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MDCCCLIX.

ART. VI.—*The Limits of Religious Thought Examined.* The Bampton Lectures for 1858. By HENRY LONGUEVILLE MANSEL, B.D., Reader in Moral and Metaphysical Philosophy at Magdalen College; Tutor, and late Fellow of St John's College, Oxford.

THE icy and rigid Rationalism of last age has dissolved in the heat of a warmer season, and of late we have had a time of wading deep in melted matter; and now we are in an atmosphere of sultriness and dimness, of haziness and dreaminess. It is universally acknowledged that the logical processes of definition and reasoning can do little in religion; and those who, in days bygone, would have appealed to such forms, are, in these times, betaking themselves to something livelier,—to Feeling, Belief, Inspiration,—or, in one word, to Intuition, which looks at the truth or object at once, and through no interfering process or dimming medium. In last age, certain of our “excelsior” youths were like to be starved in cold; in this age, they are in greater danger of having the seeds of a wasting disease fostered by lukewarm damps and gilded vapours.

The clearest views, they show, are those which we obtain by gazing immediately on the object. Have not, they ask, the seers and sages of our world, poetic and philosophic, seen farther than other men by direct, and not by reflected or introspective vision? Does not our own consciousness witness that we get the farthest-reaching glimpses when we are wholly engrossed in looking out at things, without being at the trouble to analyse our thoughts? There are moments when all thinkers, or certain thinkers, have seen farther than in their usual moods; and this, by overlooking all interposing objects, and gazing full on the truth. Some seem to have experienced ecstatic states, in which, being lifted above themselves and the earth, and carried—whether in the body or out of the body, they know not—into the third heavens, they behold things which it is not possible for man to utter. An entranced minute of such bursting revelation is worth, they say, hours or years of your logically concatenated thought. The soul is then carried as to a great height—above the clouds that rise from the damps of earth—like unto Mount Teneriffe, from which ardent gazers thought they saw land lying to the far West, ages before the practical Columbus actually set foot on America. As there are sounds—such as the sighings of the stream—heard in the stillness of evening which are not audible in the bustle of the day, so there are voices heard in certain quieter moods of the mind which cannot be discerned

when the soul is being agitated by discussion and ratiocination. As there are states of our atmosphere in which remote objects seem near, as there are days in which we can look far down into the ocean and behold its treasures, as the night shows us heavenly lights which are invisible in the glare of common day; so there are day moods and night moods in which we look into great depths, and see the dim as distinct, and behold truths glittering like gems, and brilliant as constellations. At these times it looks as if a veil or cloud were removed, and we see—as it were by polarised light—the inward constitution of things which usually expose but their tame outside; and we gaze on naked truth without the robe which it commonly wears, but which conceals what is infinitely more lovely than itself. Our eye can then look on pure light without being blinded by it; and we stand face to face with truth and beauty and goodness, and, in a sense, with God Himself.

This is a view very often presented in the present day; and it should be admitted at once, that it is by spontaneous, and not by reflective thought, that the mind attains its clearest and most penetrating visions of things. Our mental powers operate spontaneously and act most faithfully when we are taking no notice of them, but are influenced by a simple desire to discover the truth; when the mind is in its best exercises, the interposition of metaphysical introspection and syllogistic formulæ would tend only to dim the clearness of the view. It may be allowed further, that there are times in every man's thinking when great truths come suddenly upon him—times when he feels as if he were emerging at once from a tunnel into the light of day. These are states to be cherished, and not curbed. But it is of vast moment that we understand their precise nature, and the value to be attached to them, and the restrictions to be laid upon the confidence we put in them.

First, In these visions, clear or profound, there are commonly other processes besides simple intuition. Almost always there is involved in them the gathered wisdom of long, and varied, and ripened experience; very often there are analyses more or less refined, generalisations of a narrower or wider scope; and not unfrequently ratiocinations, passing so rapidly, that the processes are not only not analysed, they are not even observed. When Archimedes broke out into such ecstasy on discovering a law of hydrostatics; when the thought flashed on the mind of Newton, that the power which draws an apple to the ground is that which holds the moon in her sphere; when Franklin identified the sparks produced by rubbing certain substances on the earth with the lightning of heaven; when it occurred to Watt that the steam which moved the lid of a kettle might be turned to a

great mechanical purpose ; when the Abbé Haüy, in gathering up the fragments of a crystal, which had accidentally fallen from his hands, surmised that all crystals were derived from a few primitive forms ; when Oken, on looking at the bleached skull of a deer in the Hartz Forest, exclaimed, "This is a vertebrate column,"—every one acknowledges that there was vastly more than intuitional power involved : there were presupposed large original talents of a peculiar kind in each case, habits of scientific research, and long courses of systematic training and observation ; while at the instant there were the highest powers of comparison and computation in exercise. It will be readily allowed that there was a similar combination of native gift, of accumulated experience and connected ratiocination, implied in the discoveries made by Adam Smith and others in political and social science. But we go a step farther, and maintain that the grand views of moral and religious truth, which burst on the vision of our greatest philosophers, were the result of rays coming from a thousand scattered points. When Socrates unfolded to an age and nation deprived of the light of revelation such elevated doctrines regarding a superintending Providence, and the intimate relation between virtue and happiness ; when Plato showed that man participated in the Divine intelligence, and that the forms of nature partook of the ideas or patterns which had been in or before the Divine Mind from all eternity ; when Leibnitz developed his grand theory of a pre-established harmony running through the mental and material universe,—there were in active exercise profound reflection, long observation of human nature and of the ways of God, searching analyses, and a cultivated moral vision. We are sure that there is a similar union involved in those far-reaching glimpses which more obscure men have had, at their better moments, of great moral or spiritual verities regarding the nature of man, and the character and dealings of God.

The leap of waters at the cataract of Niagara is on the instant, yet it is not after all a simple process : antecedent to it there have been rains falling from heaven, and these gathered into a river and acquiring momentum as they move on, and a precipitous cliff formed for their descent ; and in the fall, water, rock, and atmosphere mingle their separate influences. The flash of lightning across the sky is instantaneous, yet it is the produce of long meteorological operations, in which probably air, moisture, sunlight, electricity, and an attracting object, have each had its part ; and it is only on the whole gathering to an overflow that the convulsive effect is produced. There must have been a similar collection of strength and combination of scattered influences in those sudden leaps which certain minds have taken ; as when Augustine abandoned paganism, and Luther left ritu-

alism; and there are the same in those movements of the spirit of man in which it penetrates to immense distances without our being able to follow it through all the intermediate space, and illumines as it passes the densest masses of darkness. It is the business of physical science to explain the one set of processes; and it shows that they are the result of a conspiracy of agencies. It is the office of psychological science to explain the other set of operations; and it can show that there is involved in them a variety of original and acquired endowments. A number of different rays have met in the production of this pure white light. The views are so wide-ranging, because all the inlets of the mind are open to receive impressions.

Secondly, In all these higher visions there is apt to be a mixture of error. The glittering lustre in which the objects are seen, is apt to dazzle the eye, and prevent it from taking too narrow an inspection. The rapidity of the mental process is favourable to the concealment of hastiness of inference, to which we are led by the influence of inferior motives—acting like concealed iron upon the ship's compass. With the desire to discover the truth, there may be united the personal vanity, or the idiosyncrasies of the individual, or the prejudices of the pledged partisan, or the proud and self-righteous temper, or a spirit of contradiction. How often does it happen, in such cases, that the conceits of the fancy or the wishes of the heart are attributed to the reason, that high feeling is mistaken for high wisdom, that what is dark is supposed to be deep, that what is lovely is supposed to be holy! In the region to which they have betaken themselves, objects seem gigantic because perceived in the mist—as they look through the openings in which, persons mistake gilded clouds for sun-lit islands, or mountains based on the earth and piercing the sky.

Besides the error which may be in the original vision, there are apt to be additional mistakes when the individual would unfold it and put it into language. As Aurora Leigh says:—

“It may be, perhaps,
Such have not settled long and deep enough
In trance, to attain to clairvoyance,—and still
The memory mixes with the vision, spoils
And works it turbid.”

The intuitionist often has a genuine feeling; and, when he confines himself to a simple description, his statement, if not altogether free from error, may be a correct transcript of what has passed in his own mind, and may have as vivifying an influence upon others as it has had upon himself. The glow which radiates from such men as Coleridge, when tracing the correspondences between subject and object, or Wordsworth, as he sketches the feelings awakened by the forms and aspects of

nature, or Ruskin, as we gaze with him on the higher works of art, steeps all attendant minds in its own splendours—as the gorgeous evening sun burnishes all objects, clouds as well as landscapes, in its own rich hues. The intuitionist ever succeeds best in poetry, or in prose which is of the character of poetry, and might, if the father of it chose, be wedded to immortal verse. But when he attempts, as he often does, a systematic exposition, scientific, or logical, or philosophical, or theological, of his sentiments, there may now, with the errors of the original writing, be mingled the mistakes that arise from an unfaithful transcription. Every one knows that to feel and to analyse the feeling are two very different exercises; and it often happens that those who feel the most intensely, and even those who think the most profoundly, are the least capacitated for unfolding the process to others. In attempting to do so, they often mix it up with other elements, and the product is a conglomerate, in which truth and error are banded together without the possibility of separating them. In unwinding the threads, they have tangled them; and they become the more hopelessly entangled, the greater the strength which they exert in unravelling them. The pool may—or quite as possibly may not—have been originally pure: it has certainly been rendered altogether turbid by the mud stirred up in the attempt to explore it. As the author of “Hours with the Mystics” says, “This intuitional metal, in its native state, is mere fluent, formless quicksilver: to make it definite and serviceable, you must fix it by an alloy; but then, alas! it is *pure* Reason no longer, and, so far from being universal truth, receives a countless variety of shapes, according to the temperament, culture, or philosophic party of the individual thinker.”

These visions, raptures, and ecstasies are most apt to appear in philosophy and theology; and it is there they work most mischief. The intuitionist is ever placing things in their wrong category, dividing the things which should be joined, or mixing the things which should be separated. His analogies overlook differences; his distinctions set aside resemblances. His limitations are like the mad attempts of Xerxes to chain the ocean. His definitions are like the boundings of a cloud—while he is pointing to them they are changed;—indeed his whole method is like a project to make roads and run fences in cloudland. In metaphysics, he represents as essences what are in fact nothing but attenuated ghosts, created by his own oppressed vision as it looks into darkness. The Neo-Platonists pretended to see the One and the Good by ecstasy; what they saw was merely an abstract quality separated from the concrete object. They tried to raise up emotion by the contemplation of the skeleton attribute, but in this they did and could not succeed; for it is not by abstrac-

tion that feeling is excited, but by the presentation of an individual and living reality. The attempt in the present age, by certain metaphysical speculators, to call forth feeling by the presentation of the True, the Beautiful, the Good, must terminate in a similar failure. It is not by the contemplation of truth, but of the God of truth; not by the contemplation of loveliness, but of the God of loveliness; not by the contemplation of the good, but of the good God, that feelings of adoration and love are called forth and gratified.

There are still greater perils attending the indulgence of these inspirations in matters of religion. The intuitionist is tempted to ascribe to some higher influence the idea which arises simply from the law of association or organic impulse; to attribute to intuition what is mere floating sentiment—to pure reason what is the product of habit or of passion—nay, to God Himself what springs from the fallible human heart. The height to which the soul is carried in these elevations is apt to have a dizzying influence; and not a few have fallen when they seemed to themselves to be standing most secure. Some, pretending to a heavenly mission, have yielded at once to the temptation which the true Messenger withstood; and, without a promise of one to bear them up in their presumption, have cast themselves down from the pinnacle to which they were elevated, and been lost amidst the laughter of men. Some have claimed for their own conceits the inspiration of Heaven; and have come to deify their own imaginations, and to sanctify their schemes of ambition, by representing them as formed under the sanction of God.

Thirdly, The error is to be detected by a careful reflex examination of the spontaneous process of intuition, or, what is more frequent, of the intuition with certain conjoined elements. That error may creep into these visions and raptures, is evident from the circumstance, that scarcely any two inspirationalists agree even when pretending to have revelations on the same point; and when they do concur, it is evidently because of the dominant authority of some great master. How, then, are we to decide among the claims of the rival sages, or seers, or doctors, or schools? Plainly by inquiring which of them, if any, are in fact under the influence of a native intuition; and this is to be done by an inductive inquiry into the nature of our intuitions, and by trying the proposed dogma or feeling by the tests, thus discovered, of intuition.

In no other department of human investigation, except speculative philosophy and theology, will an indiscriminate appeal to intuition or feeling be allowed in the present day. Mathematics admit of no such loose methods of procedure. The fundamental principles of that science are, no doubt, founded on intuition; but

then it is on intuitions carefully enunciated and formalised, and the whole superstructure is banded by rigid logical deduction. Physical science will not tolerate any such anticipations except at times in the way of suggesting hypotheses, to be immediately tried by a rigid induction of facts, and accepted or rejected only as they can stand the test. In political science there is a necessity for the weighing of conflicting principles, and room for clearness of head and far-seeing sagacity; but in these operations mere intuition has a small share, and is not allowed to pass till it is carefully sifted. It is surely high time that intuition were prevented from careering without restraint in the fields of philosophy and theology, and that rules were laid down, not for absolutely restraining it, but for confining it within its legitimate province.

The sole corrective of the evil, the only mean of separating the error from the truth, is to be found in a cool reflex examination of the spontaneous process. This is needed, even when the idea is one which has occurred to our own minds, to protect them from the self-deception to which all are liable, to provide them with a safety-lamp when they would enter dark subterranean passages; or with a chart when they would venture on a sea of speculation; or with a compass to tell the direction when they would go out beyond the measured and fenced ground of thought into a waste, above which clouds for ever hover, and where are precipices over which multitudes are for ever falling. Needed to guard us even in our personal musings, it will surely be acknowledged that it is still more necessary when others demand our assent to their proffered visions, lest what we pick up be

“Like cast-off nosegays picked up on the road,
The worse for being warm.”

Not that this review of the spontaneous thought should set out with the fixed purpose of rejecting all that has been suggested; on the contrary, it should retain and carefully cherish all that may be good, and cast away only what cannot stand a sifting inspection. But the testing, in order to accomplish these ends, must proceed on certain principles. So far as the spontaneous exercise professes to be guided by an induction of facts, it must be tried by the canons of the logic of induction. So far as it involves ratiocination, the approved rules of reasoning must determine its validity. So far as it claims to be intuitional, metaphysical science is entitled to demand that the principle involved be shown to be in the very constitution of the mind, self-evident, necessary, universal; and further, that its determinate rule be specified and formalised, so that we may see whether it covers the case in hand.

In moral subjects, *first thoughts* are often the best, because

formed prior to the calculations of selfishness. They may not, however, always be the best ; for they may proceed from passion, which, in fallen man, is as spontaneous and quite as quick as any moral impulse. As a general rule, neither the *first* nor the *second* thoughts are the best ; but the *last* thoughts of a studious course of reflection, in which both first and second thoughts are reviewed, that which is good in each being preserved, and that which is evil rejected. The same remark holds good of the exercises of the intellect. The first views of the truth are frequently the freshest and the justest. It has been remarked, that the first view of the new-born infant discloses a resemblance to father or mother which the subsequent growth of the child effaces ; and there is often a similar power of penetration in the first glance of the intellectual eye, directed towards a truth presented for the first time : the prominent features are then caught on the instant, and correspondences are detected which disappear on a more familiar acquaintance, being lost sight of among other qualities. But while these original glimpses are often very precious, and are to be carefully noted and registered, it is equally true that first impressions often contain large mixture of error. At these times of intense rapture and ardent longing, the mind seizes eagerly on what presents itself, and is incapable of drawing distinctions, and may utterly neglect other aspects, which are only to be detected by longer and more familiar acquaintance. Hence the need of cool reflection to come after, and retain only what can be justified by the rules of logic. As the first looks of the infant reveal features which are subsequently lost sight of, so the last look of the dying will call up once more likenesses which had escaped our notice in the interval. Let there be a similar holding of all the true analogies caught in the first look in those last looks, which, after many a survey, we cherish and retain for ever of the objects which excite our interests and claim our regards.

Verily these intuitionists must be made, by some scientific process, to consume their own smoke, which is so polluting the atmosphere. We have a work before us eminently fitted to lay an arrest on this speculative spirit, whether it founds on a formal rationalism or a loose intuition.

Mr Mansel is known to all who take an interest in such studies, as one of the greatest living logicians and metaphysicians in our country. In respect of learning, we know no English-speaking philosopher to be put on the same high level. In all his writings there is an acuteness equal to that of the Doctor Subtilis or the most illustrious of the schoolmen. With these are conjoined a modesty, a candour, a love of truth, and a reverence for Divine teaching, which win our confidence, and endear him to every genuine mind. Albeit only in middle age,

he is already an extensive author. His "Notes to the Logic of Aldrich"—whose musical pieces and whose church-architecture the students of Oxford are impudent enough to prefer to his *Artis Logicæ Rudimenta*—are so learned and acute, that we only wish he had hung them on a better pillar; as Sir W. Hamilton says, "La sauce vaut mieux que le poisson." His *Prolegomena Logica*, some of the doctrines of which were first expounded by him in this *Review*, have carried certain questions in metaphysics to as advanced a stage as they have reached in this country. We agree with him, that logic is, in a sense, dependent on psychology; at the same time, we would give a somewhat different account of the relation. The laws of thought, which logic unfolds and applies, are in the mind *a priori*, and independent of our observation of them; but they act spontaneously, and are not before the consciousness as laws; and we can discover and express them only *a posteriori*, and by an induction of their individual actings.¹ But the great merit of the work lies in drawing attention to certain differences in the meaning and interpretation of our intuitive convictions. It is now generally admitted, that necessity is at least one characteristic (self-evidence seems to us a prior one) of fundamental truths; and Mr Mansel has shown that it is needful to distinguish between different kinds of necessity, such as logical and metaphysical, thus contributing to what should be the metaphysical work of the coming age the exact expression and interpretation of these intuitions of the mind. His *Article on Metaphysics*, in the *Encyclopædia Britannica*, carries us over the whole wide subject. We should have wished to dwell on its numerous excellences, especially in regard to the place which it gives to our consciousness of self and conviction of personality; but this would require a whole article,

¹ The following works on Logic, lately published, have deservedly a name on the continent of Europe:—"System der Logik von Ueberweg," and "Essais de Logique par Waddington." In the latter, Hamilton's views as to induction and consciousness are examined. Among works of Religious Philosophy, Dr Scheukel's "Die Christliche Dogmatik vom Standpunkte des Gewissens aus dargestellt," and Dr Ulrici's "Glauben und Wissen," are worthy of special commendation. The former is especially noteworthy, as treating fully of a topic so often discussed by British philosophers since the days of Butler, the nature of Conscience, and is peculiar in representing the conscience as (too exclusively, we think) the religious organ. In a long article in the last number of the leading philosophical journal of Germany, "Zeitschrift für Philosophie und philosophische Kritik," conducted by Fichte, Ulrici, and Wirth, Dr Ulrici formally gives his adhesion to the doctrine of Dr M'Cosh (the article is a review of the "Method of Divine Government"), as against the *a priori* speculation of Germany, and maintains, that while the soul proceeds on fundamental (*a priori*) principles, it is at the same time unconscious of these principles, and needs therefore observation and classification, in short, induction, in order to their discovery. The article closes with expressing a wish to have the intuitions of the mind, in regard to their "nature, rule, and limits," carefully unfolded in the inductive manner. Surely this is not without significance, as coming from Germany.

and we have other interesting matter before us at present ; some of the more important points in which we agree with and differ from him will come out as we review the "Bampton Lectures." Mr Mansel has likewise minor works. He has a "Lecture on the Philosophy of Kant," containing important strictures on that great thinker, but adopting, as it appears to us, too many of his principles, and expecting the Kantian philosophy to effect a good in this country which it has failed to accomplish in Germany, where thinkers, starting with his critical method, declined to stop where he paused. He has a letter on the "Conception of Eternity," in which he shows that Mr Maurice has set aside the laws of thought in his view of the world to come. He has a pamphlet on the "Limits of Demonstrative Evidence," in which he exposes some of the excesses of Dr Whewell, who makes a number of truths *a priori* which are evidently *a posteriori*; but perhaps has himself been guilty of defects, in not admitting that the demonstrations of mathematics have an objective value in regard to bodies so far as they have extension, and that we have a native conviction of power, which has a similar but more limited objective value in regard to body as exercising force. He has an admirable lecture on "Psychology as the Test of Moral and Metaphysical Philosophy." And now we have these "Bampton Lectures," which will raise him to a high rank as a Christian philosopher. The notes give evidence of extensive reading of works ancient and modern, British and continental. In the Lectures themselves, the inevitable dryness and technicality of certain discussions is relieved by apophthegms of profound practical wisdom and bursts of noble eloquence.

The work may be regarded as an application to theology of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy of the Unconditioned. Every deep and influential system of philosophy has had its religious or irreligious applications by the founder of the system or his disciples. The philosophies of Plato, of Aristotle, of Zeno, of Descartes, of Locke, of Leibnitz, of Hutcheson, of Butler, of Kant, of Schelling, and Hegel, have all been carried by the men themselves, or their admiring followers, into religion,—in some cases to do little good to the cause of sacred truth, the simplicity of which they served to corrupt. We have now, in these Lectures of Mr Mansel, the philosophy of Hamilton in its supposed religious aspect. Its value is represented as being chiefly negative in arresting rash speculation, both in favour of religion and against it. Mr Mansel applies it to cut up by the roots the Rational theology, which sprung up in Germany posterior to Kant, and which has of late come over to our country from that thinking shop of Europe. It is now nearly thirty years since Sir W. Hamilton published his tremendous criticism of the Philosophy

of the Unconditioned. This work of Mr Mansel does for Rational theology what the work of Hamilton did for the theories of the Absolute. No systematic attempt has been made to repel the battering-ram assaults of the Scottish metaphysician; and we scarcely expect that the supporters of a speculative theology will ever venture to meet, one by one, the equally acute arguments of the English divine.

“It is to a philosopher of our own age and country that we must look for the true theory of the limits of human thought, as applicable to theological, no less than to metaphysical researches—a theory exhibited, indeed, in a fragmentary and incomplete form, but containing the germ of nearly all that is requisite for a full exposition of the system. The celebrated article of Sir William Hamilton on the Philosophy of the Unconditioned, contains the key to the understanding and appreciation of nearly the whole body of modern German speculation. His great principle, that ‘the Unconditioned is incognisable and inconceivable, its notion being only negative of the Conditioned, which last can alone be positively known or conceived,’ has suggested the principal part of the inquiries pursued in the present work.”—*Preface*.

We are not to understand from this modest admission that the author is a slavish follower of the late distinguished Edinburgh philosopher, whom all thinkers are so constrained to revere. In several points he separates from Hamilton, and in all of these we thoroughly concur with Mr Mansel. Hamilton has established “truths that awake to perish never,”—truths which will go down through all time, for a while in an isolated stream, with rocky, sharp-cut banks, and then mingled with the great river of truth which is ever gathering accessions as it flows on. But there has been a general feeling among all, except a few devoted pupils, that he has overlooked some of the deepest intuitive convictions of our constitution, or referred to them, under the name of “beliefs,” only to decline to discuss them. He is emphatically the Kant of Scotland and of the nineteenth century. In Germany, thinkers were not satisfied with the dry forms and categories of Kant, which kept men at such a distance from living realities, and are, in fact, no more the full exhibition of our mental constitution than the bones are of our bodily frame, and they would no more abide there than they would in a room of skeletons; and so, taking with them certain of the principles of the critical method, they stuffed the bones and formed a figure of gigantic dimensions, put convulsive life into it, and called it Realism. We believe that, in like manner, the youth of the coming age, even of the present age, and that even in Edinburgh, will not be satisfied with Hamilton’s negations, relations, and conditions, but will strive to get nearer realities—may we hope in the inductive, and not in the *a priori* or critical method.

We are glad to find Mr Mansel taking great pains, in all his greater works, to show that we have a knowledge of self. It is thus announced in "Prolegomena Logica," p. 129 :—"I am immediately conscious of myself seeing and hearing, willing and thinking. This self-personality, like all other simple and immediate presentations, is indefinable; but it is so because it is superior to definition. It can be analysed into no simpler elements, for it is itself the simplest of all; it can be made no clearer by description or comparison, for it is revealed to us in all the clearness of an original intuition." The doctrine is stated and defended at length in the article on Metaphysics, where (p. 618) he speaks of the consciousness of personality as "an ontology, in the highest sense of the term." And now, in these Lectures, p. 348, he says, "This conscious self is itself the *Ding an sich*, the standard by which all representations of personality must be judged, and from which our notion of reality, as distinguished from appearance, is originally derived." This seems to us to be the true doctrine, and is very different from that of Kant, who, by making our very knowledge of self *phenomenal* (as opposed to *real*), and affirming that the mind in its knowledge superinduces on the object something not in the object, opened an outlet which allowed all the pantheistic extravagances of Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel to flow out. When we return to the natural doctrine, and suppose that the mind has an immediate knowledge of self, as a *thing in itself*, and that attached to this there is a necessary conviction of personality, we have laid an arrest on every form of Pantheism.

We are glad to find too, that, in common with nearly all who have referred to the subject, Mr Mansel does not concur in Hamilton's doctrine of causation. He criticises it in the article in the *Encyclopædia* (p. 601), and in these Lectures describes it as unsatisfactory (p. 381). If Hamilton's doctrine of causation be disallowed, so must also we suspect his doctrine, never fully expounded, of substance and property; for, as Locke again and again says, and as Kant admits, power is involved in our idea of substance. Mr Mansel further (Bamp. Lect., p. 311) criticises Hamilton's doctrine of creation being "an evolution." "All that is now *actually* existent in the universe, this we think, and must think, as having, prior to creation, *virtually* existed in the Creator." We agree with Mr Mansel, that this statement scarcely accords with the principles of his general system, but it shows how defective the view of causation which could have issued in such a declaration.

When Mr Mansel has taken these steps in advance of Kant, and, we believe, of Hamilton too, we regret that he has not gone a little farther in the same direction. If we have an intuitive

knowledge of self, why not suppose that we have likewise an intuitive knowledge of body—at least of body in its primary qualities, let us say, of our organism as extended. The only satisfactory theory of man's mental acquirements is that which makes him begin, not with ideas or phenomena, but with knowledge, and this a knowledge of things, of things presenting themselves, of self and body presented to self. Mr Mansel admits this in regard to self. But surely consciousness testifies that our knowledge of the object body, is knowledge quite as certainly as our knowledge of the subject mind; and that we know the one (body) to be reality, quite as much as we know the other to be a reality. It is at least quite in the spirit of Hamilton to put the two—our knowledge of the object and the subject—on the same footing: not that either knowledge is absolute, but both are positive, and not simply phenomenal or relative. We know both self and body presented to self as having an existence independent of our knowledge of them, or of the mind contemplating them. He who does not bring out this is overlooking some of the essential features of our original and intuitive convictions.

Mr Mansel has dissented from Hamilton's theory of causation. We do not regard his own as full and complete; yet a single step in advance in the direction in which he is going would conduct him to the right result. He affirms that we know self—he affirms that we know self as a person; let him just add, that we know self, in certain exercises of it, as a power—and we have a result, supported by consciousness, and fitted to extricate metaphysics from a host of difficulties. The universal statement is, that we do not know mind except by its properties; but what are properties, at least certain properties, but powers? If this view be correct, then we are not at liberty, with Mr Mansel (p. 173, etc.), to call cause an "unknown something" which "still remains absolutely concealed." The language of Mr Mansel, as applied to personality, may be transferred to it: "It is undefinable, but it is because it is superior to definition. It can be analysed into no simpler elements, for it is itself the simplest of all; it can be made no clearer by description or comparison, for it is revealed in all the clearness of an original intuition."

On yet a third point we are inclined to think that the philosophy both of Hamilton and Mansel is deficient: we refer to their account of man's conviction in regard to the infinite. So far as we have perused the writings of philosophers and divines, we think we are justified in representing the great body of profound thinkers as maintaining, on the one hand, that the finite mind of man cannot comprehend the infinite, while, on the other hand, the mind has some sort of intuitive conviction in regard to

infinity. Even Sir W. Hamilton and Mr Mansel, while they hold that man's conception of infinity is a mere impotence and a negation, do yet fully allow that man has a belief in infinity. Mr Mansel says (p. 64), "We feel that God is indeed, in His incomprehensible Essence, absolute and infinite;" and again, more fully (p. 67), "We are compelled by the constitution of our minds to believe in the existence of an Absolute and Infinite Being." Now we could have wished that these eminent men had stated precisely the nature of this belief, feeling, conviction; that they had shown how it stands related to our cognitions, and that they had vindicated its validity and authority. Till this is done, it will ever be felt by many to be unsatisfactory to represent our conception as a mere impotence and a negation, and then to hand us over to a belief of which no account is given. It appears to us that our belief in the infinite, like our belief in everything else, proceeds on a cognition. We have a knowledge (limited) of such objects as space and time, and we can rise to a positive, though of course partial, knowledge of God; and in regard to these objects, we are "compelled by the constitution of our minds" to believe them infinite. We go a step farther: this belief is a belief in something—aye, and in something apprehended, or it would be a belief in *zero*. It is the office of psychology to bring out the precise nature of this apprehension. It will be felt to be a most inadequate conception: never do we feel our creature impotency more, than when we try to form a conception of the infinite. Yet there is an apprehension, and a positive apprehension, to which the belief is attached. We apprehend, say, space and time stretching away farther and farther; but to whatever point we go, we are constrained to believe in a space and time beyond. There is thus a positive belief attached to a positive apprehension; and both the one and the other native and necessary. Such a conception, with its attached beliefs, is very inadequate; but still it is sufficient to enable us to think and speak about infinity intelligibly and without a contradiction.

The reference in these passages to "beliefs" leads us to point out another oversight in this work of Mr Mansel, and in the philosophy of Hamilton so far as it has been given to the public. Sir W. Hamilton says, "By a wonderful revelation we are thus, in the very consciousness of our inability to conceive aught above the relative and finite, inspired with a belief in the existence of something unconditioned, beyond the sphere of all comprehensive reality" (Discuss., p. 15). He speaks of a horizon of faith beyond the domain of knowledge, and Mr Mansel frequently uses similar language. Always after limiting with terrible stringency our cognitive power, this whole school is ever

referring us to a circumambient region of faith, dark, or at least unexplored; and, on conducting us to its verge, they leave us to find our way as best we can, or as we please. As Kant saved himself from the nihilism of the Speculative Reason by an appeal to Practical Reason, and as others in Germany tried to secure the same end by faith or feeling, so the school of Hamilton, after so limiting our cognitive power that they seem to land us in nescience, hastens to call in faith to save us from an issue from which the mind draws back with shuddering. We know what followed in Germany;—one set of men attacked the Practical Reason and the Faith with the criticism which had been employed against the Speculative Reason; while others turned Faith or Feeling to purposes which they were never meant to accomplish. In order to prevent such consequences on the destructive or constructive side from issuing out of Hamilton's philosophy, we must have these obscure and mysterious "faiths" brought out to view, and their nature, value, and limits explained. If this is not done, some will allow themselves to remain in the coldness of nescience and negation rather than go out into a region of darkness, while others may allow themselves in the most extravagant beliefs; and it will turn out that nothing has been gained by expelling the intuitionist from the field of cognition, if you allow him to run or ride, to drive or fly, at pleasure in the region of faith. Our beliefs are as essential a part of our mental constitution as our cognitions or conceptions. It is the business of psychology, and of metaphysics too, to unfold our native beliefs as well as our knowledge and notions. The beliefs so gather round our cognitions, that it is impossible for us to have a full or clear view of the latter if we do not determine accurately the nature of the former. As much error and confusion have arisen in theology and religion from the abuse of our native faith as of our native knowledge. We are convinced that there are tests wherewith to try and limit our belief, just as there are tests to try our intuitive knowledge; nay, we believe that the tests which restrain the one are substantially the same with those which restrain the other. But as man has constitutional beliefs, and as these are so liable to abuse, being so restrained by one party and not at all restrained by another party, we desiderate that this work on the "Limits of Thought" be followed by another on the "Limits of Native Faith."

There are two distinctions borrowed from Kant, frequently employed by Mr Mansel, to which we must here refer, as being liable to great abuse. One of these is the distinction between "form" and "matter;" a phraseology which has been employed in so many and incongruous senses by Aristotle, by Bacon, by Kant, and by logicians, that, like the word "idea," which has

also assumed so many suspicious *aliases*, it were better to banish it from the kingdom of mind altogether, and send it back to the material world from which it came. As used in the Kantian sense, the distinction implies that the mind imposes on the object, or "matter," a "form" not in the object itself. The whole idealism of Fichte, of Schelling, and Hegel is shut up here, and must fly out as soon as this Pandora's box is opened. For if the mind in cognition may add one thing, why not two or ten things—why not all things? The only way of escape from these consequences is to return to the natural system, and to suppose that the mind is so constituted as to know the object—say self or body presented to self—not absolutely, or in all its qualities and relations, but still the object so far, and within certain limits.

Out of this has arisen another Kantian distinction also liable to be perverted. As stated by Mr Mansel, it is the distinction between the regulative and speculative use of knowledge: "The highest principles of thought and action to which we can attain are regulative, and not speculative." "They do not tell us what things are in themselves, but how we must conduct ourselves in relation to them" (p. 141). Again, "How far the knowledge we can attain of God represents God as He is, we know not, and have no need to know" (p. 146). "Action, and not knowledge, is man's destiny and duty in this life" (p. 149). Now, we maintain with Aristotle, that man was "organised for knowledge." We acknowledge that human knowledge cannot furnish grounds for the speculations which the German metaphysicians and their followers in this country have built on it. This can be shown by an inductive inquiry into the nature of that knowledge. Still this knowledge is not nescience, but knowledge positive and trustworthy so far as it goes. Any further knowledge of the same object possessed by other beings, such as angels, would not set it aside, but simply add to it. All existing objects might be represented as polygons,—some perhaps with a hundred sides, some with a thousand, and the Supreme Being with an infinite number; and of these man may see only a few, perhaps a half dozen or a dozen, still what he sees is real: the knowledge may not be sufficient to enable him to construct the mathematics of the figure, or to discover all the relations of side to side and side to centre; still what he sees are real sides of the very thing, and, if he could see other sides, or all the sides, it would not even modify his first knowledge, but simply enlarge it.

We are now in circumstances to judge of the philosophy of the Conditioned in its reference to theology. And, first, let us view it in its bearing on Natural Theology. Sir W. Hamilton declares that "the only valid argument for the existence of God, or the immortality of the soul, rests on the grounds of man's moral

nature" (Discuss., p. 623). And Mr Mansel concurs: "The speculative argument is unable to prove the existence of a Supreme Being" (p. 103). Hamilton, like Kant, was obliged to hold this view in logical consistency. For Hamilton has unfortunately given his adhesion to Kant in regard to causation, which the latter represented as a form or category imposed by the mind on things, as a mere law of thought, and not of things. We acknowledge that it is a law of thought, but it is a law of thought in reference to things. On discovering an effect, we are intuitively convinced that it must have had a cause, and that if the effect be a real thing, so must also be the cause. We are not unfolding all that is in the intuitive conviction, we are not interpreting it aright, if we do not make it embrace all this. When we take this view of causation, the argument from the traces of order and design can be fully vindicated, quite as much so as that from man's moral nature. Indeed, if the argument from causation be rejected, that from man's moral nature may be repelled on the same grounds; for if the intuition in regard to causation has no objective value, we may suppose that our conviction in regard to moral good is quite as impotent.

All this, we admit, does not prove that God is infinite or supreme; and we rather think that no man of note ever said that it did. In establishing this further truth, we must take along with us man's intuitive conviction as to infinity. Kant and Hamilton are precluded from this by their defective view of man's conviction on this subject. When viewed under these aspects, the deficiencies of the philosophy of the Conditioned come out very prominently to the view. It does not enable us to give an exposition of certain great truths which the Bible presupposes, such as that a God exists, the invisible Maker of the visible universe.

Viewed in its reference to Christian divinity, the philosophy of the Conditioned is fitted to serve, and, as used in these pages, it is made to serve, some important purposes. No doubt it deprives us of some of the internal evidences in favour of Christianity which divines have been accustomed, and, we think, legitimately, to advance; this it does because of such oversights as those we have pointed out. But, on the other hand, it delivers us from an immense amount of rash speculation, whether as employed in Dogmatic or Rational Theology. There always will be, and there always should be, a systematic divinity; but, provided always that no portion of revealed truth be pared away, we have no objections to see it relieved from many of the old logical distinctions with which it has been shackled, and from being identified with abstruse metaphysical principles, which certain schools of philosophy affirm and others as stoutly deny. It is certain that every plant which our heavenly Father hath not planted shall be rooted

up. But in exciding the exploded logic and philosophy of former ages, it might be as well to resist, at the same time, the introduction of the German distinctions of Kant and Schleiermacher, lest they too become antiquated in next age, or possibly even in this age.

In the first of these Bampton Lectures there is a definition of Dogmatism and Rationalism; and it is shown how the one is apt to err by forcing reason into accordance with revelation, and the other by forcing revelation into accordance with reason. In the second Lecture Mr Mansel points out with great distinctness the two opposite methods by which a Philosophy of Religion may be attempted: the one, the objective or metaphysical, based upon a supposed knowledge of the nature of God; the other, the subjective or psychological, based on a knowledge of the mental faculties of man. He enters on a criticism of the first. It is here that his searching review bears the closest analogy to the formidable assault of Hamilton on the Philosophy of the Absolute. He labours to show that the fundamental ideas of Rational Theology—the Absolute, the Infinite, the First Cause—involve mutual contradictions; and that there are further contradictions involved in the coexistence of the Absolute and Relative, the Infinite and the Finite. We are not sure that we can concur in all the strong statements made on this subject by the school of Hamilton. Some of them are advanced in the very manner of the Eleatic Zeno, when, in order to shut men up into the doctrine that all things are one and immoveable, he tried to show that there are contradictions in the idea of motion. Ever since Kant propounded his Antinomies, or supposed contradictions of reason, it has been the delight of the schools ramifying from him to multiply contradictions. It appears to us to be possible both to think and speak about motion, and about the Infinite, the Absolute, and the First Cause, without landing ourselves in contradictions. There are native convictions collecting round all these subjects, and as long as we keep to them, and give the exact expression of them, we are not landed even in seeming inconsistencies. We admit freely, that whenever we pass beyond the limited portion of truth thus intuitively revealed, we are landed in darkness and in mystery,—any assertions we make will in fact be meaningless, and rash assertions may be contradictory on the supposition that they have a meaning,—but then the contradictions do not lie in our native convictions, but in our unwarranted statements;—it can be shown that the Antinomies of Kant are not real contradictions in the *dicta* of reason, but merely in his own mutilated account of them, derived from criticism, and not from induction. Not a little confusion is produced in these discussions, by looking on infinite and cause as if they were entities, whereas infinity and power are merely

attributes of an entity, say of God. We never could see even the appearance of a contradiction between the idea of an infinite space and an infinite God on the one hand, and a finite piece of matter and a finite creature on the other. The supposed contradiction arises only when we make unwarranted statements about the one or the other. The real mystery arises only when, not satisfied with the fact of the existence of both, we put unmeaning questions about the *how*, or about some unknown bond of relation. The following is the account which we are inclined to give of what Mr Mansel has actually done in the second lecture :—With an acuteness which we have never seen surpassed, he shows how we land ourselves in darkness whenever we, who know but in part, make assertions as if we knew the whole, and how those who would construct a Rational Theology out of the ideas of Infinity and First Cause, land themselves in positive contradictions. As he says in another Lecture :—

“Reason does not deceive us if we only read her witness aright; and reason herself gives us warning when we are in danger of reading it wrong. The light that is within us is not darkness, only it cannot illuminate that which is beyond the sphere of its rays. The self-contradictions into which we inevitably fall when we attempt certain courses of speculation, are the beacons placed by the hand of God in the mind of man to warn us that we are deviating from the track which He designs us to pursue; that we are striving to pass the barriers which He has planted around us. The flaming sword turns every way against those who strive in the strength of their own reason to force their passage to the tree of life.”—P. 198.

In the third Lecture he examines the Philosophy of Religion as constructed from the laws of the human mind. He enunciates four conditions of all human consciousness. Knowing the abuse made of them by Professor Ferrier, we are suspicious of conditions laid down so rigidly, and without a previous induction. We acknowledge no conditions of consciousness, except those laws of human intelligence which can be discovered by a careful and cautious observation, which, in discovering the existence of the laws, will also discover their limits. The conditions are :—distinction between one object and another; relation between subject and object; succession and duration; and personality;—all of which he endeavours to show are inconsistent with an idea of the Infinite or Absolute. It appears clear to us that there are native convictions attached to all these subjects, viz., the difference between things made known to us; the difference between self and not-self; time; and personality;—what we desiderate is to have these stated fully and cautiously, not as conditions, but as facts. When these convictions are properly enunciated, all appearance of contradiction between them and the native convic-

tion which the mind has of the Infinite will disappear. Every man has a necessary conviction of his personality ; but there is no seeming contradiction between this and our conviction, that there is an infinite God. I am led to look on God as a person ; and if personality be viewed as an attribute, there is really no inconsistency in supposing God to possess the further attribute of infinity. We deny that "the only human conception of personality is that of limitation" (p. 119). This statement might come consistently from a Kantian, who, starting with a number of other and artificial forms, has most inexcusably overlooked personality as a native conviction. But Mr Mansel has told us that personality is revealed in all the "clearness of an original intuition." Transfer this indefinable attribute to God, and transfer at the same time our intuitive conviction as to infinity to God, and we can see no incongruity. A mystery may arise, we admit, when we travel beyond our convictions. Mr Mansel has shown how those who would construct a Rational Theology out of these mysteries land themselves in hopeless contradictions.

In the fourth Lecture he expounds what he regards as the two principal modes of religious intuition, which are a feeling of dependence, and a sense of moral obligation. The former is represented as implying a Personal Superior, and prompting to prayer ; while the latter implies a Moral Governor, and gives a sense of sin and of the need of an expiation. Mr Mansel is now on ground which we rejoice to see him occupying ; and we can go along with him freely and buoyantly without our being for ever in terror of running on a bristling barrier, or of being crushed in the collision of a contradiction. It is here we find him showing that the mind has a belief in the Infinite, and a "conviction that the Infinite does exist, and must exist." Right heartily do we concur in his exposition of moral obligation, and of the great truths involved in it : we only wish that he had been equally fearless in his interpretation of our intellectual intuitions. In regard to the feeling of dependence, we may be permitted to say, that while we look on it as native, we regard it as issuing from a combination of different convictions ever pressing themselves on us. Feeling or emotion, we might show, is always attached to an apprehension of something ; and we think we can specify the apprehensions which give rise to the feeling of dependence. All that we see or know on earth points to a higher cause. Providence, in particular, is impressing us with our dependence on arrangements made independent of us. Our sense of obligation points to a Being to whom we are at all times responsible, and to whom we must at last give an account of the deeds done in the body, whether they have been good or evil. Our sense of sin and of want ever prompt us to look out for one who may supply what

we need. Nor is it to be omitted, that the conviction we have of the Infinite is ever prompting us to bow before one who is inconceivably above us. The feeling of dependence seems to us the result of such deep convictions as these. We can, therefore, agree with Mr Mansel in thinking that Schleiermacher has by no means given the right account of it; and we have to thank him for his criticism of the fundamental position of the Schleiermacher philosophy and theology.

We have already noticed the distinction between speculative and regulative truth: it is drawn by Mr Mansel at the close of the fourth and in the fifth Lecture. Our doctrine on this subject is, that man does know truth positively, but that he knows truth only "in part," and ever errs when he supposes that his knowledge is absolute. And hence we can agree with nearly all that he says so ingeniously as to the analogy between man's constitution and the mode in which instruction is given in the Bible, so adapted to man's finite comprehension. The two are in unison, in that both imply that man's capacity of knowledge is limited. The inspired writers "prophesy in part" to beings who can "know but in part."

In the sixth Lecture we have admirable parallels between our ignorance as to religious truths and our ignorance in regard to philosophic truth. "Reason gains nothing by repudiating revelation; for the mystery of revelation is the mystery of reason" (p. 178). We thank him for the rebuke administered to those who look on the mode of procedure by natural law as involved in our idea of God.

In the seventh Lecture he speaks of human morality as being relative, not absolute. At the same time he insists (p. 206) that there is an "absolute morality," that there is "a higher and unchangeable principle" embodied in these human and relative forms. We ask him how he knows this, or how he can prove this? For if the mind's "forms" may modify morality in one thing, why not in others?—why not in all, till we are landed in moral nescience? We save ourselves from these consequences by declaring, that man's convictions of morality are at once positive and limited—positive as distinguished from relative, and limited as distinguished from absolute. Man's moral cognition being thus limited, we agree with all that Mr Mansel says about our not being in a position to judge of God's judgments which are unsearchable, and His ways which are past finding out.

In the eighth and last Lecture he gives a summary of the Christian Evidences, internal and external. We are inclined to give a larger place to the internal evidences than he is able to do, in consequence of his imposing such terribly stringent limits to the objective value of our intuitive convictions. We, too, have

a limit which we impose ;—it is, that the internal principle appealed to, be shown to be in the constitution of the mind, and be rigidly inducted. We most heartily concur in all that he says, so admirably and so devoutly, in closing, as to the difficulties of revealed religion arising from the limited nature of our faculties, and as forming part of our training and discipline in this present life.

There are perplexities in philosophy as well as in theology, which the human intellect cannot make straight any more than it can square the circle. We who dwell in a world “where day and night alternate,” we who go everywhere accompanied with our own shadow, cannot expect to be absolutely delivered from the darkness. Man is so constituted that he can admire, and love, and even trust, in that which is so far mysterious. The mind is not averse to go out at times into the dim, the ancient, the mingling of light and shadow. It avoids instinctively the open, uninteresting plain, where all is seen and discovered by one glance of the eye, and finds more pleasure in losing itself amid a variety of hill, and dale, and forest, where we catch occasional glimpses of distant objects, or see them in dim perspective. The soul of man never has been satisfied with a cold and rationalistic creed, but has rather delighted to luxuriate amid the doctrines of the Word, which win and allure us by the exhibition of the light and love of God, and yet awe us by the shadow of infinity which falls upon us.

Human logic has endeavoured at times to construct a religion, but has failed in all its attempts, as this age is prepared to acknowledge. But Intuitionism is just as incapable of forming a religion as the logical understanding. All attempts hitherto made are confessed failures. There was at one time an expectation that something better than the old faith of the Bible might come out of the philosophies of Schleiermacher, or Schelling, or Hegel ; but we rather think that the last hope of any such issue has vanished.

It was also long thought by some, that certain men of genius, who had borrowed from the German metaphysicians, such as Goethe, Coleridge, and Thomas Carlyle, must have something to unfold new and important, and fitted to satisfy the deeper wants of the soul. But in this they have been disappointed. Such men as Francis Newman, Theodore Parker, and Emerson, have followed so erratic and meteor-like a career that few would desire to follow them, and have arrived at results which the heart feels to be unsatisfactory, and this all the more, inasmuch as the scanty creed which they retain is liable to be assailed on the same grounds as the tenets which they have abandoned. Intuitionism has thus had its trial in the age now passing

away, as Rationalism had in previous ages ; and both have been found utterly insufficient.

In Oxford, since Pusey, Manning, Keble, Wilberforce, and Newman (men of strong, but diseased minds) originated the mediæval High Church movement, the wheel of opinion has taken one full half turn. It has, unfortunately, not brought those who are mounted on it any nearer to a thorough submission to Scripture. As in Roman Catholic countries the rampant superstition leads to scepticism, which again, when its hideousness is discovered, tempts men to flee back to superstition, so in Oxford the High Churchism of last age, brought in to repel at one and the same time Rationalism and Dissenterism, has ended in this age in Intuitionism. We rather think that there will now be found in Oxford few young men of ability, under thirty years of age, professing Puseyism, while not a few of the more impulsive are high Intuitionists. But, as the opposite sides of the wheel have a point of union in the centre, so the opposite parties have a bond of connection, in an unwillingness to allow the common doctrines of Natural Theology and to submit to a literal interpretation of the Word ; and so they agree with each other, after all, in not a few things ; as in going elsewhere than Scripture for their religion—in the last age to the church, in this age to a showy intuition ; we may add, in their attachment to stained glass, fine music, and imposing forms, and in their antipathy to the evangelical party in the church and beyond the church. In these circumstances, we are gratified beyond measure to find one of Oxford's most learned sons declaring—

“ No man has a right to say, ‘ I will accept Christ as I like, and reject Him as I like : I will follow the holy example ; I will turn away from the atoning sacrifice : I will listen to His teaching ; I will have nothing to do with His mediation : I will believe Him when He tells me that He came from the Father, because I feel that His doctrine has a divine beauty and fitness ; but I will not believe Him when He tells me that He is one with the Father, because I cannot conceive how this unity is possible.’ This is not philosophy which thus mutilates man ; this is not Christianity which thus divides Christ.”