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ART. I.—*Notes, explanatory and practical, on the Gospels: designed for Sunday School Teachers and Bible Classes.* By Albert Barnes. *In two volumes. Fourth edition—each edition contains two thousand.* New York and Boston, 1834, 12mo.

THOUGH we hardly have a right to notice, as a new work, one which has been so long in circulation, and with which so many of our readers are familiar, we feel ourselves called upon as Christian critics, to say what we think of Mr. Barnes's expositions. This we shall do as plainly and as kindly as we can. As our object is simply to characterize a book, which is likely to exert a very durable and extensive influence, we shall confine ourselves entirely to an enumeration of the points in which we think it worthy either of praise or censure. We have only to premise that our conclusions have been mostly drawn from the notes on Matthew and John, especially the former, though we have so far compared the rest as to remain convinced, that the first part of the work is a sample of the whole. Throughout our strictures, we shall endeavour to be pointed and specific, referring when we can, to individual examples, both of defect and merit, though it be at the risk of seeming sometimes hypercritical, a reproach which can scarcely

Charles Hodge

ART. VIII.—*Notes, Explanatory and Practical, on the Epistle to the Romans, designed for Bible-Classes and Sunday-Schools.* By Albert Barnes. New York. 1834. 12mo. pp. 328.

WHEN we undertook to criticise Mr. Barnes's "Notes on the Gospels," we were not aware that the present work was on the eve of publication. Our parting advice, at the close of the other article, comes of course too late. Whether we were too tardy in attending to the first book, or Mr. Barnes too hasty in bringing out the second, we shall not presume to say. In either case it so happens, that we are under the necessity of assigning two places in the same quarterly number, not merely to two works of the same author, but to what may be regarded as two volumes of the same continuous series. We shall not be expected to despatch this new work within such narrow compass as the old. The subject itself and the way in which it is handled, call for a more extended and minute critique.

Mr. Barnes, in his Preface, says, "My brethren in the ministry, so far as they may have occasion to consult these Notes, will know how to appreciate the cares and anxieties amidst which they have been prepared. They will be indulgent to the faults of the book; they will not censure harshly what is well-meant for the rising generation; they will be the patrons of every purpose, however humble, to do good." We have little doubt that this expectation will be generally realized. There cannot be, among candid and good men, any disposition to depreciate a work requiring so much labour, and so obviously needed. Our Review of the "Notes on the Gospels," shows, we trust, that we are ready to give him full credit for his attainments and ability. Here, however, as there, we must endeavour to exhibit, with fairness, what we believe to be the real character of the work before us. If its merits prove to be fewer, and its defects greater, than those of the previous volumes, it will be a matter of duty and justice to say so. Our estimate and statement of its character, we hope, will be as candid and impartial as if the work were anonymous.

Mr. B. remarks, with great propriety, in the close of his Introduction, that "perhaps, on the whole, there is no book of the New Testament that more demands an humble,

doeile, and prayerful disposition, than this epistle." Had the state of mind indicated by this remark, and by the one just quoted from the Preface, been preserved while writing the book itself, his expectation of a favourable estimate could hardly have been disappointed. But Mr. B., perhaps unconsciously, relapses almost immediately into a positive and dogmatical manner, denouncing long received opinions as absurd, pronouncing them matters of speculation and theory; and often, without argument or proof of any kind, rejecting what the vast majority of pious commentators and readers of the Bible believe to be its obvious meaning. Near the end of the Introduction he says, "Where Paul states a simple fact, men often advance a theory. The fact may be clear and plain; their theory is obscure, involved, mysterious, or absurd." "A melancholy instance of this we have in the account which the apostle gives about the effects of the sin of Adam. The simple fact is stated, that that sin was followed by the sin and ruin of all his posterity." The explanation of this fact devised by theologians, according to Mr. Barnes, is, that Adam's sin was imputed to his posterity. "This is *theory*; and men insensibly forget that it is mere theory," &c. &c. When it is remembered, that the doctrine thus disposed of, was held by the reformers and the churches which they founded, almost without exception; received by the great body of pious commentators in all ages; and most explicitly taught in the standards of the Presbyterian Church, it must be regarded as a proof of no small self-reliance, to select and present it as a specimen of the absurd. When the reader comes to find that Mr. Barnes does not understand this doctrine; that the objections urged in his commentary are either founded on misapprehension, or have been answered a hundred times, he will be surprised at the supercilious tone of his decisions. Such is poor human nature, that the exhibition of an undesirable temper on the one side, is almost certain to provoke it on the other. On this account, it is to be regretted also, that Mr. B. should have placed, at the very threshold of his book, such a stumbling-stone as the following sentence on the first page of his Preface. "The design has been to state what appeared to the author the real *meaning* of the Epistle, without *any* regard to any existing theological system; and without any deference to the opinions of others, further than the respectful deference and candid examination which are due to the opinions of the

learned, the wise, and the good, who have made this Epistle their particular study." Mr. B. seems to forget, that the independence here asserted is a very great virtue; the last attainment of an humble heart and elevated intellect; of a heart so impressed with the sense of responsibility to God, and of the value of truth, as to be unaffected by the thousand impure sources of undue bias; and of an intellect so clear and lofty as to be above the influence of other minds, and subject only to truth and God. Mr. Barnes's taste would not be more offended by hearing any one say, "I am the bravest of men—I fear no danger—I am afraid of no man," than the taste of others is offended with his own claim to the possession of a mind so well poised and so enlightened as to be above the disturbing causes to which other men are subject.

There is another view of this matter in which it assumes a graver aspect. Mr. B. has publicly and solemnly assented to the truth of an existing "system of doctrine." It must, therefore, be to many an offensive declaration, that he does not care whether what he teaches falls within or without the pale of that system. They understand it as meaning, that he does not care whether he really believes what he has solemnly professed to believe. This we do not suppose to be the sense in which he makes the declaration; and yet this, without perversion, is a sense which his words may well convey. But why this assertion of utter disregard to the system of doctrines which he has professed to believe? By that profession he has declared, not only that he is convinced of its truth, but that such conviction is the result of examination and comparison. His duty as a commentator, indeed, is not professedly to teach that system; but if his investigation of the sacred Scriptures brings him to the conclusion that the Bible teaches one thing and the system another, he should retract his profession of faith and not proclaim his disregard for it. After all, however, we are disposed to think that such disavowals as the one in question, are with some men, words of course, meaning nothing more than is denoted by the phrases "freedom of discussion," "liberty of thought," "march of mind," and other favourite formulas which are passing incessantly from mouth to mouth, and which are rather indications of disposition than expressions of ideas. If Paul could say "when I became a man I put away childish things," Mr. Barnes need not blush to put his away likewise, and among the rest

his professions of independence and of disregard to system. Instead of increasing confidence in his independence, they rather lessen it, by impairing respect for his judgment, while at the same time they irritate, and excite suspicion.

The merits of this book are very much the same as those of the "Notes on the Gospels." There is, in general, the same conciseness and point of expression, the same clearness of statement, the same evidence of research and labour, and the same endeavour to be practically useful. The same defect of plan that was there discovered, meets us here where its effects are far more serious. We refer to the neglect of analytic method. If that neglect does mischief in the Gospels, what must it do in the Epistle to the Romans! As the difficulties in an argumentative discussion are not difficulties of words and phrases merely, but of principles and reasonings, that commentator leaves an important part of his work unfinished, who devotes his attention, almost exclusively, to detached expressions. We suspect that an ordinary reader might go through what Mr. Barnes has written on the second chapter, without understanding a whit better than when he began, what the apostle's object is, what he has proved, and by what arguments. The several clauses he may find explained or illustrated; but the apostle's discourse, as a discourse—his argument, as an argument—remains as dark as ever.

A second defect in this work is one which includes a great deal, and may account for its errors of doctrine. It is, a want of maturity. Mr. B., to borrow a figure, has plucked his pear before it was ripe. This is very evident from the frequent looseness and inaccuracy of the exposition; from the want of precision and correctness in his doctrinal statements; from the misapprehension of the opinions of others, and inconsistency in the statement of his own; from the consequent irrelevancy or inconclusiveness of many of his arguments and objections; and from his peculiar positiveness and confidence when he is most in error. It requires no great amount of previous knowledge, or familiarity with the study of the Scriptures to see abundant evidence of the truth of these remarks even on a cursory perusal of his work. It is indeed to be regretted that Mr. B. has thus early committed himself on such a variety of difficult and delicate subjects as are embraced in this volume. Let him look around and see if he can fix on one of his friends more than forty years of age, who holds at this moment the opinions

which he held ten or twenty years ago; (barring of course, that such friend is what is called a confession of faith, or old school man, who is not expected to change either for the better or worse.) For ourselves, with the exception just stated, we know no such man. Such have been the mutations of systems, and such the change of ground, even among those who profess to disregard all system, that we know no man who is now standing, where he stood fifteen years ago. Where are all the Hopkinsians and Emmonites of former days? Who now hears of the divine efficiency in the production of evil—or that a man must be willing to be damned for the glory of God; that unregenerate men ought not to pray or use the means of grace? Even the theory that holiness is but a means to happiness; that disinterested benevolence is the only moral good, and that all sin is selfishness; seems to be fast sinking with the dimmer stars of the same constellation beneath the waves of oblivion. The gazers on these stars have turned their eyes, some on the fixed and lasting luminaries of heaven, and some on meteors destined, we trust, to be still more transient than the objects of their former admiration. We were recently strongly impressed by a remark made by a clergyman who stands in the first rank of talent, that at different periods of his life, he had indulged various doctrinal views, but never felt the least disposed to return to any opinion once discarded, unless it was one of the good old doctrines which he had learned in the nursery. There is something more, we are persuaded, than a psychological reason for this result. Doctrines which are true are immortal. They may for a while be forgotten or neglected. The young and ardent misled by appearances, may, for a time, renounce them, but their self-evidencing light continues to shine on, and sooner or later, those who have eyes to see, do see and acknowledge their truth and beauty. There are some men who seem destined from whatever point they start, to run an erratic course; while others, whose minds not always better, but differently constituted, embrace and hold with steadiness, the doctrines to which the former, after many wanderings, tardily arrive. And the more certain we are that a doctrine is true, the less are we anxious about its final triumph. It is out of the question, that Mr. B. should long hold many of the doctrinal opinions contained in this work. A mind like his, with his habits of study, cannot always rest in inconsistency, or remain under the mere

delusion of a name. It is therefore to be regretted that an unusual degree of self-reliance, cherished no doubt by the extraordinary success of his efforts in a very different field of labour, should have led him to send forth a book bearing so many and so obvious marks of immaturity.

This defect, as before intimated, is not confined to matters of doctrine, but extends to his knowledge of the principles of interpretation, and the force and meaning of the language of the New Testament. There is a neglect of precision, accuracy and consistency in conducting his exposition, which evidently results from a want of familiarity with the language of the Scriptures, or of disregard to the minutiae on which the correctness and certainty of interpretation depend. Thus it seems often a matter of indifference to him what preposition the apostle uses, or with what case. A vague statement is often made that a given phrase means this or that, or that which may or may not be consistent with the force of the words. At other times the precise language of the apostle seems to be left entirely out of view, and a general paraphrasing declaration of the meaning is given, gathered partly from the context, partly from the English version, and partly from his own mind, but which the original cannot by possibility bear. At other times a word or phrase is made to mean one thing, and before the comment upon it is completed, it is made to mean another. These and similar evidences of want of accuracy, or strict attention to the original text, are very frequent. We know Mr. B. says in his preface, that it was not his design to write a learned commentary, or enter minutely into critical investigations; that the results rather than the process of such inquiry is given. This is perfectly proper; but the ground of our stricture is not, that the process of criticism is not given, but that it has so often been neglected, or carelessly performed; and that the result has been in such cases vagueness and inaccuracy.

We must, of course, refer Mr. B. and our readers to a sufficient number of examples to justify the opinion which we have expressed. These we shall in general state in the order in which they stand in the book.

On the phrase *δικαιοσύνη Θεοῦ* (ch. i. 17.) Mr. B. correctly remarks, "there is not a more important expression to be found in the Epistle than this." Such being the fact, it ought to be carefully examined before a positive decision as to its meaning is given. Mr. B. says, "it is capable only

of the following interpretations." 1. Some have said that it means the attribute of God, denominated righteousness or justice. 2. The goodness or benevolence of God. 3. God's plan of justifying men. The author decides for the last. We do not mean to dispute the correctness of this decision, in favour of which much may be said; but simply to illustrate the ease with which Mr. B. makes the most positive assertions, without the least foundation for them. Instead of its being true that the phrase is capable of only the three interpretations here given, it admits with equal propriety of a great many more. As the word rendered *righteousness* is the general term in Scripture for moral excellence, it may be used and is used, especially in the Old Testament, for any moral excellence—for holiness in general, for veracity or faithfulness as well as justice or goodness. But the point of our remark is, that Mr. B. does not mention the most obvious, natural, and generally received interpretation. Why may not the righteousness of God mean "that righteousness of which God is the author and of which he approves," since the truth of God—the salvation of God—the ways of God—the wisdom of God, &c. &c. &c., mean the truth—the salvation—the ways or wisdom of which God is the author, and which he approves? There is no force of the genitive more familiar and common, than that which this interpretation assigns to *θεου of God.* This view of the passage is almost universal among the older commentators, and is adopted by a large proportion of the modern philological interpreters.

On p. 82 we have another specimen of Mr. B.'s positiveness, when he is entirely wrong, and when he makes no other effort to show he is right than putting his words in italics. The expression on which he is commenting is *guilty before God.* "The idea," he says, "is that of subjection to *punishment*, but *always* because the man personally *deserves* it, and because being unable to vindicate himself, he *ought* to be punished. It is never used to denote simply an obligation to punishment, but with reference to the fact that the punishment is personally *deserved*. This word rendered guilty is not elsewhere used in the New Testament, nor is it found in the Septuagint. The argument of the apostle here shows, 1. That in order to guilt, there must be a *law*, either that by nature or by revelation, (ch. i. ii. iii;) and 2. That in order to *guilt* there must be a violation of that law which may be charged on them as individuals, and for which they are to be held personally responsible." We

would remark on this passage, 1. That what Mr. B. here says is not to be understood of the scriptural use of the Greek word, for this word he tells us occurs no where else in the Bible. It is the word *guilty* of which he makes the positive assertions just quoted. 2. That these remarks of the author are not called for by the passage of which he is speaking. The simple declaration of the apostle that *all the world is guilty*, i. e. exposed to condemnation, every one understands, and understands in precisely the same manner. But there are some subjects such as ability, imputation, &c. which Mr. B. cannot let pass, when even a verbal association brings them before his mind. We have seen that he enters upon the first mentioned point, on the occasion of the words "we cannot tell," as he does also when he meets the expression "when we were without strength." v. 6. With a little reason he attacks the second when speaking of ii. 26. And here he starts a theological question which has no natural connexion with the point in hand. These things are not indicative of a calm or independent mind, but of one that has a favourite point to carry, and is governed by a strong antipathy against certain opinions which leads him to bring them up when least called for. The mind that could follow Paul through all his previous reasoning, until he arrives at the solemn conclusion that all the world is guilty before God, are all exposed to condemnation, and stand in absolute need of a Saviour; and find room only to comment on the word *guilty*, with a view of showing that certain theologians do not know what it means, is not in a healthful state. This is more like the conduct of a partisan disputant, than an impartial commentator. 3. There is no force in his argument as to the meaning of the word. 'Paul says all the world is guilty before God; hence we learn that personal demerit is essential to guilt.' Such is the argument. How the conclusion follows from the premises we cannot discover. Because it is right to say men are guilty, i. e. exposed to punishment because they are sinners—does it hence follow that the word expresses any thing more than this exposure? The Apostle says all men are sinners, and therefore guilty, i. e. exposed to punishment, which as a statement and an argument all men are ready to admit. But our standard says "the guilt of Adam's first sin," i. e. exposure to punishment on that account has come on all men; and it is customary also to say that the blessed Saviour took upon him the guilt of our sins. These are points which Mr. B. denies; and he makes the first to teach absur-

dity and the second blasphemy, by making the word *guilt* to involve the idea of personal demerit. He does not speak merely of what ought in his judgment to be the meaning of the word, or that it is an infelicity or inaccuracy to use it as it is done in the catechism of the church, but he maintains such is its meaning, it *always* is so used and *never* expresses mere exposure to punishment without the idea of personal ill-desert. And accordingly he asserts that "the doctrine of imputation has been that infants are *personally* guilty of Adam's sin." And if this doctrine is true, he says, "then they *sinned the very identical sin*" that Adam did. This is in a book designed for passive recipients of knowledge; to circulate among Bible Classes and Sunday Schools; to make every human being who believes its statements, regard the standards of the church, and all the writings of the Reformers as teaching unheard of folly and wicked blasphemy! What proof does Mr. B. pretend to offer in support of his definition of the word *guilt*? None in the world, but asserting with emphasis that it *always* means so, and not so; and that Paul argues that sinners are *guilty*. This is a mere philological and historical question. What is the meaning of a word? A question not to be decided by italicised assertions, but by an appeal to the usage of standard writers. It is not our purpose to make this appeal to any great extent, because every well informed man is already aware of the meaning of the term, and because our time and limits must be otherwise employed. We give only a few from thousands of examples which might easily be collected, of the use of the English word *guilt*, the Latin *reatus* and the German *Schuld* to express the simple idea of exposure to punishment. Dr. Owen on Justification, p. 280, says, "He (Christ) was alienæ culpæ reus. Perfectly innocent in himself; but took our guilt upon him, or our obnoxiousness unto punishment for sin." Turretin, vol. 1. p. 654, "Reatus theologice dicitur obligatio ad poenam ex peccato." Reatus or guilt, he says, is twofold, "the one is called *potential*, and denotes the intrinsic desert of punishment of sin, and is inseparable from it; the other *actual*, which by the merey of God can be separated from it, by pardon, which is properly the removal (ablatio) of actual guilt." And immediately after, "Hence it appears, that actual guilt at least can be separated from sin. For in the renewed there is ἀνομία *sin*, but not guilt, Rom. viii. 1. In Christ, on the contrary, there is guilt, Is. liii. 5. 2 Cor. v. 21,

because he was our surety, and yet no ἀνομία or sin." Exactly to the same amount, Bretschneider in his Dogmatik vol. ii. p. 278, corrects Döderlein's assertion that guilt is inseparable from sin, and says he confounds the subjective and objective meanings of the word. In the former sense it is the judgment which man or God forms of the immorality of an act; in the latter "it is a relation or an obligation, viz. the relation of the sinner to the divine justice, or the obligation to suffer punishment proportionate to the offence. This relation God can change," &c. &c.* Any individual therefore who is brought to stand in this relation to God, or who is under obligation to suffer punishment, (that is, pain judicially inflicted in support of law,) is constantly and properly said to bear guilt. Accordingly, this independent and clear headed writer, in stating the doctrine of the Reformation on the subject of atonement, says, "The death of Christ is a satisfaction for our sins, inasmuch as Christ has borne or suffered for us, the guilt or punishment which we should have borne or suffered." *Entwickelung* p. 615. And on the next page he says, "In reference to the punishment which Christ endured, the symbolical books, or confessions of faith, teach with one voice that he endured our punishment; that thereby guilt or liability to punishment (Schuld oder Strafbarkeit) might be removed." Storr (Hebrews, p. 489-90,) makes the very idea of a sin offering to be that it bears "the guilt and punishment" of those for whom it is offered. In this sense, he over and over says, Christ is a sacrifice for our sins.—Grotius, in his *Treatise De Satisfactione Christi*, uses the term constantly in this sense. It is however too plain a point to spend so much time about. The word in question is used literally thousands and tens of thousands of times in the works and confessions of the Reformers and subsequent theologians, to express the obligation to punishment on account of sin, without the implication of personal demerit. This being the fact, though we have no right to complain, that any man thinks it an unfortunate, or unhappy use of the term, we have a right to complain that any one should say it *always* includes the idea of personal ill-desert, and *never* is used in another sense, and thence infer that those who say that the guilt of

* It is worth while to remark that Döderlein is a moderate theologian; Bretschneider a rationalist. The former had gone only far enough to cavil at the doctrines of the church; the latter by caring nothing about them could afford to be candid.

Adam's sin has come on us, or of our sins has been laid on Christ, teach and must teach that all men are personally and morally guilty of Adam's sin, and Christ of ours.*

Mr. B.'s explanations of c. iii. 25, is, as we think, erroneous, and as he admits, unusual, though *evidently*, he says, the only correct one. The passage is, "To declare his righteousness for the remission of sins that are past, through the forbearance of God." "This," says Mr. B., "has been commonly understood to refer to past generations, as affirming that sins under all dispensations of the world are to be forgiven in this manner, through the sacrifice of Christ. This may be true; but there is no reason (!) to think this is the idea in this passage. For 1. The scope of the passage does not require it. 2. The language has no immediate or necessary reference to past generations. It evidently refers to the past lives of the individuals, and not to former times. If it be referred to the sins of former times, it would not be easy to avoid the doctrine of universal salvation." The cause, we presume, why Mr. B. could see "no reason" for the common interpretation, is that he did not look at the original. His comment, here, as so frequently elsewhere, seems founded exclusively on the English version. Yet in this as in other cases, the construction of the Greek is difficult and dubious, and must be settled before the meaning of the passage is decided upon. The scope of the passage is surely not against the ordinary interpretation. That scope is to exhibit the plan of salvation, to show how it was that sin could be consistently forgiven. Paul says Christ was set forth as a propitiatory sacrifice for this very purpose, to show how it was that God could be just in passing by transgressions. And it was as necessary to show this in reference to the sins that were past even *during* (*ἐν*) the forbearance of God, as any other. That is, the fact was notorious that God had forgiven sin under the former dispensations, and was ready to forgive them now; it was requisite that the ground on which this forgiveness was granted should be known, in order that it might be seen that God is just even in dispensing pardon. The point of

* It is of course not intended, by any man in his senses, to undertake to answer for or justify all the modes of expression on this and kindred subjects found in any and every theological writer. The doctrines, or modes of expression of some of the English Antinomians are shocking; but they have nothing to do with the language and doctrines of the Reformers, and of the great body of the Lutheran and Calvinistic Divines.

our remark, however, is not so much the incoherence of Mr. B.'s exposition, as the unnecessary confidence of his tone, and the little insight which he exhibits into the grounds of the opinions which he rejects.

The important expression c. iv. 3, &c. *Faith was imputed for righteousness*, Mr. B. explains in several different, and as it appears to us, inconsistent ways. He first says, "All that is material to remark here is, that the *act* of Abraham, the strong confidence of his mind in the promises of God, his unwavering assurance that what God had promised he would perform, was reckoned to him for righteousness."—"For *righteousness*. As righteousness: or to regard and treat him in connexion with this *as* a righteous man." Every one is aware that there are two leading views of the doctrine of justification by faith. The one, which is commonly adopted by Arminian writers, that faith itself, considered as an act of the mind, is taken (in connexion with evangelical obedience) for righteousness; that is, in virtue of the work of Christ, faith is accepted as though it were complete obedience to the law. According to this view, faith itself is the ground of acceptance. This view Mr. B. repeatedly disclaims. The other is, that faith is but the instrumental cause of justification, and the merit of Christ is the ground of our acceptance. These views seem to be confounded in Mr. B.'s exposition. To say that "the act of faith is reckoned for, or *as* righteousness," is to say that it is taken for righteousness, or accepted in the place of complete obedience; but to say that the whole phrase means "to regard and treat him (the believer) in connexion with this as if he was a righteous man," properly expresses a different idea. According to the first interpretation δικαιωσιν is taken to mean *righteousness*; and according to the second, *justification*. It may have either sense, but cannot in the same place have both. Εἰς δικαιωσιν may be rendered—*as righteousness*—or, *in order to justification*. If the former be adopted, then the passage teaches that "faith itself is righteousness;" or is so regarded. Just as in an analagous phrase "uncircumcision is counted for circumcision;" that is, the one is regarded as the other. If the latter method be preferred; no such doctrine is taught; the relation of faith to acceptance is not expressed, but it is simply said that faith is imputed, or the individual is regarded as a believer in order to his justification. The grammatical structure of the sentence is to be explained on

one principle if the one view is taken, and on a different one, if the other.

Mr. B. in his subsequent remarks says expressly, "faith is not the *meritorious* ground of acceptance; for then it would have been a work. Faith was as much his own act, as any act of obedience to the law." And again, "Faith is a mere instrument, a *sine qua non*, that which God has been pleased to appoint as a condition on which men may be treated as righteous." This is all very good, but he immediately turns the whole matter round, when he proceeds, "It expresses a state of mind which is demonstrative of love to God; of affection for his cause and character; of reconciliation and friendship; and is **THEREFORE** that state to which he has been graciously pleased to promise pardon and acceptance." This gives a sadly erroneous view of the relation of faith to justification. Faith is the instrumental cause of justification, because it is the means of our becoming interested in the merit of Christ; and not because it is indicative of love to God, or of reconciliation or friendship. This is plain from the constant language of scripture which speaks of faith in Christ, faith in his blood, faith in his name, &c. and of believing in Christ, receiving him, &c. &c. All these declarations are expressive of the act of reliance upon Christ as the ground of our acceptance. Faith is confidence; it is a firm persuasion of the truth of all that God has said in reference to Christ, and includes from its nature this reliance upon him as the ground of pardon and justification. We do not doubt from what Mr. B. says in many parts of his commentary, that he fully believes this grand principle of gospel truth and evangelical religion; but from the confusion and indistinctness of his views, he has not only in this important passage left it out of sight, but given an exposition apparently inconsistent with it. Faith is no more "demonstrative of love to God," than repentance, gratitude, self-denial, or any other holy exercise. To say, therefore, that this is the reason of its being made the condition of acceptance, is to alter the whole method of salvation. It is this condition, because it contemplates God's promises of pardoning mercy—which we under the gospel see clearly is exercised through Christ; and which those who lived under the former dispensation, saw through clouds and shadows, was to be extending, in some way, through him who was to bruise the serpent's

head, and in whom all the nations of the earth were to be blessed.

This unfortunate and erroneous view of the subject, Mr. B. repeatedly presents. At the close of his remarks on this passage, he says, "All faith has the same nature, whether it be confidence in the Messiah, or any of the divine promises or truths. As this confidence evinces the same state of mind, so it was as consistent to justify Abraham by it, as it is to justify him who believes in the Lord Jesus Christ under the Gospel." The first remark is no doubt correct, all faith is of the same nature, however different its object; but it is not because it evinces a particular "state of mind" that it is the means of our acceptance.

As the same phrase occurs in v. 22, Mr. B.'s comment on that verse is liable to the same objection. Speaking of Abraham, he says, "His faith was so unwavering that it was a demonstration that he was a firm friend of God. He was tried, and he had such confidence in God, that he showed he was supremely attached to him, and would obey and serve him. This was reckoned as a full proof of friendship; and he was recognised and treated as righteous, i. e. as the friend of God." How completely does this view of the justification of Abraham, leave out of sight the real ground of his, and every other sinner's, acceptance with God. Abraham's friendship and obedience towards the divine Being, was evinced by leaving his own land, by his daily prayers and sacrifices, by his thankfulness, patience and general obedience, as well as by his faith. It was not therefore on this ground that faith was the means of his acceptance. There is no passage of Scripture which presents faith in the relation to justification in which it is here exhibited by Mr. B. It is no where said or intimated, that it secures acceptance because it is indicative of love to God. At the close of his comment on v. 3, the writer does indeed refer to Heb. xi. in support of his view of the subject. But he should have remembered that here Paul is speaking of justification, and the manner in which it is to be obtained; there he is treating of a very different subject, and with a very different design. His main object there is to illustrate the power of faith, not its relation to justification. He was writing to those who were surrounded by many seductions and trials. He exhorts them to hold fast this profession. He warns them of the consequences of

apostacy. He shows them that their trials were not greater than those which the people of God had from the beginning been called to endure. That faith which was the substance of things hoped for, and the evidence of things not seen, had sustained and carried them triumphantly through. It had enabled Moses to resist the allurements of the court of Pharaoh, and Daniel the terrors of the lion's den. But he no where says that faith was the condition of acceptance, because demonstrative of love to God.

We are sorry to have to remark on the low view which Mr. B. takes of the object of Abraham's faith. Mr. B. here, as in many other places, seems to deal very hardly with the sacred text. He takes it up as he would a sponge, (wet with the dew of heaven) and squeezes every drop of moisture from it which he can express, and throws it to the reader as dry as he can make it. It seems to be a principle with him to allow the text to mean as little as possible, and to judge of this amount of meaning, not from a large view of the passage in all its relations, but as if it stood alone in the Bible. Thus in chap. v. 12, he insists upon it the death spoken of in the threatening to our first parents, as understood by them, could mean nothing more than the dissolution of the body. He does not consider that the real penalty denounced was God's displeasure. The death of the body was no evil unconnected with his disapprobation, of which it was the sign and expression. What Adam understood and felt was that if he transgressed he should incur the disapprobation of God. This was the evil, and the dreadful evil; the sum and essence of all punishment. He felt that transgression would suspend his friendly and delightful intercourse with God, which was the life of his soul; that it would separate him from his Maker, which is spiritual death; and if the soul is immortal, and if Adam knew it, (and who that has a soul can doubt that the exercises of a spirit undefiled by sin contain in their nature the evidence of immortality) it was eternal death, in his apprehension, unless he was aware of the possibility of redemption. In like manner, in the case before us, the author makes the object of Abraham's faith to be the promise of a numerous posterity. "The faith which Abraham exercised was, that his posterity should be like the stars of heaven in number," p. 94. Again, "Abraham showed his faith mainly in confiding in the promises of God respecting a numerous posterity. This was the leading truth made known to him, and

this he believed." p. 103. He thus makes the main point of the promise to Abraham to be, that his posterity should be very numerous. It is, however, to be remembered, that it was expressly declared to the patriarch, that in him, or in his seed, all the nations of the earth should be blessed. This declaration, we know from Paul's own explicit statement, included the promise of Christ; he was the seed in whom all nations were to be blessed. See Gal. iii. 16. Accordingly, in this chapter, as well as in Gal. iii. 14, he speaks of the blessing of redemption as that which was to come on the Gentiles, and calls it "the blessing of Abraham," i. e. the blessing promised to Abraham. This promise is the one which Paul especially refers to in the chapter just cited, and which was included in the promise that he should have a son, and that his posterity should be greatly multiplied. It was therefore not a simple declaration as to the number of his descendants, that Abraham believed. That the patriarch understood these promises as the apostle has explained them, is stated in almost express terms by our Saviour when he said, "Abraham rejoiced to see my day, and he saw it, and was glad." Mr. B. seems to think that the Old Testament dispensation was one of total darkness, or to forget that redemption is the one grand idea of the Bible; the middle point of all God's revelations. To our first parents was at least given the assurance of deliverance; and from the institution of sacrifices, in all probability, the mode of deliverance was made known. The human heart was then what it is now. The necessity of an atonement, and of a Redeemer, which every man convinced of the nature and ill desert of sin now feels, must have been felt then, for it has been felt in all ages and parts of the world, and arises out of the very elements of our moral nature. The necessity of redemption is the one great necessity of sinners. And the promise having once been given and recorded, would be the turning point of all the hopes and anxieties of the soul, then, as it is now. As this original promise by subsequent revelations was explained and confirmed, it was still less likely to be left out of view. To Abraham it was made known that the great expected blessing, in which all the nations of the earth were to participate, was to be secured through his seed. This was the great promise to him; this was the main object of his faith; this it was which he saw and was glad. It is a great mistake, therefore, to push the ancient patriarchs so

far into the night of mere natural religion, or to suppose that the piety of the Old Testament was so different from that of the New. If, as Mr. B. thinks and asserts so strongly in his Notes on chap. v. 12, many err in carrying back too much of the light derived from subsequent revelations to the interpretations of the words and phrases of the earlier declarations of the Scriptures, he unquestionably errs on the other and more unfortunate extreme.

At the top of p. 94 we meet with the following singular remark. "Faith is always an act of the mind. It is not a created essence placed within the mind. It is not a substance created independently of the soul, and placed within it by almighty power. It is not a *principle*, for the expression, *a principle of faith*, is as unmeaning as a principle of joy, or a principle of sorrow, or a principle of remorse." There is in itself no harm in this remark; any more than in saying faith is not a house, or a tree, or a river, which we presume has been as often held and said, as that it is a created essence, or substance created independently of the soul. The subsequent sentence about *principles*, however, seems to intimate, what otherwise we should have been slow to imagine, that the remark in question was designed to have a bearing on the question, whether dispositions and acts admit of being properly distinguished. As such we are willing to let it pass for what it is worth. We presume that the expression "principle of faith," which sounds new to our ears, if used at all, is to be understood as Mr. B. wishes it to be understood, when he tells us, p. 103, the faith of Abraham and that of Christians "is therefore the same *in principle*, though it may have reference to different objects."

Another illustration of the state of Mr. B's mind on certain doctrinal questions, and of the manner in which he connects them with passages, which would seem hardly able to suggest such ideas, is afforded by his remarks on the clause, *we were yet without strength*, p. 108. If the word ἀσθενῶν is here understood in its moral sense as denoting "inability or feebleness with regard to any undertaking or duty," it is very correctly stated, that it must be taken in reference to the point of which the apostle is here speaking, viz: the means of reconciliation to God; we had no strength to effect this great purpose. But we demur when Mr. B. adds, "The remark of the apostle here has reference *only* to the condition of the race *before* the atonement was made.

It does not pertain to the question whether man has strength to repent and believe now that the atonement is made, which is a very different inquiry."—It is no doubt true if the word is used in reference to our want of ability to make an atonement, it has no bearing on the question as to our ability to repent and believe. But how it hence follows that the apostle's remark has reference *only* to the state of man *before* the atonement was made, we cannot discover. Are not men just as unable now to make an atonement for their sins as they ever were? If the words ungodly, sinners, enemies, used in this context, are applicable to the present state of man, why not the word *weak* also? The moral state of man, or human character is not changed by the atonement. That is, men are as truly weak, ungodly, sinners and enemies in their natural state now as they ever were. Paul speaks of the relation of men to God, as helpless and unworthy.—It was for such Christ died; and such are we as really and fully as any generation of the children of men. The remark, therefore, is not correct, that the apostle's declaration is to be confined to the state of man before the advent.

In his exposition of the important passage, ch. v. 12—21, Mr. B. agrees so closely with Professor Stuart, that there is no necessity for our entering at any length into the examination of this part of his work; Professor Stuart's commentary on this passage having been so fully discussed in a former number of this Review. As we are at present considering the exegetical, rather than the doctrinal character of these notes, we shall confine ourselves to a very few minor points. We see the same want of accuracy and philological correctness here, as in other parts of the book. On the very first words *δια τούτο*, we find Mr. B. completely at a loss. That they are properly inferential cannot be questioned; but, unfortunately, those who are opposed to the common interpretation of the whole passage, cannot see from what the inference is drawn; for if the natural force of the words be adopted, it leads them directly into the old orthodox view of the passage; a consummation not to be endured. Various, therefore, are the devices to turn this sharp corner. Mr. B. explains it thus, "*Wherefore*, on this account. This is not an *inference* from what has gone before, but a *continuance* of the design of the apostle to show the advantages of the plan of justification by faith." "*On this account* it is a matter of joy. It meets the ills of a

fallen race," &c. Immediately after he says, "*In respect to this state of things* into which man has fallen, the benefits of the plan may be seen, as adapted to heal the maladies," &c.—Here we have, in the first place, two equally unnatural and at the same time inconsistent interpretations of the same words. First they are made to mean *on account of*; and then *in respect to this*. Nor is this all, there are introduced into the text ideas for which the words themselves give not a shadow of foundation. In the former of the two expositions, we have, *it is also a matter of joy*, and in the latter, *state of things into which man has fallen*. Here is the introduction of entirely foreign matter. It is neither in the text, nor in the context. We may safely say it is an absolute impossibility that the passage can have this meaning. The apostle says, "Wherefore, as by one man sin entered into the world," &c.—Let any man compare these words with Mr. B.'s exposition, and ask himself what possible relation they have to each other. "*Wherefore*, i. e. on this account also it is a matter of joy," or, "in respect to the state of things into which man has fallen." We should like to see the exhibition of Mr. B.'s indignation at such liberties with the sacred text, if found in any old commentator, and in support of any old orthodox doctrine. We should then be told, not in italics, but in capitals, that men "should not *suppose* or *infer* this, but show distinctly that it is in the text," &c. &c. The writer is of course forced to assume without any necessity, and against all probability, that the commencement of the verse is elliptical. "The passage," he says, "is *elliptical*, and there is a necessity of supplying something to make out the sense." The sense is plain enough, if men were only willing to receive it. But rejecting that of the apostle, they are forced to make one of their own. Paul has been proving from the beginning of the epistle, and had asserted in the immediate context, that men are justified, not on account of their own merit, but on account of the merit of Christ. *Wherefore*, as by one man we have been brought into condemnation, so by one man are we justified. Here is no ellipsis,* no forcing into the text what does not belong to it, no unnatural interpretation of the word *wherefore*; it is properly inferential; it introduces the

* The reader will of course see that the question is about the first words of this verse. That the comparison indicated by the words "as by one man," is not fully stated until the verse 18, is admitted on all hands.

grand conclusion from all the previous reasoning, we are justified by the merit of one man, even as we are condemned for the sin of another. The road by which Mr. B. attempts to get through this passage is utterly impassable. The reader may judge with what propriety the writer says, "Probably the whole passage would have been found *far less* difficult if it had not been attached to a *philosophical theory* on the subject of man's sin, and if a strenuous and indefatigable effort had not been made to prove that it teaches what it never was designed to teach." Different men see things in different lights. We think the greatest difficulty is to avoid the plain and obvious meaning of the passage. Sure we are, that Mr. B. finds greater difficulty in the words *δια τούτο* than we do. And the difficulties are not confined to the threshold; they go on accumulating, until they form a mass before which, we should think, the stoutest heart must quail.

It is very evident that the view entertained of the design of a passage must exert great influence on the exposition of it. Mr. B. does not seem to be very clear upon this point, as he makes various statements on the subject not very consistent with each other; and yet each is stated positively and with emphasis, i. e. generally in italics. On p. 112, he says, "The plain and obvious design of the passage is this; *to show one of the benefits of the doctrine of justification by faith.*" On p. 114, "The Christian religion is just *one mode of proposing a remedy for well known and desolating evils.* Keeping this design of the apostle in view therefore," &c. On 113, "His *main* design is not to speak of the introduction of sin, but to show how the work of Christ meets well known and extensive evils. Great perplexity has been introduced by neglecting the *scope* of the apostle's argument here—he is showing how the plan of justification *meets well understood and acknowledged universal evils.*" On p. 120, "His *main* design is to show that greater benefits have resulted from the work of Christ than evils from the fall of Adam." Even these are not all the declarations of the writer upon this point. Now we humbly submit that it is impossible that these statements should all be correct; and no less impossible that the commentator who makes them can give a clear or consistent view of this important passage of the Scriptures. If the main design is to show *how* the work of Christ meets the evils of the fall; if it is to show *how* the plan of justification produces its benefits;

then it cannot be the main design to show that the blessings of redemption are greater than the evils of the fall. The one statement supposes the apostle to illustrate the nature of justification; to show *how* it is that men are saved; the other supposes him simply to magnify the greatness of its results. The former of these statements we think correct. It is the design of the Apostle to illustrate the nature of justification; and this he does by a reference to the fall. He shows *how* we are justified, by showing *how* we were condemned. As by the offence of one, all are condemned; so by the righteousness of one, all are justified. Keeping this design in view, a clear and steady light is thrown upon the passage; and the reader easily finds his way through all its intricacies. What must be the confusion consequent on a misapprehension of the design, or what is still worse, at one time making one thing, and at others another, the main object of the sacred writer, may be readily imagined.

Many of Mr. B.'s arguments in favour of his own interpretations, and his most confident objections to those of others, rest on this misapprehension. Thus with regard to the bearing of verses 13 and 14, it is essential to determine what is the design of their introduction. They commence with the word *for*, and are evidently intended to prove something. Whatever it is, it is contained in the declaration of verse 12. If Mr. B. had consistently adhered to his statement that the main design of the apostle is to show *how* the work of Christ produces its benefits, i. e. to illustrate and confirm the nature of justification, he would have seen that these verses (13 and 14) were designed to confirm the declarations of verse 12. Instead of this, however, he (after Prof. Stuart,) makes these verses an answer to a silly imaginary cavil of the Jews, such a cavil as they would be the last in the world to make, and the apostle the last to answer. According to the view of these writers, Paul would here prove to the Jews, that the Gentiles were really sinners! Yet this most improbable, and almost impossible supposition, is made the ground on which the interpretation of important parts of the passage is defended, and the common interpretation rejected.

In the comment on the words, *For if through the offence of one many be dead*, verse 15, we have a specimen of Mr. B.'s loose manner of interpretation. He says, "By the fall of one. This simply *concedes the fact* that it is so. The apostle does not attempt to explain the *mode* or *manner* in

which it happened. He neither says it is by *imputation*, nor by *inherent depravity*, nor by *imitation*.—Nor have we a right to *assume* that this teaches the doctrine of the imputation of the sin of Adam to his posterity. For, 1. The apostle says nothing of it. 2. That doctrine is nothing but an attempt to explain the *manner* of an event which the apostle did not think it proper to attempt to explain," &c. &c. Similar remarks are made on all the corresponding phrases in the subsequent verses. This is done with scarcely an allusion to the original, as though the case in which the nouns occur, or the prepositions with which they are connected, had nothing to do with the decision of a question which every commentator is bound to decide. It is the very thing which he professes to undertake; and he badly performs his office when he shelters himself under the ambiguity of the English version, or even the original, and protests against the question being asked. The question is strictly and purely exegetical. What is meant by saying, *By*, or through the offence of one, many be dead? And on exegetical, not philosophical, or speculative grounds, it may and must be decided. Mr. B. though in words he disclaims any attempt to decide it, and thus leaves his work unfinished, does in fact assume a decision, and that without argument. He assumes all along that this, and the corresponding expressions, do not mean *on account of the offence of one, many die; on account of one offence all are condemned, &c.*; but on the contrary, that the prepositions and cases in question, express the mere general cause or occasion. Thus he decides on the force of these very words, into the meaning of which, he pronounces it theory, speculation and philosophy, to inquire.

Near the top of page 123, Mr. B., after admitting that certain evils come upon all men on account of Adam's sin, adds, "There is no reason to believe that they are *condemned* to eternal death or held to be guilty of his sin, without participation of their own, or without personal sin; any more than there is that they are *approved* by the work of Christ, or held to be personally deserving, without embracing his offer, and receiving him as a Saviour." Who holds that any man is condemned to eternal death, without any sin of his own? Such is not the doctrine of the reformers or of the Presbyterian church on this subject. We quote this passage, however, rather in reference to the general inaccuracy of its language. The first part of the sentence pro-

perly implies that "men are not held to be guilty of Adam's sin, without a participation of their own, or without personal sin," but being personally sinners, then they are held to be guilty of Adam's sin. The second part implies that men are not held "to be personally deserving" until they receive Christ, but then are so held. Neither of these things, we presume, did Mr. B. intend to say. Yet he does say them; according to the obvious meaning of his language.

His general plan of breaking up sentences into detached words and phrases, often renders it difficult to know what interpretation he means to give to the whole, or leads him to leave the sentence, as such, unexplained. Thus in regard to the peculiarly important declaration of the apostle in verse 16, "*the judgment was by one (offence) to condemnation,*" he proceeds thus: "*The judgment.* The sentence; the declared penalty. The word expresses properly the *sentence* which is passed by a judge, &c.—*Was by one.* By one offence; or one act of sin. *Unto condemnation.* Producing condemnation; or involving in condemnation," &c. This is unsatisfactory, because the relation of the several words of this sentence to each other, on which the meaning depends, is not pointed out. *Κριμα εις κατακριμα* is a condemnatory sentence, or sentence of condemnation, as Professor S. renders it, and not a sentence producing condemnation; which is a rather unintelligible form of expression. This sentence is not the sentence passed on Adam exclusively, but on all men, as is necessarily implied in the context, and as is expressly stated in verse 18, where these same words are repeated. *The sentence came on all men to condemnation.* This sentence which is said to have passed on all men, is for one offence, one act of sin. It would seem that the whole compass of language, at least of the Greek language, could not afford a more precise and definite statement of the simple fact, that for one offence a sentence of condemnation has passed upon all men. This is the whole doctrine of imputation. How does Mr. B. invalidate this interpretation? Is it by exegetical arguments showing that *κριμα εις κατακριμα* does not mean a sentence of condemnation? Not at all. This is not attempted; it is so plain that Professor Stuart without hesitation gives it his support. Mr. B. simply says that *unto condemnation*, means producing condemnation, without showing that this is or can be the meaning of the words. In like manner, no attempt is made to explain the words *εις ενοος*. Yet Mr. B., after such an im-

perfect examination and exhibition of the proper force of the text, makes his usual statements, and with his usual confidence. "It is proved by this," he says, "that the effect of Adam's sin was to involve the race in condemnation, or to secure this as a result that all mankind would be under the condemning sentence of the law, and be transgressors. But in *what way* it would have this effect, the apostle does not state." "He speaks of a broad and every where perceptible fact, that the effect of that sin had been somehow to overwhelm the race in condemnation. In what *mode* this was done is a fair subject of inquiry; but the apostle does not attempt to explain it." All this rests upon a foundation of sand. It is not what Paul says, nor is it an exposition of his language; but a comment on Mr. B.'s own language. Paul does not say that something has come on all men which has the effect of involving them in condemnation. But his simple unadulterated declaration is, that a sentence of condemnation has passed on all for one offence. When therefore it is said so often that the apostle does not tell us the *mode* in which the sin of Adam produced the condemnation of all men, the assertion has no better foundation than the commentator's own erroneous exposition. *He* does not tell us the mode, but the apostle does, as plainly as language will allow. Mr. B. throughout speaks as though the words *εἰς κατακρίμα* unto condemnation, were to be construed with the word *παράπτωματος*, offence, a grammatical impossibility. He argues as if Paul had said the offence was to condemnation—i. e. produced condemnation. Whereas, it is *κρίμα εἰς κατακρίμα*, the sentence to condemnation, or, sentence of condemnation. Sentence has passed on all for one offence. Such is the simple grammatical meaning of the apostle's words. This can hardly be disputed, not only because the case is in itself so plain, but because it is virtually admitted by Professor Stuart, who is as much opposed to the doctrine of imputation as Mr. B. can be. Let either the Greek words, or Professor Stuart's translation of them, "the sentence by reason of one offence was a condemning sentence," even apart from their connexion, be submitted to any ten (or ten thousand) competent men, who never heard a syllable of Adam, and if they do not say that the proposition, "a sentence of condemnation has come upon a man by reason of one offence," means that he was condemned for that one offence—we will agree with Mr. B. in saying that Paul teaches us nothing as to the

mode in which the one offence of Adam brings condemnation upon all men. In the mean time let the reader judge who it is that mingles theory with the word of God.

There is scarcely in the compass of his book a more melancholy example of the extent to which Mr. B. allows himself to deviate from the letter of the text, and dilute its meaning by the admixture of his own thoughts, when its simple sense does not suit him, than that afforded by his comment on verse 17. This verse is literally rendered in our version, "For if by one man's offence death reigned by one; much more they which receive abundance of grace, and of the gift of righteousness, shall reign in life by one, Jesus Christ." It would, we presume, occur to few unprejudiced readers of the Scriptures, to doubt that *to receive the gift of righteousness*, means *to be justified*; and that *to reign in life*, means *to be actually partakers of eternal life*. Yet Mr. B. paraphrases the verse thus: "If under the administration of a just and merciful Being, it has occurred, that by the offence of one, death has exerted so wide a dominion; we have reason much more to expect under that administration, that they who are brought under his plan of saving mercy, shall be brought under a dispensation of life." How is it possible that "to receive abundance of grace and of the gift of righteousness," means only "to be brought under a plan of saving mercy?" This of course can be said of all who hear the gospel. But what similarity have the text and the comment to each other—*to receive the gift of righteousness*, and *to be under a plan of saving mercy*? The next clause is, if possible, still more strangely distorted. *To reign in life*, is made to mean "to be brought under a dispensation of life." We know not how such an interpretation is to be refuted; the mere statement of it is all that can be given, and is all that can be necessary. It would be difficult to bring together two more different propositions than that "men shall reign in life through Jesus Christ;" and that "they shall be brought under a dispensation of life." The former is a precious declaration of actual and glorious salvation; and the latter of the mere offer of life. Were all the similar declarations of Scripture treated in the same manner, there would not be a foothold left for the anxious soul to rest upon. Why may we not with as much propriety say, that the promise, "He that believeth shall be saved"—means merely, "shall be brought under a dispensation of salvation?" *Shall be saved* is not so strong as

“shall reign in life.” If the one melts to nothing in the crucible of the critic, what is to preserve the latter? The above interpretation is so unnatural and even impossible, that we find Mr. B. himself, before he quits the verse, giving another directly opposed to it, and consequently far more correct. “The argument,” he says, “here is, that if by one man’s sin, death reigned over those who were under condemnation in consequence of it, we have much more reason to expect that those who are delivered from sin by the death of Christ, and accepted of God, shall reign with him in life.” We have here—“delivered from sin by the death of Christ, and accepted of God,” substituted for being “under a plan of saving mercy;” and “shall reign with him in life” exchanged for being “under a dispensation of life.” Yet both comments purport to be an exposition of the same passage.

The comment upon verse 18, is liable to the same general objections of looseness, inaccuracy, and disregard to the literal meaning of the text. The English version of the passage is as follows. “Therefore, as by the offence of one, *judgment came* upon all men to condemnation; even so by the righteousness of one, the *free gift came* upon all men to justification of life.” The simple meaning of this verse is, ‘As by the offence of one all have been condemned, even so by the righteousness of one all are justified.’ Mr. B. as usual breaks up the verse into small fragments and explains them separately without much reference to their mutual relation. As the first part of the verse is a repetition of the middle clause of verse 16, little is said about it. He proceeds thus: “*Even so.* In the manner explained in the previous verses, with the same certainty, and to the same extent. The apostle does not explain the *mode* in which it was done, but simply states the *fact.* *By the righteousness of one.* This stands opposed to the *one offence* of Adam, and must mean, therefore, the holiness, obedience, and purity of the Redeemer. The *sin* of one man involved men in ruin; the *obedience unto death* of the other, (Phil. ii. 8,) restored them to the favour of God. *Came upon all men.* Was with reference to all men; had a bearing upon all men; was *originally adapted* to the race.” “As the tendency of the one was to involve the race in condemnation, so the tendency of the other was to restore them to acceptance with God.” “*Unto justification of life.* With reference to that justification which is connected with eternal life. That is, his work is *adapted* to produce acceptance with God, to

the same extent as the crime of Adam has affected the race by involving them in sin and misery." We can hardly undertake to dwell on all the inaccuracies and inconsistencies of this exposition; it rests, as did the other, on a false basis. 1. In the first place, *unto justification*, does not mean "with reference to justification," and no attempt is made to prove that in this connexion it either has, or can have, this meaning. And yet on the assumption of this meaning the whole interpretation rests. Mr. B.'s exposition, therefore, is again founded on his own language, and not on that of the apostle. The grammatical structure of the passage is entirely neglected. The words *χαρισμα εις δικαιοσιν* mean *the gratuitous gift of justification*; just as *κριμα εις κατακριμα* mean *sentence of condemnation*. See Prof. S. on verse 16, who makes the one clause to signify "a condemning sentence," and the other "a sentence of acquittal." This is substantially correct, and cannot be disputed. Paul, therefore, does not say, that something (the free gift) which "has reference to justification," or, is "*adapted* to produce acceptance with God," has come upon all men; but simply that "a sentence of acquittal," or more literally, "the gift of gratuitous justification" has come upon all men; has come upon them, or been pronounced on them. This is the simple grammatical meaning of his words, and the opposite interpretation is founded on an entire neglect or disregard of the grammatical structure of the sentence. To say that men are justified, and to say that they are under a dispensation "*adapted* to produce acceptance with God," or, which "has a tendency" to secure this result, are as different as possible. The former is what Paul says; the latter is the diluted and perverted exposition of the commentator. Here again as usual, the common interpretation adheres to the text, and the other, for doctrinal reasons, departs from it. 2. In one part of his exposition, Mr. B. tells us the meaning of the apostle is, "As the tendency of the one (the offence of Adam) is to involve the race in condemnation; so the tendency of the other (the righteousness of Christ) is to restore them to acceptance with God;" and in another, "The *sin* of one man involved men in ruin; the *obedience unto death* of the other restored them to the favour of God." These two statements are inconsistent with each other. To say that sin condemns; and that faith justifies; is very different from saying that sin has a tendency to produce condemnation, and faith a tendency to produce justifi-

fiction. How effectually would every man's hold on the promises be loosened, if the Scriptures are to be interpreted on this principle; if the positive declaration that the righteousness of Christ justifies men, is to be made to mean, that it has a *tendency* to produce acceptance with God. 3. It is to be remarked that this interpretation, while it is irreconcilable with the strict grammatical sense of the passage, and introduces ideas entirely foreign to it, is adopted solely on doctrinal considerations. That is, no attempt is made to show that the words of the apostle have this meaning; but it must be assumed, or otherwise he would teach the old orthodox doctrine. He would say that as all are condemned by the offence of one, so all are justified by the righteousness of the other. Now this he does say. And even if the passages did teach universal salvation, which is not the case, yet as this is the simply philological meaning of the words, we should have no right to exact by torture a different sense from them. But it can be shown, by the strictest laws of exposition, that no such doctrine is deducible from the apostle's declaration. It is a principle of interpretation, universally recognised, that such universal terms are to be explained and limited by the context, by the nature of the thing spoken of, and by other declarations of the same writer on the same subject. Mr. B. tells us that the passage, Rom. viii. 32, "delivered him up for us all," means "for all Christians;" and correctly adds, "The connexion requires that this expression should be understood here with this limitation." There is the same necessity for its limitation here. As there *all* means "all Christians," so here it means "all believers; it is the *all* spoken of in the context, the all "who *receive* the gift of righteousness," v. 17, which even Mr. B. says with strange inconsistency, means only the redeemed. As the *all* in one part of the verse means all connected with Adam; so *all* in the other means all connected with Christ. Precisely as this same apostle in 1 Cor. xv. 22, says, "As in Adam all die, so in Christ shall all be made alive," i. e. partakers of a glorious resurrection. (See Prof. Stuart on the Romans, p. 524.) If Paul, when he says, "by the obedience of one all men are justified," all "are constituted righteous," means the whole race, we marvel that Mr. B. does not venture to use the same language when preaching to a promiscuous audience. He must have a strong internal conviction that such language means more, and would be understood uni-

versally to mean more, than that the righteousness of Christ has a tendency to justify all; is adapted to all; is originally applicable to all. We only beg him to understand Paul, as he would expect to be understood himself, according to the natural import of his language.

Verse 19 is, "For as by one man's disobedience many were made sinners, so by the obedience of one shall many be made righteous." He paraphrases the verse thus, "As in consequence of the sin of one, the many became sinners, without explaining the mode in which it is done; so the many may become righteous in the mode and on the terms which are explained." Now by what authority does he make the first part of the verse positive, and the latter conditional. If the words (the correctness of the translation he does not and cannot question) "were made sinners," expresses a positive fact, that men became sinners; by what process are the words, "shall be made righteous," made to mean, may become righteous? This is not exposition. This is no statement of the actual sense of the words of the sacred writer, but the introduction of an idea entirely foreign to the literal meaning of the language. The assertion, that saying a man shall be made righteous, which Mr. B. admits to mean "shall be justified," i. e. pardoned, regarded and treated as just, is nothing more than that he may be justified, that pardon and acceptance are proffered to him, is indeed a "melancholy example" of the lengths to which fondness for one system or dislike of another, and a habit of loose interpretation can carry even independent men.

On page 126, Mr. B. says, "The word *by* ($\delta\iota\alpha$) is used in the scriptures as it is in all books and in all languages. It may denote the efficient cause; the instrumental cause; the principal cause; the meritorious cause; or the chief occasion by which a thing occurred." It is, by the way, rather inaccurate, to say that the word *by* or $\delta\iota\alpha$ either, occurs in all languages. But we quote this sentence as an example of want of attention to the real force and meaning of the original text. It is true that the preposition in question has all the meanings here assigned to it; but has the case with which it is connected nothing to do with its signification? This is the very circumstance on which its meaning mainly depends. With one case it means one thing, and with another it means another. There is scarcely a preposition in the Greek language which is more fixed and definite in its use; and which with different cases more uniformly ex-

presses different ideas. The English reader who feels the difference between the words, *by means of*, and *on account of*; who knows that to say a thing happened *by means of another*, and to say, that it was done *on account of another*, mean very different things; may see how loose and uncertain must be the interpretations of a commentator who merges these things together and makes it a matter of indifference, whether his text expresses properly the one idea or the other.

On p. 127, speaking of the verb *καθίστημι*, the author says, "It is in *no instance* used to express the idea of *imputing that to one which belongs to another.*" These words are put in italics by the author himself, to indicate the importance of the statement here made; and of course to intimate that the advocates of the doctrine of imputation are mistaken in their explanation of the word. Yet it is believed there never was a human being who said or supposed the word was ever so used. Mr. B. has entirely mistaken the nature and force of the argument he is endeavouring to answer. That argument does not rest on the meaning of the word, but on the meaning of the clause. "To make righteous," Mr. B. says, means to justify—and "to make sinners," we say, means to condemn: yet he, we presume, does not intend that the verb *to make*, signifies to justify, or regard and treat as righteous, or to impute that to one which belongs to another. Yet this is precisely the amount and value of his remark as just quoted. On the same page we have, if possible, a still more striking instance of the same want of knowledge of the real nature of the argument he had to deal with. Speaking of the preposition mentioned above, he says, nothing can be learned from its use of the *mode* in which a thing is done, when one thing is said to be done or happen by another; as when it is said, "a young man is ruined in his character *by* another;" or "that thousands, were made infidels by the writings of Paine or Voltaire." "In each of these and all similar cases, we should deem it most inconclusive reasoning to attempt to determine the mode by the preposition *by*, and still more so if it were argued from the use of that preposition that the sins of the seducer were imputed to the young man; or the opinions of Paine and Voltaire *imputed* to infidels." This is absurd enough we admit; but the question is, to whom is the absurdity to be imputed? Certainly not to any advocate of the doctrine of imputation, that we have ever seen or heard

of, for such an argument they never framed or presented. The preposition, however, of which Mr. B. is speaking, does express the *mode* in which a thing is done. It is the very thing it is designed for. With the genitive it expresses the mode of instrumentality; and with the accusative the ground or reason: *δια πιστεως* is by means of faith, *δια πιστευ* is on account of faith. This is a great, pervading, and almost uniform usage of the Greek preposition. Mr. B.'s remark is founded more on the English word *by*, than the Greek *δια*. We do not deny that there is to a certain extent a departure from this usage, and that this word may correctly at times, be rendered *through* or *by means of*, with the accusative; though it is doubtful if it ever properly and directly means *on account of*, with the genitive. Sometimes indeed the *means* by which a thing is done, is, from the nature of the case, the reason for doing it—as when justification through righteousness, and condemnation through sin, is spoken of. But to say the preposition does not express the *mode* in which a thing is done, is all a mistake—or, rather, it is an inaccurate mode of expression. But this is not the point we had in view in referring to this paragraph. Mr. B. represents men as arguing that because it is said *by* the offence of one many were made sinners, the sin of the *one* must be imputed to the many; and justly says this is as absurd reasoning, as it would be to argue that the opinions of Voltaire are imputed to infidels, if made such *by* his writings. But such is not the argument in favour of imputation derived from this passage, nor anything like it. Mr. B. says, that “to be made righteous *by* means of the righteousness of Christ,” means to be treated as righteous on account of that righteousness; others say, “to be made sinners by means of the disobedience of Adam,” means to be treated as sinners on account of that disobedience. Is there any thing more absurd in the one exposition than the other? Because it is absurd to argue that the sins of Voltaire are imputed to his victims, if they were made infidels by his writings; does he consider his own expositions of all such expressions as “justified freely *by* his blood;” “*by* the redemption that is in Christ Jesus;” “*by* his death;” are equally absurd? What then does his argument amount to?

Page 145, the passage “For the woman which hath a husband, is bound by the law to *her* husband, so long as he

lives," &c. is thus commented upon. "This verse is a *specific* illustration of the general principle in verse 1, that death dissolves those connexions and relations which make law binding in life. It is a simple illustration; and if this had been kept in mind, it would have saved much of the perplexity which has been felt by many commentators, and much of their wild vagaries in endeavouring to show that 'men are the wife, the former law the husband,* and Christ the new one;' or that 'the old man is the wife, sinful desires the husband, sins the children.' Beza. See Stuart. Such expositions are sufficient to humble us, to make us mourn over the puerile and fanciful interpretations, which even wise and good men often give to the Bible." Any man competent to read English, sees that Paul means to illustrate the fact that believers are freed from the law as a rule of justification, by a reference to a similar and strikingly analogous case. "As a married woman is bound to her husband as long as he lives, but if he be dead, is at liberty to marry another; even so believers are bound by the law until it is satisfied; but the law being satisfied by the sacrifice of Christ, they are at liberty to be married to another." Can any thing be plainer than that in this illustration, the law is compared to the first husband; Christ, to whom Paul says we are MARRIED, to the second? And the figure is carried out. The result of the first marriage, was, that "we brought forth fruit unto death;" the design and result of the second is, that "we should bring forth fruit unto God." This is in precise accordance with the apostle's object. He designed to show that the law was inadequate to sanctification, that it was necessary to be free from its bondage before we could live acceptably to God, that a legal or self-righteous spirit which is inseparable from the endeavour to seek the divine favour by our own works, was productive only of evil; whereas, the filial temper which results from gratuitous justification, and union with Christ, is productive of genuine obedience. Yet an interpretation which is not merely supported by the great body of the "wise and good," but is so evidently little more than a repetition of the identical words of the apostle, is stigmatized as a wild vagary, puerile and fanciful, and as enough to humble us, that we partake of the same nature with men ca-

* Instead of saying "the former law is the husband," we presume Mr. B. meant to say, "the law is the former husband, and Christ the new one."

pable of such expositions. Would that this or something else might produce a result so desirable as humility.

On verse 5, "*Motions of sins*. This translation," Mr. B. says, "is unhappy. The expression, 'motions of sins,' conveys no idea." He ought to have told us to whom. The word *motion* is the old English word for *emotion*. Mr. B. should have remembered the language of the catechism. "Any inordinate motions, or affections towards any thing that is his." "*Sin* is here personified. It means not a real *entity*; not a physical subsistence; not something independent of the mind, having a separate existence, and lodged *in* the soul, but it means the corrupt passions, inclinations, and desires *of the mind itself*," &c. We quote this passage as an example of the strange way in which Mr. B. sometimes allows himself to write. We question whether there is one solitary being in existence who holds the opinion here stated. The nearest approach to it, that we know of, is the doctrine of Mr. B. as quoted above, that sin has its seat in the flesh, that is, independent of the mind; and of course if in the flesh, either a substance, or the result of the peculiar state and modification of the material part of our system. There is in all probability not one in a hundred of the readers of these Notes, who ever heard the opinion that sin was "a physical subsistence," attributed to any one in this country, except in the caricatures of the doctrine of original sin which are sometimes presented by partizan writers. If the passage quoted above produces any other effect than wonder that Mr. B. should write in this manner, it must be the impression he has condescended to the last and lowest resource of a controversialist, that of grievous misrepresentation. The doctrine of original sin, which is at times spoken of in the same terms as those used by Mr. B. is as Prof. S. ingenuously confesses, the doctrine of all the churches of the reformation, and of all christendom, with the exception of the nominal Christians called Socinians. To the best of our knowledge there is no organized Christian sect which does not hold and teach the doctrine of native depravity, in the ordinary sense of those words, that is, as meaning inherent corruption of nature. It is very unfortunate that Mr. B. should use the language with which this doctrine is assailed by the few writers who have arrayed themselves against it. There are numerous declarations in this book which lead us to suppose that Mr. B. himself holds the common faith of the Christian world on

this point, and it is therefore the more to be regretted that he should use language on the subject of sin, which nothing but the bitterest enmity to the doctrine is wont to suggest to those who are the most reckless in their assertions.

We are happy to see that the view given of the latter part of the seventh chapter is in accordance with the ordinary interpretation of Calvinistic writers.

On the eighth chapter, there is a good deal which we think incorrect and inaccurate. Here, as so generally, the original seems to have been but little regarded in writing his commentary. It is in the main a commentary on the clauses of the English version.

Mr. B. at the beginning of the chapter, on the words *Therefore now*, says, this is connected with the closing verses of ch. vii. This is a matter of great importance, because the proper interpretation of the succeeding verses depends in a great measure on the view taken of the connexion and consequent design of the passage. Mr. B., if his plan did not allow him to state the different modes in which the connexion may be explained, might at least have used a form of expression indicative of the possibility of a different view of the matter from that which he has presented. Instead of that, he gives one, and that perhaps among the least generally adopted, and as we think, the least probable, without the smallest intimation that there could be any doubt on the subject. As he finds space for remark on far less important matters, points so essential to correct interpretation should not have been neglected. The view given of the succeeding verses influenced by this erroneous view of the connexion, is also, as we think, inconsistent with the true meaning of the apostle.

On p. 167, Mr. B. renders *δι ἁμαρτίαν* "*Through sin; by means of sinful passions and appetites.*" And on the same page *δια δικαιοσύνην* "*Through righteousness.*" The common English version is in both cases correct, *Because* of sin; and *because* of righteousness. We do not mean to say that the other translation is inadmissible; but as *δια* with the accusative, in ninety-nine cases perhaps out of a hundred, signifies *because, on account of*, a writer ought not so unceremoniously and without a word of explanation, to give it in such a construction, the sense which properly belongs to it with a different case. His whole exposition of the passage from which these examples are taken, is in the highest degree unnatural, and at variance with the usage and force of the

words. He makes *σῶμα* the body, to mean the same as *σαρξ* the *flesh*. The words, *The body is dead because of sin*, he explains thus: "The *body* refers to that of which the Apostle had said so much in the previous chapters—the flesh—the man before conversion. It is subject to corrupt passions and desires, and may be said to be *dead*, as it has none of the elements of spiritual life." The word *σῶμα* never has this sense, or if ever, the instances are so rare as to have escaped the attention of Wahl, the most accurate of all the New Testament lexicographers. And here where it is opposed to the spirit or soul, the interpretation is hardly possible. "The body is dead, indeed, but the spirit is life." The next verse is, "He that raised up Christ from the dead shall also quicken your mortal bodies." Mr. B. says, this does not refer to the resurrection. "The sense is, that under the Gospel the entire man will be made alive and recovered to the service of God." How *mortal bodies* can admit this interpretation it is hard to discover. Mr. B. however, on both these passages, we know is in good company; but this does not make his interpretations the more natural, or lessen the propriety of citing them as instances of his disregard of the literal meaning of his text. He erroneously cites Calvin as explaining the tenth verse, "The body must die on account of sin, but the spiritual part shall live, and even the body shall live also, in the resurrection." Unfortunately this which is so obviously the simple and natural meaning of the words in this connexion, is not Calvin's view of the passage. Mr. B. was probably led into this mistake by Prof. Stuart, and he by Tholuck. Calvin is for once on Mr. Barnes's side of the question, though far more consistent in his exposition.

In this connexion we may quote a sentiment which Mr. B. often expresses. On p. 167, he says, "Sin has its seat in the fleshly appetites." This is a common doctrine in Germany, and is the grossest form in which the doctrine of physical depravity has ever appeared. It is most assuredly, however, not the doctrine of the apostle. In Gal. v. 20, he enumerates as among works of the flesh, sins which cannot with any propriety be traced to the "fleshly appetites," as envyings, heresies, &c.; and in Col. ii. 18, even the philosophical speculations of the early heretics, their demonology and voluntary humility, is attributed to the same source. The same remark may be made of what is said of the wisdom of the world, or the speculative philosophy in which the

Greeks so much prided themselves, see 1 Cor. i. and ii. The opposition of which Paul speaks when he places the flesh and spirit in contrast with each other, is not the opposition between the soul and body, or between the sensual and rational or spiritual portions of our nature; but between our whole nature as fallen beings and God or the divine Spirit. The *flesh* therefore is not the body, nor is it the desires or propensities which have their seat in the body; but it is human nature, the nature of man (who is so often called flesh) considered as destitute of the life of God, or Holy Spirit. It is therefore not the doctrine of Paul, that "sin has its seat in the fleshly appetites," or that the soul derives its corruption from contact, so to speak, with the body, and subjection to its demands. This would indeed make sin a matter of physical necessity, and corruption a physical evil.

The beautiful and difficult passage viii. 18—23, Mr. B. greatly mars. We are not disposed to quarrel with him for adopting that one of the many interpretations of the passage, which we may not be ready to regard as the best; but our complaint is that he does not abide by it, and carry it through, but violates all probability by making *κρίσις* mean first one thing and then another. In verses 19, 20, 21, it means Christians; in verse 22, the external world. The inconsistency of this view of the passage and the violence which it does the text, is not so sensibly felt by the English reader because our translators vary the expression in these verses, while in the original, the word remains unchanged. And this probably has led Mr. B. into this unnatural exposition. Let the same word be retained throughout in the English version and every one will feel the force of our objection. 'For the earnest expectation of the creation waiteth for the manifestation of the sons of God; for the creation was made subject to vanity unwillingly, and with hope; because the creation shall be delivered from the bondage or corruption; for we know that the whole creation groaneth and travaileth together in pain until now.' Can any one doubt that the creation (*κρίσις*) has the same meaning throughout the passage? If it means Christians in verse 19, so it must in verse 22. 'Christians wait, Christians are subject to vanity, Christians shall be delivered from this bondage, all Christians groan,' &c. This interpretation though not in our judgment, correct, would at least be consistent with itself. But to make the creation in the first three verses mean Christians, and in the fourth the external

world, is doing violence to the plainest rules of interpretation; and the adoption of such a view of the passage shows how little Mr. B.'s exposition regards the literal meaning of the text.

When speaking of the imprecations which occur in the Psalms. Mr. B. remarks, p. 235, "Much difficulty has been felt in reconciling the petitions in the Psalms for calamities on enemies, with the spirit of the New Testament. Perhaps they cannot all be thus reconciled; and it is not at all improbable that some of them were wrong. David was not a perfect man, and the spirit of inspiration is not responsible for his imperfections. Every *doctrine* delivered by the sacred writers is true, every fact recorded is recorded as it was. But it does not follow that all men who wrote, or about whom a narrative is given were perfect," &c. Mr. B. seems to confound cases which are very different. It is one thing to give an inspired narrative of wicked actions, and another for a man writing under the influence of inspiration to experience and express wicked feelings. Moses and John recorded the apostacy of Adam and the treachery of Judas, as a thousand other sins are recorded in the Scriptures, without the possibility of any one imagining that giving the narrative could imply any approbation of these sins. But the case is far different when a man under the influence of the Spirit of God is pouring out his prayers, praises, and thanksgivings, to assume that these prayers are wrong, and the feelings they express wicked. What then is the difference between David and Watts? If the former was not under an influence which secured the exercise of right feelings, and the utterance of proper petitions, he was not inspired as a Psalmist any more than the latter. It is a very different thing to admit that David and Paul, as men, were imperfect and often committed evil actions, and to maintain that the one as a Psalmist, and the other as an Apostle, erred. The view which Mr. B. expresses on this subject is inconsistent with the design of the book of Psalms, and destructive of its authority. That book was designed as a book of devotional exercises, of prayers, praises, and thanksgivings, for the people of God in all ages. That it should be filled with improper feelings is therefore entirely inconsistent with this object. No one can suppose that Watts, Wesley, Montgomery, or any other uninspired writer of sacred poetry, would knowingly admit into hymns designed for the service of God the expression of unholy

exercises. Far less can it be imagined that the Holy Spirit would allow the introduction of such feelings into any book prepared for such a purpose, under his own immediate influence. Besides, if this view is correct, of what authority are the Psalms? How are we to know what is right and what is wrong? If every man is to sit in judgment upon the sacred Psalmist, and to decide for himself when his penitence, his prayers, and praises are correct, the authority of the book, as a guide, is entirely gone. It is in many cases impossible to separate the doctrinal statements from the expressions of feeling. When David prays for the Spirit to give him a new heart, he teaches that the Spirit does operate on the human soul, and that the blessing in question is the result of divine influence. When he prays that his eyes may be open to see wonders out of God's law, he teaches that there are wonders there which the Spirit of God only can reveal. If therefore we would not entirely invalidate the authority of one of the most precious portions of the word of God, we must maintain that it is a record of prayers and praises, confessions and acknowledgments, uttered under the guidance of inspiration, and expressive of feelings produced by the divine Spirit. There is no necessity for the assumption of the opposite opinion. Mr. B. himself, has suggested the principle on which many of the passages are to be explained. Some of them are prophecies, as those quoted by the apostle, which are the strongest expressions of the kind perhaps in the whole collection. Some are "imprecations on his enemies as a public man, as the magistrate of the land;" and what is of far more consequence, they are pronounced upon the enemies of God, as such. David's enemies were God's enemies, and it was in this character that the Spirit denounces woe upon them. The form in which this is done is different from what is adopted in other parts of Scripture, from the character of the work, but the principle is the same. We know not that there is throughout this book, a more alarming manifestation than the one just noticed. Who is to limit the extent of its application? Why may not the apostles have indulged wrong feelings in their doctrinal epistles, and so been led to disguise or pervert the truth? Why may not the inspired historians be supposed to have suppressed or exaggerated facts, under the very same influence which betrayed the Psalmist into improper feelings and expressions? This principle of interpretation is more than erroneous—it is

very dangerous. We do not believe that Mr. Barnes was fully aware of what he was saying. His terms are often strongest where he means the least. But let us affectionately warn him not to amuse himself with fire-brands, arrows, and death.

The same defect which characterizes so large a part of the exegetical portion of this work affects no less its doctrinal statements. On the subjects of ability, depravity, imputation, and justification, we find the same inaccuracy and inconsistency, which can only be accounted for from the immaturity of the author's views.

1. On the first of these subjects, though little is said of it except incidentally, we have three different views presented. The one which seems to be generally assumed is the common popular view that full ability or power to perform every thing which the law requires, is essential to accountability, and is inseparable from moral agency; and consequently is found in man in his fallen state, and under all the circumstances of his existence. This opinion, we suppose, was present to the author's mind when he wrote such sentences as the following. "Whether the *man himself* might not obey the law—whether *he* has or has not ability to do it is a question which the apostle does not touch." "But the affirmation does not mean that the heart of the sinner might not be subject to God; or that his soul is so physically depraved that he cannot obey, or that he might not obey the law." p. 164. Remarks of a similar character are not unfrequent. This is one theory of the nature of ability.

2. Another is, that man has, by the fall, lost the power of perfectly obeying the law of God, but that the influences of the Spirit are, in consequence of the intervention of Christ, extended to all men to such a degree that all have the power to repent, believe, and obey. This is what is called common grace. This view of the subject seems to have been regarded as the correct one, when Mr. B., speaking of man being *without strength*, says, "The remark of the apostle here has reference *only* to the condition of the race *before* the atonement was made. It does not pertain to the question whether man has strength to repent and believe now that the atonement *is* made, which is a very different inquiry." p. 108.

3. The third doctrine on the subject is that presented in our standards, "That no mere man since the fall is able perfectly to keep the commandments of God." It is an inability which, arising out of the sinful state of the

soul, is entirely inexcusable. It is that of which every man, whether saint or sinner, whatever may be his philosophy, is conscious. It is that of which Paul speaks when he says, "how to perform that which is good I find not," Rom. vii. 18; and "these are contrary the one to the other so that ye cannot do (*μη ποιητε*) the things that ye would." Even this opinion Mr. B. at times seems to recognise as correct. For example, on the words *I find not*, Rom. vii. 18, he says, "I do not find it in my power; or I find strong, constant obstacles, so that I fail of doing it. The obstacles are not natural, but such as arise from long indulgence in sin, the strong native propensity to evil."

II. On the subject of depravity there is still greater inconsistency. Almost every possible form of the doctrine is taught. 1. We have the doctrine that sin is, as to its source, independent of the mind and external to it, having its seat in the body. "Sin has its seat in the fleshly appetites; and the whole body may be admitted thus to be dead or corrupt." p. 167. This remark is made in reference to the passage, "the body is dead because of sin." Again, on chap. viii. 13, the author says, the *deeds of the body* mean "the corrupt inclinations and passions; called deeds of the body, because they are supposed to have their origin in the fleshly appetites." Again, p. 163, "the *flesh* is regarded as the source of sin. Note, chap. vii. 18. The flesh being regarded as the seat and origin of transgression, the atoning sacrifice was made in the likeness of sinful flesh, that thus he might meet sin as it were on its own ground, and destroy it." Flesh in this passage cannot be used in the figurative sense of the apostle, i. e. for the soul, considered as unrenewed; because it was not in the flesh in that sense that the atoning sacrifice was made. Neither would this interpretation be consistent with the other declarations just quoted, in which the body is declared to be the seat and origin of sin. This is the only view of the doctrine ever prevalent in the church, which can with any propriety of language be called 'physical depravity.' It places it in the material part of our system, external to the soul and independent of it. The doctrine of inherent corruption of nature, which is sometimes injuriously stigmatised by the term physical depravity, is at the greatest possible remove from such a view of the subject. The reformers and their followers were abundant and specific in stating that the corruption of nature of which they spake "was not the substance of

the man himself; i. e. not an essential attribute, but an *accident* (accidens) a mere incidental quality. (zufällige Beschaffenheit.)* “Original sin is not the substance of man, not his body, or his soul, or something mixed with it as poison with wine; * * * not an essential attribute, but an accident, something which has no existence by itself.”† Any thing approaching therefore the idea that sin is “a physical substance, having a separate existence,” is entirely at variance with the explicit statement of the doctrine as taught by its advocates. And charging upon men who so expressly deny this idea, the holding of such an opinion is something worse than a misrepresentation.

2. If some expressions, which occur frequently in this book, are to be interpreted agreeably to the usual laws of language, Mr. B. rejects the doctrine of original sin entirely. Speaking of Rom. ix. 11, “The children being not yet born, neither having done any good or evil,” &c. he says, “This is a very important passage in regard to the question about original sin. It proves, 1. That as yet they had no moral character. They had *done* nothing good or bad; and where that is the case there can be no *character*, for character is the result of conduct. 2. That moral agency had not yet commenced,” &c. This passage has no bearing properly on the question about original sin. It is no part of that doctrine that moral agency commences prior to birth; or that good or evil can be performed before that event. It simply teaches that the nature of man from the first moment of his existence is in an abnormal state, out of communion with God, destitute of any such predisposition to holiness as it has to self-love, to self-gratification, &c. And as a necessary consequence of the absence of this predisposition to delight in God, there is a predisposition to make self the centre and end of its existence. There is no infusion of any positive evil; the absence of good is the presence of evil, as the absence of light is darkness, and the absence of order is confusion, the absence of heat is cold, &c. But at the same time the principle contained in the above extract, that moral character is the result of conduct alone, or that there is no moral tendency to evil until formed by repetition of individual acts of transgression, is entirely at variance with the doctrine in question. It is the

* Bretschneider's *Entwicklung*, p. 542.

† Bretschneider's *Dogmatik*, vol. ii. p. 30.

very assumption on which its impugners have rested their arguments from the days of Augustine to the present time. The very point which they endeavoured to prove, was that man was born neither virtuous nor corrupt, but formed entirely his own character. And the opposite position was maintained as the very essence of the doctrine of original sin by its advocates; it is presupposed in the administration of baptism, and has, whether true or false, been the doctrine of the whole Christian church; and is included in the confession of every Greek, Catholic and Protestant denomination. See Prof. Stuart's statement on this subject, copied from Bretschneider, on p. 534 of his Commentary on the Romans. There are several other passages in Mr. B.'s work which seem to assume the principle which he has here so explicitly stated. The passage, chap. v. 13, *Sin is not imputed where there is no law*, he says, "contains a great and important principle, that men will not be held to be guilty unless there is a law of which they are apprized and which they voluntarily transgress." According to the sense in which Mr. B. uses the word guilt, we suppose this passage was intended to assert that there is no moral character until there is knowledge of law and voluntary transgression. See also p. 164. As the expressions, "sin is a physical subsistence," "something created and put into the soul," have of late become the current language of denunciation for the doctrine of inherent depravity, we fear that Mr. B. uses them in this injurious manner.

3. He teaches, however, the old orthodox and almost universally received doctrine on the subject in terms no less explicit. On p. 122 he says, "In like manner, although men are indubitably affected by the sin of Adam; as, e. g. by being born with a corrupt disposition; with loss of righteousness; with subjection to pain and wo; yet there is no reason to believe that they participate in the direct effect of sin, in eternal death, without being personal transgressors." What more could any one desire? This is nearly the definition of original sin as given in the confessions of the reformation. This language cannot be understood otherwise than as teaching that men are born destitute of righteousness, and with a corrupt disposition. This is asserted to be the effect of Adam's sin; of course they might have been born, had it not been for that sin, with righteousness, i. e. with a good moral character, and character is not the result of conduct alone. Viewed in the light of

this declaration, all such statements as the following are to be understood in their obvious sense, as teaching the doctrine which these expressions have been constantly employed to teach. "Since human nature was depraved, and men prone to sin," &c. p. 101. "The apostle does not here say that all have sinned in Adam, or that their nature has become corrupt, which is true, but which is not affirmed here," &c. p. 117. "Native propensity to evil," p. 157.*

III. The doctrine of imputation, however, is the great bugbear. Mr. B.'s imagination is in such a state on this subject that it conjures up all monstrous, all portentous things, on the mere mention of the word. No matter how innocent a passage may be of teaching, or of having ever been suspected of teaching the doctrine, if the words *impute*, *charge*, *reckon*, &c. occur in it, it is sure to disturb the balance of his mind. He insists upon it that the doctrine contains all manner of absurdities and impossibilities, the confusion of personal identity, the transfer of moral character, &c. &c. It so happens, however, that he is frightened at his own shadow. If he would come a little into the light, the spectres which so terrify him, would vanish, and he be forced to smile at his former credulity. The doctrine contains no such contradictions as he imagines. It is neither a theory nor a speculation, but the statement of a simple fact in simple scriptural language. The word *to impute* signifies *to ascribe to*, *to lay to one's charge*, and generally with the associated idea of treating one according to the nature of the thing charged. Who ever imagined that the zeal of Phineas was transferred to him, infused into him, &c. &c. when it was imputed to him for righteousness? To impute sin is to lay sin to one's charge and treat him accordingly. When Shimei prayed, "Let not my Lord impute iniquity unto me," did he pray that sin might not be infused into him? It is very strange that men who themselves use the word constantly in this sense, who see

* See also his exposition of his doctrinal opinions presented to the Synod of Philadelphia.

In this exposition he uses the following language. "The fact that men are the subjects of a hereditary depravity, is again and again affirmed, [in the sermon on the Way of Salvation] with all the explicitness which it was in the power of the author with his use of language to do it." He also quotes Pres. Edwards' definition of original sin, viz. that "it is the *innate sinful depravity of the heart*;" and adds, "This statement in regard to its nature, has not been denied in the sermon, but is fully affirmed."

it thus used (and acknowledge the fact) in the Bible continually, the very moment it is applied in its strict biblical sense to the case of Adam's sin, or Christ's righteousness, forget entirely its meaning, and insist upon it, that it means all that is impossible and dreadful. Thus Mr. B. tells us that "the doctrine of imputation has been, that infants were personally guilty of Adam's sin; that *they* sinned in him; that there was a *personal identity* constituted between them and Adam, and that therefore his sin was *theirs*, as really and truly as if committed by themselves."

If there was a personal identity, it was actually committed by themselves, and they could not be treated merely *as if* they had performed the act. Mr. B. might at least frame the accusation so that it should not slay itself. Again, on the same page, "if the doctrine of imputation be true, it is certain they had not only *had** sinned after the similitude of his transgression, but had *sinned the very identical sin*. (Just above they had not committed it themselves.) It was precisely like him; it was the very thing itself," &c. p. 119. In like manner, on p. 96, he says, if the righteousness of Christ is set over to men, transferred to them in any sense, then they are not *ungodly*. "They are eminently pure, have a claim, not of grace, but of debt to the very highest rewards of heaven." Mr. B. does not we presume, at least he cannot consistently, use the word *transfer* in this passage, in the sense of transfusing, because he says *in any sense*; and because he explains the word in the previous page thus; "The word (*λογιζομαι*) is never used to denote *imputing* in the sense of *transferring*, or of charging that on one which does not properly belong to him." Again, "no doctrine of *transferring*, or of setting over to a man what does not properly belong to him, be it sin or holiness, can be derived therefore from this word." He constantly interchanges the words impute, transfer, charge, reckon, setting over, as synonymous. The use of the word *transfer* therefore, instead of the word impute in the passage just quoted, does not relieve it from the objection that Mr. B. makes the doctrine of imputation to involve the transfer of moral character. It is hardly necessary to say that this is all a vain imagination. The doctrine contains no such idea. This is so familiarly known, and has been so fully proved

* We presume there is a typographical mistake in this clause, how it is with the phrase, "it was precisely *like* him," we do not know.

in former numbers of this work that we shall not weary our readers with a repetition of the proof.* It is enough that the constant and familiar use of the word in the scriptures which fixes its meaning, shows that no such idea is intended; that the men who make this assertion contradict themselves continually; and that the use and explanation of the word in all the confessions of faith of the reformers, and in the writings of standard authors, show that it conveys no such sense. We have already seen that on the same page Mr. B. makes the doctrine of the imputation of Adam's sin to be, that men committed that very identical sin, and then that they are regarded *as if* they had committed it. The opposers of the doctrine tell us that the phrase *to bear one's sins*, is to bear the punishment of them; and the declaration of the prophet that the son shall not bear the iniquity of the father, is a positive denial of the doctrine of imputation; of course, then, to impute the sin of one man to another, of a father to a son, is to punish the one for the sins of another, and not to transfer the moral character of one man to another man. Thus they change about, first on one foot and then on another. The testimony of impartial men and even rationalists we hope may have the effect of convincing even Mr. B. of his mistake on this subject, and of leading him to feel some remorse for his caricature of one of the most generally received doctrines of the reformation. Prof. Stuart, p. 534, speaking of the reformed churches says, "The prevailing sentiment has been, that the sin of Adam is charged to us; and that on account of this, as well as hereditary depravity, independently of all actual sin we are justly subjected to the penalty of the second death. Melancthon called this *impia opinio*, at first; but seems gradually to have given way to it." According to this, to impute is *to charge to*, not to transfer moral character. The statement of Prof. S., however, that the prevailing sentiment was that men were condemned to the second death on account of Adam's sin, is not correct; but the loss of original righteousness and consequent corruption of nature is almost constantly presented as the penal evil which we suffer in consequence of that sin. See Bretschneider Dog. vol. ii. p. 33, where he quotes the Augsburg Conf., "*per lapsum, justo Dei judicio (in poenam hominum) justitia con-*

* See Biblical Repertory, 1830, p. 425, 1831, p. 407, and the Review of Prof. Stuart's Romans, (1833,) whose objections and assertions Mr. B. repeats.

creata sue originalis amissa est, *defectu illo*, &c. humana natura ita corrupta est," &c. "By the fall, through the just judgment of God, concreated or original righteousness as a punishment for men, was lost, and *by that defect*—human nature was corrupted," &c. It should be remarked by the way, that corruption of nature is not as Prof. S. and others constantly affirm, a positive infusion of evil, but the consequence of the loss of original righteousness. The same author further remarks, "that the loss of the image of God was regarded as a punishment of Adam's sin, lies in the assertion of the Apology, i. p. 58. "Defectus et concupiscentia sunt pœnae (i. e. des Adamitschen Vergehens, von dem die Rede est,)" &c.

But to return to the nature of imputation. Bretschneider, p. 69, defines the imputation of Adam's sin to be, "Judicium Dei secundum quod homines omnes ob peccatum primum morti sunt obnoxii." "That judgment of God by which all men on account of the first sin are exposed to death," or penal evil. Knapp (Lectures on Theology § 76,) says, the imputation of Adam's sin, amounts to this, "God punishes the descendants (of Adam) on account of the sin of their first parents." These men do not believe the doctrine; they are merely giving a historical statement of what the doctrine is. The former of these writers in speaking of the doctrine of the Reformed Churches on justification says, "The Confessions contradict the scholastic idea of justification adopted by the Romish church, viz. that it was an act of God, by which he communicated to men a habitual righteousness (*justitia habitualis, infusa*) that is, rendered them virtuous. They regarded it far more as a forensic or judicial act by which the moral relation of men to God, not men themselves, were changed, at least not immediately." "It consists 1. of the imputation of the merit of Christ. 2. Remission of punishment. 3. Restoration of the divine favour, and of the happiness forfeited by sin:" "Imputation of righteousness, according to the symbolical books, is that judgment of God, by which he treats us, as though we had not sinned, but had fulfilled the law, or as though the merit of Christ were our own." *Entwickelung* p. 631, &c. "This imputation (of Christ's righteousness) is not the transmission or transfusion of the righteousness of another into them which are to be justified, that they should become perfectly and inherently righteous thereby. For it is impossible that the righteousness of one should be trans-

fused into another, to become his subjectively and inherently." Owen on Justification, p. 242. The ground of this imputation, whether of sin or holiness, is not a mysterious confusion of identity, but the union of representation and headship. "The sin of Adam was imputed unto all his posterity. And the ground thereof is, that we stood in the same covenant with him, who was our head and representative." Owen, p. 236. So our own standards, "The covenant being made with Adam not only for himself but for all his posterity," &c. Fisher in his exposition of the Catechism asks, "Q. Upon what account is Adam's first sin imputed to his posterity? A. On account of the legal union betwixt him and them, he being their legal head and representative, and the covenant being made with him not for himself only, but for his posterity." So far from the idea of identity of person and transfer of moral character being included in the doctrine of imputation, it was constantly, formally and strenuously denied, in all the controversies of the Reformers and their successors with the Papists, who made then the objections which are now so confidently urged in the nineteenth century.* This doctrine is, as we have seen from the testimony of its opposers, the doctrine of the Reformation; received and cherished by all parties as essential to the doctrine of the fall and justification. The late Dr. J. P. Wilson, in his notes to Ridgely's *Body of Theology*, quotes, and no doubt with approbation, a long passage from Fuller, in which he asserts his faith in the doctrine of the imputation of our sins to Christ, and of his righteousness to us, and adds, "Were I to relinquish either the one or the other, I should be at a loss for ground on which to rest my salvation." He then goes on to explain the doctrine very nearly in the terms common to the writers of the time of the reformation, and to the great body of Lutheran and Calvinistic divines, and in opposition to the perversions and extravagances of certain Antinomians.

We do not think it requisite to go over Mr. B.'s objections to this doctrine in detail, because they are so generally founded on a misapprehension of its nature, that a correct statement of the doctrine is all the refutation they need. Others of them are mere repetition of assertions a hundred times rebutted already. We must say a few words

* Mr. B. makes one general reference to Edwards on Original Sin, in support of his assertion. But he confounds what Edwards says, to account for the transmission of hereditary depravity, with imputation.

on one or two of his most confident declarations. 1. He says, p. 95, that he has examined all the places in which the word rendered to impute occurs in the Old Testament, and "that there is not *one* in which it is used in the sense of *reckoning* or *imputing* to a man that which does not strictly belong him." He makes the same assertion with regard to its use in the New Testament. Again, p. 128, "It is an unscriptural use of the word impute. That is *never* used to denote the charging of an act on a man which does not properly belong to him." Supposing all this to be true, of what account is it? If the word signifies to lay to one's account, to regard and treat as righteous or as wicked—then, is it a strictly correct and scriptural use of the word to make it express the idea that one man is regarded and treated as though he had done what he has not done, or what another did. This idea is, confessedly, included in the phrase, to bear the iniquity of any one, to be regarded and treated as having committed his offence. The ancient law commanded that children should not be thus treated. The children should not bear the imputation of the sin of the parent; nor the parent that of the children. If therefore Christ is said to "bear our sins;" to be treated as a sinner; or we are said to be made righteous, or so regarded and treated on account of his righteousness, then is the doctrine taught as plainly as language can teach it. That is, the idea is expressed, and that too according to the admission of those who reject the doctrine in question. The objection that the word *impute* does not occur in relation to this subject is of no more weight than that the words trinity, original sin, &c. do not occur in the Bible. But the reader will be surprised to hear, that the confident assertions of Mr. B. are not only in direct contradiction to the fact, but are made while commenting on a chapter in which the word occurs twice in the very sense in which he so repeatedly asserts it *never* occurs in the whole Bible. Paul, chap. iv. 6, says, God imputes righteousness to the ungodly. Here, surely, something is ascribed to men which does not strictly and properly belong to them. That is, they are treated as if they were, or had done what they are not, or have not performed. And again, in verse 11, "That righteousness might be imputed unto them also." We turned with inquiring eyes from Mr. B.'s assertions to his commentary on these passages; and although the reader may scarcely credit it, there is not a word said in

order to reconcile these declarations of the apostle with his previous statement. So far from it, he goes on, in happy unconsciousness of any contradiction, to state the very reverse of what he just before asserted. He tells us "he imputeth righteousness," means to treat as righteous—"he reckons and treats him as a pardoned and righteous man." Yet, speaking of this same subject, p. 128, he says, "God reckons or imputes things *as they are*, not as they are *not*." Is then the ungodly, the man without works, strictly and properly righteous? So on verse 11, "that righteousness might be imputed to them," Mr. B. says, means, "might be accepted and treated as righteous." It is therefore by the author's own admission agreeable to scriptural usage to employ the word impute in the sense of ascribing to a man what does not personally belong to him; and of treating him accordingly. So also in the Old Testament, Lev. xvii. 4, it is said, If a man offer a sacrifice and do not bring a part of it to the door of the tabernacle, "blood, i. e. blood guiltiness—murder—shall be imputed to that man." That is, he shall be regarded and treated as having done what in fact he did not do. See Rosenmueller on that passage.

2. The objection most frequently urged is that the doctrine of imputation is a theory, mere theory, philosophy, a speculation, &c. These, however, are mere words of course, and amount to nothing in the estimation of men who think for themselves. After having ascertained what the meaning of the word impute is; the only question is, whether the Scriptures teach the fact that the sin of Adam and the righteousness of Christ are imputed to men. If the word means to regard and treat an individual as though he had performed the act imputed, then our only inquiry is, do the Scriptures teach that men are regarded and treated as sinners on account of what Adam did; and are they regarded and treated as righteous on account of the work of Christ? We affirm that they do assert both these facts as clearly as language can express ideas. The mere subterfuge, therefore, of creating a diversion by crying out theory, metaphysics, philosophy, can produce no effect.

3. Mr. B. insists that Adam was not the representative and federal head of his race. "The words *representative* and *federal head* are never applied to Adam in the Bible. The reason is, that the word *representative* implies an idea which could not exist in the case—the consent of those who are represented." p. 121. This is new to us. We have

always thought that a representative was one properly appointed to act for another. We did not know that it supposed one, and one only method of appointment. Under the British constitution not a twenty-fifth part of the people have the right of suffrage, and yet the Parliament is regarded as representing the whole nation, and their acts are binding upon all. In France the proportion is still less. And even in our own country not more probably than one-sixth of the people have a voice in the choice of the representatives of the whole. In common life a parent, or a court of justice may and does very often appoint guardians, who are the legal representatives of their wards, and all their acts binding as such. If it is competent for an earthly parent to appoint a representative for his children without their consent, we are at a loss to discover why our heavenly Father may not do so also. Whether he has done so or not is a mere question of fact, although as usual pronounced by Mr. B, a "mere philosophical speculation." The question is, whether God determined that Adam should act in the great trial to which he was subjected for himself alone, or also for his posterity? If the Scriptures and experience answer in the affirmative, the question is settled. Do the Scriptures, then, teach that the act of Adam decided any thing for his race—did it bring upon them the manifestations of the divine displeasure? The question is almost too plain to need an answer. The truth is written on every page of the Bible and of the history of the world. So plainly, indeed, that the editors of the *Christian Spectator* freely admit that Adam was not on trial for himself only, but also for his posterity; and Mr. B. himself admits it, as we shall presently see.

4. The author has a great many small objections, which we have not time or space to notice particularly. Such as that the phrase, "sinned in Adam" conveys no idea." It does to most minds convey an idea as plain as when Levi is said to have "paid tithes in Abraham;" or that "in Adam all die, in Christ all shall be made alive;" or the every day expression, the people of the United States in Congress assembled, &c. &c. &c. So also he says, "the expression 'to sin by imputation' is unintelligible, and conveys no idea." We do not know that it does, and only wonder why he used it. It has nothing to do with the doctrine of imputation; we never saw the expression, to the best of our recollection, any where but in Mr. B.'s and

Professor Stuart's writings. Again, he says, "It is utterly absurd to suppose that men, from the time of Adam to Moses, were sinners *only by imputation.*" p. 119. We think so too, and never heard of a man who either said or thought so. Professor Stuart again is the only authority that we know of who sustains Mr. B. in the pertinency of this objection; and he charges this opinion on Tholuck and Schott, neither of whom believes in imputation at all. Again, Mr. B. says that the doctrine of imputation is a mere explanation; and yet explains nothing, but only adds a new difficulty. It is no explanation at all. It is a mere statement of an acknowledged and often asserted scriptural fact, that the sin of Adam was the ground of the infliction of penal evils on all his posterity; and the righteousness of Christ the ground of the justification of all his people.

5. A more serious objection is that it is inconsistent with our moral consciousness, and instinctive sense of justice. We admit this objection to be true and valid against Mr. B.'s idea of imputation; but deny that it has the least force against the true doctrine on the subject. The appalling fact is, and one which Mr. B. and every other man in the world has to meet and reconcile as he can with the divine character, that sin every where exists throughout the world; and that the universal sinfulness and misery of men were made to depend on the one act of one man. This Mr. B. admits, and by admitting it, is burdened with the whole difficulty. The only difference between him and us, is, that he refuses to receive this fact as it is stated and taught in the sacred Scriptures, while we are contented to abide by the simple truth in the form in which it is there presented. The apostle says that men are condemned for the sin of Adam; Mr. B. denies this, but asserts that they endure the evil of which Paul speaks, but that the evil is not penal. The question is not about the amount of the evil, for this Mr. B. makes as great as Paul, or the advocates of the doctrine of imputation. The question is about the form of the evil; Paul says it is a condemnation; Mr. B. says it is a natural or arbitrary consequence. We greatly prefer the apostle's view of the subject.

Notwithstanding all the objections urged against this doctrine, and the obloquy which he endeavours to fasten upon it, Mr. B. teaches it to its full extent. On page 122, he says, "men are indubitably affected by the sin of Adam; as, e. g. by being born with a corrupt disposition, with loss

of righteousness, and subjection to pain and wo." Here are evils inconceivably great and dreadful, which are declared to come on all men, prior to all agency or concurrence of their own, for a sin committed some thousand years before their birth, and beyond their control. Further than this, who need wish to go? Further, the Scriptures, the reformers, our own standards, and the great body of old orthodox divines do not go. Let Turretin speak in the name of all. He says expressly, vol. i. p. 680, that the punishment directly inflicted on account of Adam's sin is merely *privative*; (quia est causa privationis justitiæ originalis;) as to *positive* inflictions, they are not imposed until we are personally corrupt. (Quia isti pœnæ obnoxii nos sumus, nisi postquam nati et corrupti sumus.)

IV. On the all important subject of justification Mr. B.'s views do not appear to be very definite. We have not been able to find any clear and comprehensive statement of the doctrine. Scattered about under different passages of the Epistle there are declarations which if combined may make out such a statement; but even on this subject there is the same want of consistency we have noticed on those already referred to. We have already seen that he presents several different views of the relation of faith to justification. 1. He tells us "that faith is reckoned *as* righteousness;" which can only mean that it is taken in place of righteousness: it was so regarded and treated. As "uncircumcision is reckoned as circumcision;" the one is regarded as if it was the other. This makes faith the ground of justification. 2. He tells us that faith is not the meritorious ground of our acceptance; but the instrumental cause, the sine qua non, the condition of our justification. 3. He teaches that it is the means of acceptance because it evinces a certain state of mind, a state of friendship and reconciliation to God; not because it embraces the offer of Christ and relies upon his merit for acceptance. See the Notes on ch. iv. especially on verses 3 and 22.

On the question what is the ground of the sinner's acceptance there is still the same defect. It is in reference to this subject that one of the most exceptionable passages in the whole book occurs. On p. 96, he says, "but if the doctrine of the scriptures was that the entire righteousness of Christ was set over *to* them, was really and truly theirs, and was *transferred* to them in any sense, with what propriety could the Apostle say, God justified the ungodly. If they

have all the righteousness of Christ as their own, as really and truly *as if* they had wrought it out themselves, they are not *ungodly*. They are eminently pure, and have a claim, not of grace but of debt, to the very highest rewards of heaven." Mr. B. tells us that the word rendered to impute signifies *to reckon, to charge on one, to set over to, &c.** When, therefore, Paul speaks of "the blessedness of the man to whom the Lord imputeth righteousness," he speaks of righteousness being reckoned to him, or set over to him. Yet the author does not think or say that he teaches that the righteousness becomes a personal and moral attribute of the man to whom it is imputed. He says it means merely that the man is regarded and treated as righteous. How utterly inconsistent then to say, that if the righteousness of Christ is set over to the believer he is eminently pure, &c. On the other hand, if he means what he says, that is, if he denies that the righteousness of Christ is in any sense set over to the believer, or reckoned to him, he denies the very essence of justification; i. e. he denies that the merit of Christ is the ground on which the sinner is regarded and treated as righteous; for he tells us that to impute righteousness is "to reckon and treat as pardoned and righteous," ch. iv. 6. To say therefore that the righteousness of Christ is not set over, or reckoned, to the believer, is to say it is not the ground of his being reckoned and treated as righteous. The doctrine, however, which Mr. B. seems here so explicitly to deny, he has taught elsewhere, in nearly these identical words—(see his Expose before the Synod,†) and in perfectly equivalent terms in various parts of the book before us. On p. 85, he explains *being justified*, "being treated as if righteous; that is, being regarded and treated as if they had kept the law." How is it the ungodly are so regarded and treated? Not on account of their own works; to them it is entirely a matter of grace. "It does not mean," he adds, "that it has been obtained without price or merit from any one, for the Lord Jesus has purchased it with his own blood, and *to him* it is a matter of

* Compare the Notes on ch. iv. verses 3, 5, 8, where these and other explanations of the word are given.

† "The author," (Mr. B. is speaking of himself,) "fully affirms that he receives and teaches the doctrine, that men are justified *by the righteousness of Christ*, and not at all by their own works and deserts; that it is reckoned to them, or, set over to their account, for all the purposes of their salvation."

justice that those who were given to him should be justified." On the passage, ch. v. 19, "by the obedience of one shall many be made righteous." He says, "*Be made*, means to appoint, to *become*. The Apostle has explained the mode in which this is done i. 17, iii. 24—26, iv. 1—5. That explanation is to limit the meaning here. No more are considered righteous than become so *in that way*," i. e. by faith in Christ. In these passages then it is taught that even the ungodly become righteous, are so considered and treated on account of the merit or obedience of Christ. It is even a matter of justice to the Redeemer that all his people should be justified. It is very much to be regretted that a man who can write thus, should in words deny this very doctrine and urge against it the very objection which the Papists were constantly urging against the Reformers. The former maintained that men were justified by being made personally just or virtuous; the latter by having the righteousness of Christ imputed to them, or set to their account, so that on that ground they could be regarded "as if they had kept the law." This was the doctrine of the Reformers universally, as every one knows, and as we proved above by the testimony of Bretschneider, and which may be seen to be correct by any one who will take the trouble to consult the Confessions of that period. The grand question was whether men are justified by inherent, or by imputed righteousness. This is the doctrine which even Fuller, as quoted by Dr. Wilson, says if he rejected, he "should be at a loss for ground on which to rest his salvation." Yet this is the doctrine which Mr. B. *in words* explicitly rejects. We say in words, because he himself teaches it in the passages just quoted and in many others in the course of his book. He often says, that works or personal obedience is not the ground of our acceptance; that faith is not, it is only the instrumental cause, ch. iii. 30. That it is by the obedience of Christ that we become, or are considered righteous, &c. &c. Although the truth on this subject may be gleaned from detached portions of this commentary and put together as a whole, yet the denial of this same truth in such a book, is a great evil; much greater than that of inconsistency merely. The same remark is applicable to Mr. B.'s statements in reference to the doctrine of ability, depravity, and imputation. On all these, and on other subjects, propositions might be selected from this work directly at variance with the Scriptures, and the

standards of his own church; while on the same subjects another set of propositions might be extracted directly contradicting the former, and in perfect accordance with the system of doctrines which he has professed to believe. The evidence of the correctness of this remark, we have already exhibited. This book is stereotyped: stereotyped as it was, for the first time, passing through the press. Who else, under similar circumstances, would have put a work on such a subject beyond the reach of alteration and correction? We are the more surprised at this, as Mr. B. is so strong an advocate for the progressive improvement of Theology. It would appear natural that he should have allowed room for his own growth, instead of submitting to the process of petrification in his present state.

Notwithstanding the difficulty attending a change now, we feel persuaded that Mr. B.'s conscience will force him to make such alterations at least, as shall bring the different parts of his work more into harmony with each other. To remain where he is now seems impossible. He must either strike out the statements characteristic of the system of doctrines taught in the confession of faith; or those which are directly at variance not only with that system, but with his own declarations. He can hardly hold all sides of the same question at the same time. If instead of trying, as really seems to be often the case, to exaggerate the points of difference, and to make the most of whatever error he does hold, by stating it in the most offensive and irritating manner possible, he should follow the example of Paul, in trying to give none offence, neither to the Jews, nor to the Gentiles, nor to the church of God; he would do more to promote the cause to which he is devoted than in any other way. As the book now stands, it must give great and unnecessary offence, because it abounds with the most confident assertions at variance with the standards of the church, on all the vitally important subjects mentioned above. We say unnecessary offence, because these statements are gratuitous and uncalled for, and appear to arise from a morbid and irritated state of mind. They are not necessary to the exhibition of the author's opinions, for he contradicts them all. It is our sincere hope and prayer that he may live to purge his book from its inaccuracies and errors, and send it forth imbued with the true doctrines of the Apostles, to be a source of blessing to the multitudes who read it.

In the conclusion of this article we beg our readers to bear in mind, that our review is not of an aggressive character. The book, which we have been examining, contains a violent, and as we must think, gratuitous attack upon some of the most important doctrines of the church. If there be, therefore, an offensive and defensive attitude, in relation to this subject, we certainly are in the latter. Had Mr. Barnes adhered to his design, and given, according to his own views, "the real *meaning* of the Epistle, without *any* regard to any existing theological system," what a different book would he have produced! So far however from his having no regard for any system, the system of doctrines contained in the standards of the Presbyterian church seems to have been constantly before his mind. Instead of simply stating and defending his own views, he frequently and at length attacks those of the Confession of Faith. He goes out of his way repeatedly for this very purpose; introducing these topics where the passage on which he comments, gives not even a plausible pretext for so doing. That those who love and revere these doctrines as the sacred truth of God, and as intimately associated with the spiritual and eternal interests of themselves and their fellow men, should feel anxious to show that the interpretations on which his objections rest are incorrect; that the doctrines themselves, being misapprehended by the author, are misrepresented, can be to no man a matter of surprise. As little can it admit of doubt, that it is the duty of all such persons, to do what they can to vindicate these truths, and to disabuse the public mind of the erroneous impressions which incorrect statements respecting them cannot fail to produce. If there is evil therefore in religious controversy, the blame must rest on the assailants, not on the defendants. While nothing should be done through strife or vain glory, but each should esteem others better than themselves, we are required to stand fast, in one spirit, with one mind, striving together for the faith of the gospel.