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MIND



A QUARTERLY REVIEW

OF

PSYCHOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY.

EDITED BY

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I.—A BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF AN INFANT.

M. Taine's very interesting account of the mental development of an infant, translated in the last number of *MIND* (p. 252), has led me to look over a diary which I kept thirty-seven years ago with respect to one of my own infants. I had excellent opportunities for close observation, and wrote down at once whatever was observed. My chief object was expression, and my notes were used in my book on this subject; but as I attended to some other points, my observations may possibly possess some little interest in comparison with those by M. Taine, and with others which hereafter no doubt will be made. I feel sure, from what I have seen with my own infants, that the period of development of the several faculties will be found to differ considerably in different infants.

During the first seven days various reflex actions, namely sneezing, hickuping, yawning, stretching, and of course sucking and screaming, were well performed by my infant. On the seventh day, I touched the naked sole of his foot with a bit of paper, and he jerked it away, curling at the same time his toes, like a much older child when tickled. The perfection of these reflex movements shows that the extreme imperfection of the voluntary ones is not due to the state of the muscles or of the co-ordinating centres, but to that of the seat of the will. At this time, though so early, it seemed clear to me that a warm soft hand

The *ergo* in Descartes' formula, therefore, may be taken as indicating the fact that my existence—my self-verified existence, at least (see the article on "The Veracity of Consciousness," in MIND, No. V.)—is rendered existent to me as the result or consequence of my Knowing. 'I think, therefore (or thereby) in so far, at least, as I am possessed of self-verifying attributes, I exist to myself.'

W. GEO. DAVIES.

Elements involved in Emotions.—I have long been dissatisfied with the account given of Emotion in books of mental philosophy. In particular great confusion has been introduced by the words 'feeling,' and 'sensibility' being employed to designate two such different things as sensations like pleasure and pain on the one hand, and mental emotions like hope, fear, pity on the other. The former are simple unresolvable states; in the latter are involved several elements. In a work to be published at no distant date I am to make an endeavour to unfold these elements. Meanwhile I present to the readers of MIND a summary of my views.

Four persons of much the same age and temperament are travelling in the same vehicle. At a particular stopping-place it is intimated to them that a certain person has just died suddenly and unexpectedly. One of the company looks perfectly stolid. A second comprehends what has taken place, but is in no way affected. The third looks and evidently feels sad. The fourth is overwhelmed with grief which finds expression in tears, sobs, and exclamations. Whence the difference of the four individuals before us? In one respect they are all alike: an announcement has been made to them. The first is a foreigner, and has not understood the communication. The second had never met with the deceased, and could have no special regard for him. The third had often met with him in social intercourse and business transactions, and been led to cherish a great esteem for him. The fourth was the brother of the departed, and was bound to him by native affection and a thousand ties earlier and later. From such a case we may notice that in order to emotion there is need first of some understanding or apprehension; the foreigner had no feeling because he had no idea or belief. We may observe further that there must secondly be an affection of some kind; for the stranger was not interested in the occurrence. The emotion flows forth from a well, and is strong in proportion to the waters; is stronger in the brother than in the friend. It is evident, thirdly, that the persons affected are in a moved or excited state. A fourth peculiarity has appeared in the sadness of the countenance and the agitations of the bodily frame. Four elements have thus come forth to view.

First, we may note the Affection, the Motive Principle or Spring of Action, or what I prefer calling the Appetence. In the illustrative case there is the love of a friend and the love of a brother. But the Appetence may consist in an immense number and variety of other motive principles, such as the love of pleasure, the love of wealth, or revenge or moral approbation. These appetences may be original,

such as the love of happiness, or they may be acquired, such as the love of money, or of retirement, or of paintings, or of articles of *vertu*, or of dress. These motive powers are at the basis of all emotion. Without the fountain, there can be no flow of waters. The passenger who had no regard for the person whose death was reported to him was not affected with grief. The two who loved him felt sorrow, each according to the depth of his affection.

Secondly, there is an Idea of something, of some object or occurrence as fitted to gratify or disappoint a Motive Principle or Appetence. When the friend and brother of the departed did not know of the occurrence they were not moved. But as soon as the intelligence was conveyed to them and they realised the death, they were filled with sorrow. The Idea is thus an essential element in all emotion. But ideas of every kind do not raise emotion. The stranger had a notion of a death having occurred but was not moved. The idea excited emotion in the breasts of those who had the affection, because the event apprehended disappointed one of the cherished appetences of their minds. The law is, that ideas raise emotion which contemplate the appetible or inappetible—that which gratifies or disappoints an appetence original or acquired.

Thirdly, there is the Conscious Feeling. The soul is in a moved or excited state; hence the word 'emotion'. Along with this there is an attraction or repulsion: we are drawn towards the objects that we love, that is for which we have an appetence, and driven away from those which thwart the appetence. To use looser phraseology, we cling to the good and turn away from the evil, not giving to the good or evil any moral quality. This excitement with the attraction and repulsion is the specially conscious element in the emotions. Yet it all depends on the other two elements, on the affection and the idea of something fitted to gratify or disappoint it. The felt excitement or passion differs according to the nature of the appetence and the depth of it, and according to what the idea that evokes it contains. A smaller gain or loss does not affect us so much as a greater, and the greatness or smallness of the gain or loss is determined by the cherished affection. What is a loss to one is not felt to be so by the other, because the ruling passions of the two men differ.

Fourthly, there is an Organic Affection. The seat of it seems to be somewhere along the base of the brain, whence it influences the nervous centres, producing soothing or exciting or at times exasperating results. This differs widely in the case of different individuals. Some are hurried irresistibly into violent expressions or convulsions. Others feeling no less keenly may appear outwardly calm, because restrained by a strong will, or feel repressed and oppressed, till they get an outlet in some natural flow or outburst. But it is to be observed that this organic affection is not the primary nor the main element in any feeling that deserves the name of emotion, such as hope and fear, joy and sorrow, anguish, reproach, despair. A sentence of a few words, it may be, announces to a man the death of his friend, and reaches his mental apprehension by the sense of hearing. First

he has to understand it, then he feels it because of his cherished affection, and then there is the nervous agitation. Emotion is not as it has often been represented by physiologists a mere nervous reaction from an external stimulus, like the kick which the frog gives when it is kicked. It begins with a mental act and is essentially an operation of the mind.

Each of these four elements has been noticed by different observers. All moralists have talked of the motives by which men are swayed, and attempts have been made by Dugald Stewart and others to classify them. Aristotle remarked *Ὁρεκτικὸν οὐκ ἀνευ φαντασίας* (*De An.*, III. 10), no appetite without a phantasm; and the Stoics represented passion as consisting in idea, and argued that passion could be subdued by controlling the idea. The excitement with the attachment is the prominent characteristic in the common apprehension and especially among novelists. Physiologists are apt to magnify the organic affection, and may be able to throw more light upon it than they have hitherto done. He who can unfold the whole of these four elements and allot to them their relative place and connection, will clear up a subject which is confusedly apprehended at present, will find a good classification of the emotions and be able to show us what emotion is in itself, and what place it has in the human constitution.

JAMES M'COSE.

IX.—CORRESPONDENCE.

MR. TYLOR'S REVIEW OF *The Principles of Sociology*.

Of the criticisms which Mr. Tylor makes on those chapters of the *Principles of Sociology* reviewed by him in the last number of *MIND*, I do not propose to say anything, further than to thank him for pointing out some errors of detail which I hope to correct: not, however, so soon as I should like, since the second edition was nearly through the press before his review appeared. But certain of his statements I feel called upon to notice, because of their personal implications.

These implications are contained in the second paragraph of his review, by the following among other passages:—

“As a worker for many years on the ground where Mr. Spencer is now engaged, I am desirous of noticing where he has followed lines already traced. . . . These chapters may, I think, be properly described as a new statement, with important modifications and additions, of the theory of Animism which (to pass over less complete statements in previous years) was given by me in summary in the *Journal of the Ethnological Society* for April 26, 1870,* and was worked out with great fulness of detail in my *Primitive Culture*, published in 1871. . . . How far his conclusions have been arrived at independently of mine I cannot say. . . . In comparing Mr. Spencer's system with my own, I am naturally anxious to see where the later writer differs from the earlier, and where for the better and where for the worse.”

* In the last No. of *MIND*, this date was erroneously given as 1871.