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I.

DR. ABRAHAM KUYPER.*

I.

IT goes without saying that the following pages do not contain everything that might well be said about Dr. Kuyper. What

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* [We depart from our ordinary custom of publishing only fresh articles written expressly for the REVIEW, in order to give our readers a translation of this, no doubt somewhat inadequate, account of Dr. Kuyper's life up to 1888 by Jhr. Mr. Witsius H. de Savornin Lohman. In Dutch it forms one of the issues of a series of booklets published by H. D. Tjeenk Willink at Haarlem, under the editorship of Dr. E. D. Pijzel, and designed to describe the *Mannen van Beteekenis in Onze Dagen;* and it appeared as long ago as 1889. This early date, of course, detracts seriously from the completeness of the sketch: for so far from Dr. Kuyper having been idle during the last decade, this is precisely the period of his greatest activity and of his greatest achievements in Church and State—including his breach with the State Church and his successful leading of a large body of "Doleerenden" (as his followers were suggestively called) out of its bondage and finally into union with the "Christian Reformed Churches," so forming the strong existing body of free churches known as the "Gereformeerde Kerken." Mr. Witsius Lohman has, however, given a fair account of Dr. Kuyper's teachings during the earlier years of his public activity, and the facts that the stress of the sketch is laid rather on Dr. Kuyper's political program than on his theological work and that it is written distinctly for a Dutch audience, we are persuaded, constitute an apparent rather than real drawback to its usefulness. For Dr. Kuyper is about to make himself known to the American public in his work as a theologian—not only in the course of "Stone Lectures" on *Calvinism* which he will deliver before the Theological Seminary at Princeton this autumn, but in the translation of a portion of his *Encyclopædia of Sacred Theology* just now appearing from the press of Charles Scribner's Sons: and there may be some danger that we should not realize that he has long been as significant a figure in the political life of present-day Holland as in its theological thought. This essay may be taken, therefore, as supplying in some sort a preliminary preparation for the knowledge of the man which we shall derive from his

IV.

THE METAPHYSICS OF CHRISTIAN APOLOGETICS.

IV. Morality.

We have now discussed the first three of the fundamental truths of Christian apologetics. We have, as we think, established Reality, or the truth that what we term substance is not mere appearance, but has being of its own; Duality, or the truth that substance is of two kinds, essentially different and mutually exclusive, mind and matter; and Personality, or the truth that mind, in one of its forms at least, exists as self-conscious entities that we call persons. Thus far, then, we have confined ourselves to the sphere of the actual. The questions that we have asked have been: Is there Reality? Of how many sorts is it? What are the characteristics of these? In every case our inquiry has been as to what *is*, and only as to what is. In taking up the fourth of the fundamental truths of Christian apologetics, however, we enter a radically different sphere. In simply mentioning Morality, we pass at once from the actual to the ideal. The question immediately concerns, not what is, but what *ought* to be. Duty, not fact, engages our attention.

But what is meant by duty, which the word ought is felt by all to express? This needs to be clearly determined; for, as has just been implied, morality is rooted in the idea of oughtness and grows through the practical recognition of the particular duties in which oughtness unfolds itself. No definition, however, may be attempted. Like all words designating knowledge given directly in intuition, ought cannot be analytically defined. As in the case of being or reality, there is nothing simpler into which to resolve it and by which to explain it. Yet while this is so, it does not follow that it cannot be discerned. On the contrary, it is known intuitively, and it is thus known as certainly as reality is. In short, the idea of oughtness, as that of reality, is so simple that, if no definition is possible, so none is required. Moreover, though the idea of oughtness cannot be defined, it can be described. We cannot classify it by referring it to any genus, but we can point out the features characteristic of all the species, so to speak, which it itself embraces. These features are three. First, oughtness necessarily calls attention to an ideal. It points, not to the actual, but to what is presented as a standard for the actual. When I say, You are honest, I affirm honesty to be a trait of your character. When I say, You ought to be honest, I affirm honesty to be an essential of the standard for your character. I refer, not to what you are, but to that which sustains such a relation to what you are as to be to you an obligatory ideal; and it is the fact of this relationship, and so the objectivity, as well as the binding force, of the particular ideal to which it relates you, that my use of the word ought indicates. Secondly, oughtness implies free-agency. You may say, Thou oughtest, only to a free-agent. An ideal is possible only for a self-determining being. Thus one who has been mesmerized is not blameworthy, even though he does what in his case before he was mesmerized would have been a grievous sin. The reason is, not that he has not violated what was his true ideal, but that it is an ideal for him no longer. Just so soon as his will passed under the control of the mesmerizer he became incapable of having an ideal. Thou oughtest might be said to him no more than to a stone. With the loss of self-determination he left at once the sphere of morality. Free-agency, however, is not so much a further characteristic of the moral as it is the other side of it. If, on the one hand, ought, as we have seen, by expressing the relation between ourselves and our ideal, affirms its existence and binding force for each one of us; on the other hand, by bringing us thus into relation to an ideal, it declares our power of self-determination. It would not, therefore, be incorrect to say that morality in its objective reference points to an obligatory ideal, and that in its subjective reference it emphasizes free-agency; or, as Pres. Patton has put it (*The Pres. Rev.*, Vol. vii, No. xxv, p. 134), "in the idea of oughtness there is involved, not only an obligatory Ideal, but a Free-Agent." Thirdly, morality always supposes personality. Only to a self-conscious being, a person, may Thou oughtest be said. This is so because the obligatory ideal implied in Thou oughtest becomes meaningless except in the case of one who, in addition to being by nature able to recognize it as an ideal and particularly as an ideal binding on himself, can also compare himself with it and then try to bring himself up to it, and so make it the practical ideal that he has already felt it to be. For this reason a beast's life must be non-moral. Though he determines himself, he can do so only as he pleases; he cannot do so as he ought. An obligatory ideal is impossible for him, inasmuch as he is not self-conscious. Since he cannot compare himself with it, it could have no force, and so has no existence, in his case. Such, then, are the three essential features of what we may call the sphere of oughtness as distinguished from that of actuality. Whenever they are combined we may and must say, Thou oughtest. Let even one of them, however, be absent, and ought cannot be used without nonsense. Of these three features the third, Personality, has been discussed, and its truth vindicated, as we believe, in the paper immediately preceding this in this series. In order to the establishment of the basis of morality two questions, therefore, remain for consideration; viz., the inquiry as to an objective obligatory ideal and the inquiry as to free-agency. These, then, must now claim our attention.

I. Their supreme importance appears, first of all, in their relation to apologetics. They form the very foundation of that one of the arguments for God which most philosophers have regarded as the strongest, and which Kant pronounced the only valid one. Could it be shown that there is no ideal obligatory on us; that ought meant originally no more than what is best for us, and that ought not meant only dread of punishment; in a word, that Bain's or Spencer's account of the genesis of these ideas is true—could this be established, the Moral Argument for God, at least in its common form, would fall. The idea of oughtness, on which it is built, the categorical imperative on which it rests, would not be entitled to much respect, and certainly could not be the ground for our belief in a righteous Law-giver and Governor of the universe, if we were obliged to admit that in reality they were only the last counsel of a "take care of number one" policy. Hence, the necessity of vindicating the intuitional character of oughtness. Deny the moral law which it emphasizes, and men will at once begin to ask, Why should we, nay, how can we, believe in a Moral Ruler of the world? Do away with duty, and you will seem to do away with God.

The importance of the questions under consideration is seen quite as clearly in dogmatics. Not only does this everywhere proceed on the great facts of an objective obligatory ideal for men and of their free-agency, but it is in its relation to morality that it finds its explanation. Thus the historic events of which its doctrines are the interpretation were all in order to holiness, to the complete realization of that which ought to be. For example, Christ came from heaven to earth, "not to destroy, but to fulfill the law," our obligatory ideal. He died that we might become "holy and without blemish before Him in love." We are justified on the ground of His sacrificial blood that we may be sanctified by the inworking of His Spirit. The redemption which is in Christ is, therefore, fundamentally and throughout moral, the doing what, in view of our sin, ought to be done by God, if He would express His love for us by enabling us to become what, in view of our relation to Him, we ought to be. According to what we believe to be the Word of God, it could not be otherwise. God is invariably represented as essentially moral, as always and in all respects all that He ought to be, as thus the absolute ideal. Undermine morality, consequently, by denying what we have seen to be its basal facts, and Christian theology is left without its reason or end, nay, its very substance is evaporated. It is nothing, if it be not the theology of morality, and it is preëminently *the* moral theology. It is rooted in oughtness, it grows only in the atmosphere of oughtness, its fruit is the perfection of oughtness. The love of Christ is essentially righteous.

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Again, the importance of the inquiries that we are prosecuting appears in their relation to human destiny. The immortality of the soul could scarcely have been imagined save from the moral standpoint; and certainly its defense will be most feeble if conducted on any other than the moral basis. It is only when we regard ourselves as self-determining beings, so created that we may realize the divine ideal for us—it is not until then that the opportunities of the life that now is, for our moral development, for our reward, for our punishment, become so self-evidently insufficient that it is felt that reason itself demands the life everlasting. In a word, let a man deny that he is self-determining, and that he is under law to determine himself according to law, and he can hardly help admitting that he is to die as the dog dies. Even thus is our hope for the future a moral one. It can find little nourishment outside the moral sphere.

This suggests the immense importance of the questions under discussion even to the most practical interests of the present life. Our attitude toward this depends very largely on our belief with respect to the future. Hence, the Epicurean maxim, "Let us eat and drink, for to-morrow we die." Nothing so certainly robs life here of its value as the thought that there will be no life hereafter. And so it is that the foundations of morality, inasmuch as they are also the natural foundations of the hope of immortality, are the necessary bases of individual and social prosperity and happiness. This is so, indeed, directly, as well as because of the relation of morality to our views concerning the future. What, for example, would be the effect on us, did we really believe, that we had lost the power of self-determination; that we were mere creatures of circumstance; that we were swept along irresistibly by the forces up the stream of our descent? All stimulus to effort would at once be destroyed. Unable even to influence our development, why should we strive to be other than we are? Why should we endeavor to realize our ideal, to make the most of ourselves, to bring in the kingdom of God? There could be no ideal obligatory on us, no law for us, no goal for our attainment. Life would be absolutely devoid of interest. It would mean no more for us than it does for the stone. Nor would it be materially different, though the power of self-determination were preserved. It is the obligatory ideal that gives to this power its worth and, to a high degree, its value. Suppose that we had no other basis of choice than our present likes and dislikes. Suppose that we had no conception of a law above us and a corresponding ideal within us demanding our obedience and devotion. Suppose that we had never heard and could not hear the solemn but majestic imperative, Thou oughtest. How would our self-determination differ essentially from that of the hog turning himself from his rooting to the garbage that he craves? How would our life be nobler than that of the beast that perishes? How would human progress be possible? How would civilization be even conceivable? They are, therefore, no questions of merely theoretical interest that come before us when we undertake the vindication of the bases of morality. On the contrary, they are inquiries on the answer to which depend the validity of much of Christian apologetics, the existence of Christian dogmatics, the natural hope of immortality, even the present well-being of man and the very continuance of human society.

Nor here in the moral sphere any more than elsewhere may it be urged that practice is independent of belief and that, consequently, it is of no great importance what views are held on the questions that we are considering. Indeed, it is in the moral sphere as nowhere else that mistakes in thinking issue in disease, death, and corruption. This is the explanation of the pessimism of India. Life has lost all value to its millions because it has lost all dignity, and its glory has thus departed because of the pantheism in which for centuries the Hindus have been trained. They have ceased to regard themselves self-determining. So, too, the sensational philosophy issued in sensualism. Even had human freedom not been denied, men could not long have continued to strive toward a supersensible ideal when they were taught that the senses were the only inlets of knowledge. Let us therefore take up at once these two questions with reference to which it is of such supreme practical moment that the truth should be exactly ascertained and resolutely held.

II. The first of these relates to the *objective Obligatory Ideal.*

That we may confine the discussion within the narrow limits permitted, we will consider:

1. The Status Questionis.—Our inquiry, then, is not concerned with the genesis of the sense of oughtness. When and how this sense emerges, when and how the child first becomes conscious of the difference between I want and I ought, when and how he rises from the intuition of this distinction in individual cases to the conception of the general law which they reveal—this it would be interesting and useful to determine; but it is aside from our purpose. It is a psychological rather than a metaphysical study. Nor is the question as to the efficient cause of the sense of oughtness, and of the law and ideal which it implies. We know that these point to God as their author. Conscience is not His voice, but it calls attention to His "law written on the heart." This, however, though a truth which is second to none in importance, is not so fundamental as that which is before us. It is theological rather than metaphysical. Nor, again, does the inquiry refer to the ground of the obligatory ideal. What is that which makes it what it is? What is the ultimate test of right? Why ought we to do this? Why ought we not to do that? This ground of duty, this test of right, we find in the divine nature as expressed in the divine will for us. We ought to do what God has commanded, and, in our sphere and measure, to be what He is; and we ought thus to be holy because He is holy. Yet these truths, profound though they are, may not claim vindication at our hands. They belong to ethics, not to metaphysics. Nor, once more, does the question relate to the end or purpose of the obligatory ideal. Clearly its design is that we may become like the God who has given it to us and whose nature is its ground. But this truth, while of the highest practical worth, we may not develop. It is religious; it is not metaphysical. In opposition to all these inquiries, psychological, theological, ethical, and religious, the one N B to which we must now address ourselves is metaphysical. It underlies and conditions all the questions just named. It is simply this, *Is there an objective obligatory ideal?* There seems to be. Conscience calls attention to it. Consciousness testifies to nothing more clearly than to its imperative. Is this testimony, however, trustworthy? Is there really a law above us and a corresponding ideal within us that we ought to obey in spite of consequences; or can this idea of duty be so explained that what is unique in it, its oughtness and the implied objective law and ideal, will be explained away?

2. There are those who claim that it can be. They may be divided, speaking generally, into the following three schools, the

first two of which, at least at present, usually to a greater or less extent, combine their methods:

The Associationists.—These would get rid of an obligatory ideal by resolving the idea of duty into the idea of happiness, and they would identify the former idea with the latter by means of the principle of association. This class of moralists, though foreshadowed by Hobbes, had its real beginning, at any rate in modern times, with John Locke. He opened the way for it in his well-known denial of what he conceived to be the doctrine of innate ideas. This he applied to ethics as well as to psychology. "Moral principles," says he (i, 3), "are even further removed than intellectual ones from any title to be innate." His successor Hartley rejected the intellectual side of his philosophy and developed a materialistic psychology. Indeed, he affirms (i, 360) that "all our most complex ideas arise from sensation, and reflection is not a distinct source, as Mr. Locke makes it." According to Hartley, therefore, "there exists no morality founded on the eternal reasons and relations of things, but all notions of right and wrong proceed from association alone, from clusters of ideas which are only modified sensations—all affection as well as all reasoning being the mere result of association" (i, 499). That is, believing with Locke that happiness was the principle of morals, whatever experience showed to be conducive to pleasurable feelings he regarded as obligatory, and he explained how the idea of duty came to appear original and independent on the ground that the idea which forms the link of association may be forgotten though the association itself continues. Thus the idea of honesty is associated with the idea of pleasure by being the best, the most pleasure-producing policy. This fact, however, may be lost sight of but the association remain; and then honesty will be practiced, and will seem to be considered obligatory, for itself; because it is a duty, and not because it is expedient. It is as in the case of the miser and his money. To others and to himself he appears to love it for itself. Yet really he began to love it for the conveniences which it supplied. The chain of association holds, though the link of utility is no longer perceived. By Hartley, then, the obligatory ideal is resolved into such conduct as we have found associated with pleasurable sensations. This empirical and arbitrary view of obligation was buttressed by Hume. In his celebrated doctrine of causation he denied all connection between cause and effect except a merely customary one. A virtuous act he regarded as such, not because it was fitted to arouse a feeling of satisfaction in us, but simply because experience showed that the latter generally followed the former. Thus to Hume's mind honesty was right only for the reason that it usually turned out to be best. It was neither right in itself nor in itself adapted, so far as we cold say, to promote prosperity. It was found to do so: hence it became a duty. Should dishonesty appear to have the same result, it would be equally a duty. This travesty of duty Paley tried to spiritualize by substituting for individual sensations of pleasure or feelings of approbation the everlasting happiness of heaven. He defined virtue as "the doing good to mankind, in obedience to the will of God, for the sake of everlasting happiness." In the final analysis, therefore, he made the oughtness of a state or action to depend on its association with, or rather its tendency toward, the individual's eternal glory; and according to him, the only essential difference between the saint and the sinner was that the former was wise and the latter foolish. Paley's contemporary Bentham developed this school of morals along quite different lines. On the one hand, he went back and affirmed the Epicurean doctrine that pleasure was the chief good. On the other hand, he went forward and made the true principle of morals to be, not even the everlasting happiness of the individual, but what he called "the greatest good of the greatest number." A further and scarcely consistent step was taken by John Stuart Mill. "Departing from the original idea of his predecessor, that pleasure is the only good, and that pleasures differ from one another only in intensity, he interpolated into the general idea of quantity of happiness the discriminating idea of quality." Regard for the highest happiness rather than for the greatest amount of pleasure he made the spring of moral action. He even allowed as a psychological fact that virtue may become "a good in itself, without looking to any end beyond it," and that the mind is not in a right state unless it love virtue "as a thing desirable in itself." Yet that, though speaking thus, he continued an associationist appears in this, that he sought to account for the phenomena referred to by his famous principle of the chemistry of the association of ideas. "The only color for representing our moral judgments as the result of a peculiar part of our nature, is that our feelings of moral approbation and disapprobation are really peculiar feelings. But is it not notorious that peculiar feelings, unlike any others we have experience of, are created by association every day?" (*Dis.*, pp. 139, 140). That is, while admitting that the idea of duty is now distinct from the idea of happiness, he, too, claims that it *was* identical with it. Whatever resulted in the highest happiness was duty. This was the explanation of oughtness. The doing of duty has come to be regarded as a part of happiness and so has in itself an end and thus to be done for its own sake, only because of its invariable association with the highest happiness. In this manner is it attempted to explain away our obligatory ideal. The categorical imperative seems to refer to an objective and absolute law, but it is merely for the reason that we mistake for this the desire for the happiness which results from obedience to it. In reality, right is only the highest expediency; the sense of duty is only the sense of prudence; the moral law is only the rule of wisdom. What ought I to do? is only the polite way of asking, What will pay? There is no objective obligatory ideal. The idea of oughtness originates in our feelings of pleasure and pain.

1 To this widely prevalent theory the following objections, if appreciated, would seem to be fatal. The distinction between high and low pleasures which Mr. Mill introduces and which makes him the most attractive and plausible of associationists is suicidal to him and to his school. To see this it is necessary simply to remember that the essential difference in the quality of high and low pleasures is not a matter to be ascertained by any experience, but, as Blackie says (*Four Phases of Morals*, p. 348), "springs directly out of the intellectual and emotional nature of man, asserting its own innate superiority precisely as light asserts itself over darkness, and order over confusion." That is, the reason why there are high and low pleasures is that there are beings such that we may speak of them as in themselves high or low. Thus intellectual pleasures are not pleasures at all to a pig, because a pig is incapable of them, and a bad man can see nothing desirable in virtue by itself because he is incapable of such delight. It is the fact that a pig is a pig, which makes us say that his pleasures are and must be low. It is the fact that a man is a man which makes us say that his pleasures, if appropriate to him, are high and that all his pleasures should be so. It is the fact that a good man is good which makes us say that his pleasures are the highest of all. To regard, therefore, with Mr. Mill, the highest happiness as the *sole* principle of morals is to contradict yourself. Not as a principle or otherwise can the highest happiness be even conceived by itself. It necessarily presupposes another and independent principle by conformity with which it is seen to be the highest. That there is innate in man an ideal—this it is that renders his pleasure higher than that of the creatures below him and enables us to discriminate between the happiness of different men as higher and lower.

2 Moreover, this distinction must be introduced. By introducing it Mr. Mill contradicted his theory, but by not introducing it his predecessors contradicted common sense. The distinction as to the quality of pleasures is so real, so palpable, that to ignore it

argues imbecility or willful perversity or both. It is absurd to say that the only difference between the happiness of the London roué and the happiness of Mr. Gladstone was that the latter had more of it. It is equally absurd, as Blackie writes, to regard "a Joseph Mazzini consecrating his whole life with the most intense enthusiasm to the ideal of a possible Italian republic as being as much an Epicurean as David Hume sneering at all enthusiasm, and pleasing his soul with the delicate flatteries of fair dames in a Parisian saloon. This is to confound all things, and to reduce the whole affair to a fence of words rather than to a battle of principle." In short, this qualitative distinction must be recognized, and that it cannot be recognized without invalidating the theory that we are considering is certainly fatal to the theory.

Were this not so, however, its refutation would be easy on other grounds. Its instrument is the association of ideas, and this cannot do what is required. For example, what is demanded on this theory is that the sensation of pleasure shall be changed into the idea of oughtness. This is what the associationist claims has taken place. We come to regard as obligatory what we at first looked on as desirable only. Now can the mere association of ideas effect this wonderful transformation of a feeling into an idea so radically different from it? We claim that it cannot. Give us mere sensations of pleasure, and no reproduction of them, even through association, will make of them more than ideas of pleasure. Things are not altered by uniting them, and no more are ideas and feelings by associating them. An apple and an orange will be only an apple and an orange when looked at together, and the idea of honesty and the idea of pleasure will be only the idea of honesty and the idea of pleasure when thought of together. The laws of association can explain why they come to be thought of together, but that is all. Nor does Mr. Mill help matters when he represents the association of ideas as "a process of a similar kind to chemical operations" (*Logic*, B. vi, c. iv, § 3). The comparison is not justified by the facts. See what is implied in the production of a new body by chemical composition. There is one element, oxygen, for example, with its properties, and another element, hydrogen, with its properties, a mutual action in which there is potential energy expended, and a new product with its properties; and it is this mutual action, which we name chemical affinity and whose laws we try to determine, that causes the new element. In the association of ideas, however, it is quite different. We have two ideas, the idea, we will say, of honesty, and the idea of prosperity; and because these two ideas are found to follow one another, we are told that there results the third and dissimilar idea of the obligation to honesty. But this is a *non-sequitur*. Ideas are not elements with properties. Above all, the mutual action of the combined elements, involving the operation of electricity, or of some one of the correlated forces of the universe, is not observable in the case of the association of ideas. That is, what makes the new product when chemical elements are properly combined appears to be absent even when ideas are rightly associated. At the very point that is essential, therefore, the comparison breaks down. It follows, consequently, that the instrument of this theory is not what it is cracked up to be. Indeed, it is quite ineffective. It can explain how it is that ideas rise together in thought; but it cannot give the new idea which it must originate, if the theory is to hold. It can tell us why it is easy for us to think of certain things as obligatory, but it cannot tell us how the idea of oughtness came to be in our minds.

Were even this not so, however, the situation would be practically the same. Let association do all that is asked of it, still the associationists could not save themselves. The cornerstone of their 4 system is that "pleasure is the chief good," and that all our desires may be reduced to the desire for happiness. But is this so? Does not the claim that it is rest on a false psychology? What is the meaning of the conflict which every one experiences and which more than all else distinguishes human life from other life, the conflict between duty and pleasure, between what we feel that we ought to do and what we would like to do? This conflict is either real or unreal. If it be real, it implies two distinct and, in the case at issue, antagonistic principles. If it be unreal, then human life is but a farce. That in it which gives to it its dignity and meaning is a delusion.

Finally, the cornerstone of the theory under review rests on a foundation that is no foundation. This is sensationalism. As we noticed at the outset, associationists would find the origin of moral distinctions, as of all distinctions, in the feelings. This, however, is to put the cart before the horse. "A feeling presupposes some reality present to consciousness or contemplated in thought." Thus sugar is not saccharine because it is agreeable to the taste; it is agreeable to the taste because it is saccharine. In like manner, moral feelings presuppose the knowledge and so the independent existence of moral distinctions. Thus virtue is not right because it gives satisfaction; it gives satisfaction because it is right. In short, the sense of oughtness, so far from being capable of resolution into some other feeling, itself, as a feeling, presupposes the knowledge of an objective obligatory ideal. That is, the associationist would explain away the idea of duty by what itself involves it.

The Social Evolutionists.—According to this school, man becomes social by development, and as he does so he becomes moral. Evolution, not association, as in the theory just discussed, plays the chief part, sympathy takes the place of selfishness, and, above all, it is our ancestral experience, and not merely our experience as individuals, that is considered. The sense of oughtness is not due to the association of certain kinds of conduct with the gratification of our own selfish feelings; it is rather the result of ages of social evolution under the influence mainly of sympathy with others. The process of this evolution is variously set forth. It may be studied in such writers as Darwin, Wallace, Spencer, and Fiske. The exposition of the last-named is so concise, so lucid, and so representative, that an epitome of it is all that we shall attempt.

On this theory, then, as on that just noticed, there is no objective obligatory ideal. The moral sense, which seems to us to imply it, is not inherent in man. It does not pertain to him as man. In his first estate he lived for his own pleasure only; he had no moral sense. On the contrary, this is "the last and noblest product of evolution which we can ever know" (*Outlines of Cosmic Philosophy*, Vol. ii, p. 324). It is a mistake to regard it as an ultimate fact, "incapable of being analyzed into simpler emotional elements;" because, "though ultimate for each individual" at the present time, it is "derivative and . . . . has been built up out of slowly organized experiences of pleasures and pains" (*ibid.*, p. 327). These experiences are its "emotional antecedents," "as exhibited in ancestral types of psychical life" (*ibid.*, p. 327). So far this theory is like that just examined: both get the idea of duty from feelings of pleasure and pain. At this point, however, the difference between the two methods appears. That now under review accounts for the organization of the above-mentioned feelings into the idea of duty by the emergence and growth of sociality. With it arises the germ of the moral sense. Before man became a social being his feelings were wholly selfish or egoistic. As soon as he is a social being, however, his feelings become ego-altruistic. That is, while he still lives for his own happiness, he seeks it now in the manner in which the family, the tribe, the nation, in a word, society, regards him. The complete development of "the germ of a moral sense" which the savage thus acquires as the result of his entrance on social life has been accomplished by "the enormous expansion of sympathy due to the continued integration of communities." That is to say, the multiplication and perfection of the relationships of society increase and diversify our sympathy: and this, though, as "the power of ideally reproducing in ourselves the pains of another," it is a kind of self-pleasing, inasmuch as what it impels us to do is to remove that which it is painful for us to see—this sympathy gradually loses this character, because it ceases to be "the power of reproducing in one's self the pain of another," and becomes the power of "representing feelings detached from the incidents of particular cases," from which power there comes the "instinctive abhorrence of actions which the organically registered experience of mankind has associated with pain or evil," a power that, "as the sympathetic feelings are extended over wider and wider areas," becomes stronger and stronger, until at last it generates "an abstract moral sense, so free from the element of personality that to grosser minds it is unintelligible" (*ibid.*, pp. 355, 356). The final stage in this process is the development of what are called the self-regarding virtues. This is reached when "ethical conceptions begin to be reflected back upon the conduct of the individual where it concerns chiefly or only himself." Hence, for example, the conviction that it is wicked to neglect one's own health or culture. Thus moral growth and perfection are the result of the sympathy which social relations stimulate.

The question, however, arises at this point, How did man become a social being and thus acquire "the germ of the moral sense"? Granted that its development has been explained, we still need to account for its origin. There is yet to be bridged the tremendous chasm between man when, according to Mr. Fiske, he was only a gregarious creature moved merely by feelings of pleasure and pain, and man when he had become a social being under the control of ideas of right and wrong, though as yet but in germ. How will even the social evolutionist make this passage? "By the threefold bridge of sympathy, remorse, and mythology." Sympathy, as has been implied, is "the power of reproducing in one's self the pleasures and pains of another person." This power is "manifested in a rudimentary form by all gregarious animals of a moderate intelligence," and it will be "strengthened and further developed when a number of individuals are brought into closer and more enduring relationships." "Given this rudimentary capacity of sympathy, we can see how family integration must alter and complicate the emotional incentives to action" (*ibid.*, p. 346). "This sympathy will affect conduct within the family or clan;" and it will affect it there because "a curb" is put upon the exercise of "brutelike predatory instincts" by "a nascent public opinion, which lauds actions beneficial to the clan and frowns upon actions detrimental to it," and which is the product of "a sense of collective pleasure or pain." Thus "the mere animal incentives comprised in personal pleasures and pains" must be often overruled. "The good of the individual must begin to yield to the good of the community" (*ibid.*, pp. 347, 348). This process is greatly aided by remorse. It is caused by the contrast between past and weaker because selfish impressions and the ever-enduring social instincts. "The incentives to actions beneficial to the community are always steadily in operation," while "the purely selfish impulses" are "accompanied by pleasures that are brief in duration and leave behind memories of comparatively slight vividness." "Consequently, when one of the latter has been gratified, the fact that the impression which remains is weak compared with that which would have remained if one of the former had been obeyed, occasions dissatisfaction with conduct" (*ibid.*, p. 348). Thus, again, disinterested action is promoted. At the point at which some curiosity is felt concerning the causes of phenomena mythology emerges in the form of fetichism, and furnishes incentives of a mysterious and supernatural character. "The object of worship that it presents is reckoned the tutelary deity of the tribe, and is supposed to punish actions condemned by the community" (*ibid.*, p. 340). Thus is man developed out of a state of gregariousness into a state of sociality; and thus, consequently, he acquires "the germ of a moral sense." Involved in sociality, it is really the product of the sympathy, the remorse, and the mythology to which sociality itself is due.

At this point another question suggests itself. How does it happen that man is the only animal that becomes social? He is not the only gregarious animal by any means. He is not the only sympathetic gregarious animal. Here, however, is the reason. The vital difference in development just referred to is the result of the fact that when we reach man the maximum of dependence of children on their parents is reached, and so through the long continuance of this relationship of dependence the family becomes permanently organized. Then out of it arises the tribe; out of it, the nation; and out of it, society; and with it, in the men composing it, "the germ of the moral sense." Thus would the social evolutionists explain away our obligatory ideal. It is neither independent nor inherent in us. Our moral sense is nothing but "the experience of utility organized and consolidated through all past generations," and we have now the idea of duty only because our childhood is so long and so dependent.

That this theory will not accomplish its end would seem to be sufficiently evinced by the following among many considerations: It cannot account for the development of "the germ of a moral sense." "The enormous expansion of sympathy," to whatever this may be due, is inadequate. The expansion of an idea does not alter its essential significance. If sympathy be egoistic at the start, even infinite expansion will only make it an infinite display of egoism. In a word, multiplication or expansion effects a change of quantity simply. It is, however, a change of quality which is demanded. The development of the moral sense does not, according to the hypothesis, consist in the increase of the egoistic or even of the ego-altruistic feelings. The former of these are altogether non-moral and the latter largely so. The essence of the development in question is the conversion of egoism into altruism, of regard for one's own pleasure into devotion to duty in the abstract, of hedonism into morality. In short, "the development of the germ of a moral sense," is the substitution for one thing of its contrary, if not its contradictory; and there must be more than expansion to do that. Nor is the argument affected by any amount of "generalization and detachment" from the incidents of particular cases. If sympathy were at first, as we have seen that Mr. Fiske admits it to have been, individualistic and self-regarding, it will be individualistic and self-regarding, however general and abstract it may become. To quote Mr. Kidd (*Religion and Morality*, p. 97), "the only difference between 'the pain occasioned by the sight of another's suffering' and 'the generalized and detached idea of that suffering,' is that, in the one case, we are moved by a painful sight and, in the other, by a painful imagination; and these, so far as their aim is concerned, are one and the same. They are distinctly personal in their bearing, and it is impossible to extract from either of them a moral sense that is 'free from the element of personality.' The truth is that the element of personality is the only thing that they can yield. They begin with that which is personal, and they must end with it; for nothing intervenes that can affect it." That is, the quality of a feeling is not changed by considering it apart from its occasion. Now it is precisely a change of quality which the exigencies of this theory demand. Hence, its inadequacy. But this is not all. Were it adequate, it would be fatal to itself. If it could, through the expansion and generalization of sympathy, transform individualistic egoism into abstract altruism, and so leave utterly behind all self-regarding feelings, how should we ever get the self-regarding virtues? These are impossible without self-regarding feelings. Thus social evolution breaks down in its first effort. It cannot account even for the development of the moral sense.

Again, though it could do this, it could not explain the genesis of the moral sense. The chasm between gregariousness and sociality, and, therefore, between the hedonism and the morality which these respectively imply, cannot be bridged by sympathy, remorse, and mythology, either singly or combined. Mythology cannot do it; for this, according to the hypothesis, assumes that the gods "punish actions condemned by the community," which itself presupposes the sociality that it is introduced to explain. Remorse cannot do it: for this springs out of the contrast of past and weaker because selfish impressions with the ever-enduring social instincts, a contrast that brings retribution; and not even in the present highly developed state of society do we find that "the incentives to actions beneficial to the community are always steadily in operation" and that "the purely selfish impulses" are "accompanied by pleasures that are brief in duration and leave behind memories of comparatively slight vividness." On the contrary, we observe that men are naturally selfish and that ordinarily indulgence in selfish pleasures only stimulates the desire for them. Mr. Darwin, whom Mr. Fiske follows, has evidently studied other species of animals more accurately than he has his own. As Miss Cobbe well remarks (*Darwinism in Morals*, p. 23), "he has overlooked the vast class of intelligences which lie between baboons and philosophers." Indeed, his account of remorse does more than presuppose sociality; it is without basis on any known condition of human nature. Nor can sympathy bridge the chasm that must be crossed, if egoistic feelings are to be transformed even into ego-altruistic feelings. That it does not do this of itself is admitted; for we are told that "this power is manifested in a rudimentary form by all gregarious animals of a moderate intelligence." That sympathy is as ineffective even when developed and transformed should be as evident; for the first factor in its upward movement is "a nascent public opinion." This, however, was based on, and was organized by, "the sense of collective pleasure or pain;" it lauded "actions beneficial to the clan, and frowned on actions detrimental to it;" in a word, it was "fundamentally hedonistic, individual, and self-regarding;" it was simply the aggregate of the selfish desires of the community. What effect could it have on sympathy, but to make it even more hedonistic, individual, and self-regarding than this theory insists that it was at first? Yet were this not so, there would still have to be reckoned with the objection that we have already noticed. Does not even a nascent public opinion itself imply sociality, that is, the very thing to be accounted for? It would seem, then, that if the chasm separating gregariousness from sociality, hedonism from the germ of morality, has been crossed, it has been, as Mr. Kidd well says, "on the wings of imagination, and not by the solid bridge of fact and proof." The bridge on which we suppose ourselves to have gone over, is made of materials which, even were they sufficiently strong, are to be found either nowhere or only on the farther brink. That is, to get sociality and its implied germ of the moral sense, social evolution must have sociality and "the germ of the moral sense." With its hedonistic starting-point it can explain sociality and the germ of the moral sense only by sociality and the germ of the moral sense.

Let all that has been said, however, go for naught. Grant, if you will, that social evolution can account both for the development and for the genesis of the germ of the moral sense, the theory will still collapse when we raise the question, Why is it that of all gregarious and sympathetic animals man is the only one to become social and moral? His long and dependent childhood cannot explain this. Childhood in the case of most animals is at first a relationship of dependence, and the mere lengthening of the term of relationship does not alter the nature of the relationship. For example, the relationship of master to servant is essentially the same after forty years that it was after ten years. It is as truly as ever a relationship of superiority and authority. In like manner, if, as is claimed on this theory, the relationship of childhood was, in the case of man as in that of other animals, a gregarious relationship, it would be gregarious and only gregarious no matter how prolonged the childhood might be made. Nor may it be replied that it is sympathy which transforms man from a gregarious to a social animal, and that our extended childhood gives to this a unique opportunity for operation. This is true, but of what avail would be this opportunity? The fact is not that sympathy transforms man from a gregarious animal into a social one. The fact is, according to Mr. Fiske, that what we may call gregarious sympathy is itself transformed into social sympathy. Time, however, as we have just seen, could effect this, only if sociality were merely a higher and purer form of gregariousness. But it is really, and on this theory avowedly, something as radically different from it as altruism is from egoism. Yet this is not all. This change in the duration of childhood of which so much is made not only could not render man a social being; it is itself because he is a social being. As Mr. Kidd says (*Morality and Religion*, p. 88), "Men do not become social because brought into certain unions, but they form these unions because they are social. Social evolution confounds cause with effect; and because it does this, it cannot account for the existence of morality, or for the presence and operation of a moral ideal and a moral sense." In short, the fatal defect of this whole scheme is that if it is to work at all, it must start with what it is devised to explain away. It must begin with a social and moral being, if it would justify its development of sociality and morality. It must admit what implies an objective obligatory ideal, if it is not to contradict its account of the evolution of the idea of right and wrong.

The Transcendentalists.—This school is a decided advance on that of social evolution. As the latter aims, by means of social evolution, to supply what is lacking in the associationist theory taken by itself; viz., the reason why the association of ideas has a social and thus moral issue: so the transcendental philosophy tries to avoid the rocks which, as we have seen, obstruct the course of social evolution, by regarding this as dialectic rather than as biological or psychological. It is clearly recognized that any scheme of evolution which depends wholly on the forces of nature must encounter serious difficulties. Higher orders of being cannot be explained, it is felt, simply by reference to lower orders. To do so involves, to go no further, the fundamental fallacy that you can get out of a thing what is not in it; that, for example, as we have already observed, sociality can be evolved from gregariousness, though differing from it, not in degree, but in kind. This, and some other snags, dialectic evolution clears. It regards "all existence as a manifestation of the one Absolute Being, the Universal Intelligence;" and it conceives of the inherent power of this Absolute Idea as the sole agency at work in all transformations. Dialectic evolution, therefore, is not an evolving of one thing out of another and different thing; it is the progressive unfolding of the real meaning of the universal thing or rather idea. In a word, it is not so much a scheme for the construction of the world as it is a scheme for the interpretation of the world. It is not its first aim to show the development of matter into mind: it tries rather to set forth the successive steps in the self-revelation of the Absolute Idea; and the logical process whereby this is being accomplished, whereby matter and then mind are generated, is itself both the Absolute and the world, the Idea and reality. That is, whatever is real is rational, and whatever is rational is real: and the rational and real is neither more nor less than this process itself of dialectic evolution. Thus the dialectic evolutionist would identify God and the world in a universal syllogism; he would explain what is by what should be; he would read facts in the light of logic alone. As we remarked when, in the second paper of this series, we were tracing the development of the realism of Kant into the transcendental idealism of Hegel, dialectic evolution conceives of the Absolute Idea, and is so named because it so conceives of the Absolute Idea, "as containing in itself the principle of difference, as having immanent in itself a 'dialectic,' or power of movement, which must develop the entire wealth of the actuality exhibited by the worlds of mind and of matter." In a word, not only is reason the prius of all things, but in their essence all things are reasonable: events correspond with logic; to be understood, what is must be read as illuminated by its rational conclusion. This is *the* truth of being.

It is also the principle of morality. This, as in the theory last considered, has its root in feeling or desire. Desire, however, has a deeper meaning. Real, it must, like all else, have the potency, if not the appearance, of the rational. Hence, the Hegelian theorem is, "Human desire is the personal in the evolution of existence." This Calderwood (*Handbook of Moral Philosophy*, p. 141), interprets thus, "The intelligent agent desires, not a thing outside himself, but self-satisfaction, that is, enlargement of being—'self-realization' in a richer experience—so reaching the end of his existence." That is, human desire, absurd though itself may often seem, is, in its essence, a demand for the fulfillment of the self or subject of the desire. It is as the premises in the syllogism, which necessitate their conclusion because they involve it and which involve it because they necessitate it. In like manner must human desire be understood. It is a demand for the rational; and this, of course, will be the realization of its unique and supreme since self-conscious subject.

The passage from mere animal desire to this consciousness of self-realization as an objective obligatory ideal is described by T. H. Green, in his *Prolegomena to Ethics* (Bk. ii, chap. i), somewhat as follows: We have "wants," and we have "impulses for the satisfaction of those wants." The rational system to which man belongs is distinguished from the animal system by "the transition from mere want to consciousness of a wanted object." This implies "the presence of the want to a subject which distinguishes itself from it, and is constant throughout successive stages of the want." In the direction of the activity of this subject under these conditions a reflective process may be discerned. "At the same time as the reflecting subject traverses the series of wants, which it distinguishes from itself, while it presents their filling as its object, there arises the idea of a satisfaction on the whole—an idea never realizable, but forever striving to realize itself in the attainment of a greater command over means to the satisfaction of particular wants." Now "it is this consciousness which yields, in the most elementary form, the conception of something that *should be*, as distinct from that which is." Thus the dialectic evolutionist would explain away the objective obligatory ideal, of which, as he himself admits, we seem to be conscious, by resolving it into the demand involved in because rational for the desire of a person, the demand that he should be a person with all that this implies. In a word, he would show that the idea of duty is really the desire for self-realization.

This view, attractive and lofty though it is, is open at least to the following and, as it seems to us, insuperable objections. Our limits forbid more than the barest mention of them.

As we saw in the preceding paper of this series, the transcendental scheme now under consideration is hopelessly embarrassed by "the host of difficulties starting in our path when all that is commonly attributed to man is referred to the direct agency of the Absolute One." Though an imposing, it is an utterly unworkable theory of the universe. Notwithstanding that it sets out to explain all facts, it continually butts against facts, and these the most significant, which contradict it. It could not fail to do this. *À priori* speculation cannot construct even the frame of reality. As Weber remarks in his admirable criticism of Hegel (*History of Philosophy*, p. 534), "Thought is a *mode* of the creative activity of things; it is not their *principle*. It follows that the *knowledge of things* does not come from pure thought, but from thought supported and governed by experience."

This appears most clearly when we consider the fundamental principle of dialectic evolution. It is not true that whatever is real is rational, and that whatever is rational is real. It would be hard to show that all that is rational is real, but it would be harder to show that all that is real is rational. Are there not irrational desires? Do we not observe large masses of men, not only degraded, but degrading themselves? Is not oppression frequent? Is not tyranny common? Do we not meet evil everywhere? May we say that these things are not real? Yet on the other hand, may we pretend that they are rational, and that they would be felt to be so did we comprehend them? Doubtless, they are found in a rational system and will be overruled to a rational end, but they are not themselves rational; and to claim that they are is to make it illogical to admit the other and less evident distinctions in being, and to do this is practically to annihilate it.

The falsity of this fundamental principle of dialectic evolution is seen also very conspicuously in the assumed development of the ethical consciousness. It is not the fact that the issue of human desire is always the desire for self-realization. It is true that if the real were invariably rational, this would be so. It is true that desire is always for an end that has some relation to the self. As, however, Mr. Kidd has shown conclusively (*Morality and Religion*,

p. 40), desire may be for self-gratification as well as for self-realization; and while self-realization consists in the satisfaction of self as determining the desire, self-gratification consists in the satisfaction of desire to which the self has been subjected. That is, human desire may be either rational or irrational, self-realizing or self-enslaving, in its issue and cannot, therefore, be necessarily rational in its essence.

Even though self-realization were the real meaning of all human desire, dialectic evolution could not justify itself. The idea of self-realization is not equivalent to the idea of duty. As Calderwood 4 puts it (*Handbook of Moral Philosophy*, p. 149), "The idea of self-realization, being concerned with our life as a whole, is equivalent to 'our good on the whole,' including all forms of self-interest and all forms of suitable effort. Hence, it cannot be identified with the 'should be'" (we would better say, ought to be), "of ethics. Duty is a distinct imperative of conduct; our 'Good' on the whole is an indefinite and variable conception."

Were this not so, it would still be an unanswerable question, how the idea of duty, the sense of oughtness, would ever be the result of dialectic evolution. As Calderwood asks, "How is a being whose life is the manifestation of the Universal Intelligence a fit subject for the injunction to obey moral law?" Such a being must be under the law of necessity: he cannot be under the law of morality. He does not freely determine himself according to his own nature; he is absolutely determined by the universal nature in which his, as all personality, is swallowed up. To say ought to such a being is as unmeaning as it would be to say ought to a stone. The latter is not more in bondage to physical necessity than the former is to spiritual necessity; and, as we have already observed, duty implies a free-agent, nay, is inconceivable as duty without one.

But this is not all. Even if self-realization were the equivalent of duty and even if the oughtness which is the unique characteristic of duty could be the result of dialectic evolution, a more serious difficulty would confront us. We should not be able to assign its proper place to the obligatory ideal, the ethical law. This is "an imperative of the life, an imperative of the reason." On that account it is essential to the life in which reason reigns. It is the essential basis of the activity of the perfect life. Consequently, the holier a man becomes the more does he live under the influence of the idea of duty. The more spontaneous his performance of it, the stronger is its power over him. Hence, God is oughtness personified. He is the Absolute Ought, because He is so holy that it is impossible for Him to do or to be wrong. This place, however, cannot be given to the ethical law, the obligatory ideal, under an evolution theory dominated, as dialectic evolution is, by the notion of movement, and not by that of law. Under such a theory "the end of conflict or movement is transmuted into the end of life itself." Duty being equivalent to self-realization, when self shall have been realized, duty will be no more. As Pres. Patton has put it in a criticism of the germ of this view as it appears in Kant (*Pres. Rev.*, No. xxv, p. 148), "the climax of morality would be the abolition of morality." Thus this theory fails to interpret ethical law. It narrows it to the process of the evolution which is introduced to explain it. It conditions its reality on difficulty in fulfilling it. In a word, the last achievement of that which is intended to account for the objective obligatory ideal is its annihilation. When perfection of personality shall have been attained, the law of our perfection will bind us no longer.

Thus ends in absurdity the attempt to do away with an objective obligatory ideal by identifying it with the subjective rational demand for self-realization. Really it is an attempt to identify things which are essentially incapable of identification. The ideal or ethical is always rational, but it is also other than and higher than the rational. Though what ought to be is ever the logical, very often the logical is far from being what ought to be. In short, as *à priori* speculation cannot give us the actual world, so neither can it give us the ideal one. The syllogism is useful in the interpretation of both facts and duties, but it cannot generate or describe either.

3. There remains, then, the position taken at the beginning of this paper. In opposition to the Associationists and the Social Evolutionists, who would explain away the idea of obligation, and in opposition to the Dialectic Evolutionists, who assail the objectivity of the rule of obligation, we hold to an objective obligatory ideal. There is objective truth to which rational beings are under obligation to conform their characters and actions. That is, just as there is a real world which exists independently of us, though we belong to it; so there is an ideal world which we are bound to realize, which would bind us even if we became unconscious of the obligation, and in realizing which we shall develop the best implied in ourselves. Thus this position is the basis and the explanation of the possibility of those that have been refuted. It accounts for all that is true in them. Self-realization is a duty and "the greatest good of the greatest number" *ought* to be an end because we and the world are in *vital* relation to a standard which is without and above and, in this sense, *objective to* both us and the world. The truth of such an ideal is proved by the following considerations:

a. A presumption this way is at least suggested by the relationship just indicated between the position which we would vindicate and those which we have, as we believe, overthrown. These latter cannot be wholly false. They would scarcely have been embraced by so many, they would not have persisted so long, had there been no truth in them. That, therefore, they imply and, as we have seen above, depend on the view that we are defending would seem to make for it. Even error must rest on or be mixed with truth. May it not be that what we would establish is the truth necessarily involved in the theories that we have been controverting? That it seems to be certainly suggests a presumption to this effect.

b. This presumption is distinctly raised by the fact that the burden of proof is all on those who would deny an objective obligatory ideal. The doctrine of such an ideal as this doctrine has just been expounded meets the requirements of the case. Mr. Mill admits that the idea of duty is *now* distinct from the idea of happiness and that "the mind is not in a right state unless it love virtue as a thing desirable in itself" (*Dis.*, p. 53). The great aim of the theory of social evolution is to explain how it is that, though "our moral sense is nothing but the experience of utility organized and consolidated through all past generations," it yet discerns moral principles which appear to be and which, so far as the individual is concerned, are *à priori* (Letter of Mr. Spencer to Mr. Mill in Bain's *Mental and Moral Science*, 1868, p. 722). Even stronger is the utterance of dialectic evolution. For example, to quote Mr. F. H. Bradley, a distinguished representative of the Hegelian school, "What is clear at first sight is that to take virtue as a mere means to an ulterior end, is in dire antagonism to the voice of the moral consciousness . . . . to do good for its own sake is virtue" (*Ethical Studies*, pp. 56, 59). Thus all allow an objective obligatory ideal to be that to which consciousness testifies. This, however, is an admission that the theory which we are vindicating would be adequate. It would explain the phenomena to be explained. That is, if there be an objective obligatory ideal, it is easy to see why each one of us is conscious of it. It is just as easy as to understand why, if a real man is before you, you behold a man. In both cases, and in both equally, the knowledge is, according to the hypothesis, "the reflex of reality." You perceive a man because there is a man to be perceived, and you are conscious of an objective obligatory ideal because there is an ideal obligatory on man and because this ideal, in the sense already stated, is objective to him. Hence, this explanation, if true, would be satisfactory. Moreover, it is the only one that is so. We have carefully examined the other theories of oughtness, and we have found them to be inadequate as well as inconsistent with themselves and unjust to the phenomena for which they would account. Surely, then, it still devolves on the advocates of these theories to show why the doctrine of an objective obligatory ideal is not the true one. When an hypothesis seems to explain the phenomena in question and when there is no other hypothesis at hand that is either valid or sufficient, the presumption is always in favor of the former. The law of parsimony so demands.

c. This presumption is even strengthened when we examine the objections that have been urged against it. These objections, though variously presented, can probably be reduced to two. The first is that of Schopenhauer. He claims (*Die beiden Grundprobleme der Ethik*, Leipsic, 1860), that the idea of duty should be eliminated from moral science; that it is a superficial and merely popular principle; that it is not logically conceivable; and that the reason for all this is that it involves the existence of an impossible free-will. Such argumentation, however, may be consistent for those who, like Schopenhauer, make unconscious will the principle of all things; but it would be most illogical for others. We have not yet inquired whether a free-will is possible or impossible; but we do know that when we consider a good action as good we feel that we ought to perform it, and that when we consider a bad action as bad we feel that we ought to abstain from it. This consciousness is generally admitted. As we have observed, it is often admitted most unreservedly by those who would explain away its oughtness. If now this ought, or the objective obligatory ideal that it signifies, necessarily implies the existence of a free-will, then this necessity is an argument for free-will: "but," as Janet well says (*Theory of Morals*, p. 140), "we cannot reason conversely, and reject a plainly evident truth for the sake of avoiding a consequence which is metaphysically disagreeable." We might do so no more than we might deny that we were men on the ground that that would imply that we must die.

The second and more serious objection is that there is no moral unity of the human race. This objection itself assumes two forms. It claims, in the first place, that savages are destitute of even the germ of morality. This claim, however, is based on ignorance of facts. or on their misinterpretation. As Janet has shown by an exhaustive review of the facts (*Theory of Morals*, Bk. iii, chap. iv), there is no people without the sense of right and wrong. This sense is often feebly developed and there is usually much diversity of opinion as to what is right and as to what is wrong; but the more searching investigation may be, the more clearly does it reveal the universality of the appreciation of this distinction and of its objective character. That all men naturally believe in duty is as much a fact of science as that they believe in the supernatural. The other form of the objection under consideration is based on the just alluded to diversity of moral judgments among men and even among civilized men. This diversity must be admitted. It does not, however, involve the denial of an objective or even of a self-evident objective obligatory ideal. Perplexing though the diversity of judgment on moral questions often is, the extent and force of agreement is a marvel when we remember the constant activity of a self-regarding spirit, and the consequent rivalry of interests. As we have seen, all admit the distinction between right and wrong. Contradictory positions are never taken when the moral law is formally expressed. All agree that truthfulness, justice, and benevolence are right. Moral distinctions are not transposed so as to place virtues in the category of the morally wrong. Indeed, as Calderwood remarks in his admirable treatment of this subject (*Handbook of Moral Philosophy*, p. 75), "Diversity of opinion on moral subjects is much more concerned with what is wrong than with what is right." For example, men excuse deceit without condemning integrity. They may condone vice in themselves, but they denounce it in others. How are we to account for this agreement in the moral judgments of the race? Can we account for it so rationally as by assuming an objective obligatory ideal that is self-evident to all who study it? When men see to a large degree alike, we say that they all see the same thing. We explain the diversity of vision on the ground of difference of standpoint or of attention or of faculty: we never infer from this diversity, unless it be greater than the agreement, a difference of object. Were there not, however, this significant agreement in the moral judgments of men, the objection under consideration would still help rather than weaken the position of this paper. The various standards of right and wrong by their very multiplicity would seem to imply one true and objective one. The more false weights and measures there are, the more sure you may be that there is a genuine and authoritative set.

Thus the objections to an objective obligatory ideal are so empty that they can avail nothing against it. Indeed, that which appears at first to be the most formidable of them even strengthens the presumption in favor of it.

d. This presumption is made proof by the clearness and distinctiveness of our sense of oughtness, our idea of duty. That which it gives us is absolutely incapable of identification, at least in consciousness, with anything else. It comes before the mind as unique. This appears in our experience as individuals. Take, for example, the case of ill-desert. One regrets being sick, but he does not blame himself for it. Yet sickness is equally opposed to one's own happiness, to the greatest good of society, and to self-realization. If, however, one becomes sick through intemperance or even through imprudence, then he does blame himself. Why? His sickness is no more prejudicial in itself to his own happiness, or to the welfare of the community, or to self-realization, than in the former instance. True, but he ought not to have been intemperate or even imprudent. This is all the explanation that can be given, it is all that needs to be given. The consciousness of broken *law* is what makes the difference between the two cases, and this consciousness is so clear and distinct that one has but to have it to recognize its uniqueness. This uniqueness appears as clearly and perhaps more impressively in history. On its pages the moral, that which implies oughtness, that which presupposes an objective obligatory ideal, stands out in striking and often awful individuality and originality. In the words of one of the deepest thinkers of the American pulpit of the present half-century, Rev. Thatcher Thayer, D.D., "Natural affections are very lovely, and are even the friends of moral; but they are not moral, since men are frequently very vicious yet very affectionate. No amount or variety of intellect constitutes a righteous man. The Italian Renaissance was as brilliant with genius as the sky with northern lights, but it was blood-red with crime. Logic cannot reason out right. Imagination cannot fancy goodness. Very sad to say, Lord Bacon was a swindler. The utmost skill in painting or sculpture not unfrequently goes with depraved lives. Sacred music sings movingly about goodness, but sacred music cannot sing goodness itself." No, oughtness is absolutely simple and unique. It is known by intuition and by intuition only, and we have no intuition clearer as we have none so impressive. We may not, therefore, deny the objectivity of the obligatory ideal that through moral intuition we behold. This would be as irrational as, in the opening paper of this series, we saw would be the denial of the reality of what we truly perceive. Genuine intuitions are equally and entirely trustworthy.

e. This proof that we are elaborating is much strengthened by the persistence of the idea of duty. Persistence of belief is, as we saw also in the first number of this series, the final test of that self-evidence and necessity which characterize a genuine intuition, and which we have clearly observed in the case of our conviction as to an objective obligatory ideal. It is, moreover, in this instance a peculiarly decisive test. This is so because everything is against its fulfillment. Naturally man is not friendly to the idea of duty. He would give much to be emancipated from it. Yet he cannot silence its imperative. He cannot be educated to do so. He may live for his own pleasure, but even Epicurus could not always make him feel that this is right. He may hold that the greatest good of the greatest number is the sole principle of virtue, but the most astute utilitarian could not make him really believe that he would be justified in treating even one child unjustly, though it were supposed to be for the good of the whole community. He may take the realization of self as the acme and sum of duty; but even Hegel, though he might convince, could not persuade him that the most serious thing is not precisely this that the self to be realized is very far from being what ought to be realized. Thus the authority of duty still exists as unique, even when its uniqueness has been denied and rejected. We cannot help seeing its standard. We cannot bring ourselves practically to think it a delusion. Now this should not be so. As Janet says (*Theory of Morals*, p. 148), "the idea of duty should disappear like that of phlogiston." Can we explain why it does not, save on the theory that it rests on a genuine intuition?

f. That this intuition is such, and especially that the ideal which it beholds is objective, is confirmed by experience both individual and universal. This shows that the spiritual and physical worlds have been constituted and are being administered with reference to a standard. That is, as Butler puts it and proves in his incomparable *Analogy*, "we are under a moral government;" and even the irrational universe has a moral purpose. We have the evidence of the former statement in the fact that virtue tends to happiness. "I cannot solve the problem of evil;" said Pres. Woolsey, "but I do find that the holier life I lead the happier I am." The evidence of the latter statement is the fact that if men are to develop and even the physical world to improve, there must be what we call righteousness. General immorality means, sooner or later, general ruin. Now what do these tremendous facts indicate, if not, that we are under law; that this is objective rather than subjective; that it is above us as well as within us? These facts are just what we should expect, if there were above us and binding us a law with a system of rewards and punishments attached. They are precisely what could not be, if oughtness and expediency were the same or if self-realization were the equivalent of duty. Why is it that there are certain *fixed* principles of expediency? Why is it that we feel that true self-realization must follow certain *definite* lines? Why is it that in both history and individual experience there is evident a distinct power that makes for a distinct and *immutable* something which we call righteousness? All this would be impossible, it could not even be conceived, but for a standard above expediency, objective to self, and grounded in the nature of things, only because expressing their true purpose. When the essentially mutable tends thus to realize the immutable there is implied an immutable standard, and this, of course, must be above and thus objective to the mutable. Could we have stronger confirmation of our proof than that both history and individual experience thus evince an objective obligatory ideal?

g. We reach demonstration in the relation of such an ideal to personality. This, as we saw in the last paper of our series, is "the reality which gives form to all other realities, which, indeed, gives us the very idea of reality." Now morality in an important sense performs the same office for personality. That is, as "all that I can conceive of as intuitive is conceived of after the type of my experience with myself," my experience as a person; so that which is deepest in my experience as a person, that which is most real, so to speak, in myself, is the feeling of responsibility to law, the consciousness of an objective obligatory ideal. This it is which imparts to personality its dignity, its true meaning, its richest content, and so, we may say, even its reality. What would personality or human life be worth but for its moral purpose and ideal? It would be higher, more complex, more wonderful, than other life; but would it be essentially different? A pig might reason, he might imagine, he might even think of himself as reasoning and imagining; but he would be still only a learned and reflective pig, were it not that to be conscious of yourself is to be conscious of yourself as under law. An objective obligatory ideal, therefore, is demonstrated when personality is admitted. This ideal imparts to personality its reality. Hence, our consciousness of it must be true.

III. *Free Agency*.—To this, the other base of morality, a few words—and they will have to be exceedingly few—must be given before we close this paper.

1. The Status Questionis.—Our inquiry does not concern the independence of the will. This may not be conceived as a separate entity, essentially distinct from the other faculties of the mind, and related to them only in so far as it directs and energizes them. Such a view, though popular, is radically false psychologically. Personality is one and indivisible. Its various faculties, intellectual, moral, etc., are not so many different powers; they are so many functions or modes of the same power. "A man cannot be independent of himself or any of his faculties of all the rest." Nor is the question as to what is called indifference of the will.

By this phrase is meant, that the will or faculty of choice and resolution, at the moment of decision, is self-poised among conflicting motives; that it decides one way or another, not because of the greater influence of one motive, but because it itself is indifferent or undetermined; that it is able to act in accordance with the weaker against the stronger motive, or even without any motive at all. This position, though taken by Cousin, Tappan, Hazard, and many thinkers of repute, is open to two fatal objections. In virtually holding, as it does, that the will's choice is undetermined and so uncaused, it denies the intuitive and so necessary judgment that every effect must have a cause. It also contradicts observation. "We find that the law of causality reigns among the wishes of the heart and the purposes of the mind, as it reigns in every other department of the soul." For example, in proportion as a mind is thoroughly honorable do we see that it chooses what is honorable and that thus character expresses itself in the will and so determines it. The administration of society may almost be said to be founded on this fact. Nor again is the inquiry as to the self-determination of the will. This is the view of many who do not deny the influence of motives, who even strongly emphasize it. Thus Prof. Samuel Harris (*The Philosophical Basis of Theism*, § 71), while insisting that our natural and rational sensibilities incite and impel the will to act, maintains that they do not determine it; in the last analysis, the will, however strongly influenced, determines itself. Thus Prof. James Seth, while making much of our feelings as constituting motives and expressing character, distinguishes between the character and the self or will; claims that "while the Self *is* what in its character it *appears* to be, it yet is always *more* than any such empirical manifestation of it;" and holds that it is in "this *more*," and so in the self rather than in the character, that we have "the secret of the moral life" (*A Study of Ethical Principles*, p. 380). Thus Julius Müller (*The Christian Doctrine of Sin*, ii, p. 47), affirms that "freedom is power to *become*—to form one's own character—out of self." This position, however, is open to the same objections as those already noticed. It implies, if it does not teach, that the will is a separate faculty, and that as such it is outside of the domain of cause and effect. Really, though many, as Prof. Seth, for example, strenuously deny this, it involves Kant's error of a transcendental as distinguished from an empirical self.

Nor, on the other hand, is the question as to the power of the will or self over the character. That this power is both real and great, we freely admit. The choice of evil, and, still more, the resolution to do evil, do make one evil. That is, the self as will can and does confirm the character or self as already determined. What we do not allow is that the character is the product rather than the expression of the self; and that, if the latter be, as we claim, the truth, the self can change its essential nature. Nor, once more, is the inquiry whether the self can review its feelings, judge between them as to which constitute right motives and which wrong ones, and then choose the right even though the wrong may seem to be much the stronger. Were it not thus, man would be incapable of deciding as he ought, and so could not be a moral being. What we do insist on is that, when he does decide in this way, there will be a sufficient reason for his decision, and that sufficient reason will be in the inclination of his character or self. If he chooses to do his duty, it will be because he is a man in whom reason and conscience are really more influential than feeling and sense, much more powerful though the latter may seem before decision to be. It is the event which shows which army is actually the stronger. This does not appear in the number or in the equipment or in the noise of the regiments.

In short, the only question for us is this, Is self-determination of the *person* a fact? This involves two inquiries: Are we the efficient causes of our own choices and acts: that is, agents rather than instruments? And is the final cause or sufficient reason of our choices and acts in ourselves; that is, are we determined by ourselves rather than by what is external to ourselves? In a word, are we free-agents?

2. That this is the only inquiry before us in this connection is clearly evinced by two considerations:

First, free-agency, as we have interpreted it, is all that is required for responsibility, and so for the moral life, in addition to knowledge of an objective obligatory ideal. A moment's reflection and an appeal to common sense should make this plain. A criminal would not be judged guilty of murder in the first degree, if he did not himself commit it; or if, though actually committing it himself, it was only as the compelled and unwilling instrument of some one else. Neither would you regard him guilty, if he was determined to the murder by a force outside of himself; by the will, for example, of some wicked hypnotist. In this case the question would be whether he was so hypnotized as really to cease to be self-determining. If he was, though he would be responsible for allowing himself to come under the influence of the hypnotist, he would not be held responsible for what he did after he had been hypnotized. If, however, the criminal was himself the agent in the commission of the murder, and if he did it with his own conscious consent; that is, if he himself was both the efficient and the final cause of the decision to commit the murder, we do not seek further: the law says, and the conscience of mankind agrees, that he is under obligation to suffer punishment. Thus if he was constituted to know better, free-agency as we have explained it is the only additional condition of moral responsibility.

The other consideration is that liberty of indifference, and even the view of Müller, Seth, and Harris, in proportion as it approaches the former, are inconsistent with moral life. This, though it is, as we have emphasized, more than rational, is still essentially rational. The content of its characteristic demand is the highest form of the highest reason. A moral being must, therefore, be at least a rational being. Otherwise, oughtness would mean no more to him than it does to a dog. But a being who can decide against the stronger motive and even without any motive is not a rational being. On the contrary, he is an irrational being; for to decide without any motive is to decide without any reason. Nor does it avail to say, with writers like Prof. James Seth, that the self is always *more* than the character in which it appears to manifest itself, and that "the secret of the moral life is in this *more*." If this means that the secret of the moral life is in that which determines itself without reason, it simply means that there is no moral life because what is called the moral life is in its essence irrational. If, however, all that it means is that "the more" in which resides "the secret of the moral life" is inscrutable to us so that we cannot discern the motives or reasons influential in it, we have no objection to offer. We do not claim to understand all the motives or to appreciate in advance of the event the force of all the reasons in accordance with which we always and certainly determine ourselves. What we do claim is that we never consciously decide without a motive or reason; and that if we could do so, we should not be moral beings. That a man may decide according to mere irrational impulse as the beast does we do not question; but such a choice is not, in the case of the beast, any more than in that of the man, irrational in the sense of being without a reason. In both cases, the choice is according to the nature of the chooser. The man who makes such a choice has become like a beast in disposition. The vital difference between them is in the way of making the choice. The beast does it spontaneously; the man does it intelligently as well as spontaneously. But this, of course, implies a sufficient reason for the choice. If we must have this, even in mere spontaneous choice, much more must we have it in choice which is both spontaneous and intelligent.

3. The theories opposed to this doctrine of free-agency or self-determination of the person may be reduced to the following three:

Fatalism.—This is the belief that events, personal as well as physical, are determined and connected by a blind force in such a way that, whatever you may do, a certain thing must happen. Such a view is, of course, the flat denial of both the elements of free-agency. One cannot be the efficient cause of his own choices and decisions; for the very point of the hypothesis is that the blind force of fate is stronger than any special causes. Neither can one have in himself the sufficient reason for his volitions: for there is no sufficient reason for anything except the blind force of fate; and this is not a reason, since another point of the hypothesis is that fate is blind. This theory, however, to go no further. is contradicted by the fact that the world in which we live and of which we form a part is a cosmos; that is, a world which evinces reason both in its constitution and in its development. Otherwise, science would be impossible. Indeed, the fact of science is the absolute refutation of fatalism.

Materialism.—This admits the first element of free-agency. It allows that a person, or what it conceives to be one, is the efficient cause of his own choices, resolutions, and actions. It denies, however, the second element of free-agency. We do not determine ourselves according to our own nature, but we are determined altogether by the chain of essentially physical causes in which and of which each of us is one. Thus, as really as on the hypothesis of fatalism, we are under the law of necessity; mechanical rather than blind, it is true, but just as real and external a necessity. This is the view of writers like Bain, Maudsley, and Münsterberg. The general position of this school is set forth in the following quotation from a recent publication, *Evolutionary Ethics and Animal Psychology*, by E. P. Evans: "If we could trace all the complex incitements and impulses which lead the assassin to lift his arm and strike the fatal blow, we should, doubtless, find the necessity of the action as absolute and inevitable as the movement by which the decapitated frog raises its leg to scratch an irritative drop of nitric acid from its side." Thus the human will would be reduced to mechanism pure and simple. But the objections to this view are insuperable. Can that be a part of the mechanism of nature which discovers, explains, and employs that mechanism? Because the human person is in these and other ways above nature, while he may be affected, he cannot be determined, by it. Again, the mechanism of the physical world is known only to consciousness. Now that we determine ourselves is an admitted fact of consciousness, and one of the clearest of them. How, then, may we say with Bain that the consciousness of freedom is only a delusion? If we invalidate consciousness in the one case, we invalidate it in the other.

Pantheism.—This saves the second element of free-agency, but denies the first. It allows self-determination: but, whether materialistic and geometric, like the pantheism of Spinoza; or spiritualistic and ideal, like the pantheism of Hegel—it is fatal to the view that you and I are the efficient causes of our choices, resolutions, and actions. Strictly speaking, on either of these theories, or on those that approach them, as Malebranche's theory of "occasional causes," Edwards' doctrine of continuous creation, and Emmons' "exercise scheme," there is no efficiency save in the Absolute: this is the cause of all. Such a position, however, in any of its forms, is exposed to the fatal objection, to refer to but one of many, that it also contradicts a fundamental fact of consciousness. If we are conscious of anything, we are conscious, not that our volitions are made for us, but that they are created by us. Indeed, it is from ourselves as exerting power and originating action in willing that we get our idea of power and such a conception as we have of creation.

4. It only remains, then, for us to vindicate free-agency: or the theory that we are, not the instrumental, but the efficient causes, of our own acts, resolutions, and even choices; and that in all this we are finally determined, not by anything outside of ourselves, but by our own nature. We really choose, we choose as we really please to choose, and we please to choose as we ourselves really are. This is the position to be established, and its establishment would seem to be complete on the following among other grounds:

a. As has been already remarked, it is involved in the obligatory ideal whose objective reality, as proved in the former part of this paper, we may and should now take for granted. Such an ideal is possible only for a free-agent; and so the fact of such an ideal carries with it the truth of free-agency, and would do so, even were there no other considerations to be urged in its support.

b. There are, however, many such. For example, a presumption in favor of free-agency is raised by the fact that the burden of proof now falls on those who would deny it. The hypothesis that man is a free-agent would meet all the necessities of the case, if it were true. As we have seen, it would justify our consciousness of responsibility. It would explain also our consciousness of free self-determination. This consciousness is precisely what we should expect that we should have, if we were self-determining beings. The hypothesis that we are such is, therefore, the one demanded by the facts. Moreover, it is the only one that does fit the facts. The other theories all, as we must now have inferred, leave at least the consciousness of freedom unexplained. The nearest that they come to an explanation is when they say with Spinoza that we have forgotten or do not know the causes of our decisions and on this account judge them to be free. This, however, is to explain what is distinctly positive in consciousness by a mere negation, and so is no explanation. That we have forgotten the cause of something does not show why we know ourselves to be the cause. Surely, then, it devolves on the holders of these theories to disprove free-agency, and this raises a decided presumption in its favor. The law of parsimony so requires.

c. This presumption is strengthened by the very difficulties by which, at first sight, the theory of free-agency seems to be embarrassed. There is what we may call the practical difficulty. This arises from "moral statistics." These appear to prove that human actions are not the products of free-will, but of a natural law. For example, tables have been prepared which seem to show that "in any given number of men from year to year a certain definite and constant percentage of crimes, and even of crimes of a particular kind, may be reckoned on." Such statistics, however, really point toward the position that we would establish. At any rate, they are clearly inconsistent with the hypothesis that human actions are the products of natural law only. They are not constant enough for that. They vary perceptibly while natural laws are invariable. Moreover, these approximately constant numbers can be obtained only by taking in a wide range. If among ten millions of men there is annually one offender in three thousand, it is not the case that in every actual group of three thousand there is one offender. Yet if it were a law of natural necessity that operated, its applicability as law would tell in regard to all parts. "The law of the combination of O_2 with C in carbonic acid proves as true in regard to a gramme of carbonic acid as in regard to a kilogramme." Yet, on the other hand, these "moral statistics" are too nearly constant for us to suppose that they express no law. What, then, is indicated, if not a law other than natural; a spiritual force which, though above natural law, is under law to itself; a person who, though within limits determining external nature, is always and altogether determined by his own nature? More serious than this is the metaphysical difficulty. The power of will and the universal reign of causation are contradictory. Hence, logically, to admit the power of the will means to deny the universal reign of causation and thus to surrender metaphysical completeness in our scheme of the universe. Yet even Kant, who felt this difficulty as keenly and stated it as sharply as it has ever been felt and stated, would not succumb to it. He insisted, as do Lotze and the Neo-Kantians, on "recognizing this theoretically indemonstrable freedom as 'a postulate of the practical reason.'" We would venture to show with McCosh (*The Divine Government*, p. 280), "a more excellent way." The contradiction to which Kant referred does not lie in the principles of reason, but only in certain false *à priori* representations of them. That is, the power of the will and the universal reign of causation may be contraries, but they need not be contradictories. To prove them to be the latter, it would be necessary to show freedom and non-causation to be the same attribute. But "this is the very point in dispute, and cannot be settled by the principle of contradiction itself; nor indeed by any mere analytic or logical principle, but by synthetic evidence which cannot possibly be had." In a word, the power of will and the universal reign of causation are ultimate facts attested by primary principles in our constitution. That we cannot trace the connection between them is, therefore, no reason why they should not both be true. Nay, it strengthens the already stated presumption that they are. It is a characteristic of ultimate facts that they are independent. If a connection could be discovered between them, it would show that they were not ultimate, but met in a farther unity.

d. That they may even be seen not to be contradictories would seem to follow from the fact that many thinkers, the most keenly logical who have based their systems of the universe on the universality of causation, have, nevertheless, had not the least difficulty in holding to free-agency and have even been among its most zealous teachers. In support of this statement it is sufficient to name John Calvin, John Owen, and Jonathan Edwards. "If," says Calvin (Henry's *Life of Calvin*, i. p. 497), "force be opposed to freedom, I acknowledge and will always affirm, that there is a free-will, a will determining itself, and proclaim every man who thinks otherwise a heretic. Let the will be called free in this sense, that is, because it is not constrained or impelled irresistibly from without, but determines itself by itself." And Owen says (*Dissertation on Divine Justice*, chap. i, sec. 26), "to act freely is the very nature of the will: it must *necessarily* act *freely*."

e. The solution of our problem is in this statement of Owen. The human will, because the activity of a person or spirit, cannot but be free. Its freedom is of its essence. If it were not self-determining and self-acting, it would not be spiritual. Hence, T. H. Green, though a thinker of a school very unlike Owen's, has well said (*Prolegomena to Ethics*, p. 93), "the question as to the freedom of moral agents is not the question commonly debated, with much ambiguity of terms, between 'determinists' and 'indeterminists;' not the question whether there is or is not a possibility of unmotived willing; but the question whether motives, of that kind by which it is the characteristic of moral or human action to be determined, are of properly natural origin or can be rightly regarded as natural phenomena.'' That they may not be so regarded is clear. As a matter of fact it is not what is external to us that moves us to choice and action. The saloon is no temptation to a man of pure appetites: it is an invincible temptation to a man of thoroughly depraved appetites. Thus it is not the external saloon but the internal appetite that makes the temptation: and so it is that the man, though he be the slave of drink, is free; he determines himself by himself; he himself chooses to drink, and he so chooses because of his own appetite. So long as he is a man he cannot do otherwise. It is the necessity of his nature thus to determine himself by himself and so to be under the law of freedom, just as it is the necessity of the stone's nature to be determined in its course by what is outside of itself and thus to be under the law of necessity. Causation operates equally in both cases. It operates differently, however, in both, because of the radical difference between them. In the one case it is physical and, therefore, must be necessary; in the other it is rational and, therefore, must be free.

f. Finally, as an obligatory ideal is, as we have seen, the reality of personality; so in an even deeper sense is this true of free-agency: The meaning, the dignity, of humanity appears, not so much in the fact that we are under law, as in the fact that we determine ourselves strictly according to ourselves whether to obey it or not to obey it. It is this tremendous fact of free-agency and consequent responsibility which, as Prof. James Seth says (*A Study of Ethical Principles*, p. 349), is the grand characteristic of our life, and forbids its resolution into the life either of nature or of God! If, therefore, we accept the truth of personality, if we believe in ourselves; we must grant free-agency. It is personality's soul.

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