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
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F—HERMAN.

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horns and bristly hairs about the mouth. The name *wilde-beest* is given on account of the habit the animal has of frantically rushing about in a most violent manner. It is very fleet and timid.

Go'a, the name of a territory of Hindostan, on the Malabar coast, situated between lat. 14° 54' and 15° 45' N., and belonging to Portugal. Area, 1066 sq. m. Pop. 313,262. It produces rice and pepper, but requires an annual support of £71,920 from Portugal. Cap. Panjim, or New Goa.

Goa, town of Hindostan, on the Malabar coast, in lat. 15° 30' N. It was formerly the capital of the Portuguese dominions in India, and a magnificent city, but it is now decaying. In the beginning of the eighteenth century it was deserted on account of cholera. Pop. 4000.

NEW GOA, 6 miles W. of Goa, is the residence of the Portuguese governor-general and of the archbishop of Goa. It has handsome churches and other public buildings, and has been the capital since 1758. Pop. 10,000.

Goalpa'ra, a district of the Bengal presidency, British India, lying W. of Assam, N. of the Garrow Hills, S. of Bootan, and traversed by the river Brahmapootra. It has a hot, wet, and sickly climate and a productive soil. Area, 4430 square miles. Cap. Goalpara. Pop. 442,761.

Goat (*Capra*), a genus including the goats proper. It is characterized by hollow, annulated horns, which are directed upward and backward. There are eight cutting teeth in the lower jaw, and none in the upper. The chin is bearded in the male. This genus has no representative in America, though in the domestic state the goat is found in all parts of the world. The single American species which so long was regarded as the Rocky Mountain goat is properly an antelope. The wild goat (*C. sagraus* Gm.) roams in extensive herds on the Persian and other mountains of the eastern hemisphere; it is regarded as the parent-stock from whence all the domestic varieties have sprung. The ibex (*C. ibex*) is a notable example, distinguished by its large, square, and transversely ridged horns. The Caucasian ibex (*C. caucasica*) has similarly large horns of a triangular form. The Cashmere goat of Thibet is the most valued; a delicate gray wool grows under the longer silky hair: about two ounces of this is obtained from one individual, and is the much-prized material of the cashmere shawls. The goat exhibits a striking difference of habit as compared with the sheep. Buffon has given a graphic description, in which he regards the former as being "superior both in sentiment and dexterity." The milk of the goat is sweet, nutritive, and is also esteemed as medicinal. In ancient times the skin was valued for clothing; at present it is a favorite and familiar item in the manufacture of the best turkey or morocco leather, and, in the young state, of the better class of gloves.

Goat Island, an island which divides the current of the Niagara River at the Falls. It belongs to Niagara tp., Niagara co., N. Y. Area, 70 acres. It is 900 feet distant from the American and 2000 from the Canadian shore. It is connected with the former shore by a substantial bridge.


Goat'sucker, the *Caprimulgus Europæus*, a passerino bird of the Old World, the type of the family Caprimulgidae, to which belong the whip-poor-will, the chuck-wills-widow, the night-hawk, and several other birds of the U. S., all of which are sometimes collectively called goat-suckers. The first bird mentioned above gets his name from the popular belief that he sucks the cow's and the goat's milk, infecting the animal with a deadly disease. It is also called fern-owl, dor-hawk, night-jar, etc.; the latter name coming from a jarring or purring sound which it utters. It is the subject of many popular superstitions in the folk-lore of many nations.

Gobelins Tapestry, the most highly valued grade of carpet, manufactured only in the Gobelins factory, in the Faubourg St. Marcel, Paris, in the Rue Mouffetard. The carpets are all of rug-like make, and are works of art, not of artisanship. Many of the designs are pictured scenes in colors. The workmen (or rather artists) are about 120 in number. The colored silks and wools which they employ are passed into the work by means of wooden needles. The result is a faithful copy of the pictured pattern. Each artist averages less than 1½ square yards per annum. Some Gobelins carpets cost from \$30,000 to \$40,000, and require from five to ten years for the completion. Since 1791 none have been sold. They are mostly presented by the French government to foreign courts. The Gobelins factory was first called *Gobelin's folly*. It was an unsightly structure, built by a Belgian wool-dyer of the fifteenth century, one Jehan Gobeelen. Here the brothers Cannaye, and afterwards others, carried on car-

pet-making with success. In 1662, Louis XIV. made it a royal manufactory. In 1826 another royal carpet-factory, La Savonnerie, established in 1615, was joined to it. May 24, 1871, the Communists burned a part of the factory.

Go'bi, Co'bi, or Sha'mo, is a wide tract in Central Asia, between lat. 40° and 50 N., and lon. 90° and 120° E. It forms a table-land 3000 feet above the level of the sea, between the mountain-ranges of Altai and Kuen-Lun, with only small depressions and elevations. Its western part is mostly covered with fine sand, drifting before the wind, and forming an undulating surface which reminds the traveller of the waves of the ocean. The eastern part is mostly naked rocks. It is a desolate region where the winter is nine months long; frost and snow may occur in July, and the short summer, with its intense heat, creates but an oppressive atmosphere. Extensive steppes, rising towards the mountainous borders, afford pasture for the flocks of the nomadic tribes of Mongolians who wander in these wilds.

Go'by (*Gobius*), a genus of small marine fishes of the



The Black Goby.

family Gobiidæ. They have no swim-bladder, and live mostly upon muddy bottoms, where they burrow in holes. Some of them build nests for their young. The *Gobius carolinensis* is a typical species found on our Atlantic coasts. The black goby (*Gobius niger*) and other European species are rather larger. These fishes are prized for the aquarium, in which their nesting can be readily observed. More than 100 species are known.

God. It is proposed to state briefly what is known of God under the following heads: (1) Definition of the term; (2) proofs of his existence; (3) his names; (4) attributes; (5) existence as Three Persons; (6) relation to the world; (7) works; (8) prevalent atheistic theories.

I. In consequence of the predominance of Christian ideas in the literature of civilized nations for the last eighteen centuries, the word *God* has attained the permanent and definite sense of a self-existent, eternal, and absolutely perfect free personal Spirit, distinct from and sovereign over the world he has created.

II. PROOFS OF HIS EXISTENCE.—The word nevertheless continues to be used with a wide latitude of meaning. The full conception associated with it by Christians is of course largely the product of revelation. On the other hand, the general idea of God as a being upon whom we depend, and to whom we are responsible, and for whose communion we long, is innate in human nature—i. e. it is universally generated and sustained in human consciousness by the laws of our nature. This fact is by some attributed to a "God-consciousness" (*Schleiermacher*); by others to a direct intuition of God (*Schelling, Cousin*); and by others to an innate religious sentiment or instinct. It bears all the marks of an intuitive truth or first principle of reason—e. g. universality and necessity—since it reappears and persists in all normal conditions of consciousness. (See CICERO, *Natura Deorum*, and GILLET, *God in Human Thought*, etc.) This general idea of God, native to the human soul, has been moulded into various forms by tradition and speculation, and perfected by revelation. All the "arguments" for the being of God are intended either to quicken and confirm this innate idea, or to expand and render it definite by showing *what* God is, as well as proving *that* he is. (See DR. McCOSH'S *Intuitions of the Mind*, pt. 3, b. 2, ch. 5, § 2.)

A. *The Ontological Argument* has been presented in various forms: 1. Anselm, archbishop of Canterbury (1093–1109), in his *Monologium* and *Proslogium*, states this argument thus: We have an idea of an infinitely perfect being. But real existence is a necessary element of infinite perfection. Therefore, an infinitely perfect being exists, otherwise the infinitely perfect as we conceive it would lack an essential element of perfection. 2. Descartes (1596–1650), in his *Meditationes de prima philosophia*, prop. 2, p. 89, states it thus: The idea of an infinitely perfect being which we possess could not have originated in a finite source, and therefore must have been communicated to us by an infinitely perfect being. He also, in other connections, claims that this idea represents an objective reality, because (1) it is pre-eminently clear, and ideas

carry conviction of correspondence to truth in proportion to their clearness; and (2) it is necessary. 3. Dr. Samuel Clarke in 1705 published his *Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God*. He argues that time and space are infinite and necessarily existent, but they are not substances. Therefore, there must exist an eternal and infinite substance of which they are properties. 4. Cousin (*Elements of Psychology*) maintained that the idea of the finite implies the idea of the infinite as inevitably as the idea of the "me" implies that of the "not-me." (Dr. Shedd's *Hist. Christ. Doc.*)

B. *The Cosmological Argument* may be stated in the form of a syllogism: Every new thing and every change in a previously existing thing must have a cause sufficient and pre-existing. The universe consists of a system of changes. Therefore the universe must have a cause exterior and anterior to itself. It has been objected that our "causal judgment" rests solely on experience, which gives only invariable sequence, and not efficiency. (See MILL's *Logic*, p. 203, and HUME's *Treat. on Hum. Nature*, pt. 1, § 1.) On the contrary, the "causal judgment" is a self-evident or intuitive truth or law of reason, presupposed in all experience, bearing the marks of universality and necessity. Moreover, an endless series of effects supported by no absolute cause is infinitely less rational than any single uncaused effect. The mind can rest only when it has reached ultimately an uncaused first cause. (Dr. McCosh's *Intui. of the Mind*, pt. 2, b. 3, ch. 2, § 8.)

That the universe is a system of changes is proved and illustrated by all the sciences, especially by geology, zoology, and anthropology. John Stuart Mill, in his *Essay on Theism*, argues that the conclusion from the recently established doctrine of the "conservation of force" is, that the matter and force of which the universe consists are a constant quantity, assuming various forms, but themselves without beginning or cause. But the fact is, that the theory of cosmical development from the days of Laplace to the present involves the constant dispersion of physical energy, the sun and planets passing from a state of heated gas to frozen and lifeless solidity; and since this dispersed and lost energy is finite, it must have commenced in a spontaneous cause—i. e. a personal volition.

C. *The Teleological Argument*, or argument from design or final causes, is as follows: Design, or the adaptation of means to effect an end, implies the exercise of intelligence and free choice. The universe is full of traces of design. Therefore, the "First Cause" must have been a Personal Spirit. This argument has been elaborated ever since the time of Socrates. (*Memorabilia*, b. 4.) Bacon says: "I had rather believe all the fables in the Legend, and the Talmud, and the Alkoran than that this universal frame is without a mind." "Final causes" have been repudiated as a principle of interpreting nature by Hume, and under his influence by a class of modern naturalists. He maintained (see *Dialogues on Nat. Relig.*) that the judgment which infers a designing cause from adjustments adapted to effect an end rests wholly upon experience; and as we have no experience of world-making, we have no right to infer a world-maker. But this judgment is intuitive, universal, and necessary. Its force is admitted by J. S. Mill. (*Essay on Theism*.)

The new doctrine of the "survival of the fittest" is urged by Herbert Spencer, Darwin, and many naturalists as an alternative more rational than that of "design." This at present is admitted by its advocates to be a bare hypothesis, demanding many postulates, and leaving many broken links; e. g. the "first germs," the introduction of sensation, the beginnings of organs, intelligence, volition, moral obligation, necessary ideas, etc. (See art. A CRITICISM ON DARWINISM, by J. H. SEELYE, and EVOLUTION, by HENRY HARTSHORNE.) (See WALLACE, *Natural Selection*; MIVART, *Genesis of Species*; ULRICH, *Review of Strauss*; ALEX. WINCHELL, *Evolution*; J. W. DAWSON, *Earth and Man*; DR. MCCOSH, *Christ, and Positivism*.) The design everywhere manifest in the inorganic, organic, instinctive, and rational provinces of the universe has been fully demonstrated in the *Bridgewater Treatises*, Paley's *Nat. Theol.*, Butler's *Analogy*, McCosh's *Typical Forms*, etc., Buchanan's *Faith in God*, etc., Tulloch's *Theism*, etc.

D. *The Moral Argument* derived from the constitution and history of man, and his relations to the universe: 1. All our knowledge rests upon consciousness. We begin with the knowledge of self as a conscious, intelligent, spontaneous cause; and this is involved in every act of sense, perception, reflection, recollection, etc. From knowledge of self as (1) spontaneous cause, (2) intelligent, we come to recognize the absolute cause discovered by the "cosmological" and "teleological" arguments as a personal spirit. We are under the necessity of referring all the phenomena of the cosmos ultimately to mind. 2. The phenomena of conscience necessarily imply a sovereign personal will

which binds ours. The hypothesis of the associationists (Spencer, Mill, etc.), that all our intellectual and moral judgments are transformed sensations, is absurd, because (1) they are universally the same, (2) incapable of analysis, (3) necessary, (4) sovereign over all impulses, etc. 3. Man is a religious being. The instinct of prayer and worship, the longing for and faith in divine love and help, are inseparable from human nature under normal conditions as known in history. 4. The entire history of the race, as far as known, discloses the presence and influence of a wise, righteous, and benevolent moral ruler and educator of men and nations. 5. The compact and mutually supporting system of divine interventions and culminating revelations recorded in the Christian Scripture, reaching through 2000 years, is the true vertebrate column of human history, upon which all human progress in civilization or science rests.

III. THE NAMES OF GOD: Goth. *Guth*; Ger. *Gott*; Per. *Choda*; Hind. *Khoda*. Some derive the English word from "good," from its similarity of form, and make it an expression of the divine goodness. Since, however, its various cognates could not have this origin, others derive it from the Persic *Choda*—*dominus*, "possessor." The Latin *Deus* and Greek *θεός* have been commonly derived from the Sanscrit *div*, "to give light." But Curtius, Cremer, and others derive it from *deo* in *divoasdas*, "to improve." *Deos*, then, is "He to whom one prays." The Hebrew *El*, of pre-historic Semitic origin, is from *לחזק*, "to be strong." From this (or, as some say, from the obsolete *לשון*, "to worship") come *Elohim* (pluralis excellentiæ) and *Eloah* (poetic form), and Arabic *Al* or *Allah*. *Elohim* is used by Moses consistently as a general name for God, as the God of all nations, and applied to false gods, while *Jehovah* (of doubtful etymology, perhaps from *יהוה*, "to be") is always used for the peculiar covenant God of Israel, the revealed God and Redeemer. In reading the Scriptures the Jews always substituted *Adonai*, *dominus*, *κύριος*, for *Jehovah*. Hence, the English Bibles always substitute for it *Lord* in capitals, and the French *L'Eternel*, and the German *Herr*. In the Christian Scriptures God also calls himself "Spirit" (John iv. 24), "Light" (1 John i. 5), "Love" (1 John iv. 8), and "Father" (Rom. viii. 15, 16).

IV. THE ATTRIBUTES OF GOD are to be distinguished (1) from "predicates" of God in the concrete, marking his relation to his creatures as Creator, Preserver, etc.; (2) from "properties," which belong to each divine Person in distinction from the others. The attributes are the modes of existence and of action of his substance. They are the very substance itself, existing and acting in the various modes determined by its nature. They differ among themselves, not as distinct things, but as distinct tendencies and modes of existence and action of the same thing.

The sources of our idea of God are found in his revelation of himself in the human soul, in physical nature, in history, and in the Scriptures. From these materials we construct our idea (1) by the way of negation, denying all imperfections; (2) by the way of eminence, affirming of him the possession of every excellence in absolute perfection; (3) by way of causation, attributing to him all the perfections discovered in his works. The attributes of God have been variously classified: (1) According to the order in which we arrive at the knowledge of them—e. g. by way of negation, or by way of eminence, or by way of causality, etc.; (2) according as they pertain to the substance, the intellect, or the will of God; (3) according to their nature as moral or natural (non-moral); (4) as communicable or incommunicable; (5) as absolute or relative.

1. *The Divine Unity*.—Monotheism, the primitive religion, traces of which are found in the Hindoo Veda, soon gave place through nature-worship to pantheism and polytheism. It has been recovered only imperfectly by philosophers of the first rank like Plato, and has been established as a popular faith only through the Mosaic and Christian revelations. It is proved (1) There can be but one necessarily existent being, and but one infinite and absolute of the same order. (2) The unity of the cosmos proves the unity of presiding intelligence. (3) Our moral consciousness testifies that the source of all moral authority must be single and unique.

2. God is an infinite and absolute being. The transcendentalists, on the one hand, and Sir W. Hamilton, Mansell, and H. Spencer, on the other, understand by these predicates a being including all being, and excluding all relation to other being. Hence, the infinite and the absolute can neither be a person, nor conscious, nor a cause nor an object of knowledge; all of which imply limitation and relation. But the true idea of the "absolute" is the finished, and that which exists in no relation to anything not determined by its own will. And the true idea of the "infinite" is that which admits of no increase after its kind. (SIR W. HAMILTON, *Discussions and Lectures*; MANSELL, *Lim. of Rel.*)

Thought; McCosh, Intuitions; MILL, Review of Hamilton; PORTER, Human Intel., pt. 4, ch. 8; HICKOK, Creator and Creation, ch. iii.) Anthropomorphism is right and necessary when limited to the application to God in an infinite degree of the spiritual excellencies of man. But it is used in a bad sense when we attribute to God any likeness of our bodily parts or passions, or conceive of him as subject to our imperfections or limitations.

3. God is an absolute, perfect, *personal* Spirit. This, as shown above, is the result of the whole convergent testimony which establishes the fact of his existence. If not this, we have no evidence that he is anything.

4. He is *eternal*. His existence transcends all the limits of time. Eternity conceived of by us, as either *a parte ante* or *a parte post*, is really *una, individua, et tota simul*.

5. Absolutely, God is infinite in his *immensity*, transcending all the limits of space; relatively, he is *omnipresent* in his essence, as well as his knowledge and power to all his creatures.

6. He is *immutable*, as to his essence, his perfections, and his will.

7. His *knowledge* has no limits. He knows himself and all things possible by the light of his pure reason. He knows all things actually existent, whether past, present, or future, in the light of his purpose. He knows all things in their essential being, and in all their relations, by one all-comprehensive, timeless intuition. Wisdom is the perfect use which he makes of his knowledge and his power to effect his ends.

8. He is *omnipotent*—that is, the causal efficiency of his will has no limit other than his own perfections. Second causes are necessary to him only relatively to his own purpose.

9. The *goodness* of God, existing in the forms (1) of benevolence to all sentient creatures, (2) love to persons, (3) mercy to the miserable, and (4) grace to the ill-deserving, has no limit outside of his own perfections. This is as good a world as was consistent with the end God had in view. (PASCAL'S *Thoughts; LEIBNITZ, Theodicee*.) J. S. Mill in his *Essay on Theism* objects that if God is infinitely good, he cannot in consistency with facts be infinitely powerful. But he forgets (1) the glory of the Creator, and not the good of the creature, must be the last end; (2) the *ultimate* reasons of facts known to us lie out of our reach, except they are revealed; (3) the grand fact of sin, when once admitted, overthrows all his objections.

10. God is absolutely *true*—i. e. self-consistent and reliable.

11. He is absolutely *righteous*. This involves (1) holiness, or absolute subjective moral perfection; (2) justice, when he is regarded as standing to his intelligent creatures in the relation of moral governor. It is distinguished as rectoral and distributive, and is the immutable ground of rewards and punishment.

12. God's *will* is the organ of his infinite perfections. It is free, in the sense of being a rational spontaneity. It is sovereign, inasmuch as it is conditioned upon nothing save his own all-perfect nature. Hence, God is an absolute sovereign, having an unconditioned power to dispose of and command his creatures as his own perfections suggest. His will is to them an ultimate rule of right, in his "positive" commandments creating obligation, and with respect to essential morality expressing and giving effect to the law of absolute right resident in his own nature. (See CUMBERLAND, *De Legibus Naturæ; CUDWORTH'S Intellectual System*.)

V. THE ONE GOD EXISTS AS THREE HYPOSTASES OR PERSONS.—Schelling says: "The philosophy of mythology proves that a trinity of divine potentialities is the root from which have grown the religious ideas of all nations of any importance; e. g. the Hindoo Trimurti, Brahma, Vishnu, and Shiva. This shows that the Christian doctrine of the Trinity, however original and unique, has a basis in man's religious nature. Abstract Mohammedan and Unitarian monotheism conceives of an isolated, unsocial God, existing from eternity alone, whose urgent affections and infinite energies remain inactive until the advent of creation affords them an object. On the other hand, the Tripersonal God of Christian revelation has within the infinite depths of the Godhead been eternally exercising upon adequate objects those unbounded perfections which can have only an inadequate field of demonstration in a created universe. If God is love, he must have an eternal and infinite object to love. (CHRISTLIEB'S *Modern Doubt*.)

A. *The Biblical Doctrine of the Trinity*.—1. *There is but One God*.—The monotheism of the Old and New Testaments is unquestionable (Deut. vi. 4; 1 Cor. viii. 4). This is expressed by saying the Three Persons are the same in substance, numerically. 2. *Father, Son, and Holy Ghost* are each that one God. To each divine names, attributes, works, and worship are applied (Jer. xxiii. 6; John ii. 24, etc.). 3. Nevertheless, they are always set forth in speech and

action as distinct persons. They use reciprocally the personal pronouns (John xi. 41, etc.). They regard each other objectively, loving, speaking to, and acting through and upon each other as personal agents (John xiv. 31, and xvii.). 4. The Father is the fountain of Godhead, self-existent as person as well as substance. The Son is eternally springing from the person of the Father, and the Spirit from the persons of the Father and of the Son, in virtue of the spontaneous yet necessary constitution of their nature, whereby they receive the indivisible common nature in its fulness. (1) The terms Father and Son are reciprocal. The Son is eternally "begotten" by the Father, his "word," "image," "form," the "radiance of his glory." (2) The term "Spirit" expresses the personal, not the substantial, nature and relations of the Third Person. He is the personal Breath of the Father and of the Son, proceeding from and returning to both. (3) They eternally love one another, take mutual counsel, and act together, as the coexecutors of their common purpose, in a system of distributed yet correlated functions. 5. In the economies of creation, providence, and redemption the order of procedure is always to or from the Father, through the Son, by the Spirit. All actions *ad extra* may be affirmed of either person or of the Godhead absolutely. But by way of eminence creation is ascribed to the Father, redemption to the Son, and sanctification to the Spirit. The Father is the absolute from and to whom all movement originates and ends. The Son is the Revealer and Mediator, the Spirit is the Executive of God.

B. *The Historical Definition of the Trinity*.—The Antiochene Church was united in believing that Father, Son, and Holy Ghost are each eternal, supernatural divine Beings, and yet the Son as decidedly inferior to the Father, and the Spirit to the Son. Origen admitted the eternal generation of the Son, but held he was different from and dependent upon the Father. Irenæus, the disciple of Polycarp, and the Western Church generally, followed more faithfully the doctrine of the apostle John. The two antagonist principles, (a) the unity of God and (b) the distinct personality and the perfect equality of the Three divine Hypostases, were never accurately adjusted and defined before the great oecumenical councils of Nice (325) and Constantinople (381 A. D.). Each principle determined a tendency, and developed heresies.

1. *The principle of the divine unity* was maintained at the expense of the denial of the complementary elements of the revealed doctrine: (1) By the Humanitarians, who held that Christ was a mere man—e. g. the Ebionites, an heretical Jewish-Christian sect; the Alogians; the Theodotians and the disciples of Paul of Samosata (260), who denied the personality of the Logos, or divine principle dwelling in the man Jesus. (2) By the Patripassians (Praxias, Noetus, etc.), whose doctrine was matured by Sabellius (268), who held that the Godhead, existing with no intrinsic distinctions, manifests itself externally and successively in different forms; as the Father under the old dispensation, the Son in the incarnation, and the Spirit in inspiration, etc.

2. *The principle of the distinct personality of the divine Persons*, at the expense of their unity and equality: (1) By the Arians (from Arius of Alexandria, 336), who held that the Son is the first and greatest being created by the will of the Father, and his instrument in creating the Spirit, and subsequently all other beings. They expressed this by saying the Son was *hetero-ousion*, of a different nature from the Father. (2) The Semi-Arians, or Eusebians, represented by Eusebius of Cæsarea (270-340), held that the Son was eternally begotten by the Father, but that he is of a different though similar essence—*homoi-ousion*.

3. *The principle of distinct personality and equality*, at the expense of the divine unity, was maintained by the Trithoists, John Philoponus and John Ascanages (about 550), and Dean Sherlock (1690) in his *Vind. Doc. Trin.*

The Council of Nice was convened by the emperor Constantine in 325 to settle these questions by a thorough analysis and definition of the doctrine. There were present three parties: The Arians, led by Arius, who maintained the difference of essence, *hetero-ousion*; the Semi-Arians, led by Eusebius, who maintained the likeness of essence, *homoi-ousion*; the orthodox, led by Athanasius the Great (†373), who successfully maintained that Father and Son were of the same numerical substance, *homo-ousion*. This decision was expressed in the Creed of Nice, afterwards completed at Constantinople (381) and Toledo (589). The points defined were: (1) There is but one numerical substance, *ὄνεια, φύσις, substantia*, in the Godhead. (2) This substance eternally exists as three equal *hypostases, subsistentiæ, persons*. (3) Each person is distinguished from the others by a *character hypostaticus*, or personal property peculiar to himself. (4) The Father eternally begets the Son, and the Spirit eternally proceeds from the Father and the Son. The clauses relating to the Holy Ghost ("the Lord, the giver of life, who," etc.) were added by the Coun-

oil of Constantinople. The "Filioque" clause was added by the Western Church at the Council of Toledo, and rejected by the Eastern Church. The doctrine was restated with consummate skill in the Creed, "*Quicumque vult,*" falsely ascribed to Athanasius, and has been adopted by all historical churches. Through political intrigues, Arianism prevailed widely in the East, partially in the West, from 325 to the accession of Julian (361), and was finally expelled upon the accession of Theodosius I. (379). (See BISHOP BULL'S (†1710) *Defensio Fid. Nicæne*; DORNER'S *Hist. Per. Christ.*, Clark, Edin.; NEANDER and SCHAFF'S *Church Histories*; DR. SHEDD'S *Hist. of Ch. Doc.*; BISHOP HEFEL'S *Hist. of Christian Councils to 325*, Clark, Edin.)

VI. GOD'S RELATION TO THE WORLD.—In opposition to the pantheistic and deistic false views (below defined), the Christian view of God's relation to the universe includes the following points: 1. That God is a free moral person, transcending the universe, and acting upon it *ab extra* in the exercise of his *potestas libera*. 2. God is nevertheless personally present to every atom of creation through each moment of duration, in his essence and in the free exercise of all his perfections, sustaining and co-working with every creature in every event in the exercise of his *potestas ordinata*. 3. The capital distinction is made between the physical and the moral order. The former, God administers in the mode of fixed laws and forces inherent in the things themselves. The latter he administers through ideas, motives, and other moral and spiritual influences, brought to bear on the moral natures and free wills of his subjects. 4. As an infinitely perfect intelligence, God has formed a plan from eternity, immutably determining in general and in particular the being, the attributes, and the relations of all creatures, and hence the fixed laws of the physical order, and the course of events in the moral order, and his own actions concurrent therewith. In this universal plan he has established a fixed subordination of parts to the whole, and of order to order. The end of the whole he has placed in the manifestation of his own glory. The end of the natural order is the perfect development of the moral order. "In him we live and move and have our being" (Acts xvii. 28); "Of him and through him and to him are all things" (Rom. xi. 36); "Thou madest man to have dominion over the works of thy hands; thou hast put all things under his feet" (Ps. viii. 6).

VII. THE WORKS OF GOD.—As an eternal, immutable Spirit, God is essentially active. His actions are distinguished as—

A. *Those which are Immanent.*—These are (1) his purposes, technically called "decrees," which relate to all events, and are infinitely wise, righteous, and certainly efficacious; and they subordinate all his works, and all their forces, laws, and historical development in time, to a purpose or final end. (2) The actions peculiar to each person of which the other persons are the objects—*e. g.* eternal generation, procession, etc.

B. *His Emanant Actions*, or those which terminate *ab extra*.—These are—1, *Creation*, which is a free act of God in time, executing an eternal purpose. Some, as Origen among theologians, and Cousin among philosophers, have held that creation is a necessary and eternal (timeless) act of God. The latter says (*Psychol.*, p. 44): "God is no more without a world than a world without God." The Church has always held otherwise. Creation is of two kinds: (1) *Creatio prima seu immediata*, the immediate creation by God of the elements of things *ex nihilo*. This was denied by all ancients and by pantheists, and first taught by revelation. (2) *Creatio secunda seu mediata*, or the origination by God, out of and by means of pre-existing material, of new genera and species—*e. g.* the body of man (Gen. ii. 7). This distinction was admitted by St. Augustine (*De Genesi ad Lit.*, v. 45), and by all theologians since. In the method of this "mediate creation" God has been evidently executing law, creating according to types in an ascending series. (ARYLE'S *Reign of Law*, ch. 5; MCCOSH, *Typical Forms*; MIVART, *Gen. of Species*, ch. 12.)

2. *Providence*, which includes (1) *Preservation*. This some make identical with a continual creation. By some, as Strauss and other pantheists, preservation is regarded as a necessary unconscious eternal act. By others, as by Heidegger (*Corp. Theol.*, 7, 32) and by Pres. Edwards (*Orig. Sin.*, pt. 4, ch. 3), the design of such language is only to emphasize the dependence of the creature. The Scriptures teach that while second causes have real being and efficiency, "they have their being in God." (2) *Government*. This (a) extends to all creatures and all their actions. (b) Its method is consistent with the perfections of God, and congruous to the nature of each creature and action concerned. (c) Its end is God's glory through the execution of purpose. (d) It comprehends every particular as a means to a general end; it is therefore for the same reason both general and special. (e) It extends to the sinful acts

of men, to forbid, control, punish, and overrule them for good. (f) This universal government God accomplishes partly by means of the original properties of second causes and their primal adjustments, and partly by a present *concursus* of his own energy with them, guiding them in the direction predetermined by his purpose. Leibnitz (*New System of Nature*) taught the doctrine of pre-established harmony, whereby all events were predetermined from the creation by fixed sequences, alike in the separate spheres of the physical and spiritual. All theories of pantheistic tendency imply the sole agency of the Creator in all actions, the second cause being only the mode in which God appears, or the instrument by which his energy is immediately exerted. This is the tendency of Emmons, of the ultra-Calvinists of a former age, and of the extreme wing of the school of Schleiermacher.

3. *Redemption* of course involves from beginning to end supernatural intervention with the physical order for the sake of the moral order perverted by sin. It includes (1) the incarnation; (2) expiatory sacrifice; (3) resurrection; (4) dispensation of the Holy Ghost, including inspiration of Scripture, the regeneration and sanctification of individuals, and the preservation and historical development of his Church.

4. *Miracles.* (See art. MIRACLES.)

VIII. VARIOUS PREVALENT ANTI-THEISTIC THEORIES.—A. *Atheism*, according to its etymology, signifies the denial of the being of God. It was applied by the ancient Greeks to Socrates and other philosophers to indicate that they failed to conform to the popular religion. In the same sense it was applied to the early Christians. Since the usage of the term "theism" has been definitely fixed in all modern languages, "atheism" necessarily stands for the denial of the existence of a personal Creator and Moral Governor. Notwithstanding a belief in a personal God is intuitive, atheism is possible, as an abnormal state of consciousness induced by sophistical speculation or animal indulgence, as subjective idealism is possible. It exists in the following forms: 1, practical; 2, speculative. Again, speculative atheism may be—1, *Dogmatic*, as when the assertion is made either (1) that God does not exist, or (2) that the human faculties are positively incapable of ascertaining or of verifying his existence—*e. g.* Herbert Spencer. (*First Principles*, pt. 1.) 2, *Skeptical*, as when it simply doubts the existence of God, and denies the conclusiveness of arguments generally relied upon. 3, *Virtual*, as when (1) principles are maintained essentially inconsistent with the existence of God, or with the possibility of our knowing him—*e. g.* by materialists, positivists, absolute idealists; (2) when some of the essential attributes of the divine nature are denied, as by pantheists, and by Stuart Mill in his *Essays on Religion*; (3) when explanations of the universe are given which exclude (a) the agency of an intelligent creator and governor, and (b) the moral government of God and the moral freedom of man. Such explanations are made by Darwin, H. Spencer, and by necessitarians generally. In ancient times Epicurus (341–270 B. C.) and his school were really, though not professedly, atheists, and Lucretius (95–52 B. C.) was openly so. In modern times the deism of Voltaire and the Encyclopædists degenerated into the atheism of D'Holbach; at present, Moleschott, Feuerbach, the English secularist Holyoake, the disciples of Comte, and the extreme left of the Evolution school generally. (See ULRICH, *God and Nature and Review of Strauss*; STRAUSS, *Old and New*; BUCHANAN, *Modern Atheism*; TULLOCH, *Theism*, etc.)

B. *Dualism*, the opposite of *Monism* in philosophy, is the doctrine that there are two generically distinct essences, matter and spirit, in the universe. In this sense, the common doctrine of Christendom is dualistic. All the ancient pagan philosophers held the eternal independent self-existence of matter, and consequently all among them who were also theists were strictly cosmological dualists. The religion of Zoroaster was a mythological dualism designed to account for the existence of evil. Ormuzd and Ahri-man, the personal principles of good and evil, sprang from a supreme, abstract divinity, Akerenes. Some of the sects of this religion held dualism in its absolute form, and referred all evil to *šar*, self-existent matter. This principle dominated in the various spurious Christian Gnostic sects in the second century, and in the system of Manes in the third century, and its prevalence in the Oriental world is manifested in the ascetic tendencies of the early Christian Church. (See J. F. CLARKE, *Ten Religions*; HARDWICK, *Christ and other Masters*; NEANDER'S *Church Hist.*; PRESSENSÉ, *Early Years of Christianity*; TENNEMANN, *Manual Hist. Philos.*)

C. *Polytheism* (πολύς and θεός) distributes the perfections and functions of the infinite God among many limited gods. It sprang out of that nature-worship seen in the earliest Hindoo Veda, so soon and so generally supplanting

primitive monotheism. At first, as it long remained in Chaldæa and Arabia, it consisted in the worship of the elements, especially of the stars and of fire. Subsequently, it took special forms from the traditions, the genius, and the relative civilization of each nationality. Among the rudest savages it sank to fetichism, as in Western and Central Africa. Among the Greeks it was made the vehicle for the expression of their refined humanitarianism in the apotheosis of heroic men rather than the revelation of incarnate gods. In India, springing from a pantheistic philosophy, it has been carried to the most extravagant extreme, both in respect to the number and the character of its deities. Whenever polytheism has been connected with speculation it appears as the exoteric counterpart of pantheism. (CARLYLE'S *Hero-Worship*; KEIGHTLEY, *Mythol. Greece and Italy*; MAX MÜLLER, *Compar. Mythol.*, in *Oxford Essays*, 1856; PROF. TYLER, *Theology of Greek Poets*.)

D. *Deism* (from *deus*), though etymologically synonymous with theism, has been distinguished from it from the middle of the sixteenth century, and used to designate a system admitting the existence of a personal Creator, but denying his controlling presence in the world (*concurans*), his immediate moral government, and all supernatural intervention and revelation. The movement began with the English deists, Lord Herbert of Cherbury (1581-1633), Hobbes († 1680), John Toland († 1722), Woolston († 1733), Tindal († 1730), Shaftesbury, Bolingbroke (1678-1751), Thomas Paine († 1809). It passed over to France, and was represented by Voltaire and the Encyclopædists. It passed over into Germany, and was represented by Lessing and Reimarus (*Wolfenbüttel Fragmentist*), and, invading the Church and theology, it was essentially represented by the old school of the naturalistic rationalists, who admitted with it a low and inconsequent form of Socinianism—e. g. Eichhorn (1752-1827), Paulus (1761-1851), and Wegscheider (1771-1848). It has been represented in America by the late Theodore Parker and the extreme left of the party known as "Liberal Christians." In Germany mere deistical naturalism gave way to pantheism, as the latter has recently given way to materialistic atheism—e. g. Strauss. (See LELAND'S *View of Deistical Writers*; VAN MILDERT'S *Boyle Lectures*; FARRAR, *Crit. Hist. Free Thought*; DORNER, *Hist. Protest. Theol.*; HURST, *Hist. Rationalism*; BUTLER'S *Analogy*, admitted by J. S. Mill to be unanswerable as against deism.)

E. *Pantheism* (*πᾶν, θεός*) is absolute monism, maintaining that the entire phenomenal universe is the ever-changing existence-form of the one single universal substance, which is God. Thus, God is all, and all is God. God is *ré ô*, absolute being, of which every finite thing is a differentiated and transient form. This doctrine is of course capable of assuming very various forms. (1) The one-substance pantheism of Spinoza. He held that God is the one absolute substance of all things, possessing two attributes, thought and extension, from either of which respectively the physical and the intellectual world proceeds by an eternal, necessary, and unconscious evolution. (2) The material pantheism of STRAUSS'S *Old and New Faith*. (3) The idealistic pantheism of Schelling, which maintains the absolute identity of subject and object; and of Hegel, which maintains the absolute identity of thought and existence as determinations of the one absolute Spirit.

It is obvious that pantheism in all its forms must either deny the moral personality of God or that of man, or both. Logically, pantheism does render both impossible. God comes to self-consciousness only in man; the consciousness of free personal self-determination in man is a delusion; moral responsibility is a prejudice; the supernatural is impossible, and religion is superstition. Yet such is the flexibility of the system that in one form it puts on a mystical guise, representing God as the all-person absorbing the world into himself, and in an opposite form it puts on a purely naturalistic guise, representing the world as absorbing God, and the human race in its ever-culminating development the only object of reverence or devotion. The same Spinoza who was declared by Pascal and Bossuet to be an atheist is represented by Jacobi and Schleiermacher to be the most devout of mystics. The intense individuality and the material science of this century has reacted powerfully upon pantheism, substituting materialism for idealism, retiring God and elevating man, as is seen in the recent degeneration of pantheism into atheism in the case of Feuerbach and Strauss.

The most ancient, consistent, and prevalent pantheism of the world's history is that of India. As a religion, it has moulded the character, customs, and mythologies of that people for 4000 years. As a philosophy, it has appeared in three principal forms—the Sankhya, the Nyaya, and the Vedanta. In Greece, pantheistic modes of thought prevailed chiefly with the Stoic and New Platonic schools—Zeno (340-260 B. C.), Plotinus (205-270 A. D.), Porphyry

(233-305), Jamblichus († 333). It reappears in John Scotus Erigena († 883) and with the Neo-Platonists of the Renaissance—e. g. Giordano Bruno, burnt at Rome in 1600. Modern pantheism began with Benedict Spinoza (1632-1677), and closes with the disciples of Schelling and Hegel.

Besides the pure pantheism above referred to, there has existed an infinite variety of impure forms of virtual pantheism. This is true of all systems that affirm the impersonality of the infinite and absolute, and which resolve all the divine attributes into modes of causality. The same is true of all systems which represent providential preservation as a continued creation, deny the real efficiency of second causes, and make God the only agent in the universe—e. g. Edwards (in *Original Sin*, pt. 4, ch. 3) and Emmons. Under the same general category falls the fanciful doctrine of emanations which was the chief feature of Oriental theosophies, and the hylozoism of Averroes († 1217), which supposes the coeternity of matter and of an unconscious plastic *anima mundi*. (See HUNT'S *Essay on Pantheism*, London, 1866; SAISSET, *Modern Pantheism*, Edinburgh, T. T. Clark, 1866; COUSIN, *Hist. Modern Philos.*; MORELL, *Hist. Modern Philos.*; RITTER'S *Hist. Ancient Philos.*; BUCHANAN'S *Faith in God, etc.*; DÖLLINGER'S *Gentile and Jew*, London, 1863; MAX MÜLLER, *Hist. Anc. Sanscrit Lit.*)

A. A. HODGE.

Goda'very, the largest river of the Deccan, rises from the Western Ghauts, within 50 miles from the Arabian Sea, and crosses the Deccan in a south-eastern course of about 900 miles. After passing through the Eastern Ghauts it separates into several arms, in lat. 16° 57' N. and lon. 73° 30', forms a delta, and falls into the Bay of Bengal. It is navigable for some distance above its passage through the Eastern Ghauts.

God'dard (JOSHUA), a Baptist missionary, b. at Wendell, Mass., in 1813; graduated at Brown University in 1835, and at Newton Theological Institution in 1838; labored among the Chinese of Siam with success, and afterwards, for six years, at Ningpo, China, where he d. in 1854. His principal work was an excellent version of the New Testament in Chinese, but he also preached with much energy and effect, though in feeble health.

God'erich, port of entry and cap. of Huron co., Ont., Canada, on Lake Huron, is the western terminus of the Buffalo and Goderich division of the Grand Trunk Railway. It has a good harbor, and has extensive communication by steam with the various lake-ports. It has a large elevator for wheat, extensive lake fisheries, 8 valuable salt-wells, and 2 weekly newspapers. It is rapidly increasing in importance. Pop. of town, 3954; of Goderich tp., outside the town limits, 3615.

Godfather, Godmother. See SPONSORS.

God'frey, post-v. of Monticello tp., Madison co., Ill., on the Mississippi River and the Chicago Alton and St. Louis R. R., 29 miles from St. Louis, at the junction of the Jacksonville branch. It is the seat of Monticello Seminary.

Godfrey of Bouillon, king of Jerusalem and the sixth duke Godfrey of Brabant, or the Lower Lorraine, b. at Nivelles, Lorraine, in 1061; became governor of Bouillon 1076; fought with conspicuous valor in Germany and Italy on behalf of Henry IV. against the pope; slew Rudolph, the rival emperor, with his own hand, and was the first to mount the walls of Rome on Henry's successful attack, 1084; succeeded as duke 1089; took the cross for the Holy Land 1095, in order to expiate his sin of fighting against the pope (first crusade); led 80,000 men to the East by way of Constantinople; captured Nicea 1096; defeated Soliman at Dorylæum 1097; took Antioch 1098, and stormed and took Jerusalem July 15, 1099; was declared king of Jerusalem, but declined to wear a crown of gold where his Lord had worn a crown of thorns; defeated the Egyptians at Ascalon, conquered Galilee, promulgated the *Azize of Jerusalem*, a system of feudal law; d. at Jerusalem July 15, 1100, and was succeeded by Baldwin I. In 1244 the Carismians tore up and burned his remains. Godfrey's strength, valor, piety, and virtue were favorite themes of mediæval poetry. He is the central figure of Tasso's *Jerusalem Delivered*.

God'iva, The Lady, wife of Leofric, earl of Mercia and master of Coventry in England, who about 1040 imposed upon that town heavy exactions, by reason of which the people all complained. The lady Godiva entreated her lord to spare the town; and at last he consented on condition that she should ride naked by daylight through Coventry, to which proposal she readily agreed, notwithstanding her well-known and extreme modesty. The earl could do no less than order the people to keep within their houses, and not look out. This (so the story goes) they all did excepting one tailor, the Peeping Tom of Coventry (some say he was a baker), who looked out at a window as the lady rode by veiled with her flowing hair only; but the poor