greater, nor the risks more perilous, than those incurred if the Church should undertake to champion another world-wide civil war. . . . We shall never abolish war by gradual improvement and the slow processes of redemption of human nature. Dueling was not abolished by converting duelists. Men still insult and impugn one another's honor, but they don't fight duels. Dueling was abolished by a fiat of the Christian conscience. If we wait to abolish war till all men love one another, we shall wait until Judgment Day. Some generation has got to stop the thing short. Why not ours?"

In England many prominent leaders of the churches are going on record as being irrevocably opposed to all war. One of the most influential

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup>Copies of this remarkable address may be secured for five cents each from Kirby Page, 311 Division Avenue, Hasbrouck Heights, New Jersey.

of these men is F. W. Norwood, pastor of the famous City Temple, in London. In an important address before the last Annual Assembly of the Congregational Union, Dr. Norwood went on record in the following words: "Nobody knows when the day may come when his own faith and attitude will be put to a crucial test. I know for myself where I shall be if that test If I fail, you will know I am a moral coward. I know exactly where I am, as a Christian minister, with regard to war. Never under any circumstances can the slaughtering of men be in accord with the spirit of Christ. . . . I hold that it ought to be clear enough by this time that, officially at any rate, the Church of Jesus Christ dare not and ought not to give her sanction to that kind of struggle any more. . . . If war came again, some of your people would go and fight, and some would refuse. I know what I should do. I should say, You must do what you think is right. I respect your convictions, but as a public servant of the Nazarene, I dare not give His name to that kind of bitter struggle which

has taken place again and again in the world, which grows more and more horrid every time, and more and more ineffective. I stand by the eternal gospel of the Nazarene."

V

(2) Group Action. Individual efforts should be supplemented by group action. Group declarations concerning war may have a powerful effect upon public opinion. An example of the kind of thing that may be done in this regard is found in the declaration issued some months ago by 155 leading ministers and laymen of the various churches.

The following paragraphs are taken from this declaration: "There are some among us, of whom the signatories of this appeal form a small group, who regard war as the most ruinous organized sin which mankind now faces; who are sure that the war system and the Christian Gospel cannot permanently abide together on the same earth; who see clearly that the spirit of war and the spirit of the Gospel are antithetical, the one representing

what the other hates and would destroy; who recognize that war is futile as a means of furthering Christ's Kingdom, even where the end sought is righteous and where the spirit of the combatants is sacrificial.

"Our position in this appeal does not involve theoretical pacifism; we are not concerned to deny the necessity of using force, massed force, it may be in an emergency, nor of a moderate military organization for defensive purposes. But the war system is not an appeal to force in an emergency—it is a long drawn out and deliberate preparation for the use of every known means of cruel and collective destruction. . . . We are certain that unless the Church of Christ takes now a clear and consistent stand on this matter of life and death to our civilization and to the world, she will merit the contempt of men and the judgment of God. We, therefore, urge all the people of the churches, and all ministers in particular, to an outspoken declaration that the war system and the Gospel of Christ are diametrically and irreconcilably opposed. We urge that without delay this crisis of decision

between war and Christ be unmistakably recognized and stated."<sup>1</sup>

This statement is a very powerful indictment of war, but it falls short of renouncing all war by the inclusion of the following phrase: "Nor of a moderate military organization for defensive purposes." This phrase leaves the door wide open for supporting almost any future war, since all wars are now regarded as defensive. Moreover, all military preparations are moderate, in the opinion of the respective nations. Much of the effect of this declaration was, therefore, nullified by the inclusion of these words. It seems to the writer that if this phrase had been omitted, and some such sentence as the following added— "We desire to record our strong conviction that henceforth all war is sin, and, therefore, we cannot sanction or participate in any future war"the influence of this declaration on public opinion would have been increased a thousandfold. Many such declarations as this will be needed before war is finally outlawed.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Copies of this declaration, with a full list of signatories, may be secured from the World Alliance for Promoting Friendship Through the Churches, 70 Fifth Avenue, New York City.

VI

- (3) Individual and group action need to be supplemented by the corporate action of the various churches. The tactics of the campaign of the churches against the liquor traffic need to be repeated in the campaign against war. Long before official pronouncements against the saloon were made by the churches, individuals and groups were making constant declarations and passing innumerable resolutions. Finally, the churches began to issue official pronouncements. Success in the campaign against war cannot come until various conferences, conventions and assemblies of the churches-local, district, state, national and international—go on record officially as renouncing all future war.
- (4) Another important step in the direction of the permanent abolition of war is an adequate program of religious education. War will not finally be regarded as sin until this idea has been implanted in the minds of children and young people. It is all-important, therefore, that war

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and international questions be given adequate treatment in the literature and program of religious education of the various churches.

It should be fully recognized, of course, that war will never be abolished merely by regarding it as sin. Constructive measures looking toward the removal of the causes of war and the erection of international processes for the settling of disputes between nations must be promoted simultaneously. The churches have, therefore, a special responsibility for supporting such constructive proposals as were enumerated in a former chapter: the abandonment of economic imperialism, disarmament, abolition of secret diplomacy, the outlawry of war, the World Court, the League of Nations, and the creation of an international mind.

With regard to this last point especially, the churches have a supreme obligation. They are founded upon the conception of a universal Father, a universal Saviour, a universal brother-hood, and are missionary in their very nature. They are in a position to wield enormous influence in creating that international mind, upon

which all constructive proposals for the abolition of war finally rest.

#### VII

The one barrier to world peace that towers far above all others is fear. Fear is the foul spirit of this age which must be cast out if the nations are to escape suicide. It is fear of what will happen to all the higher values of life if military force is renounced that causes the churches to hesitate about turning resolutely away from all war. In the last analysis this fear is due to a lack of confidence in moral and spiritual forces. The churches have been deeply smitten with the pagan philosophy of physical force and have become timorous as to the power of love in a world like this.

The churches of America are in a unique position at this hour. Blessed as they are with an extraordinarily favorable geographical location, far removed from possible enemies, and with no actual enemies far or near; with enormous wealth at their disposal; with vast latent resources of

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moral and spiritual dynamic; it is unquestionable that they alone are so situated and have sufficient power to break the thraldom of fear which is now throttling the very jugular vein of civilization. At such an hour, with such an opportunity and responsibility, can it be that it is to these churches that the reproach of the Master comes ringing down the ages: O ye of little faith?

With faith as a grain of mustard seed the churches of America could lead in a movement for the overthrow of the mountains of fear which rest so heavily on the peace of the world. The challenge is clear: Fear not. Only believe.

Sheer audacity is required at this hour. Half-way measures are inadequate to deal with the present danger in Europe and the Near East. The churches of America have it within their power to kindle the imagination and enthusiasm of the war-sick masses in these lands and to aid them in breaking the vicious circle of fear and armaments, greater armaments and more intense fear.

The present situation demands extreme measures. Let the churches of America say to their

own government and to the peoples of the earth: We feel so certain that war is now unchristian, futile and suicidal that we renounce completely the whole war system. We will never again sanction or participate in any war. We will not allow our pulpits and classrooms to be used as recruiting stations. We will not again give our financial or moral support to any war. We will seek security and justice in other ways. We believe in the latent goodness of all peoples everywhere, in love and spiritual processes as mightier than military weapons, and that the most certain means of overcoming evil is found in the spirit of the cross. We pledge our time, our energy, our money, and, if necessary, our very lives, in the crusade to abolish war and to erect effective international processes of justice and goodwill.

Does not the truest patriotism, as well as the deepest loyalty to Jesus' way of life, demand that individuals and churches should immediately and utterly repudiate the whole war system?

#### APPENDIX

# THE FELLOWSHIP OF RECONCILIATION

"God was in Christ reconciling the world unto Himself."

"He gave unto us the ministry of reconciliation."

The Fellowship of Reconciliation is an international group of persons who are seeking uncompromising practice of Christ's principles in the present world.

Its beginning took place a few months after the outbreak of the World War and was the outgrowth of a deep dissatisfaction with the confused utterances of the Churches concerning that war and war generally. To the founders of the Fellowship, the contradiction between Christ's commandments and the commands of war, even more between Christ's spirit and the spirit of war, seemed so flagrant as to admit of no Chris-

Great Britain at the end of 1914 these men and women from different classes of the community, from different Churches and from no Church, found themselves united in the conviction that their duty in the crisis was to refuse every assistance to war and to bear unswerving witness to Christ's way of redemptive love.

The essential faith supporting this conviction was belief that love as revealed in Jesus is the basis of a true human society, the inviolable law of personal relationships, the effective power for overcoming evil and the creative life by which the world can be transformed. It was felt that the full implications of this love, in regard not only to war but to industry, class conflict, racial antagonism and all other relationships, would call for such fundamental changes in the spirit of men and structure of society as to demand new exploration of methods and sacrificial consecration of life. For this adventure the Fellowship was formed and continues to exist today.

There are branches now in nineteen countries and a membership extraordinarily diverse. There

#### APPENDIX

is no one program or theory of social reconstruction to which all are committed, but members try to work out personally and in their own way the central convictions which are held. These rest on no literalistic dogma of non-resistance but on a profound evidence of life.

The Fellowship invites all interested persons to read its literature, talk with its members and consider joining its quest. The statement of principles and other descriptive pamphlets will be sent gratis to inquirers. Communications in the United States may be addressed to The Secretary, Fellowship of Reconciliation, 396 Broadway, New York. The International office is at 17 Red Lion Square, London, W.C. 1.

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