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ART. I.—BERKELEY'S PHILOSOPHY.*

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THIS work has been a labor of love on the part of the editor. He has evidently spent years upon it, and we are reaping the benefit. He has taken immense pains in collating the published works of Berkeley, in searching for manuscripts, and in collecting all that can be known of the man. Much of the new matter is of no great value, as for example the letters, chiefly on business, to Mr. Prior, and his Sermons and Notes of Sermons, which are common-place enough. Others are of inestimable worth, such as his Common-Place Book, in which, as in a glass, we see the rise of his speculations. I have read it with as much interest as I felt years ago on inspecting in Dresden the first sketches which Raphael drew of his great master-pieces. The edition is already the standard one and will never be superseded. The notes of the editor, which are numerous, are sometimes simple enough, and mere repetitions of each other, but are commonly of great utility as connecting the scattered statements of his author on a particular subject. The editor's prefaces constitute a valuable introduction to the treatises. They are always anxiously thoughtful, but they do not clear up the subject. He writes as if he could, if he chose, say something decisive; but as he never chooses, one begins to doubt whether he has anything to say fitted to dispel the mystery. Prof. Fraser does not profess to be an adherent of Berkeley's philosophy, but it is evident that he is strongly prepossessed in its favor. He tells us that Berkeley

* The Works of George Berkeley, by Alexander Campbell Fraser, A M., Professor of Logic and Metaphysic, in the University of Elinburgh, in four vols.

was the most subtle thinker of the last century (Vol. IV., p. 415), and that "the great philosophic thinkers of the eighteenth century are Berkeley, Hume and Kant" (p. 419)—this in a century which included Hutcheson, Butler, Condillac, Wolf, Hartley, Adam Smith and Reid. *Siris* or the *Virtues of Tar-Water* is represented as the great work of the age on pure philosophy. This sounds extravagantly high in the ears of most people. But it is only from one smitten with love that we can expect so much devotion, and love is proverbially blind to the faults of the beloved one.

I am not sure what is the position in the battle of philosophy taken by the professor who sits in the chair of Hamilton. Whether he is an experientialist as Berkeley seems to a large extent to have been; or whether he falls back on first principles like the Scottish school and Kant; or whether he tries to combine them by some generalizing process of induction, the nature of which is not clearly expounded and the validity of which is not defended. Some years the School of Hamilton (of whom Fraser was a pupil) used, after the manner of their master (who in this respect followed Jacobi), to make constant appeals to Faith to drag them out of the slough of skepticism in which they were landed by following certain false principles of the Kantian philosophy. They seem to have been obliged, to some extent, to abandon these by the demand which some of us perseveringly made to compel them to tell us what they mean by this Faith. The appeal seems now to be to some unexplained thing "reflectively recognized in the reasoned common-sense of the philosopher" (IV. 370), as if reflection could show us more than is in the original perception, and as if reasoning could bring out more than is in the premises. Berkeley mentions two defects of the visive faculty: first, that the view it gives is narrow, and secondly, that it is confused; and his editor annotates "these two defects are common to every form of the intuitive consciousness of man. See Locke's *Essay* on the defects of memory. It is this defective power of intuition which calls for reasoning to assist our finite consciousness, reasoning being, as Pascal says, the sign at once of our dignity and degradation" (I. 75). The accurate statement is, that as intuition reveals only what is singular and concrete, there is need in philosophy of the discursive powers to put the truth in abstract and general form; but rea-

soning cannot widen what is narrow or clear up what is confused. To give to reasoning, to induction or any logical process, a farther power, is just to encourage the production by metaphysical youths of perplexed and toilsome systems like those of Spinoza and of Ferrier.

There can be no doubt that just at the present time there is a revived interest felt in many quarters in the philosophy of the ideal bishop. Many are turning toward it with longing, almost hoping that it may give them something to rest on in the midst of these speculative distractions. Whence this tendency? An answer to this question may show us some of the philosophic currents of the age. This disposition cannot arise merely from the beauty of Berkeley's style, nor from the still greater beauty of his character, nor from the fascination which the man exercises on all who come in contact with him; these do not operate more than they did in the ages when Berkeley was misunderstood, neglected or ridiculed. We must search for some deeper tendencies. These will be found much the same as gendered, a century and a half ago, the idealism of the Irish metaphysician. Most powerful of all is the materialism of the age, repelling our finer minds and driving them to the opposite pole. Not a few are becoming wearied of this constant magnifying of matter, and the perpetual references to inflexible mechanism, which neither man nor God himself can influence. In a spirit of independence, or perhaps of contradiction, they venture to question the pretensions of this power, which would rule alone in the earth and in the very heavens; and they are disposed to give a favorable hearing to the good bishop, who had the courage to wage war with materialists and the very mathematicians of his time. As they do so, they are made to feel that there is a charm in his speculations and in his very manner. They like his flexible exposition, as less binding on them than the dogmata of formalists in science and philosophy, and somewhat more worthy of the grandeur of nature—as they are disposed to view it. Men, tired of business, leave our rectilinear streets and railed roads, and love to wander in secluded valleys and free mountains; so there are numbers in these days heart-sick of the unbending laws of physics and the pretentious categories of metaphysics, and willing to lose themselves in the "woods and wilds" of the ideal philosophy.

The present state and wants of certain schools of philosophy tend in the same direction. It is a curious, though by no means an inexplicable circumstance, that not a few of those trained by the teaching and writings of Hamilton, especially those who have also felt the influence of Mill, are to be found, if we can catch them any where, on the borders of Berkeley's upland of mist and sunshine. Hamilton himself always spoke of Berkeley in a more appreciative tone than most of his predecessors in the Scottish school had done. His more discerning pupils have felt that their great master has left them in a somewhat unsatisfactory position; a professing realist, he is in fact the great relativist, and he ends by declaring that man can know nothing of the nature of things. Those who feel that they have no comfortable standing in such a quivering quagmire, look with a fond eye towards Berkeley, who, in taking away gross matter, leaves them substantial mind. Mansel, so acute and erudite in undermining rationalism, and so feeble in building up realism, ended by coming very close to Berkeley in his view of matter. Though the Scottish professor does not profess to be a believer in Berkeley, it is clear that there is no other philosophy which helps him so effectually in those perplexities he is so skilful in discovering in this "mysterious world," in "this curious life of ours;" if it does not support him on *terra firma*, it at least lifts him above the sinking marshes into a pleasant though somewhat foggy aerial.

A third circumstance has contributed powerfully to the same end. The schools of nescience and nihilism have seized on the negative positions of Berkeley and are turning them to their own purposes. Grote and Mill and Bain all rejoice in the thought that the idealist has delivered them from so many ghosts in the shape of substances; and they do for the admirers of Berkeley in our day what Hume did for Berkeley himself, that is, having got rid of so much they insist that they must in logical consistency abandon much more. In particular Mr. Mill, in a characteristic review of Berkeley in the *Fortnightly Review*, has dexterously used the weapons put into his hands to improve his doctrine, that matter is the mere possibility of sensations, and mind a series of feelings aware of itself with a back-ground of possibilities of feeling.

It is not very difficult, as it appears to me, to estimate the in-

tellectual calibre and the character of Berkeley. He was possessed of great acuteness and ingenuity, of great taste and refinement, but was not distinguished for good sense or shrewdness. From an early date he was addicted to dreaming reflection. "I was distrustful at eight years old and consequently by nature disposed for these new doctrines." In gazing so intently into the spiritual world, the material covering was lost sight of. He had a taste for beauty in nature fostered by the pleasant Irish scenery on the banks of the Nore and gratified by the nice little rocks and lovely bays on the shore of Rhode Island, but he seemed to have had no appreciation of the grandeur of Alpine scenery as he passed through it. He was benevolent in a high degree, but was not bold or independent: he clung resolutely to the slavish doctrine of passive obedience, and allowed the Lord Lieutenant to send him to dine with the steward, being reconciled to it by the hope of receiving a deanery. His heart was full of gratitude and love to God, and he had a high admiration of the more lovely features of Christianity, but the cure of souls does not seem to have sat very heavily upon him. The religion which he loved and defended was that of the Church of England in Ireland, and other denominations are called "sectaries." In his *Queries* he probes many of the sores of Ireland with a searching hand; but he has not a word against the infamous Penal Code passed in his time, and depriving all except Episcopalians of their civil rights, nor against the existence of an Established Church, then in the fermentation of its worst corruptions in a hostile nation of Catholics and Presbyterians.

In Trinity College, Dublin, he was trained in mathematics and in the natural philosophy of Newton, and he made himself acquainted with the philosophy of Descartes, Malebranche and Locke. He was introduced to the philosophy of Locke by Locke's friend and correspondent, Dr. Thomas Molyneux; and he fell under the influence of the great English metaphysician—quite as much as Prof. Fraser is in the grasp of Hamilton, even when wishing to escape from him. His nature shrank from many of the tenets of Locke, from his declaration that mind might be material, from his dwelling so much on sensation and disparaging faith—but he could not break away from the paths in which Locke had taught him to walk. First he was as decidedly an experientialist as Locke was; appealing incidentally, as Locke,

did, to intuition, but never explaining what intuition is or justifying the appeal to it. But if Reid and Kant have established any truth, it is that the great principles of philosophy, morality and religion have a deeper foundation than mere experience. Then, secondly, he became hopelessly entangled by the constant use of the word "idea," with all its duplicity and misleading associations, philological and historical; as signifying originally an image, and historically as having so many meanings from the time of Plato downwards. Berkeley broke out from the narrow paths which Locke cut out; but was never able to get out of them to survey the whole domain of philosophy, even when at a later date he put himself under the guidance of Plato. Berkeley noticed some of the deficiencies of Locke's philosophy, but did not see the way to rectify them.

The truth is, there was a defect in Berkeley's intellectual organization which I believe was incurable. With a keen, penetrating insight, and a superfluity of ingenuity, he was without the crowning good sense which characterized Aristotle, Locke, Reid and the Scottish school generally. The fact is, Berkeley was a visionary in everything. His Bermuda scheme and his belief in the virtues of tar-water, were not wilder than his philosophy was. It is amusing, meanwhile, to observe how he claimed to be so practical. He convinced British statesmen of great shrewdness, by an array of calculations, that the best way of converting the Indians and of christianizing the continent of America, was by a college instituted at Bermuda. By an undiscerning agglomeration of facts he convinced numbers in his own day, and he has had believers in Ireland down to our day, that tar-water would cure all sorts of diseases. In a like way, he persuaded himself that his philosophy is the expression of vulgar belief and the perfection of common-sense. He professes "to be eternally banishing metaphysics and recalling men to common-sense," "to remove the mist and veil of words," and to be "more for reality than other philosophies." Every student of human nature knows that those who have a secret consciousness of their weakness in a certain point are disposed to assert their eminence in that point—thus Thomas Brown, with a true metaphysical acumen, was nervously anxious to show that he possessed poetical genius in a far higher degree. It may have been this natural weakness which led Berkeley to dwell so much

on details in the Bermuda and tar-water business, and to appeal so much to fact and experience in defending his idealism.

His style is acknowledged on all hands to be graceful and attractive. He avoids, as Locke does, all technical and scholastic phrases; but his language is much more flowing than that of the English metaphysician. As Locke affected the style of the conversation which he had heard among the better classes, so Berkeley adopted the style of the literature of the day, that is of the wits of Queen Anne. This mode of composition has its disadvantages. If it has the ease of conversation and literature, it has also the looseness. Berkeley is by no means very precise in his use of language: "Blame me not if I use my words sometimes in some latitude; this is what cannot be helped. It is the fault of language that you cannot always apprehend the clear and determinate meaning of my words" (IV. 443). His editor complains of "the chronic tendency to misconceive" Berkeley's philosophy. His admirers are ever telling us that he has been misunderstood; and in particular that his opponents of the Scottish school, such as Baxter, Reid, and Beattie, never apprehend his meaning. His opponents are apt to feel, if not to say, that his speculations are so undefined that any one may form the shape that pleases him out of the cloud. Those who have attacked him, suppose that he denies the existence of matter; those who defend him maintain that he holds resolutely by the existence of matter. But surely there is some defect in a philosophic writer, who has so expounded his doctrine as to be forever misunderstood by able and candid minds. With all these imperfections, we feel that some of his works, such for instance as his "Three Dialogues between Phylas and Philonous," are the finest philosophic dialogues in the English tongue, and are worthy of being placed along side of those of Plato.

Many of our higher literary reviews, such as the *Quarterly* (London), the *Edinburgh* and the *North American* have taken advantage of this edition to give us sketchy articles on Berkeley. I am in this paper to undertake a more serious work required by the state of philosophic opinion in our day; I am to review the fundamental positions of the Irish metaphysician.

Theory of Vision. Berkeley is best known in connection with this theory, which he expounded in his "Essay toward a New Theory of Vision" (1709) and defended in his "Theory of Vision

Vindicated and Explained" (1733) and, indeed, in most of his works. Prof. Fraser is of opinion that in respect of his theory he has not so much originality as is commonly attributed to him. "He takes the invisibility of distance in the line of sight for granted as a common scientific truth of the time." It is well known that there were notices by Descartes of the way by which the eye perceives distances, and Malebranche specifies some of the signs by which distance is estimated. William Molyneux, in a treatise on optics, published in 1690, declared that distance of itself is not to be perceived, for "'tis a line or a length presented to the eye with its end toward us, which must therefore be only a point and that is invisible" (I. 17); and then he shows that distance is chiefly perceived by means of interjacent objects, by the estimate we make of the comparative magnitude of bodies or their faint colors: this for objects considerably remote; as to nigh objects their distance is perceived by the turn of the eyes or the angle of the optic axis. Locke, in the fourth edition of his essay, mentions a problem put to him by Molyneux, whether, if a cube and a sphere were placed before a blind man who was made to see, he would be able to tell which is the globe and which the cube, to which both Molyneux and Locke answered "not." These statements by well-known philosophers were known to all interested in such studies before Berkeley's work appeared. But the *New Theory of Vision* treated of the subject specially and in a more elaborate way, and has commonly got the credit, not certainly of originating the doctrine, but of establishing it; and it has ever since been generally accepted—the only exceptions of men of note being the late Samuel Bailey and Mr. Abbot of Dublin. In particular, he has shown that there are three arbitrary signs of near distances: The organic sensation accompanying the adjustment of the eye to the object; the degree of perceived confusion in the object; and the organic sensation of showing. The theory has been confirmed by a series of experimental cases of persons born blind but who were afterward made to see. Beginning with the Cheselden case (1728) Prof. Frazer professes to give an account of such cases, but has inexcusably omitted by far the best conducted and reported ones: the Franz case detailed in the *Transactions of the Royal Society* (1841), and the Trinchinetti cases mentioned by Abbot in his *Sight and Touch*, cases which seem to me to settle all the points still dis-

puted as to the original capacity of the sense of sight.* Prof. Fraser has shown that Berkeley all along meant his views as to vision to establish a far more important principle, that by all the senses we perceive only signs of mental realities, a doctrine cherished by him from an early date but kept in the back-ground in his early work.

Idea. Berkeley takes the word not in the sense of Plato, or the schoolmen, but in that of Descartes and Locke, specially the latter. Locke uses the term "to stand for whatsoever is the object of the understanding when a man thinks;" whatever is meant by "phantasm, notion, and species." But this is giving the phrase a very wide comprehension. The objects of the understanding when it thinks are of a very varied character: they are very different things I am thinking of when I look at the carpet of the room in which I sit, when I recall that carpet, when I think of my past feelings or my present feelings, when I think of duty or of Deity. There may be no impropriety in calling all these objects of thought external and internal, by one and the same name; but of all words "idea" is about the most unfortunate that could be employed from its literal meaning, which ever cleaves to it, being image, and from its applied meanings in philosophy being so many and inconsistent. It stands for what the schoolmen denoted by "phantasm, notion and species;" but the schoolmen drew distinctions between these phrases, and certainly did not confound the intellectual notion with the mere phantasm of the reproductive or imaging power of the mind. The liberal meaning always stuck to it in Locke's apprehension, and breeds inextricable confusion. He habitually regards the object of the mind when it thinks as an *idea* in the sense of image. He supposes there is such an image when we use the senses, even such senses as smelling and hearing, and he seeks for such an image when we think of space, time, and eternity. He sees the difficulty in the mind forming an *idea*—in this sense—of the product of abstraction and generalization. He acknowledges that it doth "require some pains and skill to form this general *idea* of a triangle," "for it must be neither oblique nor rectangle, neither equilateral, equicrural, nor scal-

* There is a later case reported by Critchett in *Med. Chis. Trans.*, Vol. xxxviii. See *Contemporary Review*, Feb., 1872.

enum, but all and none of these at once. In effect it is somewhat imperfect that cannot exist; an idea wherein some parts of several different and inconsistent ideas are put together." Upon this Berkeley remarks; "After reiterated efforts and pangs of thought to apprehend the general idea of a triangle, I have found it altogether incomprehensible" (I. 146). "The idea of a man that I frame to myself, must be either of a white, or a black, or a tawny, or a straight, or a crooked, a tall or a low, or a middle-sized man" (I. 142). Here, as in so many other cases, he has sharpness enough to detect the errors of the prevailing philosophy, but not clearness or comprehension enough to set it right. He would use the word as Locke had done: "I take the word idea for any of the immediate objects of sense or understanding" (I. 55). But then this object is an image: "By idea I mean any sensible or imaginable thing" (IV. 457). "Properly speaking it is the picture of the imagination's making. This is the likeness of and referred to the real idea or (if you will) thing" (445). He rejects, as I believe he ought, abstract ideas in the sense of Locke, that is, in the sense of images of qualities; and he claims it as his merit that he gets rid in this way of those grand abstractions, such as matter and substance, existence and extension, space and time, to which philosophers have given an independent being, and set up as rivals to Deity. But while he has exposed the errors of Locke, he has not established the positive truth. It turned out that David Hume, taking advantage of his doctrine, undermined, by a like process, the separate existence of personal identity and power, of mind and morality.

Abstract and General Ideas. His defective views on this subject perplexes his whole philosophy. He takes credit for removing abstractions out of speculation that we may contemplate realities. And it is quite true that we cannot form an abstract idea in the sense of likeness or phantasm. We cannot form in the mind an image of whiteness as we do of a lily, of redness as we do of a rose, of humanity as we do of man. We have to bring in here the distinction known to Aristotle between *phantasm* (image) and *noema* (notion.) An abstract is not a *phantasm*, an exercise of the mere reproductive, recalling an imaging power of the mind; but a *notion*, the product of the elaborative or discursive—of the comparative powers, in fact—specially of the power which perceives the relation of part and whole, of an at-

tribute to that concrete object of which it is an attribute. Having seen a lily I can ever afterwards image the lily—this is the phantasm of Aristotle. But I can exercise another mental operation regarding it, and the product is the noema of Aristotle. I can consider its whiteness and not its shape or size, and when I do so I have an abstract notion about which I can pronounce judgments and reason. On rare occasions Berkeley had a glimpse of what is involved in abstraction, as in his *Principles of Human Knowledge* (the edition of 1734): “And here it must be acknowledged that a man may consider a figure merely as triangular without attending to the particular qualities of the angles or relations of the sides. So far he may abstract; but this will never prove that he can frame an abstract general inconsistent idea [in the sense of image] of a triangle. In like manner we may consider Peter so far forth as man, so far forth as animal, without framing the fore-mentioned abstract idea [image,] either of man or animal; inasmuch as all that is perceived is not considered” (I. 148). He says that “there is a great difference between considering length without breadth, and having an idea or of imagining length without breadth.” Speaking of the qualities abstracted he acknowledges that “it is not difficult to form general propositions and reasonings about these qualities without mentioning any other” (I. 284). Had he taken as much pains in unfolding what is contained in “considering” a figure as triangular, and Peter as man, without considering other qualities and what is involved in “forming general propositions and reasonings about qualities,” as he has taken to expel abstract ideas in the sense of phantasms, he would have saved his own philosophy, and philosophy generally from his day to this, from an immense conglomeration of confusion.

Much the same may be said of the General Idea, which Locke confounded with the Abstract Idea, under the phrase abstract general idea. These two evidently differ. An abstract notion is the notion of an attribute, a general notion is a notion of objects possessing a common attribute, or common attributes. We cannot form, in the sense of likeness, a general idea. An image, as Berkeley saw, must always be singular, whereas a general notion, the notion of a class, must embrace an indefinite number of individuals, all that possess the quality or qualities which bring the objects into a class. There can be no phantasm formed of

the individuals in the class, which are innumerable, nor of the attributes, which are abstracts. At times he had a glimpse of what is implied in a general idea, but he does not pursue it, and he speedily loses sight of it. "Now, if we will annex a meaning to our words, and speak only of what we can conceive, I believe we shall acknowledge that an idea, which considered in itself is particular, becomes general by being made to represent or stand for all other particulars ideas of the same sort" (I. 145). But what constitutes the *sort* and the same *sort*? Had he proceeded to answer this question he might have found the exact truth. A sort is composed of things assorted, and assorted because possessing a quality or qualities in common, and must embrace all the objects possessing the quality or qualities. In looking at the things thus assorted, we see that the affirmations we make apply to all and each of the objects of the class, so that when a geometrician draws a black line of an inch in length, "this, which is in itself a particular line, is nevertheless, in regard to its signification, general, since, as it is there used, it represents all particular lines whatsoever, so that what is demonstrated of it, is demonstrated of all lines, in other words, of a line in general" (*ib*). This is the general idea I stand up for, and I hold that it, and the abstract idea as above described, may be made the object of the understanding when it thinks, and that we can pronounce judgments upon it, and reason about it. This is, in fact, what we do in mathematics and in all the sciences.

All this does not imply that abstract or general ideas have a separate or independent existence; that whiteness has an existence as the lily has, that rationality exists as a man does, or that the class man has the same sort of existence as the man John Smith has. It has been the tendency of metaphysicists—and of physicists too—to ascribe an independent being to the abstract and general notions of the mind, and to speak of being, of force, of gravitation, as if they were separate entities, as man is, or a lump of matter is; and some have deified the creations of their own mind, and said, "these be thy gods." Berkeley no doubt meant to do good by driving away these ghosts of departed realities, which philosophers believed in after they had lost all faith in the living and true God. But he discovered only half the truth, and produced a distorted figure, because he did not look round and see the other half. Attributes have not an independ-

dent existence, but they have an existence in concrete objects. Being is an attribute of all existing objects; power an attribute of mind—I believe also of body, and gravitation is an attribute of matter. We may deny an independent existence to abstractions; but we should never deny that they have an existence in objects possessing them. The general idea of man has not such a being as the personal man has, but it has an existence in qualities common to all men, and in men possessing these qualities.

While he set himself in an indiscriminating manner against abstract general ideas, Berkeley was not a nominalist. His aim was to carry us away both from abstracts and names to individual things. According to him “ideas become general by a particular idea standing for all the ideas of the sort,” and so, “certainly it is not impossible but a man may arrive at the knowledge of all real truth as well without as with signs, had he a memory and imagination more strong and capacious,” and therefore “reasoning and science doth not altogether depend on word or names” (IV. 467).

Existence. In every intelligent exercise we know ourselves as existing in a particular state, say thinking or willing. Our knowledge of ourselves and the particular state, say thinking, are mixed up, but we can so separate them as to consider ourselves as existing. This does not show that our existence depends on our perception. We perceive ourselves to exist because we already exist. So far as external objects are concerned, we perceive them by the eye as extended and colored, but we can, if we choose, consider them as existing apart from the color, apart even from our perception of them. Of course our perception is implied in our perceiving them; but this does not prove that our perception is necessary to their existence. In fact we perceive them because they exist. Unwilling to admit abstractions of any kind, Berkeley argued that the objects could not exist apart from the perception; hence his maxim, *esse est percipi*. I admit that a thing perceived must exist; but this does not imply, according to the rules of logic, the converse proposition, that a thing in order to exist must be perceived. I allow *percipi est esse*, but not *esse est percipi*. There were rocks deposited in our earth before there was a man to perceive them. We may believe that at this moment there are flowers in forests which have never been

trod by human foot. The external thing, be it matter or be it idea, must exist in order to my perceiving it—it is *esse* before it is *percipi*.

But then he explains that he does not mean, that in order to the existence of a thing it must be perceived by the individual, it may be perceived by other finite beings, it must be perceived by God. But this admission implies that in order to its existence it is not necessary that we should perceive it; in other words, the thing may exist independent of our perception of it. "I will grant you that extension, color, etc., may be said to be without the mind in a double respect; that is, independent of our will and distinct from the mind" (IV. 667). And if it exist independent of our perception it may exist independent of the perception of other created beings. There is nothing, then, in the nature of our perception, considered in itself, implying that the existence of the object implies perception. Berkeley speaks as if the existence of a thing independent of mind is meaningless and contradictory; is repugnant, as he expresses it. But surely I can conceive of a thing as existing out of and independent of the mind perceiving it, and if there be evidence I can believe it to exist. True, if I believe it to exist on reasonable ground, I must have perceived it myself, or have the testimony of some one who has perceived it. But then I can conceive it to exist whether I have perceived it or no; whether, indeed, I believe in its existence or no. In all this there is nothing self-repugnant. "But, then, to a Christian, it cannot surely be shocking to say that the real tree existing without his mind is truly known and comprehended by (that it exists in) the infinite mind of God" (I. 33). That everything is known to God and comprehended by his infinite mind will be admitted by all Christians, by all who believe in an omniscient God. But, then, this does not follow from the nature of perception, but from our belief derived otherwise of the guardian care of God, a belief most readily obtained when we acknowledge the reality of external objects. Observe how dextrously he slides from one meaning of comprehension, from the meaning embraced in the understanding, to "exist in" which is an entirely different thing. I comprehend the deed of a son murdering his father, but this does not make the deed exist in me. Not only so, but I hold it to be in every way most reverent, not to speak of that deed of murder as existing in

the mind of the good God. Berkeley often writes as if it were not possible for God to make a thing, having an existence out of himself, with any power in itself. This, surely, is a limitation of the divine power by no means very reverential. Believing the plunging of the knife into the bosom of the murdered man to exist out of me, I believe it to be most becoming to represent it as also existing out of God.

He is greatly alarmed for the consequences which might follow, provided it is admitted that there can be existence independent of perception. "Opinion that existence was distinct from perception of horrible consequence. It is the foundation of Hobbs' doctrine" (IV. 459). But fact and truth never lead to evil consequences, which errors, even well-meant errors, commonly do. The good bishop never dreamed that his favorite principle would furnish a starting point to Hume. I have noticed passages in Berkeley which look as if they might have suggested the basis of Hume's skeptical theory. Hume opens his *Treatise of Human Nature*: "All the perceptions of the human mind resolve themselves into two distinct kinds, which I call *impressions* and *ideas*. The difference betwixt these consists in the degrees of force and liveliness with which they strike upon the mind and make their way into our thought or consciousness. Those perceptions which enter with most force and violence we may name *impressions*; and under this name I comprehend all our sensations, passions and convictions as they make their first appearance in the soul. By *ideas*, I mean the faint images of these in thinking and reasoning." Might not the whole doctrine, and the language employed, and the distinction drawn, have risen up in his shrewd, unsatisfied mind as he read at the close of a long discussion in the *Principles*: "What do we perceive besides our ideas and sensations?" (I. 157.) He specifies the very distinction between the two, the one more lively, the other more faint. "The ideas of sense are more strong, lively and distinct than those of imagination" (170). "The ideas imprinted in the senses by the author of nature are called real things, and those excited in the imagination being less regular, vivid and constant are more commonly termed ideas" (172). Hume thus got his very phraseology, *impressions* (from *imprinted*) and *ideas*, and the distinction between the two, as lying in the difference of force or strength, liveliness or distinctness. Hume accepted the bishop's

doctrine and drove it logically to a conclusion which did not admit of an argument for the existence of a God to uphold these impressions or sensations and ideas.

Matter. The whole philosophy of Locke proceeds on the supposition that we perceive only ideas. His theory of knowledge is thus a movement in a circle. An idea is the object we perceive; the object we perceive is an idea. This idea was regarded by him as an image of an object out of the mind which it resembles and represents. But it was perceived at an early date that he had and could have no proof of this, indeed no proof of the existence of matter. Man can take no immediate cognizance of matter; and logic will not allow us from a mere idea in the mind to argue the existence of something beyond the mind. This was the condition of speculative philosophy in Great Britain when Berkeley thought out his ingenious theory. He saw it to be very unsatisfactory, if the mind can perceive nothing but the idea, to argue that there must be a material object of which it is a copy. So he boldly declared we are not required to believe in anything but the idea. All that we perceive is the idea. We have no proof of the existence of anything else. If there be anything else it must be unknown. Every purpose that could be served by this supposed external thing may be accomplished by the idea. "If, therefore, it were possible for bodies to exist without the mind, yet to hold they do so must be a very precarious opinion, since it is to suppose, without any reason at all, that God has created innumerable beings that are utterly useless and serve no manner of purpose. In short, if there were external bodies, it is impossible we should ever come to know it; and, if it were not, we might have the very same reason to think that there were that we have now" (I. 165). Berkeley thus started what Hamilton would call a presentation theory of sense-perception; that is, that the mind looked directly on the object, the object with him being the idea with nothing beyond. Reid followed. Discovering that Locke could never reach the existence of matter by a process of reasoning, he insisted that the existence of matter was suggested by instinct, intuition or common-sense, there being first a sensation, this instinctively raising a perception of an external thing. Hamilton took a bolder and a more direct course than Reid: discarding, as Reid had done, the idea of Locke and of Berkeley; and discarding, too, the suggestion of

Reid, he asserted that we look directly on matter, are immediately conscious of matter. Hamilton, like Berkeley, is a presentationist; but Berkeley says that the object before the mind is an idea, whereas Hamilton says it is a material object possessing extension.

At this point it is of all things the most important to determine in what sense Berkeley admits, and in what sense he denies, the existence of matter. He is ever asserting, and asserting in strong language, that he believes in the existence of bodies. And yet he is constantly uttering statements in the very language which the Scotch psychologists (as Fraser is fond of calling them) are condemned for employing in criticising him. Thus he says, "were it necessary to add any further proof against the existence of matter" (I. 16 and *passim*). But he is a firm upholder of the existence, not of abstract matter, but of individual bodies: "I do not argue against the existence of any one thing that we can apprehend, either by sense or reflection. That the things I see with my eyes and touch with my hands do exist, really exist, I make not the least question. The only thing whose existence we do deny is that which philosophers call matter or corporeal substance." In the interests of religion he is tremulously afraid of allowing the existence of matter as a substance. "Matter once allowed, I defy any man to prove that God is not matter" (IV. 442); as if matter did not, like mind, supply evidence of the existence of its maker and disposer. He is for expelling the substance, matter, to which some were attributing an existence independent of God; but infidels in our day are quite ready to make a like use of matter considered as a mere phenomenon: they argue that it does not need a God to support it. He is right, so I think, in maintaining that in regard to body we should not be required to believe in more than we can perceive by the senses, more than we see, and feel, and taste, and smell, and hear. But then we perceive by the senses much more than he is disposed to allow. He means by idea "any sensible or imaginable thing." An idea must be in the mind, so he argues that the whole, perception and thing perceived, must be in the mind. "The tree or house, therefore, which you think of is conceived by you." "What is conceived is surely in the mind" (I. 291, 292). "Nothing properly but persons, *i. e.* conscious things, do exist. All other things are not so much exist-

ences, as manners of the existence of persons ;" on which Prof. Fraser asks, "Is an extended thing a mode in which a person exists?" (IV. 469). He showed in his "New Theory of Vision," that color is in the mind, and then, in his *Principles* and later works, that extension, as an idea, must also be in mind. Prof. Fraser thus expounds him, I believe fairly: "When we do our utmost by imagination to conceive bodies existing externally or absolutely, we are, in the very act of doing so, making them ideas, not of sense indeed, but of imagination. The supposition itself of their individual existence, makes them ideas, in as much as it makes them imaginary objects, dependent on an imagining mind" (I. 123). Still he stands up for the reality of body: "The table I write on I say exists, that I see and feel it, and if it were out of my study I should say it existed, meaning thereby, that if I was in my study I might perceive it or that some other spirit does actually perceive it" (I. 157). This is the very theory which, passing through Hume and James Mill, has been elaborated by John Stuart Mill into the doctrine of matter being the "possibility of sensations." Every man of ordinary sense on first hearing this doctrine will be inclined to say, there must surely be some mistake, some confusion here, and this whether he is able to point it out or not. The misconceptions, I believe, are to be rectified by an inductive inquiry into what the senses really reveal. Looking simply to the testimony of our senses they make known something out of us and independent of us. In particular we know body as extended, we see it as extended in two dimensions, we feel it as with three dimensions. No doubt there is perception in all this, but perception is not extended in any sense, in one, two or three dimensions. We perceive it as something different from our perception, and we perceive it as having something not in our perception, we perceive it in short as extended. This is an intuition carrying within itself its own evidence. As being self-evident it can stand the test of contradiction: we cannot believe the opposite; we cannot be made to believe that the table before me has not length and breadth. It is also catholic or universal, as being in all men. Just as by the internal sense we know mind so by the external senses we know matter. The evidence for the existence of the one is much the same as the evidence for the existence of the other. We cannot allow the one to set aside

the other. We must accept both, and I defy any one to show that there is any repugnancy between them.

But he would confuse us, and he has confused himself, by a false analogy. "If real fire be very different from the idea of fire, so also is the real pain that it occasions different from the idea of the same pain; and yet nobody will pretend that the real pain either or can possibly be in an unperceiving thing or without the mind any more than its ideas" (I. 176). There is a manifest difference between the two cases. Pain is perceived as an affection of the perceiving subject, whereas the extended body is perceived to be different from the perceiving mind. Of course there is perception in the perception of fire; but the perception is of something out of the percipient, and as we perceive it to be different we can consider it as different. That grain of gold lying on my hand, I cannot see apart from my hand or some other object on which it lies. But I know the grain to be different from the hand, and the one to have an existence as well as the other. So I know both the hand and the grain to be different from the mind that perceives them. Berkeley would have seen this had he not been so determined to allow no abstractions. By such means he labored to undermine materialism. But it may be doubted whether any one was ever cured of this error by such means. It is not *tali auxilio* that a wise man would defend the existence of mind in this age.

Extension perceived by Sight and Touch. He puzzles himself and puzzles his editor greatly by his favorite maxim, that we do not see the same extension by the eye and by the touch. "The objects of sight and touch are two distinct things" (I 56). Prof. Fraser seems to go farther, "colored extension is antithetical to felt extension." The perplexity arises from not observing precisely what we do perceive by means of these two senses. By the eye we do not perceive abstract extension, but an extended thing. It is the same with touch; we do not perceive mere extension, we perceive an extended thing. By a subsequent act of comparison, we may discover the two, the extended table seen and touched, to be the same thing. Surely there is no antithesis here, any more than there is between seeing first one side of a building, and then another side, between seeing the one side of a shield red, and the other black. By each of the senses we get a certain amount of information, which we

combine in the one thing, which we discover to have extension, discovered both by the eye and by touch. Certainly the knowledge given by the touch in our ordinary apprehension of sensible objects, mingles with that given by the eye, and indeed with that given by all the senses, and we superadd to all these, the inferences which we have drawn. To intuitive perception by the eye, a mountain is but a colored surface with a definite outline; but we combine in it all that we have known about mountains by touch and a gathered experience, that green is grass, that other green is a tree, that brown is a scar, and that sharp outline a precipice. There is no contradiction in all this.

Substance. It is not to be wondered at that Berkeley should have been dissatisfied with Locke's doctrine on this subject. Locke denies very strongly and emphatically that he sets aside substance, and he is very angry at his opponent, Stillingfleet, when he says that he does so. He believes in substance; but then it can be made known neither by sensation nor reflection, and so it comes in very awkwardly in a system which acknowledges no other inlets of knowledge than these two. It is the unknown substratum or support of what is known. Berkeley did great service to philosophy by removing these crutches supposed to help, but really hindering our conviction as to the reality of things. "Say you there might be a thinking substance—something unknown which perceives and supports and ties together the ideas. Say, make it appear that there is need of it, and you shall have it for me, I care not to take away anything I can see the least reason to think should exist" (IV. 443). I have always regretted that Reid and the Scottish school, in discarding the "idea" of Locke as coming between the thing perceived and perception, did not also abandon the "substance" of Locke as being equally useless and cumbersome. Berkeley seems to me to be farther and preëminently right when he maintains, in regard to matter, that we are to believe only in what is made known by the senses. "That the things I see with my eyes and touch with my hands do exist, really exist, I make not the least question. The only thing whose existence we deny is that which philosophers call matter or corporeal substance. And in doing of this there is no damage to the rest of mankind, who, I dare say, will never miss it. The atheist, indeed, will want the color of an empty name to support his impiety; and the philosophers

may possibly find that they have lost a great handle for trifling and disputation" (I. 173). I am glad to find him saying farther, as if he had a reference to a mode of speaking in our day: "The philosophers talk much of a distinction betwixt absolute and relative things, considered in their own nature, and the same things considered with respect to us. I know not what they mean by 'things considered in themselves.' This is nonsense, jargon." I have, however, endeavored to show that Berkeley did not discover all that is involved in perception by the senses.

But is Matter a Substance? The answer to this question must depend on the definition which we give of substance. There is a sense, and this I believe the proper sense, in which both mind and matter are substances. It can be shown of both that they exist. It can be shown, secondly, of both, of matter as well as mind, that they are not created by our perceiving them. We perceive matter because it already exists. It exists whether we perceive it or no. It does not cease to exist because we have ceased to look at it. In this sense it has an independence, not, it may be, of God, but an independence of the percipient mind, of our perception of it. I am prepared to maintain, that matter, like mind, has power of some kind. I do not assert that it has power independent of God—this is a question which carries us into a much higher region than our primitive perceptions. What I affirm is, that it has potency, influence of some kind. Now combine these three things: being, independence of our perceptions, and potency, and we have the true idea of substance. Thus understood, substance has no need of a substratum or support. Under God, who may himself be understood as a substance, it is its own support; and any other support would be a weakness. Everything possessing these three things may be regarded as a substance. Mind is a substance, for it has being, independence and power. But matter is also a substance for the very same reasons.

Power. His views on this subject are vague and unsatisfactory. He seems to regard all power as in God. He leaves no power whatever in body. "Matter neither acts, nor perceives, nor is it perceived." The first question here is: Is it true? Can we prove it? I believe we know things in this world, we know ourselves as having power, and bodies as having power upon each other. I believe them to have such power in

our primitive cognition of them. Experience confirms this. According to Berkeley there is no relationship between material things, except that of coëxistence and succession one thing is a mere sign of another, and an arbitrary sign. These ideas which constitute all we perceive, can have no influence on each other. Now it seems to me that we are led to believe that they do act on each other. It can be shown that in all bodily actions there are two or more agents. A hammer strikes a stone and breaks it: the cause consists of the hammer and stone each in a certain state; the effect consists of the same hammer and stone in another state, the hammer having lost the momentum which it had when it came in contact with the stone, and the stone being broken. It seems plain to me that the cause here is not a mere arbitrary sign of the effect; the effect is the result of powers or properties of the agent. A second question may arise: What is the religious bearing of such a doctrine? According to it God "useth no tool or instrument at all" (I. 312); there are no second causes in nature, but only natural signs. There is "no sharing betwixt God and nature or second causes in my doctrine." Is there not a risk that this very pious doctrine land us in the very impious conclusion, that if all action is of God, sinful action must also be of him? If we have no knowledge of power in nature or in created mind, have we any proof of the existence of power in God? The doctrine was eagerly seized by Hume, who showed that according to it the mind could form no idea of power beyond a custom of expecting that things which have been unvariably together in our experience, will continue to be together. Left without the idea of power in the cognition of ourselves or earthly objects, we have really no ground except this same custom, carried illegitimately beyond our experience, (which can give us no knowledge of world making) for arguing the existence of God from his works in nature.

Signs. The great truth which Berkeley helped to establish, that distance can be known by the eye only by means of signs supplied by touch, opened new views, which he carried out further than he was logically entitled—just as in a later age the discovery of the curious workings of electricity led many to imagine that they could explain everything by this new and mysterious agency. From the beginning he meant to use the theory of vision, to establish his favorite principle that we do not perceive

extended things out of the perceiving mind ; we perceive merely the signs of things. What the eye discerns is merely the sign of something else discovered by touch. " We see distances as we see shame or anger in the looks of a friend " (I. 63). In his later works he carries out the same principle to touch, and shows that it makes known simply heaven appointed and heaven organized symbols of reality beyond. But this view involves a mistake in starting, and a want of logic in the process. It is not correct to say that the eye does not immediately discover extended body ; it looks directly on an extended colored surface. The eye may need the aid of the muscular sense to reveal space in three dimensions, but it at once perceives space in two dimensions ; and we are thus put in a position to understand the farther information conveyed by touch. Our secondary knowledge implies primary knowledge, and the elements of the secondary knowledge must be found in the primary. If there be the idea of extension in the derived knowledge, there must have been the idea of extension in the original knowledge. The looks of a man reveal shame and anger, because we already know these by self-consciousness. Signs cannot reveal to us anything not otherwise known in its materials. We certainly have the idea of an extended thing, and this could never be made known to us by a sign which was not itself extended. Signs are merely the antecedents or concomitants of things which we are enabled to conceive because we know them otherwise. Little did Berkeley see in arguing that we only see signs of things, that we are preparing the way for the avenging skeptic, who allows the existence of the signs, but argues with David Hume and Herbert Spencer that the things signified are unknown and unknowable.

Lofty minds are apt to be particularly fascinated with the doctrine that nature is a system of universal symbolism. I believe as firmly as Berkeley ever did, that it is so ; I believe with him that " the methods of nature are the language of its author " (I. 211). But I do so because the signs are real things, signs of other things. If the glass is visionary the things seen through it will be apt to be regarded as also visionary. As he advanced in life and enjoyed leisure in the bishopric of Cloyne, he eagerly turned to the study of Plato and the Neo-Platonists, and embodied the results in his " *Siris, a Chain of Philosophical Reflections and Inquiries concerning the Virtues of Tar-Water.* " His

editor waxes nearly as eloquent as the good bishop himself in his preface to this work: "On the whole, the scanty speculative literature of these islands in the last century contains no other work nearly so remarkable." "It connects far with the highest thoughts in metaphysics and theology by links which involve some of the most subtle botanical, chemical, physiological and mechanical speculations of its time." "The speculations of the deepest thinkers, ancient and modern, blend themselves with the successive links, and the whole forms a series of studies as well in physical science as in Greek and eastern philosophy" (II. 344). After such an extravagant encomium some may be amazed to find me affirming deliberately, that while I acknowledge the infinite grace of the style and the ingenuity of some of the analogies, I cannot discover in his defence of the virtues of tar-water any higher logic than quacks employ in recommending their medicines; and that his platonic speculations are vague and uncritical and of no value.

Mind.—Our author is very valiant in making inroads into the territories of his enemies; but meanwhile he leaves his own domain defenceless. "There is not any other substance than spirit, or that which perceives." But it is very difficult to tell us what he makes of spirit. Prof. Fraser acknowledges, "Berkeley has no clear teaching about finite minds—*egos* as distinguished from the *Ego*" (IV. 633). Berkeley tells us, "the very existence of ideas constitutes the soul." "Consult, ransack the understanding; what find you there besides several perceptions or thoughts? Mind is a congeries of perceptions. Take away perceptions and you take away the mind. Put the perceptions and you put the mind" (IV. 433). Every one acquainted with the history of philosophy will perceive that this, the doctrine with which the young Berkeley started, is the very doctrine which Hume reaches: "Certainly the mind always and constantly thinks, and we know this too. In sleep and trances the mind exists not, there is no time, no succession of ideas" (IV. 444). No wonder the editor says, "As to personal identity he is obscure." I would rather say, he is clearly wrong. He tells us again and again that mind or spirit is "not knowable, not being an idea" (IV. 462); a doctrine far lower than that of Locke, who maintains that we have an idea of mind by means of Reflection. "I have no idea of a volition or act of the mind; neither has

any other intelligence, for that were a contradiction" (IV. 446). He seeks to save himself from palpably absurd consequences by drawing, in the second edition of his "Principles of Human Knowledge," the distinction between Idea and Notion, (taking the phrase, I believe, from Bishop Bröwne). "It must be admitted, at the same time, that we have some notion of soul or spirit, and the operations of the mind, such as willing, loving, hating, inasmuch as we know or understand the meaning of these words" (I. 170). But he never accurately defined what he meant by Notion; and his whole philosophy is left, in consequence, in an unsatisfactory condition.

In digging away the ground on which error has rested, I do not believe that Berkeley has left to himself a foundation on which to build a solid philosophy. "I approve" he says, "of this axiom of the schoolmen, *Nihil est in intellectu quod non prius fuit in sensu*. I wish they had stuck to it. It had never taught them the doctrine of abstract ideas" (IV. 457). His editor is evidently staggered with "this remarkable statement," and does not know very well what to make of it. His doctrine on this subject is a great deal lower than that of Locke, who made reflection as well as sensation an inlet of ideas, such as those of time, and power, and spirit, by which he so far counteracted the sensational tendency of his philosophy. Berkeley is often appealing to intuition and reason in upholding his own favorite maxims, such as that there cannot be matter without mind, but has left no explanation of the nature and laws of these ultimate principles, or defense of their legitimacy. His negative appeal is to some "repugnancy," he does not tell us to what. These defects in the foundation are not to be repaired by abutments in the superstructure. There is a like defect in his ethical principles. "Sensual pleasure is the *summum bonum*. This is the great principle of morality. This once rightly understood, all the doctrines, even the severest of the gospels, may clearly be demonstrated. Sensual pleasure, *quâ* pleasure, is good and desirable by a wise man. But if it be contemptible 'tis not *quâ* pleasure but *quâ* pain; or (which is the same thing) of loss of greater pleasure" (IV. 457). This is a vastly more degraded view than that taken by Shaftesbury, of whom he speaks so disparagingly. We see how much need there was in that age of a Butler to give a deeper founda-

tion to morality than Locke or Berkeley had done. There is greater need of a Butler than of a Berkeley in our time.

His view of space and time is thus rendered by his editor : "Finite Space is, with him, experience in unresisted organic movement which is capable of being symbolized in the visual consciousness of coëxisting colors. Finite Time is the apprehension of changes in our ideas, length of time being measured by the number of changes. Infinite Space and Infinite Time, because inapprehensible by intelligence, are dismissed from philosophy as terms void of meaning, or which involve contradictions" (I. 117). If our natural judgments were not meant to deceive us there must be vastly more than this in Time, Space and Infinity, say, the Infinity of God.

There is a very general impression that the philosophy of Berkeley is favorable to religion. That he meant to be so is certain; that many have felt it to be so should not be denied. Taken apart from his speculations about tar-water and the non-existence of matter, the general influence of his writings is inspiring and ennobling, carrying us above the damp earth into the empyrean, where we breathe a pure and delicious atmosphere. His *Minute Philosopher* is distinguished by great acuteness, a lofty tone and an alluring charm of manner and of style. The speakers appointed to oppose religion do not argue so searchingly as the objecting interlocutors do in Plato's dialogues; but they bring forward the current objections of the age, and the answer to them is complete. But our present inquiry is, what is the tendency of his system. And, whatever may be the immediate impression produced by it, the influence of a philosophy is determined by its logical consequences, which will come to be wrought out by some one. Hume declares that most of Berkeley's writings, "form the best lessons of skepticism which are to be found either among the ancient or modern philosophers—Bayle not excepted," and he gives the reason, "they admit of no answer and produce no conviction." Hume certainly labored with all his might (and he was a mighty man) to make Berkeley teach lessons of skepticism, and I could have wished that Mr. Fraser had added to his other services by enquiring whether Berkeley's philosophy leads logically to the skepticism of Hume, of Mill, or of Spencer. Berkeley imagined that his theory gave him a special argument for the Divine exist-

tence. "The wild imaginations of Vanini, Hobbes and Spinoza, in a word, the whole system of atheism, is it not entirely overthrown by this single reflection on the repugnancy included in supposing the whole or any part, even the most rude and shapeless of the visible world, to exist without a mind?" (I. 305). Those who do not admit his ideal theory will not feel the force of his argument. Berkeley delights to use the argument from order and design, and he is ever speaking of "a constant uniform working which so evidently displays the goodness and wisdom of that governing spirit whose will constitutes the laws of nature" (I. 171). But the argument is not strengthened by representing external objects as having merely an ideal existence. One of his speakers is made to say, "that his arguments have not an effect on me as to produce that entire conviction, that hearty acquiescence which attends demonstration" (I. 317). If bodies have an existence merely as perceived, people will argue that it may be the same with spirits; and Berkeley virtually allows the consequence. If matter has no substantial existence, why may it not be the same with mind? And, if so, what remains but Hume's sensations and ideas? Berkeley imagined he was getting new and special proof of the Divine existence by his doctrine of signs; but Hume came after him and showed that the signs suggested things beyond them merely by the association of ideas; merely by a phenomenon of sight suggesting a phenomenon of touch; in fact merely by the two having been together. In particular, he showed that two sensations, with an interval between, gendered the illusive feeling of the continued existence of the sentient agent.

Certain it is that the leading positivists of the day are eagerly laying hold of Berkeley's favorite doctrines and applying them as Hume did for skeptical purposes; and shrewd men, like Grote, Mill and Bain, are as likely to be able to estimate the stability of the pleasant summer house which Berkeley built, as those disciples of Kant and Hamilton who have temporarily fled to it as a refuge from the nihilism coming upon them as unrelentingly as a winter storm. I should rejoice to find students of philosophy betaking themselves to the works of Berkeley; but they will be miserably disappointed if they expect to find there a foundation on which to build a solid fabric. Let them follow him into the labyrinth into which he conducts them, but let them

take a thread to guide them back into the light of day. I am satisfied if in this article I am able to put a clue into the hands of exploring youths.

Speculative thinkers speaking the English tongue have within the last age been giving a hearing to every sort of philosophy, sensational and rational, *a posteriori* and *a priori*, to Kant and Hegel, to Coleridge and Cousin, to Hamilton and Mill. Now they are listening to materialism on the one hand and to Berkeley on the other. What is to come next it might be difficult to tell; what should come next it is not difficult to say. It should be a return to the careful observation of facts by consciousness and, in connection with it, to enter upon a judicious and cautious physiological investigation of the parts of the body most intimately connected with mental action. This will lay an arrest on those ambitious systems which interest without satisfying, and while it will not disclose all truth, it will reveal much truth with no admixture of error.

ART. II.—“THE DISPENSATION OF THE FULNESS OF
TIMES.”—EPH. i. 10.

By Prof. JOSEPH MILLIKEN, Hamilton, Ohio.

IF SOMETIMES God's plans seem to realize themselves in ways and seasons untimely and irregular, and hence are as impossible of forecast as the blowing of the winds, or the shining of the lightning from the one part of heaven to the other, still, like the winds and the lightning, the various parts and accessories of their fulfilment have their laws and method; there is a *history of revelation* (revelation in the broadest sense) as there is of nature and of man. God's ordering in the domain of spirit is analogous with that in nature in this respect, as well as others, that there is at once unity and progression about it, with nothing untimely or unrelated, or anomalous.

Of plant and brute life there is such a development and history; of the collective life of the race in its material, temporal aspects and relations there is such a history; of the unfoldings of God's purposes toward the race, as to all that concerns our mental and spiritual part, there is likewise a history; an all embracing, articulate, progressive evolution of a plan.