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ARTICLE I.—*Theories of the Eldership.**

IT is not intended in the present discussion to raise the question of the scriptural warrant of ruling elders in the church of Christ, nor any quarrel about the propriety of the designation—ruling elders—in the *general* meaning of both terms—as happily descriptive of their official dignity and office as the representatives of the Christian people, and assessors with the Christian ministry in the government of the church. But as names are things, and principles precede and prepare for practical results, it is, we think, of great importance to have it clearly understood and definitively established that the name of ruling elder is applicable only in the general, and not in the official sense affixed to it in the New Testament and by the early church, and indeed by the church universally until long

* As it is designed to make this a constitutional argument, it will be necessary to review all the works on the subject of ruling powers, from Dr. Miller's work to the present time, including the separate works of Dr. Wilson, Dr. King, McKerrow, Lorimer, Guthrie, and Robinson's Church of God, Dr. Addison Alexander's Primitive Offices, Dr. Breckinridge's Knowledge of God, vol. ii., Dr. Thornwell's Review of it, Dr. Adger's Inaugural Address, and Dr. Killen's Ancient Church. The nature of the argument will require the frequent exhibition of authoritative standards.

quently referred to, and whose good counsels to the desponding were the teachings of his own protracted sorrows, and subsequent deliverance, as recorded in his interesting narrative. Like a good shepherd, the author leads his troubled readers gently, directly, lovingly to "the Chief Shepherd and Bishop of their souls," and beside His cross he points them upward to the "rest that remaineth for the people of God."

We have thus endeavoured to give our readers an idea of the only work in our language which traverses this delicate ground. It is due to the respected author to say that he has so thoroughly accomplished his purpose as to leave us little more to do than present an outline, and quotations from his careful pages. That his work will be a standard with those who can appreciate its value, we have no doubt, and we shall be amply repaid, if the readers of this article may thereby be led to profit by a volume which has given us clearer views of pastoral duty, and has brought us into closer sympathy with the afflicted, and with Him who "knoweth our frame, who remembereth that we are dust," and who was "tempted in all points like as we are, yet without sin."

Charles Hodge

ART. V.—*The First and Second Adam. The Elohim revealed in the Creation and Redemption of Man.* By SAMUEL J. BAIRD, D. D., Pastor of the Presbyterian Church, Woodbury, New Jersey. Philadelphia: Lindsay & Blakiston, 1860. Pp. 688.

THE opinion which we expressed of this work in our last number was founded, as there stated, on a very casual inspection. That opinion has been somewhat modified by a more extended examination. Although we still think that it is an able, laborious, and valuable work, its faults are greater than we then apprehended. There is throughout an overweening and unfounded confidence, a great display of half-knowledge, a lack of discrimination and power of analysis, and the advocacy of principles more entirely subversive of the system of doctrine

taught in our standards, than we were at first aware of. The writer seems, of set purpose, rather than from any logical relation of the subjects, to have introduced every specially mysterious and difficult doctrine in the whole range of theology. The Trinity, the inscrutable relations of the several persons of the Godhead, the councils of eternity, the relation of God's efficiency with second causes, the nature of sin, the origin of evil, the origin of the soul, the propagation of sin, the freedom of the will, God's agency in human actions, the person of Christ, the mystical union, are all discussed and searched out to their utmost limits. Here, therefore, if anywhere, diffidence, caution, and discrimination are preëminently needed. But these are the attributes in which Dr. Baird's book is specially deficient. He speaks as though "the deep things of God" had been all revealed to him. Nothing is obscure and nothing doubtful. He marches through rivulet and river, puddle and ocean, with equal ease, finding bottom everywhere. He is equally confident on all subjects. Everything is "incontestable," and everything is represented as all but essential. To deny that universals are objective realities, or that souls are propagated, or that the substance of our souls is numerically the same as that which sinned in Adam, is to deny original sin altogether, or to endanger the whole system of scriptural doctrine. That man's nature was designed to reveal the relations of the persons of the Trinity, that Adam's "generative nature" was an important element in his likeness to God, is declared to be incontestable; and that he breathed is "demonstrated" to be a designed outshadowing of the relation of the Holy Spirit to the other persons of the Godhead. Arguments which have not the weight of a feather are declared to be irresistible, and objections to which every other mind succumbs are pronounced futile. The language of Edwards "in the very statement of his doctrine," is said to be "a contradiction in terms," because he speaks of "a privative cause," whereas "a cause is a force of some kind, by the positive action of which the contemplated effect is produced." If Dr. Baird were sinking in the water, and a spectator should refuse to stretch out a hand to save him, he might learn that there are other kinds of causes than positive forces. The tendency of Edwards's philosophy is said to

be to Pelagianism and also to Pantheism; that is, it has diametrically opposite and incompatible tendencies. A doctrine of divine efficiency held by every Augustinian theologian, Romish, Lutheran, and Reformed, until within a recent period, is constantly spoken of as "Edwards's doctrine." With the same propriety he might speak of Edwards's doctrine of immutability, or of the deity of Christ. The doctrine of simultaneous and predetermining concurrences is no peculiar doctrine of Edwards. He says the venerable President makes motives "as external forces" the efficient causes of volition. The distinction "which Edwards draws between the freedom of the soul and the freedom of the will," is declared to be "altogether inconclusive and impertinent." We could fill half our number with quotations exhibiting the same want of discrimination, and the same absence of modesty. Such overweening confidence is not to be referred exclusively to the will; it arises in no small measure from the character of the intellect. The less clear-sighted a man is, the less can he see differences. A man may have very considerable ability in dealing with things in the concrete, in investigating and arranging facts; he may be an effective writer; he may be able to construct a luminous argument founded on such facts, and yet be a very indifferent metaphysician. And a book may have very great merits as a record and classification of facts and opinions, and yet be sadly disfigured by serious blemishes arising from the mistaken assumption on the part of the author that he has a special gift for philosophical discrimination and analysis. We should be very sorry to speak as we have done of the faults of the work before us, if we did not conscientiously believe that it is likely to do the cause of truth serious harm, should its readers allow themselves to be deceived by the tone of confidence and mastery with which its erroneous principles are announced, and the doctrines of the Reformed Church are misrepresented. It is no want of respect for Cicero to think he was a bad poet; and it is no disrespect for Dr. Baird to think or to say that his forte does not lie in metaphysics. His book goes over so much ground, so many important subjects are brought to view, the opinions of so many theologians of different schools are adduced, that the volume will prove eminently suggestive, and will take a high

rank in the theological literature of our country, although the writer may be regarded as neither sound nor discriminating.

The Lutheran and Reformed churches, the two great historical divisions of the Protestant world, happily are perfectly united on all points concerning our relation to Adam and to Christ. They agree as to the whole class of doctrines connected with the fall and redemption of man; the covenant with Adam; the nature of the union between him and his posterity; the effect of his sin on his descendants; and they consequently are of one mind as to imputation, depravity, and inability; and, on the other hand, as to the nature of our union with Christ, justification and sanctification. Not only in the symbols of these churches, but in the writings of all their leading theologians of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, there is this thorough agreement on the subjects above mentioned. They all acknowledge that our union with Adam and our union with Christ, the relation of the sin of the one and of the righteousness of the other to our condemnation on the one hand and our justification on the other, the derivation of a corrupt nature from Adam, and of a holy nature from Christ, are included in the analogy between the first and second Adam, as that analogy is presented in the Bible. It would, however, have been little short of a miracle had a whole system of theology been evolved perfectly from the beginning, had there been no confusion or inconsistency, no undue prominence given to one principle over others no less true. This would be contrary to all the ordinary methods of God's dealings with the church. The truth is usually elicited by conflict; agreement is the result of comparison and adjustment of divergencies. We accordingly find in the history of Protestant theology much more of inconsistency and confusion during the sixteenth than during the seventeenth century. It was not until after one principle had been allowed to modify another, that the scheme of doctrine came to adjust itself into the consistent and moderate form in which it is presented in the writings of Turretin and Gerhard. Nothing human, however, is either perfect or permanent. While the Protestant theology retains its power over the minds of the vast body of the purer churches of the Reformation, there has been not only open defection from it as

a whole, but also the revival of the one-sided views which, in many instances, were presented during its forming period. These views have been either advocated singly, or wrought up into entirely new philosophical systems.

All Protestants at the Reformation, and afterwards, agreed in teaching, 1. That Adam was the natural head or progenitor of the whole human race. He was admitted to be the father of all men. 2. That he was the covenant head or representative of all mankind. 3. That all men are born in a state of condemnation, destitute of original righteousness, and morally corrupt; needing redemption by the blood of Christ, and sanctification by his Spirit from the commencement of their existence. 4. That this ruin of our race, or the fact that men are born in this estate of sin and misery, is due to their connection with Adam. All men were in such a sense, in him, that they sinned in him and fell with him in his first transgression. All these points are affirmed in the symbols of the Lutheran and Reformed churches; and no one of them is denied in the writings of any standard theologian of the period of the Reformation. There is, however, no little diversity as to the relative importance ascribed to these several points. In accounting for the fact that the sin of Adam involved the race in ruin, the principal stress was sometimes laid on the covenant relation between him and his posterity; at others, on the natural relation. The fact that men are born under condemnation was sometimes specially referred to the imputation of Adam's sin as something out of themselves; at others to the corruption of nature derived from him. What finally modified and harmonized these representations was the acknowledged analogy between our relation to Adam and our relation to Christ. It was soon seen that what the Bible plainly teaches, viz. that the ground of our justification is nothing subjective, nothing done by us or wrought in us, but the righteousness of Christ as something out of ourselves, could not be held fast in its integrity without admitting that the primary ground of the condemnation of the race was in like manner something neither done by us nor infused into us, but the sin of Adam as out of ourselves, and imputed to us on the ground of the union, representative and natural, between him and his posterity. It was

this that determined the theology of the Lutheran and Reformed churches as to all this class of doctrines. Those churches, therefore, came to teach with extraordinary unanimity, 1. That Adam, as the common father of all men, was by divine appointment constituted not only the natural, but the federal head or representative of his posterity. The race stood its probation in him. His sin was the sin of the race, because the sin of its divinely and righteously constituted representative. We therefore sinned in Adam in the same sense that we died in Christ. 2. The penalty of death threatened against Adam in the event of his transgression was not merely the dissolution of the body, but spiritual death, the loss of the divine favour and of original righteousness; and the consequent corruption of his whole nature. 3. This penalty came upon his race. His sin was the judicial ground on which the favour and fellowship of God were withdrawn or withheld from the apostate family of man. 4. Since the fall, therefore, men are by nature, or as they are born, the children of wrath. They are not only under condemnation, but destitute of original righteousness, and corrupted in their whole nature. According to this view of the subject, the ground of the imputation of Adam's sin is the federal union between him and his posterity, in such sense that it would not have been imputed had he not been constituted their representative. It is imputed to them not because it was antecedently to that imputation, and irrespective of the covenant on which the imputation is founded, already theirs; but because they were appointed to stand their probation in him. Moreover, the corruption of nature derived from Adam is not, as Dr. Baird, with strange confusion of thought persists in regarding it, a physiological fact, but a fact in the moral government of God. Our author treats it as a question of physics, belonging to the general category of propagation, to be accounted for on the ground of what he calls "the mysteries of generation;" ignoring the distinction between physical laws and the principles of God's dealings with rational creatures.

In strict analogy with the relation, as above stated, between Adam and his posterity, the Lutheran and Reformed theology teaches, 1. That Christ, in the covenant of redemption, is con-

stituted the head and representative of his people; and that, in virtue of this federal union, and agreeably to the terms of the eternal covenant, they are regarded and treated as having done what he did and suffered what he suffered in their name and in their behalf. They died in him. They rose in him; not literally, so that his acts were their acts, but representatively.

2. That the reward promised to Christ in the covenant of redemption, was the justification, sanctification, and eternal salvation of his people. 3. That the judicial ground, therefore, of the justification of the believer is not their own personal righteousness, nor the holy nature which they derive from Christ, but his obedience and sufferings, performed and endured in their name, and which became theirs in virtue of the covenant and by the gracious imputation of God. 4. That the believer is not only justified by the righteousness of Christ, but sanctified by his Spirit. These two things are not to be confounded, because they differ not only in their nature, but in their source. Justification is a forensic or judicial act, by which the sinner is pronounced just on the ground of a righteousness which is not subjectively his, and which therefore does not constitute his character. Sanctification is an efficient or executive work, in which God by the power of his Spirit renovates the corrupted nature of man, and restores him to his own image in knowledge, righteousness, and holiness. The main point in the analogy between Christ and Adam, as presented in the theology of the Protestant church, and as exhibited by the apostle is, that as in the case of Christ, his righteousness as something neither done by us nor wrought in us, is the judicial ground of our justification, with which inward holiness is connected as an invariable consequence; so in the case of Adam, his offence as something out of ourselves, a *peccatum alienum*, is the judicial ground of the condemnation of our race, of which condemnation, spiritual death, or inward corruption, is the expression and the consequence. It is this principle which is fundamental to the Protestant theology, and to the evangelical system, in the form in which it is presented in the Bible, which is strenuously denied Dr. Baird, and also by the advocates of the doctrine of mediate imputation.

It has already been remarked, that in the early writings of the period of the Reformation, the imputation of Adam's sin and

the corruption of nature as derived from him, are often confounded, and, without intending to deny the former, more stress is in many cases laid upon the latter. This is the more easily accounted for, inasmuch as just the opposite tendency was at that time prevalent in the church of Rome. Many of the Popish theologians made the sin of Adam the only ground of the condemnation of his race, and seemed inclined to hold, (although contrary to the decisions of their own church,) that inherent corruption was not properly of the nature of sin, or in itself a ground of condemnation. Calvin, therefore, was accustomed to say, that men are condemned not *per solam imputationem*, not on account of the imputation of Adam's sin alone, but also on account of their own inherent corruption. This was not a denial of imputation, but the assertion of another and equally important ground of the condemnation of the race. By *death* was understood eternal death, and the Reformers were anxious to show that they did not teach that those personally innocent and pure were condemned to eternal perdition. They therefore made original sin, in its wide sense, to include two sins; original sin *imputed*, and original sin *inherent*. The latter they regarded as the penal consequence of the former. On the ground of the personal sin of Adam, as the representative of the race, God withdrew from men his favour and Spirit; they thereby lost his image, and became inwardly depraved. This depravity being truly and properly of the nature of sin, subjects those infected with it to the penalty of sin. God in his infinite mercy, through the merits of Christ, saves from that penalty all who die in infancy, that is, all who have no other sins to answer for than sin imputed and sin inherent. This we may, and do believe, without denying the fact that we fell in Adam, and without questioning the righteousness of that divine constitution.

These two things, the imputation of Adam's sin and inherent corruption, thus often confounded or combined in the writings of the Reformers, came afterwards to be so separated that the former was entirely denied or left out of view. Placæus, in the French church, taught that the corruption of nature, as derived from Adam, was the only ground of the condemnation of men, apart from their own personal transgressions. This theory

received the name of *Mediate Imputation*—not because it involved the idea, properly speaking, of the imputation of Adam's sin, but simply because Placæus was content to use the words, provided they were understood in accordance with his theory. Men are first depraved, and because of this inherent depravity, it may be said the sin of Adam is imputed to them, inasmuch as it is derived from him. *Hoc posito*, inquit Placæus, *distinguenda est Imputatio in immediatam seu antecedentem, et mediatam seu consequentem. Illa fit immediatè, hoc est, non-mediante corruptione; hæc mediatè, hoc est, mediante corruptione: illa ordine naturæ corruptionem antecedit, hæc sequitur: illa corruptionis causa censetur esse, hæc effectum: illam D. Placæus rejicit, hanc admittit.* This was said in answer to the decision of the National Synod of France, condemning his denial of the imputation of Adam's sin. The meaning of Placæus was not that Adam's sin is imputed to us, but that on account of the inherent corruption derived from him, we are regarded as being as deserving of death as he was. Imputation, therefore, is not the judicial ground of corruption, but corruption is the ground of imputation of guilt. 1. The obvious objections to this theory are, that it denies any probation to the race. They come into the world under the burden of spiritual death, infected with a deadly spiritual malady, by a sovereign or arbitrary infliction. To put a man to death in consequence of a righteous judicial sentence, is one thing; to put him to death without any offence or sentence, is another thing. According to Placæus, men being born in sin, and having no probation in Adam, are condemned without trial or offence. 2. It refers the propagation of sin to a mere physical law. Like begets like. All lions inherit the nature of the first lion; and so all men inherit the corrupt nature of fallen Adam. God deals with moral and immortal beings as he does with brutes. There is no distinction admitted between physical laws and the principles on which a holy God deals with responsible creatures. 3. The principle on which this doctrine is founded subverts the whole evangelical system. That principle is, that it is not only inconsistent with the justice of God, but irreconcilable with his very nature as an omniscient and truthful being, that his judgments of rational creatures should be founded on anything else

than their inward, subjective character. He cannot regard and treat those personally innocent as guilty. Then by parity of reason, he cannot regard the personally unrighteous as righteous, he cannot justify the ungodly. Then what is to become of us sinners? The objections against the imputation of sin bear with all their force against the imputation of righteousness. Those, therefore, who reject the one, have, as a general and necessary consequence, rejected the other. This is a fact familiar to every one acquainted with the history of theology in our own, and other countries. 4. A fourth objection to his doctrine is, it destroys the analogy between Adam and Christ, or it necessitates the adoption of the doctrine of subjective justification. We must either deny that the sin of Adam (as *alienum peccatum*) stands in a relation to our condemnation analogous to that in which the righteousness of Christ, as distinguished from our own, stands to our justification; or we must admit the analogy to be, that as we derive a corrupt nature from Adam and are on that account condemned, so we derive a holy nature from Christ, and are on the ground of that nature justified. But this, as every one knows, is to give up the great point in dispute between Romanists and Protestants; it is to renounce Luther's famous doctrine, *stantis vel cadentis ecclesie*. 5. This doctrine is in direct conflict with the declarations of Scripture. The design of the apostle in Romans v. 12—21, is not simply to teach that as Adam was in one way the cause of sin and death, so Christ was in another way the cause of righteousness and life; but it is to illustrate *the mode* or way in which the righteousness of Christ avails to our justification. From the third chapter and twenty-first verse he had been engaged in setting forth the method of justification, not sanctification. He had insisted that it was not our works, or our subjective character, but the blood of Christ, his propitiatory death, his righteousness, the righteousness of God, something therefore out of ourselves, which is the judicial ground of our justification. It is to illustrate this great fundamental doctrine of his gospel that he refers to the parallel case of Adam, and shows that antecedently to any act of our own, before any corruption of nature, the sentence of condemnation passed on all men for the offence of one. To deny this, and to

assert that our own subjective character is the ground of the sentence, is not only to deny the very thing which the apostle asserts, but to overturn his whole argument. It is to take sides with the Jews against the apostle, and to maintain that the righteousness of one man cannot be the ground of the justification of another. This doctrine, which denies the immediate or antecedent imputation of Adam's sin, and makes inherent corruption as derived from him the primary ground of the condemnation of the race, was consequently declared, almost with one voice, to be contrary to Scripture, to the faith of the Reformed churches, and even of the church catholic. It was unanimously and repeatedly condemned by the National Synod of France to which Placæus belonged. It was no less unanimously condemned by the Church of Holland. The Leyden Professors in their recommendation of the work which their colleague Rivetus had written against Placæus, declare the doctrine in question to be a *dogma contrarium communi omnium fermè Christianorum consensui*, and pronounce the doctrine of immediate imputation to be a *dogma verè catholicum*. The same condemnation of this theory was pronounced by the churches in Switzerland. It was one of the errors against which the *Formula Consensus Helvetica*, published in 1675, was directed. In that Formula it is said, "Non possumus, salva cœlesti veritate, assensum præbere iis qui Adamum posteros suos ex instituto Dei repræsentasse ac proinde ejus peccatum posteris ejus ἀπέσωσιν imputari negant, et sub imputationis mediatae et consequentis nomine, non imputationem duntaxat primi peccati tollunt, sed hæreditariæ etiam corruptionis assertionem gravi periculo objiciunt."

It would, however, be a great mistake to assume that the doctrine of the immediate imputation of Adam's sin is a doctrine peculiar to Calvinism. It is as much inwrought in the theology of the Lutheran as in that of the Reformed churches. It is not even a distinguishing doctrine of Protestants. It is truly a catholic doctrine. It belongs as much to the Latin church as it does to those who were forced to withdraw from her communion. It was, therefore, no exaggeration when the theologians of Holland declared the doctrine of mediate imputation to be "contrary to the consent of almost all Christians." Dr. Baird does not adopt that doctrine. He pronounces medi-

ate imputation a figment. He devotes a whole section to prove that his view is not identical with that of Placæus. This was the more necessary, as he adopts all the principles on which that doctrine is founded, and urges all the arguments against immediate imputation which were ever advanced by Placæus, or by Pelagians, Socinians, or Remonstrants. His doctrine is neither the one nor the other. It is neither the old intelligible doctrine of immediate imputation of Adam's sin as not our own act, but the act of our divinely constituted head and representative; nor is it the equally intelligible, although, as we think, erroneous and dangerous doctrine, that the thing imputed to us, and the primary and only ground (apart from our personal actual transgressions) of condemnation, is the corrupt nature derived from Adam. This, we say, is intelligible. We know what a man means when he refers everything to the law of propagation, and explains the derivation of a corrupted nature from Adam on the same principle that the asps of to-day get their poison from the asps before the deluge. This is in one sense intelligible; but we defy any man to put any intelligible meaning on what Dr. Baird says. Wherein he differs, or supposes he differs from this doctrine, he deceives himself with words. He does not see that what he says means nothing. He makes distinctions where there is no difference; and supposes himself to be saying something when he is saying nothing. On the justice of this judgment our readers will decide. In our opinion Dr. Baird's theory, when stripped of its words without meaning, is nothing more than the familiar doctrine adopted by the more orthodox of our New England brethren, who repudiate the idea of imputation, and yet maintain the propagation of a morally depraved nature from Adam to his posterity.

The following extracts may suffice to give an adequate idea of his views. "In the angelic hosts each several individual is possessed of a several nature, original in and peculiar to him. The history of the person and of the nature is contemporaneous and the same. But in man it is different. The nature of the entire race was created originally in Adam, and is propagated from him by generation, and so descends to all his seed. Hence arise two distinct forms of responsibility; the nature being

placed under a creative obligation of conformity to the holiness of God's nature, and each several person being, in a similar manner, held under obligation of personal conformity of affections, thoughts, words, and actions, to the holy requirements of God's law. The apostasy of this nature was the immediate efficient cause of the act of disobedience, the plucking of the forbidden fruit. Thus there attached to him the double crime of apostasy of his nature and of personal disobedience. The guilt thus incurred attached not only to Adam's person, but to the nature which, in his person, caused the act of transgression. Thus, as the nature flows to all the posterity of Adam, it comes bearing the burden of that initial crime, and characterized by the depravity which was embraced therein. In both respects the nature is in variance with the law. In both respects it is guilty of sin, (the sin of nature.) In addition to this, Adam's posterity find the depravity thus embraced and indwelling, an unfailing and active cause of other sins. The apostate nature works iniquity. Thus originate the personal sins which fill the world. Such is the ground upon which the apostasy of man's nature from holiness and its embrace of depravity, is called sin, and, as such, charged upon the race of man." P. 256.

According to this statement, the nature of man being a unit, and that one nature being concentrated in Adam, the sin of his nature was the sin of the entire race to which that nature was propagated. We, that is, our nature, sinned in Adam as truly, properly, and strictly, as he himself did. On p. 311, it is said, "We are *not* held accountable for Adam's breach of the covenant, in consequence of the transaction respecting the tree; but because of the inscription of the covenant in Adam's nature, and our in-being in him in whose nature it was inscribed." Again, it is said, "the offence of Adam is ours immediately;" "when Adam sinned, all his seed were in him, and so sinned in him in the same act with him." P. 422. The cause of actual sin is depravity, "the cause of which was the wicked apostasy of our nature from God, in the person of Adam, an apostasy in which we are as truly criminal as Adam was, because the nature by which it was committed is as really in us as in him." P. 502. The doctrine of this book, therefore, is that we sinned in Adam actually and in the proper sense of the

term. His sin is imputed to us because it is "intrinsically" ours. It is ours, not in a forensic and legal sense, but literally, because of the identity of nature between him and us. The ground, therefore, of the imputation is this community of nature, and not the covenant by which he was constituted our head and representative. It would have been ours had no such covenant been established. The only effect of the covenant was to limit the period of man's probation. "To object, therefore, to the positive transaction between God and Adam," says our author, "is to complain that God did not give us a myriad chances of falling instead of one; since the only effect of that transaction was, to secure confirmation and eternal life to man, upon condition of Adam's temporary obedience; instead of the race being held to a perpetual probation in Adam and in themselves. To complain of being held responsible for Adam's sin, is to object to being held to obedience at all; since, in any case, Adam's sin was our sin; the forces which are in us, the nature which we inherit from him, is the very nature which in him rebelled; the same, not in kind merely, but as flowing continuously from him to us." P. 302. "Had Adam, made as he was, been placed in probation without limit as to time, and had he remained upright, whilst one of his posterity became apostate, the crime and corruption thus introduced would have flowed to the family of the apostate precisely as that of Adam does to us his seed." P. 509. This is a great truth, our author intimates, which few have sense enough to see.

Such is the doctrine which is here set forth as the faith of the Reformed churches, and specially as the doctrine of the Westminster Confession. It rests on the following principles: 1. The identity of the race with Adam; or, the assumption that humanity is a generic life, a substance, a nature, a "sum of forces" numerically the same in Adam and all his descendants. 2. That a nature can act impersonally; or, the apostasy and rebellion of human nature is to be distinguished from the personal act of Adam. 3. That souls are propagated. 4. That community, in a propagated nature, involves all those to whom that nature is communicated in all the relations, moral and legal, of that nature in the progenitor whence it originated. 5. The real germinating principle from which the whole theory

springs is, that God cannot regard and treat a rational creature otherwise than he is in himself; if he is not subjectively a sinner, he cannot be treated as such, and if he is not subjectively righteous, he cannot be treated as righteous.

The first remark which we think must occur to every intelligent reader in reference to such a system is, that it is simply a physiological theory. It is a peculiar view of anthropology, of the nature of man as an animal, and the laws of his propagation. Had there been no God, or had God nothing to do in the government of the world, or did he take no cognizance of the character and conduct of men, all that this system supposes would be just as it is. When God created the first oak, he gave it a certain nature, and impressed upon it a certain law of propagation. All subsequent oaks are the development of the identical life-principle embodied in the first oak. So when the first lion, tiger, or elephant was created, a generic leonine, feline, or elephantine nature was called into being, and that identical original substance is communicated, with all its peculiar characteristics, from one generation to another. So too when man was created, the same thing happened. There was no covenant with the first lion that all other lions should inherit his nature; and the propagation of Adam's nature to his posterity, with its guilt and pollution, is altogether independent of any covenant—it is simply a physiological fact. A second remark no less obvious is, that we need no divine revelation on which to rest our faith in this fact. Physiologists teach us what is the law of propagation in the animal world; to that world man belongs; he falls under the general category. Human character is transmitted by the same law which regulates the transmission of the nature of other animals. What need then have we for any special divine revelation on the subject? It is very evident that the theory does not rest on the testimony of the Bible. It has a purely inductive basis. A man may hold it and not believe in the Bible; he may reject it, and his faith in the Scriptures be undisturbed. A third remark is, that even as a physiological theory it has no substantial foundation. From the nature of the case, it is merely a hypothesis to account for certain phenomena; it cannot be anything more. The fact is, that like begets like. Genera and species are,

within certain limits, permanent and indestructible. An oak never becomes an apple-tree, a lion never becomes an ox, a man never becomes a monkey, nor a monkey a man. Even distinct varieties of the same species of plants and animals become permanent. There are therefore fixed types in nature, either original or acquired. Men, as men, have a common nature—that is, they have the same anatomical structure, the same φύσις, the same rational and moral faculties, the same social dispositions and constitutional principles. These are permanent and universal, and belong to men as men, and therefore to all mankind. But within the limits of this specific identity we see all the varieties of the Caucasian, Malayan, and African races; the national, and even family peculiarities transmitted from generation to generation. These are admitted facts. How are they to be accounted for? How are we to explain this immense diversity and this permanency in the different forms of life? One hypothesis is, and that the most simple and sublime, the most captivating to the imagination, the most specious to the natural understanding, the oldest and most persistent of all the forms of human thought, underlying the philosophy and religions of ages and nations, viz., that all these diversified forms of life are manifestations of one all-pervading principle—God, in the various forms and states of self-development. This is a hypothesis, which is to the theory which Dr. Baird adopts, what the ocean is to a gutter. Another hypothesis, less ambitious than this pantheistic system, is that this world is a living organism, imbued with one life, of which all that lives are different forms, and man the apex of the pyramid. Another, that humanity is a generic life, a substance having objective reality which reveals itself, or comes to personality in connection with individual material organisms. As light is a subtle fluid diffused through space, and becomes luminous only on certain conditions, so this diffused principle of humanity comes to existence or self-manifestations only in combination with appropriate corporeal forms, which it fashions for itself under specific conditions. Still another is, that each genus or species of plants and animals is something, it is hard to say what—a force, a law, a life, a substance, a something having objective reality, and which

propagates itself, each according to its kind, the individuals being only the extension of the original force, principle, or substance. This is the hypothesis which constitutes Dr. Baird's book, without which it is nothing. This is the foundation on which rests his theology. If this fails, his theology disappears. On page 25 he says, Nominalism, as opposed to Realism, gave a great impulse to Pelagianism. "According to the philosophy," he says, "which prevailed before the rise of that sect, such universal conceptions, as those of genera, species, and nature, have as their ground some kind of objective realities. They are not the mere result of thought, but have in some proper sense, a real existence, and lie as essences at the base of the existence of all individuals and particulars." According to the Platonic doctrine, as we all know, these universals existed from eternity in the divine mind. They are the ideas of which individuals are the manifestations. The universal is alone real; the individual is simply apparent. This was the original form of Realism as taught by Scotus and Anselm. According to another statement of the doctrine, it was held, "Eandem essentialiter rem totam simul singulis suis inesse individuis; quorum quidem nulla esset in essentia diversitas, sed sola multitudine accidentium varietas." To the word *homo*, man, there answers, therefore, one substance or essence, which is distinguished in individuals only by accidental diversities. Dr. Baird says that according to one theory, "general conceptions are the mere product of the imaginative faculty—results of logical deduction from the observation of many like individuals. A second theory represents universals as being realities which have actual objective subsistence of their own, distinct from and independent of that of the particulars and individuals. A third holds that universals are, in a certain sense, realities in nature, but that the general conceptions are merely logical, the universals not having an existence of their own, separate from the individuals through which they are manifested." "The third," he says, "is the scriptural doctrine, according to which the substances were at the beginning endowed with forces, which are distinctive and abiding; and which in organic nature flow distributively in continuous order, to the successive generations of the creatures. Of these forces the word *nature* is the expression.

In its proper use it conveys the distinct idea of permanent indwelling force. It expresses the sum of the essential qualities or efficient principles of a given thing, viewed in their relation to its substance, as that in which they reside, and from whence they operate. Such is the sense in which the word is constantly employed in the Scriptures." P. 149. "Thus the human nature consists in the whole sum of the forces, which, original in Adam, are perpetuated and flow in generation to his seed. And our oneness of nature does not express the fact merely, that we and Adam are alike; but that we are alike, because the forces which are in us, and make us what we are, were in him, and are numerically the same which in him constituted his nature and his likeness." P. 150.

According to this view, humanity is one substance, in which inhere certain forces. This substance was originally in Adam, and has been by propagation communicated to all his descendants, so that the substance, with its forces, which constitutes them what they are, is numerically the same as that which was in him, and made him what he was. The principle here involved is asserted to be true in its application to all the genera and species of plants and animals. The lion of to-day is the same numerical substance with the lion first created; the oak of to-day is the same numerically as the original oak in Eden. What is meant by this? We take up an acorn in the forest—in what sense is it identical with the first created oak? Not in the matter of which it is composed, for that is derived from the earth and atmosphere; not in its chemical properties, for they inhere in the matter, or result from its combinations. These properties are doubtless the same in kind with those belonging to the first acorn, but they are not numerically the same. No one assumes the existence of any chemical substance, in which those properties inhere, as transmitted by the laws of propagation. Wherein then does this assumed numerical identity exist? Is it in the principle of life? But can any one tell what that is? Is it a substance? Has human skill ever yet discovered what life is, whether in plant or animal? And must a whole system of theology be founded on a conjecture as to its nature? Is a confidence on this point, which can only spring from ignorance, to be allowed to control the faith of the church?

There may be an immaterial principle which determines the species of every plant and animal, and secures its permanency, but what necessity is there for assuming that principle to be a substance, numerically the same with the first of each kind? If the chemical properties belonging to an acorn, or to the germ of a nascent animal, may be the same in kind, from generation to generation, without assuming the transmission of a chemical substance, why may not the principle of life remain permanent, without any such transmission of substance? The realistic hypothesis of the objective reality of genera and species is not only purely gratuitous, but it overlooks the continued presence and agency of God in nature. The development of a plant, and the growth of an animal body, are not to be referred to blind forces, inherent in matter, nor in any substance, material or immaterial, but to the omnipresent Spirit of God. The intelligence manifested in organic structures is clear evidence of the presence of mind guiding the operation of natural forces. It might as well be assumed that a book was written, and the letters arranged by such forces, with no present mind to control their operation. If a plant or human body can be fashioned by a transmitted substance, then a world can be so constructed. The principle on which the argument from design in favour of the being of God is founded is, that the adaptation of means to an end is evidence of a present, active intelligence. As all organic nature teems with manifestations of such adaptations, it teems in like measure with evidence of the omnipresent, active intelligence of God. We are not about to enter on the mediæval controversy about universals. All we are concerned about is, that the assumption of a generic human nature, as an objective reality, constituting all men numerically one in substance with Adam, is a pure figment, unentitled to any weight or authority in determining Christian doctrine.

The second principle on which our author's theory rests, is that natural acts are to be distinguished from personal acts; or, that a nature may act independently of the person to which that nature belongs. We are not responsible for Adam's personal act, but we are held to have performed the act of his nature, because that nature is numerically the same in him and in us. The rebellion and apostasy of his nature,

which preceded and caused his personal transgression, were our rebellion and apostasy. On this subject, the author says in a passage already quoted, "There attached to him (Adam) the double crime of apostasy of his nature and of personal disobedience." P. 256. "It is certain that nothing may be predicated of the person which does not grow out of the nature, and if this must be admitted, there appears no ground on which it can be claimed that the nature, because existing in another person, is entitled to exemption from its essential guilt." "The nature which was the cause of my person was there. And as every power or principle of efficiency which is in the effect must have been in its cause, it follows *inevitably*(?) that everything in me, upon which resistance to apostasy might be imagined, was actually there and took part in the rebellion." P. 257. "Throughout the entire argument Paul carefully distinguishes two features which are essentially united in Adam's apostasy. The one is the violation of the positive precept, which he designates as the offence, the disobedience, and the transgression. The other is the violation of the law written in Adam's heart, and so in the nature of the race, and by the offence transgressed in both. Its violation was the embrace of that which the apostle calls sin." P. 419. "There are two classes of actions—which should be carefully distinguished. Of these, one is such personal actions as result from the fact that the nature is of a given and determinate character. These in no respect change the nature, &c." To this belong, he says, all the sins of our immediate ancestors, for which we are not responsible. "The other consists of such agency, as springing from within constitutes an action of the nature itself, by which its attitude is changed. The single case referrible to this class is that of apostasy, the voluntary self-depravation of a nature created holy. Here, as the nature flows downward in the line of generation, it communicates to the successive members of the race, not only itself thus transformed, but with itself the moral responsibility which attaches inseparably to it, as active in the transformation wrought by it and thus conveyed." P. 509. "The sin was the apostasy of man's nature from God; apostasy by the force of which Adam was impelled into the act of transgression as an inevitable

consequence of the state of heart constituted by the apostasy. Now let it be carefully observed that apostasy is an act, not a habit; and, on the other hand, depravity and corruption is a habitual state, and not an act." P. 497. The obligation of the law, he says, extends "to the *substance* of the soul." "It is to the *very substance* of the soul that the law is addressed; and upon it the penal sanctions of that law are enforced. The soul is that, which, in its substance and powers intrinsically, as much as in their exercises, was created and ordained to be the image and glory of God. Conformity of this substance to this its exalted office is holiness; the reverse is sin." P. 258.

If there is any meaning in all this, we confess ourselves to be too blind to see it. We have no idea what is meant by the law being addressed "to the very substance of the soul," or by saying "conformity of substance to the image of God is holiness, and the reverse, sin." It is as unintelligible to us as speaking of the moral character of a tree, or the correct deportment of a house. It has often happened to us in reading German metaphysics, not to comprehend at all the meaning of the author; but we have always had the conviction that he had a meaning. We do not feel thus on the present occasion. The distinction which the author attempts to draw between *sinful* acts of nature and personal sins is a distinction which means nothing, and on this nothing his whole theory is founded. There are, of course, actions of very different kinds in a creature composed of soul and body; some of these may properly enough be called natural, and others, personal. But this does not apply to moral acts, whether good or evil. The mere natural functions of the body, as the process of respiration, digestion, and the circulation of the blood, are acts of nature in the sense of not being acts of personal self-determination. There is also a distinction between outward acts and acts of the soul. And this is what our author seems sometimes to have in his mind, as when he tells us we must distinguish between the act of Adam in plucking and eating the forbidden fruit, and the act of his heart. The former, he tells us, was personal, and peculiar to himself; but the latter was natural, and belongs equally to us. But at the same time he admits there is no moral character in an external act in itself considered, and

this distinction between outward and inward acts is nothing peculiar to Adam's first sin. It is no less true of every sin of word or deed he or any one else ever committed, and every such sin is a personal sin. There can, indeed, from the very idea of sin, be no *actual* sin which is not personal, because that which acts rationally and by self-determination, two elements essential to actual sin, is a person. *Actual* sin can no more be predicated of a nature as distinguished from a person than of a house. There is also, beside the different kinds of actions already mentioned, another equally obvious distinction, viz. between those which, being consentaneous with nature, do not change it, and such as from their peculiar character produce a permanent change in the nature itself. Thus of the physical acts of Adam, his eating and drinking were perfectly normal acts, belonging to his nature as originally constituted, and producing no change in its character. It is conceivable, however, that he might have performed some act which should change his physical constitution. For example, he might have done something which changed his skin from white to black. Such change might have been permanent, and all his descendants been black. Or, he might have so poisoned himself as to have made his body perishable instead of immortal, and his descendants inherited his disease. So, also, as has already been admitted, it is conceivable that as by his apostasy from God, his moral nature became depraved, that corrupt nature, by the general law of propagation, might be transmitted to his posterity. This is the view presented by many Augustinians, before and after the Reformation, and also at times by the Lutheran and Reformed during the forming period of their theology. This also is the doctrine of a large class of our New England and New-school brethren, of Dr. Dwight and of Dr. Richards, and the class whom they represent. This is Mr. Barnes's doctrine, as presented in many of his writings. This, too, is what Dr. Baird has in his mind about one-half the time. But this is very different from the doctrine that *we*, as persons, committed Adam's sin, because our nature committed it. This supposes that actual sin can be committed by persons before they are persons. That *we* acted thousands of years before *we* existed, is as monstrous a proposition as ever was

framed. The doctrine of preëxistence, as held by Origen, revived in our day by Dr. Müller and others in Germany, and by Dr. Edward Beecher in this country, is, compared to that proposition, clear sunshine. Apostasy, we are requested carefully to consider, "is an act," it is "a voluntary act," it is an act of "*self*-depravation," and it is affirmed to be our act. That is, we performed a personal act—that is, a voluntary act, an act of self-determination, before that *self* had any existence. There is no definition of a personal act more precise and generally adopted than an "act of voluntary self-determination." Such was apostasy in Adam, and if we performed that act, then we were in him—not by community of nature merely, but personally. For we are said to have done what nature, as nature, cannot do; what of necessity implies personality. Apostasy being an act of self-determination, it can be predicated only of persons; and if the apostasy of Adam can be predicated of us, then we existed as persons thousands of years before we existed at all. If any man says he believes this, then, as we think, he deceives himself, and does not understand what he says. Dr. Baird, however, asserts that he did thus act in Adam, and that he feels sorry for it. He teaches that we are bound to feel remorse and self-reproach for this act of *self*-determination performed so many centuries before self existed. This is represented as a genuine form of religious experience, an experience due to the teachings and influence of God's Holy Spirit. This is a very serious matter. To attribute to the Spirit of God the mistakes and figments of our own minds—to represent as a genuine form and manifestation of the divine life what is a mere delusion of our own imagination, or offspring of our pride of intellect, is a very grave offence, and a very great evil. It is very true that when the father of a family commits a disgraceful crime, the whole family is disgraced; or if a son or daughter is led astray from the paths of virtue, the whole household hide their faces, and weep in secret places. It is also true that when our country is honoured or degraded, we feel that it is our honour or our shame. We share in the common life of the community. The same is true of the whole human race. The sins of men are a disgrace to humanity. We may well blush for our common

nature when we read of the vileness and enormities by which our fellow-men have in all ages been guilty. But this is a very different thing from saying that we performed their acts. When a father commits murder, or a son forgery, the whole family, although humbled and distressed, although they feel a participation in the shame which does not pertain to strangers, yet do not pretend that they were guilty of the crime, and were partners in the act. Such confusion of ideas is not found in the common life. It is peculiar to those who are not content to take things as they are, who are not satisfied with phenomena, but must search into being.

The *πρωτον ψεύδος* of such speculations is, that moral principles or dispositions owe their character to their origin, and not to their nature. It is assumed that innate, hereditary depravity cannot have the nature of sin in us unless it be self-originated; hence some assume that we existed in a former state, where, by an act of self-determination, we deprived our own nature. Others assume that humanity is a person, or that personality can be predicated of human nature as a generic life, and that individuals are the forms in which its comprehensive personality is revealed; a conception as incongruous as the hundred-headed idol of the Hindoos. Others again, as Dr. Baird, distancing all competitors, insist that *we* performed the act of self-depravation thousands of years before we existed. All these are not only gratuitous but impossible assumptions, to account for the admitted fact that innate corruption is truly sin, which they say it cannot be unless it have an origin in an act of our own. Things are, however, what they are, no matter how they originated. If a man is black, he is black, whether he was born so, or made himself so. If he is good, he is good; if bad, he is bad, whether he is the one or the other by birth or self-determination. If Satan had the power to create, and should create fiends, they would not be innocent angels. Adam was created righteous. Original righteousness in him had a moral character. It was truly of the nature of holiness. It constituted Adam's moral character in the sight of God, although not self-originated. It is a first principle of Pelagianism, that moral character can attach only to acts of self-determination and their consequences. All Pelagians, there-

fore, deny that Adam was created holy. He could not be holy, they say, unless he originated his own character. So all these false theories assume that inherent corruption cannot have the nature of sin unless self-originated. If we are born corrupt, that corruption must have sprung from our own act, either in a former state of existence, or in the person of Adam. When God, by the almighty power of his Spirit, quickens the spiritually dead, the holiness thus originated is none the less holiness. It is not essential to its moral character that it should be our own work. The graces of the Spirit, although due to the divine energy, constitute the moral and religious character of the believer. In like manner the depraved nature which we inherit from Adam constitutes our moral character, although it did not originate in any act of our own. It is clearly revealed in Scripture that we are born in sin, that we are by nature the children of wrath. This divine declaration is authenticated by our own convictions and experience, and by the history of the world. To account for this fact, to reconcile it with the justice and goodness of God, may be as difficult as to account for the origin of evil. But it is to darken counsel by words without knowledge, and even without meaning, to assert that *we* acted thousands of years before *we* existed. The Bible solution of the difficulty is infinitely better than this. Our depraved nature is the penal consequence of Adam's sin, not of ours; just as our holiness is the gracious gift for Christ's righteousness, and not something self-originated and self-deserved.

A third general principle on which Dr. Baird's theory is founded is, the propagation of souls. On this point he is just as dogmatic and confident as on all others. On page 19, the immediate creation of the soul, as opposed to the theory of propagation, is declared to be "the fundamental doctrine of the Pelagian system." On page 364, he complains of orthodox theologians as uniting "with Pelagians in explaining away the teachings of the scriptures on the origin of the soul, in obedience to the dicta of an intuitive philosophy." The doctrine that the soul is an immediate creation, he says, "introduces a gross and revolting dualism into man's nature. As originally made, Adam comprehended in one being the two distinct ele-

ments of soul and body. In the unity of these elements, there subsisted a common identity, a common consciousness, common moral relations, and a common moral character." On the same page it is said, "There is no distinct mention of the creation of the soul at all; but the whole style of the narrative (in Genesis) seems to imply that it was created within the body, in an original, perfect, inseparable identification with it." P. 365. This is as near materialism as any orthodox writer could well go. Here is a denial of "dualism" in man's nature; and the assertion of "a perfect and inseparable identification" of soul and body. Then the soul and body are one and the same thing, or, at least inseparable, incapable of separate existence. This is the doctrine, on the one hand, of such materialists as Priestley, and, on the other, of the mystical school of modern Germany, as shown in our last number. Dr. Baird, however, is so characteristically incorrect and indiscriminating in his language, that it is by no means certain that he intended, even when he wrote what has just been quoted, to assert that the body and soul are identical, or even that they are inseparable.

On page 377, our author says, that "on the admission that the soul is created, the doctrine of original sin becomes altogether inexplicable." "It is in fact irreconcilable with that doctrine." It is irreconcilable with Dr. Baird's gross, materialistic theory of original sin, but not with the scriptural and church doctrine on the subject, as has been shown a hundred times by the most eminent theologians of the Reformed churches. Our author quotes Van Mastricht as saying that the first error of those who insist on the propagation of the soul, is "that they suppose corruption (in us) numerically the same with Adam's to be propagated; whereas it is only the same in species." To this Dr. Baird replies, "If not numerically the same, it comes not to us from him. Its origin is not, then, in him. He was only the first sinner in the order of time. The alternative is that each soul successively apostatizes, or that they are created corrupt. Such are the inconsistencies to which the most orthodox writers are led, when they attempt to vindicate the creation theory in consistency with the testimony of scripture respecting the nature of man."

He pronounces the theory of creation to be "Manichean-Pelagianism," that is, a mixture of Manicheism and Pelagianism. The opposite doctrine of propagation of souls, he says, is "inevitable," "unavoidable," &c., &c., from the plain teaching of the Scriptures.

On this subject we would remark, 1. That it is from its nature inscrutable. It lies beyond the sphere of observation or experiment. It lies no less beyond, or aside from the purpose and design of the teachings of the Bible. The Scriptures are designed to teach us facts, and not metaphysics, psychology, or ontology. They teach us that we derive a corrupt nature from Adam, but they are silent as to the mode of propagation. They teach us that we are regenerated by the power of the Spirit of God, but directly assert that the mode of that new birth no man can know. All positive dogmatism on this subject, therefore, is unseemly and injurious. 2. It is a point on which the church has always differed, and as to which the most profound have been the least confident. In the early church Jerome was decidedly for creation, Tertullian for propagation; Augustine for creation, but with admissions of difficulties on both sides which he could not solve. The Augustinians of the middle ages were for creation; the Lutherans in the general for propagation, the Reformed or Calvinists almost in a body for creation. Such being the historical facts in the case, we think it would require a very ordinary degree of modesty to prevent any man from pronouncing the doctrine of propagation, renounced as it ever has been by the great body of the Reformed churches, a matter perfectly plain, clearly taught in Scripture, inevitable and unavoidable. Still less should we expect any one to denounce the opposite doctrine as Manichean-Pelagian, as irreconcilable with original sin, &c., &c. All this is rather unseemly, somewhat hard to bear with becoming equanimity. 3. The origin of the soul has no necessary connection with Pelagianism one way or the other. A man may hold the theory either of creation or of propagation and be a Pelagian, and he may hold either and be a thorough and consistent opponent of Pelagianism. If he holds that responsibility is limited by ability; that we are responsible only for our acts, and only

for that class of acts which are under our own control, then he must deny original righteousness and original sin. Moral character can be predicated only of voluntary action, and consequently nothing concreated, innate, or hereditary, can be of the nature either of holiness or of sin. It is clear that a man may hold all these principles, and yet believe that the soul is the product of generation; and he may deny them and yet believe the soul to be immediately created. The two things have no logical connection whatever. And hence the most thorough Pelagians are the advocates of propagation of the soul, as Priestley and men of his school. On the other hand, the most thoroughly anti-Pelagian body in the whole history of the church, has been the most strenuous advocates for the theory of immediate creation. It is, therefore, a manifestation of no small degree of courage, for any man to assert that theory to be the fundamental principle of Pelagianism, and totally irreconcilable with the doctrine of original sin. He might as well assert that it is the fundamental principle of conic sections. The constant answer to the objection to the doctrine of creation derived from the transmission of sin, made by Reformed (or Calvinistic) theologians, is, that original sin is propagated *NEQUE PER CORPUS, NEQUE PER ANIMAM, SED PER CULPAM*. It is not a material infection of the blood; it is not a substance either corporeal or spiritual, to be transmitted by physical laws, but it is a punitive infliction. It is the consequence of the withdrawal of the fellowship and favour of God from the descendants of Adam, as the judicial consequence of his apostasy. This is the Calvinistic doctrine, and is a thousand times better than the doctrine of "the identification of soul and body," which Dr. Baird would have us believe is essential to orthodoxy.

A fourth characteristic principle of this book is one which is announced with great formality, and often repeated, and which is made of the last importance. That principle is thus stated. "Community in a propagated nature constitutes such a union or oneness, as immediately involves the possessor in all the relations, moral and legal, of that nature in the progenitor whence it springs." P. 317. This does not mean, and is not intended to mean simply, that a progenitor transmits

his own nature to his posterity; that as genera and species are permanent and transmissible in the animal world, so moral character is transmissible in the human race. This is the Placæan and New School doctrine. More than that is intended by the principle above stated. Community in a propagated nature involves community not only in moral character, but in guilt. We are said, on account of this community of nature, not only to inherit a depraved nature from Adam, but to have sinned his sin, and to bear the criminality of his apostasy. His act of self-determination in turning from God was our act, and imposes the same responsibility on us as it did on him. "We share in the moral responsibility of his apostasy as though we had wrought it for ourselves." We are "morally chargeable with that sin." "No man is held to answer for the first sin as it is Adam's; and if it is not his own, as it is sin or crime, justice will not account it his, as it is a ground of condemnation." The principle is that what a nature does in the progenitor of a race, all who receive that nature coöperated in doing. Being an act of nature it is common to all who possess that nature, and involves all in the same criminality.

This is a principle which is of wide application. It cannot be taken up and laid aside at pleasure. If true at all, it is true universally. If community of nature involves community in guilt and pollution for acts of nature, then it must be for all the acts of that nature. It is purely arbitrary and contradictory to confine it to one of those acts, to the exclusion of all others. If, in virtue of community of nature, we are agents in Adam's first sin of nature, and morally chargeable with its criminality, then we are morally chargeable with all his moral acts. If the ground of imputation of his guilt is the covenant, then it is limited to his first sin; but if that ground be community of nature, it must extend to all his sins. Dr. Baird (unconsciously perhaps) admits this. "Any exertion of Adam's will or powers," he says, "the effect of which had been to strengthen holy principles within him, affecting as it would his nature, would have been imputed to those who in him were partakers of his native holiness. Any act of his will, or exertion of the powers of his being, the tendency of which had been to weaken those principles in his nature, would have been in like

manner imputed. On the contrary, actions which bore no relation to such effects as these, were personal to the actor, and not imputed to others. To the former class belong acts of obedience to God, such as tilling the ground, observing the Sabbath, and worshipping God—acts which, by the force of habit, gave increasing strength to the holy nature in which he was created; or any want of watchfulness, in view of the dangers which were at hand, or failure to seek divine strength to uphold him in integrity. To the latter class of actions pertained such as partaking of food, and indulging in nightly slumbers—acts which had no special moral character, and exerted no plastic influence on his nature." P. 306. This is a fair carrying out the principle. Community of nature makes us morally responsible for all the moral acts of our progenitor. But what is to limit the application of the principle to our original progenitor? What is the specific difference between our natural relation to Adam and our natural relation to Noah? Human nature, as common to the extant race of men, was as truly and completely in the latter as in the former. We are as truly the descendants of the one as of the other. If community in a propagated nature makes us morally responsible for all the moral acts of a common parent, why are we not responsible for the moral acts of Noah? Again, what difference, as to community of nature, is there between our relation to Adam, and the relation of the Hebrews to Abraham? If we, on the ground of that community, are responsible for all Adam's moral acts, why are not the Hebrews responsible for all the acts of Abraham? Nay, why are we not responsible for the acts of our immediate progenitors, and of all our progenitors back to Adam? What is to hinder our being morally chargeable with every act ever committed by all our ancestors? Can Dr. Baird answer that question? He does indeed answer it, and just as might be expected, by denying his principle, and upsetting his theory. He says this objection confounds two classes of actions—"of these, one consists in such personal actions as result from the fact that the nature is of a given and determinate character. These in no respect change the nature, nor indicate any change occurring therein; but constitute mere criteria by which the character and strength of its attributes may be known." "To

this class," he adds, "belong the sins of our immediate ancestors;" which, therefore, are not imputable. "The other class," we are told, "consists of such agency as springing from within, constitutes an action of the nature itself, by which its attitude is changed." P. 509. But, in the first place, this is not the principle. The principle is, that community of nature involves us in *all* the moral and legal responsibilities of our progenitor, and not in a single class of his responsibilities only. And, in the second place, it is not the author's own exposition and application of his principle. He distinctly states that we share the responsibility of all Adam's moral acts; everything which tended to strengthen or to weaken his nature is imputable, and nothing, according to our author, can be imputed, which is not morally chargeable. It is not therefore merely acts which change nature, but acts which strengthen or weaken it, that is, all moral acts, the guilt and pollution, or merit and holiness, of which are transmitted. If this principle is true at all, it must involve us in moral responsibility for all the moral acts of the nature which we have inherited. Besides all this, the author tells us that it is acts or agencies which change nature, in which the recipients of that nature are involved; and, therefore, that if all men had remained holy, save one individual, and he should apostatize, his descendants would be involved in his crime and depravity. Then, if a man's nature is changed by the power of the Holy Ghost, why is not that holy nature transmitted? The fact that it is not, is proof that this whole theory is a chimera. It is not by physical transmission of substance that sin or holiness is propagated.

A more serious consequence of this theory arises from its application to Christ. It is admitted by our author that Christ partook of a human nature derived from Adam. The Scriptures, he says "lay much stress on the derivation of his human nature and person from the common fountain of the race."* P. 582. He was the Son of man, the Son of David, the Seed of Abraham. His genealogy is carefully traced up to Adam. He was a partaker, therefore, of the nature which apostatized from God in the progenitor of the race. He was

* Dr. Baird speaks of the derivation of Christ's *human person* from Adam, as though he were two persons. This of course is an inadvertency.

consubstantial with those whom he came to redeem. If, however, he was truly the Son of David according to his human nature; if he was, in the strict and proper sense of the words, the seed of Abraham; and if community of nature involves community in the guilt and pollution belonging to that nature, how are we to avoid the inevitable, although shocking, conclusion, that Christ was guilty and polluted? If we, because we are descendants of Adam, are partakers in his apostasy, why is not Christ, who also was a descendant of Adam, also a partaker in that crime? If it is morally chargeable on us, *on the ground of community of nature*, why is it not in like manner chargeable on him? Dr. Baird's answer to this difficulty is again a denial of his theory. He refers to the mystery of the miraculous conception. But this does not avail him. It is indeed supposable (even on the theory of propagation) that the *pollution* of our nature was removed by "the power of the Highest," before its assumption into personal union with the Son of God. But *guilt* cannot be removed by power. If a man commits a crime he is guilty, and even Omnipotence cannot undo the deed. If it is true that we apostatized in Adam, Omnipotence cannot make it untrue. And if it is true that all who partake of Adam's nature shared in his apostasy, and are morally chargeable with its guilt, then it must be true of Christ. That his human nature sinned in Adam is a simple fact of the past, according to the theory of this book, and all the power in the universe cannot make it no fact. Contradictions and absurdities are not the objects of power. They have no relation to it, and do not fall within its sphere. It is, therefore, only by a denial of the principle which the author admits underlies his whole book, that he can escape a conclusion which no Christian can admit. The principle, therefore, must be false—the whole fabric which it sustains falls to the ground. It may indeed be said that all sin is personal, and that as the human nature of Christ is not a person it cannot be chargeable with sin. But, in the first place, this is not Dr. Baird's doctrine. He holds to the distinction between personal sins and sins of nature. He teaches that the nature sinned in Adam, and that the guilt and depravity resulting from that sin attaches to all the persons to

whom that nature belongs. In the second place, although the human nature in Christ is impersonal, yet it was assumed into personal union with the divine nature, so that all that belongs essentially to that nature belongs to the one person Christ. He could say, *I thirst, I am exceeding sorrowful*. If, therefore, the nature assumed by Christ had sinned in Adam, he assumed it with the moral criminality of that act. It was his sin morally as being the sin of his nature.

The answer given by the Protestant theologians to this difficulty, shows that they held a very different doctrine from that contained in this book. They say that although Christ was in Adam naturally, he was not in him federally. He was not embraced in the covenant made with Adam as the natural head of the human family; and, therefore, he had no part in the guilt of his sin. This of course supposes that the federal, and not the natural union is the essential ground of the imputation; that the sense in which Adam's sin is ours, is a legal and not a moral sense; and that the sense in which we sinned in him is that in which we act in a representative and not a literal sense. And as to the pollution inherent in human nature, as has already been remarked, the Protestant theologians teach that it did not flow to Christ, because it is propagated "neither through the body nor through the soul, but through guilt." If there were not community of guilt, if Adam did not represent Christ in the covenant of works, then spiritual death, the punitive infliction for that offence, would not affect him. Thus Hornbeck, in his *Confutation of Socinianism*, after saying that men are in Adam, first, as their natural head; and, secondly, as their federal head, adds: "*Illâ ratione etiam ex Adamo naturæ suæ humanæ originem trahit Christus. Sed non posteriori ratione consitus in Adamo fuit, ut in capite morali et foederali, qui non pro Christo legem aut tenuit aut prævaricatus fuit;—quique proinde nec cum peccato originali (cujus in Adamo non fuit particeps, haud censitus in ejus federe) concipiendus erat.*" And Ursinus in his *Explication of the Heidelberg Catechism*, says: "*Transit peccatum originis neque per corpus, neque per animam, sed per culpam parentum, propter quam Deus animas, dum creat, simul privat originali rectitudine et donis, quæ parentibus hæc lege contulerat,*

ut et posteris ea conferrent vel perderent, si ipsi ea retinerent vel amitterent. Neque Deus hoc faciens fit injustus vel causa peccati. Nam hæc privatio respectu Dei eam infligentis ob culpam parentum, non peccatum, sed justissima poena est; etsi respectu parentum sibi et soboli suæ eam attrahentium, peccatum sit." See *De Moor's Comm. Perpetuus*, Caput xv., § xxxii. How Dr. Baird can quote these and other authors of the same class in support of his views, we cannot understand. They distinctly contradict every point in his peculiar theory, and affirm the contrary. They deny the propagation of the soul, and assert its immediate creation. They deny that the communication of original sin is through community of nature, and assert that it is through the federal relation. They deny that the loss of original righteousness is due to our own sin, and assert that it is (ob culpam parentum) on account of the fault of our first parents. In short they hold one system of doctrine, and he another.

The only other principle involved in the theology of this book, to which our limits permit us to advert, is the denial that anything can be imputed to a person which does not personally belong to him; any act which is not his own act; any sin that is not morally chargeable upon him as his own; any righteousness which is not subjectively his. No one can be punished who is not personally a sinner, and no one can be justified who is not inherently righteous. It need not be remarked how thoroughly this overthrows the whole system of evangelical doctrine and of evangelical religion.

1. The general principle is laid down, that nothing can be imputed to a man which is not really his own; his own, that is, not on the ground of a legal relation, but his own morally, as constituting his personal character. "If there is any one principle which shines forth," says the author, "on the pages of the Scriptures, with a light as of the noon-day sun, it is that thus attested. It is, that at the bar of God every man shall be judged and rewarded in precise accordance with his deserts; which certainly have respect to the attitude of the soul and its affections, as well as the actions of the life. When the Scriptures speak of the justice of God, the meaning is not obscure or doubtful. We are plainly and abundantly taught that the

rule of all his judgments is his law, which is the only criterion of merit or crime; that there are but two classes of cases recognized at his bar, namely, those who are conformed to the law, or righteous, or those who are not conformed, and are therefore criminal or sinners; and that God's justice consists in the fact, that to these severally he will render a reward appropriate and precisely proportionate to their desert." P. 489. On another page, Dr. Baird says: "He who supposes that God's dealings with his creatures are, in any case or manner, controlled by relations, or imagined relations, not in accordance with the intrinsic state of the case, as it is in every respect, not only denies that the judgments of God are in accordance with truth, but involves himself in the further conclusion that the Almighty is without a moral nature at all. For, to imagine that he can look upon one as guilty, in a matter in which he is not guilty, or liable to be punished as a sinner, when in fact he is not a sinner, is to assume that holiness is no more in harmony with God's nature than sin, truth no more pleasing to him than a lie." P. 330.

2. In the second place, he applies the general principle, that the only ground of God's judgment is subjective character and personal merit or demerit, to the case specially of sin. Sin he defines to be that which includes criminality and pollution. He therefore insists that sin can be imputed only to one who is criminal and polluted, and on the ground of such criminality. Thus, as we have seen, he constantly teaches that Adam's sin cannot be imputed to us, unless we are morally chargeable with it. He devotes a whole section to prove that men cannot be regarded and treated as sinners on account of Adam's sin, unless it is theirs in such a sense as to constitute their moral character. "It is only because truly and immediately ours, that a God of infinite goodness and mercy charges it upon us." P. 422. We are partakers "of the moral enormity of his deed." "We were so in Adam, that we share the moral responsibility of his apostasy, as really as though we had wrought it for ourselves personally and severally; and that in consequence we are guilty, and condemned under the curse at the bar of infinite justice." P. 475. The word *guilt*, he says, means "criminal liability to punishment." It includes, we are

told, two ideas: "The one is violation of law; and upon the character of the law which is violated, depends the moral enormity which the word implies. . . . The second element in the meaning of the word is, the liability to punishment which the transgression involves. Hence no one can be guilty except he has violated the law which condemns him." P. 462. By parity of reason, no one can be righteous who does not fulfil the law which justifies him.

3. In accordance with the above principle, our author teaches that none but sinners can be punished; and by sinners, he means those chargeable with moral criminality and pollution. On page 488, he says, the idea of criminality can never be separated from the word sin; "the primary conception always contained in the word is, crime—moral turpitude." The language of the Bible, he says, "knows not even how to threaten punishment, without uttering the charge of sin." "The only way in which," he adds, "we can conceive the attempt to be made to evade the force of this argument is by the assumption that, although there must be sin in order to the infliction of punishment, it does not necessarily follow that they coexist in the same party. If a creature is punished, it implies that some one has sinned; but it does not necessarily intimate the sufferer to be the sinner! To this subterfuge, two insuperable objections may be sufficient. The first is, that the entire argument of the apostle is predicated upon directly the opposite doctrine, to wit, that wherever there is punishment, it is conclusive proof of sin, (i. e. 'of moral turpitude.'). . . . The second is, that it sweeps utterly away the whole doctrine of the Scriptures respecting God's justice. The doctrine involved in the justice of God, and proclaimed in his word, is, that every intelligent creature shall be dealt with in precise accordance with his works," [and yet the author expects to be saved!] "under the provisions of the law, and the covenant therein incorporated. That provides that the sinner," [he who is chargeable with crime and moral turpitude,] "and the sinner only, shall be punished, and that in precise proportion to the enormity of his sins."

If then sin cannot be imputed where there are not crime and pollution in the person or persons to whom the imputation is made, then it follows that our sins were not imputed to Christ.

And if sinners only are punished, if punishment implies crime and moral turpitude in the person punished, then Christ's sufferings were not of the nature of punishment; and the doctrine of atonement, as that doctrine has ever been held in the church, and as it is the foundation of the believer's hope, must be given up. It would be difficult to find in the writings of Socinians or Pelagians more sweeping, emphatic, and bitter denials of the principles on which the great doctrines of satisfaction and justification rest, than are to be found in this book. How does Dr. Baird avoid these conclusions from his principles? He attempts it in two perfectly inconsistent and contradictory ways. First, by denying the principles themselves in their application to Christ, making him an exception; and secondly, by asserting that after all they do apply to him. This latter course is taken in a confused and faltering manner; it is, however, attempted. First, he denies the application of his principles to Christ: "It may be said that the Lord Jesus Christ was regarded and treated as a sinner. To this proposition we must emphatically except. He is regarded and treated no otherwise than as being precisely what he was, God's spotless Son, the spotless substitute, the vicarious sacrifice for sinners. But, that he was regarded and treated as a sinner, NEVER!" P. 440. The only exception to the principle that rational creatures shall be treated according "to their deserts," he says, "is the Lord Jesus Christ, in his atoning work. And unless we are disposed to deny the uniqueness of the person and work of Christ, and the wonderful wisdom, as well as grace, displayed in the plan of redemption, we must admit that this very exception confirms and establishes the rule. In God's own Son, and in him alone, shall innocence ever be visited with the inflictions appropriate to crime; and in his people, and in them alone, shall sin ever fail of the curse of God." P. 490. On the same page, "The doctrine which we oppose, involves the confounding of all moral distinctions—the infliction on the sinless, of the punishment of crime—the endurance by innocence, of the curse of the just and holy One. If this be so, then we are forced to conclude that there is no essential difference between holiness and sin; or else, that whatever the distinction, the Lawgiver and Judge of all is indifferent to it." This is certainly most extraordinary writing. The

punishment of the innocent, on the ground of the sin of others, is declared to be a violation of justice, inconsistent with the very nature of God, involving the assumption that he is indifferent to the distinction between holiness and sin; and yet it is admitted that Christ, although perfectly innocent, was punished! That is, God did, in the case of Christ, what his very nature forbids to be done, and what it is atheistical to say a holy God can do! On page 492, our author says, "Had Christ's sufferings been involuntary, they would have been a violation of justice, instead of being a signal display of it." But how does this help the matter? If a thing is essentially wicked, our consenting to its being done, cannot make it right. "If the infliction on the sinless, the punishment of crime," is a moral enormity, it is an awful thing to say that God has done it. How can what is impossible be done? If sinfulness in the victim is the necessary condition of punishment, then consent is no vindication of the justice of its infliction. A man may consent to suffer, but consent does not make him a sinner, and therefore, according to this doctrine, cannot render punishment just, or even possible.

The principle on which this whole book rests, renders a satisfaction to justice by vicarious punishment an absolute impossibility, because it makes sinfulness in the victim an essential condition of its infliction. All this difficulty and confusion arises out of the unwillingness or inability of the author to see that punishment has nothing to do either with the degree or nature of the suffering, or with the character of the sufferer. Everything depends on the design of the infliction. Suffering endured in satisfaction of justice is punishment, whatever be its nature or degree, and whatever be the character of the victim. If Christ suffered to satisfy divine justice for the sins of his people, his sufferings were penal.

Dr. Baird, when speaking of our relation to Adam, says it is subterfuge to say that the sin may be in one party and the punishment on another,—that Paul insists that wherever there is punishment it is conclusive proof there is sin in the sufferer. Although, as we have seen, in some places he makes Christ an exception to this principle, in others he seems disposed to carry the principle through. Community in a propagated nature

involves all who partake of that nature in the moral character and responsibilities of the progenitor whence the nature originated, is a principle which he expressly says applies to Christ. P. 317. "Unless Christ occupied such a relation to the sins of his people that they may, in some proper sense, be called his sins, they cannot be imputed to him, nor punished in him." P. 607. He had just before said that Christ's "position must be such that justice, in searching for the transgressors, shall find him in such a relation to them, to render him the party responsible to justice for their sins." All this, and much more to the same effect, may be interpreted in a perfectly good sense; but when it is interpreted in the light of the principle that community of nature involves community of character; that sin cannot be punished except in the person of the sinner; when it is remembered that our participation in Adam's sin, which is said to involve us in the charge of its moral criminality, is placed on the same ground, and declared to be analogous to the participation of Christ in our sins; then it must be admitted that the language above cited comes dreadfully near to charging the adorable Redeemer with crime and pollution. That this is in words denied is very true. But to say that sin cannot be imputed to the sinless; that it cannot exist in one person and be punished in another, is to say, either that it was not imputed to Christ and punished in him; or, that Christ was personally a sinner. A man cannot assert a thing in his premises, and deny it in his conclusion.

4. The fourth application of the principle that God's judgments are founded on subjective character, is to the doctrine of justification. Here again we are referred to our relation to Adam for illustration. The method of our justification, Dr. Baird says, "resembles the method of our condemnation in Adam." "The sentence of the law, whether condemnatory or justifying, must have some real ground; since the judgment of God is according to truth. The condemnation of sinners is for sin. The justification is of righteous ones, for righteousness." P. 425. But as the sin for which we are condemned is, and according to Dr. Baird must be, our sin, so the righteousness for which we are justified is subjectively our own. As we are chargeable with the moral criminality of Adam's apos-

tasy, so we are morally meritorious for Christ's righteousness. The one is ours in the same sense that the other is. And as the one is ours in such a sense as to constitute our moral character, and to expose us to the curse of God on the ground of that character; so the other is ours so as to constitute our character, and entitle us on the ground of our subjective state to justification before God. And as Adam's sin is a proper ground of remorse, so Christ's righteousness is a proper ground for self-complacency. P. 448. We are justified not by Christ's righteousness extrinsical to us and only nominally ours, but "the law of the Spirit of life in Christ Jesus hath made us free from the law of sin and death." Bellarmine teaches the doctrine of subjective justification more consistently than Dr. Baird does, but we do not think that he teaches it more explicitly, or that it flows more necessarily from the principles of the former than it does from those of the latter.

The principle that God's judgments must be according to truth, that if he pronounces a man guilty, he must be guilty; and if he pronounces a man just he must be just, is indeed self-evidently true. It is, however, no less true, that the same man may be at the same time both guilty and not guilty, righteous and unrighteous. In other words, the terms guilty and righteous have each two distinct, recognized, and perfectly familiar meanings. They are used in a moral, and also in a forensic sense. A man, therefore, may be guilty in one sense, and righteous in another. God pronounces the ungodly righteous. This is the very language of the Holy Ghost. Should any one convicted of theft, or of any other crime, bear full penalty of his offence, his moral character and ill-desert remain the same, but in the eye of the law he is righteous. It would be unjust to inflict upon him any further punishment. Justice, so far as his offence is concerned, is satisfied. In justification God pronounces us righteous, legally, not morally. His declaration is according to truth, because in the sense intended, we are righteous. The demands of justice have been satisfied in our behalf. When Christ is said to be guilty, or to bear our guilt, the word is of course used not in its moral, but in its legal sense. He assumed the responsibility to satisfy justice for the sins of his people. And thus when we are said

to bear the guilt of Adam's first sin, it does not mean that his sin is crime and pollution in us, but that, in virtue of our relation to him, we are justly exposed to the penalty of his sin. That such is the plain doctrine of the Scripture is the faith of the church in all ages. It is the doctrine of all the Augustinians in the Latin church; it is the faith of the Lutherans and of the Reformed, and it is the foundation, more or less distinctly apprehended, of the hope of salvation in every true believer. In opposition to this system, Dr. Baird would have us believe, that God's judgments are founded exclusively on the moral character or subjective state of his creatures; that if he pronounces any creature guilty, that creature must be morally criminal and polluted; if he pronounces him righteous, he must be subjectively holy; that only sinners, in the moral sense of the word, can be punished, and only the righteous, in the moral sense of that term, can be justified. With whatever orthodoxy in phraseology, with whatever earnestness of protestations against heresy, these principles may be set forth, they are none the less subversive of the whole system of evangelical religion. If none but sinners can be punished, then Christ did not bear the penalty of the law; and if none but the subjectively righteous can be justified, then no human being can be saved.

It is one of the infelicities of a review, that it is commonly written *currente calamo*, and sent piecemeal to the press before the ink is thoroughly dried. It is, therefore, apt to bear the impress of the feelings which the book reviewed makes at the time on the writer's mind. If it could be laid aside, and allowed to cool, much might be softened or modified. It is very possible that when we come to see this review in print, we may wish that some things had been otherwise expressed. We would very gladly have written in a style of laudation all the way through. Our first short notice of this volume is evidence that we were even too ready to commend. If we have said anything in this more protracted review which offends in the other extreme, we shall be sincerely sorry. But an author who does not hesitate to pronounce principles held by nineteenth-century men, and we believe by ninety-nine hundredths of his brethren, to be Manichean, Pelagian, and atheistical; who

represents the advocates of those principles as Pharisees, who make clean the outside of the cup and the platter, can have no right to complain that those who hold these principles should speak their minds with all frankness. We at least feel bound to enter a solemn protest against doctrines which we firmly believe subvert our whole system of faith, and to be inconsistent with the preservation of evangelical religion.

SHORT NOTICES.

A Dictionary of the English Language. By Joseph E. Worcester, LL.D. Boston: Hickling, Swan & Brewer. 1860. Quarto; pp. 1854.

THIS great work, which the public have been long looking for with excited expectations, has at last made its appearance. So far as we are competent to judge, on a cursory examination of its principles and contents, we are disposed to regard it as the most reliable and useful book of the kind in our language. It contains about one hundred and four thousand words. Many of these of course are obsolete, provincial, local, or technical. They nevertheless deserve a place in a work which professes to be a complete glossary of the language for common use. Matters of orthography may be determined either by principle and analogy, or by usage. Dr. Worcester has wisely adopted the latter as his guide. Usage is law in matters of language. As regards pronunciation, the same rule has been adopted. In doubtful cases, different authorities are cited. In all disputed points relating to the English language, the English are surely entitled to be judges. It is not desirable to get up an American language. It is one of the great recommendations of this Dictionary, that the author is disposed to defer to the authority of the standard writers of the old country. Our language is so rapidly spreading over the earth, that the only plan by which anything like uniformity can be preserved, is to have some standard to which all shall conform; otherwise we shall soon have American, Australian, Indian, Polynesian English, in endless confusion. The most difficult department of a Dictionary is the definitions. They require not only knowledge, but power of discrimination and of expression. The true rule, so