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By Whom, all things; for Whom, all things.

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## CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHY : HISTORICAL.

PHILOSOPHY, or rather the teaching of philosophy, is at present running very strongly in one or other of two directions—these very different from its tendencies the first half of this century. There is now little disposition, even in Deutschland, to construct new ideal philosophies. People are sick, as well they may be, of the systems which speculators draw out of their brains like the webs, as Bacon characterizes it, which “spiders spin out of their bowels.” The acknowledged failure of the great thinkers of Germany to fashion a reasonable philosophy *à priori* has discouraged youths from attempting to construct the universe *de novo*, by intuition like Schelling, or by transcendental logic like Hegel, or by mathematical formulæ like Herbart. And, it must be added, that the Scottish school and the Scottish-American school of philosophy, which seek to unfold the revelations of consciousness, are not able to collect around them any great amount of enthusiasm since the glow, left behind for a time by the sun of Hamilton as it set, has faded into shadow. In Germany, and latterly in France and even in Scotland, the young life runs in two streams; towards history and criticism on the one hand, and towards physiological psychology on the other.

In the October number of *Mind*, Prof. Wundt has given the number of courses of lectures delivered the last three years in the German-speaking universities, German, Austrian, Swiss, and the Russian university at Dorpat.

	HIST. OF PHIL.	LOGIC.	PSYCH.	METAPH.	ETHICS.
Winter. . . . 1874-1875	34	21	17	7	6
Summer. . . . . 1875	39	22	23	5	3
Winter. . . . 1875-1876	37	27	18	8	9
Summer. . . . . 1876	35	17	23	6	3
Winter. . . . 1876-1877	39	24	22	8	9
Summer. . . . . 1877	32	20	17	5	2
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	216	131	120	39	32

It will be noticed that the number of courses in ethics is small, and seems to be diminishing. The number in metaphysics is also small compared with what it used to be. Logic and psychology have still a considerable place, but the two together amount to little more than the number in the history of philosophy, which is predominant throughout. In Great Britain, in Oxford and Cambridge, philosophy is discussed historically, with criticisms of special systems. In Edinburgh, Prof. Fraser is expounding Berkeley; and Sterling is extra-academically criticising Hamilton, and opening to us the *sécet* of Hegel. In Glasgow, Prof. Caird is looking down upon and criticising the philosophy of Kant from the higher level of Hegelianism. In Dublin, where Locke reigned for a century and a quarter, Mr. Mahaffy is recommending Kant to the Irish youths. The subject of historical philosophy, which is exercising so many scholarly (but by no means profound) minds in the universities of Europe, will form the basis of discussion in the present paper; the subjects of Mind and Body, and Materialism, so attractive to the scientific men of Great Britain and the United States, must be deferred for subsequent treatment.

*Defects of the Historico-Critical Method.*—This method, when it is used exclusively, has its evils. It should always be preceded by a careful inductive inquiry into the operations and laws of the human mind—just as the study of the history of astronomy should proceed on a knowledge of the movements of the heavenly bodies. When this is omitted, the historical investigation will tend to take the student away from the soul and its mode of operation. It is noticeable that those who are trained simply in historical disquisitions are often superlatively ignorant of human nature, and may be led to follow the most absurd theories.

All histories of philosophy worthy of the name will contain less or more of criticism, or at least of critical remark. But there can be no criticism without a standard. Thus the valuable dissertation of Dugald Stewart in the *Encyclopedia Britannica*, on metaphysical science, proceeds on the principles of the Scottish school. Ritter's and Schweigler's histories measure all things by the transcendental forms of Hegel. Almost all the later German histories of philosophy in general, or of special

schools, explain and examine all systems after the principles and commonly in the very nomenclature of Kant. Students, before they are aware of it, are thus led into a labyrinth of artificial forms without a clue to take them out of it, and have to remain there with no means of escape. A select body of students are thus committed, without knowing it, to lines that have been laid for them, and, as they move on, find themselves carried into the most extreme positions. But the great body of the young men thus drilled go away from their colleges into the various walks of life with a sort of general impression that, of all things, the theories of metaphysicians are the most ridiculous, and not a few reach the conclusion that truth cannot be found. This threatens to be the fruit of the historico-philosophical method of teaching both in Europe and in America. The present fashion has reached its height, and is seen in a very considerable interest taken in philosophical discussion with scarcely any positive belief or convictions of any kind. In a few years there will be a terrible reaction against the search which has been so vain ; and this will take the shape either of utter indifference towards all philosophical inquiry, with a settled idea that nothing has been settled, that nothing can be settled, or a rushing towards a physiological psychology conducted by chloroform experiments on pigeons, rabbits, dogs, and monkeys, as more likely to throw some light on the mental structure of man.

While it appears necessary to utter this warning against the teaching of mental philosophy exclusively by a critical summary of opinions, it is still true that an historical exposition should accompany and follow an inductive psychology which has first made the student acquainted with the operation of the cognitive, the motive, and the moral powers of the mind. There are several recent important works constructed in the historical and critical spirit.

*Bowen's "Modern Philosophy."*—Professor Bowen and President Porter may be taken as the highest representatives of American philosophy in the present day. The former has for many years taught "Natural Religion and Moral Philosophy" in Harvard University. He gives his religious confession in his preface, "I accept with unhesitating conviction and belief the

doctrine of the being of one personal God, the creator and governor of the world, and of one Lord Jesus Christ, in whom dwelleth all the fulness of the Godhead bodily; and I have found nothing whatever in the literature of modern infidelity which, to my mind, casts even the slightest doubt upon that belief." This suggests the remark that the old Unitarianism of the school of Channing (from which Prof. Bowen has sprung, though he does not now belong to it) was always favorable to a high philosophy, which was used by them to defend what religion they were pleased to receive out of the Bible. Now, when Unitarianism has ceased to be a power in Boston, many are tremblingly anxious to find what form the young philosophy is to take in Harvard; some fearing that catching, as that university is wont, the spirit of the times, it may descend to a refined materialism, which will speedily become gross and unrefined in its practical influence.

Prof. Bowen, in a work published almost a generation since, had a judicious defence of Locke from the misrepresentations of him by the German and French critics, who at that time (they have since learned better) called him *Lockè*, and described him as a mere sensationalist; whereas he gives a high place to reflection as a source of ideas, and calls in, consistently or inconsistently, a power of intuition and reason, and thus became a favorite with the rationalistic school of Great Britain and America. Mr. Bowen is known favorably as the author of an able philosophical work on logic, in which he has unfortunately adopted Hamilton's doctrine of the thorough quantification of the predicate of propositions. Logicians should always be ready to quantify the predicate when required; but we can, and usually do, reason without such a process.

The work is called "Modern Philosophy, from Descartes to Schopenhauer and Hartmann." But he does not purpose to write a complete history of modern philosophy. There is no formal account of Hobbes, or Locke, or Hume, or Hartley, or Reid, or Stewart, or Hamilton, or the two Mills. But he treats fully of metaphysicians less known to English-speaking students: of Descartes, Spinoza, Malebranche, Pascal, Leibnitz, Kant, Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, Schopenhauer, and Hartmann, with shorter criticisms of Realism, Nominalism, and Conceptu-

alism, of Berkeleyanism and Positivism. He has evidently mastered all these philosophies, and has furnished a clear and accurate exposition of them. His criticisms, characterized by American shrewdness, are always candid and commonly just.

His account of the philosophies of Leibnitz and Kant, of Schopenhauer and Hartmann, is specially commendable. He has brought out with great felicity some of the highest aspects of the grand system of Leibnitz, the most comprehensive of all the German thinkers, and worthy to be placed in the same rank with Plato and Aristotle. He has given a full and correct account of the philosophy of Kant, and examined it from the American point of view ; that is, by good sense and common logic. His exposition of the critical philosophy is, upon the whole, the best in the English tongue ; better than the well written but loose ones of Cousin and Morell ; better even than the epitomes by German scholars, who have commonly been so caught in the net of their great metaphysician that they cannot extricate themselves so as to view his labored system impartially. Thinkers are particularly grateful to him for his account of Schopenhauer and Hartmann ; and students wishing to keep up with the latest German thinking may satisfy themselves with these two articles without travelling to Germany or toiling through the works in the originals.

*Schopenhauer.*—Of late years German students have been wondering after Schopenhauer and Hartmann ; and American and British youths seeing the crowd, have joined them and been gazing with them. The laboriously constructed systems of these two eccentric men exhibit German idealism in its latest and possibly its last form ; they seem to be a *reductio ad absurdum* of the whole speculative method introduced by Leibnitz and continued by Kant and Fichte, by Schelling, Hegel, and Herbart, a method which, it should be observed, began with optimism and has ended with an avowed and determined pessimism. These two men have not a place in the universities, from which they have been excluded by the old intellectual aristocracy of Germany, but they have hearers, if not believers, beyond the college walls—against which they have been shooting their arrows. Their systems have been gendered spontaneously out of the slimes of decayed systems, and can only have

an ephemeral existence. Schopenhauer speaks of Schelling as a "wind-bag," of Hegel as a "charlatan," and very soon there will arise avengers to apply like epithets to himself, and to describe the man himself, as he describes his philosophy, as a "pessimist."

Prof. Bowen evidently loves the men while he is exhibiting their follies. Thus he says of Schopenhauer :

"There are many good things in his philosophy, though he put them there by mistake. These we can pick out and leave the bad alone. He has often taught what is good and right, though most frequently with an evil purpose. In paving the way for his ultimate conclusions, which are often untrue and even diabolical, he has stumbled upon many intermediate truths of great moment, and has defended them with more wit, vigor, and originality than were ever expended upon them before. After the character now given of him, I am almost ashamed to add that I have read his works, not only with more interest and amusement, but in many parts positively with more instruction and delight, than those of any other metaphysician of this century." "He detests the whole tribe of German professors of the absolute; and, as he is a bitter hitter, he does good service by demolishing some of their paradoxes and exposing the inordinate use of technicalities and abstruse phraseology, and their general disregard of common-sense. He has given far the ablest, most searching, and on the whole most sensible criticism of Kantian metaphysics which has yet appeared in Germany."

His special work is entitled, "Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung." First he represents the world as presentative. "It is my presentation (Vorstellung) or mental picture: is what I represent it to be; it agrees exactly with my thought; it is *my* thought. The world exists for me only as a picture and a belief existent in my mind only so far as it is portrayed by my thought and present to my consciousness." Subject and object are only different aspects of one and the same phenomenon, viz., the presentation. This is the most thoroughgoing idealism which has yet appeared in Germany. German and American youths who have thus far ascended in this balloon, not just to heaven but to the clouds, may as well stop here and inquire how they can safely descend.

He represents the world also as will. "My body is nothing else than objectified will; that is, my will becomes a presentation, a perception."

"Will," says Schopenhauer, "is not one form or species of the genus power or force, but each and every power or force is one species of the genus will; will is not necessarily self-conscious, or known to itself as such; in the greater number of cases we infer what in several cases we directly know, that it is unconscious. Self-consciousness, knowledge as such, is only an accident of the manifestation of will *in animals*, particularly in man; but is not an invariable accompaniment of it even in him." "In the last analysis matter is nothing but force, and force is nothing but will." "This will is everywhere one and the same, a blind, unconscious God."

Following out his doctrine, he reaches the conclusion that "this is the worst of all possible worlds, tenanted by the worst of all possible beings, mankind :"

"He who, through his intellect, has arrived at a knowledge of this nature and essence of the world, has but one course remaining to him. It is to renounce the will altogether, to cease striving after any thing; to repudiate all desires; to sink into inaction and mere thought; and thereby, as far as in him lies, to reduce this life to the nothingness whence it was drawn, and which is heaven as compared with the miseries of the world. Hence, in the ethics of Schopenhauer, asceticism, celibacy, quietism, monachism, and the like, are the only virtuous modes of living. If all would adopt this course the world would immediately cease to be."

*Hartmann* was born in 1842, and is still living. His work is entitled, "Die Philosophie des Unbewussten," "The Philosophy of the Unconscious." It is divided into three books, the first of which brings together the evidence of unconscious mental action in the corporeal organism; the second contains proof of the activity of the unconscious in the phenomena of the human mind; while the third presents what the author calls the "metaphysics of the unconscious." Matter is resolved into the combined will and intellect of the unconscious. On one fundamental point he separates from both Kant and Schopenhauer. In a certain sense he maintains the objective reality both of space and time, and of the universe of external things; but it turns out that the objective reality is only an appearance of the unconscious All; and, in fact, his doctrine is the grossest materialism. He shows a greater acquaintance with physical science than Schopenhauer possessed, and his pessimism is not so extreme. "Most of his argument is intended to dissipate the illusions of the vulgar in respect to the attainableness of

happiness either here or hereafter, and thereby to induce the educated and thinking mind to strive only after such improvement of the intellect as will finally correct these illusions, and dispose mankind generally to bring the world to an end by common consent."

The reader before this time may have come to the conclusion that he has had enough of such perverted ingenuities. The circumstance that such books should have been written and have received a hearing discloses curious glimpses of a strange state of feeling among certain bodies of thinking men, and shows what an awful gulf is awaiting those who abandon Christianity. It is fortunate that the doctrine has been presented to English readers by so candid an expositor as Prof. Bowen. It is a notable circumstance that an elaborate discussion on these two authors and their subject has been produced by an acute writer well acquainted with later German thought, Mr. James Sully, who in his "Sensation and Intuition" sought, not very successfully, to combine *à priori* philosophy with empirical physiology, and who has now issued a work on "Pessimism, a History and a Criticism." This book is reviewed by Prof. Bain in *Mind*, an able periodical admitting articles on both sides, but which is, in fact, Mr. Bain's literary organ, edited by his pupil, Prof. Robertson of London University College. Mr. Sully, after weighing pleasure and pain in scales, concludes that, looking to the past and the present, "life has a bare positive value," but he expects better of the future. One good end may be accomplished by these unsatisfying discussions. Physicists, as they inquire into the origin of worlds, have of late years been discovering traces of terrible wars and struggles, and now philosophers are forced to look at the evil, though they are making a perverse use of it. Happy those who, while they see the evil, look also to the remedy which has been provided.

*Caird's "Critical Account of the Philosophy of Kant."*—Prof. Edward Caird is the brother of the Rev. Dr. Caird, who became known by his sermon before the Queen of England, and who, after being for a number of years Professor of Theology in Glasgow University, is now Principal of that University, and a leader of the Broad Church party, which is now so strong

among a body of ministers in Scotland distinguished for their literary ability. The professor occupies the chair of Thomas Reid, and is there teaching a philosophy which the common-sense philosopher would have found it difficult to comprehend ; and if he were permitted to rise from his grave to listen to his successor, Reid would say of his teachings, as he did when alive of the *à priori* arguments of Newton and Clarke, " These are the speculations of men of superior genius. But whether they be as solid as they are sublime, or whether they be the wanderings of imagination beyond the limits of human understanding, I am unable to decide."

The professor was educated first at Glasgow, at a time when there was no man of influential intellect in the philosophic chairs, and then went up to Oxford, where, in the absence of any English philosophy, there was a running after German speculation, especially after Hegel. A youth of brighter parts than even his gifted brother, he was appointed in early life Professor of Moral Philosophy in Glasgow. He is there undermining the native philosophy, and probably the underlying principles of the old theology of Scotland ; and many are looking with apprehension to the crop which is sure to follow the sowing of the principal and the professor.

A Princeton Fellow, who lately studied at the universities of Berlin and Leipsic, has asserted<sup>1</sup> that the number of Hegelians in Germany might be counted on our ten fingers. Not sustained in its native land, Hegelianism has emigrated to the country of Hutcheson, Reid, Stewart, and Hamilton, and has there found a settlement for a little while. The ablest expounders of the Hegelian philosophy are to be found, not in Germany, nor even in Glasgow, but on the banks of the Mississippi. American youths do not need to go to Berlin in order to study it. They have the best exposition of it in the *Journal of Speculative Philosophy*, which at St. Louis is courageously defending a falling cause.

The student wishing to become acquainted with the philosophy of Kant need not go to Caird's " Critical Account ;" he may find a far more intelligible account in Bowen's article.

<sup>1</sup> This Review, for April, 1875.

Caird's book is a historico-critical rather than an expository one. It opens with a chapter on the necessity of criticism, which, to serve any satisfactory purpose, should have been prefaced with an enunciation of the standard of criticism adopted by him. He traces with no great ability the critical spirit historically through ancient and mediæval times, and in the seventeenth century. He then gives the views which he, following the Germans, entertains of Locke, Berkeley, and Hume, doing scant justice to Locke. He has a criticism of Leibnitz, but does not see wherein either his superlative greatness or his superlative weakness consists.

Coming to Kant, he shows the steps by which Kant was led on to his Critical System. This is by far the most valuable part of the work, though some works have just been published in Germany throwing still farther light on the *Origines Kantianæ*. Holding first by a commonplace rational philosophy got from Wolff, the formal redacteur of Leibnitz, Kant was roused from his dogmatic slumbers by Hume, and sought to erect a mound to keep back the tide of scepticism. Prof. Caird has clearly brought out what, however, was well known before, that in order to meet objections, Kant changed his statements in the second edition of the "Critique of Pure Reason," thereby only landing himself in deeper difficulties.

Having devoted 180 pages to these preliminary matters, Prof. Caird now gives 500 pages of expository criticism, and promises another volume. It would require as many pages to review this criticism; and after the best had been done, the complaint would be that the author had been misunderstood—the complaint made by Hegel of his contemporaries was, that only one man understood him, and he did not understand him. The work has been extravagantly praised, as might be expected, in the *Westminster Review* and in *Mind*. It appears to us that Prof. Caird has followed Kant where he should have left him, and left him where it would have been better to remain with him. The author of the review in *Mind* speaks of him as a Hegelian, and he seems to proceed very much on Hegelian principles in his criticism, though Hegel would not have acknowledged him as a genuine expounder of his philosophy. He proceeds upon the principle that by the senses and con-

sciousness one does not perceive things, but appearances, and that thought lands him in contradictions. Such is the issue, the necessary issue, of Kant's Analytic, but he proposes by a synthesis to bring, after the manner of Hegel, the contradictions into a higher unity, and to reach realities, but what sort of realities it is difficult to find. Men are justified in assuming that the mind begins with realities, always singular and concrete; and that the alleged contradictions of Kant and the Hegelians, and, it may be added, of Hamilton, are contradictions, not in the principles of the mind, but in the wrong account given of them by metaphysicians, who do not inquire into their nature in an inductive manner. One is surprised to find him stating that the argument from design fails, as arguing an infinite God from finite works. All that the argument from design was ever meant to prove is that God is possessed of intelligence. It is argued that he is infinite from mental principles. All this was stated an age ago: "It is all true that the adaptation in the finite works of God does not prove that God is infinite, but it proves that he is a living, intelligent being, possessed of indefinite power; and this allows our intuition as to infinity to clothe him with infinite attributes." ("Method of Divine Government," Append. II.) Instead of trying to take the reader through the Hegelian windings, it is more profitable to state what are the fundamental objections to the philosophy of Kant.

*A Criticism of the Critical Philosophy.*—The system of Kant was meant, as every one knows, to take all that is good from the experientialism of Locke on the one hand, and the dogmatism of Descartes, Spinoza, and Leibnitz on the other, and in this way to meet the scepticism of Hume, in which Locke's philosophy had terminated, and which could not be set aside by the innate ideas of Descartes and the pre-established harmony of Leibnitz. He assumes, or rather attempts to prove, in a very weak and wavering manner, that there is an external world. But all that it discloses to men is phenomena, in the sense of appearances, being, in fact, the *impressions* of Hume. Even the internal sense or self-consciousness gives only appearances, and not things appearing. But if these be all, then metaphysics, philosophy, and theology are only a mirage. But men are impelled to seek for something higher and deeper. In

all cognition there is a more important element furnished by the mind itself in the shape of forms, imposed on objects and giving a unity to what is scattered. Without these the presentation, of sense, external and internal, are scattered and meaningless. These forms are in the mind ready to be imposed on the phenomena of sense, and the cognition, such as men are able to attain, is the result of the two : be it observed, first of appearances, and secondly of subjective moulds, the one called the *à posteriori*, the other the *à priori* element. The concrete thus constructed has turned out to be a very brittle substance, ever mouldering as it is employed in building. The phenomenon cannot be called a thing. The subjective form has no objective validity. The product partakes of the weakness of both its elements, baseless as the one, aërial and cloudy as the other, and is thus a sort of castle in the air arising from the swamps of the earth, rising toward heaven but never reaching it, in fact, obscuring it. The judgments and reasonings of the mind are themselves only forms imposed on the appearances of the sense, and on formless materials in which there is no true reality. True, there is, there must be, a reality, a *Ding an sich*, a thing in itself (though what guarantees this, men have not been able to discover), but the human mind can never reach it ; and as it attempts to do so, falls into paralogsms and contradictions. The philosophy of Kant, meant to counteract Hume, thus led, without the author meaning it, to a deeper scepticism, and ended, not in a mere negation as with the Scotch sceptic, but in a *maya*, all the more tormenting because it implied a reality beyond, forever shut out from man. The issue is seen in the Nescience of Hamilton, the Unknown of Herbert Spencer, and the Agnostic of the reigning English philosophy, which has associated so congenially with the development theory of matter, life, and mind.

It is necessary to meet all this. This should be the great work of the higher philosophy in the present day. America should hasten to take it up. There is no other country ready to undertake it. Germany could engage in it only by abandoning, what she is not prepared to abandon, the fundamental principles of the philosopher of whom she is so proud. England is following Darwin, Huxley, and Tyndall, and is not on the track. There are no signs of its being done in Scotland,

where Prof. Bain of Aberdeen is a leader in the materialistic psychology, and Prof. Caird of Glasgow is expounding Kant on the principles of Hegel. America, which has never been addicted to *à priori* speculation, has here a rich and inviting field thrown open to her. Those of her youth who have spent a year or two in Germany and have been sucked in by the current may be disposed to swim along with it, instead of extricating themselves and resisting it, and may waste their lives in expounding German speculations. But Americans will never match the Germans or Oxonians in expounding transcendentalism or carrying it up higher into cloudland. They will be employed vastly better, and more in accordance with the genius of their country, in defending a sober realism which opposes materialism, and yet does not fly up into idealism. There must be more teachers of mental and moral science in the United States than in any other nation in the world. Instead of being dependent on foreign sources, why should they not combine to form a philosophy of their own worthy of their country?

The account given by Kant of the fundamental principles of the mind is an artificial and altogether a perverted one. It represents them as Forms, bringing the scattered presentations, which are appearances without things, into unity, an ideal unity, in which the idea becomes more and more prominent, and at the end the reality disappears, it being all the while certain that there is a noumenon which cannot be discovered. Now, looking to the mind itself, and studying its operations, the true account is that it possesses a power—or rather powers—of perception, which enables it to perceive things; not impressions, as Hume maintained; not appearances, but things as appearing; not qualities, but things with their qualities. When a plane surface is perceived, there is not a cloud of scattered phenomena, and the mind from its own stores imposing space as a form upon them; but there is a perception of an object as extended in two dimensions. If the question is put, How is this proven? the answer is that there is the same evidence of this that there is of the existence of an appearance; in fact, what is known is a thing appearing. An appearance without a thing is an abstraction formed from the thing presented. Taking this view, the statement is excluded that in sense-perception there is an *à priori* and an *à posteriori* element; in fact, these two

phrases might, like *idea*, be discarded from rigid philosophy. The mental exercise consists in perceiving the external object, and should be called an intuition, and not an *à priori* form. It does not tell beforehand what objects should have or must have been, but what is in objects on which the senses, external and internal, look.

The power of intuition is not confined to the external senses. There is an internal sense by which every one looks upon himself as thinking, feeling, and resolving. Not only so, but all the higher faculties, intellectual and moral, have a power of looking on things and the relations of things. In contemplating an effect, it is perceived that it must have had a cause; on seeing a cruel action, men declare it to be evil.

As these intuitions work they may be noticed and generalized, just as Newton generalized the operations of nature into the law of gravitation. These generalizations become the principles with which philosophy has to deal. When they are properly formed out of the operations of the mind, they are the fundamental laws of cognition, belief, and judgment. When they are imperfect, one-sided, mutilated, they may lead to contradictions and serious errors. When they give the exact experience of the mind's actions, they constitute mental philosophy. As they begin with, so they end with, realities.

*Flint's "Theism."*—Professors Calderwood and Flint may be regarded as the two fittest representatives in Scotland at this present time of the genuine Scottish school. The latter was for a time a minister in Glasgow; he then became Professor of Moral Philosophy in St. Andrews, and is now Professor of Systematic Theology in the University of Edinburgh. He first became known beyond his native country by the publication of "The Philosophy of History in Europe," Vol. I., treating of France and Germany. In this book he does not treat of the philosophy of the history of these countries, but gives a historico-critical exposition of the books which have been written on the philosophy of history. The work is elaborate, and shows much reading and painstaking reflection. His recent work on Theism consists of lectures with notes, delivered in connection with the Baird Lectureship, a foundation analogous to the Bampton Lectureship. The book is calm, candid, and judicious, and is on the whole the best which could be put into

the hands of an intelligent young man who is troubled with sceptical doubts, or has become bewildered by the philosophical and scientific discussions of the times. The volume is to be followed by another upon *Anti-Theistic Theories*.

His argument is clearly thought and well expressed. He derives the idea of God and gets his argument from all classes of God's works, and from the thinking principles of the mind itself. So far as the physical facts are concerned, the argument is really, though not avowedly, that from collocations. But the lecturer sees that he needs to call in mental principles. The key to his argument may be found in the statement, "There is so much that is intuitive involved in the apprehension of God, that the apprehension itself may readily be imagined to be intuitive." He has, of course, to call in the principle of cause and effect. But he seeks to avoid metaphysical discussion as to the nature of causation. It may be doubted whether he can legitimately do this, for if causation is empirical, the theistic argument is not logically conclusive, for it will be argued that causation does not extend beyond human experience to world-making. The principle of causality is that every thing beginning to be must have a cause, and so he thinks it necessary to take it upon him to show that the world has had a commencement. He shows from recent science that the present state of things has had a beginning, but he has not shown that it cannot have come from a preceding one. It is not necessary for his argument that he should. We argue an intelligent cause of the order and adaptation as an effect continually produced before our eyes. Without committing himself to the development hypothesis, he shows, as Hugh Miller had done before him, that evolution, such as is proven to exist, needs an intelligence to guide it orderly and beneficently. He avoids the objection started by Kant, and still supposed by German metaphysicians and Prof. Caird to be unanswerable, about a finite effect not proving the existence of an infinite cause, by showing that belief in the infinity of God comes from mental principles. Altogether, the method in which he proves from internal principles that God is a spirit and clothes him with moral perfections is characterized by admirable wisdom, tact, and logical validity.

JAMES MCCOSH.