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ARTICLE I.—*History of the Old Covenant.* By J. H. Kurtz, Ord. Prof. at Dorpat.* Vol. II. 1855. 8vo. pp. 563.

THE first volume of this work traced the history of Israel as a family to its close in the death of Jacob, their last common progenitor. The next period regards Israel as a nation, and, according to the epochs marked by our author, extends to the establishment of the kingdom. This period is divided into four unequal parts, severally represented by the residence in Egypt, the wanderings in the wilderness, the conquest of Canaan, and the residence in Canaan. Each of these has its own distinctly marked character and aim. First, the family was to expand to a nation and to attain a separate and independent existence. Secondly, they must receive their national form and constitution; they are not to be like other nations, but God's peculiar people. Hence he concludes a covenant with them and provides them with their code of laws. Thirdly, in order to realize the destiny thus set before them, and to develop themselves in their newly imparted character, they need to come into the possession of a suitable land. Fourthly,

* Geschichte des Alten Bundes, von Joh. Heinr. Kurtz, u. s. w. Berlin, New York und Adelaide.

were complicated by no ethical or financial investigations. But the denial of covenanted mercy to those who were not in fellowship with the human invention of three orders, demanded rebuke, and received it.

Again we express our high respect for the author of this long desired and welcome biography. It contains, as we have intimated, the principal facts of the history, with a rich magazine of correspondence. It is unnecessary for us to say more, in order to attract to it the attention of every reader.

ART. VIII. — *The Elements of Psychology: Including a Critical Examination of Locke's Essay on the Human Understanding, and Additional Pieces.* By Victor Cousin. Translated from the French, with an Introduction and Notes, by Caleb S. Henry, D. D. Fourth improved edition, revised according to the Author's last corrections. New York: Ivison & Phinney, 321 Broadway. Chicago: S. C. Griggs & Co., 111 Lake Street. Buffalo: Phinney & Co. 1856. Pp. 568.

IN 1839, there appeared in the pages of this Review, an article entitled Transcendentalism. It consisted of two parts; the one a general survey of the modern philosophy of Germany, the other, an examination of the philosophical system of Cousin. That article was reprinted in a pamphlet form in Boston, under the auspices of the late Professor Norton. It was subsequently included in a volume containing selections from the Princeton Review, published without any suggestion, or co-operation of the conductors of this Journal; and recently, the article in question has been reprinted in a handsome volume in Edinburgh, under the superintendence of the Rev. Patrick Fairbairn, D. D., of Aberdeen. Of this article, thus abundantly honoured, Caleb S. Henry, D. D., the translator of the Lectures of Cousin on Locke, which was one of the works therein reviewed, spoke with great contempt in the preface to the third edition of his translation, published in 1841. He says, "I have never

taken any public notice of it, because, for those who thoroughly understand the subject of which it treats, the article itself is its own best refutation; while to candid and sensible persons, less familiar with philosophical studies, though its numerous untruths and calculated appeals to the prejudices of the ignorant, may not be equally apparent, yet its flippancies, personalities, and bad temper, (at variance alike with the true philosophical and Christian spirit,) are sufficiently obvious to produce the reverse of the intended impression, (I may add, that from both these classes of persons, and from various quarters, I have received numerous testimonies to this effect;) and, as to the remaining portion of the public, coming within the limited sphere of the Journal in question—persons, namely, with whom ignorance of the subject and religious associations would make that Journal an authority—I certainly felt no call to argue philosophical questions before such a tribunal.

“A few words will suffice for all that is necessary to say to the reader of this volume. The article represents Cousin as a Pantheist, denying the personality of God, as denying also the essential difference between right and wrong, and as maintaining a scheme of Fatalism. I should do wrong to content myself with simply saying that these representations are totally false. Not only are they entirely destitute of just foundation, and contradictory also to the system of Cousin; but, on each and every one of these points, Cousin *strenuously maintains doctrines precisely the reverse of those imputed to him!* The statements of the article are as laughably untrue as it would be to call Athanasius an Arian, Bishop Berkeley a materialist, or Jonathan Edwards a believer in the self-determining power of the will! It seems to me, therefore, incredible that any person of ordinary good sense, assuming to pass a public judgment on such subjects, should fall into an honest misconception of Cousin’s doctrines on these points. I confess I can scarcely in my own mind acquit the writer of the article of deliberately imposing on his readers representations which he knew to be not only unjustifiable as towards Cousin personally, because contradictory to his express and repeated official declarations, but also unjust in themselves, because not involved in his fundamental principles, but contrary to his principles, to

his system, and to the whole strain of his systematic teaching. This impression is rendered the more difficult to resist by the mode in which the writer has endeavoured to support his representations—his logic being of that pleasant and effectual sort sometimes called the method of proving *aliquid ex aliquo*. The only supposition upon which the writer can be freed from the imputation of deliberate bad faith, is that his predetermination to make out a case destroyed for a time his capacity to perceive anything that made against his purpose. Why he should have wished to have made out a case, is not hard to be conceived in this community, and is apparent enough from the face of the article.* “For proof of the utter falsehood of the charge of Fatalism, the reader need only turn to the tenth chapter of the present volume, and to the notes connected with the fifth chapter.”

As to the charge of denying the essential distinction between right and wrong, he says, among other things, “Cousin is one of the most decided advocates of the principles of essential and immutable morality that ever wrote: Cudworth, Butler, and Price have written nothing stronger, nothing clearer. It would not be a grosser falsehood, nor a more laughable blunder, to assert that the systems of Hobbes and Jeremy Bentham recognized disinterested virtue and the essential difference of right and wrong, than has been committed by this person in asserting that Cousin denies them.”

“So likewise with respect to the charge of Pantheism, apparently the writer of the article in question had no precise conception of the meaning of the term. Certain it is that Cousin is no Pantheist in any of the senses in which the word is ever used by persons entitled to speak on the subject.” After stating what he regards as different forms of Pantheism, he adds, “Now, Cousin not only does not teach Pantheism in either of these forms, but, on the contrary, clearly and abundantly confutes them all. He maintains the substantial existence of God and the substantial existence of the universe of

* What he means by this, we learn from a subsequent part of his remarks. He imputes to the Reviewer a desire to injure his reputation, with the view of deterring parents from sending their children to the Institution in which he was a Professor, and of inducing them to patronize the College at Princeton.

mind and matter; of God as distinct from the universe; of God as the cause and the universe as the effect; of God as superior to the universe by all the superiority of an infinite, uncreated substance and cause, over all finite and created substances and causes. Yet all that Cousin says expressly and directly on this subject, is kept out of view by the writer of the article, and some speculations respecting the relation of the creation to God, and some expressions concerning the all-pervading presence of God, are paraded as proof of Pantheism."

"I repeat, then, summarily, that the person who wrote the article in question has imputed to Cousin doctrines directly the opposite of those which he explicitly and positively teaches, doctrines which he distinctly and strenuously opposes: and the mode in which he endeavours to justify his imputations involves a perversion of thought and language scarcely less incredible. A parallel argument might be constructed to prove Cudworth an atheist, Bishop Butler an infidel, and Mr. Thomas Paine a Christian believer!"

"A professed exposition of modern German philosophy is also given in this article, putting it in as odious a light as possible, for the sake of casting accumulated odium upon Cousin, and (perhaps chiefly) upon myself. Not adopting any of those German systems, nor sympathizing with their theological spirit and tendency, I do not here feel concerned to correct the mistakes of this exposition. Besides, no thinker tolerably well-informed on the subject, needs be told what a superficial and insufficient account it is. It has every appearance of being an assemblage of scraps gathered at second and third hand from encyclopedias, reviews, and incidental notices. A moment's glance is sufficient to satisfy any competent judge that it was never formed by a discriminating philosophical mind from a careful examination of the original sources.

"These are the leading and the only material points in the article. Almost every page of it, however, abounds with particular instances of bad spirit and deficient capacity. Its arrogant and flippant personalities, its numerous perversions and blunders, both in logic and fact, taken in connection with the falsehood of its leading positions, form a combination equally pitiable and ludicrous. But I have said enough, and perhaps

more than enough, respecting an article so little entitled, either for its matter or its spirit, to the respect of any true philosopher; and whose only value to the genuine Christian, who is, at the same time, thoroughly acquainted with its subject, is in the example it furnishes, how far from truth and propriety one may be led who attempts, under the banner of religion, to excite the *odium theologicum* against another, by presuming on the ignorance and appealing to the prejudices of those whom he addresses."

All this, and much more to the same effect, was written in 1841, and is republished in 1856, the writer congratulating himself, at this late day, on his moderation. Not satisfied, however, with what he had accomplished, he adds nearly forty pages of similar matter in the preface to the recent edition of his work; and, so great is his feeling of animosity towards an article which he cannot find terms adequately to depreciate, that he has published, or at least distributed, that preface in a pamphlet form. This is certainly putting himself to a great deal of unnecessary trouble. If our article is so false, feeble, malicious, and silly, as he represents it, it does not call for such violent efforts to counteract its influence. It is strange that the writer does not see that he only makes himself ridiculous, by speaking with such contempt of a review, whose influence he finds it necessary to counteract half a generation after its publication. So far from time having moderated his irritation, the recent portion of his rejoinder is more reckless and atrocious in its abuse, than that written fourteen years ago. He charges the writer of the article in our Review, with "point-blank slander," with committing "an outrage on the decencies of any kind of public debate, such as upright and honourable men everywhere look upon with reprobation, such as they expect to see only in the lowest organs of political party rancour." In another place, he says: "That any man of ordinary capacity, and ordinary intelligence of the subject, with merely that before his eyes which the volume I put forth contained, should be able, from detached and garbled passages out of the volume translated by Mr. Linberg, to pronounce such a judgment on Cousin's views of moral distinctions; that he should be able to do it in good faith, or at least without perceiving such a contradiction between his repre-

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rejoinder

sensation and the official systematic utterances of Cousin on the point, as ought to make an honest man pause,—this is to me inconceivable, and I frankly say I do not believe it. I think the man guilty of slander; and I think that in the clear-sighted judgment of our Lord God, there are many inmates of the state prison less morally guilty than the slanderer."

He complains that our review holds him up as "a contemptibly vainglorious meddler with matters beyond my reach; for whose guilt, indeed, the only excuse is to be found in the vanity that blinded me, and the stupidity that incapacitated me from knowing what I was doing." Such was not the impression of Dr. Henry's character, which our review of 1839 was designed to produce; but it is the impression which this rejoinder of his will not only make, but render indelible. In the conclusion of his long Preface, he says, "My main purpose has been to signalize the spirit and temper of the article in its contrast with that of Sir William Hamilton; and bad as the impression I have conveyed may be, I assure the reader it is not one half so bad as the reading of the whole article itself will produce. Something also of the character of the article, as a philosophical discussion, and of the writer's competency to engage in the criticism of such questions, I have incidentally shown; but how bad, how very bad the article is, as a whole, in these respects, I have not attempted to show. Nothing can adequately show it, but the whole article itself—nor that except to a true thinker, accurately acquainted with Cousin's system, and with the history of Philosophy in all its great systems."

As we had no hand in the article thus characterized, we may be allowed to speak of it freely. Not having looked at it since its first publication, and never having seen Dr. Henry's Preface to the third edition of his book, we were a little startled by his unmeasured contempt and reprobation. With some anxiety, therefore, we took down the review, and having reperused it, we do not hesitate to say, that we regard it in both its parts, (both in the sketch which it gives of German Philosophy, and in its examination of Cousin's system,) for scholarship and ability one of the best reviews which has ever appeared in an American periodical. The outline given of German Transcendentalism is just what it pretends to be. In the compass of

thirty pages no reasonable man would expect a thorough exposition of three or four systems of philosophy. It was not the purpose of the writer to examine the fundamental principles of any one of those systems, but his professed and real object he thoroughly accomplished. That object was to present a general view of the leading principles, and of the theological tendencies of the systems in question. This was done with a copiousness of reference to original and authentic sources of information which betrays the scholar on every page. We do not know where a better view of German Philosophy can even now be obtained in so small a compass. ✓

It is, however, against that portion of the review which relates to Cousin's system, that Dr. Henry's denunciations are principally directed. The writer of that part of the article in question has been in his grave more than ten years. He is now publicly accused, not only of incompetency and of ridiculous blunders, but also of falsehood and slander, and pronounced worse than a felon. It is impossible to repress the indignation excited by these charges. The publicity given to them imposes a solemn obligation on the surviving friends of the writer, to vindicate his memory. So far as these charges rest on Dr. Henry's assertions, (which is their main foundation,) they may be fairly met by a counter assertion. We pronounce them, therefore, one and all, to be false. We assert that the charge of Pantheism, Fatalism, and the effectual subversion of moral distinctions made against the system as it was at that time exhibited, are fairly made out; and that the whole impression of the article is such as to commend it to the moral approbation of every competent reader.

There are two things which, in justice to all concerned, should be borne in mind. The one is, that every man who holds a false system of philosophy, must of necessity have an esoteric and exoteric faith. We can no more feel and act in opposition to the laws of our own constitution, than we can live independently of the laws of nature. If a man is theoretically an Atheist, he will still acknowledge God in his hopes and fears. If he is an Idealist, he will not the less speak and act on the assumption of the existence of matter. If he is a Fatalist, he will nevertheless take all available means to secure his

own welfare. If he denies the essential distinction between right and wrong, he will manifest in his feelings and judgments the operations of conscience. It may, therefore, be perfectly true that Cousin's system is liable to all the charges brought against it, though his ordinary language and life be governed by the principles of moral and religious truth. There is also a very great difference as to the degree in which those who advocate false doctrines reduce their theory to practice. The very same system in one man becomes the source of the grossest immoralities; while in another it is merely a theory—a field for the exercise of thought. The Hegelian Philosophy produced Heine, though Hegel himself is said to have been as pure as Plato. We take pleasure in saying that the impression produced on us by Cousin's writings, is that he is a man of refined and elevated tastes. Many of his lectures abound with noble sentiments and with correct principles. In contrast with the scoffing mockery of Voltaire, the whole spirit of Cousin appears to great advantage.

The other remark, which justice to all parties requires us to make, is, that Cousin has openly retracted some of his doctrines as leading to Fatalism; and he has endeavoured to modify others so as to obviate the objections brought against their religious tendencies. In his last work, "The True, the Beautiful, and the Good," the Preface to which is dated November, 1853, he has taken special pains to reconcile his doctrines, or at least the statement of them, with the fundamental principles of Theism. We do not think that he has succeeded. The system is essentially what it was before. It is just, however, that he should be judged by his latest utterances; and it is no less just that our review, written in 1839, should be judged by his writings as they then stood. Those familiar only with the forms of statement adopted in his last revision of the lectures just referred to, might think our former representations overstated; but, if they are compared with the whole course of his instructions, and even if judged by the extracts which Dr. Henry, in his infatuation, has just published in the Appendix to the Lectures on Locke, we are confident they will be fully sustained. We propose to endeavour to make this appear, for the purpose of vindicating the memory of a friend, whom Dr. Henry has so grossly assailed; and for the still higher purpose,

of doing what we can to set the public on its guard against the system set forth in Cousin's Lectures, with all the attractions of genius and eloquence, but which is, as we thoroughly believe, subversive of all religion. This is the more necessary, because the system is not presented in the scholastic form. It is not couched in dry technicalities. It is not buried under an uncouth nomenclature, intelligible only to the initiated. His doctrines are presented in the form of history. One principle is brought out here, another there; first in one form, then in another, surrounded with a brilliant haze, which conceals while it adorns. The writings of Kant, or Hegel, might circulate among our people for a generation, and not be read by a hundred persons, or understood by a dozen. It is very different with the popularized Germanism of Cousin. A poisonous stream may flow under ground and do little harm, but if its waters are thrown up in brilliant jets from a fountain in the midst of a populous city, they will excite general attention and be drunk by thousands. This is just the service Cousin has rendered the Pantheistic philosophy of Germany; and it is this that renders his writings so peculiarly dangerous. Many a youth, and it seems even some doctors of divinity, who would never think of sinking a shaft a thousand feet deep to reach the waters of Hegel, will drink them without knowing what they are, as they are cast up in rainbow tints by the genius of Cousin; or to use a more homely illustration, many a man, and especially many a young lady, (for we understand that Cousin's Psychology is taught to girls,) who would revolt at the clammy white of an egg, will delight in the same substance when beaten into froth, coloured and sweetened, and called by some appetizing name. Such is the transformation which the insipid albumen of German philosophy has undergone in the hands of Cousin.

The charges, against Cousin's philosophy, of Pantheism, Fatalism, and the denial of moral distinctions, we do not propose to consider separately; the first includes the others. Every pantheistic system is of necessity fatalistic, and by a like necessity, precludes the idea of sin.

Before presenting the evidence in support of this comprehensive charge of Pantheism, we wish to notice the way in which Dr. Henry has attempted to refute it. In the first place

Cousin

he pronounces it ridiculous. "The statements of the article" [in which this charge of Pantheism was made] he says, "are as laughably untrue as it would be to call Athanasius an Arian, Bishop Berkeley a materialist, or Jonathan Edwards a believer in the self-determining power of the will." He says it is incredible to him that "any person of ordinary good sense" could honestly bring such an accusation against Cousin's system; that an argument equally valid might be constructed to prove Cudworth an atheist, or Bishop Butler an infidel. This, if it means anything, means that to accuse Cousin of Pantheism, was as much an unheard of folly as to accuse Athanasius of Arianism. Yet Dr. Henry, when he made that assertion, knew that the charge in question had been made publicly and earnestly in France, England, and America. Nay, he himself publishes in the Appendix to the book, in the preface to which he has the hardihood to make this assertion, Cousin's own declaration of the fact. The charge was so generally made that Cousin found it necessary to defend himself. He says, "It has found so many echoes even beyond the sensual school, that I have written a special dissertation on the Eleatic school, in which I fully explain myself, on the subject of Pantheism." Was Athanasius ever called to defend himself against the charge of Arianism? This is not all; Dr. Henry refers to some remark of Professor Hickok, in his *Rational Psychology*, on the doctrine of necessary creation, in which that distinguished writer says, that Cousin's Eclecticism is "as really fatalistic and pantheistic" as any of the systems which it has assumed to supplant.* He knew, therefore, that Dr. Hickok had pronounced this judgment, and yet he represents our lamented associate as a fool for saying the same thing! Still further, he lauds Sir William Hamilton's review of Cousin's system to the skies, and yet that first of living philosophers brings and substantiates the same charges. He does this in the cool dispassionate way in which an anatomist dissects a corpse; still he does it, and does it effectually. Dr. Henry had read Sir William Hamilton's review; he knew that he asserted that Cousin made the universe the mere phenomenon of God, and that he destroyed liberty by divorcing it from intelligence. He

* See Hickok's *Rational Psychology*, p. 71.

praises Sir William, and dedicates his book to him, and denounces our reviewer as a felon for saying in 1839 what Hamilton had already said in 1829! Worse still, if anything can be worse, he publishes in the Appendix of the very book which contains his atrocious abuse of this Journal, for saying Cousin's system is pantheistic, the clearest possible proof of the justice of the charge. He publishes the "Preface to the first edition of *Philosophical Fragments*," in which Cousin advances step by step through thirty odd pages of concatenated speculation until he arrives at the conclusion that "God is everything"! What is to be thought of such a man? We can think of no theory to account for such conduct. We cannot understand why a man should voluntarily build a pillory, and then place himself upon it. We have not built it. We did not even place the ladder for him to ascend. It is all Dr. Henry's own doing.

2. Dr. Henry attempts to show that the charge of Pantheism rests on a few "fervid and exaggerated expressions." "As to the expressions," he says, "relating {to the all-pervading presence and energy of God in the universe, they are the same sort of expressions as those in which all elevated meditation on the Divine Being naturally utters itself; and the charge of Pantheism would lie equally against nine-tenths of the most accredited devotional poetry, and against the Holy Scriptures themselves, which speak of God as 'all in all,' and of creatures as 'living, moving, and having their being in him.'" It might as well be said that the conclusion of a demonstration in Euclid was a rhetorical flourish. Pantheism is the conclusion arrived at by a laborious process of argument. The charge is not made to rest on casual declarations; it is founded upon his principles, his arguments, his conclusion, and the application which he makes of the conclusion thus arrived at. Dr. Henry makes no effort to meet the real grounds of the charge. There is no show of examining the principles of Cousin's system, or of proving that they do not necessarily lead to Pantheism, or that his arguments do not go to sustain that system, or that the conclusion is not actually carried out and applied. We do not suppose he is capable of any such process, but he surely ought to have attempted it, and not contented himself with assertion and abuse.

3. He places great reliance on the fact, that Cousin often and earnestly denies that he is a Pantheist. This we admit. He declares Pantheism to be Atheism. He says, "To accuse me of Pantheism, is to accuse me of confounding the First, Absolute, Infinite cause with the universe; that is to say, with the two relative and finite causes of the me, and of the not-me, of which the limits and the evident insufficiency are the foundation from which I rise to the knowledge of God," p. 446. Again, "Human nature raises its voice against Pantheism. All the talent in the world can never justify this doctrine, or reconcile it with the feelings of mankind," p. 448. He is fairly entitled to the full benefit of these denials; but what do they amount to? Simply to this, that he is not what *he calls* a Pantheist. He gives a limited definition of Pantheism which excludes his system, and then says, he is no Pantheist. This is said by the whole school. There are comparatively few German writers of repute, who admit themselves to be Pantheists; while there are multitudes, who by the common judgment of other men are justly so regarded. Cousin defines Pantheism to be the doctrine which "ascribes divinity to the All, the grand whole, considered as God, the Universe-God, of the greater part of my adversaries, of Saint Simon, for example." In this sense, there are no Pantheists, at least among philosophers. Hase says, that "The doctrine that the Universe is God, or that God and the Universe are one and the same, is properly no philosophical conception at all; even the popular religions of the East have got beyond that point."* He quotes Hegel as speaking with contempt of the notion of a Universe-God; Cousin, therefore, is not alone in his denunciations of Pantheism. With one consent the doctrine is repudiated in the form in which he presents it, by those who are really Pantheists in the true, and perhaps the worst, sense of the word. Pantheism is the doctrine which makes God the only real being of which nature and the soul are the phenomena. It denies all dualism. God and the universe are not two. They are one. The waves and the ocean are not two, they are one: but it would be absurd to say that the waves are the ocean.

* Hase's *Dogmatik*, page 118.

So these philosophers say, it is absurd to assert that the universe is God. The ocean is not exhausted in its waves; neither is God exhausted in the universe. The ocean, however, constitutes its waves, and God constitutes the universe. God is both finite and infinite. The finite (i. e., the universe) is God—but not the whole of God. It would be wrong to confound the thoughts of a man with the man himself. Yet the sum of a man's thoughts at any one time makes up his whole consciousness for that time. So it would be wrong to confound the universe with God, though the sum of things finite is for the time being the whole consciousness of God. God, in the language of Cousin, "is everything." God is man, God is nature, God is thought, God is truth, God is light, and heat, sun, moon, stars: "God is everything or nothing." Hence the famous aphorism of Hegel, ALLES WIRKLICH IST VERNUNFTIG—ALL THAT IS, IS DIVINE. Modern Pantheism, therefore, does not merge God in the universe, but it merges the universe in God. If this is Pantheism, then we presume that no competent judge will deny that Cousin is a Pantheist. Without at all questioning his sincerity, we say that his repudiation of the doctrine amounts to nothing; because what he repudiates is not what his opponents mean. He denies that the Finite is the Infinite—that the universe is God; but he does not deny that the Infinite is the Finite, that God is the universe. "All that is, is God," is Pantheism. It is the deification of man and nature while it degrades God as to his consciousness and life, for any given time, to the limits of the creature.

The universe, according to modern Pantheism, is the Son of God. All that the Bible says of the relation of the Father to the Son, is true in reference to the relation of God to the universe. The world is consubstantial and coeternal with God. It is his image, his thought, his reason, his life. It does not exhaust him, because there is a constant development of God in the world; just as the existing flora of our globe does not exhaust the principle of vegetable life. There is an indefinite succession of plants and trees, and an endless multiplication of genera and species. But there is no vegetable life without vegetable products, nor apart from them; and there is no God without the world, or out of it. Dr. Henry has produced no denial

from the pen of Cousin of the doctrine of Pantheism in its philosophical form; nor has he produced any affirmation of the opposite doctrine; except in forms of expression freely employed by the most open advocates of the systems of Schelling and Hegel. "Cousin," he says, "is no Pantheist. We have his explicit condemnation of it. He does not confound God with the universe. And to say that he is a Pantheist, in the improper sense in which the word is sometimes used; to say, that is, that he confounds the universe with God, is equally at variance with hundreds of explicit utterances of his. It would be suicidal to his system; it would be in palpable contradiction with the numerous critical confutations he has constructed against every form of resolving the universe of mind and matter into mere phenomena. It is the very scope of his philosophy to establish the objective reality and the substantial existence of the universe of mind and matter, as distinct from God." We wish this paragraph to be remembered. It brings the matter to the true issue. The question is not whether Cousin affirms or denies Pantheism. That depends on the meaning of the word. The real question is, does he reduce "the universe of mind and matter to mere phenomena." If he does not, then we concede that he is no Pantheist. If he does, then, by Dr. Henry's own showing, he is a Pantheist, and Dr. Henry stands self-convicted of the most atrocious abuse of our reviewer for calling that Pantheism which he here acknowledges to be such; self-convicted also of incapacity to understand the first principles of a system which for thirteen or fourteen years he was engaged in teaching; and self-convicted of assiduously labouring to introduce and inculcate a system utterly subversive of religion and morality. Though our responsibility in this matter is great, it is as nothing compared to his. For if we are mistaken, what harm is done? We, in common with the majority of his readers, have misconceived and misrepresented the doctrines of an illustrious man; and if convinced of our mistake, we shall be glad to make every atonement. But if Dr. Henry is mistaken, then he has been, and still is, labouring to poison the very fountain of life.

4. The great ground of Dr. Henry's confidence, the fact to which he constantly appeals in proof not only of stu-

pidity, but of wilful perversion on the part of our reviewer, is that Cousin "strenuously maintains doctrines precisely the reverse of those imputed to him." This sentence he prints in capitals to give it the greater emphasis. The proof of the assertion which it contains, he finds in the fact that Cousin discourses largely not only of God, but of his personality, and, therefore, he cannot be a Pantheist; he discourses largely of liberty and spontaneity, and, therefore, cannot be a fatalist; he writes with eloquence and pathos on morals, and, therefore, cannot deny the foundation of moral distinctions. This mode of argument seems to us to betray the most profound ignorance of the nature of the question at issue. The most notorious Pantheists do all that Cousin does. They speak largely of God, liberty and virtue. They not only teach that God is a person, but they prove it. They tell us wherein personality consists, what are its necessary conditions, and how God becomes a person. They discuss all the theories of liberty, and often decide in favour of the right one. They examine every department of natural and moral science, and write about them very much as other men. Does this prove anything? Does the fact that Berkeley wrote a treatise on "Tar-water" prove that he was not an Idealist? May not an Idealist write a dissertation on mechanics? If a Pantheist may write discourses on chemistry or astronomy, why may he not write on liberty or virtue? The controversy between Theism and Pantheism lies back of all these questions. These questions all relate to phenomena, and phenomena are admitted by both parties. The facts of consciousness are the same for both. Both therefore may examine, classify, and explain them. The properties and the laws of matter are the same for the advocates of the atomic theory, and for the advocates of the dynamic theory, as to the ultimate principle of matter. It is, therefore, perfectly consistent with the assumption that Cousin is a Pantheist, that he discusses all the phenomena of nature and of the mind; that he examines the theory of beauty, and proves that it cannot be resolved into the agreeable or the useful. With equal consistency he may discuss the facts of consciousness as they bear on the question of liberty, and show the difference between spontaneity and deliberation. So also he may, as he actually does, examine the different theories of virtue,

and prove that it is not founded on utility, or sentiment, or on the arbitrary will of God; that the Good is good in itself, and ought to be pursued whatever be the consequence; that neither regard for our own happiness, nor for the happiness of others, is the ultimate motive in doing right. We very readily acknowledge that there is much that is pure and elevating in what Cousin has written on these subjects, and that he occupies much higher grounds than the Epicureans or followers of Paley. But what does all this amount to? Just nothing at all, so far as the real point at issue is concerned. Yet it is mainly on this ground, that Dr. Henry allows himself to use the unpardonable language, in relation to the writer in this Review, which we have quoted above. As it makes no difference whether a man is a Materialist or Idealist, when he comes to discuss the phenomena of nature; so it makes no difference whether he is a Theist or a Pantheist, when he comes to discuss the phenomena of consciousness. This is not saying that there is no difference between Materialism and Idealism, or between Theism and Pantheism. It is merely saying that the difference does not appear in the discussion of phenomena. The world, as it addresses itself to the senses, is the same to the man who thinks it all matter, as it is to him who thinks it all mind, or to him who thinks it all God. The one would be just as loath to put his hand into the fire as either of the others. How futile then it is to argue that a man does not think the fire is God, because he talks and acts about it just as other men do; or that he does not think the soul God, because he discusses its phenomena just as they are discussed by others. We honestly think that Dr. Henry is the most incompetent man in this whole sphere, whom we have ever encountered, in print or out of it.

We come now to the main question: Is Cousin's philosophy pantheistical? This is the most important question in itself, and also as it concerns the reputation of our lamented friend. If an affirmative answer to this question is proved to be the correct and only one, then our friend stands acquitted, and his accuser stands condemned. It will be remembered that we do not understand by Pantheism the doctrine that the universe is God; we do not charge Cousin with holding or teaching that doctrine which he expressly repudiates. We mean by Pan-

theism the modern German doctrine, that God is the only real existence of which the universe of mind and nature is the phenomenon. That this is truly Pantheism, we have the concession of Dr. Henry himself. "Pantheism," he says, "in the strict sense of the term, is the confounding of God with the universe—denying his distinct substantial existence, and making him merely the collective ALL of things. It may be of two sorts; *material*, when the substantial existence of spiritual being is denied, and matter is made the only substance of which the collective all of the universe is composed; or *ideal*, when the substantial existence of matter is denied, and spiritual being made the only substance. Pantheism, in the less proper meaning of the word, is the confounding of the universe with God—making God the sole substantial existence, and the universe of mind and matter merely phenomena, thereby destroying human personality, freedom, &c. Now, Cousin not only does not teach Pantheism in either of these forms, but, on the contrary, clearly and abundantly exposes and confutes them all." p. xviii. That form of Pantheism, then, which makes God the only substantial existence of which the universe of mind and matter is the phenomenon, destroys human personality and freedom. The whole question, therefore, is whether Cousin teaches that mind and matter are phenomena of which God is the substance. Having reduced the controversy to this single point, we shall endeavour to show, first, that as a historical fact Cousin adopted more or less fully the modern philosophy of Germany; secondly, that modern German philosophy involves the doctrine of Pantheism in the form above stated; and thirdly, that Cousin's system, as unfolded by himself, involves the same doctrine.

The first of these points rests on the testimony of competent witnesses. In 1817—18 Cousin visited Germany. He met Hegel at Heidelberg, whom he speaks of as being at that time known only as a distinguished disciple of Schelling. In 1818 he spent a month with Schelling in Munich, and was thus, as he says, introduced to a clearer knowledge of his philosophy. In 1821, he dedicated one of his works to Schelling and Hegel, as *Amicis et Magistris, philosophiæ præsentis ducibus*. In 1826, he spent some time in Berlin with Hegel and his

principal followers, and was more thoroughly indoctrinated in his system. From this time he was in correspondence with the now acknowledged head of the German school, whom he was wont to address as *Mon Maître*. In one of his letters he says to him, "J'attends vôtre Encyclopédie. J'en attraperai toujours quelque chose, et tacherai d'ajuster à ma taille quelques lambeaux de vos grandes pensées." In another letter, he says, "Je veux me former, Hegel; j'ai donc tant pour ma conduite, que pour ma publication d'avis austère, et je l'attends de Vous. Sous ce rapport, Vous me devez de temps en temps une lettre sérieuse." Again, he says, "Parlez, parlez, mon ami, mes oreilles et mon âme Vous sont ouvertes. Si vous n'avez pas le temps de m'écrire, dictez à d'Henning, Hotho, Michelet, Gans, Förster quelques pages Allemandes en caractères Latins; ou, comme l'Empereur Napoléon, faites rédiger Vôtre pensée, et corrigez en la rédaction, que Vous m'enverrez."

In 1833, Cousin published in the preface to the third edition of his *Philosophical Fragments*, an account of his intercourse with Schelling and Hegel, and gives in many points the preference to the former. This disconcerted the friends of Hegel, who attributed the great change in Cousin's estimate of these two great leaders, which took place between 1828 and 1833, to Hegel's having refused to review Cousin's *Fragments*, and Schelling having done him that favour. This they felt the more, because that article was made the vehicle of Schelling's first open assault against his former associate and friend. The facts above stated, however, abundantly prove that Cousin avowed himself, what every one knew he was, the disciple of the leaders of the German Pantheistic school.* They were his recognized masters.

That he became a disciple of Schelling, and enamoured of his system, is also stated by Sir William Hamilton, in his examination of Cousin's theory, originally published in the *Edinburgh Review*. Sir William Hamilton says: "If we compare the philosophy of Cousin with the philosophy of Schelling, we at once perceive that the former is a disciple, though by no means a servile disciple, of the latter. The scholar, though

* See Rosenkranz's *Leben Hegel's*, pp. 368—373.

enamoured of his master's system as a whole, is sufficiently aware of the two insuperable difficulties of that theory. He saw that if he pitched the absolute so high, it was impossible to deduce from it the relative; and he felt, probably, that the intellectual intuition—a stumbling-block to himself—would be arrant foolishness in the eyes of his countrymen. Cousin and Schelling agree that as philosophy is the science of the unconditioned, the unconditioned must be within the compass of science. They agree that the unconditioned is known, and immediately known; and they agree that intelligence, as competent to the unconditioned, is impersonal, infinite, divine. But while they coincide in the fact of the absolute, as known, they are diametrically opposed as to the mode in which they attempt to realize this knowledge; each regarding as the climax of contradiction, the manner in which the other endeavours to bring human reason and the absolute into proportion. According to Schelling, Cousin's absolute is only a relative; according to Cousin, Schelling's knowledge of the absolute is a negation of thought itself. Cousin declares the condition of all knowledge to be plurality and difference; and Schelling, that the condition, under which alone a knowledge of the absolute becomes possible, is indifference and unity. The one thus denies a notion of the absolute to consciousness; while the other affirms that consciousness is implied in every act of intelligence."*

The differences between Schelling, Hegel, and Cousin, all lie outside of the doctrine which we wish to show is common to them all. They all agree in making the Finite the phenomenon of the Infinite. They differ in their methods of arriving at the knowledge of the Infinite, and in their mode of explaining how the one passes into the other. The only object for which we cite the testimony of Sir William Hamilton is to prove that Cousin was regarded as a disciple of Schelling, and as having adopted his system as a whole, not as distinguished from that of Hegel, but as distinguished from those of Kant, and other theistical philosophers.

The difficulties attending Schelling's method, rather than

* See *Discussions on Philosophy and Literature, &c.*, by Sir William Hamilton. Harper's edition, p. 30.

dissatisfaction with his results, seem to have inclined him, for a time, to the special school of Hegel, though he appears to have subsequently returned to his first love. Michelet, (not the French historian, but the Berlin Professor,) says, "that after Cousin, subsequently to his visit to Berlin, in 1826, carried to France the principles of Hegel's doctrine, which von Henning, Hotho, and myself had systematically discussed with him, and especially after he had found such favour with the French public, by means of Hegel's views of history, the Hegelian philosophy ceased to be confined within the limits of Germany, and obtained an European reputation. This is one of the most important of the services of Cousin."* On a subsequent page, he says that Cousin had given "universality and an European reputation to the Hegelian philosophy;" and a little further on, he adds that although Cousin "took so much doctrine from Hegel, he still adhered to the stand-point of psychology, and to its method, which he had derived from the Scottish philosophy, and from the doctrines of Royer-Collard." Here again, the difference between Cousin and his German masters is confined to method, and not to results. That Cousin introduced the Hegelian philosophy into France, is the fact attested. This we consider sufficient, so far as the first point is concerned. It is indeed a matter of common fame, a fact all but universally recognized, that the wonderful success of Cousin as a public lecturer was due not more to his genius and eloquence, than to his having popularized the abstruse philosophy of Germany; for the reception of which, with its intoxicating doctrines, the youth of France were fully prepared. Nothing stood in its way; there was no reigning philosophy; the materialism of the revolutionary period had died out; the doctrines of Reid had gained but slight hold of the public mind; and, therefore, when Cousin appeared, teaching a new system, apparently original, †

* *Geschichte der Letzten Systeme der Philosophie in Deutschland von Kant bis Hegel.* Von Dr. Carl Ludwig Michelet, vol. ii., pp. 685, 687, and 689.

† It must strike every reader of Cousin's Lectures with surprise, that while he so frequently mentions Kant to praise and to refute him, he seldom or never says anything of Schelling or Hegel, from whom the staple of his philosophy is so largely drawn. He seems to his readers to have taken up the subject as it was left by Kant, and worked out his results without any intervening steps.

and recommended by a mode of presentation perspicuous and captivating, his success was without parallel in modern times.

If Cousin adopted the German philosophy, it becomes necessary to inquire, what that philosophy is. Cousin says, truly, that it is impossible to understand the doctrine of Plato, without understanding the systems which precede and follow it. It is no less impossible to understand Cousin without understanding something of those systems whence his own, as to all its great principles, is derived, and of which it is merely a modification. The comparative anatomist is enabled to determine the genus, the species, and often even the variety to which an animal, whether extant or fossil, belongs, from a single bone, and much more readily from the whole skeleton. This, however, could not be done without a previous knowledge of the various cognate types of animal nature. So it is easy for any reader tolerably conversant with the history of philosophy, to determine from a few pages of a writer, with what school he stands affiliated; though, without that knowledge, he would be as much in the dark as a man ignorant of anatomy in the presence of the bones of some unknown animal. We propose, therefore, to give a brief statement as perspicuous as we can make it, of the modern German philosophy, as indispensable to any proper apprehension of the true character of the system of Cousin. Strauss, the famous author of the *Life of Christ*, in the Introduction to his *Dogmatik*, says that all the modern systems of philosophy may be divided into two classes; the one, the Theistic philosophy of Leibnitz and Wolf; the other, the Pantheistic philosophy of Spinoza, Schelling and Hegel. It is not the peculiar doctrine of Spinoza, as distinguished from that of Schelling, nor the doctrine of Schelling as distinguished from that of Hegel, that we propose to endeavour to state; but the leading features of the system common to them all, which, unless we are entirely mistaken, will be found to include that of Cousin also.

The distinctive title of this system is Monism,* as distin-

* This is the most recently adopted designation. It is the Greek equivalent to the German *Alleinheitslehre*, *all-oneness*; or *Identitätslehre*, *the doctrine of Identity*, employed by Schelling. Hegel calls his system "Absolute Idealism," which amounts to the same thing.

guished on the one hand from Pantheism, (in one of its forms,) and on the other from Theism. It is the doctrine of one Being. God is, and beside him there is nothing. God is every thing. He is the one existence of which nature and mind are the movements; the one substance of which they are the phenomena; the absolute reason of which all things are the ideas. This is the result to which this philosophy has arrived. How has this result been reached?

The end of all philosophy is to give a rational solution of the problem of being. Whether it adopts the *a priori* method to the exclusion of the *a posteriori*; whether it starts from reason or experience, or whether it attempts to combine the two methods, the thing which philosophy proposes to do, is to explain how things are. God, nature and man, are the elements of the problem which philosophy undertakes to solve. Of the two latter, we have, by common consent, in one sense or another, immediate knowledge. But as they do not contain within themselves the solution of their own existence, we cannot stop with them. Whatever it may be called, there must be some being, either distinct from nature and mind, and the cause of them, or which includes them as the manifestations of itself.

The first point, therefore, to be determined is, what that being is; the second, in what relation he stands to the universe of nature and of mind; and the third, the consequences of the solution thus arrived at.

It is a principle of the philosophy under consideration, that intelligence implies consciousness, and that consciousness supposes a difference between the subject and object. Every act of consciousness necessarily supposes that we distinguish the self from what is not self; the ego from the non-ego. Consciousness, therefore, implies limitation. We limit ourselves by distinguishing ourselves from what is not ourselves. But limitation is, by the very force of the word, inconsistent with the Infinite. The Infinite or Absolute, (terms used as equivalent by the German school, though distinguished by Sir William Hamilton,) is the unlimited. Consciousness, therefore, cannot be predicated of the Infinite; nor can intelligence, for intelligence implies consciousness. Suppose we abstract from matter all its properties, its extension, resistance, weight, its chemical affinities, &c., what

remains? Nothing that is knowable—that is, nothing of which anything can be affirmed or denied; or suppose we abstract from mind all thought, sensation, emotion, affection, &c., and what remains? Again nothing of which anything can be affirmed or denied. So if you abstract the Finite from the Infinite, you leave nothing but a mere potentiality, a cause, power, substance,—call it what you will, it is still an unknown quantity. In order to know itself, or to be known, it must become finite. It must become objective to itself. The Infinite thus passes into the Finite, *i. e.*, into the universe of nature and mind. God has no *existence* out of the world, any more than life exists out of things living.

This determines the second point above mentioned, viz. the relation of the Infinite to the Finite; or, if you please, of God to the universe. It is a relation of identity. The universe is consubstantial and coeternal with God. Still, the latter is not exhausted in the former, any more than the mind is exhausted in its acts. The universe is finite, God is infinite. The universe is effect, God is cause. Nevertheless, the universe is God in the sense that it is, for the time being, the whole life, intelligence, and consciousness of God. Take from God the life, intelligence and consciousness of the universe, and you leave an unknown quantity. The universe, therefore, is the self-revelation of God, *i. e.*, the revelation of God to himself. It is the life of God. All that is in God is in the universe, not as a dead or stagnant pool, but as an ever-flowing stream. The water of a river is the river; but the water which fills its banks is not always the same water. It is constantly varying its course, its currents, its eddies, its form, its contents. Thus the universe is the ever-flowing stream of the life of God; now this, now that; now in one form, now in another; inexhaustible in its source, and endless in its flow. The universe, therefore, and all that it contains, are mere moments in the life of God. All acts are his acts, all feeling is his feeling, all thought is his thought, all consciousness is his consciousness. God is the only being, of which the universe is the manifestation; he is the only substance, of which the universe is the phenomenon.

The third point to be considered is the consequences which

flow from this theory, or the applications made of it. These reach very far.

1. As to the nature of God. Although he may be said to be a person, in so far as he comes to self-consciousness, the indispensable condition of personality in man, yet he is not a person as distinguished from other persons. He comes to personality as he comes to consciousness. He is a *Werdende Persönlichkeit*, or all-comprehending person. The Finite and Infinite together constitute God, and it is only of the Infinite as realized in the Finite, we can predicate intelligence, moral excellence or knowledge. The moral excellence of God is the goodness of his creatures; his omniscience is the sum of their knowledge; his omnipotence is the causality of all that is, and that is to be, and nothing more. There is nothing in God which is not in the universe, and in its progress. God is just as much an object of knowledge as nature or the soul. We know God as fully as we know ourselves.

2. As the Infinite is the substance of which the Finite is the phenomenon; and the Infinite being spirit, and the essence of spirit being thought, the Infinite and Finite are resolved into thought. The latest designation of the system is therefore Absolute Idealism, a name chosen by Hegel himself. God and man are identical. The Infinite in becoming Finite becomes man; and as this is an eternal process, without beginning and without end, man is eternal. God *is* in himself, but he *exists* only in man. Nature is unconscious, it does not know itself, and therefore God is nonconscious in nature. His real existence as a conscious intelligence is in man. And as man exists in very different degrees of development, God is in some men in a much higher sense than in others; just as reason is in a higher state in a man of science than in an infant. And as spirit is only what it knows itself to be, it is only those who know themselves to be God who are really divine. It is the "Thinker" (as Dr. Henry calls him,) who, penetrating into the depths of consciousness, finds God, and is aware of the identity of divinity and humanity, who is the true God-man. This is that self-deification which the holy Neander so abhorred, and which made this whole system to him, the abomination of desolation. This is the philosophy which American divines

and professors are peddling about by the thimble-full, to boys and boarding-school girls!

3. If consciousness is necessary to intelligence, and limitation to consciousness; and if intelligence is necessary to the *existence* of spirit, then the absolute spirit must limit itself to become spirit; that is, the Infinite must pass into the Finite; the one supposes the other, they coexist, and cannot exist apart. Creation therefore is necessary. An inoperative cause is no cause. Mind without thought is no mind. God without the world is no God. It is therefore by the strictest necessity of nature that God creates, as it is by a necessity of nature that mind thinks. As, however, the mind is spontaneous, and not coerced in thinking, so God may be said to be free in creating. This, however, does not alter the case. The necessity remains absolute. If there is no world, there is no God. Hence the elder Fichte said that the doctrine of creation in time is the fundamental error of all false religions. Necessary creation is fundamental to this whole system, and necessary creation is Fatalism; for creation is a process as continuous as thought. If you choose to make a distinction between the necessity by which a heavy body falls to the ground, and the necessity by which mind thinks, you may make a distinction between the Fatalism of the Stoics and the Fatalism of this philosophy. It is a distinction without a practical difference. It is inexorable fate in both cases.

4. History is the self-evolution of God; it is a necessary process, that is, a process governed by necessary laws. As the Infinite develops itself in one form in the stars, in another form as plants, in another in sentient creatures, so he develops himself in man. Cosmology, zoology, anthropology, are only different branches of theology. The history of man is the history of God. One idea is embodied in one epoch or nation, another in another. As this self-evolution is a process, and in its ultimate nature a process of mind, and as mind is developed by the conflict of truths, (for error is only imperfect truth,) so history is carried on by conflicts. Wars are the conflict of ideas in the concrete. They are the necessary means of progress. Without discussion there would be stagnation of mind; and without war there would be a stagnation

of society. In the conflict of ideas the true and right always prevail. So in war the conqueror is always in the right. He is always more moral than the vanquished. He that is beaten ought to be beaten. It is time philosophy put its foot on the neck of philanthropy. Success is the sole criterion of the true and good. The triumph of heathenism over Christianity under the persecuting emperors; the predominance of the Arians for centuries over Trinitarians, of the Musselmans over the Christians in the East, of Romanism over Protestantism in Italy and Spain, of Atheism in France, of Rationalism in Germany, of despotism throughout Europe, is all right. The successful are always right. ALLES WIRKLICH IST VERNUNFTIG is the motto on the banner of this philosophy.

5. There is no sin. This does not mean (as poor Dr. Henry seems to think) that there is no difference between the sentiment of approbation and disapprobation, between right and wrong, or that no moral difference can be predicated of human acts. This would be as absurd as to say, there is no difference between pleasure and pain, between one sensation and another; that all things look alike, smell alike, and taste alike. Philosophers, i. e., οἱ φιλόσοφοι εἶναι σοφοί, are, according to Scripture, pre-eminently the fools of the world, (we trust they will not throw on us the responsibility of that judgment,) but they are not fools after that sort. When they say there is no sin, they mean that sin, like pain, is a form of good; it is the negative quantity in mathematics; the negative pole in magnetism. You cannot have the one without the other; there cannot be a North without a South; strength without resistance; virtue without vice. Sin is only the sweat on the brow of labour, the travail that attends the birth of virtue. Sin (may the Infinitely Holy forgive us for writing such blasphemy) is as much a form of God as virtue. Reason is reason in the vagaries of a child, and in the speculations of Plato. Water is water in the muddy pool, in Niagara, and in the ocean. God is God in the insect and in Arcturus, in Nero and in John the Apostle. If God is everything, everything is God. The sublime consolation which these philosophers offer to the sinful and the suffering is, that God is no better off than they. Their consciousness is his, i. e., it goes to make up the sum of

his experience. It is he that is struggling and suffering; it is he who is in travail from eternity to eternity. Suffering men have only to lift themselves to the height of this great argument, and recognize themselves as a moment in the life of God, a form in which the Infinite manifests itself, in order to lose the sense of their degradation and misery in the consciousness of their Godhead.

6. Philosophy is the highest form of religion. All religions are forms more or less perfect, in which certain ideas in the absolute spirit develop themselves; or rather, they are conceptions which the people form of ideas; or the forms under which phenomenal reason (reason in man) apprehends the absolute reason. There is a constant progress in this development, and therefore, the last religion is the best; this is the advantage of Christianity; it is the highest form of religion for the masses; philosophy is something higher, to which "thinkers" have attained, and they kindly offer their assistance to raise the gospel to their own level. There are different views, however, entertained by the advocates of this system, as to its relation to the gospel. Some of them regard Christianity as obsolete as heathenism; others say, it is still good enough for the people; and others, as at times Hegel himself, say that it is the absolute religion, identical with philosophy. These are, however, only different modes of stating the same thing. The Christianity which some of the school pronounce obsolete, is repudiated by those who pronounce the gospel the absolute religion; and that which the latter thus pronounce to be true, the former also receive under the name of philosophy. What Christians in all ages have regarded as the gospel of the grace of God, is spurned by all alike. The point of contact between Christianity and Monism, is assumed to be the doctrines of the Trinity and Incarnation. Both systems teach a triplicity in unity, and both teach that God became man. The triplicity in unity of Monism is the Infinite, the Finite, and their relation. The absolute substance is both infinite and finite, and remains one, or constitutes the unity or identity of the two other members of the formula. The Infinite, as such, is the Father; as manifested in the Finite, he is the Son; the identity of the two is the Spirit; as in the Finite, (the universe of nature and

mind,) man alone is self-conscious; it is man that is properly the second person in this philosophic Trinity, the consubstantial and coeternal Son of God. The scriptural form of the doctrine of Incarnation is defective in two points. First, in making God incarnate in an individual man, Jesus of Nazareth, instead of in the race; and, secondly, in teaching that the divine and human are two distinct natures, whereas they are one and the same; still, it is to this approximation to the truth that Christianity, according to these philosophers, owes all its power.

The Fall, in this system, is the Infinite becoming Finite; and Redemption is the return of the Finite into the Infinite. These are processes necessary and eternal. As God is the world, here is hereafter, earth is heaven. This world is no longer a vale of tears leading to a heavenly land, but it is the eternal theatre of the life of God, and the judgment is the process of history.

We give this outline of modern Pantheism, or Monism, without a line of authentication. Should any one take the trouble to point out that this or that important principle has been omitted, that Spinoza held this peculiarity, Schelling another, and Hegel another, we have only to say that we did not undertake to give the essence of a hundred volumes in half a dozen pages. We merely profess to present the outline of a system common, in all its essential features, to the Pantheistic writers of the German school. If any proposition contained in the above outline is called in question, we stand ready to sustain it by abundant citations from the accredited expounders and advocates of the doctrine, or freely to acknowledge our error. We have great confidence, however, that the view here given of this portentous system will commend itself as just to the mind of every competent reader.

We come now to the third point which we proposed to establish, viz. that Cousin's system is identical with the German doctrine which we have just unfolded. By this we do not mean that he holds every principle of German Pantheism in detail, for it would be difficult to find any two German philosophers who are so completely in accord. But we do mean that he holds the system as a system, and that he traces it out to

substantially the same results. The relation of Cousin's philosophy to that of Germany is analogous to the relation of the English alphabet to the Greek. The Greek has some letters which are not in the English, and the English has some which are not in the Greek. No one, however, can read the one after reading the other, without perceiving their substantial identity. If a country schoolmaster, or even a professor, should undertake to show that the Anglo-Saxons invented their own alphabet, that it is distinguished from the Greek, and all others, "by fundamental principles," he would do just what Dr. Henry has ventured to do, in asserting the essential difference between the Philosophy of Cousin and the Pantheism of Germany. We shall endeavour to show, first, that Cousin avows the result to which the German philosophy has arrived, *i. e.*, that he avows Monism—or that God is everything. Secondly, that his principles, as traced out by himself, lead inevitably to that conclusion; and thirdly, that he deduces from the doctrine thus consciously elaborated, substantially the same conclusions.

First: Cousin avows Monism, or that form of Pantheism which makes God everything.

We have seen that the fundamental idea of German Pantheism is triplicity in unity—the Infinite, the Finite, and their relation; God, nature, and humanity are one. This idea is presented by Cousin not merely hundreds of times, but, from the popular character of his lectures, it comes up so constantly and in such various forms as to constitute the burden of his instructions. Sometimes, it is unity, plurality, and identity; sometimes, it is substance, phenomenon, and their relation; sometimes, it is absolute cause, relative cause, and their common ground; sometimes, it is the primitive, the actual, and their identity; sometimes, it is the infinite, the finite, and their relation. In every form of language the idea is presented, affirmed, illustrated, and defended, that the sum of being is to be resolved into this unity and multiplicity. Man with him is a microcosm. What is true of reason in us, is true of eternal reason. In our consciousness, there are these three ideas, the finite, the infinite, and their identity. So there are in the eternal reason. We have in consciousness, the *ego*, the *non-ego*, and their common basis, which constitute the unity of our con-

sciousness. So in God, or the absolute reason, there are the same elements.

“Reason,” he says, “in whatever way it may occupy itself, can conceive nothing, except under the condition of two ideas, which preside over the exercise of its activity: the idea of the unit and of the multiple, of the finite and of the infinite, of being and of appearing, of substance and of phenomenon, of absolute cause and of secondary causes, of the absolute and of the relative, of the necessary and of the contingent, of immensity and of space, of time and of eternity. Analysis, in bringing together all these propositions, in bringing together, for example, all these first terms identifies them; it identifies equally all the second terms, so that of all these propositions, compared and combined, it forms a single proposition, a single formula, which is the formula itself of thought, and which you can express, according to the case, by the unit and by the multiple, the absolute being and the relative being, unity, and variety, &c. Finally, the two terms of this formula, so comprehensive, do not constitute a dualism in which the first term is on one side, the second on the other, without any other relation than that of being perceived at the same time by reason. . . . These three terms are distinct, but inseparable, and constitute a triplicity and an indivisible unity. Having attained this height, we have lost sight of land, and it becomes us to see where we are.”* The finite and infinite and their relation then constitute a triplicity in unity. “There are in human reason two distinct elements, with their relation: that is to say, three elements, three ideas. These three ideas are not an arbitrary product of human reason; far from that, they constitute this reason. Now that which is true in reason, humanly considered, subsists in reason considered in itself: that which is the basis of our reason is the basis of eternal reason; that is, a triplicity which resolves itself into a unity, and a unity which develops itself in triplicity. The unity of this triplicity is alone real, and at the same time, this unity would entirely perish if confined to one of the three elements which are necessary to it. They are therefore all of the same value, and constitute an in-

* *History of Modern Philosophy*, translated by O. Wight, vol. i. p. 83.

decomposable unity. What is this unity? Divine intelligence itself."*

"I have shown how variety springs from unity, the finite from the infinite, relative being from absolute being; I have shown that unity, the infinite, being in itself absolute substance, being cause also and absolute cause, could not [but] have produced variety, the finite, the relative; so that true unity and veritable infinity being given, you have already in the germ variety and the finite, that is, finite and varied causes, a world animated and full of forces, and a humanity which is itself an active and productive power."†

"The ideas of the finite, of the infinite, and of their necessary connection as cause and effect, meet in every act of intelligence, nor is it possible to separate them from each other; though distinct, they are bound together, and constitute at once a triplicity and a unity."‡

"The first term, [the Infinite] though absolute, exists not absolutely in itself, but as an absolute cause which must pass into action, and manifest itself in the second [the Finite]. The Finite cannot exist without the Infinite, and the Infinite can only be realized [*i. e.*, become real] by developing itself in the Finite."§ We could fill a volume with equally distinct avowals of the fundamental principle of modern Pantheism.

It is not, however, merely by asserting that the Infinite becomes real only in the Finite, that Cousin avows Monism. That avowal is involved in the constantly recurring statement, that God is the one absolute substance of which the universe is the phenomenon. Dr. Henry admits that this is a form of Pantheism, and that it destroys human personality and freedom; yet he himself makes his master teach this doctrine in the most explicit terms. He tells us that Cousin teaches, that "The fundamental fact of consciousness is a complex phenomenon composed of three terms; first, the *me* and the *not-me*, limited and finite; then, the idea of something different from these, the unlimited, the infinite; and third, the relation of the finite to the infinite which contains and unfolds it. These three

* History of Modern Philosophy, translated by O. Wight, vol. i. p. 88.

† Ibid. p. 153.

‡ Cousin's Psychology, by Henry, first edition, p. xviii.

§ Ibid.

terms universally and necessarily meet in every act of consciousness. We find there the consciousness of self, as distinguished from the not-self, and of both as *finite*; but at the same time, we are, and must be, conscious of something *infinite*; of something *substantial*, as that is *phenomenal*; and, finally, connecting the two terms, infinite and finite, under the principle of causality, we do and must regard the former as a cause, and consequently in its nature an infinite cause. That is God."* Can any thing be plainer? The infinite is substance, the finite, *i. e.*, the universe of nature and mind is phenomenal. It is a great trial of one's patience and meekness to see a man professing to be a teacher of philosophy, denouncing and upbraiding the *Princeton Review*, for saying that Cousin taught the doctrine, which he himself thus expressly declares he did teach.

Sir William Hamilton, whom Dr. Henry so highly lauds, and to whom he attributes so just a comprehension of Cousin's system, says, that according to that system, "In every act of consciousness, we distinguish a *self* or *ego*, and something different from self, a *non-ego*; each limited and modified by the other. These together, constitute the finite element; but at the same instant, when we are conscious of these existences, plural, relative, and contingent, we are conscious likewise of a superior unity in which these are contained, and by which they are explained; a unity, absolute as they are conditioned; *substantive as they are phenomenal*; and an infinite cause, as they are finite causes. This unity is God."†

"The great division of ideas at present established," says Cousin himself, "is the division into contingent ideas, and necessary ideas. This division, in a point of view more circumscribed, is the foundation of that which I have just presented to you, and which may be expressed under the different formulas of unity and multiplicity, of *substance and phenomenon*, of absolute causes and relative causes, of the perfect and the imperfect, of the finite and the infinite. Each of these propo-

* Cousin's *Psychology*, by Henry, first edition, p. xxi.

† *Edinburgh Review*, October 1829. See the reprint of the article in "Discussions on Philosophy and Literature." By Sir William Hamilton. Harper's edition, page 17.

sitions has two terms; the one necessary, absolute, single, essential, perfect, infinite; the other, imperfect, phenomenal, relative, multiple, finite. A wise analysis identifies all the second terms among themselves, as well as all the first terms among themselves; it identifies, on the one hand, immensity and eternity, the absolute substance and the absolute cause, the absolute perfection, and the absolute unity; and, on the other hand, the multiple, the phenomenal, the relative, the limited, the finite, the bounded, the imperfect. Behold then, all the propositions which we have enumerated reduced to a single one, as vast as reason and the possible, to the opposition of unity and plurality, of substance and phenomenon, of *being and appearance*, of identity and difference, &c.”*

“The human race has believed with equal certainty in God and in the world. They believe in a world as a real effect, firm and enduring, which they refer to a cause, not to a cause powerless [who ever heard of a powerless cause?] and contradictory in itself, which forsaking its effect, for that very reason would destroy it, but to a cause worthy of the name, which, producing and reproducing without cessation, deposits without ever exhausting them, its force and its beauty in its work; they believe, as it were, in a *combination of phenomena which would cease to be at the moment in which the eternal substance should cease to sustain them*; they believe, as it were, in the visible manifestation of a concealed principle which speaks to them under this cover, and which they adore in nature and in consciousness. Behold in what the mass of the human race believe. The honour of true philosophy would be to collect this universal belief, and to give it a legitimate explanation.”† According to this, mankind believe in an eternal substance of which all things are the phenomena—a being of which the universe is the ever-varying appearance; they believe that nature and humanity are moments in the ceaseless flow of the life of God; and it is the business of philosophy to explain and authenticate this grand conception.

We shall not multiply citations on this point. The idea that the Infinite is alone substantial and the Finite phenomenal, is

* Hist. of Philosophy. Wight, page 78.

† Ibid. p. 121.

so inwrought in Cousin's system, that it will come up at every step as we advance.

There is still another form in which Cousin gives in his adhesion to German Pantheism. So far as modern forms of thought are concerned, there are but three general systems of philosophy. The one is the Theistic, which assumes the existence of an eternal, self-conscious, extra-mundane God, existing independently of the universe, and creating it in time by the word of his power, out of nothing. The other is the doctrine that the universe is God, that God is nothing but the universe, and as the universe is finite, God is finite. This the Germans call False Pantheism. This they reject. The third system is a medium between the others, and is sometimes called by its advocates, the true Pantheism, sometimes the doctrine of Identity, sometimes Monism. Nothing is more common than to find these German philosophers repudiating Pantheism (as above explained) on the one hand, and Theism, (or the scholastic doctrine of God as they call it) on the other; and claiming to occupy the true *via media*. Cousin does precisely the same thing. "If I have not confounded," he says, "God and the world; if my God is not the Universe-God of Pantheism, neither is he, I confess, the abstraction of absolute unity, the lifeless God of the scholastic theology. As God is made known only so far as he is absolute cause, on this account, in my opinion, he cannot but produce, so that the creation ceases to be unintelligible, and God is no more without a world than a world without God."*

"Is God to be considered as a substance purely, and which is not a cause, as Spinoza will have it, or at most a cause of himself, which is not a true cause? We thus destroy his power, we destroy the possibility of humanity and that of nature; we have, like the Eleatics, the Infinite in itself, but without any relation to the Finite, the absolute without any relation to the relative, unity without diversity. On the other hand, do we plunge into the exclusive idea of the cause of the cause operative, that is, in the relative, the contingent, the multiple, and do we refuse to go beyond it? We stop,

* Cousin's Psychology, by Henry, p. 447.

then, at the form of things, and fail of their essence and of their principle. We can thus end only in a chimerical Theism, or an extravagant Theism. True Theism is not a dead religion, that forgets precisely the fundamental attribute of God, namely, the creative power, action, and what is derived from it. Pantheism is in possession of all observable and visible reality, and of its immediate laws, but it misconceives the principle even of this reality, and the first and last reason of its laws. Thus, on all sides, diverse methods, diverse systems in psychology, in logic, and in metaphysics, on all sides opposition and contradiction, error and truth, altogether. The only possible solution of these contradictions is in the harmony of contrarities, the only means of escaping error is to accept all truths."*

We have thus shown that Cousin avows Monism, 1. By making triplicity in unity, the fundamental principle of his system as it is the fundamental principle of Monism. 2. By making the Infinite the only substance, and the Finite, *i. e.*, the universe of nature and mind, its phenomenon. 3. By rejecting Pantheism (in one of its forms) on the one hand, and Theism (in its ordinary sense) on the other, and taking a middle ground, which is, and can, under the circumstances, be no other than Monism.

The second point which we proposed to establish is, that Cousin's principles not only logically lead to this result, but that he consciously traces them out to this conclusion.

There are several causes which enhance the difficulty of getting a clear view of Cousin's system. One is, that being professor not of philosophy, but of its history, his writings are devoted rather to expounding the opinions of others than to developing his own. Another is, that as his instructions were delivered in the form of lectures, addressed to large and promiscuous audiences, they are rhetorical, repetitious, and often declamatory. Still another is, that his views are rarely presented in a concatenated form; one principle comes up here, and another there. Besides all this, his nomenclature is not fixed; he uses the same word in opposite senses, and therefore frequently affirms and denies the same proposition. Thus he sometimes says that the *ego* is a substance, and the *non-ego* is a

* Hist. of Philosophy, translated by Wight, p. 259.

substance; and, then again, he not only denies this, but argues to prove that neither the one nor the other can be substantial. Perhaps the greatest difficulty after all arises from the fact, that he was not sure of his own ground. He had not gained fully his own consent to the system which he had embraced; his better nature no doubt often revolted against it; and he had a wholesome and praiseworthy apprehension that the public mind in France was not prepared for the full development and inculcation of German Pantheism. Hence the vacillations, the saying and unsaying, the inculcations of Pantheism and the avowals of Theism, with which his writings abound.

The most connected view anywhere given by Cousin himself of his whole system, so far as we know, is to be found in the Preface to the first edition of his *Philosophical Fragments*. The greater part of that Preface, Dr. Henry has translated, and printed in the Appendix to the recent edition of Cousin's *Psychology*, pp. 406—440. We propose to analyze that exhibition of his doctrine, and to show that it is an elaborate argument in support of Monism, or of that form of Pantheism which merges the universe in God.

After proving that philosophy must be founded on observation, he says, that the facts of consciousness, though our point of departure, are not the limits of our investigations. Though we must begin with psychology, we must end with ontology.

When we inspect our consciousness, we find there three orders of facts due respectively to reason, sensibility, and the will. We have many notions which cannot be referred to sensation as their source; such, for example, as those of cause, substance, time, space, the good, the beautiful.

There is one characteristic common to the facts of reason and to those of sensibility; they are necessary; they do not depend upon the will; we do not create the phenomena either of reason or sense; they are entirely independent of our volitions. We cannot will a thing to be hard or soft, true or false, good or evil; we cannot will two and two to be six; our whole power, or causative being, is in the will; the will, therefore, is the person; reason is impersonal; it does not belong to us, nor to humanity; it is universal and necessary. Reason presents itself in our consciousness under two forms, spontaneity and

reflection. We have a spontaneous apperception of the truth, which it is the office of reflection to analyze. There can be nothing in reflection which is not in spontaneity. God, nature, and man, are all included in the spontaneous apperceptions of reason, and are therefore included in consciousness, and even in every act of consciousness. Those only, however, who have the skill, and who take the necessary trouble to analyze their consciousness, are aware of its contents.

The two laws of reason, which "are reason itself," are those of causality and substance. Every effect supposes a cause, and every quality a substance; but as these laws are not subjective, as they do not belong to us, or to reason in its reflective form as it appears in our consciousness, but are necessary and universal, we are forced, by the laws of thought, to refer them to a necessary and absolute substance; but absolute substance is of necessity One. There cannot be two Absolutes; nor can there be any substance which is not absolute; otherwise the Absolute would be limited, that is, it would not be absolute. "Relative substance contradicts the very idea of substance." Finite substances, (so called,) are therefore, phenomenal. "Unity of substance is involved in the very idea of substance." Finite reason is, therefore, a phenomenon of which the absolute reason is the substance. Such is the analysis of reason. It is resolved as it appears in our consciousness into a form of the absolute reason, that is, of God. Thus one, and that the most essential element of our being, is lost in the Infinite.

The second element in consciousness is will, or causality. To will, to cause, to exist for ourselves, are synonymous expressions. Will and person are therefore identical.

The Will presents the following elements. 1. To decide upon an act to be performed. 2. To deliberate. 3. To resolve. The first and second of these elements, however, belong to reason, and to reason in its reflective form. To conceive an end and to deliberate, involve the idea of reflection. Every voluntary act is, therefore, a reflective act; but a reflective act cannot be primitive. To will is to deliberate, and to decide on an act. This supposes the knowledge that we have the power to resolve and act; and this again supposes that we must have previously acted without deliberation. Activity which precedes

deliberation is due to spontaneity. Spontaneity and Reflection include all the forms of activity; both are causes; both Spontaneity and Will are sources of action. The Spontaneous includes all that is in the Reflective.

What then is the power which has this twofold manifestation? To answer this question we must remember, that all personal acts, whether spontaneous or voluntary, have this in common, viz., they are referred to a cause which has its point of departure in itself; that is, they are free. The true notion of liberty is that of a power which acts from its own energy. Liberty, however, is distinct from free phenomena. Liberty is not a form of activity, but activity itself. On the other hand, the Ego, or personal activity, is not activity, but merely represents it. It is "liberty in action, not liberty in power; it is a cause, but phenomenal, and not substantial; relative and not absolute." In respect to activity, therefore, we reach the substantial only, "beyond and above all phenomenal activity, in power not yet passed into action, in the undetermined essence which is capable of self-determination; in liberty disengaged from its forms, which limit while they determine it," that is, in God.

"We have thus arrived," says Cousin, "in the analysis of the *me*, by the way of psychology still, at a new aspect of ontology, as a substantial activity, anterior and superior to all phenomenal activity, which produces all the phenomena of activity, survives them all, and renews them all, immortal and inexhaustible in the destruction of its temporary manifestations." Thus our activity, as well as our reason, is merged in God. All our acts are the acts of God. The Ego, or personal activity, is only a "temporary manifestation" of the activity of the absolute cause!

The third phenomenon of consciousness is sensation. We do not produce our own sensations, and therefore refer them to a cause out of ourselves. As our sensations are various we refer them to various causes or qualities, "for qualities are always causes." The external world is, therefore, an assemblage of causes. These causes or forces act according to law. But law supposes reason, and therefore, nature resolves itself into reason and activity. Reason and activity, however, are

the constituent elements of humanity, therefore, nature is, as Cousin expresses it, "of the same stuff with man." "There is nothing material in forces," therefore there is nothing material in nature. (Idealism.)

Let us go further. We have seen that it is a law of reason to refer every phenomenal cause and every phenomenal law, to something absolute; that is, to a substance. This absolute substance must be cause in order to be the subject of external causes, and must be intelligence in order to be the subject of laws, which, as we have seen, are forms of reason. This substance is, therefore, "the identity of intelligence and activity," that is God. The external world, then, is an assemblage of phenomenal forces and laws. These phenomenal forces and laws suppose an absolute cause and intelligence of which they are the manifestations. Thus the external world has followed reason and activity (*i. e.*, humanity) into the abyss of the Absolute.

We have now shown that Cousin by a strict process of argument merges all reason, whether spontaneous or reflective, all activity whether spontaneous or voluntary, all external nature, whether force or law, into God. The conclusion of this deduction is expressed by Cousin himself in the following words: "The God of consciousness is not an abstract God, a solitary monarch exiled beyond the limits of creation, on the desert throne of a silent Eternity, and of an absolute existence which resembles even the negation of existence. He is a God at once true and real, at once substance and cause, always substance and always cause, being substance only so far as he is cause, and cause only so far as he is substance, that is to say, being absolute cause, one and many, eternity and time, space and number, essence and life, indivisibility and totality, principle, end and centre, at the summit of Being and at its lowest degree, infinite and finite together, triple, in a word, that is to say, at the same time God, nature, and humanity. In fact if God be not everything, he is nothing!"

No sane man will now say that the charge of Monism, or modern Pantheism, is made against Cousin's system on the ground of isolated passages, or fervid expressions. It is the

doctrine which he not only avows, but which he labours to prove.

The third point which we proposed to establish is, that the doctrine thus avowed and proved is carried out by Cousin to its legitimate conclusions.

1. The first and most obvious, and perhaps the most thoroughly destructive consequence of this doctrine is the denial of the personality of God. This consequence Cousin avows, adopts and affirms. He argues it out, and attempts to establish it as the basis of a new and harmonious, comprehensive philosophy. As, however, he constantly, at the same time, professes to believe in a personal God, it is necessary to state, first, what is meant by God's being a person, in the ordinary scriptural sense of the terms; secondly, that in this sense, the only true and proper sense of the words, Cousin denies the doctrine of a personal God; and, thirdly, what it is he would substitute in its place under the same name. By a personal God, is meant by the Church and by all mankind a Being to whom we can say, Thou; a self-conscious, intelligent, and infinite Spirit, existing independently of the world, extra-mundane and eternal; a God to whom the world is not necessary, who has consciousness and intelligence independently of the world; and who, therefore, is over it as its creator, preserver, governor, and judge, to whom as a person distinct from ourselves we are responsible for our character and conduct. This doctrine which is the foundation of all religion and morality, and without which religion and morality are empty words, Monism and Cousin as its advocate deny. This is what he calls chimerical, or extravagant Theism—a scholastic God—a God on a barren throne, &c., &c.

That Cousin does deny this doctrine of a personal God is proved, first, because that denial is inseparable from the system which he labours to establish. He endeavours to prove that God is at once God, nature, and humanity; that God is man, God is nature, God is everything. If humanity is a form of God, if nature is a form of God, if God is everything, then God is not a person distinct from his creatures. Secondly, consciousness is necessary to intelligence, and intelligence to personality; but God, according to Cousin, has no consciousness,

and therefore, no intelligence or personality out of the world. "Take away," he says, "my faculties, and the consciousness that attests them to me, and I am not for myself. It is the same with God; take away nature, and the soul, and every sign of God disappears."* Take away from me my consciousness and I am not for myself; take away from God the universe, (nature and humanity,) and he is not for himself. This is one of those revealing sentences and illustrations, which are worth pages of philosophical jargon. What can be predicated of a soul without consciousness? How can such a soul think or act, or be addressed as a person? An unconscious soul is no soul, and an unconscious God is no God. If then, God comes to self-consciousness in the world; if taking away nature and the soul from him, leaves him without consciousness and intelligence, it leaves him without personality. This idea is wrought into the very substance of his system. What does he mean by triplicity in unity, and unity in triplicity, of which his writings are full, but that it is a law of rational life, the fundamental condition of reason, that in consciousness there should be the three elements, the ego, non-ego, and their relation; and that one of these cannot exist without the others; if you take away one, you destroy all; and that this is true of the absolute reason, as it is of our reason? In God there are and must be, the Finite, the Infinite, and their relation. If you take away one, you destroy all. Take away the Infinite, and the Finite is gone; take away the Finite and the Infinite is gone; that is, take away the universe and God no more exists, than a cause without effects, or a soul without consciousness or faculties, exists. The denial of the personality of God in the Theistic, sense of the terms, is, therefore, involved in the very essence of this whole system. Reason in itself is impersonal. It comes to personality only in man. The Absolute in itself is undetermined, unlimited, but consciousness is limitation; therefore, the Absolute, as such, is unconscious and impersonal. The Infinite must become Finite, in order to know itself; but self-knowledge is essential to personality; therefore, the Infinite, as such, is impersonal. If you eliminate these ideas from

* Lectures on the True, the Beautiful, and the Good. Appleton's edition, p. 365.

Cousin's writings, you leave his system in the condition in which matter is left, if you take away all its properties; or mind, if you take away all its thoughts.

How then are we to understand Cousin's frequent declarations, that he believes in a personal God? Precisely as similar declarations are to be understood from the lips of Hegelians. God comes to self-consciousness in the universe and thus becomes a person. God, humanity, and nature, considered as one, is their personal God. The true doctrine "concerning God's personality," says Michelet, "is not that God is a person as distinguished from other persons, neither is he simply the universal or absolute substance. He is the eternal movement of the Absolute constantly making itself subjective, and in the subjective alone comes to objectivity or to a true existence;" that is, as Cousin expresses the same idea, the Infinite becomes real in the Finite. Michelet goes on to say, "God is the only true personal being;" and further, "as God is eternal personality, so he eternally produces his other-self, viz., nature, in order to come to self-consciousness."*

But Cousin sometimes says he believes in a personal God distinct from the world. How is this to be understood? Precisely as he believes in matter without properties, and the soul without consciousness. The soul knows itself only in its acts. But it is not exhausted in its acts. Take away its acts, and you take away self-knowledge, but you leave a potentiality of action. The soul apart from its acts and consciousness, may be said to be potentially a person, but it is a real self-conscious, intelligent person, only as active. So with God. Take away the universe, and you leave a potential, but not a real person. If there is no consciousness and no intelligence in God without the universe, then there is no personality in God apart from the world.

The fact is, the advocates of this system believe in a personal God, just as they believe in the doctrine of the Trinity. They profess to be Trinitarians. If any honest man ventures to say they do not hold the doctrine of the Trinity, some Dr. Henry starts up, and exclaims, that is "point-blank slander;" it

* *Geschichte der letzten Systeme, &c.*, vol. ii., p. 647.

is contrary to the "official utterances" of these philosophers; the slanderer is worse than a felon, &c., &c. When we ask, however, what they really mean, they say, 'We believe the Infinite is the Father, the Universe the Son, their relation is the Spirit, therefore we are Trinitarians.' So their personal God is not the God of the Bible, but a being in whom all personality centres—who is the only person, as he is the only substance, of which mind and nature are the ever-flowing phenomena. They are Theists just as they are Trinitarians. No form of Atheistic Pantheism more destructive of all religion than this ever entered the mind of man. TO MAKE GOD EVERYTHING, IS TO MAKE HIM NOTHING.

2. Monism unavoidably leads to the doctrine of a necessary creation; and this consequence Cousin accepts and avows in every variety of form. Dr. Henry makes him say, "Creation is comprehensible and necessary; for creation is nothing else than the necessary development of the Infinite in the Finite, of unity in variety, and that in virtue of the third element which binds the two terms together, and in which both are realized. God being substance and cause—being substance as cause and cause as substance, that is, being absolute cause as well as intelligence, cannot but manifest himself. This manifestation is creation, the development of the Infinite in the Finite, of unity in plurality. Creation is necessarily implied in the idea of God; and the world, the universe, is the necessary effect of the divine existence and manifestation."*

Sir William Hamilton says Cousin teaches, that "God, as he is a cause, is able to create; as he is an absolute cause, he cannot but create. In creating the universe he does not draw it from nothing, he draws it from himself. The creation of the universe is thus necessary; it is a manifestation of the Deity, but not the Deity absolutely in himself. It is God passing into activity, but not exhausted in the act."†

We have already quoted so many explicit declarations from Cousin himself on this point, that it is hardly necessary to multiply citations. Speaking of the relation of the Infinite

* Introduction to the First Edition, &c., xix.

† Review of Cousin, p. 16.

and the Finite, the one being necessarily implied in the other, he says, "The first term of the formula is cause also, and absolute cause; and as absolute cause cannot avoid developing itself in the second term—(*i. e.*, in) multiplicity, the finite, the relative, &c."* "As God is made known only so far as he is absolute cause, on this account, in my opinion, he cannot but produce, so that creation ceases to be unintelligible; and God is no more without a world, than a world without God. This last point has appeared to me of such great importance that I have not hesitated to express it with all the strength that I possessed."†

His familiar illustration on this subject is derived from voluntary action in man. "We create," he says, "every moment," and "divine creation is of the same nature."‡ Creation to God is, therefore, as necessary as voluntary action to man. We can no more conceive of God without creation, than of mind without thought, or of will without volition.

The Fatalistic consequences of this doctrine are too apparent to escape notice. Creation is not, according to this theory, a transient act. It is defined to be "the development of the Infinite in the Finite." This is a continued process going on perpetually in the universe of nature and mind. If, therefore, creation is necessary, this whole process of development is necessary; all the processes of nature, all the operations of mind, all the progress of history is the unfolding of God in the world. This was made so obvious, that Cousin was constrained to say: "Upon reflection, I feel that this expression (the necessity of creation) is scarcely reverential enough towards God, whose liberty it has the appearance of compromising, and I have no hesitation in retracting it; but in retracting it, I ought to explain it. It covers up no mysterious Fatalism; it expresses an idea which may be found everywhere, in the writings of the holiest doctors, as well as the greatest philosophers. God, like man, acts, and can act only in conformity with his nature, and his liberty itself is relative to his essence. Now, in God, above all, the power is adequate to the substance, and the divine power is always in act; God, there-

* History of Philosophy, Wight, p. 84.

† Psychology, p. 447.

‡ History of Philosophy, p. 93.

fore, is essentially active and creative. It follows from that, unless we despoil God of his nature, and of his essential perfections, we must admit that a power essentially creative could not but create, just as a power essentially intelligent could not but create intelligently, or a power essentially wise and good could not but exercise its wisdom and goodness in creating. The word *necessity*, here, expresses nothing else. It is inconceivable that from this word anybody should have been disposed to derive, and impute to me, universal Fatalism.”*

This is no retraction. It is a reassertion of the doctrine in the only sense in which it was ever understood. God being a creative power cannot but create, just as mind cannot but think. But as mind thinks spontaneously, so God creates spontaneously, not by coercion. This is precisely the doctrine of necessary creation, as taught elsewhere in his works, and which he here teaches. There is no retraction, and there can be none, for the idea is essential to the system. The Hegelians say everything which Cousin says in this recantation. “To say God created the world freely, does not mean that the necessity of creation does not exist in the divine nature; but since this necessity is in God himself, he is still free. To regard liberty in God as arbitrary, is to overlook the identity of liberty and necessity. God must create, but that must is in his will; and the continuance of the world is due to the continuance of that will. The world, therefore, as to its being is coeternal with God.”†

3. Monism denies the incomprehensibility of God. On this point Cousin says: “His incomprehensibility is for us his destruction. Incomprehensible, as a formula and in the school, he is clearly visible in the world which manifests him, for the soul which feels and possesses him. Everywhere present, he returns to himself, as it were, in the consciousness of man, of which he indirectly constitutes the mechanism and phenomenal triplicity by the reflection of his own nature, and of the substantial triplicity of which he constitutes the absolute identity.”‡ As God returns to himself in our consciousness, we

* Advertisement to Philosophical Fragments, third edition, in the Appendix to Psychology, p. 561.

† Rosenkranz Encyclopadie, p. 53.

‡ Psychology, p. 435.

know him just as we know our consciousness. As God is nature, we know him as we know nature. Besides, Cousin often says that ideas constitute the nature of God; but of ideas, he says, "They have but one characteristic, viz., to be intelligible. I add, there is nothing intelligible but ideas."* According to this system, God exists only so far as he is known. The incomprehensible is the non-existing.

Sir William Hamilton represents Cousin as teaching, that "The divine nature is essentially comprehensible. The three ideas constitute the nature of Deity; and the very nature of ideas is to be conceived. God in fact exists to us only so far as he is known."†

"Every man," says Cousin, "if he knows himself, knows all the rest, nature and God at the same time with himself. Every man believes in his own existence, every man therefore believes in the existence of the world and of God; every man thinks, every man therefore thinks God, if we may so express it; every human proposition, reflecting the consciousness, reflects the idea of Unity and of Being that is essential to consciousness; every human proposition therefore contains God [for it contains an idea]; every man who speaks, speaks of God, and every word is an act of faith and a hymn."‡

Cousin however teaches that God is incomprehensible. How is this? Precisely as the soul is incomprehensible. The soul is not exhausted by its acts, though it knows itself, and is known only in its acts. So God is not exhausted in the universe, though he knows himself, and is knowable only in the universe. As there is phenomenal power in the soul for a constant succession of acts, so there is substantial power in God for a constant succession of worlds. Still the soul *exists* only so far as it is known; and God *exists* only so far as he is known. The Infinite is real only in the Finite.

4. Intimately connected with the doctrine of necessary creation and of the comprehensibility of God, is another feature of this system. It makes history the self-development of God. History is one, and that the principal, part of the process by

* History of Philosophy, Wight, p. 25.

† Psychology, p. 435.

‡ Review of Cousin, p. 16.

which the Infinite unfolds itself in the Finite; and by which the ideas which constitute the manner of God's existence are realized. This is specially true of man. One idea is realized in one epoch, another in another. One nation brings out one thought, another a different one. Most especially is this true of the history of philosophy; which being the history of reason, is the history of God. History is determined by necessary laws. There is nothing contingent. "The dice are loaded." These ideas are reproduced by Cousin in his peculiar way. His lectures are so filled with these Hegelian principles, that the citation of particular passages is, for those who have read them, unnecessary. For those not familiar with his writings, it will suffice to point out a few significant indications of his views on this subject. If creation, as we have seen, is, according to his system, a process of development, and if creation is necessary, it involves the view of the nature of history just referred to. Apart from this general consideration, his language on this particular point is sufficiently explicit. "History reflects not only the whole movement of humanity, but as humanity is the summary of the universe, which is itself a manifestation of God, in the last resort history is nothing less than the last counter-stroke of divine action. The admirable order which reigns there is a reflection of eternal order, and its laws have for their last principle God himself. God, considered in his perpetual action upon the world and upon humanity, is Providence. It is because God or Providence is in nature, that nature has its necessary laws; it is because Providence is in humanity and in history, that history and humanity have their necessary laws. This necessity, which the vulgar accuse, which they confound with external and physical fatality, and by which they designate and disfigure the divine wisdom applied to the world, this necessity is the unanswerable demonstration of the intervention of Providence in human affairs, a demonstration of a moral government of the world. Great events are the decrees of this government, promulgated by the voice of time. History is the manifestation of God's supervision of humanity; the judgments of history are the judgments of God himself."*

* *History of Philosophy*, translated by Wight, p. 159.

“If history is the government of God made visible, everything is there in its place; and if everything is there in its place, everything is there for good, for everything arrives at an end marked by a beneficent power. Hence this historical optimism which I have the honour to profess,” &c.*

“Upon what condition does Providence exist? Upon the condition, that God, without, it is true, exhausting his being, passes into the world and into humanity, and, consequently, into history, that he there deposits something of himself, that he establishes there wisdom, justice, order, an order as invariable as its author. Providence is involved in the question of the necessity of the laws of history. To deny the one is to shake the other, it is to reverse and obscure the moral and divine government of human things. If, therefore, any one should dare to give our system the name of Pantheism and of Fatalism, that is, indirectly, or rather very directly, to accuse us of Atheism, it would be necessary, in order to defend ourselves, to throw back in our turn this amiable accusation on those who make it,” &c.†

“If a nation does not represent an idea, its existence is simply unintelligible.” “If every nation is called to represent an idea, the events of which the life of this nation is composed, aspire to, and end at, a complete representation of this idea; whence it follows that the order in which these events follow each other is a true order of progression, &c.”‡

“War has its roots in the nature of the ideas of different nations, which, being necessarily partial, exclusive, are necessarily hostile, aggressive, conquering; therefore, war is necessary. Let us see what are its effects. If war is nothing else than the violent encounter, the concussion of the exclusive ideas of different nations, in this concussion, the idea which shall be the most feeble will be destroyed by the strongest, that is, will be absorbed by it.” “Again, if ideas are the prizes in war, and if that which wins is necessarily that which has the most future, it is necessary that that should win, and for this end that there should be war; unless you wish to retard

* *History of Philosophy*, translated by Wight, p. 160.

† *Ibid.* p. 164.

‡ *Ibid.* p. 175.

the future, to arrest civilization; unless you should wish that the human race might be immobile and stationary." "Thus a nation is progressive only on the condition of war." "A war is nothing else than the bloody exchange of ideas; a battle is nothing else than the combat of error with truth; I say with truth, because in an epoch a less error is a truth relatively to a greater error, or to an error which has served its time; victory is nothing else than the victory of the truth of to-day over the truth of yesterday, which has become the error of the following day."*

"The hazards of war and of the diverse fortunes of combats are spoken of without cessation; for my part I think there is very little chance in war; the dice are loaded, it seems, for I defy any one to cite me a single game lost by humanity." "I have proved that war and battles are, first, inevitable; secondly, beneficial. I have vindicated victory as necessary and useful; I undertake, nevertheless, to vindicate it as just in the strictest sense of the word. We usually see in success only a triumph of force, and an honourable sympathy draws us towards the vanquished: I hope I have shown that, inasmuch as there must be a vanquished party, and inasmuch as the vanquished party is always that which ought to be vanquished, to accuse the vanquisher and to take part against victory, is to take part against humanity, and to complain of civilization. It is necessary to go further, it is necessary to prove that the vanquished party deserves to be vanquished; that the vanquishing party not only serves the cause of civilization, but that it is better and more moral than the vanquished party." "Virtue and prosperity, misfortune and vice are in necessary harmony." "Feebleness is a vice, and therefore it is always punished and beaten."†

"When we speak of victims, let us understand that the sacrificer whom we accuse, is not the vanquisher, but that which has given victory to the vanquisher, that is, Providence. It is time the philosophy of history set its foot on the declamations of philanthropy. War is action on a great scale, and action is positive proof of what a nation or an individual is worth.

* *History of Philosophy*, translated by Wight, pp. 182, 183.

† *Ibid.* pp. 186, 187.

The soul passes altogether with its powers into action. Would you know what a man is worth? See him in action; so all the worth of a nation appears on the field of battle.”*

“In the last lecture I defended victory; I have now defended power; and it remains to me to defend glory. We never attend to the fact that whatever is human [permanent?] is made so by humanity, were it only in permitting it to exist; to curse power, I mean a long and durable power, is to blaspheme humanity, and to accuse glory, is simply to accuse humanity which decrees it. What is glory? The judgment of humanity upon one of its members; and humanity is always right.”†

If any one does not see how all this flows from the doctrine that God and humanity are one; that history is merely the self-development of God; we have nothing further to say; and if any one does not see that these views are to the last degree immoral; that they suppose an utter denial of moral distinctions, in the proper sense of the terms, he must have a standard of judgment peculiar to himself. To resolve all virtue into power, to make feebleness a crime, success the only criterion of goodness, the conqueror always more moral than the vanquished, is equivalent to denying that there is any real distinction between right and wrong. It is to resolve right into might, as a philosophical and moral principle. It is however, the unavoidable conclusion from the doctrine which we have been unfolding.‡ If the universe is God, manifesting himself

* History of Philosophy, translated by Wight, p. 189.

† Ibid. p. 201.

‡ Spinoza says: Quo magis unusquisque—suum esse conservare conatur et potest. eo magis virtute præditus est; contra, quatenus unusquisque—suum esse negligit, eatenus est impotens. *Ethic.* p. iv., propos. xx. In the demonstration of this twentieth proposition he makes the idea of power and that of virtue identical—See Müller's *Lehre von der Sünde*, vol. i. p. 332. In Hegel's system the principle that whatever is, is right—that everything real is God—is carried so far that even one of the most lingering of his disciples said, “Satan is, therefore he is good, in God and with God; Satan is evil, therefore he is not.” And Rosenkranz says, what we will not print in English, and hardly dare to print in German; Die dritte Consequenz endlich ist die, dass Gott der Sohn auch als identisch gesetzt ist mit dem Subject, in welchem die religiöse Vorstellung den *Ursprung* des Bösen anschaut, mit dem *Satan, Phosphorus, Lucifer*. Diese Verschmelzung begründet sich darin dass der Sohn innerhalb Gottes das Moment der Unterscheid.

to himself, evolving one form after another, the last always more perfect than those which preceded it, of course the truth of yesterday becomes the error of to-day, and the truth of to-day the error of to-morrow; everything is progress; the last is best; that which succeeds is the right. Ye murderers, who stained the Alpine snows with the blood of saints, and "rolled mother with infant down the rocks," ye were the true saints, more moral than your victims! This is the philosophy which American Christians are hiring men to teach their sons and daughters!

5. Monism destroys the idea of sin. This consequence also flows from the system of Cousin.

Sin is the want of conformity to law. Where there is no law there is no sin. There can however be no law where there is no lawgiver, and there can be no lawgiver, if God is himself the universe. If, therefore, this system excludes, as we have already shown that it does, the idea of a personal God distinct from the world, it must of necessity exclude the idea of sin. The law to which sin stands related is not the law of reason, it is not the idea of the Good, it is not expediency, it is not self-respect, it is the law of God. It arises from the very nature of a creature, that the moral law which binds the conscience should assume in consciousness the form of the will of God, that is, of a Being to whom we are responsible. None but God is above law and a law to himself. In the consciousness therefore of every human being, sin assumes the form, not merely of something hateful, or degrading, or injurious to others, but of alienation from God. It is therefore always attended, not only by a sense of demerit, but by a sense of guilt, that is, of just exposure to the wrath of God. This cannot be got rid of. We cannot throw off our allegiance to God, and substitute in his place, the True, the Beautiful, and the Good—mere ideas. We cannot place his sceptre in the

ung ist, in dem Unterschied aber, die Möglichkeit der Entgegensetzung und Entzweiung angelegt ist. Der Sohn ist der selbst-bewusste Gott. How is Cousin, or his miserable apes in this country, to escape this consequence? If God is everything, then if there be a Satan, God is Satan. Rosenkranz says, the understanding is horrified at this, because it does not recognize the intimate connection between good and evil, that evil is in good and good is in evil. Without evil there is no good. *Encyklopädie*, p. 51.

hands of reason, or clothe "being in general" with his authority. Our allegiance is to God, and if there be no God, then there can be no sin. This, any man who chooses to examine his own heart, cannot fail to discover. An Atheist may see some things are expedient and some inexpedient; some things elevating and some degrading. He may be amiable, honest, beneficent; he may recognize the rights of his fellow-men, and if he injures society, he may feel responsible to its laws; but he cannot have a sense of guilt for sins of the heart, for pride, or malice. The only idea of sin of which the Bible, the infallible interpreter of consciousness, takes any cognizance, is want of conformity to the law of God. "Against thee, thee only have I sinned," is the language in which the sense of sin everywhere expresses itself.

If this view of the nature of sin be correct, it requires no argument to show that it is excluded by this system. If God is at once God, humanity, and nature; if the reason in us is God's reason, if our intelligence is his, our activity his activity, if God is the only substance of which the universe is the phenomenon, if we are moments in the life of God, then there can be nothing in us which is not in God. Sin in this view becomes mere limitation. It is undeveloped good, just as error is partial truth. If the universe and history are the self-evolution of God, then everything is a form of God, and everything is good. But all, as remarked above, is progress. And in progress, the imperfect precedes the perfect, as infancy precedes manhood. Thus as the imperfectly true is error, and the imperfectly beautiful is the deformed, so the imperfectly good is evil—but absolutely all is good. Hegel says, even sin is something unspeakably higher than the law-abiding motion of the planets and the innocence of plants.

There is another way in which Cousin's system subverts the foundation of morality. It makes reason impersonal, and teaches that our personality resides exclusively in the will. The will however gets all its light from reason. It is necessarily determined by the intelligence; if it is not, and so far as it is not, it is irrational. We never attribute will to brutes, because they have no reason. If, therefore, our reason is not our self, volition is not self-determination. The very idea of liberty is

libentia rationalis, will be determined by reason; and consequently if reason is impersonal, we have no rational liberty, and are incapable of responsible action. We presume this is what Sir William Hamilton means, when he says that Cousin's system destroys liberty by divorcing it from intelligence. Hamilton asserts that Cousin's doctrine is not only inconsistent with Theism, but with morality, which, he says, cannot be founded on "a liberty which only escapes necessity by taking refuge with chance."*

6. In relation to revealed religion we have seen that Monism subverts its very foundation. It makes reason the highest conceivable authority, and perverts the doctrines of Christianity into mere philosophical figments. All this is faithfully reproduced by Cousin.

"Philosophy," he says, "is the light of all lights, the authority of all authorities. Those who wish to impose upon philosophy and upon thought a foreign authority, do not think that of two things one must be true; either thought does not comprehend this authority, and then this authority is for it as though it were not, or it does comprehend it, forms of it an idea, accepts it for this reason, and thereby takes itself for measure, for rule, for highest authority."† Philosophy "destroys not faith; it illuminates it and promotes its growth, and raises it gently from the twilight of the symbol, to the full light of pure thought." "Happy in seeing the masses, the people, that is, nearly all, in the arms of Christianity, it is contented to offer gently its hand to Christianity, and to aid it in ascending to a higher elevation."‡ Cousin is willing to aid Jesus Christ to ascend to a higher elevation!

Reason, he says, "is the sole faculty of all knowledge, the only principle of certainty, the exclusive standard of the True and the False, of good and evil, which can alone perceive its

* Morell, a eulogist of Cousin, and a man not to be suspected of any stringent orthodoxy, says, that according to Cousin, "God is the ocean—we are but the waves; the ocean may be one individuality, and each wave another; but still they are essentially one and the same. We see not how Cousin's Theism can possibly be consistent with any idea of moral evil; neither do we see how, starting from such a dogma, he can ever vindicate and uphold his own theory of human liberty. On such Theistic principles, all sin must be simply defect, and all defect must be absolutely fatuitous."—History of Modern Philosophy, p. 660.

† Cousin's History of Philosophy, p. 26.

‡ Ibid. p. 27, 47.

own mistakes, correct itself when deceived, restore itself when in error, call itself to account, and pronounce upon itself the sentence of acquittal or of condemnation."* Man is completely his own God; he owes allegiance to nothing higher than himself. Reason in him is declared to be the eternal Logos. Cousin therefore frequently says, "humanity is inspired," "humanity is infallible." The only revelation or inspiration possible on his system is that which, in different measures, is common to all men. "What is God? I have told you, he is the first substance and the first cause of the truths which man perceives. When, therefore, man does homage to God for the truths which he is able to refer neither to the impressions which the world gives to his senses, nor to his own personality, he relates them to their true source, and the absolute affirmation of truth, inspiration, enthusiasm, is a veritable revelation. Thus in the cradle of civilization, he who possessed in a higher degree than his fellows this gift of inspiration passed for the confidant and interpreter of God. He is so for others, because he is so for himself, and he is so in fact in a philosophic sense. Behold the sacred origin of prophecies, of pontificates, and of modes of worship."†

Cousin subjects the most sacred doctrines of religion to precisely the same transmutations into philosophical formulas, or "pure thought," as he calls it, as his German masters. After having expounded for the hundredth time the triplicity in unity of reason, and taught that this triplicity in unity is the basis of absolute reason, in which the Infinite, the Finite, and their relation as necessarily co-exist as the ego, the non-ego, and their relation, or common ground, in human consciousness, he asks, "Do you know what is the theory I have stated to you? It is nothing less than Christianity. The God of Christians is threefold, and at the same time one; and the accusations which would be raised against the doctrine which I teach, would extend even to the Christian Trinity."‡ He quotes from the Catechism of Meaux the definition of the Son of God: "Le Fils de Dieu est la parole intérieure de son Père, sa pensée éternellement subsistante et de même nature que lui; and from

* Psychology, p. 441. † History of Philosophy, p. 129. ‡ Ibid. p 90.

the Catechism of Montpellier: Le Père ne peut pas subsister un seul moment sans se connaître: et en se connaissant il produit son Fils, le Verbe éternel. Le Père et le Fils ne peuvent subsister un seul moment sans s'aimer, et en s'aimant ils produisent le Saint Esprit." In Cousin's system, therefore, the Finite, that is, nature and humanity, occupy the place which belongs to the eternal Son of God in the Christian Trinity. The universe is God to Cousin as truly as the Son of God is God to us. Thus he says, though the form is different, "the contents of religion and philosophy are the same."

Dorner gives the following view of Schelling's doctrine on this subject. "The Finite is the necessary form of divine manifestation. The eternal, divine Idea cannot in itself be manifest; to that end it must become finite. But as it cannot present itself in any one finite form, the divine life is manifested in a multiplicity of individuals, in historical development, in which each moment exhibits some particular aspect of the divine life, and in each of which God is as the absolute. Hence the Finite is not simply finite, but it is that in which God lives. The Finite is the necessary form of manifestation, or of God as manifest. It is God in the process of development, or the Son of God. All history thus obtains a higher significance. Humanity does not exclude divinity, but includes it, history is the birth-place of the Spirit, (*i. e.*, of God,) the theatre of Theogony. Hence the idea of God becoming man is raised to the principle of all philosophy; and since that idea is the essence of Christianity, Christianity and philosophy are reconciled. Every thing is to be explained by this idea of God becoming man."*

If $a b g d$ have any relation to $a \beta \gamma \delta$, then is Cousin's philosophy a reproduction of the Pantheism of Schelling and Hegel. It is the same tune with variations. It is German in French idiom. We have shown, first, that he avows the result to which his German predecessors had arrived, viz. that "God is everything;" at once "God, nature, and humanity;" secondly, that he consciously and elaborately traces out his principles to that great conclusion; and thirdly, that he applies the result thus obtained to the illustration of all the great ques-

* Dorner's Christologie, first edition, p. 342.

tions of philosophy and history. We have made this exposition, at no small expense of time and labour, for the double purpose of vindicating the memory of a friend, whom we loved and honoured while living, and of contributing our mite to open the eyes of the Christian community to the true character of that German philosophy which is percolating by a thousand dribbles through our literature, and even our theology. Hardly a discourse on history, or on its philosophy, has come before the public of late years, which has not been more or less imbued with pantheistic principles. No inconsiderable portion of the recent expositions of the nature and doctrines of theology exhibits the same character. Unitarians now speak freely of the doctrines of the Trinity and Incarnation as primary truths. A certain class of our New-school brethren find no formulas so suited to express ideas borrowed from this philosophy, as the time-honoured phrases of Old-school orthodoxy. We must not allow ourselves to be deceived "by vain words." The end of these things is death. Since the world began there never appeared a more Protean, insidious, seductive, and destructive form of error, than that from which we have endeavoured to withdraw the mask.

We conclude this long review by repeating a remark already made. We have spoken of Cousin's system, not of his abiding personal convictions. We know not what they may be. We give him full credit for learning, genius, and eloquence. We acknowledge the elevated sentiments which characterize many of his writings, which are strangely at variance with the spirit and principles of other of his publications. These things do not lessen our abhorrence of his system, nor do they furnish the slightest evidence that our exhibition of that system is incorrect. Hume, in his *Treatise on Human Nature*, labours to prove that men have no souls, that "successive perceptions constitute the mind," that human identity is an imagination, that "a substance, a me, a soul," is an invention. This *Treatise* set the philosophers in commotion. Kant bent all his acumen to discover a flaw in the argument. Cousin pronounces it irresistible, assuming Locke's stand-point to be correct. This form of scepticism is known as Hume's system, the world over. No one has yet appeared simple enough to attempt to prove that

Hume never held any such doctrine, from the fact that in his History and Essays, and in his private conversation, he speaks perpetually of men as having souls. We hope, therefore, that no one will undertake to prove that Cousin does not teach the system which we have attributed to him, because he often speaks in the language of ordinary men. He may, and does teach, that nature and humanity are the mere phenomena of God, though he often uses language framed on the opposite hypothesis.

Of Dr. Henry we have said enough to show that he is a calumniator of the dead, and entirely incompetent to understand the first principles of a philosophy which for thirteen years he professed to teach. We hold ourselves, therefore, exonerated from the obligation to take the slightest notice of anything he may hereafter think fit to publish against the Princeton Review.

SHORT NOTICES.

Cyclopædia of American Literature; embracing Personal and Critical Notices of Authors, and Selections from their Writings, from the earliest period to the present day; with portraits, autographs, and other illustrations. By Evert A. Duyckinck and George L. Duyckinck. In two volumes. New York: Charles Scribner. 1855. Royal 8vo.; pp. 676, 742.

WE are safe in saying, that no more convenient, full, or elaborate work has proceeded from the American press. Every literary reader observes, on the sight of these volumes, that they fill a *lacuna* in his shelves. The authors, who are brothers, have been long known to the reading public by their redaction of the *Literary World*, a journal of bibliography and criticism, which was cleverly and liberally conducted, and is very much missed by all book-buyers. Their labours on that work fitted them in no common degree for the severe task which they afterwards imposed on themselves, and of which the fruit is before us. The work is a Thesaurus of whatsoever American authorship has effected, and an Index to our growing