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ART. I.—*Lectures on Moral Science.* Delivered before the Lowell Institute, Boston. By MARK HOPKINS, D.D., LL.D., President of Williams College; author of “Lectures on the Evidences of Christianity,” etc. Boston: Gould & Lincoln. New York: Sheldon & Co. 1862.

DR. HOPKINS first became known to us, and to that portion of the public with which we were then conversant, through an able article on Moral Science, published in one of our principal religious Quarterlies,\* more than a quarter of a century ago. This article was of that marked character which at once drew attention to itself and its author, on the part of those interested in ethical, and ethico-theological discussions. In the circle of our acquaintance, it lifted the author, then young and previously unheard of, into decided prominence among the rising thinkers and guides of opinion on moral and religious questions. We well remember the light and inspiration we derived from it, as we were struggling through a chaos of youthful discussions on questions which then convulsed the

\* We do not now certainly recollect which, nor have we at hand the means of ascertaining. Our impression is quite strong, however, that it was the *Biblical Repository*, then published at Andover, Massachusetts, and since merged in the *Bibliotheca Sacra*.

tendency of this system must ever be whilst it continues to be held is here revealed in the most striking manner, viz., to degrade man. But it is comforting to know that discovery and science are moving in the right direction to ensure its overthrow. If, indeed, man is nothing more than an animal, and has no traits differing in kind from those of the monkey, the elephant, the ox, the lion, the dog, then, and not otherwise, this system may stand. But if it is no less untrue, than it is repulsive to common sense and to the human heart, that men and brutes have psychical faculties and powers in every respect the same in kind—yea, if man is man—the system must fall; and reason and conscience will come to fill their proper place in determining the classifications of zoölogy. God speed the day!

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ART. VII.—*The War.*

THE war which is now desolating our country bids fair to be an epoch-making event. It will probably modify essentially our political and social institutions. Should Europe become involved in the struggle, it can hardly fail to produce changes in that part of the world equally important. Should European nations be wise enough to abstain from intervention, the disturbances in the course of trade, and the radical changes therewith connected, may produce results which no human sagacity can now foresee. The interests involved in this struggle are therefore so momentous that the eyes of the civilized world are anxiously watching its progress. None but the frivolous can in this matter be indifferent or neutral. Men must take sides, and they must speak out. Silence is impossible. The feelings of the community do, and must, find expression at the family altar, from the pulpit, the forum, and the press, both secular and religious. The cobweb theories by which some among us attempted to muzzle the church, speaking through her ministers, her religious journals, and ecclesiastical courts, have been

swept away. The authors of those theories were among the first to discard them. This war touches the conscience in too many points to render silence on the part of religious men either allowable or possible. There never was a time when the public conscience was more disturbed, or when it was more necessary that moral principles in their bearing on national conduct should be clearly presented. In the first place, the great principle that the moral law, the will of God however revealed, binds nations as well as individuals, needs to be so exhibited and enforced as to secure its practical recognition. It cannot be denied that it is too frequently ignored. Not only public men in their actions, but the people in their judgments, proceed on the assumption that expediency is the only rule to guide the conduct of nations. The point in each case to be decided, is the wisdom, not the morality, of a given measure. How it will affect this or that interest is carefully considered, and the decision is suspended on this calculation of probabilities. Whether it be consistent or inconsistent with the law of God, is not taken into consideration. Of course, in extreme cases, ignoring the morality of actions is impossible. No nation can openly advocate murder, treachery, or theft. Nevertheless it is true, to a lamentable extent, that public measures are adopted and estimated, as a general thing, by the rule of expediency, to the disregard or neglect of the law of God. Indeed, according to a scheme of ethics which for many years has been taught extensively in Europe and America, there is no higher principle of action than expediency. Right and wrong are words without specific meaning. That is right which promotes our own happiness, say some, or the happiness of the community, as others say; and that is wrong which has an opposite tendency. Apart from the degrading character of this theory, it is obvious that the decision of the question, what the operation of a given measure will be, is often one which the widest range of experience and the greatest sagacity are unable to answer, whereas its moral character a child may determine with certainty and in a moment. Expediency, so far as all moral questions are concerned, is not only a wrong rule of action, but one which can lead neither to certainty nor unanimity of judgment. It will be a great national benefit, if the

people of this country should be roused by the trials through which we are now passing, to turn their minds to God, to recognise their dependence upon him, and their obligation to make his will their rule of action as a nation. If this war should burn into the national consciousness the conviction that what is wrong never can be expedient, we shall not have suffered in vain.

In the second place, What is the moral or religious aspect under which this war is to be regarded? Are the sufferings under which we, as a nation, are now labouring, divine judgments—the manifestation of God's displeasure on account of our national sins? This is the popular view of the subject. We constantly hear the exhortation addressed to the people to confess their sins before God, to humble themselves under his rod, and to put away those evils which have called down upon us the Divine wrath. The principle is often avowed that suffering, whether in individuals or in nations, and especially in the latter, is always punitive. We have heard in high places the declaration, that whenever we see calamity overtake any man, we may conclude that it was for some sin known or unknown. Nations, as such, having no immortality, must find in this world the period of retribution, and therefore, especially with regard to them, it is said, we may safely infer that national suffering is a proof and punishment of national sins. This disposition to look upon calamities as evidences of the Divine displeasure, it must be confessed, is very natural. It has revealed itself in every form, from the days of Job to the present time. When the barbarous people of Melita saw a viper fasten on the hand of Paul, they said, "No doubt this man is a murderer." This disposition to administer justice, is only one expression of that spirit of self-righteousness which belongs to our fallen nature. If men expect acceptance with God on the ground of their goodness, they expect suffering on account of their sins. The legal spirit attributes prosperity to the Divine favour, and adversity to the Divine wrath. It was our common fallen nature, and not any thing peculiar to Christ's disciples, which prompted the question, "Master, who did sin, this man, or his parents, that he was born blind?" This disposition to look on suffering as always punitive is not only natural, but, we are told, has the

support of Scripture. Long lists of passages are quoted, threatening the wrath of God on nations and individuals for their sins. The Bible is full of promises of prosperity to the good, and of denunciations of evil to the wicked. The righteous "shall be a tree planted by the rivers of water, that bringeth forth his fruit in his season; his leaf also shall not wither, and whatsoever he doeth shall prosper. The ungodly are not so; but are like the chaff which the wind driveth away." From such representations it has been inferred that good and evil are in this world distributed on the principles of justice. The Bible itself, however, tells us that if we speak thus, we should offend against the generation of God's children. We are not to interpret providence on the assumption that this is the state of retribution; we are not to regard Lazarus, at the gate of the rich man, as accursed of God, and Dives as his favourite. What the Scriptures plainly teach on this subject is, 1. That so far as rational creatures are concerned, where there is no sin, personal or imputed, there is no suffering. 2. That no man, no community of men, no society, church, or nation, ever suffered in this life as much as their sins deserve. And, consequently, no individual or nation can ever justly complain of the dispensations of Divine providence as unmerited inflictions. 3. But thirdly, it is no less clearly taught, that the distribution of good and evil in this world to individuals, churches, or nations, is not determined by the principles of justice, but according to the wise and benevolent sovereignty of God. He puts up one, and puts down another of the princes of the earth; he exalts one nation and humbles another; he gives one man prosperity and another adversity, not according to their several deserts, but according to his own good pleasure. Sometimes, nay often, his dispensations towards individuals and nations are punitive. He often makes suffering so directly the consequent of transgression, that their causal and judicial relation can be questioned neither by the offender nor by spectators. It is not more evident that death by the hand of the executioner, is the punishment of murder under the government of man, than that disease and poverty are the punishment of drunkenness under the government of God. That suffering may be punitive, is however no evidence that it



always is so. Because loss of health is the punishment of excess, it does not follow that every case of sickness is an expression of the wrath of God. As with individuals, so with churches and nations. God has various ends to accomplish by the trials which he calls upon them to endure. Sometimes, as we just said, he means to punish them for their sins; sometimes he designs to try their faith and patience, and to make them examples to others; sometimes he intends to develop their character, to call forth their powers, to fit them for higher degrees of usefulness; and sometimes, as our Lord said, the end of their sufferings is, "that the works of God should be made manifest in them." This was the grand design of all Paul's sufferings; and therefore he rejoiced in his infirmities, in order that the power of Christ might rest upon him. Such being the case, it is obviously most unscriptural, and often the manifestation of a pharisaical and censorious spirit, when men regard calamities, whether of individuals or of nations, as necessarily Divine judgments, and manifestations of his wrath. This is not only a fundamentally erroneous view of the Divine government as administered in this world, but it betrays an inordinate estimate of mere temporal prosperity. Happiness, abundance of the good things of this life, health, riches, and honours, are not the highest gifts of God. Poverty, suffering, the necessity of labour, disappointment and reproach, are often the greatest blessings, and evidence of God's especial favour. How strange would the Beatitudes sound if accommodated to this new theory, Blessed are ye rich, Blessed are ye that are prosperous and honoured among men! How is it that our Lord says, Blessed are they that mourn; Blessed are ye when men shall revile you and persecute you? Who are they of whom God says, "The world was not worthy," but those who wandered about, being destitute, afflicted, tormented? Good people sometimes err in this matter from confusion of mind. They feel the burden of their sins; they are oppressed with a sense of guilt; they know that nothing which they or others can be called upon to suffer in this life, can exceed their ill-deserts; and hence they assume that to deny that suffering in themselves, or in the community to which they belong, is punitive, and evidence of God's displeasure for their sins, is equivalent

to denying that they are guilty in the sight of God. This is a strange mistake. Paul regarded himself as the chief of sinners, but he gloried and rejoiced in his afflictions, not as evidences of God's wrath, but as tokens of his love, and the means of manifesting the power of Christ. The martyrs, one and all, were sinful men, and deserved "the wrath and curse of God, both in this life and in that which is to come," but who would dare to say that their sufferings on the rack or at the stake were in punishment of their sins. The apostle called upon believers to count it all joy when they fell into diverse temptations or trials; and the early Christians all considered it an honour to suffer for Christ's sake. Nothing can be more contrary to Scripture, more opposed to history and fact, or more repugnant to right feeling than this doctrine, that the distribution of good and evil in this world is determined by the principles of distributive justice.

It is often said, indeed, that providence may not be judicial so far as individuals are concerned, but as nations do not exist in the future world, they must be punished for their national sins in this life. It is, however, no more true of nations than it is of churches, that they have no organic, denominational existence in the world to come. Are we therefore to infer that the persecutions of the early church, the massacre of the Waldenses, the butchery of St. Bartholemew's day, the dragonnades of France, were all vials of Divine wrath poured out upon his church? The truth is, that God deals with nations as he does with individuals. He acts as a sovereign, sometimes he punishes them for their sins; sometimes he allows them to prosper in their iniquities; sometimes he spares them for centuries, and then brings on one generation the retribution due for the blood shed from the foundation of the world. Quite as often, however, he disciplines and educates them by suffering, as he does his own children, and purifies them as by fire, not in wrath, but in mercy. There is no more reason for regarding a nation struggling for truth and righteousness, as accursed of God, than for regarding the afflictions of God's elect as evidence of his displeasure. The monstrous doctrine of Carlyle, and of the modern philosophy, that the *Weltgeschichte* is the *Weltgericht*; that history is judicial; that the strong are always

right; that those who succeed ought to succeed; that we must always take sides against the afflicted and down-trodden, is simply diabolical. It would make us the partisans of the kingdom of Satan from the beginning until now. No man really believes this. No American regards the trials of our revolutionary war, as Divine judgments for the sins of the people; no patriot looks upon the blood shed at Bunker Hill, Princeton, or Yorktown, as drawn by the scourge of the Almighty. Neither does any enlightened man of this generation look upon the civil war in England as a judgment of God against the nation. It was its salvation. To the perfidious Stuarts and their abettors, it may have been punitive, but to the people it was the price and means of their Protestant and national life. So in our case, we, as a nation, have sins enough to justify our destruction. So had Paul and all the martyrs. This war, for what we know, may be a punishment for those sins. But no man has a right to assume this, much less has he the right to press that assumption on the consciences of others. It may be, as other wars and other trials, individual and national, have been, a mark of God's favour; the discipline by which he is educating the nation for a higher career of usefulness in his service. It may be his means of awakening the consciousness of our unity as a nation, of arousing the spirit of patriotism, and of patient endurance. It may be the necessary process of developement of our national life, and be all meant in mercy and not in wrath. This at least is an elevated and healthful view of the subject. At any rate, we are not to take for granted that God is against us. We are not to assume, even should the rebellion be successful, that God approves of the cause of the Confederates; that he favours the perpetuity and extension of slavery; or that he condemns the efforts of the government and of the nation to preserve our national life and institutions. There is need for caution against this pharisaical and censorious spirit. We can hardly take up a religious journal, or enter a religious meeting, without being struck with some of its manifestations. If the works of some public improvement are carried away by a flood, it is because the proprietors violate the Sabbath. If a village is burnt, it is because the inhabitants were wicked; if a man falls dead, it is because he was a blas-



phemer. Do not these things happen to the just and unjust? Are we entitled to gather up our skirts lest they should be defiled by the touch of poverty or suffering? Do not the Scriptures and all experience teach us, that God is a sovereign, that the orderings of his providence are not determined by justice, but by mysterious wisdom for the accomplishment of higher ends than mere punishment or reward? We are in his hands, and we are to learn his will and our duty, not from the adverse or prosperous dispensations of providence, but from his holy word.

A third point about which the public conscience is exercised, is the nature and extent of the allegiance which we owe to the government. It is admitted on all hands that government is a Divine institution; that obedience to the higher powers is a moral duty; and that disloyalty is not only a civil crime, but a sin in the sight of God. It is, and must be, further admitted, that the government to which our allegiance is due, is the national government at Washington, of which Abraham Lincoln is the constitutional head. Even those who hold to the doctrine of secession, must admit that the citizens of those States which have not seceded are conscience-bound to be loyal to the United States. But what is loyalty? As disloyalty is a crime, we have no right to change the meaning of the word. No man has a right to say of another, "he is not loyal in my sense of the word," any more than he has a right to say, he is a thief or murderer in his sense of those terms. Words have a sense of their own, determined by usage, which no man is at liberty to alter. It is important, therefore, that we should have a distinct idea of what loyalty is, and what is, and what is not, inconsistent with it. Unfortunately this, as so many other words, has more than one legitimate meaning, so that a man may be loyal in one sense, and disloyal in another. Neither of these senses, however, can be arbitrarily determined. They must be ascertained and fixed by authority. In the strict meaning of the word, loyalty is the allegiance and service which the law requires of a citizen to his country, or of a subject to his sovereign. This meaning of the term is determined by its etymology, as well as its usage. As it is derived from the French word signifying law, it is properly that service

which the law demands. Loyalty, however, is also a sentiment. It expresses a state of mind. It is fidelity of love. Thus Cowper says: "We, too, are friends to loyalty; we *love* the king who loves the law," &c. As human laws respect overt acts, it is evident that a man may be loyal in the legal sense of the term—in that sense which entitles him to all the rights and privileges of a loyal citizen—who has no real affection for the government under which he lives. We suppose every one has heard, even before this war began, a preference expressed for other forms of government than our own; and not unfrequently, an ostentatious disavowal of all patriotic feeling. Whatever may be thought of those who utter such sentiments, they are not amenable to the law of the land for disloyalty. Besides those who are heart and soul devoted to their country, not only obedient to its laws and true to their allegiance, but zealous for the success of the government in its present struggle for national existence, constituting, as we doubt not such persons do, the great mass of the people of the North, there are among us three other classes of men. First, those who are strictly and conscientiously loyal in the legal sense of the word. They scrupulously perform all the duties which the law exacts at their hands, and abstain from everything which tends to afford aid or comfort to the rebels. Nevertheless, they disapprove of the war. They think it unauthorized or unwise. They prefer that the matters in dispute should be peacefully adjusted, or, failing in such attempts, that the Union should be dissolved by mutual consent. A second class go still further; while keeping within the limits of the law, they nevertheless cordially sympathize with the South, they are glad whenever the rebels are successful, and cast down when victory attends the federal arms. They, however, keep these feelings to themselves, or utter them only in the privacy of their own households. We do not see how the law can take cognizance of either of these classes. If they do not transgress law, they cannot be legally molested on account either of their opinions or their feelings. There is, however, still a third class, consisting of those who are not wise or self-possessed enough to abstain from the expression of their feelings. They openly exult when the federal armies are defeated, and publicly express their satisfaction when the rebels

are successful. What the law would say to such persons we do not pretend to know. Liberty of speech is a very sacred right, and should not be lightly invaded. Many of the best men in England openly sided, so far as the expressing of feeling was concerned, with the American colonies during the Revolutionary war, and were unmolested. More recently, the liberals in parliament and elsewhere, did not hesitate to denounce the war against Napoleon, and to rejoice in every success of the French over the allied forces. If such liberty was afforded in monarchical England, it may be allowed in republican America. Still it is very hard to bear. To hear men, enjoying the protection of the government, and, in many cases, seeking its offices and emoluments, openly rejoicing in its discomfiture, taking sides in feeling and in words with its enemies, even when through prudence or cowardice they abstain from any illegal action, is a trial to the patience of patriotic men, to which they ought not to be subjected. Such persons should at least be marked and avoided. All political support or encouragement should be withheld from them. They may be allowed to enjoy the protection of the law, which they take care not to transgress, but they have no right to complain, if nothing more than what the law demands be conceded to them. Whatever may be legally withheld, may be rightfully withheld from those who in heart, if not in act, are the enemies of the country. It is better to err on the right side, and to allow too much, rather than too little liberty. We should bear with great evils rather than violate any of those principles of law and order, which lie at the foundation of all society. This distinction between loyalty as a legal duty, and loyalty as a sentiment, ought not to be overlooked. For the former we are responsible to the authorities of the land; for the latter we are not. And doubtless much injustice has been done from confounding these two things. Men have not only been denounced as disloyal, but treated as such, who have not offended against the law, though their opinions and feelings may not have been on the side of their country. That many friends of the Union at the South have been despoiled of their property, imprisoned or hung, for the mere expression of their feelings, is no reason why we should violate the law or the principles of justice.

The South has done much in this war, which, if done at the North, would fill the world with indignation. Nevertheless let us be just. Let us not attempt to make men amenable to the civil authorities for their opinions or their feelings. For their words they may be held responsible. It is by words information is given to the enemy. It is by words that soldiers are induced to desert, or men dissuaded from enlisting, or from paying taxes. It is for the law to determine when a man, in the exercise of his liberty of speech, exposes himself to judicial process. Our great anxiety is that our country should do right; that those in authority should not transgress the law of God, or violate the principles of justice, in this the time of our probation.

Fourthly, a still more momentous subject which concerns the public conscience, is the object of the war. It is very possible that a change as to this matter, may consciously or unconsciously be effected in the minds of the people or of our rulers. When the war began there was no diversity of opinion on the subject. By the unanimous vote of Congress, by the official, and often repeated declarations of the President, and of the heads of departments, and of commanding generals, the sole object of the war was proclaimed to be the preservation of the Union and of the Constitution. Any desire or purpose to alter that Constitution, or to impair the rights of the several States, was openly and solemnly repudiated. So far as we know there has been no official or authoritative renunciation of this object as the only legitimate end of the war. The President has recently declared this to be the object at which he still aims. The abolition of slavery, when spoken of at all in this connection, was only adverted to as a means to an end. If the Constitution and Union could not be preserved without the abolition of slavery, then slavery should, if possible, be abolished. To this sentiment, we believe, the heart and conscience of the country fully responded. It can, however, hardly be questioned, that what was spoken of as a means, is by a large party at home and abroad, now regarded as the legitimate end. The abolitionists, to a great extent, are for the war as a means of putting an end to African slavery; as a means for the restoration of the Union, they would be opposed to it. The same is true,



to a great extent, with the philanthropists of Europe. Even Count Gasparin, the most enlightened of our friends abroad, evidently contemplates the emancipation of the slave as the object which gives elevation, grandeur, and interest to the conflict in which we are now engaged.

This is a very serious matter. If the abolition of slavery be made, either really or avowedly, the object of the war, we believe we shall utterly fail. If the perservation of the Union and the Constitution be sincerely adhered to as the only legitimate end of the war, we believe we shall not only be successful in the conflict, but that the abolition of slavery will follow in a natural and healthful manner. We regard it, therefore, as the duty of every man to enter his protest against any departure from the object for which the country so enthusiastically took up arms. To substitute for that object the abolition of slavery, would, in our judgment, be disastrous, 1. Because it would be morally wrong. It may be conceded that the system of slavery, as it exists in this country, is a great moral evil; that it is a burden and curse to the whole nation; that it is a great source of power to those in arms against the nation. It is, however, not enough that our object should be in itself good, and its attainment eminently desirable, to justify a war. False religion is a great moral evil; its prevalence is the one great curse of the world; the prosperity of our own and of every other country would be immeasurably promoted by its suppression. Would this justify a crusade against idolatry and superstition? So also despotism is a grievous yoke on the neck of the nations. Its prevalence abroad is a great evil to us. The fellow-feeling between political and domestic despots, between the privileged classes and slaveholders, is the secret of a great part of the hatred to the North and sympathy with the South, which prevails in Europe, and which have been one of the principal causes of the continuance of this war. But this would not justify our government in making war against England and France. We cannot rightfully sacrifice thousands of lives and hundreds of millions of money, because aristocrats hate us, and wish evil to our institutions. Nothing can be a legitimate object of a war but something which a nation has not only a right to attain, but which also it is bound to secure. The sup-

pression of false religion; the destruction of feudal institutions abroad; the abolition of slavery in Asia or Africa, does not fulfil either of these conditions. These are not objects for which our government was instituted, nor is it responsible for them. But the security of its own territories; the protection of the lives and property of its citizens; the preservation of its own national existence, with all the prerogatives therewith connected, are the very ends for which civil governments are instituted, and for which they are responsible. These are ends which they are bound to secure, and these, therefore, alone are the legitimate objects of war. Other things may be benevolent, useful, desirable, but they are to be attained in some other way. War is a tremendous evil. It is no slight matter for parents to give up their children to death. The government which calls for this great sacrifice must make out a case of necessity. There must be a moral obligation on a people to make war, or the war itself is a crime. Now it cannot be asserted that the abolition of slavery, however desirable in itself, is one of the ends for which our national government was instituted. We are not bound to abolish slavery by war, as we should be bound to resist invasion, or as we are bound to suppress rebellion by force of arms. England had the power, as mistress of the seas, to suppress the slave trade, by making it a ground for war. But she was not bound to put an end to that horrid traffic in that way, and to have done so would have been an outrage on the rights of nations, and therefore a violation of the moral law. If our government, therefore, has neither the right nor the obligation to abolish slavery within the limits of the States, which is undeniable, and never has been denied, then to make such abolition the end of the war, is a plain and palpable violation of the oath of allegiance to the Constitution, and of the law of God. We do not say that the emancipation of the slaves may not be a legitimate means for the prosecution of the war. But the difference between its being a means and an end, is as great as the difference between blowing up a man's house as a means of arresting of a conflagration, and getting up a conflagration for the sake of blowing up his house. Plain as this is, and essential, in the moral aspect of the case, as this distinction is, we do not expect to

see it regarded. If men hate and disapprove of any thing, they seldom are scrupulous as to the means of getting rid of it. The plains and hills of every European nation are red with the blood shed in obedience to this spirit. The end sanctifies the means, is the motto of fanaticism as well as of Jesuitism. Christianity was hateful to the heathen, Protestantism was hateful to the Papists, and therefore all means, rapine and murder included, were lawful in their eyes for their suppression. In like manner slavery is hateful to the men of this generation, and therefore they are prone to make its extirpation the great end of the war. We have, however, in the sight of God, no more right to do this, than we have to make war for the suppression of false religion, or despotism, or any other great evil which prevails in the world.

2. The substitution of the abolition of slavery for the preservation of the Union, as either the real or avowed object of the war, besides being morally wrong, because transcending the powers of the government, would also be in the highest degree inexpedient. If there be any one condition of success, in the deadly struggle in which we are now engaged, more essential than any other, it is the cordial union of the people in the loyal States. That this great war should be conducted to a safe conclusion as a party measure, is simply impossible. Neither the Republicans nor Democrats can command the resources of the nation. Much less can those resources be called out and directed by a mere fragment of either of those great parties. Unity of purpose and of effort on the part of the North and of the border States, is therefore essential. It is self-evident that this union and coöperation can be secured only by the adoption of a truly national, as distinguished from a party, policy. The object of the war must be something in which the whole country can with a good conscience coöperate, and for which the whole people are willing to exert their utmost energies. Stated in these general terms, these principles can hardly be questioned. If, then, it can be shown that the whole country, the people now loyal to the government, cannot, and will not unite, in making the abolition of slavery the object of the war, then it must be admitted that any such change in the purpose of the government must be fatal to our

success. It, however, is not a matter which needs to be proved, that the whole people cannot be brought to sustain the war as a means of emancipating the slaves. No party has ventured publicly to announce any such purpose. Nay, the President has, within a few weeks past, disclaimed it. The most influential of the Republican papers (the *New York Times*) in a recent issue made the same disclaimer. The democratic party, which prevailed in so many of the late elections, is known to be hostile to any such measure; and the large body of voters, who are not party men, but vote as their conscience directs,—the conservative men of the country as they are called—are no less opposed to any such policy. It must, therefore, be suicidal, if not treacherous, for any man or any set of men, to insist on the government taking ground on which the people cannot and will not stand. If there be not wisdom and right feeling enough to secure a national policy, that is, the policy of adhering truly and avowedly to the restoration of the Union as the only legitimate object of the war, then we believe success is hopeless, and the sooner the war is brought to an end the better it will be for all concerned. We are not arguing against the abolition of slavery, any more than we are arguing for the continuance of false religion, or of despotism. We are only arguing that these are not legitimate objects of the war. Having undertaken the war for a purpose which the government and the people heartily approved, and for the attainment of which they felt bound to make every sacrifice, to substitute any other object, be it the acquisition of new territory; the consolidation of the government; the subjugation of one part of the country to another; the abolition of slavery; or any thing else, is palpably wrong and must be disastrous. The policy of States must be guided first by the law of God, and next by a regard to the convictions, feelings, and interests of the people. The men who control that policy at any one time may have their own private opinions as to what would be right and wise, but they must, as statesmen, act for the people, and give effect to their well ascertained desires. It is the public, and not the private conscience and judgment which are to govern the country, and therefore no extreme measure, no measure sanctioned only by a small part of the thinking public, can



be wisely adopted. In the *Pittsburgh Banner* for December 27, 1862, there is a very judicious editorial article bearing on this point, which we should be glad to transfer to our pages. "The people," says the editor, "must be united. A platform, broad enough for all loyal people to stand upon, must be adopted. The radicals cannot carry their principles through. It is utter folly in them to think so. They have not the numbers. The people will not go with them. And the Republicans cannot, as a party, so wage the battle as to triumph. They have the reins of government but only half the people, a power far too weak. Neither could the Democrats, on party principles, succeed. . . . There must be union; and to have union we must adopt broad, noble, national principles."

We do not argue against making the abolition of slavery the object of the war, on general grounds; on the tremendous social revolution involved in the immediate emancipation of four millions of slaves, the great majority of whom are in the lowest state of civilization, or on the wide-spread misery consequent on the loss of the recognised right of property in the labour of such a multitude of men. The President in his recent annual message dwells at length on these evils in favour of his plan of gradual emancipation. We are content to rest the matter on the two grounds already mentioned, viz., that the United States have no more right to go to war for the abolition of slavery than for the correction of any other great social evil at home or abroad; and that the country cannot be expected to unite in the support of a war for any such purpose. We must keep right, and we must keep united, or we must be defeated.

Fifthly, another moral question, of scarcely less importance, concerns the means or measures which are adopted for carrying on the war. The aphorism that all things are lawful in war, is not only unchristian, but inhuman. It was rejected by the heathen and adopted only by savages. And yet we frequently hear the doctrine advanced, that the end of war is to inflict injury on your enemies, and the more injury you inflict the sooner and the more effectually will the war be brought to an end. We have heard men justify the burning of cities and laying waste the country by fire and sword. This, indeed, is often the language of passion rather than of deliberate convic-

tion. Nevertheless, there is great reason to fear that many of the people, and some even in places of authority, have very little scruple as to the morality of the means to be adopted in the suppression of this rebellion. The end sanctifies the means, is practically the creed of many who would not dare to adopt it in its abstract form. We may, however, safely assume that no Christian man can advocate the principle, that every means of injury against enemies may be rightfully adopted. The apostle says of those who teach that we may do evil that good may come, that their damnation is just. That is the judgment of God, and his judgments cannot be disregarded with impunity. It follows, therefore, that if the Union can be preserved only on the condition of the commission of sin, it must be allowed to perish. If one word of blasphemy against the Saviour of men could give us peace, that word should never be spoken. Better far that the whole land should be buried in the depths of the sea. About this there can be no dispute. As little can it be doubted that it is a sin, a violation of the law of God, for our government to disregard any of the established laws and usages of modern warfare in its efforts to suppress the rebellion. Better let the rebels succeed, than offend God, by reverting to the cruel and wicked usages of former ages, or of savage nations. It is one of the recognised rules of modern warfare, that prisoners of war should be humanely treated, and the lives of non-combatants be regarded as sacred. Of course any violation of this rule would be morally wrong. It would not justify a departure from this principle that our enemies disregard it. We fear that the records of southern prisons will prove that, in numerous instances, federal prisoners of war have been subjected to the greatest hardships and indignities, and sometimes shot on the slightest provocation. We must disbelieve not only the testimony of loyal men, but the statements of the southern journals themselves, if hundreds of men, guilty of no other crime than fidelity to the country, expressed no otherwise than by words, have not suffered death. No such case, to our knowledge, has ever occurred at the North. Prisoners have not only been kindly treated, but non-combatants, however open in their avowals of hostility to the Union, have escaped injury from unauthorized persons. In the compara-

tively few cases in which they have been deprived of their liberty, it has been by the officers of the law, and in obedience to the command of the constituted authorities.

Again, it is one of the humane regulations of modern warfare that private property is entitled to protection. Robbery or marauding, on the part of soldiers, is punishable with death. The evils of war are great enough without adding to them the right of unlimited spoliation. The track of armies, whether friendly or hostile, can hardly fail to be marked with desolation. Necessity, which knows no law, subjects the resources of the country through which an army passes, to a greater or less degree to its support. Men and horses must be fed, and it is often impossible that sufficient food or forage can be transported to meet necessary demands. Private property, therefore, must be used; but it is to be used only when necessary, and, when taken from persons not in active opposition to the government, the proprietors are entitled to a fair compensation. What we hold, however, to be immoral and demoralizing, is the doctrine that the private property of non-combatants is a lawful prize in war. Indiscriminate plunder, or wholesale confiscation, confiscation of the property of classes of men, without judicial decision in each case affirming the lawfulness of the forfeiture, we believe to be contrary to the law of God and the usages of civilized society. It is easy to assert the doctrine that a state of war supersedes all civil rights, when we are the gainers. But we become clear-sighted to its injustice, when it operates against ourselves. Here, again, we think that the federal authorities are entitled to great commendation. Southern property in northern hands, or when vested at the North, has not been confiscated; southern debts have not been sequestered to the use of the federal government. The congress of the Confederate States, on the other hand, has made it unlawful for southern debtors to liquidate the claims of northern creditors. Hundreds of millions of dollars due by the law of God and by the recognised principles of honesty, have been, and still are, withheld from loyal men, who have thereby been ruined. This violation of the great principles of moral obligation by our enemies, will not justify a similar course on our part. What we are anxious should be impressed on the public

conscience, and on the minds of our rulers, civil and military, is, that the rights of property are sacred—that they cannot be violated except in cases of absolute necessity, or in punishment of offences judicially authenticated. We are aware that exception is perhaps unavoidably made to this rule, when towns or cities are not only defended, but turned into fortresses, which must be taken by assault. When a citizen's house is transformed into a fort, from which shots are fired, it loses its character and forfeits its right to protection.

Once more, the usages of war and the consciences of Christian people, condemn as morally wrong all unusual and cruel methods of conducting hostilities, such as poisoning streams, wells, or food, or letting loose hordes of savages, or stirring up servile insurrections. We do not say that it would be wrong to employ the Indians or negroes in our military service, any more than it is wrong for the English to employ the Sepoys of India. When so employed, however, Christian principle and common humanity require that they should be under military discipline, and restrained by all the rules of war. If the great powers of Europe were justifiable, which no man doubts, in interfering to arrest the indiscriminate massacre of the Greeks by the Turks, we may be sure that we should arouse against us the indignation of the Christian world, if we should resort to the instigation of servile war, as a means of suppressing the rebellion. Better far that we should be defeated, and the country divided, than that its unity should be preserved by any such revolting means. If a strong man is bound to arrest the hand of a ruffian about to murder a child, Christendom would be bound to interfere and put an end to a war conducted on any such principles. We have no fear, however, that any thing so horrible as servile insurrections would ever be resorted to, or tolerated by the American government. We should not have even adverted to the subject, had we not been told, (what our own ears never heard,) that men and women, professing to be Christians, have been so demoralized, or demented by passion, as to maintain that it would be just to visit the South with the fate of the Canaanites. We know no parallel to this, but some of the ravings of the southern press, in which resort to poison, fire, and the poinard of the assassin,



has been advocated as lawful in such a war as this. God forbid that such persons should be, or be regarded, as fair representatives either of the North or of the South. If we cannot succeed by right means, we can never succeed at all.

Another question on which the public conscience is sorely tried, and on which good men are much divided in opinion, relates to the limits of the power of the executive. Has the President of the United States the right to suspend the privilege of *habeas corpus*, to order the arrest and imprisonment of private citizens, without due process of law, or to subject them to trial for offences not specified in the laws, by the military authorities? Has he the right to abolish slavery either in the States or Territories? Nothing connected with the war has so disturbed the public mind as the principles involved in these questions. Nothing has called forth such opposition and bitter denunciations against the administration, as the exercise of the right to deal in this summary and arbitrary manner with the liberty and property of private citizens; and nothing threatens so much danger for the future. It is on these points division at the North is most to be apprehended. Already direct collision between the state governments and the national executive is looming up before us. It is not the number, the resources, or the persistency of our enemies, that is to be apprehended, so much as radical division and alienation among the loyal men of the North. This, therefore, is a subject of transcendent importance. It is one also of great difficulty. When the highest legal authorities in the land are found arrayed on opposite sides, it is folly for either party to assume that the matter is plain and simple. It is still greater folly to make the view taken of these questions the test of loyalty or devotion to the cause of the country. Men equally patriotic, and zealous for the support of the government and for the suppression of the rebellion, are found on both sides of these questions. We have no idea of discussing these subjects in their legal or political aspects. The whole object of this article is to endeavour to show the bearing of the moral law on these great questions of national interest, and to assist ourselves and our readers to determine the path of duty. With

this view we propose, in very few words, to state how this matter presents itself to our minds.

1. In the first place, it is conceded that the President of the United States, in his capacity of civil magistrate, and in ordinary times, has no authority under the Constitution, and consequently no authority at all, to suspend the writ of *habeas corpus*, or to arrest and imprison any citizen without due process of law, or to emancipate a single slave. On this point there does not seem to be any difference of opinion. The proclamation of the President is issued in his capacity of commander-in-chief of the army and navy of the United States. The emancipation of the slaves is declared to be "a war measure." Its justification is rested not on general principles of justice and humanity. It is not because slavery is a moral wrong, but simply because emancipation of southern slaves is assumed to be a necessary means for the successful prosecution of the war, that the decree for their emancipation is defended. This is avowed by the President himself, and therefore the operation of the proclamation is confined to States and parts of States in actual rebellion. If emancipation was proclaimed as a matter of justice to the slave, it must of course be general in its operation.

2. It may also be conceded that the war power of the President is not only derived from the Constitution, but limited by that instrument. In declaring that the President shall be the commander-in-chief of the army, the Constitution invests him with all the prerogatives, which, according to the laws of nations and the usages of war, are attached to that office. We see no reason to dissent from the dictum of Judge Curtis, that the President "possesses and exercises these powers, not in spite of the Constitution and laws of the United States, or in derogation from their authority, but in virtue thereof, and in strict subordination thereto." This is the President's own view of the subject. He closes his recent proclamation with the solemn words, "Upon this act, sincerely believed to be an act of justice, warranted by the Constitution upon military necessity, I invoke the considerate judgment of mankind, and the gracious favour of Almighty God."

3. The only question is, How far does the war power of the

President extend? To this we answer, So far as the preservation of the country demands, and no farther. He has the right to do whatever is not in itself sinful, which is necessary to protect the government and Constitution, which he has sworn to support. The law of self-preservation is the same in nature in its application to individuals and to states, or organized communities. Any man is justifiable in setting at naught the rights of property, to preserve his own life or those of his family. Who would venture to arraign a man for theft, who, in order to save himself or children from drowning, should take a boat which did not belong to him. Nay, the right to life yields to that of self-preservation. It is justifiable homicide to kill a man in self-defence. The same principle applies to organized communities. They, too, have the right of self-preservation, and they must have organs through which that right can be exercised. In times of emergency the common council of a city, for example, cannot be called together. The mayor must act, and because he must act, he has the right to act. If a great fire occurs, he may arrest its progress by blowing up any buildings, no matter how valuable or venerable. It would be vain to quote the Bill of Rights about the inviolability of property, or to produce the municipal charter to prove that blowing up houses was not one of the functions of the mayor. All such pleas are felt to be nugatory in the presence of the instinct of self-preservation. So, too, when pestilence has revealed itself in a particular part of a city, its inhabitants are removed, its places of business are closed, and all access to it is debarred. What would it avail to protest against such measures on the ground that a man's house is his castle, or that he has a right to carry on his business where he pleases? In all these cases, the necessity must be real, and not imaginary or fictitious; and the means employed must not transcend the immediate exigency. If a man kills another on the plea of self-defence, when he is in no real danger, he is guilty of manslaughter; and if his plea of self-defence is feigned, and the homicide is committed with malice aforethought, he is guilty of murder. So, also, to justify the destruction of private property to arrest a conflagration, the necessity must be real and apparent, and the destruction must not be carried beyond what

the exigency demands. These principles evidently apply to military affairs. A commanding general has the right to seize private property, to arrest suspected persons, and to do whatever is not morally wrong, which the necessity of the service requires. He may proclaim martial law, which suspends the common and statute laws, and puts in their place the arbitrary will of the general in command. This is admitted. It is done in every war. It has been enforced during the present war by the rebels as well as by the loyal generals. It is on this ground of self-preservation, of immediate and urgent necessity, that we think that the right of the President to suspend the writ of *habeas corpus*, is to be defended. It has been said that Congress alone, as a legislative body, has the right to suspend the operation of the law of the land in so vital a matter. To this we answer, first, that then the constitutional provision for the suspension of the writ in question would be nugatory. Before Congress could be called together to act, irreparable evil might be done. And secondly, this is contrary to all analogy. A man whose life is in imminent danger is not required to go to a magistrate to get permission to kill his assailant; neither is it necessary for the mayor of a town to call together the common council to give him authority to destroy private property to arrest a raging fire. No less unreasonable is it to assert, that the President of the United States must obtain permission of Congress to arrest and imprison enemies of the country in times of emergency. Judge Curtis admits that this right does exist. He says, "In time of war, a military commander-in-chief, or one of his subordinates, must possess and exercise powers both over the persons and property of citizens which do not exist in time of peace." Again, "In the time of war without any special legislation, not the commander-in-chief only, but every commander of an expedition, or of a military post, is lawfully empowered by the Constitution and laws of the United States, to do whatever is necessary and is sanctioned by the laws of war, to accomplish the lawful objects of his command." Martial law, according to Judge Curtis, goes even further than this. "It is," he says, "the will of a military commander operating without any restraint, save his judgment, upon the lives, upon the persons, upon the entire social and



individual condition of all over whom this law extends." Such is the absolute power which martial law vests in a commanding general. Such is the power which he is often called upon to exercise. When shut up in a besieged city, he is, and must be, master of all its resources; and when, as was the case with General Butler in New Orleans, he is in a captured city filled with a hostile population and discordant elements of every kind, it would be suicidal for him to submit to the trammels of ordinary law. He is, and ever must be, bound by the great principles of morals, but he must, at the same time, be clothed with all the powers which the exigencies of his position demand. Judge Curtis, however, as we understand him, insists first, that this military power of the President, or of his subordinates, must be confined to the present. It cannot be exerted to determine the future relations either of persons or property; and secondly, that it must be confined to the sphere of actual military operations. The former of these limitations has nothing to do with the propriety of arbitrary arrests, as they are called. It is on the second ground, as we understand, that the objection to such arrests is founded. We presume it would not be charged as a fault against General Banks, if he should arrest individuals who, in the streets of New Orleans, were haranguing the people against the government, or exhorting them to cheer for the rebel authorities. It is because the President has ordered the arrest of suspicious persons outside of the field of military operations, and within the limits of loyal States, that he has been so severely censured and denounced. We cannot see the reason for this limitation. We understand well enough that a subordinate general must confine the exercise of his power to the immediate sphere of his command. A general commanding one department has no more authority to exercise his military power in another department, than the President can exercise such authority in Canada. But the authority of the President extends over the whole United States. What he can lawfully do in one place, he can lawfully do in another. This extraordinary war power, springing "from present pressing emergencies," says Judge Curtis, "is limited by them." Then it exists wherever and whenever those emergencies arise. There is no justification for the

exercise of such power, but necessity; and the necessity is a justification wherever it exists. It seems strange to us, that a man may be lawfully arrested and imprisoned, in one place, because he is dangerous to the country, and be exempt from all harm in another place, where he may be ten-fold more dangerous. The President of the United States, in times of rebellion and invasion, may, on pressing emergencies, do any where whatever any commanding general may do within the sphere of his authority. Neither the one nor the other can rightfully do any thing but what the law of self-preservation demands. A power which arises out of necessity is limited only by that necessity.

There may be just cause of complaint in some cases, on the ground that these summary arrests were made when no necessity called for them; that men truly loyal, or whose disloyalty was a mere matter of feeling, have been unjustly imprisoned. Admitting this to be true, it does not touch the principle. If the right to arrest dangerous persons be admitted, each case of its exercise must be judged on its own merits. Much is said about the dangerous character of this power. It is said to put in peril the most sacred rights of the citizen, and the Constitution itself. All power is liable to abuse, and its exercise should be jealously watched. We have, however, as little fear of any serious danger to the liberty of the people from the power in question, as we have of indiscriminate manslaughter, or the general blowing up of houses, because homicide and the destruction of private property are justified in cases of emergency. Much of our fear on this subject is traditionary. It is a correct maxim, that the depositaries of power should be sedulously watched. "The price of liberty is perpetual vigilance." Formerly, kings and nobles were the depositaries of power, and it was obligatory on the people to be constantly on their guard, and to resist the first indication of encroachment on their rights. English history, which is our own history, is a record of this struggle of the people against their rulers. This we have been instructed to regard as the spirit of liberty. We have received it as part of the great inheritance bequeathed to us by our Anglo-Saxon ancestors. We are not duly mindful, however, of the entire change of our position. The maxim still

holds good, that the depositaries of power are to be jealously watched, but in this country all power vests in the people, and not in our ephemeral rulers. The danger to liberty is from the masses, and from State pride and assumption, not from the federal government. This De Tocqueville discovered years ago. "So far," says he, "is the federal government from acquiring strength, and from threatening the sovereignty of the States, as it grows older, that I maintain it to be growing weaker and weaker, and that the sovereignty of the Union alone is in danger." This stupendous and wicked rebellion, with which we are now struggling for our national life, is the outbreak of popular and State feeling against the authority of the Union. It is not the power of the national government, it is the license of the people and the patronage of the government we have to fear. If every post-master, and every other officer of the government below the members of the cabinet, could hold their positions on the good behaviour tenure, it would do more to purify and strengthen our institutions than any new restrictions on the power of the President. Our reasons for not sympathizing with the alarm manifested on account of "the arbitrary arrests," besides the one just intimated, are that this power of the President can be exercised only in times of rebellion or invasion; that it is limited to cases of necessity; and that the agents of the government are responsible for their acts, in obedience to the commands of the central government. If a man kills another on the plea of self-defence, he is bound to make out that the homicide was necessary to his safety. If the authorities arrest and imprison a man as dangerous to the government, they must be prepared to show that such arrest was an act of necessity, that the public safety demanded it. If it can be proved to be wanton or malicious, those who make the arrest will be held to account. We repeat our conviction, that our danger is not from the despotic power of the President. When men are rushing with their engines to extinguish a conflagration, there will always be those to cry out against them for breaking the curbstones or barking the trees; but after all, the real danger is from the fire, and not from the injury done the public thoroughfares.

In like manner, our present danger is from the rebellion, and not from the irregular exercise of national authority.

The above principles apply to the emancipation of slaves. If the President, as commander-in-chief, or his subordinates, may, in time of war, and in case of pressing necessity, appropriate the property of the enemies of the country, why not their property in slaves? They claim slaves as property; they have a recognised and legal title to their labour; on the proceeds of that labour they live; by it they are enabled to carry on this war for the overthrow of the government. There seems to be no reason why this peculiar kind of property should be exempt from the operation of the laws of war. If the rebels confiscate or sequester, without any pretence of military necessity, not only hundreds of millions of mercantile debts due to northern men, but the immense amount owned by them in southern banks and railroads, they at least should not complain of the application of strictly war principles to themselves. As, however, this emancipation of the slaves is declared to be a war measure, founded on "military necessity," it must, as before said, be limited by that necessity, and by the nature of the President's authority as commander-in-chief. Both of these limitations are essential. The President has no authority to liberate a single slave, except on the ground of military necessity. If that necessity exists, the right exists, and to the extent and no further, that the exigency demands. This is conceded. Men may differ as to what "military necessity," in this matter, at the present moment does require, but they must admit that nothing can be rightfully done which the present emergency does not demand. The right to emancipate slaves cannot extend beyond the military necessity for such emancipation. This we understand to be the President's doctrine. The other limitation is no less important. The President's power to emancipate is a military power. It belongs to him as the head of the army. But the authority of a general is executive, and not legislative. He cannot make laws to be permanently binding. He acts for the present, and for pressing emergencies. The President does not pretend to be a dictator. He does not assume the right to enact new laws, or to overturn the institutions of the country. He speaks in his



character of military officer, and assumes to do only what lies legitimately within his military authority. He may, as commander-in-chief, issue an order to his subordinates in the navy and army to regard and treat as freemen all the slaves within their respective commands, or who may seek refuge within their lines. What is more than this, must be legally void, and practically inoperative. The President's authority, at the present time, is no more regarded in South Carolina than that of the governor of New Jersey. Until that State is occupied by our armies, a proclamation of emancipation from the former can have no more effect than one issued by the latter. What its moral effect may be is another question. We are not to deceive ourselves in this matter. There is something so grand in this idea of three millions of slaves raised in one day, and by a stroke of a pen, to the dignity of freemen, in the vastness of the social change thus effected, and in the world-wide consequences of such a measure, that it is almost impossible to avoid being carried away by feeling, and uttering shouts of exultation. Many will not, and many cannot, stop to consider whether the edict itself is, in its literal import, and in its prospective operation, of any real authority, above what has just been indicated. The approbation accorded to it, is an approbation of slave emancipation, and not a judgment as to the legality of the measure, in the sense in which they understand it. Were the President to issue a proclamation, as "a war measure," suppressing the Protestant religion in this country, *Te Deums* would resound through the Vatican; or should he ordain the closing of every Catholic church in the land, doubtless many Protestants would be loud in their applause. In both cases, joy over the result would render men indifferent as to the means by which it was effected. This would be very natural, but not very wise. We have no idea that one intelligent man in ten, or the President himself, believes that he can legally ordain the permanent abolition of slavery throughout the United States. His proclamation can only operate as instructions to his subordinates to regard and treat all slaves who come within their power as freemen. This is a vast deal, and may produce a radical change in the state of the country. With this, con-

scientious men, loyal to the Constitution, ought to be contented. The right, in the long run, is always the most effective.

In view of the present state of the country, it is certainly imperative on all good men to unite in the support of the government; to render those in authority all the aid they need to carry on this struggle to a successful issue; cheerfully to submit to the burdens and sacrifices which the war imposes; and to render prompt and hearty obedience to all the lawful commands of the powers that be. This duty does not depend on the opinion which men may form of the wisdom or efficiency of the national administration. Whether the weakest or the wisest government the country ever had, the duty of submission and devotion is still the same. The threats of revolutionary or factious opposition, which have at times been made, are in the highest degree criminal. Our only safety is in fidelity to the Constitution and to our constitutional rulers.

Another great duty, which presses on all loyal citizens, is not to despond. The work which we have undertaken is a great work. To sustain the Constitution and Union against an organized rebellion of the people of eleven States, and the divided allegiance of several others, is a herculean task. It must be expected to demand great effort and great sacrifices. The difficulties which we have to encounter are tenfold greater than those which the rebels have to encounter. They are on their own ground, in the midst of their own resources. We have to operate at a distance from ours. General Rosecrans's base of supplies is Louisville, two hundred miles in his rear. General Grant must draw all his resources from Columbus, at a still greater distance. To guard effectually such long lines of communication, is almost impossible. If General Lee's army were in central New York, with loyal Pennsylvania in his rear, what would become of him? How would he keep up his communication? It is wise to look the difficulties of our position calmly in the face, so that we may not be cast down at unavoidable disasters. There is no sufficient cause for discouragement, if we can only be united and persevering. Confident in the justice of the national cause, assured that God is on our side, we are bound not to despond. We should remember that we are acting for generations to come; that the fate of the

country, and, in large measure of Christendom, hangs on the issue of this conflict. The question, as it seems to us, to be determined, is, Whether North America is to be the abode of liberty and constitutional order, or converted, through the greater part of its extent, into a vast empire, in which the blacks shall be slaves, and all, except slave-holders, miserable serfs. We do not say that success will certainly attend the right. The wrong in this world, which for a time is the kingdom of Satan, often triumphs. But we do say, that it is a thousand-fold better to be defeated with the right, than to be triumphant with the wrong.

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## SHORT NOTICES.

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*Sectional Controversy, &c.* By William Chauncey Fowler, LL.D. New York: Charles Scribner. 1862.

THIS thin octavo was written by Professor Fowler, of Amherst College, Massachusetts, a native of New England, and a descendant of the Puritans. It purports to trace historically, and to illustrate by numerous citations from original documents, the progress of the political controversy between the North and South, which has at last culminated in civil war. It is written in the interest of the South. It espouses the extreme doctrines of Mr. Calhoun, which southern statesmen themselves repudiated, until forced to adopt them in justification of the present rebellion. Professor Fowler belongs to that class of persons of all others most to be commiserated, "northern men with southern principles." Such men forfeit the respect of the North and are despised by the South. The latter word is not too strong. We have never heard words more bitterly contemptuous than those uttered by southern men against this class of persons. In this depth, however, there is a lower deep. Some northern men not only adopt southern principles, but give in to the southern assumptions. Men of the South say that this war is a war of races, a conflict between Normans and Saxons, between a ruling and a servile race. This claim, as a matter of history, is not only unfounded, but,