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ART. I.—REVIEW.

Book on the Soul, First part. Book on the Soul, Second part. By the Rev. T. H. Gallaudet, &c.

THERE is, perhaps, no field for benevolent enterprise, which has been more neglected, or which promises a richer harvest to the cultivator, than the preparation of suitable books for children. It is somewhat surprising that the attention of philanthropists has been so little turned to this subject, and that while so much has been published of late on the importance of education, and of commencing our efforts early, so little has been done in the way of furnishing the means of communicating knowledge to the minds of children. At first view, it seems an easy task to prepare such books as are needful for the instruction of youth; yet when we come to ponder the subject deeply, we cannot but confess, that it is a work of extreme difficulty. We do not speak of the elementary books which are needful to teach the art of reading: these, however useful, communicate no instruction to the mind; they only furnish one means of acquiring knowledge. We refer to books adapted to the minds of children in the several stages of their development, and which are calculated, especially, to train the thoughts, 'to teach the young idea how to shoot;' and by which their

VOL. IV. No. II.—T

ART. X.—THE NEW DIVINITY TRIED.

Review of "The New Divinity Tried;" or, An Examination of the Rev. Mr. Rand's Strictures on a Sermon delivered by the Rev. C. J. Finney, on making a new Heart. Boston. Pierce & Butler, 1832. pp. 44.

WE learn from this pamphlet, that the Rev. Mr. Finney delivered, sometime last autumn, a sermon on making a new heart, founded on Ezek. xviii. 13. The Rev. Mr. Rand, being one of his auditors, took notes of the discourse, which he published, attended with a series of strictures, in a periodical work of which he is the editor. As these notes, in the judgment of Mr. Finney's friends, presented an imperfect view of his sermon, one of their number obtained the outline used by the preacher himself, and sent the requisite corrections to Mr. Rand, who availed himself of the aid thus afforded. The notes and strictures were afterwards published in a pamphlet form under the title, "The New Divinity Tried." It is the review of this pamphlet, by an anonymous writer, of which we propose to give a short notice.

We are not prepared to justify the course pursued by Mr. Rand, in thus bringing Mr. Finney before the public without his knowledge or consent. The considerations which evince the general impropriety of such a step are obvious, and are forcibly stated in the Review. That there may be cases in which the evil produced by a popular preacher constantly presenting erroneous views in his discourses, is so serious, that the usual etiquette of literary proceedings should be sacrificed in order to counteract its influence, we do not doubt. Nor do we question that Mr. Rand felt the present to be such a case. As the publication has not only been made, but noticed by the friends and advocates of Mr. Finney, there can be no impropriety in our calling the attention of our readers, for a few moments, to the contents of this Review. It is an elaborate production, distinguished both by acuteness and research, and pervaded by a tone of moderation. These are its favourable characteristics. On the other hand, it is lamentably deficient in open, manly discussion. Instead of a clear and bold statement of the distinguishing principles of the New Divinity, and a frank avowal of dissent from the Old Divinity of New Eng-

land, there is an anxious attorney-like mincing of matters; a claiming to agree with every body, and an endeavour to cast off his opponent into the position of the solitary dissentient, and overwhelm him with the authority of great names. The evidence on which this judgment is found will appear in what follows, of its correctness the reader must judge.

We gather from the review itself, (for we have in vain endeavour to obtain, in season, a copy of Mr. Rand's pamphlet) that the leading objections to the New Divinity are those which have been urged from various quarters against some of the doctrines of the Christian Spectator. Indeed, the reviewer, to show that Mr. Rand was not obliged to publish the notes of an extemporaneous discourse, in order to bring the opinions which it advocated, before the public, tells us the doctrines of the sermon are those which have been repeatedly presented in the Spectator, and elsewhere. We need therefore be at no loss for the distinguishing features of the New Divinity. It starts with the assumption that morality can only be predicated of voluntary exercises; that all holiness and sin consist in acts of choice or preference. When this principle is said to be one of the radical views of the New Divinity, neither Mr. Rand nor any one else can mean to represent the opinion itself as a novelty. It is, on all hands, acknowledged to be centuries old. The novelty consists in its being held by men professing to be Calvinists, and in its being traced out by them to very nearly the same results as those which the uniform opponents of Calvinism have derived from it. Thus Dr. John Taylor, of Norwich, presents it as the grand objection to the doctrines of original sin, and original righteousness; and in defending these doctrines President Edwards laboriously argues against this opinion. Yet it is in behalf of this radical view of the new system, that the authority of Edwards, Bellamy, Witherspoon, Dwight, Griffin, Woods, as well as Augustine and Calvin, is quoted and arrayed against Mr. Rand. Almost every one of these writers not only disclaims the opinion thus ascribed to them, but endeavours to refute it. Thus President Edwards, after stating Dr. Taylor's great objection to the doctrine of original sin to be, "that moral virtue, in its very nature, implieth the choice and consent of the moral agent," and quoting from him the declaration, "To say that God not only endowed Adam with a capacity of being righteous, but, moreover, that righteousness and true holiness were created with him, or wrought into his nature, at the

same time he was made, is to affirm a contradiction, or what is inconsistent with the very nature of righteousness," goes on to remark, "with respect to this, I would observe, that it consists in a notion of virtue quite inconsistent with the nature of things and the common notions of mankind." That it is thus inconsistent with the nature of things, he proceeds to prove. In the course of this proof we find such assertions as the following: "The act of choosing what is good is no further virtuous, than it proceeds from a good principle, or virtuous disposition of mind. Which supposes that a virtuous disposition of mind may be before a virtuous act of choice, and that, therefore, it is not necessary there should first be thought, reflection, and choice, before there can be any virtuous disposition." "There is no necessity that all virtuous dispositions or affections should be the effect of choice. And so, no such supposed necessity can be a good objection against such a disposition being natural, or from a kind of instinct, implanted in the mind at its creation."* Again, p. 409, in showing Dr. Taylor's inconsistency, he says, "If Adam must *choose* to be righteous before he was righteous," then Dr. Taylor's scheme involves a contradiction, &c. A mode of expression which clearly shows the position against which he argues. Again, "Human nature must be created with some dispositions; a disposition to relish some things as good and amiable, and to be averse to other things as odious and disagreeable * * * * *. But if it had any concreated dispositions at all, they must have been right or wrong;" and he then says, if man had at first a disposition to find happiness in what was good, his disposition was morally right—but "if he had a disposition to love most those things that were inferior and less worthy, then his dispositions were vicious." "This notion of Adam's being created without a principle of holiness in his heart, taken with the rest of Dr. Taylor's scheme, is inconsistent with" the history in the beginning of Genesis, p. 413. It would, however, be an endless business to quote all that might be adduced to prove that Edwards did not hold the opinion which the reviewer imputes to him. There can, it would seem, be no mistake as to his meaning. These are not mere casual expressions, which he afterwards retracts or contradicts. Neither is there any room for doubt as to the sense in which he uses the words disposition, principle, tendency, &c.

* Works, Vol. II. 407, 408.

Because he carefully explains them, and characterizes the idea he means to express by every one of the marks which the reviewer and others give, in describing what they spurn and reject under the name of "principle," "holy or sinful taste." They mean something distinct from, and prior to, volitions; so does President Edwards; it is that which, in the case of Adam, to use his own word, was "concreated;" it was a disposition to love—not love itself—a relish for spiritual objects, or adaptation of mind to take pleasure in what is excellent; it was a kind of instinct, which, *as to this point*, (i. e. priority as to the order of nature to acts,) he says is analogous to other instincts of our nature. He even argues long to show, that unless such a principle of holiness existed in man prior to all acts of choice, he never could become holy. Again, the "principle," or "disposition" which they object to, is one which is represented as not only prior to voluntary exercises, but determines their character, and is the cause of their being what they are. So, precisely President Edwards, "it is a foundation laid in the nature of the soul, for a new kind of exercises of the faculty of the will."* This he assumes in the case of Adam to have existed prior to his choosing God, and determined his choice; what in the case of men since the fall he assumes as the cause of their universally sinning; and in those which are renewed, as the cause of their holy exercises. If President Edwards did not hold and teach the doctrine which the reviewer rejects and denounces, then no man ever did hold it, or ever can express it. The case is no less plain with regard to Dr. Dwight, who also gives the two characteristic marks of the kind of disposition now in question, viz. its priority to all voluntary exercises, and its being the cause of the character of those exercises. Both these ideas are expressed with a frequency, clearness, and confidence, which mark this as one of his most settled opinions. Take a single specimen: "There is a reason," he says, "why one being is holy and another sinful." This reason, or "cause of moral action is indicated by the words *principle*, affections, nature, habits, tendency, propensity." That he does not intend by "this cause of moral action," an act, exercise, volition, is plain; first, because he says, "these terms indicate a cause, which, to us, is wholly unknown;" secondly, because he expressly and repeatedly asserts the contrary. "We

* Treatise on the Affections, p. 232.

speak of human nature as sinful, intending *not the actual commission of sin*, but a general characteristic of man, under the influence of which, he has committed sins heretofore, and is prepared, and is prone to commit others. With the same meaning in our minds, we use the phrases *sinful propensities, corrupt heart, depraved mind*; and the contrary ones, holy or virtuous dispositions, moral rectitude of character, and many others of like import. When we use these kinds of phraseology, we intend that a reason exists, although undefinable and unintelligible by ourselves, why one mind will either usually, or uniformly, be the subject of holy volitions, and another of sinful ones. We do not intend to assert, that any one, or any number of the volitions of the man whom we characterize, has been, or will be, holy or sinful, *nor do we mean to refer to actual volitions at all*. Instead of this, we mean to indicate a state of mind generally existing, out of which holy volitions may, in one case, be fairly expected to arise, and sinful ones in another.* Again, "When God created Adam, there was a period of his existence after he began to be, antecedent to that in which he exercised the first volition. Every man, who believes the mind to be something besides ideas and exercises, and who does not admit the doctrine of casualty, will acknowledge, that in this period *the mind of Adam was in such a state*; that it was propense to the exercise of virtuous volitions, rather than sinful ones. This state of mind has been commonly styled *disposition, temper, inclination, heart, &c.* In the Scriptures it usually bears the last of these names. I shall take the liberty to call it disposition. This disposition was the *cause* whence his virtuous volitions proceeded: the reason why they were virtuous, and not sinful. Of the metaphysical nature of this cause, I am ignorant." "This cause, of necessity, preceded these volitions, and therefore certainly existed in that state of mind which was previous to his first volition."† This idea enters essentially into his views of several important doctrines. Thus, he says, Adam was created holy; i. e. with holy or virtuous dispositions, propense to the exercises of holy volitions. See his Sermon on Man, and that on Regeneration. Again, he makes original sin, or depravity derived from Adam, to consist in this sinful disposition—a contaminated moral nature—and

* Works, vol. i, 410 and 11.

† Works, vol. ii. p. 419.

argues that infants are depraved before they are "capable of moral action." And, again, he represents regeneration to consist in "a relish for spiritual objects, communicated to it by the power of the Holy Ghost," and explains his meaning by a reference to "the state of mind of Adam in the period antecedent to that in which he exercised his first volition." "The soul of Adam was created with a relish for spiritual objects. The soul of every man who becomes a Christian, is renewed by the communication of the same relish. In Adam, this disposition produced virtuous volitions. In every child of Adam, who becomes the subject of virtue, it produces the same effects."* It is impossible, we should think, for any man to force himself to believe that Dr. Dwight held the doctrine, that "moral character is to be ascribed to voluntary exercises alone." To reconcile all the declarations which we have quoted, and a multitude of others with which his works abounds, is an impossibility. Unless, indeed, we admit that he did not really believe what he over and over declares to have been his faith, and really adopted an opinion against which he earnestly protests and ably argues, or that he was so little master of the English language as to be unable to communicate ideas at all. The reviewer may possibly say, that he does not deny that Dr. Dwight and others held to the existence of a metaphysical something, as the cause of moral actions; but they did not attribute to this something itself a moral character; that it was called holy or sinful not from its nature, but only from its effects. To this, however, the reply is obvious; Dr. Dwight not only speaks of this disposition as virtuous, or vicious, calls it a sinful or holy propensity, principle, nature, habit, heart; terms which, in themselves, one would suppose necessarily imply that the thing to which they apply had a moral character; but he in so many words, declares it to be "the seat of moral character in rational beings;" it is that which mainly constitutes the moral character; it is what we mean, he says, when we use the phrases, *corrupt heart, depraved minds*; or the contrary ones, holy disposition, moral rectitude, holiness of character. He tells us he intends by these phrases "a state of mind," which is not a voluntary exercise, but the cause of volitions. "This cause is what is so often mentioned in Scripture under the name of *the heart*; as when it is said, 'The heart is deceitful above

* Vol. ii. p. 214.

all things, and desperately wicked.'” Will the reviewer have us believe Dr. Dwight taught there was no moral character in this cause of voluntary exercises, which he supposed the Bible meant, when it speaks of a desperately wicked heart? Besides, he tells us, the communication of a holy disposition, or relish for spiritual objects, constitutes regeneration—is not the moral character changed in regeneration? Has that no moral character, the reception of which constitutes a man a new creature in Christ Jesus? Yet this, Dr. Dwight says, is not a volition, (p. 418. vol. ii.) but “a relish for spiritual objects,” “a disposition which produces virtuous volitions.” Again, the very same objections which the reviewer and other advocates of the New Divinity, urge against the idea of moral principles prior to voluntary exercises, and determining their character, Dr. Dwight considers and refutes. And, finally, the reviewer tells that he and his friends agree on this point with the advocates of “the exercise scheme,” the very persons from whom Dr. Dwight most earnestly dissents as to this very point, which, he says, no one but a friend of that scheme, or of the liberty of indifference, would think of maintaining. Very much to the same purpose, President Edwards says, that this opinion concerning virtue, (as entirely depending on choice and agency,) “arises from the absurd notions in vogue concerning the freedom of the will, as if it consisted in the will’s self-determining power.”*

If any thing could be more wonderful than the reviewer’s claiming the authority of Edwards and Dwight, in favour of the opinion under consideration, it would be his claiming Dr. Griffin in the same behalf; a theologian who is almost an ultra on the other side. Our limits and time utterly forbid our exhibiting the evidence in every case of the lamentable misrepresentations by the reviewer of the opinions of the authors to whom he refers. In the case of Dr. Griffin, it is the less necessary, as his Park Street Lectures are so extensively known, and as he has so recently proclaimed his dissent from the New Divinity in his sermon on Regeneration. We refer the readers to these works. In the former, they will find him speaking of sin as an “attribute of our nature,” derived from our original parents, “propagated like reason or speech, (neither of which are exercised at first,) propagated

* Works, vol. ii. p. 410.

like many other propensities, mental as well as bodily—propagated like the noxious nature of other animals.” p. 12.

As to poor Augustine and Calvin being represented as holding the radical doctrine of Pelagius, we must think it a great oversight in the reviewer. It destroys the whole verisimilitude of his story. It forces the reader to suspect the writer of irony, or to set down his statements with regard to less notorious authors, for nothing. Calvin defines original sin “an hereditary depravity and corruption of our nature, diffused through every part of the soul, [strange definition of a voluntary exercise,] which first makes us obnoxious to the wrath of God, and then produces those works which the Scriptures denominate the works of the flesh.” Do not the “works of the flesh” include all sinful exercises? and is there not here asserted a cause of those exercises, which has itself a moral character? Infants, he says, at their birth, are liable to condemnation, “for though they have not at that time produced the fruits of their unrighteousness, yet they have the seed inclosed in them; nay, their whole nature is a mere seed of sin, so that it cannot but be odious and abominable to God.” *Institutiones*, Lib. ii. Cap. 1. 8. And in another place, he speaks of men being sinners, “*non pravæ duntaxat consuetudinis vitio sed naturæ quoque pravitate.*” Is this the language of Mr. Finney? Could any advocate of the New Divinity say with Calvin, that the “whole nature” of man, prior to the production of the works of the flesh, “is odious and abominable to God?” If not, why quote Calvin as agreeing with them as to this very point, that all sin consists in voluntary exercises? The reviewer himself represents Calvin as teaching, that original sin consists in “inherent corruption,” a mode of expression constantly employed by such writers, to indicate moral depravity as distinct from actual sins, and prior to them.

With regard to Augustine, the case is still more extraordinary. The reviewer quotes from De Moor the following passage from this father: “Sin is so far a voluntary evil, that it would not be sin if it were not voluntary,” in proof that he also held, “that a moral character was to be ascribed to voluntary exercises alone.” And yet De Moor immediately adds, in answer to the appeal, which, he says, Pelagians make to this passage, that Augustine did not wish the declaration to be understood of original sin, but restricts it to actual sin, and quotes in proof from his work against Julian, an explicit state-

ment that the principle was to be so restricted. "*Hoc enim,*" says Augustine, "*recte dicitur propter proprium cujusque peccatum, non propter primi peccati originale contagium.*" "This is properly said in reference to the proper (or actual) sin of each one, but not of the original contagion of the first sin." With this declaration before his eyes, how could the reviewer make such a representation?

It is this reference to such men as Edwards, Bellamy, and Dwight, besides older writers, as holding opinions which they not only did not hold, but which, in every form, expressly and by implication, they rejected and condemn, that we consider unfair and uncandid. We are painfully anxious to have this course on the part of the reviewer and others explained. We wish to know on what principle such statements can be reconciled with honesty. We take it for granted, they must have some esoteric sense, some private meaning, some *arriere pensée*, by which to clear their consciences in this matter; but what it is, we cannot divine. This has become so common and so serious an evil, that we are not surprised to find some of the leading theologians of Connecticut saying, "It is surely time that the enemies of truth were relieved of the burden of making doctrines for us, or of informing us what we ourselves believe."* It is just as easy to make Mr. Rand agree with Mr. Finney, as it is President Edwards or Dr. Dwight. All that is necessary is, to take some declaration which is intended to apply to one subject, and apply it to another; and adopt the principle, that language is to be interpreted, not according to the writer's views of the nature of the subject, but according to those of the reviewer. If he say with Dr. Griffin, "men are voluntary and free in all their wickedness;" or, ask with Dr. Witherspoon, "Does any man *commit* sin but from his own choice? or is he hindered from any duty to which he is sincerely and heartily inclined?" Then he holds, "that a moral character is to be ascribed to voluntary exercises alone." These identical passages, referring, as the very language implies, to actual sins, are quoted by the reviewer in his defence of that position, and as implying that a moral character can be ascribed to nothing anterior to such voluntary exercises. It matters

* See the Prospectus of a new monthly Religious Periodical, to be entitled the Evangelical Magazine, and to be conducted by the Executive Committee of the Connecticut Doctrinal Tract Society.

not, it would seem, that these declarations are perfectly consistent with the belief in moral principles, dispositions, or tastes, as existing prior to all acts, or that their authors express such to be their belief. This is gross misrepresentation of a writer's real opinions, whatever be its motive, or on whatever principle its justification may be attempted.

We have already admitted that there was no novelty in this fundamental principle of the New Divinity, but that the novelty consisted in its being adopted by nominal Calvinists, and traced to much the same results as it ever has been by the open opposers of Calvinism. Thus, Mr. Finney says with great plainness, "a nature cannot be holy. The nature of Adam, at his creation, was not holy. Adam was made with a nature neither sinful nor holy. When he began to act, he made it his governing purpose to serve God." This declaration is, at least, in apparent opposition to the statements so constantly occurring in theological writers—that the nature of Adam was holy at his creation—that the *nature* of man since the fall is sinful, and others of similar import. The method which the reviewer adopts of reconciling this apparent discrepancy, is, as usual, entirely unsatisfactory. He tells us there are three senses in which the word nature is used, as applied to moral beings; first, it indicates something which is an original and essential part of their constitution, not resulting at all from their choice or agency, and necessarily found in them of whatever character and in whatever circumstances;" second, it is used to designate the period prior to conversion, as when Paul says, "we are by nature," i. e. in our unregenerate state, "the children of wrath;" and "a third sense is, an expression of the *fact* that there is something in the being a thing spoken of, which is the ground or occasion of a certainty, that it will, in all its appropriate circumstances, exhibit the result or quality predicated of it." What the preacher meant and only meant, according to the reviewer was, "that holiness was not an essential part of Adam's constitution, at his creation, so as not to result at all from his choice and agency." p. 9, 10. There is in all this statement, a great want of precision and accuracy. The reviewer uses the expressions, *essential* part of the constitution, and "not resulting from choice or agency," as synonymous; though he must be aware that Mr. Rand, and the great body of Christians, agree in saying, that holiness and sin are not and cannot be essential attributes, in the sense of the reviewer. An es-

essential attribute is an attribute which inheres in the essence of a thing, and is necessary to its being. Thus the attributes of thought and feeling are essential to mind; without them, it is not mind. Whoever maintained, that holiness was so an essential part of man's constitution, that he ceased to be man when he lost it? Who ever maintained, that either sin or holiness resided in the essence of the soul, or was a physical attribute? The reviewer knows as well as any body, that this Manichean and Flacian doctrine was spurned and rejected by the whole Christian Church. But does it follow from this, that holiness and sin must depend entirely on choice and agency; that there can be nothing of a moral character prior to acts of preference? Certainly not. For this simple reason, that while the Christian Church has rejected the idea of the substantial nature of sin and holiness, it has with equal unanimity held the doctrine of moral propensities, dispositions, or tendencies, prior to all acts of choice. It is in this sense that they have affirmed, and it is in this sense the New Divinity denies, that "a nature may be sinful or holy." And this denial, as Mr. Rand correctly states, is a denial of the doctrines of original righteousness and original sin. "The doctrine of *original righteousness*, or the creation of our first parents with holy principles and dispositions, has a close connexion," says President Edwards, "with the doctrine of original sin. Dr. Taylor was sensible of this; and, accordingly, he strenuously opposes this doctrine in his book on original sin." "Dr. T.'s grand objection against this doctrine, which he abundantly insists on, is this: that it is utterly inconsistent with the nature of virtue, that it should be created with any person: because, if so, it must be by an act of God's absolute power, without our knowledge or concurrence; and that moral virtue, in its very nature, implieth the choice and consent of the moral agent." This is the notion of virtue, which he pronounces quite inconsistent with the nature of things. Human nature, he afterwards says, must be created with some dispositions; these concentrated dispositions must be right or wrong; if man had a disposition to delight in what was good, then his dispositions were morally right. Vol. ii. p. 406 and 413. This is the view which has been well nigh universal in the Christian Church; this is the idea of original righteousness, which the New Divinity rejects, urging the same objection to it which Dr. Taylor, of Norwich, and Pelagians and Socinians long before him had done. We are not,

any more than the reviewer, discussing the truth of these doctrines, but merely endeavouring to correct his very uncandid representations, as they appear to us.

It is further objected to the New Divinity, that it rejects the doctrine of original sin. This the reviewer denies. What is this doctrine? If this point be ascertained, the question whether the objection is well founded or not, can be easily answered. Let us advert then to the definitions of the doctrine as given in the leading Protestant Confessions. In the Helvetic Confession, the *Confessio et Expositio brevis*, &c. cap. viii. after stating that man was at first created in the image of God, but by the fall became subject to sin, death, and various calamities, and that all who are descended from Adam are like him, and exposed to all these evils, it is said, "Sin we understand to be that native corruption of man, derived or propagated from our first parents to us, by which we are immersed in evil desires, averse from good, prone to all evil," &c. "We therefore acknowledge *original sin* to be in all men; we acknowledge all other sins which arise from this," &c. The Basil Confession of 1532. We confess that man was originally created in the image of God, &c. "but of his own accord fell into sin, by which fall the whole human race has become corrupt and liable to condemnation. Hence our nature is vitiated," &c. The Gallican Confession, 1561. "We believe that the whole race of Adam is infected with this contagion, which we call original sin, that is, a depravity which is propagated, and is not derived by imitation merely, as the Pelagians supposed, all whose errors we detest. Neither do we think it necessary to inquire, how this sin can be propagated from one to another," &c. The ninth article of the Church of England states, "Original sin standeth not in the following of Adam, (as the Pelagians do vainly talk,) but it is the fault and corruption of every man, that naturally is engendered of the offspring of Adam, whereby man is very far gone from original righteousness, and is of his own nature inclined to evil, so that the flesh lusteth always contrary to the Spirit." The Belgic Confession says, "We believe, that by the disobedience of Adam, original sin has been diffused through the whole human race, which is a corruption of the whole nature, and a hereditary depravity, by which even infants in their mother's womb are polluted, and which, as a root, produces every kind of sin in man, and is so foul and execrable before God, that it suffices to the condemnation of

the human race." The Polish Confession, Art. iii. "All men, Christ only excepted, are conceived and born in sin, even the most holy Virgin Mary. Original sin consists not only in the entire want of original righteousness, but also in depravity, or proneness to evil, propagated from Adam to all men." The Augsburg Confession, Art. ii. "This disease or original depravity is truly sin, condemning and bringing even now eternal death to those who are not renewed by baptism and the Holy Spirit." And the *Forma Concordantiæ*, "Not only actual transgressions should be acknowledged as sins, but especially this hereditary disease should be regarded as a horrible sin, and, indeed, as the principle and head of all sins, whence, as from a root, all other transgressions grow."

We have referred to the leading confessions of the period of the Reformation to show that they all represent as the constituent essential idea of original sin—a corrupted nature—or hereditary taint derived from Adam, propagated by ordinary generation, infecting the whole race, and the source or root of all actual sin. This is not the doctrine therefore of Calvinists merely, but of the Reformed churches generally, as it was of the Catholic church before the Reformation. It is the doctrine, too, of the great body of Arminians. It is unnecessary to refer to individual writers after this reference to symbols which express the united testimony of thousands as to what original sin is. That the more modern Calvinists, (with the exception of the advocates of the exercise scheme) unite in this view, is as plain, and as generally acknowledged, as that it was held by the Reformers. Thus President Edwards defines original sin to be, "an innate sinful depravity of heart." He makes this depravity to consist, "in a corrupt and evil disposition," prior to all sinful exercises. He infers from the universality and certainty of the sinful conduct of men, first, "that the natural state of the mind "of man is attended with a propensity of nature to such an issue," and secondly, that their "nature is corrupt and depraved with a moral depravity." He speaks of this propensity "as a very evil, pernicious and depraved propensity;" "an infinitely dreadful and pernicious tendency." He undertakes to prove "that wickedness belongs to the very nature of men." He devotes a chapter to the consideration of the objection, "that to suppose men born in sin without their choice, or any previous act of their own, is to suppose what is inconsistent with the nature of sin;" and another, to the objection, that "the doctrine of native

corruption" makes God the author of sin. Precisely the objections of the New Divinity, to the common views on this subject.

Dr. Dwight is not less explicit, he makes this depravity to consist in "the corruption of that energy of the mind whence volitions flow, and which is the seat of moral character in rational beings."—Vol. I. p. 488. He proves that "infants are contaminated in their moral nature," from the sinful conduct of "every infant who lives long enough to be capable of moral action." Here then is moral pollution prior to moral action.

Dr. Woods also maintains the doctrine of depravity as natural, innate, and hereditary, in his letters to Dr. Ware. "Sin," according to Dr. Griffin, "belongs to the nature of man, as much as reason or speech, [which we do not believe, but it serves to show to what lengths the reviewer has permitted himself to go, when he quotes this writer in support of the position, that all sin consists in voluntary exercises] though in a sense altogether compatible with blame, and must be derived, like other universal attributes, from the original parent; propagated like reason or speech, (neither of which is exercised at first,) propagated like many other propensities, mental as well as bodily, which certainly are inherited from parents, propagated like the noxious nature of animals." He afterwards argues, "if infants receive their whole nature from their parents pure," "if they are infected with no depravity," when born, "it is plain that they never derived a taint of moral pollution from Adam." "There can be no conveyance after they are born, and his sin was in no sense the occasion of the universal depravity of the world, otherwise than merely as the first example."*

We think it must be apparent that Mr. Rand was perfectly justifiable in asserting that the New Divinity rejects the doctrine of original sin. What is the meaning of this assertion? Is it not, that the idea commonly expressed by that term is discarded? This idea, as we have shown, is that of natural hereditary depravity, or of a corrupt moral nature derived from our first parent. Sometimes indeed more is included in the term, as the idea of imputation. Sometimes the phrase is explained with more, and sometimes with less precision—some resolving the idea of corruption into its constituent parts—

* Park Street Lectures, p. 12—15.

the want of original righteousness and tendency to evil—and others not; but with an uniformity almost unparalleled in theological language and opinion, has the idea of innate corruption been represented as the essential constituent idea of original sin. The very distinction between original, and actual sin, so common, shows that the former expression is intended to convey the idea of something which is regarded as sin, which is not an act or voluntary exercise. The obvious sense, therefore, of Mr. Rand's assertion, is correct.

The reviewer's answer is a little remarkable. He tells us there are various senses in which the phrase "original sin" has been used in orthodox confessions and standard writings, in some one of which senses Mr. Finney may, and doubtless does, hold to "original sin." p. 13. He then undertakes to enumerate eight different senses, mainly by representing as distinct, different modes of stating the same idea. 1. The first sin of the first man. 2. The first sin of the first man and woman. (Is it not clear the reviewer was anxious to swell his list?) 3. Natural or inherent corruption. 4. Want of original righteousness and inclination to evil. (Identical with the preceding.) 5. Imputation of Adam's sin, and the innate sinful depravity of the heart. 6. Something not described, but distinct from natural corruption, and that came to us by the fall of Adam. (This specification is founded on the answer given in the Form of examination before the communion in the Kirk of Scotland, 1591—to the question, "What things come to us by that fall? Ans. Original sin, and natural corruption. Where it is plain that by original sin is meant, the guilt of Adam's first sin.) 7. The guilt of Adam's first sin, the defect of original righteousness, and concupiscence. 8. The universal sinfulness of Adam's posterity as connected with his first sin by divine constitution.—*Dr. Hopkins.*

No one, we presume, could imagine that Mr. Rand intended to charge Mr. Finney with denying the fact that Adam sinned, when he said he denied the doctrine of original sin. The first and second, therefore, of the foregoing specification might safely have been omitted. As to all the others, excepting the last, they amount to the simple statement of President Edwards, that the phrase is commonly used to indicate either the guilt of Adam's first sin, or inherent corruption, sometimes the one and sometimes the other, but most frequently both conjoined. The cases in which original sin is said to include both the want of original righteousness and

corruption of nature, are, as we before remarked, but examples of greater precision in the description of the thing intended, and not statements of an opinion diverse from that expressed by the single phrase, innate depravity. The absence of light is darkness, the absence of heat is cold, the absence of order is confusion, and so the absence of original righteousness is depravity, and this is all that President Edwards intended to express in the passage quoted by the reviewer, in which he says, there is no necessity, in order to account for a sinful corruption of nature, yea, a total native depravity of the heart of man, to suppose any evil quality infused, but that the absence of positive good qualities is abundantly sufficient. The reviewer, we presume, knows very well that this is the common view adopted by those who hold the doctrine of *physical* depravity, as it is styled by the New Divinity. He knew that, according to their views, it is just as supposable that man might be created with an "instinctive" disposition to love God, as with the disposition to love himself, love society, his children, or any thing else; that Adam was actually thus created, that this disposition was not constitutional in the sense in which the instinct of self-love is constitutional, but supernatural, resulting from his being in communion with the Spirit of God; that the human soul, instinct with the dispositions of self-love, natural appetite, &c., and destitute of any disposition to take delight in God or holiness, is not in its normal state, but in a state of moral degradation and ruin; that they believe there is a great difference between the state of the soul when it comes into existence, since the fall, and the state of Adam's soul; between the soul of an ordinary man and the state of the soul of the blessed Jesus; that this difference is prior to all choice or agency, and not dependent upon them, and it is a moral difference, Adam being in a holy state, instinct with holy dispositions, and men being in a state of moral corruption, at the moment of their coming into existence. He doubtless knew also, as his own enumeration shows, that the phrase, original sin, has been, with great unanimity, employed to designate this state of the soul prior to moral action, and that the fact that all men actually sin, and that their sinfulness is *somehow* connected with the sin of Adam, is not the fact which the term has been employed (to any extent) to express; that on the contrary the one fact (the universally sinful conduct of men,) has been the standing argument to prove the other fact, viz: innate inherent depravity; and he should,

therefore, have seen that it is preposterous to assert, that the fact of all men actually sinning, and that this is *somehow* connected with Adam's sin, is the fact expressed by the term original sin. If this be so, then all Pelagians, and all Socinians, and all opposers of the doctrine of original sin, still hold it. For they all believe that men universally sin, and that this is *somehow*, (by example, &c,) connected with Adam's sin. The reviewer's saying "that men sin, and *only* sin until renewed by the Holy Ghost," although it may make a difference as to the extent of the wickedness of men, makes none in the world as to the doctrine of original sin. This doctrine, as it has been held by ninety-hundredths of the Christian church, he rejects just as much as the Pelagians do.* We presume this will be called an *ad invidiam* argument. It little concerns us, what it is called, if it is but just and proper in itself. What is the state of the case. Here are a set of men, who hold certain opinions, which they assiduously and ably advocate. Not content with allowing them to stand on their own merits, they seek to cover them with the robes of authority, asserting that this, and that, and almost every man distinguished for piety and talents, has held or does hold them. When currency and favour are thus sought to be obtained for these opinions, by claiming in their behalf the authority of venerable names, is it not a duty to say and to show that this claim is unfounded, if such be really the case? What means this arraying against Mr. Rand, the authority of Augustine, Calvin, Edwards, Bellamy, Dwight, &c. &c.? What is the object of this array, if it is not to crush him, and sustain Mr. Finney? And yet we presume, there is no fact in the history of theological opinions more notorious, than that, as to the points in debate, they agree with Mr. Rand, and differ from Mr. Finney. The earliest advocate of some of the leading doctrines of the New Divinity, the author of *Views in Theology*, instead of pursuing this objectionable and unworthy course, came out with a distinct avowal of dissent from the generally received doctrines on these subjects. The same honourable course was taken by Dr. Cox; by the late Mr. Christmas, in

* The appeal which the reviewer makes to writings of the disciples of Dr. Emmons, is, as he must know, entirely unsatisfactory. Though as to the verbal statement, that sin consists in voluntary acts, there is an agreement, the whole view and relations of the doctrine as held by him and them are different, and some of the most zealous opponents of the New Divinity, are these very Emmonites, to whom he is constantly appealing for protection.

his sermon on Ability; by Mr. Duffield, in his recent work on Regeneration, and we venture to commend it to the reviewer as the right course, and, if such a consideration need be suggested, as the most politic. We have little doubt some of the advocates of the New Divinity have suffered more in public confidence from taking the opposite course, than from their opinions themselves. And we suspect the reviewer's pamphlet, will be another mill-stone around their neck.

Another inference from the leading idea of this new system is, that regeneration is man's own act, consisting in the choice of God as the portion of the soul, or in a change in the governing purpose of the life. Mr. Finncy's account of its nature is as follows: "I will show," says he, "what is intended in the command in the text (to make a new heart.) It is that a man should *change the governing purpose of his life*. A man resolves to be a lawyer; then he directs all his plans and efforts to that object, and that, for the time is his governing purpose. Afterwards, he may alter his determination, and resolve to be a merchant. Now he directs all his efforts to *that* object, and so has changed his heart, or governing purpose." Again, "It is apparent that the change now described, effected by the simple volition of the sinners mind through the influence of motives, is a sufficient change, all that the Bible requires. It is all that is necessary to make a sinner a christian."

This account of making a new heart, the reviewer undertakes to persuade the public is the orthodox doctrine of regeneration and conversion. This he attempts by plunging at once into the depths of metaphysics, and bringing out of these plain sentences, a meaning as remote from their apparent sense, as ever Cabbalist extracted from Hebrew letters. He begins by exhibiting the various senses in which the words, *will, heart, purpose, volition, &c.* are used. We question the accuracy of his statements with regard to the first of these terms. He is right enough in distinguishing between the restricted and extended meaning of the word, that is, between the will considered as the power of the mind to determine on its own actions, and as the power to choose or prefer. But when he infers from this latter definition, that not only the natural appetites, as hunger and thirst, but also the social affections, as love of parents, and children, &c., are excluded, by Edwards and others who adopt it, from the will, we demur. Edwards says, that "all liking and disliking, inclining or

being averse to, being pleased, or displeased with," are to be referred to the will, and consequently includes these affections. However, it is not to our purpose to pursue this subject. The reviewer claims, as usual, to agree with Edwards, and excludes all such affections as love of parents, love of children, &c., from the will until they involve a preference or choice. As though every exercise of these affections did not in their own nature involve such a preference, as much as love, when directed to any object. He then makes the will and heart synonymous, (thus excluding love of children, &c. from the heart) and proceeds to enumerate the various classification of volitions into *principal, ultimative, subordinate, immanent*, and *imperative*, and winds up his elucidation and defence of Mr. Finney's statement, by making his "governing purpose," to be equivalent with an "*immanent volition*," or "the controlling habitual preference of the soul." We cannot understand by what rule of interpretation this sense can be got out of the preacher's expressions in their connexion in the sermon. Certain it is, the common usage of language would never lead any reader to imagine that, in a plain popular discourse, not in a metaphysical essay from an avowed advocate of the exercise scheme, the phrase a "governing purpose," meant an immanent volition; or "to alter a determination," meant, to change the supreme controlling affection or choice of the soul. The reviewer himself betrays his conviction that this is not the proper acceptation of the terms. For he complains of Mr. Rand for making Mr. Finney's governing purpose mean no more than a mere determination of the mind; and yet the preacher substitutes one of these expressions for the other, as in his own view, synonymous. He tells us "a man alters his determination, and so has changed his heart or governing purpose." But supposing we should admit that, taken by themselves, the words "governing purpose" might bear the sense the reviewer endeavours to place under them, how is this to be reconciled with the preacher's illustrations? "A man resolves to be a lawyer, then he directs all his plans and efforts to that object, and that for the time as his governing purpose; afterwards he may alter his determination, and resolve to be a merchant, now he directs all his efforts to *that* object; and so has changed his heart or governing purpose." What is the nature of the change involved in the alteration of a man's purpose, with regard to his profession? Is it a radical change of the affections, or is

it a mere determination of the mind, founded on considerations of whose nature the determination itself can give us no certain information? As one man may make the change from one motive, and another from another, one from real love to the pursuit chosen, and another from extraneous reasons, it is evident the change of purpose does not imply, nor necessarily involve a change in the affections. When, therefore, Mr. Finney tells his hearers that the change required of them, is a change analogous to that which takes place when a man alters his determination as to his profession, and that this is all that is required, all that is necessary to make a sinner a Christian, he is justly represented as making religion to consist in a mere determination of the mind. Whatever may be his esoteric sense, this is the meaning his words convey, and his hearers, we have no doubt, in nine cases out of ten, receive. This impression would be further confirmed by their being told, that it is a very simple change, effected by a simple volition of their own minds; and that it is a very easy change, it being as easy to purpose right as wrong. The reviewer's defence of this mode of representing a change, which is said in Scripture to be effected by the mighty power of God, strikes us as singularly weak. He tells us, "there are two different senses in which a moral act may be said to be easy or difficult to a man; the one referring to the nature of the act, and the capacity of the agent, that is, his possession of the requisite powers for its performance; and the other referring to the disposition and habit of his mind in reference to the act." p. 11. Thus we may say, it is as easy to be generous, as covetous; and that it is very difficult for a covetous man to be generous. It is admitted, then, that it is very difficult for a man to do any thing contrary to the disposition or habit of his mind, and of course it must be exceedingly difficult to make an entire and radical change in the affections. But Mr. Finney says it is very easy to change the heart—to alter one's purpose. Would not this prove that he supposed the thing to be done was not the thing which the reviewer represents to be very difficult? Does it not go to confirm the impression that he makes the change in question to consist in a mere determination of the mind, to the exclusion of a change in the affections? When the ease of the work to be done, is urged as a motive for doing it, we have a right to suppose that an easy work is intended. But the transferring the affections from one object to another of an opposite character; to love

what we have been accustomed to hate, and to hate what we have been in the habit of loving, is a difficult work, and therefore, not included in a mere alteration of one's purpose, which is declared to be, and in fact is, so easy. Not only, therefore, the mode of expression employed, in describing a change of heart, but the illustrations of its nature, and the mode of enforcing the duty, are adapted to make precisely the impression which Mr. Rand received from the sermon, that conversion, in the judgment of the preacher, is a very trifling affair, effected as easily as a change in our plans of business; and we have reason to know that this is the impression actually produced on the minds of hearers by the preachers of this class; and on the minds of the friends and advocates of the new system themselves. Such, we think, is the natural and fair impression of the popular mode of representing the subject. And we very much question whether the metaphysical explanation of it amounts to any thing more. It is one of the most singular features of the review under consideration, that although the writer seems willing to take shelter under any great name, his principal reliance is on the advocates of Emmonsism. Yet it so happens that his system and theirs are exactly the poles apart. In the one, divine agency is exalted to the real exclusion of that of man; in the other, very much the reverse is the case. According to the one, it is agreeable to the nature of sin and virtue to be created; according to the other, necessary holiness is no holiness, there cannot be even an "instinct" for holiness, to borrow President Edwards's expression. The same expression, therefore, in the mouth of the advocate of the one theory, may have a very different meaning from what it has in that of an advocate of the other; and even if the idea be the same, its whole relations and bearings are different. It is not, then, to the followers of Dr. Emmons we are to go, to learn what is meant by the imminent volitions, primary choices, or governing purposes of the New Divinity. We must go, where the reviewer himself, in another part of his pamphlet sends us, to the advocates of the new system itself. We find that when they come to give their philosophical explanation of the nature of regeneration, it amounts to little more than the popular representations of Mr. Finney. In the *Christian Spectator*, for example, we find regeneration described, as the choice of God as the chief good under the impulse of self-love, or desire of happiness. The sinner is, therefore, directed to consider which is adapted to make him most happy, God or the world; to place the case

fairly before his mind, and, by a great effort, choose right. This, as we understand it, is a description, not of an entire and radical change in the affections, but of a simple determination of the mind, founded on the single consideration of the adaptation of the object chosen to impart happiness. If I determine to seek one thing, because it will make me more happy than another, (and if any other consideration be admitted, as determining the choice, the whole theory is gone,) this is a mere decision of the mind, it neither implies nor expresses any radical change of the affections. On the contrary, the description seems utterly inappropriate to such a change. Does any man love by a violent effort? Does he ever, by summoning his powers for the emergency, by a volition, and in a moment, transfer his heart from one object to another? Was it ever known, that a man deeply in love with one person, by a desperate effort, and at a stroke, destroyed that affection and originated another? He may be fully convinced his passion is hopeless, that it will render him miserable; but he would stare at the metaphysician who should tell him, it was as easy to love one person as another; all he had to do was to energize a new volition and chose another object, loving it in a moment with all the ardour of his first attachment. As this description of an immanent volition, does not suit the process of a change in the affections in common life; as no man, by a simple act of the will, and by a strenuous effort, transfers his heart from one object to another; so neither does it suit the experience of the Christian. We have no idea that the account given in the Spectator of the process of regeneration, was drawn from the history of the writer's own exercises, nor do we believe there is a Christian in the world who can recognise in it a delineation of his experience. So far as we have ever known or heard, the reverse of this is the case. Instead of loving by a desperate effort, or by a simple volition effecting this radical change in the affections, the Christian is constrained to acknowledge, he knows not how the change occurred. "Whereas I was blind, now I see," is the amount of his knowledge. He perceives the character of God to be infinitely lovely, sin to be loathsome, the Saviour to be all he needs, but why he never saw all this before, or why it all appears so clear and cheering to him now, he cannot tell.

We cannot but think that the impression made by the mode of representation adopted by the New Divinity of this important subject, is eminently injurious and derogatory to true religion. That the depravity of the heart is practically repre-

sented as a very slight matter, that the change and the whole change necessary to constitute a man a Christian, is represented as a mere determination of his own mind, analogous to a change of purpose as to his profession; that a sense of his dependence on the Spirit of God is almost entirely destroyed, and of course the Spirit himself dishonoured. This latter evil results not merely from the manner in which the nature of the change of heart is described, and the ability of the sinner to effect it is represented; nor from the fact that this dependence is kept out of view, but also from the ideas of the nature of agency and freedom of the will, which, as we have before had occasion to remark, appear to lie at the foundation of the whole system, as it has been presented in the *Christian Spectator*, and from the manner in which the Spirit's influence is described by many of the most prominent advocates of the theory. These views of human agency are such that God is virtually represented as unable to control the moral exercises of his creatures; that notwithstanding all that he can do, they may yet act counter to his wishes, and sin on in despite of all the influence which he can exert over them consistently with their free agency. If this be not to emancipate the whole intelligent universe from the control of God, and destroy all the foundations of our hopes in his promises, we know not what is. When sinners are thus represented as depending on themselves, God having done all he can, exhausted all his power in vain for their conversion, how they can be made to feel that they are in his hands, depending on his sovereign grace, we cannot conceive. What the nature of the sinner's dependence on the Spirit of God, according to Mr. Finney, is, we may learn from the following illustration. "To illustrate the different senses in which making a new heart," says the reviewer, "may be ascribed to God, to the preacher, to the truth or word of God, and to the sinner himself, Mr. F. supposed the case of a man arrested, when about to step over a precipice, by a person crying to him, *stop*. And said, This illustrates the use of the four kinds of expression in the Bible, in reference to the conversion of a sinner, with one exception. In the case supposed, there was only the voice of the man who gave the alarm; but in conversion, there is both the voice of the preacher and the voice of the Spirit; the preacher cries *stop*, and the Spirit cries *stop* too." p. 28. On this subject, however, the advocates of the system profess not to be united. Mr. Finney and others maintain, that there is no mystery about the mode of the Spirit's operation; the review-

er is inclined to think there is; the one says "there is no direct and immediate act;" the other, if he must adopt a theory, is disposed to admit that there is an immediate influence on the mind. The reviewer lays little stress on the difference, as both views, he says, have not only been held by many Calvinistic divines, but in connexion with a firm belief of the absolute necessity, and universal fact of the special agency of the Holy Spirit in producing conversion. We are aware of the diversity of representation as to this special point, among orthodox writers, but we are fully persuaded, that whatever may be the private opinions of those who preach as Mr. Finney is represented to have done in this sermon, the impression made on their audience of the necessity of divine influence, of the sinner's dependence, is immeasurably below the standard of the divines to whom the reviewer appeals in their justification. For an audience to be told, that all the Spirit does for them is to tell them to *stop*; that, antecedently even to this influence, they *may* and *can* do all that God requires; and, what is part of the system of the Spectator, that subsequently, or during the utmost exertion of this influence, they *may* and *can* resist and remain unconverted, is surely a representation from which those divines would have revolted, and which has a necessary tendency to subvert what the reviewer calls the fundamental doctrine of the absolute necessity of the special agency of the Holy Ghost in producing conversion.

We believe that the characteristic tendency of this mode of preaching, is to keep the Holy Spirit and his influences out of view; and we fear a still more serious objection is, that Christ and his cross are practically made of none effect. The constant exhortation is, to make choice of God as the portion of the soul; to change the governing purpose of the life; to submit to the moral Governor of the universe. The specific act to which the sinner is urged as immediately connected with salvation, is an act which has no reference to Christ. The soul is brought immediately in contact with God; the Mediator is left out of view. We maintain that this is another Gospel. It is practically another system, and a legal system of religion. We do not intend that the doctrine of the mediation of Christ is rejected, but that it is neglected; that the sinner is led to God directly; that he is not urged, under the pressure of the sense of guilt, to go to Christ for pardon, and through him to God; but the general idea of submission (not the specific idea of submission to the plan of salvation through

The New Divinity Tried.

Jesus Christ,) is urged, or the making a right choice. Men are told they have hitherto chosen the world, all they have to do is to choose God; that they have had it as their purpose to gain the things of this life, they must now change their purpose, and serve God. Our objection is not now to the doctrines actually held by these brethren, but to their characteristic method of preaching, the effects of which we have had some opportunity of learning. Conviction of sin is made of little account; Christ and his atonement are kept out of view, so that the method of salvation is not distinctly presented to the minds of the people. The tendency of this defect, as far as it extends, is fatal to religion and the souls of men. The happiness is, that sinners are not under the influence of this kind of preaching alone; their religious character is not entirely formed by this mode of representing what God requires; but, when excited by the pungency and power with which these brethren frequently address the conscience, and when aroused to the necessity of doing something to secure the favour of God, they are influenced by the truth already lodged in their minds, or derived from the immediate perusal of the Scriptures, and hence, under the influence of the Spirit of God, instead of following the directions of their teachers, which would lead to God, in some other way than through Christ, they feel their need of the Saviour, and go to him as the Gospel directs. It is in this way, we have no doubt, much of the evil of this lamentable neglect of the grand doctrines of the Gospel is prevented. But just so far as this defective mode of representing the mode of salvation has any influence, it is to introduce a radically new system of religion. We again remark, we do not doubt, that if these preachers were asked if they meant to leave Christ thus out of view, and to direct sinners to God without his intervention, they would answer, No. But we are not speaking of what they may believe on the subject, but of the manner in which, both from the press and the pulpit, the great duty of the sinner under the Gospel is presented.

It was our intention to call the attention of our readers to the panacea which the reviewer has discovered, (or rather undertaken to recommend) for the cure of all doctrinal differences. But our notice of his pamphlet has already been protracted to three times the length we originally intended, and we therefore have time to say but little on the subject. His prescription is, to draw a distinction between the doctrines of religion and the philosophy of the doctrines, which

he justly remarks, is an important distinction, which it is of the highest moment should be understood and properly applied. "*The doctrines of religion are the simple facts of Christianity. The philosophy of the doctrines is the mode adopted of stating and illustrating those facts, in their relations to each other, to the human mind, to the whole character and government of God.* From this distinction, results the following most important practical principle of Christian fellowship and of theological discussion. *All who teach the leading facts or doctrines of Christianity are orthodox, though they differ greatly in their philosophy of those doctrines.*" p. 31. The reviewer gives these passages in *italics*, to note his sense of their importance. We are constrained, however, to think, that although they contain a very obvious and familiar truth, they are of little consequence for his purpose. The truth they contain is, that there is a distinction between the essentials and not essentials of a doctrine. We care little about his calling doctrines *facts*. But how is this to aid any one in deciding on what is heresy, and what is not? The reviewer chooses to say, that the fact which all the orthodox must receive respecting sin is, that it exists, and that it is a dreadful evil. But how its existence is accounted for, is philosophising about it. But if I assert, it exists by the immediate efficient agency of God, do not I assert a fact, as much as when I say it exists? Or, if I say it exists because God cannot control a moral agent, do not I assert a fact? Again, the orthodox fact about man's natural character is, that in consequence of the fall of Adam, men sin and only sin, until renewed by the Holy Spirit; the philosophy is in accounting for it. But is it not obvious, that when the Church declares, that the universality of actual sin is to be accounted for by a sinful corruption of nature, she means to declare, that the Scriptures account for one fact by another? When it is said, we are condemned for the sin of Adam, is it not a fact again asserted? We think, therefore, the reviewer's distinction between facts and the philosophy of them, perfectly futile. The use he would make of it, is still worse. "All who teach the leading facts of Christianity, are orthodox." But what are these facts? Let the reviewer state them, and then he is orthodox; let Edwards state them, and he is a heretic. The substance of the fact regarding man's character, is, that *somehow*, in consequence of the fall, he sins and only sins, &c. Is not this a bald *petitio principii*? That *somehow* may be the very thing which the Scriptures clearly

reveal, and reveal as a *fact*. Again, it is a fact that we are saved by the death of Christ—this we have seen stated as the *doctrine* of atonement. Yet, as so stated, there is not a Socinian in the world, who is not orthodox on this point. This fact is not all that the Scriptures teach, nor that it is necessary to believe. The death of Christ saves us, and saves us as a sacrifice. That it operates in this mode, and not in another, is as much a matter of fact, as that it operates at all. Again, it is a fact, that men are renewed and sanctified by the Holy Spirit. But here again, all Arminians, Pelagians, and even Socinians are orthodox; for they admit the fact as much as the reviewer does, (allowing them to make the Spirit of God mean “divine energy.”) They and he might philosophise rather differently about it; but the fact they all admit. How the Spirit does the work, is matter of explanation, some say, by an immediate influence on the mind; others by moral suasion, or presenting motives; others by having revealed the truth in the Scriptures—so that the result may be ascribed either to the truth as the immediate cause, or to its revealer, the Spirit. And so, finally, though illustrations might be multiplied without end, the Scriptures are a divine revelation; here is a fact, in which, it would seem, all might acquiesce, and be orthodox, without asking, how God reveals truth to man. Yet this fact, the neologists of Germany hold and proclaim. It is true, when they come to the *philosophy* of the fact, they tell us they mean that the Scriptures are a providential revelation from God, in the same sense as the Dialogues of Plato.

It is too obvious to need comment, that the reviewer’s position is all that any man in the world, who professes any form of Christianity, needs, to prove his orthodoxy. Let him have the stating of scriptural facts, and he will do as the reviewer in many cases has done, state them so generally, that Arminians, Pelagians, and Socinians, as well as Calvinists can adopt them, and, according to this standard, be orthodox.

We have spoken of this anonymous pamphlet with sincerity: that is, as we really felt. We view it as highly objectionable in the respect to which we have principally referred. Whoever the writer may be, we think he has more reason to lament having given occasion to the Christian public to ask, how his statements can be reconciled with notorious facts, than to be offended at the strictures to which it may, and ought, to subject him.