

THE
BIBLICAL REPERTORY
AND
THEOLOGICAL REVIEW.

JULY, 1831.

ART. I.—REVIEW OF SPRAGUE'S LECTURES TO
YOUNG PEOPLE.

*Lectures to Young People, by William B. Sprague, D. D.
Pastor of the Second Presbyterian Church in Albany,
with an Introductory Address by Samuel Miller, D. D.,
Professor in the Theological Seminary at Princeton.*
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IT is the highest wisdom of man to endeavour to discover, and to follow the plan of God. This plan is manifested in the nature of his creatures, in the dispensations of his providence, and in his word. It is our business to fall in with this; never, from vain ideas of doing more good, venturing to counteract it. Thus, the different natures which God has given the sexes, renders it necessary, in order that the greatest perfection should be attained, and the greatest good effected, that the difference should be carefully preserved; that the man should not assume the position, or discharge the duties of the woman; and that the woman should not step out of her appropriate sphere into the province of the man. This is, however, a common evil. Unenlightened zeal in religion often leads to a greater or less infringement of the plan of God, in this respect. Women take a stand, and undertake to discharge duties, which

VOL. III. No. III.—2 P

blanch, nor his strength forsake him—clad in the armour of God—his loins girt about with truth—the breast-plate of righteousness and the shield of faith glittering upon him—his feet shod with the preparation of the gospel of peace—the helmet of salvation upon his head, and the sword of the Spirit (which is the word of God) in his hand,—we can look upon his advancing course with exulting joy. A thousand shall fall at the side of such a child, and ten thousand at his right hand, but he shall not be dismayed, neither shall defeat nor destruction come nigh him. This is one who has been educated for the God of Israel, and the God of Israel is his strength, and will be his everlasting portion.”

ART. IX.—THE CHRISTIAN SPECTATOR ON THE DOCTRINE OF IMPUTATION.

IN the Christian Spectator for March last, there are two articles, in reply to our remarks on “A Protestant’s Inquiries respecting the doctrine of Imputation.” One is from the Protestant himself, the other from the editors, who, not having concluded all they wished to say on the subject in that number, resumed and completed their task in the one for June, which has just been received.

In discussions, conducted in periodical works appearing at distant intervals, it is often necessary to subject the reader to the irksomeness of occasional repetitions, that he may have distinctly before him the state of the question. We would, therefore, remind our readers that, in the History of Pelagianism, which called forth this discussion, we stated, “That Adam’s first transgression was not strictly and properly that of his descendants (for those not yet born could not perform an act) but interpretatively or by imputation;” and secondly, that imputation does not imply “the transfer of moral acts or moral character.” The mere declaration of our belief of this doctrine, and conviction of its importance, led to the first communication of the Protestant on the subject. He made no objection to the correctness of our exhibition of the subject; his inquiries were directed against the doctrine itself. His article was written, as he now informs us, “to lead the author of that piece (the History of Pelagianism) to see and feel, that one who undertook the office of a corrector with severity, should weigh well whether he had any *faux pas* of his own to correct.” This accounts for the *schooling* manner so obvious in his communication, and which seems to have escaped his observation. We think it right to turn his attention to this sub-

ject, because he is abundant in the expression of his dissatisfaction "with the spirit and manner" of our articles. We acknowledge that we are as blind to the bad spirit of what we have written, as he appears to be to the character of his inquiries. This proves how incompetent a judge a man is in his own case, and should teach him and us how easy it is to slip into the very fault we condemn in others, and to mistake mere dissent from our opinions for disrespect to our persons. We are prepared to make every proper acknowledgment for any impropriety of manner with which Christian brethren may think us chargeable, although our sincere endeavour to avoid an improper spirit, while penning the articles in question, must prevent any other confession than that of sorrow at our want of success.

We were much surprised to find that we had mistaken the main object of the Protestant's first communication. He now says, "The writer in the *Repertory* has chosen his own ground; and, passing over my main points, and at least nine-tenths of all I had said, has selected the topic of *imputation*, which was only a very subordinate one with me, and occupied no less than forty-eight pages in descanting on this." p. 156. The editors of the *Spectator* ~~was~~ no less unfortunate in their apprehension of his object, for they head his communication "Inquiries respecting the Doctrine of Imputation." Indeed the Protestant himself seems to have laboured under the same mistake. For, p. 339, (vol. 1830) he says it was his object "to submit a few inquiries and difficulties in respect to some statements which he (the historian in the *Repertory*) had made." He then quotes our statement respecting "the imputation of Adam's sin to his posterity," and no other. On p. 340, he adds, "For the present, I neither affirm nor deny the doctrine of imputation. But I frankly confess I have difficulties." He then states these difficulties in order, introducing them, after the first, by "Again," "Again," "Once more," "Finally," "Last of all," to the close of the piece. We inferred, from all this, that the doctrine of imputation, so far from being "a very subordinate point" with him, was the main point, and indeed the only one. This is a very small matter; we notice it, merely to let him see on what slight grounds he sometimes expresses dissatisfaction.

To these inquiries communicated by the Protestant, the editors of the *Spectator* appended a series of remarks, intended to show, that we had abandoned the views of the older Cal-

vinists on this subject. In these remarks they hold the following language: "Adam's first act of transgression was not, strictly and properly, that of his descendants, says the historian. The sin of the apostacy *is* truly and properly theirs, says Edwards, and the rest." Again, "We are glad, likewise, to see him proceed one step farther." This farther step, they tell us, is the denial of "any transfer of moral acts or moral character." That both the Protestant and Editors considered the doctrine as involving these two ideas, is also evident from the nature of their objections. The former inquires of us, whether we have ever repented of Adam's sin, and founds most of his difficulties on the principle that there can be no sin where there is no knowledge of law, and as there can be no knowledge of law at the first moment when men begin to exist, he infers there can be no imputation of Adam's sin at that period. see p. 341. And the Spectator says, "No one who does not totally confound all notions of personal identity, can hesitate to admit, that the historian has done right in rejecting the old statements on this subject." p. 343.

In our reply to the above mentioned articles, we undertook to prove that these gentlemen had misapprehended the views of old Calvinists on the nature of imputation; and maintained that this doctrine does not involve "any mysterious union with Adam, so that his act was personally and properly our act, or that the moral turpitude of his sin was transferred from him to us." This statement was repeated so often and so explicitly, that no one could fail to see it was our object to prove "that neither the idea of personal identification, nor transfer of moral character is included in the doctrine of imputation."* This, therefore, is the real point in debate. And it is one of importance. For if the doctrine does, when properly explained, include these ideas, then have its opponents done well in rejecting it; and its advocates, instead of wasting time in its defence, would serve the cause of truth, by at once following their example. And on the other hand, if these ideas form no part of the doctrine, then do all the objections founded on them fall to the ground. And, as these objections are the main, and indeed, almost the only ones, to establish the point at which we aim, is to redeem an important truth from a load of aspersions, and vindicate it even in the eyes of its opposers. The question then is, are we correct in the ground which we have

* See Biblical Repertory for July, 1830, p. 436. et passim.

assumed. If the Protestant and editors have done any thing to the purpose in their reply, it must be in proving that old Calvinists taught that "Adam's act was strictly and properly our act, and that its moral character was transferred from him to us." If they have accomplished this object, we owe them many acknowledgments for having opened our eyes to a doctrine we have professed, without understanding, the greater part of our life. And this obligation will not be confined to us. For we may state, without intending to compliment ourselves, that we have heard from many old Calvinists of different denominations, in various parts of our country, and no whisper has reached us, of the exhibition of the doctrine made in the Repertory, being a departure from the faith. Without an exception, those who have spoken on the subject at all, have said, as far as we know, "So we hold the doctrine, and so we have always understood old Calvinists to teach it." As they who profess to receive any doctrine, and to incorporate it in their system of faith, may be supposed to feel a deeper interest in it, than those who have always been taught to reject it, we may, without arrogance, presume that the probability is in favour of old Calvinists understanding their own opinions, and our brethren being mistaken in their apprehensions of the subject. Let us, however, see how the matter stands.

It may facilitate the proper understanding of this subject to state, in a few words, the distinct theories which have been adopted respecting the connexion between the sinfulness of men, and the fall of their first parent.

1. Some hold, that in virtue of a covenant entered into by God with Adam, not only for himself, but for all his posterity, he was constituted their head and representative. And in consequence of this relation, his act (as every other of a public person acting as such,) was considered the act of all those whom he represented. When he sinned, therefore, they sinned, not actually, but virtually; when he fell they fell. Hence the penalty which he incurred comes on them. God regards and treats them as covenant-breakers, withholds from them those communications which produced his image on the soul of Adam at his first creation; so that the result is the destitution of original righteousness and corruption of nature. According to this view, hereditary depravity follows as a penal evil from Adam's sin, and is not the ground of its imputation to men. This, according to our understanding of it, is essentially the old Calvinistic doctrine. This is our doctrine, and the

doctrine of the standards of our church. For they make original sin to consist first, in the guilt of Adam's first sin; 2dly, the want of original righteousness, and 3dly, the corruption of our whole nature. This too, is President Edward's doctrine throughout two-thirds of his book on original sin. We never meant to say any thing inconsistent with this assertion, with regard to this great man. We stated, that in the portion of his work from which the Spectator quoted, he had abandoned the old ground, and adopted, for the sake of answering a particular difficulty, the theory of Stapfer, which, however, contradicted the general tenor and explicit statements of the former part of his work.

2. Others exclude the idea of imputation of Adam's sin, but admit that all men derive, by ordinary generation, from our first parents, a corrupt nature, which is the ground, even prior to actual transgressions, of their exposure to condemnation. This is essentially the view of Placæus, against which, as we endeavoured to show, the Calvinistic world of his time protested. This is the view, in the main, of Stapfer, and in one place of Edwards. This is Dr. Dwight's doctrine, and that of many others. Most of the older advocates of this opinion, retained at least the name of imputation, but made the inherent corruption of men the ground of it.

3. Others, again, on the same principle involved in the former theory, viz. that the descendants should be like their progenitor, suppose that the nature of Adam having become weakened and disordered, a disease or infirmity, not a moral corruption, was entailed on all his posterity. So that original sin, according to this view, is not *vere peccatum*, but a malady. This is the view of many of the Remonstrants, of Curcelleus, of Limborch, of many Arminians and Lutherans. Many refer this disorder of human nature, to the physical effect of the forbidden fruit.

4. There are those, who rejecting the ideas of imputation of Adam's sin, of moral innate depravity, or of an entailed imbecility of nature, and adopting the idea that all sin consists in acts, maintain that men came into the world in *puris naturalibus*, neither holy nor unholy, (as was the case with Adam at the time of his creation;) and, that they remain in this neutral state until they attain a knowledge of law and duty. They account for all men sinning, either from the circumstances in which they are placed, or from a divine constitution.

The view taken by the true Hopkinsians, who adopt what is

is called the "exercise scheme," is somewhat different from all these, as they suppose the moral exercises of the soul to commence with its being; and that these, in every case, should be sinful, was decided by the fall of Adam.

These, as far as we know, are all the radical views of this subject. There are, of course, various modifications of these several systems. Thus, some retain the idea of the imputation of Adam's sin, but reject that of inherent hereditary depravity. This was the case with many of the most distinguished Catholic theologians of the age of the Reformation. Others, again, uniting part of the first and third view, teach that original sin consists in the imputation of Adam's first transgression, and an enfeebled, disordered constitution, but not a moral corruption.

This enumeration of the various opinions on original sin, and of our relation to Adam, is given, not because we suppose our readers ignorant on the subject, but because it is necessary in order to understand the language of the old authors and confessions, to bear in mind the opinions which they meant to oppose or condemn. Had the Protestant done this, it would have preserved him from the strange oversight of quoting from the old confessions the declaration, that original sin is *vere peccatum*, as having any bearing on a discussion on the nature of imputation. Of this, however, in the sequel. In order to the correct interpretation of particular modes of expression occurring in any author, it is, however, not only necessary that we bear in mind the nature of the opinions which he may be opposing, but most especially the nature of his own system, whether of philosophy, theology, or of whatever else may be the subject of discourse. Here, as we think, is most obviously the great source of error in the gentlemen of the Spectator. They seem entirely to overlook the distinctive theological system of the old Calvinists, and detaching particular modes of expression from their connexion in that system, put upon them a sense, which the words themselves will indeed bear, but which is demonstrably foreign to that in which these writers employed them, and directly contradictory of their repeated and explicit statement of their meaning. These gentlemen err precisely as the early opponents of the Reformers and Calvinists did, by *insisting on taking in a moral sense, modes of expression which were used, and meant to be understood, in a judicial or forensic sense.* This is the *πρωτον ψευδος* of our New Haven brethren on this subject, and it runs through all their exhibi-

tion of the views of the old Calvinistic doctrine. In this respect they are treading, as just remarked, in the footsteps of all the early opposers of these doctrines. When the Reformers taught that we were rendered righteous or just, by the imputation of Christ's righteousness, their opponents at once asked, How can the righteousness of one man be transferred to another? If this doctrine be true, then are believers as just as Christ himself—they have his moral excellence. They further asserted, that the Reformers made Christ the greatest sinner in the world—because they taught that the sins of all men were imputed to him. To these objections the Reformers answered, that imputation rendered no man inherently either just or unjust—that they did not mean that believers were made morally righteous by the righteousness of Christ, but merely *forensically*, or in the eye of the law—and that it was mere confusion of ideas, on the part of their adversaries, which led to all these objections. We take it, this is precisely the case with our brethren of the Spectator. We find them making the identical objections to the doctrine of imputation, which were urged by some of the Catholics, and afterwards by the Remonstrants; and we have nothing to do but to copy the answer of the old Calvinists, which is, a simple disclaimer of the interpretation put on their mode of expression. They say, they never intended that the moral character of our sins was conveyed to Christ, nor of his righteousness to us, nor yet of Adam's sin to his posterity—but that all these cases are judicial or forensic transactions; that in virtue of the representative character which Christ sustained, he was in the eye of the law, (not morally,) made sin for us, and we righteousness in him; and in virtue of the representative character of Adam, we are made sinners in him, not morally, but in the eye of the law. A moment's attention to the old Calvinistic system, will convince, we hope, the impartial reader that this representation is correct.

In reference to the two great subjects of the fall and redemption, they were accustomed to speak of the two covenants of works and grace. The former was formed with Adam, not for himself alone, but for all his posterity. So that he acted in their name and in their behalf. His disobedience, therefore, was their disobedience, not on the ground of a mysterious identification, or transfer of its moral character, but on the ground of this federal relation. When Adam fell, the penalty came on all his race, and hence the corruption of nature, which we all derive from him, is regarded by old Calvinists as a penal evil.

The second covenant, they represent as formed between God and believers in Jesus Christ. In virtue of which, Christ stands as the representative of his people. Their sins were imputed to him; or, he assumed their responsibilities, acted and suffered in their name and in their behalf. Hence on the condition of faith, his righteousness is imputed to them, that is, is made the ground of their being judicially justified. No one, at all familiar with the writings of the older Calvinists, can fail to have remarked, that this whole scheme is founded on the idea of representation, and that it involves the assumption of the transfer of *legal obligation* but not of *moral character*. Two things which the Spectator perpetually confounds. And here is their radical misconception, as we have already remarked. Nothing is more common than to illustrate this idea, by a reference to transfer of pecuniary obligations, which is a matter of every day occurrence. But, as the cases are not in all respects analogous, the old Calvinists are very careful in stating the difference, and in asserting the justice and propriety (under certain circumstances) of the transfer of legal obligation even in cases of crime. And although this, from the nature of the case, can rarely occur in human governments, as no man has a right to dispose of life or limb, yet it is not without example.

It is on this idea of representation, of one acting for another, that they maintained the imputation of Adam's sin to his posterity, of our sins to Christ, and of his righteousness to us. The nature of this imputation is in all these cases the same. They are all considered as forensic transactions. The obligation to punishment, in the two former cases, and the title to pardon and acceptance, in the last, arising not out of the *moral character*, but the *legal standing* of those concerned. Christ's obligation to suffer arose not from the moral transfer of our sins, but from his voluntary assumption of our law-place, if modern ears will indure the phrase. And our obligation to suffer for Adam's sin, *so far as that sin is concerned*,* arises

* These are points taught to children in their Catechism:

“ Q. How is original sin usually distinguished ?

A. Into original sin *imputed*, and original sin *inherent*.

Q. What is original sin imputed ?

A. The guilt of Adam's first sin.

Q. What is original sin inherent ?

A. The want of original righteousness, and the corruption of the whole nature.

Q. What do you understand by the guilt of sin ?

A. An obligation to punishment on account of sin. Rom. vi. 23. [Of

solely from his being our representative, and not from our participation in *its* moral turpitude. And so finally, they taught, that the believer's title to pardon and heaven, is not in himself. Christ's righteousness is his, not morally, but judicially. Hence the distinction between imputed and inherent righteousness; and between imputed and inherent sin. The former is laid to our account, on the ground of its being the act of our representative, but is not in us, nor morally appertaining to us; it affects our standing in the eye of the law, but not our moral character: the latter is ours in a moral sense.*

We have stated, that the imputation spoken of in all these cases is, in nature, the same, and therefore, that what is said of the imputation of our sins to Christ, and of his righteousness to us, is properly appealed to in illustration of the nature of imputation, when spoken of in reference to Adam's sin. To this the Protestant strongly objects. "I cannot but notice one thing more," he says, "the reviewer every where in his piece, appeals to the *imputation of Christ's righteousness*, as decisive of the manner in which Adam's sin is imputed to us. Now this is the very point which Calvin in so many words denies," &c. p. 161. Again, on the next page, "As the reviewer so often refers to the doctrine of imputation as triumphantly established in Christ's sufferings and merits, and seems to think that nothing more is necessary, than merely to make the appeal in this way, in order to justify such a putative scheme as he defends; I add one more question for his solution, viz. 'Is the righteousness of Christ ever imputed to sinners, *without any actual repentance and faith?* If not, then how can the analogy prove that Adam's sin is imputed to us, without any act on our part; and that we are condemned before any actual sin at all?' He does not appear once to have thought that here is a difficulty, which no part of his explana-

course the guilt of Adam's sin which rests on us, is an obligation to punishment for that sin, not its moral turpitude.]

Q. How are all mankind guilty of Adam's first sin?

A. By imputation, [not inherently.] Rom. v. 19. "By one man's disobedience many were made sinners."

Q. Upon what account is Adam's first sin imputed to his posterity?

A. On account of the legal union betwixt him and them, he being their legal head and representative, and the covenant being made with him, not for himself only, but for his posterity; likewise 1 Cor. xv. 22. "In Adam all die." See Fisher's Catechism.

* Our exposure to punishment for our own inherent depravity is a different affair.

tions has even glanced at. Nay, he does not even suppose it possible to make any difficulty." He is mistaken as to both points. The idea is one of the most familiar connected with the whole subject; and in our former article, p. 435, the distinction, to which he refers, is clearly stated, and abundantly implied elsewhere. The Protestant's difficulty evidently arises from his allowing his mind to turn from the *nature* to the *justice* of imputation in these several cases. Now, although there is a great and obvious difference between the appointment of a person as a representative, with the consent of those for whom he acts, and his being so constituted without that consent, yet the difference does not refer to the nature of representation, but to the justice of the case. Thus a child may either choose its own guardian, or he may be appointed by a competent authority, without the child's knowledge or consent. In either case, the appointment is valid; and the guardian is the legal representative of the child, and his acts are binding as such. Any objection, therefore, to the justice of such an appointment, has nothing to do with the nature of the relation between a guardian and his ward. Nor has an objection to the justice of Adam's being appointed our representative without our consent, any bearing on the nature of the relation which old Calvinists supposed to exist between him and us. If they believed that this was the relation of representation;* and if this were assumed as the ground of imputation in all the cases specified, there is

* This opinion is not confined to old Calvinists. "In this transaction between God the Creator and Governor, and man the creature, in which the law with the promises and threatenings of it, was declared and established in the form of a covenant between God and man, Adam was considered and treated as comprehending all mankind. He being, by divine constitution, the natural head and father of the whole race, they were included and created in him, [this goes beyond us] as one whole, which could not be separated: and, therefore, he is treated as a whole in this transaction. The covenant made with him was made with all mankind, and he was constituted the public and confederating head of the whole race of men, and acted in this capacity, as being the whole; and his obedience was considered as the obedience of mankind; and as by this, Adam was to obtain eternal life, had he performed it, this comprehended and insured the eternal life of all his posterity. And on the contrary, his disobedience was the disobedience of the whole of all mankind; and the threatened penalty did not respect Adam personally, or as a single individual; but his whole posterity, included in him, and represented by him. Therefore the transgression, being the transgression of the whole, brought the threatened punishment on all mankind." We are glad that this is not the language of an old Calvinist, but of Dr. Hopkins. See *System of Doctrines*, vol. 1. p. 245, and abundantly more to the same purpose in the following chapter.

the most obvious propriety in appealing "to the imputation of Christ's righteousness as decisive of the manner in which Adam's sin is imputed to us;" according to the opinion of old Calvinists, especially as they state, with the most abundant frequency, that they mean by imputation in the one case, precisely what they mean by it in the other.

This analogy is asserted by almost every old Calvinist that ever wrote. "We are constituted sinners in Adam, in the same way that we are constituted righteous in Christ; but in Christ we are constituted righteous by imputation of righteousness; therefore, we are made sinners in Adam by the imputation of his sin, otherwise the comparison fails." *Turretin*. "We are accounted righteous through Christ, in the same manner that we are accounted guilty through Adam." *Tuckney*. "As we are made guilty of Adam's sin, which is not inherent in us, but only imputed to us; so are we made righteous, by the righteousness of Christ, which is not inherent in us, but only imputed to us." *Owen*. We might go on for a month making such quotations. Nothing can be plainer than that these men considered these cases as perfectly parallel as to the point in hand, viz. the nature of imputation. And, consequently, if they taught, as the Protestant and Spectator imagine, that the moral turpitude of Adam's sin was transferred to us, then they taught that Christ's moral excellence was thus transferred; that we are made inherently and subjectively holy, and Christ morally a sinner, by imputation: the very assertion which they constantly cast back as the slanderous calumny of Papists and Remonstrants. Why then will our brethren persist in making the same representation?

But if these cases are thus parallel, how is it that Calvin, Turretin, Owen say they differ? asks the Protestant. It might as well be asked, how can cases agree in *one* point, which differ in *another*? Because the imputation of Christ's righteousness, is, as to its nature, analogous to the imputation of Adam's sin—does it hence follow that our justification can in no respect differ from our condemnation? or, in other words, must our relation to Christ and its consequences be, in all respects, analogous to our relation to Adam and *its* consequences? Paul tells us, and all the old Calvinists tell us, "As by the offence of one, judgment came upon all men to condemnation; even so by the righteousness of one, the free gift came upon all men to justification of life," and yet, that these cases differ. The judgment was for one offence; the "free gift" had reference to

many; one is received by voluntary assent on our part, the other comes in virtue of a covenant, or constitution, (if any man prefers that word,) which, though most righteous and benevolent, was formed without our individual concurrence. And besides, we are exposed to condemnation not on account of Adam's sin *only*, but *also* on account of our own inherent hereditary depravity; whereas the righteousness of Christ is the *sole* ground of our justification, our inherent righteousness, or personal holiness being entirely excluded. And this is the precise point of difference referred to by Calvin, in the passage quoted by the Protestant, which he not only misunderstands, but mistranslates. After saying there are two points of difference between Christ and Adam, which the apostle passes over because they were not to his purpose, he adds, "Prior est, quod, peccato Adae, non per SOLAM imputationem damnatur, acsi alieni peccati exigeretur a nobis poena; sed ideo poenam ejus sustinemus quia ET culpae sumus rei, quatenus scilicet natura nostra in ipso vitiata, iniquitatis reatu obstringitur apud Deum." The plain meaning of which is, that we are not condemned on the ground of the imputation of Adam's sin *solely*, but *also*, on account of our own depraved nature; whereas, the righteousness of Christ is the *sole* ground of our justification, our sanctification having nothing to do with it. This is the difference to which he refers. Precisely the doctrine of our standards, which makes original sin to consist not only in the guilt of Adam's sin, but also in corruption of nature. Two very different things. The reason of Calvin's insisting so much on this point was, that many of the leading Catholics of his day, with whom he was in perpetual controversy, maintained that original sin consisted *solely* in the imputation of Adam's sin; that there was no corruption of nature, or hereditary depravity. Hence Calvin says, it is not *solely* on the former ground, but *also* on the latter that we are liable to condemnation. And hence too, in all his writings, he insists mainly on the idea of inherent depravity, saying little of imputation; the former being denied, the latter admitted, by his immediate opponents. This is so strikingly the case, that instead of being quoted as holding the doctrine of imputation in a stronger sense than that in which we have presented it, he is commonly appealed to by its adversaries as not holding it at all.

The Protestant need only throw his eye a second time upon the above passage, to see that he has misapprehended its meaning and erred in his translation. He makes Calvin say, "We

are condemned, not by imputation merely, as if punishment were exacted of us for another's sin, but we undergo its punishment (viz. the punishment of Adam's sin,) *because we are chargeable with its criminality*, (viz. the criminality of Adam's sin,) [directly against the reviewer again.]” Yes, and against Calvin too; for there is nothing in the original to answer to the word *ITS*, and the insertion entirely alters the sense. Calvin does not say, that we are chargeable with the criminality of Adam's sin, but just the reverse: “non per solam imputationem damnatur, acsi alieni peccati exigeretur a nobis poena; sed ideo poenam ejus sustinemus, quia et culpae sumus rei, quatenus scilicet natura nostra in ipso vitata, iniquitatis reatu obstringitur apud Deum.” “We are condemned not on the ground of imputation *solely*, as though the punishment of another's sin was exacted of us; but we endure its punishment because we are *also* ourselves culpable, (how? of Adam's sin? by no means, but we are culpable,) in as much as, viz. our nature having been vitiated in him, is morally guilty before God,” (iniquitatis reatu obstringitur apud Deum.) Here is a precise statement of the sense in which we are morally guilty, not by imputation, but on account of our own inherent depravity. Two things which the Protestant seems fated never to discriminate.

Besides, the Protestant after making Calvin say, “we are chargeable with *its* criminality, (viz. the criminality of Adam's sin,)” thus renders and expounds the immediately succeeding and explanatory clause, beginning, “Quatenus scilicet,” &c. “Since our nature being in fact vitiated in him, stands chargeable before God with criminality, i. e. *with sin of the same nature with his.*” Now, it certainly is one thing to say we are chargeable with Adam's sin, and another that we are chargeable with sin of the same nature with his. Hundreds who admit the latter, deny the former. Yet the Protestant makes Calvin in one and the same sentence say, we are chargeable with the one, since we are chargeable with the other. That is, we are guilty of Adam's sin, because guilty of one like it. This, in our opinion, is giving the great Reformer credit for very little sense. We make these criticisms with perfect candour. Of their correctness let the reader judge. This “egregious mistake” of the Protestant (we use his own language, p. 158,) doubtless arose from his not having thought it his “duty to launch into the dispute about imputation,” nor, as we presume, to examine it. To the same cause is probably to be traced the character of the following para-

graph; which strikes us as being peculiarly out of taste and unfortunate. "This (the passage quoted from Calvin) settles the whole controversy at a single stroke—not as to what is truth—but as to what is old *Calvinism*. If Calvin be not permitted to speak for himself, this is one thing; but if he be, then Tuckney, and De Moor, and the reviewer's notable French Synod, would have done well to read Calvin instead of arguing *a priori* in order to prove what he has said." It settles nothing at all, except that Calvin admitted both doctrines, the imputation of Adam's sin and inherent depravity. It is true, if the clause, "*acsi alieni peccati exigeretur a nobis poena,*" be cut to the quick, and taken apart from its connection, it does deny our doctrine and Calvin's own assertion. For in saying that Adam's sin is not the *sole* ground, it admits that it is *one* ground of our condemnation. If I say a man is condemned, not for piracy merely, but also for murder, do I not assert that both are the ground of his condemnation? If the clause in question be viewed, historically, in the light thrown upon it by the opinions of those with whom Calvin was contending; and in connection with other declarations in his works, its consistency with the common Calvinistic theory will be apparent. He meant to say in opposition to Pighius and other Catholics, that men were not condemned on the ground of the act of another, solely, without having a depraved moral character; but being inherently corrupt, were in themselves deserving of death.

This is a distinction which he often makes. In his creed written for the school at Geneva, he says, "*Quo fit, ut singuli nascuntur originali peccato infecti, et ab ipso maledicti, et a Deo damnati, non propter alienum delictum duntaxat, sed propter improbitatem, quæ intra eos est.*" Whence, it is clear that according to Calvin, men are condemned both *propter alienum peccatum*, and their own depravity. The same sentiment occurs frequently. But supposing we should admit, not, that Calvin taught that Adam's sin was morally our sin, for of this the passage contains not a shadow of proof, but that he denied the doctrine of imputation altogether, *nullius addicti jurare in verba magistri*, it would not much concern us. We have not undertaken to prove that Calvin taught this or that doctrine, but that Calvinists as a class, never believed that imputation involved a transfer of moral character.

It is, moreover, a novel idea to us, that a sentence from Calvin can settle at a single stroke, a controversy as to what Calvinists as a body have believed. We have not been accustomed

to suppose that they squared their faith by such a rule, or considered either his Institutes or Commentaries the ultimate and sole standard of orthodoxy. Tried by this rule, the Synod of Dort, the Westminster Divines, the old Puritans, and even Beza and Turretin were no Calvinists. Sure it is, we are not. There is much in Calvin which we do not believe and never have. We do not believe that Christ descended *ad inferos* and suffered the pains of the lost. Yet Calvin not only taught this, but that it was of great importance to believe it. A controversy of this kind is not so easily settled. The only proper standard by which to decide what Calvinism is, is the confessions of the Reformed Churches and the current writings of standard Calvinistic authors. We make these remarks merely in reference to the Protestant's short and easy method of dispatching the business; not at all, as admitting that Calvin rejected the doctrine of imputation. Controversy seems to have had in him, in a measure, its natural effect. As his opponents went to one extreme, he may have verged towards the other. As they, in regard to original sin, made by far too much of imputation, he was under a strong bias to make too little of it. As they denied entirely the corruption of nature, he was inclined to give it an overshadowing importance. Yet, as we have just seen, his works contain explicit declarations of his having held both points, as the great body of Calvinists has ever done.

But to return from this digression. The point of difference between "Christ and Adam," to which Calvin refers, does not, therefore, pertain to the nature of imputation, which is the matter now in debate, but to the fact that, although inherent sin enters into the ground of our condemnation, inherent righteousness is no part of the ground of our justification. It is stated very nearly in the same terms by Turretin and others, who, notwithstanding, uniformly maintain, that we are constituted sinners in Adam (*eodem modo, eadem ratione*) in the same manner that we are constituted righteous in Christ. Turretin, vol. ii. p. 703, in refuting the Catholic doctrine of justification, says, "Christus per obedientiam suam recte dicitur nos justos constituere non per inhaerentem justitiam, sed per imputatam, ut Rom. iv. 6, docetur et ex oppositione antecedentis condemnationis, cap. 5, 19, colligitur. Justi enim non minus constituuntur coram Deo, qui propter obedientiam Christi ipsis imputatam absolvuntur à meritis poenis, quam ii qui propter Adami inobedientiam injusti constituuntur, i. e. rei sunt mor-

tis et condemnationis." Here then, it is expressly stated, the obedience by which we are constituted just in the sight of God, is not inherent (that which affects or forms our own moral character) but imputed, (i. e. laid to our account) exactly as the disobedience of Adam by which we are constituted unjust, i. e. exposed to death and condemnation, is not inherent in us. So far, the cases are parallel—that is, so far as imputation is concerned. But after this, the parallel does not hold; because we derive from Adam a corrupt nature (inherent depravity) which is *also* a ground of exposure to death, whereas the internal holiness which is the fruit of Christ's Spirit is no part of the ground of our justification. "Nec si Adamus nos *etiam* injustos constituit effective per propagationem vitiositatis inhaerentis, propter quam *etiam* rei mortis sumus coram Deo, sequitur pariter Christum nos justos constituere per justificationem forensem judicii Dei per justitiam inhaerentem nobis ab ipso datam." The precise doctrine of Calvin, and our standards, and of the Repertory.

This seems the proper place to correct another mistake of the Protestant. After quoting from the Gallic Confession, 1566, the declaration, "*Original sin, is vere peccatum, by which all men, even infants in the womb, are subject to eternal death,*" he says, "Now the old Calvinists did not make two sins, first Adam's, and secondly original sin as resulting from it. All was *one* sin, (*peccatum originis*) reaching throughout the whole race, even to infants in the womb. It must then be in their *union* to Adam, that infants in the womb have *vere peccatum*, i. e. what is *really* and *truly* sin. But the reviewer says their sinning in Adam was merely *putative*—that to make it really and truly their sin, destroys the very idea of imputation. It is perfectly clear, therefore, that his view of the subject is diametrically opposed to that of the Gallican churches." It need hardly be remarked that we have here again the pervading misapprehension to which we have so often referred. Old Calvinists *did* make two sins, first the sin of Adam, and secondly inherent depravity resulting from it. The former is ours *forensically*, in the eye of the law; the latter morally. The former is never said to be in us *vere peccatum*; the latter, by Calvinists, always. This is a distinction which Calvin makes in the very passage quoted by the Protestant. It is made *totidem verbis* by Turretin, as we have just stated. It is made in the very catechisms of the Church. Original sin consists "in the guilt of Adam's first sin,"

“and the corruption of the whole nature.” See also the passage quoted above from Fisher. “Original sin is usually distinguished into original sin *imputed*, and original sin *inherent*.” The Augsburg Confession, in a formal definition of original sin, makes the same distinction. “Intelligimus, autem peccatum originis, quod sic vocant Sancti Patres, et omnes orthodoxi et pie eruditi in ecclesia videlicet reatum quo nascentes propter Adæ lapsum rei sunt iræ Dei et mortis æternæ, ET ipsam corruptionem humanæ naturæ propagatam ab Adamo.” Turretin, in speaking of the adversaries of the doctrine of imputation, includes those who do not make the distinction in question. Thus Placaëus, he says, “Adversariorum commentum adoptavit, et dum totam rationem labis originalis constituit in habituali, subjectiva et inhaerenti corruptione, quæ ad singulos per generationem ordinariam propagatur, imputationem istam rejicit.” Our French Synod, for which the Protestant seems to have so little respect, but who in charity may be supposed to have known what were their own doctrines, formally condemned the view which he asserts was the common doctrine of Calvinists. “Synodus damnavit doctrinam ejusmodi, quatenus peccati originalis naturam ad corruptionem hæreditariam posterorum Adæ ita restringit, ut imputationem excludat primi illius peccati, quo lapsus est Adam.” The Westminster Assembly, as we have already seen, in their Catechism, assume the very same ground. Burgess, one of the leading members of that Assembly, in his work on Original Sin, p. 32, says, “As in and by Christ there is an imputed righteousness, which is that properly which justifieth, and as an effect of this, we have also an inherent righteousness, which in heaven will be completed and perfected: Thus by Adam we have imputed sin with the guilt of it, and inherent sin the effect of it.” Again, p. 35, “The Apostle distinguisheth Adam’s imputed sin, and inherent sin, as two sins,” (“directly in the very teeth of the” Protestant, if we may be permitted to borrow one of his own forcible expressions.) “By imputed sin, we are said to sin in him actually, as it were, because his will was our will, (*jure repræsentationis*) but by inherent sin, we are made sinners by intrinsical pollution.” We sin in Adam as we obey and suffer in Christ, the disobedience of the one is ours, in the same way, and in the same sense, in which the obedience of the other is ours. In neither case is the moral character of the act of one person transferred to ano-

ther, which is a glaring absurdity. We hope there is not a single reader who does not perceive how surprisingly the Protestant has erred in his appeal to the old confessions. The passages which he quotes, have nothing at all to do with the subject of imputation, but were intended to define the nature of that *hereditarium vitium* which is diffused through the race. As the term original sin is used sometimes in a broader, and sometimes in a more restricted sense; sometimes as including both imputed and inherent sin, and sometimes only the latter, the Protestant has strangely confounded the two things. The early Reformed churches were anxious to guard, on the one hand, against the doctrine of some of the Catholics, that original sin consisted *solely* in imputation, without any corruption of nature; and on the other, against the idea that the hereditary evil of which they spoke was a mere disease, and not a moral corruption. Hence we find the assertion reiterated, that this *hereditarium vitium*, is verè peccatum. But never, that imputed sin is verè peccatum. One might as well assert, that, as the sanctification of the heart, or inherent righteousness wrought by the Spirit of God, is truly of a moral character, therefore Christ's imputed righteousness is so too.

In danger of utterly wearying the patience of our readers, and proving to them the same thing for the twentieth time, we must be allowed to make a few more quotations in support of the position which we have assumed. That is, to prove that imputation does not include the transfer of moral character; that in the case of Adam there is a sin, which, by being imputed to us, renders us forensically guilty, but not morally; as in the case of Christ, there is a righteousness, which, by being imputed to us, renders us judicially, but not morally righteous. One would think that enough had been presented, in our former article, abundantly to establish this point. The declaration of Owen, however, that, "*To be alienae culpae reus, MAKES NO MAN A SINNER,*" passes for nothing. His affirming that, "Nothing more is intended by the imputation of sin unto any, than the rendering them justly obnoxious unto the punishment due unto that sin. As the not imputing of sin is the freeing of men from being subject or liable to punishment," produces no effect. In vain, too, does Tuckney say, in one breath, that it is blasphemous to assert that the imputation of our sins to Christ, or his righteousness to us, conveys the moral character of either, and in the other, that we

are accounted righteous through Christ in the same manner that we are accounted guilty through Adam.

Let us see, therefore, whether we can find any thing still plainer on the subject.

Turretin, vol. ii. p. 707, after stating that imputation is of two kinds, 1st, where something is laid to a man's charge which he himself performed, and 2d, where one is regarded as having done what, in fact, he did not perform, infers from this, that to impute "is a forensic term, which is not to be understood physically of infusion of righteousness (or unrighteousness) but judicially and relatively." "Unde colligitur vocem hanc esse forensem, quae not est intelligenda physice de infusione justitiæ, sed *judicialiter et relative*."

Immediately after, in answer to the objection that if a thing is only putative, it is fictitious, he says, the conclusion is not valid: "Cum sit res non minus realis in suo ordine scilicet juridico et forensi, quam infusio in genere morali seu physico." Again, p. 715, * "Justitia inhærens et iustitia imputa, non sunt sub eodem genere, Illa quidem in genere relationis, Ista vero sub genere qualitatis:" Whence he says, the same individual may be denominated just or unjust, sub diversa *σχέσει*. "For when reference is had to the inherent quality, he is called a sinner and impious, but when the external and forensic relation is regarded, he is pronounced just in Christ. It is true indeed, no one can be called inherently just by the righteousness of another, because if it be inherent it is no longer another's. Yet he can, by imputation, be declared *justified*." Again, same page, "When God justifies us on account of the imputed righteousness of Christ, his judgment is still according to truth, because he does not pronounce us just in ourselves subjectively, which would be false, but in another imputatively and relatively, which is, in the strictest sense, true."

Now, in all these cases, if language be capable of expressing ideas, it is most distinctly asserted that imputation is a forensic term; that the act which it expresses does not affect the moral character, but the legal relation of those concerned; that imputed sin and imputed righteousness do not come sub genere qualitatis, but, sub genere relationis. Hence Turretin says, p. 715, "Christus propter imputatum ipsi nostrum peccatum,

* Having already shown that, according to Turretin and other Calvinists, the nature of imputation is the same, whether spoken of in reference to sin or righteousness, such passages are perfectly *ad rem*.

non potest dici peccator, quod importat corruptionem inhærentem.”

On p. 716, the following passage occur: “ Ut inobedientia Adami vere nos peccatores constituit per imputationem,* (a declaration which will be seized upon with both hands; but hear the whole). Ita et justitia Christi vere nos justificat imputative. Ita *imputatum* bene opponitur *inhaerenti*, sed non *vero*, quia non fingimus imputationem, quae consistat in mera opinione et juris fictione, sed quae maxime realis est et vera, SED ISTA VERITAS EST IMPUTATIONIS, NON INFUSIONIS, JURIDICA, NON MORALIS.” We shall forever despair of proving any thing, if this does not prove that imputation, according to Turretin, at least, does not involve the transfer of moral character. The imputation of the disobedience of Adam constitutes us sinners, and the imputation of the obedience of Christ constitutes us righteous. Now in what sense? Ans. JURIDICALLY, NOT MORALLY.

There are many passages in the old authors which distinctly assert the absurdity and impossibility of such a transfer of moral character, as the ancient and modern opposers of the doctrine of imputation charge them with believing. Turretin, p. 711, in proving that we are justified by the righteousness of Christ, which is ours, “ non utique per inhaesionem, sed per imputationem,” gives, among others, the following reasons, 1. “ Quia actus unius non potest fieri plurium, nisi per imputationem.” (It cannot become theirs by transfer, or infusion, it can only, on some ground of union, be laid to their account.) 2. “ Quia *κατακριμα* (Rom. v. 18,) cui opponitur *δικαιωσις ζωης*, non est actus physicus, sed forensis et judicialis.” That is, as the act by which we are constituted, or declared guilty on account of Adam’s sin, is not a physical act rendering us morally guilty; so our justification, on account of the righteousness of

*Some may say here is a direct contradiction. Imputation constitutes one truly a sinner, yet just before, our sin being imputed to Christ does not render him a sinner. And so there is a point-blank contradiction. Exactly such an one as the Protestant says he has a thousand times charged on old Calvinists, and which he, or any one else, may charge on any author in the world, if you take his words out from their connexion, and force on them a sense which they by themselves may bear, but which was never intended. To any man who thinks a moment on the subject, there is no contradiction. Imputation of sin constitutes us sinners in one sense, but not in another; in the eye of the law, but not morally. Thus Paul says that Christ, though he knew no sin, was made sin, (i. e. a sinner.) As much of a contradiction, as in the passages before us.

Christ is not a rendering us formally or subjectively righteous. In each case the process is forensic and judicial. And immediately after he quotes the following passage from Bellarmin, as containing a full admission of the doctrine of imputation: "*Peccatum Adami communicatur nobis eo modo, quo communicari potest quod transit, nimirum per imputationem.*" Sin, therefore, cannot pass by transfer. To this passage from the Catholic Cardinal, Turretin subjoins the remark, that it cannot be inferred from the fact, that we are also rendered sinners and liable to condemnation by the corrupt nature which we inherit from Adam, we are also justified by our inherent righteousness communicated by Christ in regeneration; because the apostle did not mean to teach that the cases are parallel throughout, though they are, as far as imputation is concerned. This is the point of difference to which we have already referred. On the same page we have the declaration, "*Quod est inhaerens opponitur imputato.*" And on the opposite, Christ is our righteousness before God, "*non utique inhaerenter, quia justitia unius ad alium non potest transire, sed imputative.*" It follows too, he says, from 2 Cor. v. 21. "*Eo modo nos effici justitiam Dei in ipso, quo modo factus est pro nobis peccatum. At Christus factus est pro nobis peccatum, non inhaerenter aut subjective, quia non novit peccatum, sed imputative, quia Deus ei imputavit peccata nostra.*"

In every variety of form, therefore, is the idea of transfer of moral character denied and rejected as impossible and absurd, and the assertion that it belongs to the Calvinistic doctrine of imputation treated as a calumny. Turretin, towards the close of his chapter on the imputation of Adam's sin, in speaking of some, who on certain points agreed with Placæus, says, that as to this, they do not depart from the common opinion. This, he states, was the case with Amyraldus, "*qui fuse probat peccatum alienum posse juste imputari iis qui cum auctore aliquo vinculo juncti sunt, licet culpam non participant.*" Here then is a distinct assertion, that imputation does not imply a participation of the criminality of the sin imputed. In this case the word *culpa* is used in its moral sense. In proof of his assertion, Turretin quotes such passages as the following:— "*Ex eo clarum esse potest, quomodo Apostolus intelligat doctrinam justificationis, nempe quod ut condemnatio qua condemnatur in Adamo, non significat qualitatem inhaerentem sed vel obligationem ad poenam, vel obligationis illius declarationem a potestate superiore; Ita justitia qua justificamur in*

Christo, non sit etiam qualitas inhaerens, sed vel jus obtinendæ in judicio divino absolutionis, vel absolutio ipsa a iudice.”

We have taken our extracts principally from Turretin, because we thought a clearer view would be presented, by a comparison of various statements from the same author, than by disjointed declarations from several. We have pursued this course, the rather, because the Spectator does not pretend that Turretin differs from common Calvinists in his views on this subject. They themselves quote him as holding, what they consider the old Calvinistic scheme, and endeavour to show from his writings, that we have erred in our understanding and exposition of the point under discussion. He is an authority, therefore, to which, as to the question of fact, they will cheerfully bow. It would be easy, however, to multiply quotations to almost any extent from the whole range of standard Calvinistic writers in support of the views which we have presented. A very few by way of example, will suffice. MARK, who has ever been considered as one of the most thorough and consistent theologians of the old school, in his *Historia Paradisi Illustrata*, has a chapter on imputation, in which, as well as in his *System of Theology*, the doctrine is presented precisely as we have exhibited it. According to him, the union, which is the ground of the imputation of Adam's sin—is that of representation, he being the common father and representative of the race. In his introductory paragraph he says, he proposes to speak, “*de omnium naturalium posterorum representatione in Adamo ut cum uni parente et foederis capite.*” p. 753. In Rom. v. 12, he says, we are taught the doctrine of imputation because all men are said “to have *sinned in Adam.*” This sinning *in Adam*, however, according to him, is asserted, not on the ground of a mysterious personal union—but “*Peccatum omnibus tribui actuale in eo uno homine Adamo, eos repræsentante.*” (The same doctrine is taught in the passage, he says, though εἴη ᾧ be rendered *eo quod*, or *quandoquidem.*)

The analogy between the imputation of Christ's righteousness and the sin of Adam, is repeatedly and strongly asserted. An analogy so strict, as far as imputation is concerned, that all the difficulties “*tum exceptiones, tum objectiones,*” which are urged against the one, bear against the other; whether they be derived “*a Dei justitia et veritate, ab actus et personæ Adamicæ singularitate, ex sceleris longe ante nos præterito tempore, ex posterorum nulla scientia vel consensione in illud, ex non imputatis aliis omnibus factis et fatis Adami,*” or from

any other source. Hence, he says, there is the greatest ground of apprehension, (“metus justissimus sit,”) if the one be rejected, the other will be discarded also. And, therefore, “mirandum æque quam dolendum est,”) that some, (Placæus and his followers) bearing the name of Reformed Theologians, should “sub specie curatioris attentionis et majoris cujusdam sapientiae,”) revive these very objections, which, in his apprehension, the orthodox had answered “tam solide et late,”) against the Socinians and Remonstrants. “Quod ne serpat latius ad ecclesiae patriæque totius novam turbationem et Pelagianismi importunam reductionem, faxit pro sapientia et bonitate sua Deus!”*

In direct opposition to the Protestant’s assertion, that “Old Calvinists did not make two sins, first Adam’s sin, and secondly original sin (depravity) as resulting from it,”) he, in common with all the Reformers, almost without exception, and the whole body of the reformed, constantly make the distinction between imputed sin and inherent corruption, maintaining that the latter could not be reconciled with God’s justice, without the admission of the former. “Whatever is said,”) he remarks, “of a natural law, according to which corrupted Adam should beget a corrupt posterity, as a wolf begets a wolf, and a diseased man diseased children; and of no one being able to communicate to another what he has not himself, &c. it is all utterly vain, unless the JUDICIAL imputation of Adam’s act be admitted.” “Id omne, absque admissa judiciali imputatione Adamici facti, vanissimum est.” p. 756. And on the preceding page, he complains of Placæus as “not admitting imputation as the antecedent and cause of native corruption flowing from it.” And adds, “Enim vero si ipsa Adami transgressio prima nos non constituit damnabiles, nec corruptio nativa pro poena illius in nobis debet haberi, sed ob Adami peccaminosam similitudinem tantum rei coram Deo simus aut fiamus, jam revera imputatio illa tollitur.” The idea, therefore, that we are guilty, i. e. exposed to condemnation, because of our sinful likeness to Adam merely, which the Protestant represents as the true Calvinistic doctrine, is expressly rejected. This view

* We presume our brethren will consider this as another specimen of the *ad invidiam* argument. Though we question whether the idea entered their minds, that their making Owen assert that those who held our doctrine were pretty near Socinianism, was any thing of the like nature. We do not object to their remark, for we are not, as we think, quite so sensitive as they are.

of the judicial imputation of Adam's sin, as the cause and ground of innate corruption, is not a later addition to Calvinism, as has been inconsiderately asserted, but was taught by Calvin himself, and almost all his brother reformers. Calvin says, "*Deum justo judicio nobis in Adamo maledixisse ac voluisse nos ob illius peccatum corruptos nasci, peccasse unum, omnes ad poenam trahi,*" &c. It is by the just judgment of God, therefore, according to Calvin, and as a punishment for Adam's sin, that we are born corrupt. To the same effect Beza speaks of the "corruptio, quae est poena istius culpae imposita tam Adamo quam posteris." And Martyr strongly asserts, "profecto neminem esse qui ambigat, peccatum originale nobis infligi in ultionem et poenam primi lapsus."

This view, as already stated, is not confined to Calvinists. The Augsburg confession, as quoted above, clearly expresses it. And further, the standards of the Lutheran Church assert that, "*Justo Dei judicio (in poenam hominum) justitia concreata seu originalis amissa esset,*" by which defect, privation, or spoliation, human nature is corrupted. See Bretschneider, vol. 2. p. 33. This writer immediately adds, the same sentiment is contained in the assertion of the Apology I. p. 58. "*Defectus et concupiscentia sunt poenæ, (des Adamischen Vergehens, von dem die Rede ist.) Melancthon held the same doctrine. "Melancthon betrachtete auch den Verlust des Ebenbildes und des Entstehen der concupiscentia als Strafe für Adam's Vergehen."* And in the next page he quotes from his *Loci Theolog.* the following passage, "*Revera autem perpetua Ecclesiae sententia est, prophetarum, apostolorum et scriptorum veterum: peccatum originis non tantum esse imputationem, sed in ipsa hominum natura caliginem et privitatem.*"* Here we have the common view to which we have so often referred, original sin includes both imputation of Adam's sin, and inherent depravity. Bretschneider himself says expressly, that according to the Schmalkald Articles and the Form of Concord, "*Beides, das Vergehens Adams sowohl als das dadurch entstandene Verderben selbst Ursache der Strafe sey.*" "*Both Adam's transgression, and the corruption thereby occasioned, is the ground of punishment.*" Here, "*are two sins—first Adam's, and secondly depravity resulting from it.*"

We refer to this expression of opinion by the early Reformers, to show that not merely Calvinists, but Lutherans also,

* *Loci Theologici*, p. 86. Detzer's edition, 1828.

held the doctrine of imputation as we have exhibited it. That they held the doctrine cannot be denied, and the way in which they understood it, is plain, from their calling imputation a forensic or judicial act, a declaration of one as a sinner in the eye of the law, in opposition to his being rendered so in a moral sense; precisely as justification is a rendering just legally, not morally. The same thing is plain from the illustrations of the subject, with which their works abound—illustrations borrowed from the imputation of our sins to Christ, of his righteousness to us, of parents' sins to their children, &c. and finally from the constant representation of inherent, innate depravity, as a penal evil. If penal, of what is it the punishment? Of Adam's sin. Then, if this sin be morally ours, they taught that men are punished with moral depravity for being morally depraved—they assumed the existence of corruption, to account for its existence! All becomes plain, if you will allow these men to mean what they say they meant, viz. that in virtue of our union with Adam as our common father and representative, his offence is judicially regarded (not physically rendered) ours, and on the ground of its imputation to us, (i.e. of its being judicially laid to our account,) the penalty came on us as well as on him; hence the loss of original righteousness and corruption of nature, are penal evils.

This, we are persuaded, is the common Calvinistic doctrine on this subject. The Protestant blames us for being so confident as to this matter. We *are* confident; and to such a degree, that we are willing to submit to all the mortification arising from the exposure of ignorance, where ignorance is most disgraceful, viz. of one's own long cherished opinions, if either the Protestant or Spectator will accomplish the task as to the point in debate. Let it be recollected what that point is: Does the doctrine of imputation, as taught by old Calvinists as a body, include the ideas of "literal oneness" and transfer of moral acts, or moral character? Prove the affirmative of this, and we stand ready to confess ignorance, and to renounce old Calvinism. As both the Protestant and Spectator have made the attempt, and repeated it, without, in our judgment, with modesty be it spoken, throwing the weight of a straw's shadow into the opposite scale, our confidence, to say the least, is not weakened. We make this remark in no overweening spirit. But having been thus taught the doctrine in question, on our mother's knees—having heard it thus explained from the catechism and pulpit all our lives,—to have it now asserted, "you

know nothing of the matter; the true doctrine includes impossibilities and absurdities (and blasphemies too) of the most monstrous kind," takes us not a little by surprise, and finds us not a little incredulous.

Let us, however, for a moment see what are the most plausible grounds on which their allegations rest. The Protestant, indeed, tells us, "he has not thought it his duty to launch into the dispute itself about imputation," but intended to make only "a few observations." In these observations he does not deny that the exhibition, given in the Repertory, of the views of Turretin, Owen, &c. is correct. He says, indeed, these writers contradict themselves, but that they taught as we have represented them to do, he admits. For he has not said a word to rebut the positive declarations, which we adduced from their writings, but questions their competency as witnesses, as to what Calvinism is. If, therefore, we had no other opponent in this discussion, we assuredly should not have thought it necessary to say another word on the subject, until he had so far condescended as to show, either, that Turretin, Owen, De Moor, Tuckney, and the French Synod of 1645, were not Calvinists, or that we had misapprehended or misstated their views.

He expresses great surprise at our appealing to such authorities. "I confess," he says, "this mode of establishing the reviewer's opinions, struck me with not a little surprise. What? A *Presbyterian*, and leave the Westminster confession out of view?" Again, "But why did he not go to the *standards* of the Calvinistic churches, instead of Turretin and Owen? As he has not done it, I must do it for him." p. 159. The answer to all this, is very easy. The point in debate is not, whether Calvinists held the doctrine of imputation, for this is not denied; but, how did they understand it? This question is not to be decided by appealing to the old confessions, because in them we find the mere assertion of the doctrine, not its explication. They tell us that "original sin includes the guilt of Adam's first sin;" the question is, what does this mean? The Protestant and Spectator say it means one thing; we say it means another. Who is to decide? One would think the original framers, adopters and expounders of these confessions—the very persons to whom we appealed—and whose testimony the Protestant so disrespectfully rejects. But if the framers of an instrument are not to be permitted to tell us in what sense they meant it to be understood, we know

not where to go for information. We were very much surprised to find even the Spectator saying, that from our silence with regard to their reference to the Westminster Catechism, they supposed we meant tacitly to admit our dissent from the doctrine of imputation, as taught by the Westminster divines, p. 163. This remark is the more singular, as the very point in dispute was, in what sense those divines and Calvinists generally held the doctrine. It would have been strange indeed to admit our dissent from the very men with whom we were labouring to prove we agreed. Besides, in introducing the testimony of Tuckney, p. 445, we stated that he was a member of the Westminster Assembly, and of the committee to draft the Confession of Faith, and the author of a large part of the Catechism, and therefore, "a peculiarly competent witness as to the sense in which our formularies mean to teach the doctrine of imputation."*

But the Protestant thinks we had very good reasons for not appealing to the old confessions. "What? A *Presbyterian*, and leave the Westminster confession out of view? Why this? was the spontaneous question. For a reason plain enough. The reviewer recollected the answer he used to give, when a child, to a *catechetical* question, viz. *Sinned IN him and fell WITH him in his first transgression*. Indeed? Sinned IN him? Then there is something more than *putative* sin; for here Adam's sin is *our* sin, and his guilt is our guilt," and so on, p. 159. We shall endeavour to answer this seriously. What do our standards and old Calvinists generally, mean when they say, "All mankind sinned *in* Adam?" The expression obviously admits of two interpretations; the one, that which the Protestant and Spectator would put upon it, viz. that in virtue of a "literal oneness," all mankind really acted

* On the same page, the Spectator says of us, that notwithstanding our tacit acknowledgment of dissent from Calvin and the Westminster Divines, "Still they maintain that the doctrine, as they hold it, was the real doctrine of the reformed Churches, though they acknowledge that Doederlin, Bretschneider, and other distinguished writers on theology, are against them on this point." If the Spectator will turn to the passage, p. 438, to which he refers, he will find that we make no such acknowledgment. We were speaking, not of the "Reformed churches," but of "Augustine and his followers." It was to the latter, we stated, these writers attributed the idea of literal and personal oneness, between Adam and his posterity—not to the Reformed Churches. So far from it, they expressly distinguish the theory of Augustine from that of federal union, which they say prevailed among the Reformed. We know of no "distinguished writer on theology" who maintains the ground assumed in the Spectator, in reference to the opinions of the great body of Calvinists.

in him—his act was literally our act. The other proceeds on the principle of representation; we acted in him as our representative. This latter interpretation is at least possible. First, because it is a very familiar mode of expression. Nothing more common. Every monarch is said to do what his representatives do. “The good people of the United States, in Congress assembled.” Were they ever thus actually assembled? Are not the people said to do every thing, that is done in their name? Good, says the Protestant, but we never appointed Adam our representative. True. But this bears on the justice of his being so constituted and so acting; not on the propriety of saying “We sinned *in* him,” on the supposition of his being our representative, which is the only point now at issue. Common usage, then, bears out this interpretation. Secondly, biblical and theological usage does the same. The apostle says, “Levi paid tithes *in* Abraham.” Again, Paul says, in reference to this subject, ἐφ’ ᾧ πάντες ἡμαρτον, which a multitude of commentators, Pelagian, as well as others, render “in whom all sinned.” Do they all hold the doctrine of literal oneness with Adam? Does Whitby, who maintains the words will admit of no other rendering, understand them as expressing this idea? Besides, when the Bible says we died with, or in Christ—are raised in him—do they mean we actually died when he died, and rose when he rose?

The interpretation, therefore, which we put on the phrase in question is possible. But, further, it is the only interpretation which, with a shadow of reason, *can* be put upon it in our standards. First, because, times without number, their authors, and the theological school to which they belonged, expressly declare this to be their meaning—and secondly, because their illustrations prove it. Yet the Spectator, p. 168, says, “The oneness described by Turretin is a literal oneness, not something resulting from stipulation or contract.” We are filled with wonder, that such a declaration should come from such a source. They had before attributed the same doctrine to our standards. Had they been *Presbyterians*, and learnt the catechism, they never could have made such an assertion. “The COVENANT being made with Adam, as a public person, not for him only, but for his posterity, all mankind descended from him by ordinary generation, sinned in him and fell with him in his first transgression.”* If English

* Larger Catechism.

be any longer English, this means, that it was as our representative—as a public person we sinned *in* him—in virtue of an union resulting from a covenant or contract. Let it be noted that this is the *only* union here mentioned. The bond arising from our natural relation to him as our common parent, is not even referred to. It is neglected, because of its secondary importance, representation being the main ground of imputation; so that when representation ceases, imputation ceases, although the natural bond continues. Let us now hear Turretin, who holds “this literal oneness.” “Adamus duplici isto vinculo nobiscum junctus est; 1. *Naturali* quatenus Pater est, et nos ejus filii; 2. *Politico* ac *forensi* quatenus fuit princeps et caput repræsentativum totius generis humani.” This is a formal, precise definition of the nature of the union. Is there any thing mysterious in the bond between parent and child, the representative and those for whom he acts? “The foundation, therefore,” he continues, “of imputation, is not merely the *natural* connexion which exists between us and Adam, for were this the case, all his sins would be imputed to us—but *principally* the *moral* (not physical; just above it was called *political*) and *federal*, on the ground of which God entered into covenant with him as our head. Hence in *that sin*, Adam acted not as a private, but a public person and representative, &c.” p. 679. Here, as before, it is a “oneness” resulting from contract which is made the ground of imputation—the *natural* union is frequently not mentioned at all. Thus, p. 689, in stating in what sense we acted in Adam, or how his act was ours, he says, it is “repræsentationis jure.” Again, p. 690, “Although, after his first sin, Adam did not cease to be our head *ratione originis*, yet he did cease to be our representative head *relatione fæderis*.” And therefore, the ground of imputation no longer existed. Thus *Marck* says, as quoted above, “All men sinned in Adam “*eos repræsentante*.” Again, in his *Medulla*, p. 159, “*Justissima* est autem hæc imputatio, cum Adam omnium fuerit *parens*, coll. Exod. 20, 5, ‘visitans iniquitatem patrum super filios,’ &c. et præterea fæderaliter omnes repræsentaverit.” The *natural* connexion with Adam is, therefore, the relation between parent and child. All mankind, says Fisher, in his exposition of the catechism, “descended from Adam by ordinary generation, were represented by him as their covenant head, and **THEREFORE** sinned in him.” “Qui enim actu nondum fuimus, cum Adamus peccaret, *actu quoque peccare non potuimus*.”

Wenderline, (a strict Calvinistic Hollander) *Christiana Theologia*, p. 258. It is just, however, he says, that Adam's sin should be imputed to us, i. e. considered ours; "Quia Adam totum quoque humanum genus representavit."

Now for some of the illustrations of the nature of this union. First, we were *in* Adam, as we were *in* Christ, the act of the one is ours, as the act of the other is. So Turretin repeatedly, p. 689. As the act of Adam is ours, *repræsentationis jure*, sic justitia Christi est actus unius, and yet ours, on the same principle. Again, *Quamvis non fuerimus* (in Adamo) actu—yet being in him as a father and representative, his act was ours—*Ita quamvis non fuerimus actu in Christo*, still, since he died *for* us, his death is virtually our death. "Ergo ut in Christo satisfecimus, *ita* et in Adamo peccavimus."* Again, we were in Adam as Levi was in Abraham, p. 687. Was this literally?

It is surely unnecessary to dwell longer on this point. The Spectator, indeed, tells us that, according to the old writers, "Adam's posterity, 'were *in* him as branches in a root,' 'as the members are in the head.'" Well, what does this mean? Literal oneness? Surely not. Does every writer who speaks of a father as the root of his family, hold to the idea of a "literal oneness" between them. You may make as little or as much as you please out of such figurative expressions, taken by themselves. But by what rule of interpretation they are to be made to mean directly the reverse of what those who employ them tell us they intend by them, we are at a loss to divine. It must be a strange "literal oneness" which is founded on the common relation of parent and child, or of representation. Yet these are the only bonds between us and Adam which Turretin acknowledges, and of these the former is comparatively of so little importance, as very commonly to be left out of view entirely, when speaking on the subject.

But we must hasten to another point. The main dependence of the Spectator, in his attempt to prove our departure from the old Calvinistic system, is on the use of the word "ill-desert." But words, he tells us, p. 321, are nothing. Let us have ideas. We said, the ill-desert of one man cannot be transferred to another. Turretin says, "The ill-desert of Adam *is* transferred to his posterity." Admitted, freely. Is not this a direct contradiction? Not at all. Turretin says, on one

* Zanch. Epist. quoted and approved by Leidecker, *Fax Veritatis*, p. 444.

page, "Imputation of sin does not constitute one a sinner,"* on the very next, "The imputation of Adam's sin does constitute all men sinners." Is there any contradiction here? So the Protestant would say: but there is none. Let language be interpreted, not by the tinkling of the words, but by the fair and universal rules of construction. Imputation does render a man a sinner, in one sense, and not in another—judicially, not morally. So justification renders a man just in the eye of the law, but not inherently. How often may the same verbal proposition be, with equal propriety, affirmed or denied. How obvious is it, that the same man may, at the same time, be pronounced both just and unjust, sub diversa *σχεσει*. This is an evil—an ambiguity in the sense of terms, which pervades all language, and which subjects every writer to the charge of contradicting himself and every body else, any one may take a fancy to place in opposition to him. The word *guilt* is as ambiguous as the word *sinner*. It is sometimes used in a moral, at others in a legal sense; and so is the word *ill-desert*. We used it in the former, Turretin in the latter. These are points to be proved. As to the first, viz. that we used the word *ill-desert* in its moral sense, it is plain, if from no other fact, at least from this, that the Spectator so understood it, so understands, and so urges it. He, therefore, at least, must be satisfied. It is plain, too, from this fact, that we, (in the history of Pelagianism) interchanged it with the phrases "moral acts" and "moral character," in a way clearly to evince that we employed them as equivalent expressions. And the Spectator quotes them, as meaning precisely the same thing. That this was our meaning, is still plainer, if possible, from the fact, that in the long discussion of the nature of imputation, the word *ill-desert* does not occur at all. Seeing the confusion of ideas which prevailed, we endeavour to prevent all cause of stumbling, by avoiding an ambiguous word, and by repeating, we fear to weariness, that it was "moral acts," "moral character," "moral turpitude," the transfer of which we denied; and so again the Spectator understood us. The difficulty is, not that they have mistaken our meaning, but that they misunderstand Turretin. All we have to prove, is that they consider Turretin to use the word *ill-desert* in a moral sense, as equivalent to moral turpitude, or moral character; and secondly, that in this they commit an obvious mis-

* So Owen, "To be *culpæ alienæ vereus* makes no man a sinner."

take. If we establish these two points, we shall be in clear day again. As to the first, it hardly needs proof, for it is the very point they have from the beginning been labouring to establish—viz. that imputation conveys the moral character of the act imputed. On page 165, they ask, “What then *was* our sin in Adam? It was, as Turretin tell us, in a passage quoted above, (*commune peccatum, communis culpa*) ‘a sin, a criminality *common* to Adam and his whole race.’ But they all affirm, that it was ‘*vere peccatum,*’ ‘*truly sin,*’ AS TRULY SO AS ARE ANY OF OUR PERSONAL, i. e. ACTUAL TRANSGRESSIONS.”*

Now as to the second point, viz: that Turretin and other Calvinists do not use the words *guilt, demerit, ill-desert, &c.* as the Spectator understands them, in a moral sense, we have already proved it, and might abundantly prove it again, because they expressly, repeatedly and pointedly affirm the contrary. Thus, when he says, “We are constituted truly sinners by the imputation of Adam’s sin,” he tells us as plainly as language permits, in what sense, “*ISTA VERITAS EST IMPUTATIONIS, NON INFUSIONIS, JURIDICA, NON MORALIS.*” The sin of Adam is a *common* sin. In the Spectator’s sense or ours? Let Turretin answer. The act of Adam is universal (or common) *repræsentationis jure—quia individuum illud universum genus humanum repræsentavit. Sic Justitia Christi,*” is common on the same ground and in the same way, p. 689. Again, To impute is a forensic term, meaning to set to one’s account, “*non est actus physicus, sed forensis et judicialis;*” it is to render one a sinner in the eye of the law, not morally—as the imputation of righteousness renders legally, and not inherently just. Alas! how often must this be said? Again. Imputed sin is constantly opposed to inherent. The one comes under the category of *relation*, the other under that of *quality*—one affects our legal standing, and the other our moral character. See above.

We might prove the point in hand, 2dly, from the illustrations which he gives of the subject. These illustrations are drawn from the imputation of Christ’s righteousness to us, of our sins to Him—of those parental sins, which are visited on children, &c. Take two passages in addition to those already quoted. “As the righteousness of Christ, which is one, can yet be communicated by imputation, to an innumerable mul-

* These capitals are ours.

titude; and as the guilt of those sins of parents which are imputed to their descendants, is one and the same, which passes upon all; so nothing prevents the guilt of Adam's sin being one and equal, which passes on all men." p. 690. The guilt of Adam passes, therefore, as the righteousness of Christ does, and as the guilt of those parental sins which are imputed to their children. Now, if any sane man will maintain that the righteousness of Christ, according to Turretin, is rendered morally ours; or, more monstrous still, that the moral turpitude of parents is transferred to their children—then we shall leave him in undisturbed possession of his opinion. Again, to the same effect, p. 689. "It is inconsistent with divine justice that any should be punished for a sin foreign to him, *foreign* in every sense of the word; but not for a sin, which, although it be foreign *ratione personæ*, is yet *common* in virtue of representation or some bond of union, by which its guilt may involve many—for, that this may justly happen, the threatenings of the law, and the judgments by which they are executed, and the example of Christ, to whom our sins were truly imputed, demonstrate." Here, then, notice, first, in what sense Adam's sin is a *common* sin, viz. in virtue of union with him as our representative and parent; and secondly, that as his guilt involves us, so the guilt of parents involve their children, (*when their sins are imputed to them*), and so our guilt involves Christ. Now will not the Spectator frankly admit that the guilt, the demerit, the ill-desert of which Turretin speaks as being transferred—is not moral character or turpitude—but legal responsibility—such as exists between a sponsor and him for whom he acts—a surety and debtor—Christ and his people—an obligation to suffer—a *dignitas pœnæ* arising out of the legal relations, and not out of the moral character of those concerned? Will they, or *can* they, charge the greatest and holiest men of the Church with holding the blasphemous doctrine, that Christ was rendered morally a sinner, by the transfer of our sins?

We should have to go over the whole ground anew, were we to exhibit all the evidence, which we might adduce, to prove that Turretin and old Calvinists generally, do not use the words guilt, demerit, ill-desert in a moral sense. If they do, then they held the transfer of moral character; admit the validity of all the objections of their opponents; acknowledge as true, what they pronounce to be as absurd and impossible, as to be wise with another's wisdom, honest with another's integrity,

or comely with another's beauty; they maintain the communication of that which they declare to be "as inseparable and incommunicable as any other attribute of a thing or its essence itself." Into such a maze of endless self-contradiction and absurdity do we necessarily involve them, when we insist on interpreting their language, out of its connexion, according to our own preconceived notions—insisting upon it, that because we are accustomed to attach the idea of moral pollution to the words guilt, sinner, demerit, they must have done so too. Accordingly the Protestant has nerve enough to say, for the thousandth time—that all these men are travelling a perpetual round of self-contradiction—affirming and denying, in rapid succession, precisely the same thing. But what, let us ask, is the use of the "new exegesis," (*sensus communis redidivus*,) if all its principles are to be trampled under foot—if a writer, instead of having his language explained agreeably to the *usus loquendi* of his age and school—to his own definitions, explanations, and arguments, and in accordance with his own system and the nature of the subject—is to be made, without the slightest necessity, to use terms in the sense in which we may happen to be accustomed to employ them? What kind of reasoning, for example, is this, To be truly a sinner, is to have a sinful moral character. Turretin says, we are rendered truly sinners by imputation of sin—ergo—Turretin taught that imputation of sin conveys a sinful moral character. Q. E. D.? Or this: To be truly righteous, is to have a righteous moral character, (i.e. a moral character conformed to the law.) Calvinists say, we are constituted truly righteous by the imputation of righteousness—ergo—imputation conveys moral character. Q. E. D.? Yet here is the concentrated essence of sixty pages of argumentation. And what does it amount to? to a very ingenious specimen of that kind of syllogism in which the major proposition includes a *petitio principii*. In assuming that the terms "sinner" and "righteous," are used in a moral sense, the very thing to be proved is taken for granted. Against this assumption old Calvinists constantly protest, and state with tiresome frequency, that they use these words as they occur in the Bible—in courts of law, and a thousand times in common life, not in a moral, but in a legal or forensic sense; that to be legally a sinner is one thing, and morally so, another—to be legally righteous is one thing, and morally so, another. If our brethren, however, will have it, that because the terms, in their opinion, should always include the idea of

moral character, therefore old Calvinists do in fact so employ them, we venture to predict they will stand very much alone in their opinion.*

But it is high time to draw this article to a close. There are properly two questions involved in this discussion. The one relates to the nature of imputation: Does it include the ideas of literal oneness and transfer of moral character? The other: Supposing these ideas not to belong to the doctrine, how far is there any real difference of opinion between, those who hold the doctrine and those who reject it? The Spectator says, the difference is merely verbal—we think it real and important. There is, however, a measure of truth in their assertion. For it has happened here, as it is wont to happen in such cases, men often violently denounce a doctrine, in one breath, and in the next assert radically the same idea. Thus Bellarmine denied, with singular vehemence, the imputation of Christ's righteousness, and yet comes out with the doctrine so fully and plainly that Tuckney affirms, neither Luther nor Calvin could have presented it with more precision and distinctness. And

* The passages quoted from Calvin by the Spectator, p. 165, are of a different character, though quite as little to the purpose. When Calvin uses the expression, "*acsi nulla nostra culpa periremus*," the Spectator understands him as saying that Adam's sin was properly our sin. They ask, "What then was our sin *in Adam*," and answer, "They (i.e. old Calvinists) all affirm it was truly sin—as truly so as are any of our personal, i.e. actual transgressions. It is "*nostra culpa*," "our criminality," says Calvin." Now Calvin says no such thing. He does not say that Adam's sin was our sin: "*Sunt qui contendunt*" he says, "*nos ita peccato Adae perditos esse, acsi nulla nostra culpa periremus, ideo tantum quasi ille nobis peccasset.*" "There are some who contend that we are so destroyed by the sin of Adam, as that we perish without any criminality of our own—as though he *only* sinned for us." These "some" were the Catholic divines with whom he was in constant opposition, who taught that original sin consisted in the imputation of Adam's sin solely; that there was no depravity of nature. This it is he denies—we do not perish on account of that sin solely, without being personally depraved. This too, he thinks the apostle denies, when he says: Rom.v. 12. "Since all have sinned" i.e. all are corrupt. "*Istud Peccare, est corruptos esse et vitiatos. Illa enim naturalis firavitas quam é matris utero afferimus, peccatum est.*" Calvin, therefore, is speaking of one subject, and the Spectator applies his words to another. We have adverted to this point already, and clearly shown that Calvin taught we are condemned, both propter peccatum alienum, and propter improbitatem, which is in our own hearts. So in Ezek. xviii. 20, he says, "*Si quaeratur causa maledictionis, quae incumbit omnibus posteris Adae, dicitur esse alienum peccatum, ET cujusque proprium.*" The ground of our condemnation is peccatum alienum, as well as, peccatum cujusque proprium. Two sins—imputed and inherent.

Turretin quotes him as stating the doctrine of the imputation of Adam's sin, to his entire satisfaction. Such things still happen. We question whether any man since the days of Augustine has stated the latter doctrine in stronger terms than Dr. Hopkins, in the passage quoted above; yet he rejects the doctrine. That Adam is our federal head and representative, and his disobedience is our disobedience, he admits, and this is the whole doctrine. So, too, our New Haven brethren revolt at the idea of representation, and of our being included in the same covenant with Adam, and yet tells us, "Adam was not on trial for himself alone," but also for his posterity. How one man can be on trial for another, without that other standing his probation in him—falling if he fall, and standing if he stand—we cannot conceive, and happily, it is not for us to explain. Though the opposers of such doctrines, driven by the stress of truth, do thus occasionally come out with the admission of what they are denying, still, we cannot thence infer that there is no real difference, even as to these very points, between them and those whom they oppose. We should err very much if we were to conclude from the fact, that Bellarmine states so clearly the doctrine of the imputation of righteousness, that, he agreed with Luther and Calvin, on the subject of justification. The case was far otherwise. He retained his idea of inherent righteousness, and moral justification, and sapped the foundation of the cardinal doctrine of the Christian system—justification on the ground of Christ's merits, to the exclusion of every thing subjective and personal. And the evils of this theory, notwithstanding his admission, by turning the confidence of men from Christ to themselves, were not the less fatal to truth and holiness. This is no unusual occurrence. It is a common saying, that every Arminian is a Calvinist in prayer, yet we cannot thence infer, he is really a Calvinist in doctrine. Though we are ready to admit, therefore, that at times the Spectator comes near admitting all we ask, there is still, we fear, a *hiatus valde deflexus* which continues to separate us. What the difference is, we distinctly stated in our previous article. They deny the transfer, or assumption of legal obligation or responsibility, and therefore maintain that the punishment of one man can never, under any circumstances, come upon another. We use the word *punishment* precisely as they do; it is evil inflicted on a person by a Judge in execution of a sentence, and with a view to support the authority of the law. This is the principle which they reject. A prin-

ciple, which entering, as it does, into the view of original sin as entertained by all the Reformed Churches, (for all held that the loss of original righteousness and corruption of nature were penal evils,) essential as it is to the doctrine of substitution, and, as we think, to all correct views of atonement and justification, we deem of the highest consequence to the cause of evangelical truth and piety. This is a part of the subject on which we have not time to enter, and which is entirely distinct from the task which we originally assumed: which was to vindicate ourselves from the charge of having abandoned the common Calvinistic doctrine of imputation, by proving that the doctrine was held by old Calvinists precisely as we have presented it. If after this proof and this exhibition, our New Haven brethren can intelligently say, they agree with us, we shall heartily rejoice.