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I. THE CONTRA-NATURAL CHARACTER OF THE MIRACLE.

NONE but the maintainers of a rigid process of evolution, enforced by a law of blind, immanent necessity, would deny that man has degenerated from his primitive condition. He has fallen from the estate of holiness and happiness in which he was created into one of sin and misery. That being admitted, it is obvious that the scheme of religion which he originally possessed is now utterly inadequate to his wants. The law which it contained as a rule of action has been violated, and its condemning sentence renders impossible an acceptable obedience to its requirements. So far as that scheme of religion is concerned man is doomed.

On the supposition that God the Moral Ruler were willing to reveal to sinful man another scheme, not merely legal but redemptive, as a directory of faith, a guide of life and a basis of hope, it would be just, if not indispensable, that its credentials should be so clear as to admit of no reasonable doubt. They ought to be not so much deductions from speculative premises however apparently well-founded, as phenomenal facts easily apprehended by consciousness, or immediate and necessary inferences from those facts, and therefore of equal validity with the original data themselves: the concrete results of observation and experience, or good because logical consequences from them. While the revelation itself is to be proved, its proofs ought to be as nearly as possible autopistic.

VI. NOTES.

DABNEY'S REFUTATION OF THE SENSUALISTIC PHILOSOPHY.—BUT WHAT NEXT?

At the opening of this paper, I cannot refrain from saying how delighted I am that the Southern Presbyterian Church has started an organ having so high an aim as the *PRESBYTERIAN QUARTERLY*. That church has defended all along the orthodox faith in religion, and now it is pleasant to find that it is setting before it a high moral end in literature and philosophy.

We are pleased to find that Dr. Dabney has been called to issue an enlarged edition of his philosophical work on "The Sensualistic Philosophy of the Nineteenth Century." He says: "The sensualistic philosophy is that theory which resolves all the human spirit into the functions of the five senses and modifications thereof." He begins very properly with Hobbes, who speaks so clearly and dogmatically that weaker people bend under him, as led to believe that he must be speaking truly. Deriving all our ideas from the senses, he strips the soul of all its deeper principles and associations. We can believe that he should have so felt in regard to this world that he desired to find a hole by which he might creep out of it. He next takes up Locke, whom I am accustomed to speak of as "sagacious," but whom Dr. Dabney describes somewhat curiously as "pious and amiable," and as "tender-hearted." We are not sure that he does justice to Locke, who held such sway over the philosophy of our fathers the whole of last century and the beginning of this. Locke, it should be remembered, calls in reflection as well as sensation as a source of ideas, and gives intuition an important, though, we think, not the right place in the mind, had a strong intellectual element, as has been shown by Professors Bowen and Webb, in his philosophy, and was a decided rationalist in religion. We agree with Dr. Dabney that Locke did not give a sufficiently deep foundation to knowledge, and was responsible so far for the sensationalism of France and the nescience of Hume. Dr. Dabney's picture is, "We see a pure and pious Locke, a perspicacious ecclesiastic like Condillac, an aged literary coxcomb like Saint Lambert, pursuing their deductions from

the primal error which denies to the human spirit all *a priori* notions and judgments"—in which last phrases there may lurk nearly as much error as in sensationalism. He denounces in strong language, but not stronger than it deserves, the miserable philosophy (if philosophy it can be called) of Helvetius and the sensualist school of France, which gave a wrong direction to what would otherwise have been good in the French Revolution.

We are surprised to find at this place he does not notice Hume, who undermined all the older philosophy still cherished in his day, and added agnosticism (as it is now called) to sensationalism, deriving all our knowledge from impressions or sensations, and yet giving no reality to sensations, thus starting the leading philosophical heresy of our day, which runs through the systems of the two Mills, of Bain, of Lewes and of Herbert Spencer.

Dr. Dabney takes up James Mill, who first followed the trade of a preacher in the Church of Scotland, and not getting a charge for which he was an applicant went up to London and gave up all religion, natural and revealed; became, in the *Westminster Review*, one of the leaders of infidelity; and published his "Analysis of the Human Mind," in which he contrives in a superficial manner to account for all the high qualities of the mind, imagination, conscience and will, by sensation and association of sensations, in all this simply following Hume.

Our author once more crosses the English channel, and turns to M. Comte, who, if not just a sensationalist, constructed a huge system of positivism, in which he gave a very bald view of the history of philosophy in the past, making it first theological, then metaphysical, and now positive; whereas a high philosophy has had all along, and should now embrace, the whole of these and give each its place; beginning with facts, rising to principles, and culminating in God. Comte denies to man the power of discovering causes and moral good, and thus undermines all philosophy and all theology—except, indeed, the worship of woman.

From this place, Dr. Dabney's arrangement of systems is not so definite, while his discussion becomes fully fresher. He treats of what he calls the "false evolution theory," which, though not the same as sensualism, joins on to it in making mind materialistic. He does not inquire whether there may not be a true evolution theory, in which evolution properly explained and confined to its own province is represented as simply God's method of procedure, connecting the present causally with the past and the future, and one means of giving its unity

to nature. To my knowledge a great many young men, especially those who know natural history, would be grateful to have the evolution which is manifestly in nature so expounded as to save them from sensualism and atheism.

Dr. Dabney criticizes Hamilton and Mansell. Neither of these men is a sensualist or sensationalist. Both have given admirable defenses of man's spiritual nature. But both have fallen into errors, which Dr. Dabney points out. Both made our knowledge relative, that is, simply of the relations of things themselves unknown, and thus landed themselves without perceiving it in agnosticism. They both make our idea of the infinite negative. But surely there is something positive in our idea of the infinity of God, if only we could apprehend it and express it. Our author enters into a wrestling match with Hamilton as to whether the idea of infinity involves a contradiction. It has always appeared to me that there is a good deal of logomachy in Hamilton's argument, and it is difficult for an opponent not to fall into a like sin.

Mr. John Stuart Mill is a much more enlightened thinker than his father. The book on Induction in his *Logic* is one of the great works of the century. But the metaphysics which run through his *Logic* are at once sensationist and agnostic, and are liable to the objections taken so acutely by Dr. Dabney.

He has touched on Herbert Spencer, the ablest philosophic speculator of our day. But Spencer is not a mere sensualist. He calls in profound principles which lead him on to agnosticism, and these will require to be searchingly examined by higher arguments than those employed to put down a sensual philosophy. Dr. Dabney's closing chapters on ethics and religion are the most useful in the volume.

By this book Dr. Dabney is doing good service at once to philosophy, morality, and religion. We have scarcely any fault to find with the book. The style, if not always academic, is always clear. Self-confident youths will insist that it is too sermonic, and that they prefer drawing the moral for themselves, which, however, they often neglect to do, and so our author does it for them. It may sometimes be more expedient to let youths draw in the lessons unconsciously. We are inclined to think that Dr. Dabney too often disposes of a theory by showing that it leads to evil consequences, whereas his first business as a philosopher should be to show wherein lies the error from which the pernicious results follow. It has often happened that new scientific doctrines which have been charged with being injurious to religion—as, for instance, geological truths—have, when properly understood, turned out to be favorable to it.

BUT WHAT NEXT? Dr. Dabney has shown us the negative side. But the thinking soul can no more live on negations than the body can live in empty space. There are forms of philosophy now prevailing which logically issue in as blank a result as even sensationalism. Suppose that the thinking youth abandons sensualism, whither is he now to turn? The remainder of this paper may be profitably employed in contemplating the philosophic systems which are spreading out their attractions before us in the last quarter of the nineteenth century.

The Modern English School. We so call it for want of a more specific name. It sprang originally from Hume, and has come down to us through James Mill, John Mill, Lewes and Bain, and is now represented by Herbert Spencer and his followers, such as Fisk and Grant Allen, and, to some extent, by Sully. It is quite as defective as the sensational school, to which it adds the subtleties of agnosticism. It derives all our ideas from sensation, but goes farther, and doubts whether our senses give us any reality. It is the agnosticism of the day, and is ably defended by Huxley and Spencer. Let us notice some of its glaring omissions.

Even in sense perception it omits, it entirely leaves out, the existence of body as a substance, making it a mere sensation or impression. With Mr. John Mill it is the "mere possibility of sensations." Our inner sense, or self-consciousness, is not supposed to give us any knowledge of self, or of anything beyond feelings; with Mr. Mill it is merely a series of "feelings aware of themselves," and cannot recognize or sanction personal identity. Memory is represented as a mere reproduction of our sensations or feelings, whereas it is the recognition of an object as having been before us in time past, thus giving us the idea of time. The idea of infinity has, and can have, no place in the system. The number of relations which the mind can discover is very scanty:—with some, such as Professor Bain, it is merely that of resemblance and difference, and the deeper relations, such as those of substance and quality, of identity, of cause and effect, are left out. Causation is merely invariable antecedence and consequence. Emotions, such as those of hope and fear, of approval and remorse, are mere sensory feelings, whereas they have all an underlying appetence and an idea of an object as appetible or unappetible. Moral good in the last resort is happiness, or rather mere pleasure. Free will is impossible, as all things are governed by physical necessity. There can be no proof that a soul so meanly endowed is entitled to immortality; it is not worth preserving, any more than the soul of the brute is. The argument for the existence of God utterly

fails on a system which does not allow us from the traces of design in nature to argue a designer. Any God started as an hypothesis must, as Herbert Spencer maintains, be unknown and unknowable. This agnostic philosophy of the close of the nineteenth century is no better than the sensualistic philosophy of the previous ages.

The German School, beginning with Kant and culminating in Hegel, or branching off with Lotze. There are passages in Dr. Dabney's work which sound as if he might adopt the method and the leading principles of this philosophy. He calls in "*a priori* ideas and judgments," and claims to be a rationalist in philosophy. But this school, logically followed out as it has lately been, issues in as fatal consequences as even sensationalism. It makes the mind perceive not things, but merely phenomena, in the sense of appearances, from which appearances we can never logically infer the existence of things without having more in the conclusion than in the premises. It supposes that in all its cognitive acts the mind adds forms to things; it makes the mind create space and time, to which it gives a mere subjective existence. It does the same with substance and quality, with cause and effect. But if the mind can create these and superinduce them upon things, why may it not create, as with Fichte, the things themselves, till all existence is made ideal? We are thus kept from real things in a region of imaginary forms, and in the end are landed logically in nihilism. It is a notable circumstance that Herbert Spencer and all agnostics, when pushed hard, fall back on Kant.

The School of Physiological Psychology. This department has been cultivated earnestly by a few men in Germany and in France for the last age or two. Lately it has been imported into the United States, where we have the able and elaborate work of Professor Ladd, of Yale. We have other diligent cultivators of the subject, such as Stanley Hall, Cattell, and Yastrow. The tendency of the school is to become narrow and exclusive. It claims to be the whole of psychology, whereas it is only a part, or rather, to use a biological phrase, only the environment of the mind. Physiological psychology has discovered a number of curious facts and a few important facts. But the peculiar, the great benefit derived from mental science as taught in America, has been that it has brought young men into constant connection with mental, moral, and spiritual ideas so fitted to elevate the mind. A physiological psychology, cultivated exclusively, may lead practically to materialism quite as certainly as the sensualism exposed by Dr. Dabney. Those who look to it as furnishing a knowledge of the proper acts of the mind,

or as being a philosophy, will find that they have got the husk but not the nut.

The Scottish School; what are we to make of it? From 1763-'64, when Reid published his "Inquiry," down to the middle of this century, this school had influence, not only in Scotland, but in the Irish province of Ulster, throughout America, and even in England and in France. It is now somewhat in the background. In Scotland, besides others, it has two able representatives in Prof. Calderwood and Prof. Flint, both attached to the Scottish school, but pursuing an independent course; and it is hoped that Prof. Seth, lately appointed to St. Andrews, will advance towards it rather than Hegelianism. On the other hand, it is counteracted by two brilliant men, the brothers Caird, of Glasgow, who have created some interest in Hegelianism, and will stand by it till it dies a natural death. In other countries the Scottish philosophy has at present very little power, and is not likely to have a revival. One reason for this is that it is not pretentious. It has not raised huge systems like those of Fichte, Schelling, Hegel and Lotze, who for the last age or two have so awed and prostrated the minds of young men. The school does not claim to have discovered all truth and settled all difficulties. In the view of ambitious youth it has the Scottish weakness of *canniness*.

On several very important points it is very defective. I do not wish it to be understood that I am ashamed of my country or my country's philosophy; but I have been declaring all along, in the old country and in this, that the Scottish school has errors which ought to be abandoned. It does not declare clearly, unambiguously and firmly, that we know things. Reid and Stewart say that we know qualities and not things, whereas the true account is, that we know things with their qualities. Hamilton resolutely argues that man's knowledge is relative and not positive; not of things, but of the relation of things themselves unknown. This doctrine has not, so far as I know, been disavowed by Hamilton's pupils, Prof. Fraser, of Edinburgh, nor Prof. Veitch, of Glasgow. It has in fact given a starting point to Herbert Spencer's nescience, and all the consequences he has drawn from it. I have been calling on the followers of Hamilton to show that the conclusions of Spencer do not follow logically from the principles laid down by their master. Hitherto they have failed to do this.

An American student in brooding over these systems may find a difficulty in accepting any one of them, and he may unfortunately be allured into agnosticism, or be led to abandon the study. How are we

to meet this tendency? Some will answer: Take what is good from all systems and reject the evil. But this only starts the question: On what principle are we to make the selection, that is, on what system are we to proceed? An eclectic system may be a heterogeneous and an utterly inconsistent mass, which will not cohere any more than the gold, silver, brass, iron and clay in the image seen by Nebuchadnezzar, "which was broken in pieces together and became like the chaff of the summer threshing floor." There is only one course for American students in these circumstances: Let them look into their own mind by self-consciousness, which will act as a magnet to draw out the metals and leave the clay. As they do this they will find out the truth, each for himself, and we shall have an American philosophy, which this country has not yet had. This I have long desired to see. I wish I could raise a cry sufficiently clear and ringing to be heard and bring such a philosophy to us. Let it hasten to fill up the vacuum at present existing.

In accordance with the American character this philosophy will take the form of realism. It will be opposed to sensationalism on the one hand and to idealism on the other; to sensationalism which draws all our ideas from the senses, and idealism which seeks to add to nature out of the riches of the mind and to mend things which it only mars. I am not speaking against idealism, which has its place but should be kept in its place. We do not allow idealism to come into science, to improve the laws of nature, to make gravitation and chemical affinity more attractive. Just as little should we allow it a place in philosophy.

Americans are a composite people, drawn from all nations of the Old World, but brought into a unity by their republican constitution and laws. So it will be with the American philosophy. It will be ready to take in truth from Greek and Roman, from Britain and Germany, but it will subordinate all to its observational method. It will proceed with the Scottish philosophy in the inductive method, but in pursuing this method, with consciousness as the agent of observation, it will discover the *a priori* truths of Kant, prior to experience, above experience, and having their authority in themselves.

This is the REALISM which in a crude state is the first philosophy, and, as purified by careful inspection, is to be the final philosophy. It begins with self and with body as affecting self, both being realities. It does not attempt to prove these by mediate probation. If it did not assume them it could never prove them. It assumes them and justifies itself in assuming them. Assuming them as real, it regards as equally

real all the careful inductions and logical deductions from them, and thus lives in a world of realities. It is not the vulgar realism which looks merely at the surface of things. It draws distinctions which separate between our original and acquired perceptions, between the real and the additions which man may have superinduced. It becomes a discerning and enlightened realism, which looks on things as God has made them.

JAMES McCOSH.

Princeton College, N. J.

BIBLE STUDY IN COLLEGE—THE METHODS.

The views advanced in a former article on Bible Study in College are not merely speculative and theoretical. It is possible to make a liberal education distinctively scriptural and christian. The distinctive mark of the cordage of the Royal British navy is an imperishable red thread twisted into every strand of the rope. The rope maker finds it easy enough to introduce it in the process of manufacture. All education ought to have the distinctive red thread of divine truth running through the whole; but the educator must intertwine it with all other truth in the very process of education.

The writer has been directly engaged for seventeen years in reducing his views to practice in the class-room, and he maintains that the problem presents no real difficulty. A concrete plan, matured and verified by experience, is better than elaborate argument and skilful speculation, and far more easily understood and appreciated. Let this be the writer's apology for presenting his own methods in this brief article.

1. Bible study is put into the rank of the severe studies, both for time and work. The course is a three-years' course, called junior, intermediate and senior, and three hours a week are given to each class. Latin, Greek and mathematics can claim no more time. A partial, limited and easy course is not valued in any department because it calls for no effort. Successful labor generates a student's enthusiasm. We therefore coördinate Bible study with the severe studies.

2. The studies of this course are enforced by the same sanctions as others; the same system of grading daily recitations; the same written examinations; the same distinctions for excellence. Graduation in the "Bible Course Proper" is necessary to every degree, and every student in the regular classes of the University is required to take one or more classes of the Bible course every year till it is completed. Some are