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ARTICLE I.

LECKY'S HISTORY OF EUROPEAN MORALS.

*History of European Morals.* From Augustus to Charlemagne.  
By WM. EDWARD HARTPOLE LECKY, M. A. Third Edition,  
revised, in two volumes. New York: D. Appleton & Co.

It may seem rather late in the day to notice this work of Mr. Leckie—a work which has been for years before the public, and has passed through several editions in this country as well as in England. But the fact that new editions are demanded is evidence that the book continues to be read, and if still read, its statements and arguments ought still to be subjected to critical examination.

Certainly it is no light undertaking which Mr. Lecky sets before himself. His history extends over a vast tract of time; and whilst it passes by changes merely political or social, it presents that aspect of the European world, the faithful portraiture of which requires of the historian the exercise of some of the noblest and rarest qualities of intellect and heart. To be satisfactory, such a history must embrace an accurate delineation of the moral facts which gave its own character to each of the successive periods constituting the whole term surveyed; and what involves far greater difficulty—it must explain these facts, bring-

Epistles, when their functions had become more spiritual, the Deacons were to be appointed, not elected." "In the Pastoral Epistles there is no reference to their being charged with any secular ministrations." "The believers generally chose them. The selection is attributed by the Church to divine inspiration in our Collect for the Ordering of Deacons. In the first instance this was a special appointment to supply a special and urgent need. . . . If the ministry of the Word was not originally assigned, the office must have been very much modified, and very soon. St. Stephen taught at Jerusalem and St. Philip made the gospel known in Samaria. St. Paul uses *διανομία* of his own ministry, and applies *διάνομος* to himself and to the Apostles generally."

And how does he understand the Elders or Presbyters whom Paul in Acts xx. 28 addresses by the title Bishops? He says, "The Presbyters, therefore, while the Apostles lived were *Episcopi*, overseers. But the Apostles, in foresight of their approaching martyrdom, having appointed their successors in the several cities and communities, as St. Paul did Timothy at Ephesus and Titus in Crete, A. D. 64, four years before his death, it was thought well to keep that name proper and sacred to the first extraordinary messengers of Christ. And in the very next generation after the Apostles it was agreed all over Christendom at once to assign and appropriate to the successors of the Apostles the word *Episcopus* or Bishop."

This extraordinary statement Bishop Jacobson quotes without comment from "Bentley's Remarks on Free Thinking"; it would be a hopeless task for him to undertake to prove it from veritable Church history.

J. B. A.

*The Emotions.* By JAMES McCOSH, D. D., LL. D., President of Princeton College; Author of "Method of Divine Government;" "Intuitions of the Mind," etc. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 743 and 745 Broadway, 1880. 12mo., pp. 255.

We have here another book from the prolific pen of Dr. McCosh, and he seems to have no idea of stopping. He tells his readers that he hopes to treat of Conscience and Will in another little volume, and intimates that he may issue a "separate work"

on the hypothesis of Evolution. We admire the industry and fertility of the distinguished author; but we have often questioned with ourselves whether he might not now, as his evening shadows are lengthening, accomplish more by carefully revising and perfecting the works which he has already produced, than by adding fresh ones to their number. We are disposed to doubt the continued vigor of the creative power after a certain time of life has been passed. The very analogies of nature would seem to show that the mature wisdom of age should be employed in consummating the labors of an earlier period, rather than in the origination of new productions. We intend, however, to pass no hostile criticism upon any of the books of Dr. McCosh. We have read, and still read, his works with interest and profit. To two of them we have given special attention. We remember to have been impressed in our youth by the high encomiums pronounced by a profound writer in this REVIEW upon the "Method of the Divine Government." He could scarcely have paid it a finer compliment than he did in comparing it, in its spirit, to the great work of Bishop Butler on the same general theme, with the remark that it possessed an advantage over the Analogy in its more evangelical comprehension of man's sinful condition and of the principles of redemption. Especially have we been struck by the masterly discussion of Conscience in that work. A positive advance was made in its treatment, by the author's bringing to bear upon it the common sense philosophy of the Scottish school. The fact was called into notice that the fundamental laws of morality lie at the root of the moral judgments, as the fundamental laws of belief are latent in the ground-forms of the intellectual processes.

The discussion of the Will, particularly in its relation to the divine efficiency, was hardly so happy. Something appeared to us to be lacking so far as definiteness of conception and self-consistency were concerned. If the treatment of conscience could be made fuller, and that of the will more perfect, we venture to suggest that an office more useful to posterity would be discharged than by independent discussions of those topics, however valuable in themselves they might be. We have long felt the wish that

so noble a work as "The Divine Government" might attain the highest perfection to which the great abilities of its author can advance it. It deserves, we think claims, his last hand.

The other work to which we alluded is the "Intuitions of the Mind." In this book Dr. McCosh has contributed materially to the development of the Scotch Philosophy by an endeavor to analyse and classify the fundamental principles of thought and belief. Some of his observations we have found eminently suggestive. He has more fully than any writer with whom we are acquainted elucidated the validity of our faith-knowledge, and discriminated our faith-judgments from those of the elaborative faculty. This is a territory which demands more thorough investigation than has yet been given to it. There is still great haziness hanging over the region where our thought-judgments and our faith-judgments approach each other. And if Dr. McCosh should more formally and completely develop the profound hints which are contained in the "Intuitions of the Mind" in reference to those questions, he would go far towards maturing the results of some of the most important principles of that school which has been illuminated by the splendid names of Reid, Stewart, and Hamilton.

The book before us is strongly marked by that combination of philosophical analysis and statement with pertinent illustrations drawn from imagination, science, and history, which constitutes so conspicuous a feature of the author's work on the Divine Government. There is no reader of intelligence, however unaccustomed he may be to metaphysical technicalities, who will find it dry and uninteresting. The special cases by means of which abstract truths are reduced to practical exemplification, are so appropriate and so vividly and happily stated, that entertainment as well as instruction is afforded at every step in the progress of the exposition. In one or two instances, however, the author employs illustrations which reveal the fact that he did not intend to address a circle of readers coextensive with the limits of this land. There is a certain class of them, however restricted they may be, to whose taste, to say the least, his book would have lost none of its attractiveness by the absence of such allusions. But that,

we presume, is matter of small concern to one whose reputation is in no degree dependent upon their suffrage. Still a professedly philosophical work, we take leave to say, would not be apt to suffer, in the estimation of the republic of letters, in consequence of possessing the attribute of catholicity. A contempt for the feelings of Frenchmen might be expected in a patriotic speech by a German professor, but his taste would be questionable should he give it expression in a calm metaphysical treatise.

In the Preface, Dr. McCosh intimates his dissatisfaction with the ordinary treatment of the feelings and emotions in books of mental science. He objects to the term *feeling* as "very vague and ambiguous," and deems it desirable to separate the emotions from the feelings, and "to have a renewed attempt to give an analysis, a description and classification of them, as distinguished from other mental qualities." We concur with him in regarding it as important to make and to emphasise such a distinction. If, however, he means that the term *feeling* should cease to bear a generic signification, including *emotion*, we are not clear that the criticism is just. We can think of no word wide enough to embrace all the phenomena which it is usual to group under the term *feelings*, if that term be discarded. In the present state of the language, it would be hard to improve upon Sir William Hamilton's terminology.

The author analyses emotion into four constituent elements: first, appetences which are the springs in which it originates; secondly, the idea or phantasm which calls forth and conditions it; thirdly, excitement with attachment and repugnance; and fourthly, the organic affection, or the impressions made by it upon the organs of the body, and reciprocally made upon it by the excited states of those organs. We have some doubt whether a strict analysis would assign the last of these to the nature of emotion, so far as the affection of the bodily organs is concerned. Dr. McCosh very properly insists upon the necessity of keeping apart psychological and physiological investigations, and of distinguishing between mental emotion and nervous sensibility. But the incorporation of organic affections into the very nature of mental emotions would seem to endanger the maintenance of

these just distinctions. Might it not be better to treat organic affections as concomitants of emotion, rather than as constituent elements?

Book First of the treatise is occupied in an exposition of the four elements of emotion which have been mentioned. It contains many striking observations. As a specimen we give a passage occurring in his treatment of the second, which is worthy of consideration by that class of public speakers who aim at stirring the emotions of their hearers in order to induce them to take action in regard to the subject enforced upon their attention:

“Our doctrine admits an application to the art of rhetoric, as showing how feeling is to be excited. We are never, indeed, to neglect the more important task of enlightening and convincing the understanding in the view of impressing the sensibility. If the judgment is not convinced, feeling will be merely like the fire fed by straw, blazing for a time, it may be, to be speedily extinguished, with only ashes remaining. But in order to secure consideration by the understanding, or when the understanding has been gained, it may be of advantage or it may be necessary to interest the heart. Now we have seen in what way the feelings are to be gained. No man ever stirred up feeling by simply showing that we ought to feel. Still less will it be roused by high sounding exclamations, such as “how lovely,” “how good,” “how sublime.” Commonplace orators shout and rave in this way, without exciting in the breast of those who listen to them any feeling, except it be one of wonder, how they should seem to be so warm when they are saying nothing fitted to warm us. A steady tide will be raised only where there is a body like the moon attracting the waters. He who would create admiration for goodness must exhibit a good being performing a good action. He who would draw out compassion must bring before us a person in distress. He who would rouse indignation must expose to us a deed of cowardice, deceit, or cruelty. Or, if he would stir up gratitude he must show us favors conferred upon us.” (Pp. 49, 50.)

We fully subscribe to the author's strictures upon those systems of religion or morality which abstract moral excellence from its existence in a living personal Being, and appeal to the love of the good rather than to the love of God. He very justly remarks that “unless we place before the mind a living, acting, benevolent God, the affections will not be drawn towards him”; and that “the injunction or recommendation of virtue in the abstract, as was done in so many of the pulpits, and by so many of the ethical

writers, of Great Britain in the middle of the last century, is found to be utterly powerless upon the heart, character, and conduct" (p. 49).

Book Second contains a classification and description of the emotions. They are reduced to two classes: first, those directed to animate objects; secondly, those called forth by inanimate objects. In treating of those embraced in the first class, he professedly follows the division of Dr. Thomas Brown into Retrospective, Immediate, and Prospective Emotions.

Book Third is devoted to what the author denominates Complex Emotions, which he distributes into two kinds: Continuous Emotions, and Motives swaying masses.

This work challenges attention not only by the ability which characterises all the productions of its distinguished author, but by the fact that it contributes to the supply of a real demand—the demand for thoroughgoing discussions of the emotions apart from the intellect, the will, and the conscience. Such works as those of Alison and Burke do not profess to be more than partial. Dr. McCosh covers the whole field of the Emotions.

The mechanical execution of the book is all that could be desired.

J. L. G.

*Socialism.* By ROSWELL D. HITCHCOCK, D. D. New York: Anson D. F. Randolph & Company, 1879. Pp. 111, 12mo.

This little Essay on a great and extremely difficult subject is smart, pretentious, flippant, unsatisfactory. We quite agree with "some of the many critics who have noticed the book" when they "say it does not solve the social problem," as the author tells us they have said. It is divided into four parts: 1. Socialism in general; 2. Communistic Socialism; 3. Anti-Communistic Socialism; 4. Christian Socialism.

Dr. Hitchcock knows very well how to express himself. If he would devote a half score of years to the study of the question he briefly disposes of in these few flashy pages, we should no doubt have something worthy of his theme and of himself; but the Essay as it stands impresses us as a very shallow production.

There are two points which we must signalise. Dr. Hitchcock

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