

S. M. Casey  
1871  
Berkeley

THE  
PRESBYTERIAN QUARTERLY.

---

NO. 1.—JULY, 1887.

---

I. BERKELEY'S IDEALISM.

A splendid edition of Bishop Berkeley's works was issued, in 1871, by Professor Alexander Campbell Fraser, the incumbent of the Chair of Logic and Metaphysics in the University of Edinburgh—the chair once illuminated by the genius of the illustrious Sir William Hamilton. The elaborate dissertations in which the accomplished Editor expounds the Bishop's idealistic system, and the fact that they have emanated from one who has succeeded the great exponent and defender of Natural Realism, have had the effect of calling attention afresh to the principles of Berkeley's philosophy. In proceeding to discuss them we deem it important to furnish a brief preliminary statement of the main features of Berkeley's system :

1. The Denial of Abstract Ideas.
2. The Denial of the Existence of Matter as Substance. There is no such thing as material substance.
3. The Denial of even the Phenomenal Existence of Matter, separate from and independent of spirit: denial of Natural Realism. Material things have no reality in themselves. Whatever reality or *casuality* material things possess, is dependent and relative.
4. *Esse est percipi*: the so-called material world depends for existence upon the perception of spirit. A thing exists only as it is sensibly perceived.

225038

5. Ideas, Sensations, and Sense-given Phenomena are the same. The material or external world of these Ideas, Sensations or Sense-given Phenomena depends for existence upon Perception—that is the perception of spirit. “The existence of our ideas consists in their being perceived, imagined, thought on.”

6. These external things or ideas constitute a system of symbols which (1) furnish a medium of communication between different spirits, (2) interpret to finite intelligence the being and casual efficiency of the Infinite Spirit. *causal*

7. There is no real causality in the external world of ideas. The only relation between them is that of antecedence and sequence.

8. The permanence of the sensible world of ideas is grounded to us in the fact that our present sensations are signs of the past and of the future. “Physical substance and causality” (so-called) “are only the arbitrarily constituted signification of actual sensations.”—*Fraser*. “Substantiality in the material world is permanence of co-existence among sensations. \* \* \* Causality of phenomena is permanence or invariableness among their successions.”—*Fraser*. This permanence of matter (so-called) is in God. Sensations and sensible things are neither permanent, nor efficient. “The sensible world consists of significant sensations in perpetual flux, and sustained by the divine reason or will.”—*Fraser*.

9. We now see what Berkeley meant by *ideas*. They are what are ordinarily termed material things or phenomena. They are in the mind, but not of it. Their origin is subjective, but they become objective. Material phenomena are ideas objectified and externalized. What we call the law of nature is only the order of the succession of these ideas.

10. God calls forth in us our ideas in regular order.

11. Real ideas, that is, ideas externalized, do not depend on our will for their production. Imaginary ideas depend upon the will. Real or sense-ideas are caused by the Infinite Spirit.

12. We are prepared to understand what Berkeley meant by *externality*. It is simply externalized ideas: not a phenomenal reality independent of the perception of spirit.

13. What then is spirit? Berkeley says: “The Mind, Spirit or Soul is that indivisible, unextended thing which thinks, acts and perceives. \* \* \* That which perceives ideas, which thinks and wills, is plainly itself no idea, nor like an idea. Ideas are things, inactive and perceived; and spirits a sort of beings altogether different from them.”—*Hylas & Philonous*.

14. We are directly conscious of the *substance* of our spirits. This consciousness he sometimes denominates reflection: we know, he says, our souls by reflection.

Thought, volition, perception,—these are properly constituents of the soul; they are in it and of it. But ideas, while they are in the soul as sensational impressions, are not of it. They are not elements which belong to its substance. They are not the self—the Ego.

Berkeley distinguishes between real ideas and imagined ideas. The real are phenomenal, sensible things; the imagined are purely mental and subjective—mere *entia rationis*. Now it is important to notice his doctrine of causality as applied to these two different sorts of ideas. The real, he contends, are not caused by us, but by the Infinite Spirit, who puts us in relation to them, or them in relation to us. The imagined are caused by ourselves. The nature of this causal relation between our minds and these imagined ideas he defines from the will. They are caused by the will. We can mentally construct, at will, unreal combinations of the real ideas which we have perceived.

We must also notice his doctrine of the immediacy of our knowledge of real ideas or phenomenal and sensible things. He was not a Hypothetical Realist, but rejected the doctrine of Representative Perception. Between perception and these real ideas, there is, according to him, no intervening modification of the mind, vicarious and representative of the so-called external reality—his real idea. We have an immediate knowledge of it by perception. But while he cannot be ranked as a Cosmothetic Idealist or Hypothetical Realist it must not be inferred that he was a Natural Realist or Absolute Dualist. There is in his doctrine, as Prof. Fraser, the interpreter of his system, endeavors to show, a species of dualism, but it was not that of the Scottish school. It is merely the dualism of the conscious spirit and its own ideas, conceived as external phenomena. The existence of material things separate from and independent of spirit, it was the very point of his philosophy to deny.

He is evidently to be classed with Monists, who affirm the existence of but one substance, and as he contended that this one substance is spirit, he must be assigned to the specific class of Idealistic Monists.

Let us now group the features of his system as they have

been enumerated, so as, if possible, to get a brief and comprehensive statement of his theory. If possible, we say, for any one who attempts to accomplish this will find himself balked by discrepancies and inconsistencies which it is difficult to harmonize, and which reveal the want of mature elaboration of the theory by its author himself.

There is no such thing as matter, according to the ordinary conception of philosophers and the common people. No material substance can be proved to exist. It is therefore to us nothing. Nor are the so-called phenomena of matter realities which have an independent existence as such. They depend for existence upon their being perceived by spirit: *Esse est percipi*—their very being is to be perceived. Abstract the perception of spirit from them, and they are zero. They are consequently ideas, not separate from the mind, but in it as impressed upon it through the media of sensations. Indeed, they are represented as sensations themselves. Phenomena, which are denominated external, are, therefore, but objectified ideas or sensations. The mind gone, they are gone. But these ideas are not limited to any one spirit. They are related to the aggregate of finite spirits, and ultimately to the infinite Spirit. Finite spirits being supposed to be out of relation through perception to these real ideas or sensible phenomena, they continue to find the reason of their existence in the perception of the omnipresent Spirit. In fact they are creatively caused by God—are God's ideas. The universe, consequently, is a collection of God's ideas. Whoever, then, perceives the universe, or any part of it, perceives God's ideas, and has presented to him by the ordinary experience of the perceptive faculty incontestable evidence of the existence of God as an intelligent and omnipotent Spirit. For, all phenomena constitute a symbolism of sense which is a medium of communication between finite spirits, and which signifies to us the divine attributes. As we put together letters to form a word, so we collect these sensible symbols to spell out the great name of God. These external phenomena, thus systematised, and having their unity in their relation to the Infinite Spirit as caused by him, have no other coherence in themselves but that which

springs from a divinely ordained antecedence and sequence. The only cause which operates in them and through them is that which originated them ; and as God's ideas they meet their continuity and persistence alone in his immediate efficiency.

It will be seen, from this brief and necessarily inadequate sketch of Bishop Berkeley's philosophical theory of idealism, that his pious purpose—as he himself avowed it to be—in its construction, was to resist and overthrow the prevailing Materialism of his times, and to vindicate the doctrine of God's existence, and of his immediate relation to the phenomenal universe as his product against the objections to it which Materialists were wont to urge. It remains to be seen whether, in the prosecution of this laudable design, he did not go far towards the opposite extreme of asserting, at least by logical consequence, an idealistic Pantheism, which cancels the difference between the Deity and his works, which makes God the universe and the universe God.

In proceeding to consider the theory let us understand, at the outset, what are *not* the questions to be discussed.

First, it is not the question, whether any so-called material things actually exist as unperceived by some spiritual intelligence, whether any unperceived or unperceivable matter exists. This cannot be made a question, since *it may be* that wherever matter in any form exists, there also finite spirits exist and are in perceptive relation to it ; and since *it is certain* that no material things can exist out of relation to God, as an omnipresent spirit.

Secondly, it is not the question, whether any finite thing can have the cause of its existence in itself. The existence of God being admitted, all matter (so-called) and all finite spirits must be regarded as caused by his infinite power. Separate being, as caused, they may have, but it is necessarily derived and dependent.

Thirdly, it is not the question, whether the material system depends for continued existence upon spirit. Every opponent of Materialism admits the fact that it depends for that existence upon God as the infinite Spirit. In this they all concur with

Bishop Berkeley. They may differ from him as to the mode of the divine *concursum* and support.

Fourthly, it is not the question, whether matter is an original and underived cause of any effects, whether it possesses an independent power to cause phenomenal changes. It may be a question whether matter (so-called) is endowed with properties which as second and subordinate causes are adapted to produce phenomenal changes, but it is not made a question in this discussion, whether it has the efficiency of a first and original cause. That the pure Materialist may affirm, but its denial is here assumed.

These, then, are not questions with which the present argument has to deal, and must consequently be thought away. What, then, are the questions about which it is concerned?

I. The first question which falls to be considered is, whether or not there be such a thing as Material Substance. Bishop Berkeley denies that its existence can be proved, and explicitly affirms the contrary. It is one end of these remarks to evince the incompetency of his hypothesis.

1. Berkeley begins by denying and ridiculing the alleged existence of what are termed abstract ideas. The substance of matter is one of these ideas. As there are no such things, there can be no material substance. It is a play upon words, a mere fancy and crotchet of philosophers. Now there are two kinds of ideas, denominated abstract, which are to be carefully distinguished from each other. An oversight of the distinction must involve the discussion in confusion. First, by the terms *abstract idea* is sometimes meant the idea or conception of a phenomenal quality which is common to several individuals, while at the same time they possess other qualities which as peculiar distinguish each of these individuals from the others. The question being, whether such a common quality can in thought be abstracted from its connexion with others and made a separate object of contemplation, Bishop Berkeley at times takes the negative, and at others seems to admit the affirmative. His ordinary doctrine is, that there can be no such quality, to which we can attach an idea. He contends that what we con-

ceive is an individual thing, in the concrete, whatever it may be, and that we make that individual the standard with which we compare others, in order to form a class. While pursuing this line of reasoning, he declares it impossible and ridiculous that there can be an abstract idea of a common quality in the sense of a quality containing in itself the general marks of different individuals. But, on the other hand, he sometimes speaks of a quality which, although particular and not general, sustains a common relation to several individual objects. He says, for example: "A man may consider a figure merely as triangular, without attending to the particular qualities of the angles, or relations of the sides;" and again he observes: "An idea which, considered in itself, is particular, becomes general by being made to represent or stand for all other particular ideas of the same sort."\*

This looks very much like giving up the question as to the possibility of abstract ideas. Once admit that the abstract idea does not involve a general inclusion in itself of the ideas of all the qualities which belong to a class of individuals, but is a particular idea—that is, an idea of a single quality which holds a common relation to several individuals, and that is all that we care to contend for. And Sir William Hamilton, who concurs with Berkeley in his Nominalism, attributes to him, and himself holds, the doctrine of the possibility of such abstract ideas. The question is, What grounds the relation of resemblance between the individuals composing what is called a class? The answer is, and must be, Some quality which is common to them. And this is the answer which Hamilton gives, in expounding the Nominalistic theory.

When, in maintaining the first-mentioned of these views, Berkeley says that a general notion, or, what is the same thing, an abstract idea, is merely a name, and that we delude ourselves when we suppose it anything else, he loses sight of the obvious consideration that a name is significant, or it is an unmeaning cipher. It is the symbol of something. If then there be not some quality which is signified by what is called

---

\* Principles of human knowledge.

a general term, the term is mere gibberish. We have seen that Berkeley stated the true doctrine when he granted the existence of ideas of particular qualities having common relations. It is precisely such ideas or concepts as are symbolized by general terms. If, then, there may be according to his own admission, abstract ideas of phenomenal qualities, his general doctrine is invalidated, that no such things as abstract ideas can exist. This argument, however, has no direct bearing upon the question in hand, namely, whether there can be the abstract idea of the *substance* of matter; for the abstract idea of phenomenal qualities being conceded, it does not follow that such an idea of substance may exist. The indirect office discharged by the argument—and it is a valuable one—is to break down the universal affirmation that no abstract ideas are possible.

Secondly, there is another kind of abstract idea which it is more pertinent, and indeed which it is vital, to the discussion, to consider. It is the abstract idea of things which are not phenomenal, but which it is common to infer as the substrates of phenomenal qualities, as their ground of manifestation and their bond of unity. Such an idea is that of cause, which it is usual with men, not biased by some philosophical hypothesis, to infer from phenomenal changes. Such an idea is that of substance which it is also common to infer from phenomenal qualities—the substance of the soul, the substance of God, and the substance of matter. Berkeley confines our knowledge of matter (so-called) to perception. As it will be confessed on all hands that we cannot *perceive* substance, it follows from his datum that we have no knowledge of material substance, or, to use his phraseology, we can have no abstract idea of it; the terms mean nothing. The thing signified by them is a chimera.

In the first place, the *argumentum ad hominem* may be employed against this view. Bishop Berkeley, as a Christian theologian, admitted the existence of the substance of God. That he, or any one else, could know that transcendent substance by perception, internal or external, is out of the question. How, then, did he construe the apprehension of it? The answer must be by one of those very abstract ideas of substance which he vehe-

mently rejects. He contends that we know God, apart from the direct testimony of revelation, though those phenomenal manifestations of himself which he denominates ideas—the objectified, externalised ideas of the Divine Being. Of course, then, he inferred the existence of the divine substance from these finite manifestations. As the substance is not, cannot be, perceived, it cannot be a concrete percept. What then? It can only be apprehended as an abstract idea. But the Bishop's position is that there can be no abstract idea of substance. This one, eminent instance to the contrary, negatives his assertion, and negatives it by virtue of his own confession. But, if we may have an abstract idea of the divine substance, why not of material substance? The alleged impossibility of such an idea will not answer. The argument from the incompetency of perception to furnish it palpably breaks down.

In the second place, Berkeley expressly admits the existence of the substance of the soul, but he contends that we know it by consciousness. Now consciousness is equivalent to immediate knowledge, and unless we utterly misconceive his doctrine, it is precisely, that consciousness involves such knowledge. But we may safely challenge the proofs from any quarter that we have immediate knowledge, or, what is the same, an intuition of the substance of the soul. If we have we can describe it, as we can, every object of immediate knowledge. Who ever succeeded in doing this? It is too obvious to require argument that what knowledge of the soul's substance we possess is not derived from a direct gazing upon it in consciousness; it is not an intuition, a percept. We immediately and necessarily infer its existence from its phenomenal manifestations of which we are conscious and therefore have immediate knowledge. The idea, then, which we have of the substance of the soul is an abstract idea. Here we have another instance of a knowledge of substance which is not directly derived from perception, a knowledge without which we must apprehend our mental being as a mere bundle of phenomenal qualities ligated by no bond of unity—appearances of something which has no existence, qualities of nothing to be qualified. If, therefore, the substance of God and the substance

of the soul cannot possibly be percepts, we have a knowledge of them through ideas which are abstracted from any concrete appearance. Why not—the question recurs—why not a similar abstract idea of the substance of matter? There is certainly nothing in the constitution of our minds to preclude such knowledge. It must be shown that there is something peculiar in the very nature of what is called matter, which exempts it from the possibility of being thus apprehended.

In the third place, unless there be some philosophical speculation which gives their minds a peculiar bent, men are accustomed to infer the existence of substance from perceived phenomena. This is well-nigh a universal law; it finds utterance and proof alike in the language which is almost universal in its employment. The term *phenomenon* has scarcely any meaning, unless there is something which grounds appearances, unless all reality is reduced to mere appearance, and everything around us and within us which is an object of perception is “mere shine.” The term *manifestation* implies that there is something which is manifested. *Quality* suggests something which is qualified; *property* something to which the thing so denominated belongs. *Mode* infers something which is modified. *Attributé* guarantees something to which somewhat is due. *Accident* probably signifies etymologically that which falls upon something else for support. The term *substance* itself, which belongs at least to the language of every cultivated people, would be a meaningless collection of letters, unless it signified something which is under other things and serves in some sort as their support. And we cannot here forbear remarking that although the Bishop makes great sport of the thing called substance, and facetiously asks what kind of pillars it has, he very naturally, like ordinary mortals, talks of the substance of the soul as supporting its qualities. We might have craved of him the favor to tell us what its pillars look like, and how they hold up qualities!

The terms which have been mentioned, used as they are almost universally, sufficiently indicate the common belief of the race in the existence of substance; and as all of them are more or less commonly applied to the substance of matter,

the common belief of the race in the existence of that kind of substance. Berkeley's endeavor to show that his theory really interprets this belief is only an ingenious attempt to quadrate his speculations with the convictions of mankind. It is certainly a powerful presumption against any opinion that it traverses universal conviction.

2. There pervades all Berkeley's reasoning in support of his theory the confusion of the knowledge of existence with existence itself. If this were an oversight it would certainly be curious, and all the more curious that it is not noticed by his distinguished commentator, Professor Fraser. If it were designed as an inherent element in his system, it behooved him to rebut the presumption which lies against it by an articulate consideration of it. Whatever may be thought of the doctrine of the Relativity of Knowledge, as expounded by Sir William Hamilton, as a whole, the position that, while all that is known by us must in some way be in relation to our faculties, still our knowledge is not the measure of existence, is so obviously true as to commend itself to an almost unquestioning acceptance. In this affirmation the great Scottish philosopher limits knowledge to perceptive knowledge, which is substantially Berkeley's position. But Hamilton admitted and contended for the doctrine that there are realities, transcending perception, which must be believed,—realities which are close to us, such as the occult substance of the soul and the equally occult substance of matter. But however close to us an alleged reality may be, Berkeley declares its non-existence, except it be perceived. Now, the doctrine is so astounding that perceptive knowledge grounds or even conditions real existence, that only arguments of the most demonstrative character could induce its reception. It is to violate common sense to say that knowledge is efficiently casual of existence. We necessarily attribute it to power as its efficient cause. Power is productive, knowledge apprehensive. It may direct power, but cannot be conceived as substituting it. And this is all the more remarkable, inasmuch as Berkeley holds — and attention is particularly invoked to the fact— that the sensible phenomena which he calls ideas and maintains to be

grounded for existence in perception, are caused by the creative power of God. Granted, that he admits realities which our perceptions cannot reach, and that they exist because God perceives them, how is that position to be reconciled with the other, that God causes their existence by His will? But if God may cause the existence of realities which, in consequence of their distance from us we cannot apprehend by perception, He may cause the existence of substance very near to us which may equally lie beyond the scope of the mere perceptive faculty. The truth is that neither our own knowledge, perceptive or not, nor that of other finite beings, nor that of God Himself, is the ground, or efficient cause, of existence. It is true that nothing exists without God's knowledge, but it is another thing to say that nothing can exist except it is produced by His knowledge. If this be true of the Infinite Spirit, much more is it true of our spirits. And if it be true of all knowledge, it certainly is of perception. The mere fact, therefore, that alleged material substance is out of relation to our perceptions in no degree affects the question of its existence. There may be and probably are a thousand existences around us of which we can have no knowledge by perception. God Himself is around us and in us, but we perceive Him not.

3. Berkeley's theory, in restricting the knowledge of material existence to perception, takes no account of the fundamental laws of belief, and the faith-judgments which spring from them when elicited into expression by the conditions of experience. It was one of the great offices discharged by Kant and the philosophers of the Scottish school, that they called attention to the fundamental forms of thought and belief which are imbedded in the very foundations of our nature. Perception furnishes the conditions upon which they emerge into consciousness and affirm themselves, but once drawn forth from their latency, they originate the grandest knowledges of the human soul. It is not our perceptions, it is our faith-judgments, which impart the highest import to our knowledge, and stamp the loftiest significance upon our duties, our relations and our destiny. It is such judgments as cannot be furnished by perception, judgments which give us cause and substance, God and immortality, that lend the

truest dignity to our being. To leave out of account these fundamental laws with their accompanying interferences is to sink out of view by far the most important elements of our knowledge. Now, it is exactly these principles which lead to the inference of substance, and it is no wonder that Berkeley, in overlooking them, has been led into the capital error of concluding that because perception cannot affirm the existence of material substance, therefore it cannot exist. This is the point at which his theory especially breaks down.

So far as to Berkeley's denial of the existence of material substance.

II. The second question which claims consideration is, whether phenomenal things, ordinarily termed material, are as ideas dependent upon the perceptions of spirit; for Berkeley's regulative principle is *esse est percipi*—to be is to be perceived. Let it be observed that the question is not now in regard to the substance of matter. That question is discharged. It is in respect to what are ordinarily termed the phenomena of matter. And in order that this question may be distinctly apprehended let us for a moment recall Berkeley's doctrine. He maintains the view that there are no material phenomena, as such. The phenomena so called are dependent for existence upon the perception of spirits. They have no separate, independent existence. There is no such thing as a material system. Materiality is denied and Immateriality affirmed. All sensible phenomena are ideas and these ideas are dependent upon perception, and are all *in the mind*. Properly speaking, they have no external objective existence, except so far as ideas in the mind can be said to have existence. All the so-called qualities of matter are contained under this denomination—ideas. These ideas, further, are sensations: for whatever is an object of perception is a sensation. Sensations include all the qualities of so-called matter—the primary as well as the secondary. Ideas, sensible things, real ideas, real things, sensible objects, sensible phenomena, sense-given ideas or objects, sensations—these all, however, Berkeley's phraseology and even his statements sometimes vary, are by him treated as the same. This may safely be

affirmed to be his catholic doctrine. The question before us is, then, in regard to the position that all so-called material phenomena, as ideas, are dependent for existence upon their being perceived by spiritual substance.

1. The theory is chargeable with the logical fault of wanting scientific coherence and self-consistency.

(1.) In stating the main principle which regulates it—namely, to be is to be perceived, it was absolutely necessary that the question be met, upon the perception of *what spirits* do material phenomena, or ideas, depend for existence? This question Berkeley answers by saying that some ideas depend upon the perception of human spirits, others upon that of non-human finite spirits, and all upon that of the Infinite Spirit. It would seem to be evident that he started out with the hypothesis that it is the perception of the individual human spirit which conditions phenomenal existence. And to this he adhered until the difficulties attaching to it shut him up to the admission, that all phenomenal existence cannot depend upon the perception of an individual finite spirit. This is made apparent from the way in which he dealt with the difficulty raised by the absence of the individual from certain phenomenal realities, and the impossibility, consequently, of his perception conditioning their existence. He states the case himself. While he was present in his study, the existence of the books it contained depended upon his perceiving them. But was their existence suspended, while he was absent, and could not perceive them? No, he replies, when absent I can imagine them, and the imagination of them conditions their existence.

Subsequently, he saw the absurdity of this position, and took the ground that their existence depended, in the absence of all human percipients, upon the perception of the omnipresent Spirit. This ought, in consistency, to have led him to the abandonment of the supposition that any phenomenal reality depends for existence upon the perception of human spirits, or even upon non-human finite spirits, and to the assertion of the view that all phenomenal reality depends for existence upon the perception of the Infinite Spirit. But this he did not do, and

the consequence is, that he jumbles the perceptions of finite spirits and of the Infinite Spirit as the ground of phenomenal existence. One or the other ought to have been affirmed, not both. They cannot possibly be made the conjoint or common ground of phenomenal existence.

(2.) Another evidence of inconsistency in the theory lies in the fact that Ideas and Sensations are treated as the same; for Berkeley says that sensations are internal feelings, and that ideas are external things. How can mental phenomena be at the same time internal and external? To escape this inconsistency it may be said that they are not at the same time both internal and external, but as the same things they are first one and then the other. Let us take that supposition. If they be first internal and then become external, the difficulty occurs that as sensations are necessarily subjective feelings, there would in the first instance be nothing to originate them; there would be no external reality to which they would correspond. Another difficulty would be, as ideas and sensations are the same, to account for their becoming external. For Berkeley holds that external ideas are not caused by the will. But their externalization could only take place in consequence of some mental effort or energy. They must therefore externalize themselves, which is absurd, since it is contended that they possess no causal force. These difficulties are fatal to the supposition that ideas or sensations are first internal and then become external.

But, on the other hand, let it be supposed that they are first external and then become internal. The difficulty then would be to account for the transition. As external they must be conceived as grounding themselves as internal, which is absurd; and besides, the supposition is inconsistent with Berkeley's main principle, that perception grounds ideas or sensations. It cannot be true that ideas or sensations as external ground themselves as internal, and that perception grounds their existence whether as internal or external. In addition to this, it is obvious that as a sensation, from the nature of the case, is a mental feeling and therefore subjective, it is incompetent to represent it as first external and objective and then internal and subjective

But whether this reasoning be correct or not, the principal feature of the inconsistency returns in force, namely, that ideas and sensations being treated as the same, it cannot be maintained that ideas are external phenomena and sensations are internal feelings. If ideas are not external phenomena absolute subjective Idealism is the result, and that Berkeley does not affirm ; if sensations are not internal feelings, but external phenomena, Materialism is the result, and that it is the main purpose of his philosophy to deny.

(3.) Still another element of inconsistency may be noticed. Berkeley contends that there can be no phenomenal realities, or what is the same, there can be no ideas, except there be the perception of them by spirit. Now this must mean, if it mean anything, that the perception of spirit grounds the existence of ideas. What else does the great maxim signify—*esse est percipi*, being is to be perceived? The being of ideas depends on their being perceived. Yet Berkeley explicitly says, that ideas are not caused by finite spirits, but caused alone by the will of God. Here the ground of the existence of ideas is declared to be God's will. There are then two grounds for their existence—the perception of finite spirits and the will of the Infinite Spirit. This is certainly a confusion of thought. If it be said that the ground of existence which is assigned to finite perception is different from the cause of existence, the distinction is unintelligible. And, further, if the ground of existence in perception is shifted from finite spirits to the infinite Spirit, inconsistency still emerges ; for it is inconsistent to say that the ground or cause of the existence of ideas is at the same time in the perception and in the will of God. Whatever may be thought of the hypothesis that God's knowledge is the cause of finite existence, it is not unintelligible. And it is certainly competent to say that God's will, on the other hand, is the cause of finite existence. But it is unmeaning to say that such a cause is to be referred in the same sense both to the knowledge and the will of God. Such are some of the inconsistencies which inhere in Berkeley's theory ; and if they have been proved to exist, they cannot but damage its truth.

2. 'Having pointed out the logical inconsistency of Berkeley's theory in its attempt to find a ground of phenomenal existence, first in the perception of individual finite spirit, then in that of a number of finite spirits, and lastly in that of the Infinite Spirit, or in the perception of both finite spirits and of the Infinite Spirit, we proceed to show that the theory involves real inconsistencies—inconsistencies not merely of arrangement, but of a metaphysical character. When, as was inevitable, it became apparent that no individual finite spirit could possibly be at all times in the relation of perception to any section of phenomenal existence however limited, or at any time to the whole of phenomenal existence, the view had to be abandoned that phenomenal existence is grounded in the perception of individual intelligence. This is conceded by the editor of Berkeley's works, and was substantially admitted by the Bishop himself. Recourse was then had to the view that the ground of phenomenal existence was to be sought in the aggregate perceptions of all finite intelligences. This supposed that there are no phenomenal realities which are not in relation to the perception of some finite spirits. But it soon became evident that this supposition could not be maintained. It is not only a fact which must be acknowledged that even that small part of phenomenal reality which at some time may be related to the perception of the individual is not at all times so related, but that there can be no proof of the relation at all times of the whole or even of a part of phenomenal reality to any finite perception. On the contrary, it is easy to suppose the existence of phenomenal reality apart from relation to the perception of any finite intelligence. If, for instance, the moon be uninhabited, its particular features would exist out of relation to intelligent finite beings, and their existence could not be said to be grounded in the perception of such beings. So, upon the geologic assumption that the world existed long before it became the home of intelligent beings, its existence could not have been conditioned by their perception. Nor can we resist the conviction that if this globe were now stripped by some dread catastrophe of all its intelligent occupants, it might continue to exist, although out of relation to all human perception.

The hypothesis of the existence of spirits, of whom the Bible alone speaks, is hyperphysical and, therefore, cannot enter as an element into a strictly philosophical argument.

Now, how were these obtrusive and admitted difficulties met by Berkeley's theory? In this way: the sensations which are at any given period of time experienced by finite intelligences, although they could not have been always experienced by them, nor can be in the whole future experienced by them, are while experienced signs of past and future sensations. It is easy to detect the insufficiency of this extraordinary hypothesis, framed to account for the existence of sensations or ideas when they stood or will stand in no immediate relation to finite perception. Let us not lose sight of the thing to be proved. It is that phenomenal existence abides when no finite being perceives it. The proof furnished is, that present sensations, which *are* perceived, are signs of the existence of past and future sensations. But it is, *ex hypothesi*, admitted that these past and future sensations are out of relation to perception, and are signified by present sensations which alone are in relation to perception. Now Berkeley's great principle is that perception grounds or conditions phenomenal existence. According to this principle, then, these past and future sensations or phenomenal realities being conceded to be unrelated to perception can have no existence. It is not sensations or ideas, according to Berkeley, which ground the existence of other sensations or ideas—that he denies; but it is always perception which is the reason of their existence. As then the only ground of past and future phenomenal existence which is assigned by this hypothesis is significant sensations or ideas, the hypothesis is signally out of harmony with the main theory.

Further, it is obvious to remark, that the supposition of these significant sensations in order to show that phenomenal realities may exist out of relation to finite perception, is a clear abandonment of the principle that any phenomenal realities depend for existence upon the perception of finite intelligences. If some confessedly exist apart from that relation, all may.

If, in reply to this reasoning it be urged, that these sensations

which are signs of past and future phenomenal existences, out of relation to the perception of finite spirits, are signs of phenomenal existence in relation to the perception of the infinite Spirit and having its ground of continuance in that perception, it must be rejoined that this would be to change the issue. If in an attempt to show that present sensations, as signs, prove the continued existence of phenomenal realities in relation to finite intelligence, it be at the same time maintained that their persistence in being is due to God's perception, the question is altered, and the procedure is illegitimate. This but serves to fortify the stricture already passed upon the theory, that it inconsistently tries to found phenomenal existence alike upon the perception of finite and of infinite intelligence. The theory ought to have been purged of this inconsistency, and to have sought the ground of phenomenal existence simply and alone in the divine perception. It would in that case have had, at least, the advantage and the merit of unity.

3. It is clear that in those cases, in which phenomenal realities or ideas are in immediate relation to our perception, Berkeley's doctrine is that they depend for existence upon that perception. There is an evident difficulty which lies in the way of this hypothesis. Most, if not all, of the phenomena which come within the scope of our perception operating through the senses are not simple, but compound. Now, it is certain that some of the fundamental elements of these complex realities are beyond the reach ordinarily of sense-perception. It is only the art of the chemist and of the microscopist which can avail to reveal to us their sensible existence. Nor can it be proved that there are not still simpler and more ultimate elements in existence than those which even that art has brought to light. These elements lying out of the reach of perception are, according to Berkeley's theory, destitute of a ground of existence. As they are not perceived by us, they do not exist. And yet these very unperceived and consequently non-existent elements are the ground-forms of those complex wholes which are obtrusively presented to perception.

4. Upon Berkeley's theory Representative Knowledge is

impossible. Let us remember certain of his principles : perception is immediate knowledge of ideas or phenomenal realities. All external phenomenal realities are known by perception. Their existence depends upon perception. It follows, that unless they be perceived, unless they be immediately known, they cannot exist. Now Berkeley distinguished ideas into two classes—real and imagined. Real ideas are sensible phenomena, which are not caused by us, but caused by God's will. Imagined ideas are mental phenomena of our own creation ; they are caused by our wills. From all this it is plain that Berkeley grounded the existence of all phenomenal realities in perception. The question then is, When we do not perceive these real phenomenal existences, how do we know them? The ordinary answer would be, by representing them in the imagination. Apprehending by immediate knowledge, that is by internal perception or consciousness, the representing images, we necessarily believe in the existence of the objects represented. We have a knowledge of the formerly presented objects which is mediate, it is true, but is, at the same time, valid and trustworthy. But Berkeley could not, consistently with his theory, thus answer. Nothing but perception, that is immediate knowledge, of the object can ground its real existence. Where that is wanting, the ideas we cognize are mere creatures of the imagination, in themselves unreal, and having no ground of existence. They represent no realities ; they are spectral and illusory. Representation is not perception : perception alone gives us real, objective existence ; consequently, the representative faculty cannot give us that sort of reality.

Let these remarks be applied to memory as a representative faculty. The external, phenomenal facts once presented are no longer in relation to perception. They have, therefore, according Berkeley's theory, lost their ground of existence. To be is to be perceived. They are not *perceived* ; consequently they *are* not. If we imagine them by the representative faculty, we can have no guarantee of their reality. All the past, as it has slid away from relation to our perception, is irrecoverably gone into the region of unreality. The largest section of our knowledge is

obliterated. The representative faculty as one furnishing the knowledge of the real is *nil*. This consequence may appear too absurd to be imputed to Berkeley's theory. Let him who thinks so apply the controlling principle, to be is to be perceived, to the processes of our faculties of representative knowledge, and he must be convinced of the legitimacy of the consequence.

5. It revolts common sense to say that a phenomenal reality would cease to exist, were there no finite spirit to perceive it; that a mountainous pile of rock for example, would not exist, if some spirit were not perceiving it. The case does not bear reasoning. It so traverses common conviction that its enunciation provokes derision, and deservedly provokes it. So sensible was Bishop Berkeley of this, and also his interpreter, Professor Fraser, that it was deemed necessary to invoke a hyperphysical ground for the persistence of objects not perceived by finite beings, and in that way to supplement the deficiencies of the theory. This retreat from the hypothesis that phenomenal existence is grounded in finite perception was its deliberate sacrifice. When its friends forsook it, what could be expected for it from the tender mercies of its foes? When the Israelites retired from Saul, the Philistines decapitated him and fastened his body to the wall of Bethshan. Why, then, it may be asked, attack an abandoned hypothesis? Is it not most conclusively refuted by the fact that its originators gave it up? The answer is, that they gave it up and they did not give it up. They confessed its insufficiency and continued to speak in defence of it, as one would mention some of the virtues of a forsaken friend. It is right to shut them up to its complete relinquishment and to the advocacy of another hypothesis—the grounding of phenomenal existence in God's perception.

No reasoning, however subtle, supported though it be by the genius of the accomplished Bishop of Cloyne, can succeed in practically convincing men that their sensations are the same with the external, phenomenal things by which they are surrounded, and which they are accustomed to regard as only the occasions of the sensations. They cannot be argued into the belief that the pain they feel is the very same with the fire to

which they attribute it—with the wood and the flame; that the sensation of hardness they experience is the same with the great iron pillar that helps to sustain a massive roof; that the sensation they feel when beholding the glories of the starry heavens is the same with the measureless systems that stud the amplitude of space. When, in the elegant dialogue in which Berkeley defends his theory, Hylas, the representative of the existence of matter, confesses his entire conversion to the views of Philonous the exponent of Immaterialism, he utters the confession amidst throes and misgivings which suggest the nausea and vomiting of a man who in the intervals of the spasms endeavors to land the virtues of the medicine which has sickened him.

That a powerful presumption lies against a philosophical hypothesis which is contrary to the common convictions and belief of men is explicitly admitted by Berkeley himself, and he exerts his power of argument to show that his view upon this subject is not opposed by the weight of that presumption. He succeeded, as was to be expected, in persuading his imaginary interlocutor, Hylas, of the tenableness of this view, but not much is risked by the statement that his argument would not meet with the same success if addressed to the mass of mankind. It is at least certain that the very need of such an argument supposes that the ordinary belief of men is opposed to the Bishop's doctrine.

7. That element of Berkeley's theory is incapable of justification, in which the doctrine of the school of Associationalism is maintained, that the only relation between sensible phenomena, ordinarily termed material, is one of mere antecedence and sequence. This view flows from his position that the will of God is the only cause which operates in the system of phenomenal relations, that ideas are caused alone by his will, and have their connection with each other determined by a causality which is entirely foreign both to their own intrinsic nature and to the will of finite intelligences.

(1.) This doctrine is paradoxical; it is out of harmony with the common beliefs of the race. Whatever philosophers may hold, it is idle to argue that men in general

do not entertain the conviction that there is the relation of cause and effect between sensible phenomena, and between the will of man and the objects of the external world. Even those philosophers who hold that the judgment which affirms the relation of cause and effect is not an original principle of our mental constitution but is the result of experience, maintain the view that it is a necessary judgment unavoidably arising from empirical conditions; while the drift of modern philosophical thought is towards the assertion of the law of causality as one of the fundamental and original elements of our nature. And it cannot well be denied that this tendency falls in with the ordinary belief of mankind. Is a phenomenal change observed? The natural inquiry which spontaneously arises is, What is its cause? Let it be observed, that this demand of reason is not made with reference merely to the origination of substantial existence or of phenomenal being, but also and most frequently in regard to changes which are recognized as taking place in the realm of simple phenomena. The hypothesis of antecedence and sequence does not satisfy this requirement; and, to the extent of its involving that hypothesis as an integral element, Berkeley's theory clashes with the instinctive judgments of men.

(2.) In regard to the position that the human will exerts no causal influence upon the relations of external phenomenal objects, we venture to take the ground that it contradicts consciousness; for consciousness delivers to us the fact that the will is competent to institute the relation of antecedence and sequence between external things. It can bring them together in that relation. And if so, the invariableness of the relation as a law which is not subject to voluntary control is disproved by a datum of consciousness. Nothing is more common than the collocation of sensible things by voluntary action for the purpose of securing desired results. And further than this, consciousness also delivers the fact that the continuance or interruption of the relation is within the power of the human will. This could be illustrated in numberless ways. The hypothesis, then, that there is a fixed relation of mere antecedence and

sequence between so-called material things, which cannot be affected by the free elections and the causal force of the human will, is evinced to be contradictory to the deliverances of consciousness, and they must be regarded as decisive, or there is no ground of certitude in existence, no ultimate authority an appeal to which ought to put an end to strife. Of course, there is no assertion here of the power of the human will to cause ideas, in Berkeley's sense of the word, as equivalent to phenomenal existences. What is affirmed is, that the relations between these ideas are, to a large extent, determinable by the causal efficiency of the will.

It might be objected to this view, that there is no causal power in the will itself, and that the only relation between mental phenomena themselves, including volitions, is that of mere antecedence and sequence. But however Berkeley may have prepared the way, by logical consequence from his hypothesis as to material phenomena, for this sceptical result, as he did not himself advocate or even intimate it, it would be irrelevant here to discuss the question. Were the doctrine of Brown, Hume and the Mills under consideration, the case would be different.

8. It is, however, legitimate to say that the theory of Berkeley logically led the way and conduced to the nescience of Hume, and to the agnosticism of the Positivist school of the present day. For, if the immediate inference from the testimony of consciousness to the real, substantial existence of matter as distinct from that of spirit be refused, the step is easy to the denial of the inference from its testimony to the real, substantial existence of spirit, as distinct from matter. The way is opened for the maintenance of any hypothesis which men may fancy, unembarrassed by the deliverances of consciousness. Hume took the path to the denial of the certainty of any substantial existence, and Spencer has taken that which led him to sink spirit in matter, and to affirm the unknowableness of God Himself. Sir William Hamilton is right, when he says that consciousness undoubtedly gives us in the same indivisible act the existence of spirit and that of matter, related in the synthesis of knowledge

and contrasted in the antithesis of existence. Any other doctrine must logically tend to absolute Idealism, or Materialism, or Nihilism; and we are disposed to think that there is no logical halting place between the acceptance of the deliverances of consciousness in their simplicity and integrity and the adoption of the desolating doctrines of Atheists and Nihilists. These remarks are reluctantly made in regard to the logical tendencies of Berkeley's theory. The pious Bishop would have repudiated with horror the consequences which a rigid logic in the unscrupulous hands of infidels has deduced from it; but still, in the light of the developments which followed his death, it must, in candor, be allowed that his theory was the egg from which was hatched the philosophical scepticism of David Hume.

9. There is another difficulty in Berkeley's theory which is so obvious, that it cannot fail to be noticed. How, it may be demanded, does it ground our knowledge of other personal spirits than ourselves? Berkeley holds that we know our own spirits, as thinking, willing, perceiving, essences—in a word, as personal substances, by self-consciousness. All that is objective to us must be known by the perception of ideas. These ideas he carefully distinguishes from the properties of spirit. As our own ideas are not part and parcel of ourselves as spirits, so neither are ideas part and parcel of other spirits than ourselves. How then do we know other spirits? As we cannot be conscious of them as spirits, our knowledge is limited to the perception of ideas. But perception is, in this case, restricted to bodily organisms, and the language spoken or written through the instrumentality of these organisms. Now, according to Berkeley, they and the words produced by them are non-spiritual; they are merely ideas. Granted then that we apprehend these ideas by perception, the question is, how we know the spiritual substances to which they seem to be related, and to which in the judgment of common sense they *are* related. Consciousness alone can give us spirit; perception only gives us ideas. This difficulty cannot possibly be met by saying that we infer the existence of other spirits from these ideas; for Berkeley vehemently denies that we can infer occult realities from phenomena. The ideas are

phenomena; consequently, we are not allowed to derive the inference from them to spiritual essences. If, inconsistently with the principles of the theory, it be admitted that we must infer their existence, that we must have a faith-judgment which affirms it, the logical consequence would be, that in the same way we might be entitled from phenomena, which Berkeley asserts to be non-spiritual, to infer the existence of non-spiritual substance—that is, in the ordinary language of men, to infer from material phenomena the existence of material substance. As this would contradict the very principles of the idealistic theory, there can be no resort to inference to ground the knowledge of any substance, spiritual or non-spiritual. It would seem, then, to be evident that, upon Berkeley's theory, we can have no knowledge of other personal spirits than ourselves.

In reply to this reasoning, it may be said that Berkeley regarded ideas or sensible phenomena as a system of symbols—a language by means of which spirits hold intercourse with each other. He did; but how that opinion or hypothesis of his helps the matter, it is difficult to see. For even in our own case, he holds that ideas do not ground the existence of spirit, but the contrary: the perception of spirit grounds the existence of ideas. We do not get the knowledge of our own spirits by ideas; we get it by the immediate testimony of self-consciousness. How, then, can the perception of ideas give us the knowledge of other spirits? We cannot be conscious of them; we cannot perceive them—we perceive only ideas, and they are non-spiritual. How then do we know them? The theory furnishes no answer to this momentous question. It fails to account for, nay, it renders impossible, the knowledge by the individual personal spirit of other spirits like itself, and so destroys the possibility of communion between spirit and spirit: of all society based upon the fellowship and reciprocal action of personal intelligences—of the family, the Church, the State. I know my own body only as a collection of ideas, from which it is illegitimate to *infer* the existence of my spirit. In the same way I know other human bodies: they are simply bundles of ideas from which I cannot infer the existence of other spirits. It would seem then that one personal spirit can know

the existence of other personal spirits neither by consciousness, nor by external perception, nor by inference from phenomenal qualities or acts.

No doubt it will be urged in answer to this grave allegation that there is another means of knowledge by which spirits may become acquainted with each other's existence, that has been left out of account in this indictment. What should hinder their knowing each other by the *testimony* of each to its own existence? But the difficulty is not removed. How is this testimony delivered? The answer must be: through words, either spoken or written. These words, however, are, according to Berkeley's theory, a part of those sensible phenomena which he calls ideas. Certainly they are cognized through sense, and thus become objects of perception. How then can we go beyond these perceptions to reach the existence of other spirits than ourselves? Shall we infer from them that existence? This we are debarred from doing by Berkeley's principles. From perceived phenomena to argue the existence of unperceived substance—this is in no case warrantable; if it were, we might be unphilosophical enough even to believe in the substance of matter as revealed by sensible phenomena! As therefore the testimony which other spirits than myself furnish must itself be a collection of ideas, I am shut off from depending upon it as a means of knowing their existence.

In order to turn the edge of this criticism, it may be charged with misconceiving Berkeley's doctrine; for he distinctly teaches that ideas are not caused by the personal will of finite spirits, and as testimony delivered in language is caused by personal will it cannot be considered as belonging to the category of ideas. To this it is obvious to reply, that the testimony must consist either of sounds or of written characters. As sounds are perceived through the sense of hearing they are, according to Berkeley, sensations. They could be perceived in no other way, and in no other way could they be cognizable by us. They are consequently to be classed with Berkeley's ideas. Written or printed characters are perceived through the sense of sight. They also are sensations, and therefore to be ranked among his ideas. We must return then to the assertion that as they are ideas they can,

upon the Bishop's principles, afford no ground for knowing spirit. If they be ideas they are not caused by spirit, and we are excluded from referring them as effects to a spiritual cause. But if it must be admitted that they are caused by the personal will of spirit, there are some ideas which are caused by spirit and Berkeley is made to contradict himself, since he affirms of all ideas that they have no such cause. The only escape from this contradiction would lie in holding that they are not ideas; and that would be to deny their phenomenality, which has been already shown to be impossible. To say that Berkeley proves the existence of God by the phenomenal world as his ideas, is no answer; for he holds that God's ideas are caused by his will. Consequently, it would be legitimate to infer from them as effects his personal existence. There is no analogy between the cases. It has thus been evinced that, upon Berkeley's theory, one spirit cannot know the existence of other spirits.

10. We come now, in the last place, briefly to consider that aspect of Berkeley's theory to which in the final analysis it was brought by himself—namely, that all phenomenal realities, commonly called material, are God's ideas. Let it be noticed that we do not depart from his own definition of ideas, as distinguished from thought, volition and perception which he is careful to designate as the properties of spirit alone. God's ideas, then, will be treated in accordance with his own notion of them, as distinct from God's thoughts and from his perception. His doctrine is that the so-called material universe is a collection of God's ideas, created by his will, and dependent for existence upon his perception. At the same time it must not be forgotten that Berkeley to the last also contended that there are phenomenal realities which are human ideas, not indeed caused by the human will, but dependent upon human perception for their existence. In regard to this final development of his theory we make the following observations :

(1.) God's ideas are represented as being identical with fleeting, sensible phenomena, which, if any meaning can be attached to the language, is shocking to common sense.

(2.) God's ideas are in part corruptible; for it is manifest that some

phenomenal realities, as, for instance, the human body, are corruptible. They dissolve, decay and rot, and what sense can be attached to the affirmation that divine ideas are thus corruptible it tasks the power of man to conceive.

(3.) As all phenomenal existences are God's ideas and some are man's ideas, some are both divine and human ideas at one and the same time. This involves a contradiction and an absurdity.

(4.) As all ideas are said to be sensations, God is said to have sensations.

(5.) As all ideas are God's ideas, and some ideas are our sensations, some of God's ideas are our sensations.

(6.) As all ideas depend upon perception for existence, for *esse est percipi*, God's ideas depend upon his perception for existence; yet Berkeley contends that God's ideas are caused by his will, which is the same as to say that they depend for existence upon his will. Now either his perception and his will are held to be the same, and that is absurd; or they are held to be different, and then the contradiction emerges that his ideas depend for existence upon his perception and at the same time depend for existence upon his will.

(7.) Either God's ideas are held to be a part of himself, or not. If they are not, the contradiction ensues that they are affirmed to be his ideas and not his ideas at one and the same time. If they are a part of himself, as the universe is said to be a collection of God's ideas, it is a part of himself and Idealistic Pantheism is the inevitable result.

(8.) God's ideas and his will are made one and the same. We cannot resist the conviction, forced upon us by the analogies of our own being, that force is an expression of will. But there are forces in operation in the so-called material system, and that fact Berkeley admits. Now that system being, according to him, nothing but God's ideas, it follows that its forces as phenomenal are parts of his ideas, and consequently that his ideas and his will are the same. But if they be said to be the same, a contradiction occurs. For, God's ideas are said to be caused by his will, and a thing cannot without a contradiction be said to be caused by itself.

(9.) Berkeley admitted the fact of creation. But the universe, he contends, is God's ideas. Consequently, God created his own ideas. But Berkeley, in his *Siris*, confesses his leanings to the Platonic doctrine of eternal ideas, and so Professor Fraser interprets him. We have then an eternal creation, which is a contradiction in terms, for that which is created had a beginning, and that which is eternal had no beginning. But if it be held notwithstanding, as Origen maintained, that an eternal creation is possible, and further, that the universe was eternally created, we have a Christian version of the old Greek doctrine of the eternity of matter, or, in Berkeley's phrase, of the phenomenal sensible system.

One fails to see how this congeries of absurdities and contradictions can be denied as logically involved in Berkeley's theory, if it comprise as integral elements the two positions, that sensible phenomena or ideas are dependent for existence upon the perception of finite spirit, and that they are at the same time dependent for existence upon the perception of the Infinite Spirit. If the first of these elements be eliminated from the theory, in order to save it from self-contradiction and reduce it to unity, it is confessed that the bulk of Berkeley's writings, in which it is defended, are nothing worth; they have lost their significance and their interest. If it be retained, it must be granted that his most ardent admirers would find it an office which would task their utmost ability to adjust it to his latest thinking. What his latest thinking was we collect from his *Siris* which was the production of his age. In that remarkable speculation we find him speaking in terms of approbation of Plato's eternal ideas, the only true realities in conformity with which the universe of unreal and fleeting phenomena was brought into being. It cannot be denied that this subjects him to the criticism of changing the meaning of his terms. The term *ideas* which plays the most important part in his previous reasoning as representing created phenomena of sense, is now made to signify the uncreated thoughts—the eternal ideals and archetypes of the Infinite Mind. Formerly ideas were treated by him as phenomenal objects, sensible things, dependent for existence upon finite perception; now they are magnified as the concepts of the eternal intelligence.

There are two hypotheses, each maintained by a writer of genius, upon one of which it is conceivable that an attempt might be made to relieve this inconsistency. One is that of the elder President Edwards who was a contemporary of Berkeley, was preaching at Northampton when the Dean was sojourning in Rhode Island, and held an idealistic theory which to a remarkable extent coincided with that of the latter. The other is that supported in his work on *Metaphysics* by Professor Borden P. Bowne, of Boston University. Much as we would like to examine these hypotheses, the limits of this article forbid it.

This discussion of the Idealism of Bishop Berkeley, however

inadequate it may be, cannot well be deemed untimely. The main current of thought at the present time, in consequence of the prodigious advance of the physical sciences, and the absorption of many acute investigators in the contemplation of outward phenomena, may be setting in the direction of Materialism. But as one extreme of speculation tends to produce another, it is probable, it may almost with safety be predicted, that there will come a powerful re-action towards Idealism. The distinguished editor of Berkeley's Works not obscurely intimates his leaning to the theory they maintain\*; and the brilliant Reviewer of Herbert Spencer's Philosophy† declares himself an "Objective Idealist." As in the past the philosophical intellect has vibrated between the opposite extremes of Materialism and Idealism, it is to be expected that there will be a similar oscillation in the future.

Meanwhile the sober student of the facts of consciousness, and the Christian Theist who accepts the obvious teachings of the Bible, will be content, as heretofore, to tread a middle path. They will continue to affirm the difference between the indissoluble and deathless spirit with its grand endowment of intellectual beliefs and moral intuitions, on the one hand, and divisible, corruptible matter, on the other; and holding to the doctrine of Creation as the only safe moorage they will refuse to sublimate the world to unity with God, or sink God to identity with the world. Of any other theory, whatever may be its prestige, the similitude may be used, which was beautifully employed by Cardinal Pole, in a letter to the elegant scholar Sadolet, with reference to the Platonic philosophy since the introduction of the divine system of Christianity :

*"Est in conspectu Tenedos, notissima fama  
Insula, dives opum, Priami dum regna manebant ;  
Nunc tantum sinus, et statio malefida carinis."*

JOHN L. GIRARDEAU.

---

\*In this opinion we are sustained by Dr. Noah Porter: App. to Ueberweg's Hist. Phil., vol. ii. p. 438. †Prof. Bowne.