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ART. I.—*Hints on Colonization and Abolition; with reference to the black race.*

THEY who are wise enough to place implicit confidence in the statements of the Bible, as to the origin of the human race, find no difficulty in tracing the three distinct races of men who inhabit this vast continent to the patriarch Noah, as the second head and progenitor of mankind. Nor is the difficulty great, to reach the assurance that the three sons of that patriarch were respectively the heads of three races which surround us: all things concurring to prove that the North American Indians are of Asiatic, that is of Shemitish origin, whilst the origin of the white and black races is not only matter of familiar knowledge and full experience, but is stamped upon the very aspects and lineaments of the beings themselves, in characters which time is not able to erase. Indeed we think we see in the very state of things which are passing before us, the evidence of the truth of God, in the exact fulfilment of a prophecy, which, from the distance of forty-two centuries, seem to point steadfastly to us. "God shall enlarge Japheth, and he shall dwell in the tents of Shem, and Canaan shall be his ser-

society, is a subject of pleasing contemplation. This remark has been elicited by observing that Mr. Jay has dedicated his "EVENING EXERCISES" to WILLIAM WILBERFORCE, Esq.; in which he gave us to understand, that this eminent philanthropist and Christian had acted the part of a faithful friend and counsellor towards him when he first appeared before the public as a preacher of the Gospel; and that the friendly relations then formed, had not, in the space of forty years, been interrupted. There are few living men in the world, to whom more of the good influence at this time pervading the world can be traced, than to that of this patriarch of liberty, who now totters on the verge of the grave—or ought we not rather to say, of heaven? This eminent civilian will stand up in strong relief, in the history of the age, and his character will be more approved and admired, than any of the mighty men who wielded the sceptre of power, or who contended for empire in the grand arena, amidst garments rolled in blood. WILBERFORCE, the friend of liberty, the friend of man, the advocate of the truth, and the humble disciple of the meek and lowly Saviour, is a name that will be in everlasting remembrance, and will be pronounced with veneration and gratitude, in the four quarters of the world, until time shall be no more.

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ARTICLE VII.—*A Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans, with a translation and various Excursus. By Moses Stuart, Professor of Sacred Literature in the Theological Seminary at Andover.* Andover: printed and published by Flagg & Gould. New York: J. Leavitt, No. 182, Broadway. 1832. \*pp. 576.

PROFESSOR Stuart's Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans is, undoubtedly, one of the most important productions of the American press. Whether we consider the importance of the subjects which it discusses, or the research and learning which it displays, it is clearly entitled to this elevated rank. Every reader must observe that the author is familiar with all the usual sources of modern criticism, that he has been long trained in the school of philological interpretation, that he is habituated to minute examination, and that, on all ordinary matters, he has a clearness of view, and a perspicuity and order of style and method which confer on his work a great and lasting value. This value

is greatly enhanced by the consideration, that Professor Stuart, having formed himself on the modern German school of expositors, has produced a work very different from the usual productions of the English school. These latter are generally doctrinal and practical, rather than philological. However important works constructed after the English model may be to the general, and even the professional reader, yet, for the careful student of the Scriptures, who is desirous of ascertaining with accuracy and certainty, the meaning of the word of God, there can be no question, that the German is immeasurably the better and the safer plan. There can be no solid foundation for theological opinion, but the original text of Scripture fairly interpreted. We have, therefore, long been in the habit of regarding Professor Stuart as one of the greatest benefactors of the Church in our country, because he has been the principal means of turning the attention of the rising generation of ministers to this method of studying the Bible. This, we doubt not, is the great service of his life; a service for which the whole Church owes him gratitude and honour, and which will be remembered when present differences and difficulties are all forgotten. We do him, therefore, unfeigned homage as the great American reformer of biblical study, as the introducer of a new æra, and the most efficient opponent of metaphysical theology. Alas, that he should himself have fallen on that very enchanted ground, from which it was the business and the glory of his life to withcall his younger brethren!

In perfect consistency with this high opinion of Professor Stuart's services, and of the value of his work, we still think the latter has very numerous and very serious faults. The first and most fatal seem to have arisen from his not having discovered, before writing the 542d page, "that his main design was *commentary*, and not *didactic theology*." The work is too theological. The frequent discussions of this nature, in which the author indulges, are rather out of place, in a work of this kind, and are, moreover, singularly unfortunate. It is in these discussions the writer has most signally failed; misapprehended the subject in debate; misconceived the meaning of the authors whom he quotes; contradicted himself; done violence to his own theoretical rules of interpretation, and gratuitously denounced doctrines, which have not only always been regarded as part of the common faith of Protestant christendom, but which he himself over and over either asserts or implies. Evidence of the justice of these remarks will be given as we proceed.

A second fault in the work is, that the author is not sufficiently independent. We are by no means fastidious on this subject.

We think that any man, who addresses himself to write a commentary, would be very unwise to turn his back on all that has been done, and commence by running over the immense field of classical, oriental, and rabbinical literature collecting materials for himself. It is enough, if he is acquainted with the storehouses already provided, and is able from these resources to bring to bear on the interpretation which he adopts, all the scattered lights which they afford. It is, therefore, no just ground of complaint that Professor Stuart has contented himself with arranging the materials prepared to his hands. In this he does nothing more than Koppe, Rosenmüller, and most others of the same class have done before him. But we think he has allowed himself to be too much indebted to a few favourite authors. So large a portion of the critical remarks, the literature, illustrations, and general views contained in his work is to be found in theirs, (especially in Tholuck's,) as to furnish evidence of their undue ascendancy over his mind.

There is another evidence of this fault to be found in the opinions which are advocated in this work. These opinions are not only different, at least on some points, from those which Professor Stuart has been commonly considered as entertaining, but the manner in which they are presented, and the grounds on which they are supported, evince that they have been adopted under external influence. Some years ago Professor Stuart was led to present as correct, the lowest of the modern views of the nature of the sonship of Christ. This, we are happy to see, he has rejected. But that he should make the apostle say, Rom. i. 4, Christ was constituted the Son of God "*according to his pneumatic state or condition,*" (*κατα πνευμα ἀγιωσύνης*), on the reasons which he assigns, is, as we think, sufficiently strange. His fondness for such authors as Döderlein and Bretschneider seem to have moulded very much his views on the doctrines of sin, imputation, and depravity. Such writers, halfway between orthodox and neological, are very unsafe guides for a Calvinist to follow. To adopt the views of such men, is like putting a piece of new cloth into an old garment, or new wine into old bottles. There is an entire want of coherence between the old views on *grace, regeneration, and election*; and these new views on *sin, ability, and depravity*. And we should consider it impossible that Professor Stuart, retaining the former, as he no doubt does, should ever, if left to himself, have adopted the latter. He has come by them, not from the careful interpretation of Scripture, nor from independent ratiocination, but from being captivated by the plausible presentation of them in his favourite authors. Evidence of this, as before remarked, is to be found in the man-

ner in which they are presented and supported, and the concomitants with which they are held. The force of these remarks will be felt only by those who will take the trouble to read both sides, and to examine these authors for themselves. These remarks may appear to Professor Stuart to be unkind and perhaps unjust. In our judgment they are neither the one nor the other; and yet it is natural that he should think them to be both. He, no doubt, is unconscious of the influence of certain works over his mind. Men of ardent temperament are generally very little aware of the extent to which they are governed. Views, which they either read or hear, appear so plain, and affect them so strongly, that they seize them with an avidity, which makes them feel that they are their own, in every sense of the word; that they never thought differently, and never can. And yet, a week, perhaps, has not passed before different views are presented, which, if they come from a source which excites no prejudice, are in their turn, embraced with the same confidence, and with the same conviction that the contrary never was believed. This mental temperament, though it is attended by the evil of instability, and a liability to be governed, and even duped, when we least expect it, is associated with many excellencies. These Professor Stuart has. To these he is indebted for his fame and his usefulness; these have made him instead of dully erudite, the inspiring and eloquent leader of American biblical scholars.

There is another result of the temperament to which we have referred, the evils of which are visible in the work before us. Opinions are matters of feeling, instead of being founded on evidence and argument. Hence they are rejected as soon as the feeling subsides, or is changed, unless some permanent feeling, such as pride of character, or *esprit du corps*, be enlisted in their behalf. In all such cases, therefore, there is not only a want of independence on the influence of others, but peculiarly on one's own prejudices and prepossessions. A thing is true or false to such a mind, as it is agreeable, or the reverse. And if, as Professor Stuart strongly expresses it, a man feels that he must be made over again, before he can believe a certain doctrine, the only way is to make him over, reason and argument will never alter his opinion. We think that no man can fail to observe that Professor Stuart's rejection of certain doctrines, is the result of a mere prejudice awakened in his mind, and strengthened into an antipathy. That he was never led to it by the process of interpretation is clear, in the first place, from the evident labour which it has cost him to force even his own mind to accede to his interpretations; and in the second, that he admits propositions which involve every one of the offensive

principles involved in the doctrines, which he rejects. Here then is precisely the point where Professor Stuart is most deceived. Just when he thinks himself most independent, because he differs from his former self and his present friends, is he most obviously led by other writers, and his own prejudices.

Again; this work is, in many of its parts, altogether too prolix. The reader becomes fatigued before he reaches any definite conclusion, or he is offended by having more said than is necessary for his satisfaction. This fault may arise from a desire of saying all that ever has been said, or that can be said, upon a given subject; or from a writer's having no clear idea of what it is he wishes to say. He is thus led to a tiresome repetition of efforts, in hopes that each succeeding trial may bring him nearer to the point.

But it is not our purpose to dwell on such matters. We should not, indeed, have thought it worth while to say even thus much on the general character of the work, if we did not consider it important that students of theology should be put a little on their guard, and not take it for granted that every thing written in a commentary is correct. The fact is, there is more danger of receiving on authority what is presented in this form, than in any other. A commentary is like a dictionary; a book to be consulted rather than read;\* to which one goes to ask a question and receive an answer; to see, in the one case, what a word, and in the other, what a passage means. The mind thus places itself in the posture of a mere passive recipient. From this condition it should be roused, and made to feel that the statements of such works are not to be received, without examination.

It is a difficult task to review a commentary satisfactorily. It would be of little use to go over the chapters in detail, and commend the instances of happy interpretation. And to attempt to refute those of a contrary character, would require us to write a commentary ourselves. We intend, therefore, to pass by much that we think excellent, and much that we think erroneous, and to confine our attention, at least for the present, to Professor Stuart's exposition of Rom. v. 12—19, and the Excursus therewith connected. This is the most characteristic and important part of his work.

It cannot be denied that this passage is a very difficult portion of the word of God. As such it has always been regarded, and

\* And this, we may remark in passing, is the main reason why we have not before noticed Professor Stuart's book. Not having had occasion to attend especially to the Epistle to the Romans, since the publication of this commentary, we never read more than a few pages of it until within these few days.

must still be considered, after all that has been written on the subject. Still, we have no hesitation in saying, the grand difficulty is to get round it. It inculcates a doctrine which many men are very unwilling to admit. To get rid of this doctrine, is the difficulty. *Hinc illae lachrymae.* Hence these lamentations over its obscurity. A similar obscurity rests, in view of many, over the ninth chapter of this epistle; and for a similar reason. Now, we venture to assert, that those who have no special prejudice against the doctrine of imputation, and the federal headship of Adam and Christ, are not so much disposed to complain of the obscurity of the passage before us. It is only when a man is predetermined that it does not, and that it *shall* not, teach either these doctrines, or that of the transmission of a corrupt nature, that he is so much at a loss to know what it does teach; and it is really enough to move any one's commiseration, to see such a man as Professor Stuart so obviously and hopelessly in conflict with the plain meaning and argument of the Apostle; fruitlessly struggling to disengage himself from its toils, forced to admit what he denies, and teach what he rejects, travelling backwards and forwards bewildered in the mazes of own exposition. We feel entitled to express this confidence, in the first place, because we feel it; in the second, because the great body of impartial commentators, not merely Calvinistic, but Pelagian, Neological and Infidel, agree in every essential part of the ordinary view; and thirdly, because the objections to this interpretation are all *theological*: we say all, because those of an exegetical character are hardly worthy of consideration. But let us proceed.

According to the common view of this passage, it naturally resolves itself into four parts:—

I. Verse 12, which contains this general proposition: All men die, or are regarded and treated as sinners, on account of Adam—*i. e.* of his sin.

II. Verses 13 and 14, which prove this proposition. The proof is this: the *universality* of death, can in no other way be accounted for. Neither the law of Moses, nor the law of nature, is sufficiently extensive to account for *all* bearing this penalty; therefore it must be, that men are subject to death, on account of Adam.

*He is therefore a type of Christ*—that is, there is this striking point of resemblance between them: as we are condemned on account of the one, so are we justified on account of the other.

III. Verses 15, 16, 17, are a commentary on this proposition, by which it is at once illustrated and limited.

1. In the first place, if it is consistent with the divine character, that we should die for the offence of one, *how much more*, that we should live for the righteousness of one.

2. We are condemned in Adam, for *one* sin only; Christ saves us from *many*.

3. Christ not only saves us from evil, but advances us to a state of endless life and glory; (or this verse 17 may be considered as a repetition and amplification of the 15th.)

IV. Verses 18, 19, resume and carry out the sentiment and comparison of verse 12th. As we are condemned for the offence of one, so are we justified by the righteousness of another; for, if on account of the disobedience of one, we are regarded and treated as sinners, so on account of the obedience of the other, we are regarded and treated as righteous.

Verses 20 and 21 form the conclusion of the chapter, and are designed—1st. to answer the natural objection, that this view of the method of salvation makes the law useless; and, 2d. that the grace of God in the gospel of his Son, superabounds and triumphs over sin, however produced or increased.

In this analysis, we have stated in general terms the meaning of the several portions of the passage. The correctness of this statement, and the force of the several subordinate clauses, we shall endeavour to exhibit as we proceed.

Professor Stuart, in his introduction to chap. vi., viii., properly remarks, that correct views as to the general course of a writer's thoughts in a given passage, "is a *sine qua non* to a right exegesis of the whole. How can we correctly explain a writer, unless we rightly apprehend his aim, and the scope of his discourse? It is impossible," &c. p. 249. It will, therefore, not be questioned, that it is a matter of no little importance, to ascertain the design and scope of the Apostle in the passage before us. On this subject, there are various opinions: we shall give but three—

1. Some say the Apostle's main design is, to exalt our views of the blessings procured by Christ, and to show that these blessings superabound over all the evils of the fall.

2. Others say, that his object is, to counteract the narrow-minded prejudices of the Jews, by showing, that as the evils of the fall extended to all, Gentiles as well as Jews, so do the blessings of the gospel.

3. Others think, that his design is, to illustrate the great gospel truth of justification on the grounds of the merits of Jesus Christ, by a reference to the other grand analogous fact in the history of our race—the condemnation of men, on the ground of the demerit of Adam; and thus answer the natural objection, How can the merit of one man justify others?

Professor Stuart says, p. 200, that the first view here given is so obviously correct, that "the most unpractised critic can hardly fail to discern the general object, as thus stated." If he is wrong



here, it will, on his own principles, be no wonder that he is wrong all the way through; and that he is wrong, we think no critic, practised or unpractised, can fail to discern, who will attend to the few following considerations. In the first place, the idea of the superabounding of the blessings of the gospel over the evils of the fall, is not expressly stated until the 21st verse, (that is, until the whole comparison is gone through with); and then, in immediate connexion with the question, For what purpose did the law enter? Secondly, although this idea is contained in verses 15, 16, 17, yet, as Professor Stuart admits, these verses are parenthetical, and, of course, might be left out, and still the main design be expressed. As verses 13, 14, are subordinate to verse 12, and verses 15, 16, 17, to the last clause of verse 14, it is evident that verses 12, 18 and 19 must contain the main idea of the passage. In these verses, the idea of the superabounding of grace is not included at all. Professor Stuart has exalted a mere corollary into the main design and scope of the passage.

2. More might be said in favour of the second view; but this also, as will appear in the sequel, is inconsistent with the course of the argument. Paul is not yet speaking of the applicability of the gospel to the case of the Gentiles.

3. That the third view mentioned above is the only correct one, we think will appear from the following considerations: Let it be remembered, that there are two grand subjects of discussion in this epistle, viz.—the doctrine of justification, and the calling of the Gentiles; in other words, the method of salvation, and the persons to whom that method is to be proposed. The consideration of the first extends to the close of the viii. ch.; the discussion of the second commences with the ix. From the 18th v. of the first ch. Paul, argues against the possibility of justification by works, because all men, Gentiles and Jews, are sinners, and guilty before God. Having, in verses 19 and 20 of ch. iii. arrived at that conclusion, from the 21st v. he unfolds the gospel method. This he confirms throughout the fourth ch. from the case of Abraham, the declaration of David, the nature of the law, &c. In the fifth, he commences by stating some of the consequences of this method of justification: we have peace with God, access to him, confidence in his favour, and assurance of eternal life founded on the love of God, and the fact that we are justified (not for any thing in us, or done by us,) but by the blood of his son. WHEREFORE, v. 12, (that is, since we are justified for what one man has done,) as we have been brought into a state of condemnation by one man, so by one man are we justified and saved. There is nothing more wonderful in the obedience of one saving many, than in the disobedience of one destroying many: nor so

much. If the one has happened, *much more* may the other.\* This is a brief, but, as we believe, correct view of the context, and shows clearly enough the design of the Apostle in the passage before us.

As the general context requires this view of the Apostle's object, so it is the only one with which the course of the argument can be made to agree. The fact is, that the whole argument bears so lucidly and conclusively on this point, that it is no wonder that men are involved in perplexity, when they wish to make it bear on any other. What the course of argument is, we have stated above. All men are subject to death, on account of Adam. This is proved in verses 13, 14; and being proved, is all the way through assumed to illustrate the other great truth. If we *thus* die, are *thus* condemned, much more may we, by a similar arrangement, be saved. This is so clearly the prominent idea of the Apostle, that Professor Stuart cannot avoid seeing and admitting it, before he gets through.

Thirdly, not only the general context and the course of argument require this view of the Apostle's object, but also all the leading clauses separately considered. This point, therefore, will become clearer at every step, as we advance. The delightful fact, that the grace of the gospel superabounds over the evils of the fall, is, however, not the less true, because its exhibition is not the main object of the passage before us.

As Professor Stuart takes a false view of the design of this passage, we are not surprised to find him involved in perplexity, at the very first step in his exposition. He is very much at a loss about the connexion, as indicated by the words *διὰ τοῦτο*, in the beginning of the 12th verse, which he says "are so difficult," in this connexion. He devotes more than two pages to this point. We suspect his readers see very little difficulty in the case. The whole doctrine of the preceding part of the epistle, and the assertion of the immediately preceding verses, is, that by one man, not by our merits, we are justified. What more natural association, or what plainer inference, than the analogy between this and the other grand fact in the history of men. Tholuck and Flatt, Professor Stuart remarks, both represent these words as *illative*, "but they do not show *how* the sequel is a *deduction* from what precedes." Neither of these writers seems to have felt any difficulty in the case. Tholuck dismisses the words in two lines, explaining them thus, "*Aus dem bisher Gesagten geht hervor*"—*i. e.* "It follows from what has been said."

\* In ch. vi. and vii. the Apostle answers the standing objection, that this method of justification leads to licentiousness, by proving that it is the only effectual means of sanctification; the law being as incompetent for the one purpose as the other. Then comes the swelling grandeur of the viii. ch. in which he exults in the certainty and security of this method of salvation.

So much for the scope of the passage and its connexion. Let us now inquire into the meaning of

VERSE XII.

“Wherefore, as by one man sin entered into the world, and death by sin; and so death passed on all men, for that all have sinned.”

Every reader feels that something is wanting to complete the sense in this verse. We have here only one half of the comparison. The question is, where are we to seek the other. We think with Professor Stuart, that the majority of interpreters are right, “in regarding verses 13—17, as substantially a parenthesis, (thrown in to illustrate a sentiment brought to view in the protasis verse 12); and I find,” he continues, “a full apodosis only in verses 18, 19, where the sentiment of verse 12 is virtually resumed and repeated, and where the apodosis regularly follows, after an *οὕτω καί*.” As this is the only satisfactory view of the passage, it is important that it should be borne in mind. Verses 18, 19, then, it is admitted, resume and repeat the sentiment of verse 12: of course, whatever is obscure in verse 12, may fairly be illustrated from verses 18 and 19.

It is by no means unusual for the Apostle thus to interrupt himself; and, after qualifying or confirming a position, resume and carry out his original idea. In the present instance, Paul, intending to run a parallel between the fall and the restoration of men, begins with the usual sign of a comparison—*as* by one man sin and death entered into the world, *so* by one man justification and life. But the protasis needed confirmation, and he therefore gives it, before fully expressing the apodosis; and, as at the close of this confirmation, the idea of the correspondence, which he had in his mind, is really expressed by calling Adam a type of Christ, he feels that this position needed limitation and illustration, and he, therefore, gives both in verses 15, 16 and 17, and then resumes and states fully the main idea.

There is considerable diversity of opinion, as to the meaning of the clause, *sin entered into the world, and death by sin*.

1. By *ἁμαρτία*, or sin, in this case, Calvin and a host of commentators, ancient and modern, understand *corruption, depravity, vitiositas*; and by *entered into the world*, not simply commenced, but was spread over the world: so that the idea is, all men became corrupt, and, consequently, subject to death through Adam.

2. Others, suppose that the meaning is merely, *sin* commenced with Adam, and death as its necessary consequence. He was the first sinner, and the first sufferer of death.

3. Others understand the Apostle as saying—through Adam,

men became sinners. Adam was the cause of sin and death—*εἰς κόσμον* being equivalent with *εἰς παντας ἀνθρώπους*. Hence the phrase, sin entered into the world, is equivalent with *all sinned, or became sinners*.

We think the last is the true sense, because the second leaves out of view, the main idea expressed by *δι' ἑνός*, and because Paul evidently intended to express a comparison, which is not, as Adam died for his sin, so all men die for theirs; but, as Adam was the cause of sin and death, so Christ of righteousness and life. We shall not, however, discuss this point here, as the whole matter will come up more advantageously when we come to the latter part of the verse.

Another interesting inquiry is, as to the meaning of the word *death* in this passage. And here again we are happy to be able to agree with Professor Stuart, who, in accordance with the views of the great body of evangelical commentators, understands the word in its ordinary biblical sense, when connected with sin. The death which is *on account* of sin, is surely the death which is the wages of sin. All the penal consequences of sin are, therefore, included in the term. "Indeed," says Professor Stuart, "I see no philological escape from the conclusion, that death in the sense of *penalty for sin in its full measure*, must be regarded as the meaning of the writer here"—p. 208. As it is not our purpose to write a commentary on this passage, we do not adduce the grounds of this conclusion. They may be seen in Professor Stuart, and other commentators. Where we agree, there is no necessity for argument.

An important inquiry, Professor Stuart says, arises, respecting the words *καὶ οὕτως*, viz., does the Apostle mean to say, that *in consequence* of Adam's sin, sin and death came upon all men? Or, does he mean, that as Adam died on account of his sin, so, in like manner, all men die, because all sin? In other words, do these words intimate a connexion between the sin of Adam, and the sin and condemnation of his race? or, merely the invariable connexion between sin and death? Professor Stuart decides for the latter. On p. 215, he says, "consider what the writer asserts: 'Death came on Adam *on account of sin*, and *in like manner* death came upon all men, because all have sinned.'" But what becomes of the *δι' ἑνός*, if this be a correct view of the substance of the verse? Surely, these words are too prominent here, and in their frequent repetition throughout the passage, to be thus left out of view. It was *through one man*, that sin came upon all men, and that all die. Besides, as remarked above, it was confessedly not the object of the Apostle to compare the case of Adam with that of other men, and say, as Adam died, *so* all men

die; but to compare Adam and Christ, as the one caused death, so the other caused life. Again, Professor S. himself, admits that verses 18, 19, resume and repeat the sentiment of verse 12, and that those verses clearly convey the idea, that Adam's sin is the cause of the condemnation of his race. Of course, then, verse 12 must express this idea. He says, indeed, it is "*hinted*" in the words εἰσῆλθε and διῆλθε; but if the comparison between Adam and Christ be the design of the whole passage, this, which is the main idea, should be something more than "*hinted at*," in this verse which is acknowledged to contain the first half of the comparison.\* This matter, however, will appear clearer when we have considered the last clause in the verse, ἐφ' ᾧ πάντες ἥμαρτον.

We agree with Professor Stuart in thinking, that rendering ἐφ' ᾧ, *in whom*, is inconsistent, if not absolutely with usage, yet with the construction of the sentence, and therefore cheerfully accede to the rendering *in that*, or *because that*. The important question now presents itself, what is meant by πάντες ἥμαρτον? On this subject, there are three opinions.

1st. That it means, all have actually and personally sinned.

2d. All have become corrupt or depraved; and

3d. All became guilty, *i. e.* were regarded and treated as sinners.

Professor Stuart and a multitude of others adopt the first view. Then, the sentiment of the verse is, "As by one man sin invaded the world and death on account of sin, so in like manner, death has passed on all men, because all sin." Sin began with Adam, and as he died for his sin, so all men die for theirs. The connexion between Adam's offence and the sin and condemnation of men, is not *expressed*: it is merely "*hinted at*."

The second view is given by Calvin, and by a large body of

\* We have found considerable difficulty, in getting a clear idea of Professor Stuart's view of this passage. On p. 200, he says, that verses 18, 19, virtually resume and repeat the sentiment of verse 12; and yet, on p. 213, he says, "But it does not follow, because verse 19 asserts an influence of Adam upon the sinfulness of men, that the same sentiment must therefore be affirmed in verse 12; certainly not, that it should be directly asserted in the same manner."

On the same page, he says, "It is possible, that καὶ οὕτως may imply this; (the connexion between Adam's offence and the sinfulness of his posterity,) which, with Erasmus and Tholuck, we might construe, *et ita factum est*, *i. e.* and so it happened, or and thus it was brought about, viz. thus it was brought about, that all men came under sentence of death, and also became sinners, &c. \* \* Yet I am not persuaded, that this is the true method of interpreting the words καὶ οὕτως." What here is admitted as possible, is declared in p. 215, "to be wholly inadmissible."

We suspect, by the way, that Tholuck would hardly recognise, "so it happened that all men sinned in Adam, and were sentenced to death, by reason of this sin," as a correct exposition of his, "Insofern in Jenem Ersten Sünde and Uebel hervortrat, ging es auch auf alle Theile des Geschlechts über."

the most respectable commentators, ancient and modern. The meaning of the verse, according to them, is, "As by Adam depravity or corruption entered the world, and death as its consequence, and hence death has passed on all men, since all are corrupt," so, &c. This, although it expresses a truth, is a view of the passage which, as we shall see, cannot be carried consistently through; and it misses the real point of comparison between Christ and Adam. Paul does not mean to say, that as Adam was the source, or cause of corruption, so Christ is the cause of holiness; but as the offence of the one was the ground of our condemnation, so the righteousness of the other, is the ground of our justification.

According to the third view, the sentiment of the verse is, "As through one man men became sinners, and consequently exposed to death, and thus death has passed on all men, because all are regarded and treated as sinners, (on his account)," (so, on account of one are they regarded and treated as righteous.) In favour of this view, the authority of a large number of commentators might be adduced. To us, it appears decidedly the correct one, and that which alone harmonizes with the rest of the passage. In support of this interpretation, we would remark :

1. That it is on all hands admitted, that the *usus loquendi* admits of this sense of the words "all have sinned." Thus in Gen. xliii. 9, Judah says to Jacob, "If I bring him not again, *let me bear the blame.*" In Hebrew and Greek, it is "I will be a sinner," *i. e.* let me be so regarded and treated. The same form of expression occurs in ch. xlv. 34. Bethsheba says, "I and thy son Solomon, shall be sinners," 1 Kings, ch. i. 21; according to our version, which expresses the sense correctly, "shall be counted offenders." This usage, indeed, is familiar and acknowledged.

2. Professor Stuart himself admits, that verses 18 and 19 expresses the same idea with verse 12. But in those verses, the Apostle teaches, that the offence of Adam was the ground of our condemnation, *i. e.* that on his account, we are regarded and treated as sinners. This Professor Stuart is forced to admit.\* He over and over acknowledges, that the Apostle, in various parts of this passage, represents *death* as coming on all men, on account of the sin of Adam, antecedently to any act of their own. Thus on page 226, he says, "verse 15 asserts, the many were brought under sentence of death by the offence of Adam." This he explains as meaning, not that this offence was the occasion of our

\* With regard to verse 19, he gives indeed a different view; but, as we shall show, at the expense of consistency.

becoming sinners, and thus incurring death; but this offence was the ground of the infliction of death antecedent to any act of our own. "In like manner," he adds, "all receive some important benefits from Christ, even without any concurrence of their own." see p. 228. Verse 16, he tells us, repeats the same sentiment in a more specific manner, and "adds an explanation, or rather a confirmation of it," p. 229. He, therefore, renders this verse, "The sentence by reason of one (offence) was unto condemnation (was a condemning sentence,) &c." As this is a confirmation of the preceding sentiment, it can only mean "this sentence of condemnation was passed on all men on account of Adam's one offence." The 17th verse repeats again, he tells us, p. 226, the sentiment of the two preceding; and in commenting on this verse, p. 234, he teaches, in express terms, that "all are in a state of condemnation by reason of the offence of one;"—*i. e.* on the ground of the offence of one, antecedent to any act of their own, as his words *must* mean in connexion with what he had just before asserted. Here then it is expressly taught, that men are condemned, *i. e.* regarded and treated as sinners, on account of Adam's sin. The 18th verse contains the same doctrine, because the identical words of verse 16 are therein repeated, and, according to Professor Stuart, verse 18 resumes and repeats the sentiment of verse 12. If, therefore, things which are equal to the same thing are any longer equal to each other, verse 12 must express the idea, that all men are regarded and treated as sinners, on account of Adam's sin.

Again, in the 19th verse it is said "As we are constituted sinners by the disobedience of Adam, so we are constituted righteous by the obedience of Christ." And as it is admitted, that this verse carries out the comparison commenced in the 12th, if we can ascertain what Paul means by saying, "we are constituted sinners," we may be certain of what he intended when he said, through Adam, "all sinned." But in the 19th verse, as we shall endeavour to prove, the words will admit of no other interpretation, than the one mentioned above, *viz.* we are regarded and treated as sinners, this, therefore, must be the meaning of the other expression in verse 12.

Now, we would request any impartial reader to review these passages. Let him remember, that we have given Professor Stuart's own exposition of them, (except of verse 19): that he even cannot fail to see, that Paul says, *for one offence we die—for one offence we are condemned—for one offence death reigns over all—for the disobedience of one we are treated as sinners*—and we see not how any can resist the conclusion, that verse 12 (which it is admitted, expresses the same sentiment,) teaches, not the frigid doctrine, that, as Adam sinned and died, in like manner all

sin and die; nor yet, that Adam's sin was the occasion of our sinning; nor yet, again, that through Adam we are all corrupt; but, that on his account we are subject to death, or are regarded and treated as sinners.

3. As the phrases to which reference has just been made, are admitted to mean, that the sin of Adam was not the mere occasion, but the ground of condemnation to death, it must be remembered that in verses 15, 16, 17, 18 and 19, this idea is *assumed as already proved*. In each case, it is introduced by a "for if," or some equivalent expression. This, of course, implies, that verse 12 contains this proposition, and that verses 13 and 14 (which it is admitted, establish the sentiment of verse 12,) prove it; for, how could the Apostle at every turn say, "*for if* we die for Adam's sin," if nothing had been said beforehand of our being subject to death on his account? But, according to Professor Stuart, verse 12 expresses no such idea.

4. Unless this be the meaning of the 12th verse, no satisfactory explanation can be given of verses 13 and 14. They are introduced by *γὰρ*, and are obviously intended to establish the doctrine of the preceding verse. Now, if the doctrine of the 12th verse be only that all have personally sinned, and are, therefore, subject to death, then verse 13 and 14 are designed to prove that men were sinners before the time of Moses; and this, in fact, is the view which Professor Stuart and others adopt. But who, in all the world, denied this? Did the Jews, who called the Gentiles "sinners," as a name, and whose scriptures are filled with denunciations of the vices of the heathen living before, as well as after, the law? Besides, how utterly frigid and destitute of all point and purpose, in this connexion, is such a sentiment. It is most unnatural to suppose that the Apostle should stop in the midst of such a passage to answer the cavil—'as sin is the transgression of a law, there was no sin in the world before the time of Moses, and therefore it is not true, that all have sinned'—when the very persons for whose benefit this cavil is answered, believed that men were then not only sinners, but most peculiarly and atrociously such. We do not believe an instance can be found in all of Paul's writings, in which he takes the trouble to answer an objection, which the objector himself is supposed to know to be futile. Yet, such Professor Stuart supposes is the object of these verses. He might well remark, "that no intelligent or candid man" could make such an objection.

Those who cannot receive this view of these two verses, and yet reject the interpretation of verse 12, which we are endeavouring to support, are very much at a loss how to explain them. The unsuccessful attempts to derive any pertinent meaning from them,



are almost numberless. On the other hand, if we regard the 12th verse as teaching that all men sin in Adam, or, to express the same idea in different words, are regarded and treated as sinners on his account, then how natural and obvious the connexion and reasoning. All men die on account of Adam's sin, is the proposition to be proved. The universality of death, (the infliction of penal evils,) is the medium of proof. How is this universality to be accounted for? You may account for the fact, that some men die by the violation of the divine law, given to Moses; and for the fact, that multitudes of others die from the violation of the divine law written upon their hearts; but this will not account for *all* dying. Thousands die who have never personally sinned, and, consequently, if death be *on account* of sin, if it be penal, they must be accounted as sinners for the offence of Adam.\*

5. It need hardly be repeated, that this interpretation is alone consistent with the main design of the Apostle. It is not, as before remarked, his object to illustrate the fact, that Christ is the author of holiness, from the fact that Adam was the occasion of leading men to sin; but he is treating the subject of justification, and illustrating the great gospel truth, that men may be treated as righteous, on account of what Christ has done, from the fact that they have been treated as sinners on account of what Adam did.

And, finally, as a further confirmation of this exposition, it may be remarked, that the doctrine of the whole race being involved in the sin and condemnation of Adam, was clearly and frequently taught by the Jewish doctors; and, there is little reason to doubt, it was the prevalent opinion of the Jews at this period. If this

\* We are gratified to find, from p. 212, that even Professor Stuart has no objection to the "sentiment," *all have sinned in Adam*. "It must be confessed," he says, "that there is no more ground for objection to the *sentiment* which the expression ("all have sinned") thus construed would convey, than there is to the sentiment in verses 17 and 19. It is not on this ground that I hesitate to receive this interpretation." His difficulties are philological; yet, there is no philology in what follows, as far as we can perceive. The difficulty stated, is this: Paul says, men die who have never sinned after the likeness of Adam's transgression; but how, it is asked, is their sin different from his, when it is the *very same* sin imputed to them, or propagated to them. But cannot men be said to be treated as sinners on account of Adam's sin, and it still be true, that they did not sin as he did? Is it not involved in the very terms of the proposition, that they did not sin *as* Adam did, *i. e.* personally, if they are only (quoad hoc) treated as sinners on his account? So Christ is declared to be without sin, and yet treated as a sinner. We are persuaded this objection will prevent no one, besides Professor S., from receiving the sentiment of verse 12, as thus explained, if this be all. It is equally destitute of weight when directed against the idea of a vitiated nature derived from Adam being the ground of men's dying; for this vitiated nature is not Adam's *act*: his *first* sin propagated to all men.

It is well to remark here, that on this page Professor Stuart uses the phrases *treated as sinners* on account of Adam, and *sinners in him*, as equivalent. It would have been a great comfort to his readers, had he continued thus to regard them.

were the case, we cannot refuse to admit, that Paul designed to teach what his readers could hardly fail to understand him to assert. Accordingly, impartial men, who do not themselves hold the doctrine of imputation, do not hesitate to acknowledge that Paul teaches it in this passage. This is the case with Knapp, as quoted in a former number of this work.

VERSES XIII—XIV.

We have, necessarily, anticipated most of the remarks which we deem it requisite to make, respecting these verses. They are evidently designed to confirm the sentiment of verse 12. If that verse teaches, as we have endeavoured to show it does, that all men are regarded and treated as sinners on account of the sin of Adam, there can be little difficulty in understanding them.

The phrase "*sin was in the world*" is evidently of the same import with, "men were sinners"—sinners, in the sense of πάντες ἡμαρτων of verse 12; either actual sinners, or corrupt, or were regarded and treated as sinners. The last is, of course, the true meaning, if our exegesis of the preceding verse is correct. All men are so regarded, Paul says, on account of Adam; *for*, they were so treated before the time of Moses, and, consequently, not for the violation of his law, &c.

The words, "*sin is not imputed where there is no law,*" are interpreted by Professor Stuart after Calvin and others, as meaning, *is not imputed by men, as sin*—that is, men do not regard it, or consider it as sin. But, in the first place, it is, to say the least, very doubtful, whether the word ἐλλογεῖται can be properly so rendered; and, in the second, the phrase, *to impute sin*, spoken in reference to God, is so common in the scriptures, that there can be little doubt the words are here to be understood in the ordinary way. The only reason for departing from this sense here, is the supposed difficulty of interpreting the passage, when the words are so explained; but this difficulty vanishes, as we have already seen, if the sense of verse 12 be rightly apprehended.

Professor Stuart, in commenting on this verse, says, p. 217, et seq. there are some, "who state the whole of the Apostle's reasoning in the following manner, viz. 'Men's own sins were not imputed to them on the ground of their transgressing any law, until the law of Moses was given; yet, they were counted sinners, (ἁμαρτία ἦν ἐν κόσμῳ); consequently, it must have been by reason of Adam's sin imputed to them, inasmuch as their own offences were not imputed.'" We should not notice this passage, if Professor Stuart did not seem to ascribe this revolting doctrine to all who believe in the imputation of Adam's sin. It is perfectly plain, from what follows, that he has no reference to the

opinion of such men as Whitby, who understand the Apostle as teaching that men did not, anterior to the time of Moses, incur the specific evil of natural death by their own transgressions. Though sinners in the sight of God, and so regarded and punished, yet their sins were not imputed to death: This was a punishment all incurred in Adam. This is altogether a different view from that which Professor Stuart here has in his mind. He argues to show, that men were accountable for their own transgressions, and that men never were counted of God as without actual sin; of course, he ascribes the negative of these propositions to those whom he opposes. Now, who are they, who thus teach that "men's personal sins were not at all reckoned" until the law of Moses? He tells us, they are those who say, "men have only original or imputed sin charged to their account." He names Augustine and President Edwards, as though they held this opinion. He asks, "How can the sin of Adam be imputed to all his posterity, and yet their own personal sins be not at all reckoned;" and on page 223, he seems to make all who suppose the dissimilitude referred to in the 14th verse, consists in the fact, that Adam was an actual sinner, and others to whom reference is here made, sinners only by imputation," hold this doctrine. For this is the interpretation he says he has proved to be contrary to the declarations of the Old and New Testaments. From all this, it would really appear, that Professor Stuart means to represent all who hold the doctrine of imputation, as teaching that men were not accountable for their own sins, before the time of Moses. It would be an easy matter for any one to refute the doctrine, if he is permitted to state it in this manner, provided he can find readers ignorant enough to receive such statements.

It is hardly necessary to state, that no such absurdity is involved in the interpretation given above. When Professor Stuart says, that men die on account of Adam's sin, verse 16, does he mean to say they do not die on account of their own? Or, when he says that for "one offence" they are condemned, would he admit they are not condemned for their own multiplied transgressions? We presume not. In like manner, when we represent the Apostle as arguing, that men are regarded as sinners on account of Adam's sin, because the *universality* of death cannot be accounted for in any other way, we leave the full accountability of men for their own sins of thought, word, and deed, completely unimpaired.

It is not only unjust to ascribe the opinion in question to those who hold the doctrine of imputation, but we know no class of men to whom it can be fairly attributed, as Professor Stuart states it. He certainly does Tholuck and Schott, especially the former,

injustice, in ascribing the substance of this opinion to them. Tholuck says expressly, "This non-imputation does *by no means* remove guilt, since Paul has expressly asserted, that men (without a revelation) were without excuse." He says, indeed, that the accountability of men for their individual transgressions, decreases in proportion to their ignorance and insensibility, (when this is not the result of their own conduct,) but he does not, even in substance, assert that men are chargeable only with imputed sin before the time of Moses. The phrase, "Sin is not imputed where there is no law," interpreted inreference to God, Tholuck understands comparatively. Professor Stuart makes it mean, "sin is not regarded:" this he also must take in a comparative sense, since it is not true, that men without a written law have *no* sense of sin. If Professor Stuart will allow Tholuck and Schott the liberty he assumes himself, the whole absurdity of the opinion he opposes is gone. That these writers make the Apostle reason inconclusively, we think true; but we do not think Professor Stuart has done them justice. It appears to us, indeed, very strange, that he should represent them as holding in substance, that men were counted sinners before the time of Moses, "by reason of Adam's sin being imputed to them," when neither of these writers hold the doctrine of imputation at all. It seems, in fact, to be the main design of Schott's dissertation to disprove it. On p. 335, he says, "vidimus hucusque, verbis v. 12, nulla inesse vestigia dogmatis de imputatione peccati Adamitici." And as to Tholuck, his whole exposition is founded upon a different principle. It would really be worth Professor Stuart's while to make a distinction between the imputation of Adam's sin, and the transmission of a vitiated nature from him to his posterity. As all other theological writers make this distinction, he might as well do so. We are sure the works of such writers would be clearer to him, than they can be at present; for it must seem strange to him to hear them saying in one breath, that corruption, or vitiositas, has been propagated to all Adam's posterity, and in the next, deny that his sin is imputed to them, if these two things are the same.

But to return from this long digression. The next clause of any difficulty in these verses, is "*even over them who had not sinned after the similitude of Adam's transgression.*" The simple question is, what is the point of difference intended by the Apostle? Is it, that those referred to had not broken any positive, or any externally revealed, law? Or is it, that they had not sinned personally? As there is no doubt the words may express either idea, the only question is, which best suits the context? And here we may remark, that there can be little doubt on this

point, if our exegesis of the preceding verses is correct. If it is Paul's object to prove, that men are treated as sinners, (*i. e.* die,) on account of Adam, then is it essential that he should show that there is a class which die, who are not personally sinners. This class is not the whole mass of men, (even from Adam to Moses,) but a certain set only out of this general class. Hence, secondly, it is to be noticed, that the very construction of the passage would seem to require this interpretation. Paul says, death reigned over all, from Adam to Moses, *even* over those who had not sinned as Adam did. Here an evident distinction is marked between two classes of the victims of death; one general, and the other a subdivision under it. But if the latter clause be descriptive of the general class from Adam to Moses, this distinction is entirely lost. It, of course, would not do to say, death reigned over all who had not broken any positive law, *even* over those who had not broken any positive law. The second clause must mark a peculiar class. Death reigned over all men, *even* over those whose death cannot be accounted for on the ground of their personal transgressions. Another great objection to the opposite view is, that if it be adopted, no satisfactory explanation can be given of the connexion of these verses with the preceding, nor of the Apostle's argument. According to the view adopted by Professor Stuart, we must assume what we know to be incorrect, that the Jews thought the Gentiles were not sinners; and that Paul argues to prove they were, even though they had no written law. According to Tholuck's view, the Apostle's argument, as Professor Stuart correctly remarks, is entirely inconclusive. He would make the Apostle reason virtually thus, "As men were, comparatively speaking, not responsible for their offences, when involved in ignorance and destitute of a revelation, the cause of their death is to be sought in their participation of the corrupt nature of Adam." In this argument there is no force, unless it be assumed that men were entirely free from responsibility for actual sin, before the time of Moses—an assumption which Tholuck rejects, as inconsistent with truth and the Apostle's doctrine. In short, we know no interpretation of this passage, but the ordinary one given above, which makes the Apostle argue conclusively, and express a sentiment at once pertinent and important.

In what sense, then, is Adam a type of Christ? According to our view, the answer is plain: The point of resemblance is, that as Adam's sin was the ground of the condemnation of many, so Christ's righteousness is the ground of their justification. That this is the correct view, we think evident from what has already been said, and will become more so from what follows.

## VERSES XV. XVI. XVII.

These verses are a commentary on the last clause of the 14th verse—Adam is a type of Christ. There is a strong analogy between them; and yet, there are striking and instructive points of difference. The first (verse 15,) is derived from the diversity of the results they produce, viewed in connexion with the character of God. The one brought death, the other life: if, then, we die on account of what one man did, *how much more* shall we live on account of what one has done. If the one fact is consistent with the divine character, how much more the other. It is clear, therefore, that the Apostle designs to illustrate the cardinal idea of the gospel, viz. to the imputation of the merit of one to a multitude, or the justification of many on the ground of the righteousness of one.

The most important phrase in this verse, and that on which the interpretation of the whole depends, is the second clause—“*For if by the offence of one the many die.*” That there is a *causal* connexion between the sin of Adam and the death of his posterity here asserted, must of course be admitted. The only question is, as to its nature. Does Paul mean to say, that Adam’s offence was the occasion of men’s becoming sinful, or of their committing sin; and that thus, on this account, they become subject to death? Or, does he mean, that it was the ground of their exposure to death, antecedent to any transgressions of their own? That the latter is his meaning, we think very evident, for the following reasons:

1. It is not to be questioned that the words admit as naturally of this explanation as the other. “By the offence of one, many die,” is the assertion: whether the offence is the mere occasional cause, or the judicial ground, of their dying, must be determined from the context. No violence is done the words, by this interpretation.

2. This interpretation is not only possible, but necessary, in this connexion, because the sentiment expressed in this verse is confessedly the same as that taught in those which follow; and they, as we shall endeavour to show, admit of no other exposition. The sentence of condemnation, it is there said, has passed on all men for one offence of one man.

3. The whole drift and design of the Apostle’s argument requires this interpretation. As it was not his design to teach, that Christ was either the source of sanctification, or the occasion of men securing eternal life by their own goodness; so it would be nothing to his purpose to show, that Adam was the occasion of men becoming wicked, and thus incurring death for their own offences.

Happily, there is no necessity for arguing this point at present. Professor Stuart interprets the phrase precisely as we do. He teaches very explicitly, that the Apostle does not make the offence of Adam the mere occasion of the death of his posterity, but that it was the ground of its infliction. They die *on account of his sin*, independently of, and antecedent to, any offence of their own. This, which we submit is the true unsophisticated doctrine of imputation, is, according to Professor Stuart, the doctrine of Paul. It will, therefore, not do for him any longer, either to disclaim the doctrine, or condemn its advocates. Lest the reader should be incredulous on this point, and deem it impossible that so warm an opposer of a doctrine should thus expressly himself teach it, we refer him to the analysis of verses 15, 16, 17, on p. 226, and to all that is said on verse 15. We can here give a few specimens only of his language. "Adam did by his offence cause *θανατος* to come on all without exception, inasmuch as all his race are born destitute of holiness, and in such a state that their passions will, whenever they are moral agents, lead them to sin. All too are heirs of more or less suffering. It is true then, that all suffer on Adam's account; that all are brought under more or less of the sentence of death," p. 227. Of course, a man's being born destitute of holiness, exposed to a certainty of sinning, is not on account of any thing in himself. It is not on account of his own sins, that this evil (*θανατος*) comes upon him: its infliction is antecedent to any act of his own. This is imputation. This is what Professor Stuart says, has happened to all the posterity of Adam; although it is precisely what he affirms, p. 239, is entirely repugnant to scripture, in opposition to justice, and to the first principles of moral consciousness.

Again, "To say that *οι πολλοι απεθανον δια Αδαμ*, is not to say, that all have the sentence *executed* on them in its highest sense, (which is contradicted by fact;) but it is to say, that in some respect or other, all are involved in it; that, as to more or less of it, all are subjected to it; and that all are exposed to the whole of the evil which death includes," p. 228. We presume, few believe that death in its highest sense, eternal misery, is actually "executed" on all men, on account of Adam's sin. We readily admit, Paul teaches no such doctrine; but, according to Professor Stuart, he does teach that *death*, (penal evil, according to his own subsequent explanation,) comes on all men antecedently "to any voluntary act of their own." This is the whole doctrine of imputation. It is but putting this idea into other words, to say, "that men are regarded and treated as sinners on Adam's account;" for, to be treated as a sinner, is to be made subject to

the *ḡavatos* threatened against sin. It matters not what this *ḡavatos* is. Professor Stuart himself says, it is "*evil of any kind.*" The mere degree of evil surely does not alter the principle. It never entered any one's mind, that the death threatened against all sin and all sinners, was the same precise form and amount of evil. It is evil of any and every kind consequent on sin, and differs, in character and amount, in every individual case of its infliction. Taken, therefore, as Professor Stuart explains it, in this general sense, it is mere trifling to maintain that the doctrine of imputation is rejected by one man, who holds that it involves, in a given case, so much suffering, and retained by another who holds it involves either less or more. Zachariae makes it include, in this case, only natural death, and yet avows the doctrine of imputation; Professor Stuart makes it include a thousand-fold more, yet says he rejects it. According to him, it includes the loss of original righteousness, the certainty of actual sin, and temporal sufferings. Now, these are tremendous evils: viewed in connexion with the moral and immortal interests of men, they are inconceivable and infinite. All this evil comes on men, not for any offence of their own, but solely on account of Adam's sin.

We are at a loss to conceive what Professor Stuart can object to in the common doctrine, that all men are subject to death, *i. e.* penal evil, on account of the sin of Adam? Will he say, that it is shocking to think of myriads of men suffering forever, simply for what one man has done? Happily, we hold no such doctrine. We believe as fully and joyfully as he does, that the grace, which is in Christ Jesus, secures the salvation of all who have no personal sins to answer for. Will he say, that it is inconsistent with the divine goodness and justice, that men should be condemned for the sin of another? But this is his own doctrine, taught too plainly and frequently, to be either mistaken or forgotten. Will he say, I do not hold the penalty to be so severe as you do? Loss of holiness, temporal suffering, certainty of sinning, and a consequent exposure to eternal death—this is a heavier penalty, than that which Turretin supposes to be directly inflicted on account of Adam's sin. Will he further answer, I hold that Christ has more than made up the evils of the fall? For whom? For all who have no personal sins? So say we. Yea, for all who will accept of his grace: so say we again.

We would fain hope that no film of prejudice or prepossession, is so thick as to prevent any reader from perceiving, that Professor Stuart teaches the doctrine of imputation as fully as any one holds or teaches it; and secondly, that his objections are either founded



in misconception, or directed against what he admits to be a doctrine of the Bible. If he is so constituted as to believe, that the evils, above referred to, come upon us on account of the sin of Adam, and yet be horrified at the idea that one man should die for the iniquity of another, we must console ourselves with the conviction, that it is an idiosyncrasy, with which no other man can sympathize.

The second point of difference between Christ and Adam which the Apostle mentions, is stated in the 16th verse, viz. Adam brings on us the guilt of but one sin; Christ frees us from the guilt of many. In other words, in Adam we are condemned for one offence; in Christ, we are justified from many. We give this verse in the translation, and with the explanatory clauses of Professor Stuart, as it appears on p. 230: "Yea, [the sentence,] by one who sinned, is not like the free gift; for the sentence by reason of one [offence] was unto condemnation [was a condemning sentence]; but the free gift [pardon] is of *many* offences, unto justification, *i. e.* is a sentence of acquittal from condemnation." We think this a correct exhibition of the meaning of the original. The most interesting clause in the verse, is the second, "the sentence was for one offence unto condemnation,"—*κριμα εἰς ἑνος εἰς κατακριμα*. The same question presents itself with regard to these words, as in relation to the corresponding clause in the preceding verse. Does Paul mean to say, that the one offence of Adam was the occasion of our being brought into condemnation, inasmuch as it occasioned our becoming sinners? Or, does he mean that his offence was the ground of our condemnation? The latter is, as we think, the only interpretation which the words in this connexion can possibly bear. This seems evident in the first place, from the ordinary meaning of the terms. It is admitted on all hands, that *κριμα* means properly a judicial decision; and we are willing to admit, that it often by metonymy means, punishment or condemnation. But it cannot have that meaning, here; for it is connected with *κατακριμα*, since the Apostle would then say, *condemnation or punishment leading to condemnation*, has come on all men. Besides, every one here recognises the common Hellenistic construction of *εἰς* with the accusative after verbs, signifying *to be, to become, to regard*, instead of the nominative. The sentence was *to* condemnation, is, therefore, the same as saying *the sentence was condemnation*, or, as Professor Stuart correctly renders it, "a condemning sentence." This condemning sentence is said to be, *by, or for*, one offence. What is the natural meaning of such an expression? Is it, that the offence was the occasion of men's sinning? Or, that it was the ground of the sentence? Surely, the latter.

But, secondly, in this place we have the idea of pardon on the one hand, which supposes that of condemnation on the other. If, as Professor Stuart says, the latter part of the verse means, we are pardoned for *many* offences, the former must mean we are condemned for *one*. Hence, thirdly, we remark, that the whole point, meaning and truth, of the passage is lost, unless this interpretation be adopted. The antithesis in this verse, is evidently between *the one offence*, and *the many offences*. To make Paul, therefore, say that the offence of Adam was the occasion of our being involved in a multitude of crimes, from all of which Christ saves us, is to make the evil and the benefit perfectly tantamount. Adam leads us in offences, from which Christ saves us. Where, then, is the contrast, if the evil incurred through Adam is identical with the evil from which Christ saves us? Paul evidently means to assert, that the evil from which Christ saves us is far greater than that which Adam has brought upon us. He brought the condemnation of *one* offence only : Christ saved us from *many*.

Fourthly ; this interpretation is so obviously the correct one, that Professor Stuart himself fully admits it. It is involved in the translation of the verse, which we just quoted from him, "the condemning sentence was by reason of one offence ;" and still plainer on p. 226, "The condemnation which comes upon us through Adam, has respect only to *one* offence ; while the justification effected by Christ, has respect to many offences." To say that our condemnation "has respect to one offence," is to say, we are condemned for one offence. And again, on the same page, he tells us, that "verse 16 repeats the same sentiment, (*i. e.* with 15th verse,) but in a more specific manner." What is, according to Professor Stuart, the sentiment of verse 15? Not that Adam's offence was the *occasion*, but *the ground*, of our being subject to *θανατος*, *i. e.* condemned.\* Of course then, verse 16, which repeats this sentiment in a more specific manner, must mean that the one offence is the ground of our condemnation.

We may remark here, as the words under consideration will, in their connexion, admit of no other interpretation than that just given, so the idea which they express being the same as that contained in verses 12, 15, 17, 18, 19, may fairly be applied to explain the equivalent clauses in those verses which, in themselves, may be less definite and perspicuous. To explain, therefore, verse 12, as teaching either that the corrupt nature

\* We shall show directly, that Professor Stuart admits, that *being subject to death for Adam's sin*, and *being condemned on account of it*, are equivalent expressions.

derived from Adam, or the actual sins of which he was the occasion of our committing, are the grounds of death, or condemnation, coming upon us, is inconsistent with the plain and admitted meaning of this clause, which asserts that the ground of condemnation *here contemplated* is neither our corrupt nature, nor our actual sins, but the one offence of Adam. Consequently, the interpretation given above of verses 12, 13 and 14, is the only one which can be carried consistently through.

We must here pause to notice as remarkable an example of inconsistency, on the part of Professor Stuart, as we remember ever to have met with. On p. 230, he tells us, *κριμα εις κατακριμα* means "a condemning sentence," and on the next page, after remarking that *κριμα* means either *a sentence of condemnation* or *punishment*, he asks, how the phrase is to be understood here? "The very expression," he says, "shows that *κριμα* is to be taken as explained above, viz. as meaning the *evils inflicted* by Adam's sin:" and then adds, whether this evil be loss of original righteousness, or a disposition in itself sinful, "it is true in either case, that the *κριμα*, the evil *inflicted* or *suffered*, is of such a nature as to lead the way to *κατακριμα*, *condemnation*, i. e. *θανατος*, in its highest and most dreadful sense." That is, on one page, we are told the words mean "a sentence of condemnation," and on the next, "certain evils which lead to condemnation"—two inconsistent and opposite interpretations. Need this be proved? Need it be argued, that a sentence of condemnation is one thing, punishment another? If *κριμα here* means the former, it cannot *here* mean the latter. It is surely one thing to say, that a sentence of condemnation has come upon us for Adam's sin, and a very different one to say, that certain evils have come upon us which lead the way to our incurring condemnation ourselves. Let it be remembered, that this is one of the most important clauses in this whole passage; one on which, perhaps more than any other, the interpretation of the whole depends; and we think our readers will share our surprise, that Professor Stuart's views should be so little settled as to allow him to give such opposite views of its meaning in two consecutive pages. This surprise will be increased, when they observe on p. 235, when speaking of the 18th verse, he reverts to his first interpretation, and makes it mean, a sentence of condemnation. This too is the interpretation of Tholuck, Flatt, Koppe, (verse 15,) Turretin, and, in fact, of almost all commentators.

The verse 17 either contains an amplification merely of verse 15, or peculiar emphasis is to be laid on the word *λαμβάνοντες*, or, as Flatt and Professor Stuart suppose, it expresses the idea, that Christ not only secures the pardon of our many offences, as sta-

ted in verse 16, but confers upon us positive happiness and glory. "The sentiment," Professor Stuart says, "runs thus: 'For if all are in a state of condemnation by reason of the offence of one, much more shall those towards whom abundance of mercy and pardoning grace are shown, be redeemed from a state of condemnation, and advanced to a state of happiness.'" Here, we wish the reader to remark, 1st. That Professor Stuart says, the phrase "death reigns," designates a *state of condemnation*. This is expressly asserted on p. 233. 2d. That all are brought into this state of condemnation, by the offence of one. The first clause of the verse he thus translates, "*For if by the offence of one, death reigned by means of one.*" By this he means, not that the offence of Adam was the occasion merely of death reigning over all, or of all being brought into a state of condemnation, but that this offence was the ground of their condemnation, antecedent to any act of their own. This *must* be his meaning; for he thus explains the words "by the offence of one many die," in verse 15; and he can hardly maintain that the words, "by the offence of one death reigns," expresses a different idea. Besides, he tells us expressly, that this verse, (verse 17,) repeats the sentiment of verse 15—see p. 226. We wish the reader, 3d. To remark, that if verse 17 expresses the sentiment, 'all men are in a state of condemnation on account of the offence of Adam,' and if it repeats the sentiment of verses 15, 16, and if verse 18, (containing the identical words and expressing the same idea with verse 16,) repeats the sentiment of verse 12, then does verse 12, by Professor Stuart's own showing, express the idea that all men are condemned on account of Adam's sin, antecedent to any act of their own. Thus we have our interpretation of that verse confirmed, and Mr. Stuart's overthrown by the Professor himself. 4th. The reader should notice, that Mr. Stuart was led to the correct, though, for him, inconsistent, interpretation of verse 17, by objecting to Tholuck's rendering *δικαιοσύνη* *holiness*, instead of *justification*. He very properly remarks, that such an interpretation is inconsistent with "the antithesis to the state of condemnation indicated by *ὁ θάνατος ἐβασίλευσε* in the preceding clause." He insists, very reasonably, that the two parts of the sentence should be made to correspond. If the former speaks of condemnation, the latter must of justification. This obvious principle of interpretation, the reader will find Professor Stuart forgets, when he comes to the 19th verse. There is another important admission which must be noticed, and that is, that the *all* who suffer for Adam's sin, are not the *all* who are benefited by Christ: the two classes are not necessarily coextensive. "If *all* are in a state of condemnation by reason of the offence of one,

much more shall *those towards whom abundance of mercy and pardoning grace are shown*, be redeemed from a state of condemnation, and advanced to a state of happiness." All are not thus redeemed from condemnation, and advanced to a state of happiness. This too Professor Stuart, it will be seen, forgets.

VERSES XVIII. XIX.

We come now to those verses, in which, as we have already seen, the comparison, commenced in verse 12 is resumed, and carried through. Professor Stuart thus translates the 18th verse: "Wherefore as by the offence of one (sentence) came upon all men unto condemnation; so also by the righteousness of one (the free gift) came upon all unto justification of life." Does it require any argument to prove, that this verse means, "As men are condemned on account of the offence of one man, so they are justified on account of the righteousness of one man"? We hardly know how the Apostle could have spoken in plainer terms. To make him here say, that the offence of Adam was the mere occasion of our condemnation, is to do the most obvious violence to the passage; because, 1. We have shown that this cannot be the meaning of these identical words, as they occur in the 16th verse. 2. Because, such an interpretation is inconsistent with the whole scope and design of the passage. 3. Especially, because it violates the pointed antithesis in this verse, or forces us to suppose that Paul teaches, that the righteousness of Christ was the mere occasion of men becoming holy. Surely, if *δία* expresses the occasional cause in the one member of the sentence, it must in the other. But, if we are not prepared to admit that Christ's righteousness is the mere occasion (and not the ground) of our justification, then we cannot maintain that Adam's sin is the mere occasion of our condemnation. 4. We may remark, *ad hominem*, that Professor Stuart admits that the corresponding clauses in the preceding verses, express the idea, that the offence of Adam was the ground of the condemnation of men. On account of that offence, antecedent to any act of their own, death reigns over them, or they are (as he expresses it,) "in a state of condemnation." Of course, then, he cannot be permitted to turn round, and say that the same words, in the same connexion, teach here a different doctrine. There is no escaping the plain meaning of this verse. The very form of introduction proves that Paul is repeating an idea previously presented and established, "*Wherefore us;*" and this idea, as we have abundantly shown, Professor Stuart himself admits, is, that all men die, all are condemned, on account of Adam's sin.

The expression "*justification of life,*" Professor Stuart justly

remarks, means, that "justification which is connected with eternal life."

It need hardly be stated, that to say, "justification comes on all men," is equivalent to saying, "all men are justified," or, "all are constituted righteous." The Apostle, therefore, does here assert, that, "as *all* are condemned for Adam's sin, so *all* are justified on account of the righteousness of Christ." To say, as Professor Stuart says, that the latter clause of this verse means that salvation is merely provided and offered to all, is to give all exegesis to the winds. When it is affirmed, that a man is condemned, or that he is pardoned, how can this mean that he is *not* condemned, or *not* pardoned, but merely that an opportunity is offered, or an occasion presented, for the one or the other? At this rate, we may say that all men are condemned for murder, as all have opportunities to secure this result. Whatever, therefore, "justification of life" may mean, Paul does assert that all men (of whom he is speaking) do receive it. It is at utter variance with all Bible, and all common, usage, to make the words mean any thing else. Who ever announces to a congregation of sinners, that they are all justified—they are all constituted righteous—they all have the justification of eternal life? No one. Neither does Paul.

But does not this necessarily make the Apostle teach universal salvation? Must not the *all men* of the second clause, be coextensive with the *all men* of the first? We confidently answer, No. And it is a matter of surprise how Professor Stuart can urge such an objection, when he knows it admits so easily of a complete refutation; and that too, by his own admission. The plain meaning of the passage is, "as *all* connected with Adam are condemned, so *all* connected with Christ are justified." The first *all* includes all the natural descendants of Adam, (Christ, who was a man, is not included;) the second *all* includes the people of Christ, *all* connected with him by faith. Is this inconsistent with usage? Look at 1 Corinthians, xv. 21—"As in Adam *all* die, so in Christ shall *all* be made partakers of a glorious resurrection," as the last clause there confessedly means. Is the second *all*, in this case, coextensive with the first? Certainly not. "All connected with Adam die; all connected with Christ live." How can any man, who admits, as Professor Stuart does, (see p. 524,) that Paul, in this passage, is speaking only of Christians, and, consequently, that the *all* of the second clause must be confined to them, be serious, in objecting to the same interpretation in the perfectly analogous passage before us? But, secondly, Paul himself clearly intimates, or rather states in so many words, that the *all men* who are justified by Christ, are

the all "who receive the abundance of mercy and pardoning grace," verse 17. This, as we understand him, Professor Stuart admits; for he surely does not mean to say, that all men absolutely do receive this gift, and do reign in life with Jesus Christ. Finally, it is impossible to carry the opposite interpretation through. There are two classes opposed, or contrasted, in verses 15, 16, 17, 18 and 19, and these are the same throughout. Now, is it true, that the grace of God abounds to *all men* absolutely, in the meaning of verse 15; that *all* are gratuitously pardoned for their many offences, as asserted in verse 16; that *all* reign in life with Christ, as is said in verse 17; that *all* are justified with the justification of eternal life, as stated in verse 18; that *all* are "constituted righteous," that is, as Professor Stuart explains it, "justified, pardoned, accepted, and treated as righteous," as taught in verse 19? This is plainly out of the question. Neither Professor Stuart, nor any other man, except an Universalist, can say all this. We are persuaded, there must be an end to all interpretation of Scripture, and to all understanding of language, if we are to be made to believe, that, being forgiven for many offences, being justified, being regarded and treated as righteous, mean merely, that the offer and opportunity of salvation is afforded to all men. We may as well shut up the Bible at once, and go bow at the footstool of the Pope, if this be exegesis. Is it not clear, then, the objection to the common view of these passages cannot be sustained, unless violence be done to every just principle of language.

We have arrived at last at verse 19—"For as by the disobedience of one man, the many were constituted sinners, so by the obedience of one, shall many be constituted righteous." The first question of interest on this verse is, what is its relation to the 18th? Is it a mere amplification? Or, does it assign a reason for the preceding declaration? Or, may we adopt Storr's view of the 18th, and make the Apostle there say, "as in the condemnation of one man, all were condemned, so in the justification of one all are justified;"\* and then understand the 17th verse, as assigning the ground of the truth thus presented. As it does not essentially alter the meaning of the verse before us, which of these views is adopted, we need not stop to discuss this point.

A more important question is, What does Paul mean by saying, *by the disobedience of one man the many were constituted sinners?* Here we meet the three interpretations, before noticed when speaking of the 12th verse. 1. Adam's sin was the occa-

\* This is, make *παραπτωμα* and *δικαιωμα* mean, not *offence* and *righteousness*, but *condemnation* and *justification*.

sion of our becoming actually sinners. 2. By the transmission of his depraved nature, we are rendered corrupt. 3. On account of his sin, we are regarded and treated as sinners. Professor Stuart adopts the first, many Calvinistic and modern commentators the second; the majority, we presume, of all classes, the third. That this last is the correct, and, indeed, the only possible one in this connexion, we think very plain, for the following reasons: 1. Usage, as is on all hands acknowledged, admits of this interpretation as naturally, to say the least, as either of the others. 2. With no show of reason can it be denied, that "to constitute sinners," and "to constitute righteous," are here correlative expressions. If the former means, "to make corrupt, or actual sinners," then the latter must mean, "to render holy." But this the phrase cannot here mean,—*a.* because, "to constitute righteous," is substituted for the phrase, "free gift of justification" of the preceding verse; the *δικαιοσύνη* of the 17th, and the *δικαιωθέντες* of the first part of the chapter; *b.* Because such an interpretation is entirely inconsistent with the scriptural use of the terms, justify and justification, and would overturn the very foundation of the doctrine of justification by faith, as taught by Paul and the other sacred writers. We are never said to be constituted personally holy, by the righteousness of Christ. *c.* And finally, *ad hominem*, Professor Stuart tells us, "constituted righteous" means, "justified, pardoned, accepted and treated as righteous." With what semblance of consistency, then, can he deny that "constituted sinners" means "regarded and treated as sinners?" Has he forgotten what he said on the 17th verse, that if the one part of the verse speaks of condemnation, the other must speak of justification, and *vice versa*? But, 3. Not only does the antithesis here demand this interpretation, but it is no less imperiously demanded, in order to maintain any consistency in the exposition of the whole passage. We have seen, that Professor Stuart admits, that verse 15, 16, 17 and 18, all speak of our being condemned, or dying, on account of Adam's sin, and justified on account of Christ's righteousness. Shall, then, the 19th verse alone assert a different, and, in this connexion, an incoherent idea. And 4. The design and scope of the whole comparison, requires this interpretation. As we have so frequently remarked, the Apostle is not contrasting sin and holiness, but condemnation and justification. He is not illustrating the way, in which men become holy, by the way in which they become corrupt; but the fact that we are regarded and treated as righteous on account of one man, by the fact that we have been regarded and treated as sinners, on account of another. It is, therefore, not only in violation of the plainest principles of interpretation, but



at the expense of all consistency, that Professor Stuart makes the clause under consideration mean, the 'disobedience of Adam was the occasion of men becoming personally and actually sinners.'

In reviewing the ground we have now gone over, how simple, natural, and conclusive, is the argument of the Apostle, according to the common interpretation; and how forced, incoherent, and contradictory the view Professor Stuart would have us to adopt. Paul tells us, (verse 12,) that *by one man* sin entered into the world, or men were brought to stand in the relation of sinners before God; death, consequently, passed on all, because for the one offence of that one man, all were regarded and treated as sinners. That this is really the case, is plain; because, the execution of the penalty of a law cannot be more extensive than its violation; and, consequently, if all men are subject to penal evils, all are regarded as sinners in the sight of God. This *universality* in the infliction of penal evil, cannot be accounted for on the ground of the violation of the law of Moses, since many died before that law was given; nor yet, on account of the more general law written on the heart, since *even* they die who have never personally sinned at all. We must conclude, therefore, that men are regarded and treated as sinners on account of the sin of Adam.

He is, therefore, a type of Christ; and yet, the cases are not entirely analogous; for if it be consistent, that we should suffer for what Adam did, how much more may we expect to be made happy for what Christ has done. Besides, we are condemned for one sin only on Adam's account; whereas, Christ saves us not only from the evils consequent on that transgression, but from the punishment of our own innumerable offences. Now, if for the offence of one, death thus triumphs over all, how much more shall those who receive the grace of the Gospel, (not only be saved from evil,) but reign in life, through Christ Jesus.

Wherefore, as on account of the offence of one, the condemnatory sentence has passed on all the descendants of Adam, so on account of the righteousness of one, gratuitous justification comes on all who receive the grace of Christ; for, as on account of the disobedience of the one, we are treated as sinners, so on account of the obedience of the other, we are treated as righteous.

Let it be remarked, that there is not a *sentiment* (to the best of our knowledge) contained in this general analysis, which has not the sanction, in one place or other, of Professor Stuart's authority.

We will now very briefly attend to his objections to the doctrine of imputation as presented in his commentary on the 19th

verse. After stating, p. 237, that the doctrine does not lie in the word *κατεσταθῆσαν*; nor in that word in connexion with *δια παρανομίας του ἔνοχου*; and arguing well to show that *δια* with a genitive may express an *occasional*, or *instrumental* cause, as well as an *efficient* one, he says, "we must come then to the examination of the whole phrase, in order to get the satisfaction which is required. And if now, 'the many became sinners *by the disobedience of Adam*,' must it not follow that his sin is imputed to them, *i. e.* reckoned as theirs? In reply, I would ask, Why should this be a necessary consequence of admitting the apostle's assertion? If a writer should say, that millions in Europe have become or been constituted profligates, by Voltaire, would the necessary meaning be, that the sin of Voltaire was put to their account? Certainly not; it would be enough to say, in order fully to explain and justify such an expression, that Voltaire had been an *instrument*, a *means*, or *occasion* of their profligacy." It is perfectly apparent that Professor Stuart had not, in writing this paragraph, the slightest conception of the argument for imputation founded on this passage. He admits, what cannot be denied, that the words will bear either of these two senses, 'we are treated as sinners,' or, 'become sinners' personally. The question is, what is their meaning here? Now if Paul says, that all men die for Adam's offence antecedent to any act of their own; if on account of that offence they are condemned; (as Professor Stuart admits he does say,) and then that "we are constituted sinners" by his disobedience, as 'we are constituted righteous, (that is, confessedly, treated as such) for the obedience of Christ;' we think it very hard to disprove that he means to say, that we are treated as sinners on his account, or, in other words, have his sin put to our account.

The next paragraph is still more strange. "I will select," says Professor Stuart, "a case more directly in point still; one taken from the very epistle under consideration, and which, therefore, must serve to cast direct light on the *usus loquendi* of Paul. In Rom. vii. 6, this apostle says, 'Our sinful passions are *BY* the law.' Again, in v. 7, 'I had not known sin, except *BY* the law.' Again, in v. 8, 'Sin taking occasion, *BY* the commandment, wrought in me all manner of concupiscence;' and so again in v. 11." He then asks whether it can be inferred from these passages, that the law is "the efficient cause of all sin," or, that "there is evil in the law, which evil is put to our account, *i. e.* merely imputed to us?" We confess we can scarcely see how such reasoning, or rather such writing, can be answered. If it needs refutation, we almost despair of giving it. We can only say, we know no two propositions more diverse, than, 'Adam

is the efficient cause of our sins,' and 'Adam's sin is put to our account.' How any mind can regard them as equivalent, is to us a marvel. We as much believe that "the law is the efficient cause of all sin," as that Adam is. And when asked whether the passages quoted prove 'there is evil in the law, which evil is put to our account?' we answer, No, without the least idea what bearing it has on the point in hand. Did any one imagine, that the argument for imputation was founded simply on the use of the word  $\delta\iota\alpha$ , such reasoning might be sufficient; but this is not the case. The real argument we have repeatedly stated above. Is it not lamentable to see important doctrines rejected, and long received interpretations spurned by *such* a man, for *such* reasons? Yet these are his exegetical reasons as here presented. The theological ones are such as follow:

"We must then examine," says Professor Stuart, "the nature of the case. It is, (according to the *common* theory of imputation,) that the sin of one man is charged upon all his posterity, who are condemned to everlasting death because of it, antecedent to it, and independently of any voluntary emotion or action on their part." We object to the accuracy of this definition. The words "to everlasting death" should be left out, because it matters not what men are condemned to, as far as the doctrine is concerned. The doctrine is this, 'The sin of Adam is so put to the account of his posterity, that they are condemned on account of it, antecedent to any act of their own.' This is our doctrine; and as we have seen, it is *totidem verbis*, what Professor Stuart says Paul teaches in verses 15, 16, 17 of this chapter, although it is also the doctrine which he now argues against with so much vehemence. (The reader will see that Mr. Stuart's objections are not directed against the clause "everlasting death," and consequently its omission does not alter the case.) His first objection is, that the doctrine "appears to contradict the essential principles of our moral consciousness." "We never can force ourselves into a consciousness that any act is really our own, except one in which we have had a personal and voluntary concern." "A transfer of moral turpitude is just as impossible as a transfer of souls." "To repent, in the strict sense of the word, of another's personal act, is plainly an utter impossibility." We, in our simplicity, had hoped never to hear again, at least from Professor Stuart, these objections against this doctrine. They have so abundantly and frequently been proved to be founded in an entire misconception of its nature, that it is useless, because hopeless, to go over the proof again, for those who still refuse to see it. We can therefore, only say we no more believe in "the transfer of moral turpitude," than "in

the transfer of souls." Nor do we believe it possible "to repent, in the strict sense of the word, of another's personal act." Nor yet again, do we believe that two and two make twenty, and still we, not a whit the less, believe the doctrine of imputation. If it be any amusement to Professor Stuart to write thus, we cannot object; but to call it arguing against imputation, is a strange solecism.

But secondly; "Such an imputation as that in question, [viz. such as includes the idea of "a transfer of moral turpitude," and that "an act is really our own in which we have had no personal concern,"] would be in direct opposition to the first principles of moral justice as conceived of by us, or as represented in the Bible. That 'the son shall not die for the iniquity of the father,' is as true as that 'the father shall not die for the iniquity of the son,' as God has most fully declared in Ezek. xviii." It would really seem that Professor Stuart is some how infatuated on this subject; that he is unable to keep the same idea in his mind long enough to write two consecutive paragraphs. How is it, he does not see that the idea of imputation, on which this sentence is founded, is as different as day from night, from that involved in the preceding? In the one, 'the transfer of moral turpitude,' and identity of act, are included; in the other both of these ideas are necessarily excluded, and the whole doctrine is, that 'one should die for the iniquity of another.' It is not within the limits of possibility that he should understand the prophet as saying 'the moral turpitude of the father shall not be transferred to the son, nor his act be really the act of his offspring.' This cannot be; of course Professor Stuart's idea of imputation, when writing this paragraph, was the opposite of the one he had when writing the preceding.

But again; 'that a son should die for the iniquity of his father,' "is," he says, "in direct opposition to the first principles of moral justice." He wonders how President Edwards could imagine that the declaration of the Prophet was meant to be confined to the several individuals of the race of Adam, and not to be applied to the peculiar covenant relation between him and his posterity. And yet, as we have seen, Professor Stuart himself teaches, yea, on the very next page re-affirms, that *all men do die on account of the iniquity of Adam*. Such inconsistency is wonderful.

He seems to feel, notwithstanding the warmth with which he argues, that all is not quite right, for he introduces an objector as suggesting to him, "But still you admit that the whole human race became degenerate and degraded, in consequence of the act of Adam." To which he replies, "I do so: I fully believe it.

I reject all attempts to explain away this. I go further: I admit not only the loss of an original state of righteousness, in consequence of Adam's first sin, but that temporal evils and death have come on all by means of it." &c. Yes, respected Sir, you admit what you deny, and deny what you admit, in such rapid succession, your readers are bewildered. That, 'one should die for the iniquity of another' is, on one page opposed to all justice, and on the next, we not only 'all die for Adam's sin,' but we are born destitute of holiness, with "a nature *degraded* and *degenerated*, in itself considered;" we are involved in a certainty of sinning, and "are in imminent hazard of everlasting death." Of all this, you teach that Adam's sin is not the occasion, merely but that these evils come upon us antecedent to any voluntary emotion of our own. Nay, more, they are all in their nature *penal*, for in the next page you tell us, they are "*part of the penalty of the law*;" a small part, as you are pleased to think, though a much larger part than Turretin and other strenuous advocates of the doctrine of imputation, believe to be directly "inflicted on our race" for Adam's offence.

We have now, surely, seen enough to convince the reader of two things: First, that the doctrine of imputation is not touched either by Professor Stuart's exegesis or metaphysics. It is precisely where it was before; and second: That his whole exposition of this passage (Rom. v. 12—19,) is so inconsistent with itself that it cannot by possibility be correct. In reading this portion of his commentary we have been reminded of a remark of Lord Erskine in reference to one of Burke's efforts in the House of Commons, "It was a sad failure, but Burke could bear it."

It was our intention to extend these remarks to the *Excursus* on Rom. v. at the end of the volume. But we have made this article much too long already. We must, therefore, defer the execution of this purpose, to another occasion, should such be granted us. We think it will then appear, that if our New Haven brethren can claim one-half of what Professor Stuart says, we can establish our right to the other.