

THE PRESBYTERIAN AND REFORMED REVIEW

No. 3—July, 1890.

I.

RECENT DISCUSSION IN MATERIALISM.

THERE are phases of contemporary materialism which have little in common with the doctrines of ancient and mediæval materialists, and which in point of subtlety and philosophical attractiveness are quite in accord with the advanced position of nineteenth century thought. The idealist of to-day flatters himself that he avoids the inconsistencies of Berkeley and Fichte, so the materialist smiles at the mention of Priestly, D'Alembert, and Holbach. But these growths respectively in idealistic and materialistic thought have not been parallel. Idealism has tended in the last thirty years to withdraw its gaze from the thought-ultimate as a monistic conception, to perception as a dualistic relation, that is from cosmic to psychological idealism; while materialism has tended in quite the opposite direction, *i. e.*, from the crude postulate of matter in bulk to the search for an ultimate materialistic principle, that is from psychological to cosmic materialism. Each has strengthened its flank and the battle is now joined between psychological idealism and metaphysical materialism.

Spiritualism has gained vastly by this change of base. As long as the ontology of spirit rested upon a dogmatic assertion of universal mind, there was no weapon at hand wherewith to attack the corresponding assertion of universal matter. I have as good right to assert an universal as you have and *chacun à son goût* is the rule of choice. But now that philosophy is learning to value a single fact more than a detailed system, and is sacrificing its systems to the vindication of facts, it is spiritualism and not materialism which is profiting by the advances of science. Materialism has appealed to the metaphysics of force, spiritualism has appealed to consciousness

V.

RECENT WORKS ON KANT.

KANT had a favorable and deeply fixed confidence in his own philosophic ability. But I doubt whether the old bachelor, as he mused in his daily walks in the suburbs of the small college town of Königsberg, ever dreamed of the great influence which his philosophy was to exercise over the thinking world. For the last hundred years he has swayed the thought of Germany as Aristotle did that of the Middle Ages. Upwards of two hundred separate works have been published upon the Kantean system in Germany alone, besides innumerable articles in the higher journals, and dozens of volumes in other countries, such as Great Britain, France, Italy and Scandinavia. It is calculated that, in all, upwards of one hundred thousand pages have been written on Kant. A student beginning at twenty years of age might, by the age of fifty, be able to read and understand them all—it may be doubted whether, at the close, he would have a clearer head than by simply reading the “Kritik of Pure Reason.” More than one-half of these works are commonplace and valueless, adopting the formidable Kantean nomenclature and ringing changes upon it without any searching inquiry into their validity. Some of these give full accounts of Kant’s system. A greater number take up special points in which Kant has been misunderstood, or in which his system, it is thought, may be carried out more thoroughly than has been done by himself or others.

Locke was the most influential metaphysician of last century. About half a century ago earnest thinkers everywhere began to point out his defects in overlooking necessary and universal truth; and now, though he is constantly referred to, he has comparatively few readers and scarcely any thorough adherents. Kant has been the most influential philosophic thinker of this century. His system rose to the highest crest of the wave in 1881, the centenary of the publication of his great work, the “Kritik of Pure Reason.” Within the last few years I observe, if I do not mistake, a tendency to doubt of his being entitled to the supremacy which has been allowed him. What is needed above all things in these times, in philosophy, is a sifting of the principles of Kant like that to which

those of Locke were subjected half a century ago. What we need is what I have called a "Criticism of the Critical Philosophy."

I am to attempt no such ambitious task in this article. I am simply to notice, in the way of giving information, some of the works which have been published on Kant's philosophy of late years in the English language, closing with a brief account of a late work in German, subjecting Kant's system to an acute criticism.

I have always held that the system of Kant is a very wonderful one—it is the Ehrenbreitstein of the German philosophy. I do not regard it as a natural system, formed by an inductive observation of the human mind, but an artificial one, constructed with amazing skill by a powerful logical mind. It is so consistent that we cannot accept a part without being constrained to take the whole. He who would draw back must do so at the entrance. He who would go on must do so to the end.

Kant tells us that he was wakened from his dogmatic slumbers, in which he acquiesced in the orthodox philosophy of his day, by the skepticism of David Hume. His grand aim was to meet Hume by undermining the empiricism of Locke and the prevailing sensationalism of France. To accomplish this end he calls in the *a priori* principles in the mind. It is only fair, I think, that I should state what view I take of this attempt. I regard him as a profound thinker, especially distinguished by his power of organizing thought. His system contains an amount of high truth, and lifts us above a debasing sensationalism and materialism. But on the other hand, he takes us away from reality and gives us instead subjective forms, which indeed imply the existence of things but reveal to us nothing of their nature. According to Kant we do not and cannot know things as they are.

His philosophy contains two discordant elements with their corresponding tendencies. One of these is idealism involved in Kant's forms of sense, categories of the understanding and ideas of pure reason. These have been followed out by Hegel (and to some extent, as we shall see, by Prof. Edward Caird), and have culminated in absolute idealism and pantheism. But there is another element with its tendency, that is nescience. We do not know things, certainly we do not know them as they exist. Herbert Spencer, proceeding on this principle, has driven the whole to agnosticism. We know that things without us and within us exist, we know that God exists; but the nature of these objects is to us altogether unknown and unknowable. Let us notice how these characteristics come out under the three heads of the "Kritik of Pure Reason":—the "Æsthetic," the "Analytic," and "Dialectic."

The Æsthetic, which discovers the *a priori* elements in the senses.

These are space and time. They are forms imposed on objects by the mind perceiving them; they have no real or objective existence. What we perceive under these forms are phenomena, in the sense of appearances. These phenomena imply the existence of things, but they are all subjective or in the mind, and the things are unknown.

The Analytic. Here we rise above the senses to the understanding, which pronounces judgments upon them according to forms which are called categories. These are four in number, each subdivided into three:

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| I. QUANTITY. | II. QUALITY. |
| Unity, Plurality, Totality. | Reality, Negation, Limitation. |
| III. RELATION. | IV. MODALITY. |
| Inherence and subsistence, Causality and dependence, Reciprocity of agent and patient. | Possibility and impossibility, Existence and non-existence, Necessity and contingency. |

These are deduced very elaborately, and have given rise to an immense amount of discussion. It is to be understood that they are like the forms of sense, merely in the mind, and have no objective validity.

The Dialectic. Here we rise to ideas of pure reason which are Substance, Interdependence of Phenomena and God. These regulate all our thinking and seem to carry us up to very high truths. But Kant proceeds to show that they have no objective validity. We are obliged to contemplate substance, the concatenation of things and God, but have no proof of their existence. We are thus led, not just into deceptions, but into *illusions*.

Now for years past I have been objecting to this system as altogether artificial—as not in accordance with the actual processes of the mind and leading us away from reality.*

First, I object to Kant's Method. It is not the Inductive, in which we seek for and discover the first and fundamental laws of human intelligence. It is what he calls the Critical Method, which he takes credit for inventing. Reason he says can criticise itself. This has led to an endless succession of criticisms with no standard or test of fact to which to appeal.

Secondly, he makes the mind begin with Phenomena, in the sense of appearances, and not of things. Not starting with reality he can never reach reality by reasoning, without committing the logical fallacy of having more in the conclusion than in the premises.

* See my "Realistic Philosophy," Vol. ii, pp. 189-254. "A Criticism of the Critical Philosophy."

Thirdly, he makes us perceive things under Forms in the mind so that we cannot know things except under modifications imposed by ourselves. The consequence is that we do not and cannot know things as they are. We thus see how Herbert Spencer has been able to drive the whole system to agnosticism.

Kant endeavors to save himself from the nihilist consequences by a second "Kritik," that of the "Moral or Practical Reason." To this he allots a reality which he has denied to the speculative reason. First, he gives us a categorical imperative: act according to a principle which may admit of application to all intelligences. This implies that man is free, and as a corollary that he is responsible; that there is a judgment day, a future life, and a God to guarantee the whole. Under this "Kritik" he constructs an "Ethics" which is very lofty and of great value.

Kant has a third "Kritik;" it is the "Kritik of Judgment." He had previously had judgment as an exercise of the understanding. He now employs the same word to designate certain exercises of the mind which did not appear either in the criticism of the speculative or the moral reason. He must take notice of our perceptions of taste, that is of beauty and sublimity, and also of our belief in final cause or purpose in nature. His judgments thus fall under the two heads of *Æsthetic* and *Teleological*. He has made important remarks on these subjects, though it may be doubted whether he has unfolded their exact nature. The "Criticism of the *Æsthetic* and *Teleological* Judgments" constitutes no essential part of his grand system, and need not be discussed in this article. It should be observed of them that Kant represents them as ideal, and not implying any other reality than a subjective one.

We should now be in a position to look at some of the more important works which of late years have been written upon the great German metaphysician.

I. KANT'S "KRITIK OF PURE REASON," BY MAX MÜLLER.*

It is by the famous comparative linguist. It consists of two volumes and upwards of thirteen hundred pages. It was published in 1881, being the centenary of the publication of Kant's great work, the "Kritik of Pure Reason." Volume i contains first, a Preface by Max Müller; second, a Historical Introduction by Ludwig Noire; third, twenty-eight supplements, including the principal additions made by Kant in the second edition of the "Kritik of Pure

* *Critique of Pure Reason*. In commemoration of the centenary of its first publication. Translated by Max Müller, with a Historical Introduction by Ludwig Noire. London: Macmillan & Co., 2 Vols., 1881.

Reason," published in 1787. Volume ii contains Müller's translation into English of the "Kritik."

In the Preface he gives his reasons for issuing a new translation. He thinks that the translations previously used, by Heywood and Meeklejohn, were defective in that they did not attend sufficiently to Kant's use of particles and adverbs. This is a point on which Müller is entitled to speak, and in which he should be attended to by those who would thoroughly understand Kant. He insists that Kant should be translated by a German, who only is able to discover the meaning of Kant's phrases. He has some valuable remarks on the text of the "Kritik," which was not left in a correct state by the author. Noire's Historical Introduction begins with ancient philosophy, goes through mediævalism and comes down to Locke, Leibnitz and Hume. It is a fair account of the development of philosophy according to the Germans. The translation is valuable as being by one who is such a master of the German language. I do not think, however, that this work has thrown much light on the philosophy of Kant. Müller will never have the same name in philosophy as he has in philology. His recent work on the dependence of thought on language is a weak one in argument.

Müller in his Preface has given us a lengthened account of the eulogiums which have been pronounced on the "Critical Philosophy." I confess that I have been amused by their extravagance. I quote some of them: Schiller says that for the sake of Kant's ideas we ought to be grateful for having been born in this age. Jung Stilling writes to Kant: "Your philosophy will work a far greater, far more general and far more blessed revolution than Luther's reform. Your philosophy must therefore be eternal and unchangeable, and its beneficent effects will bring back the religion of Jesus to its original purity." Schopenhauer, who criticises Kant severely for the cowardice shown in his second Preface, declares: "Kant is, I believe, the most philosophic mind that nature has produced." Fichte: "Kant's philosophy will in time overshadow the whole human race, and call to life a new, more noble and more worthy generation." Fortlage: "Kant's system is the gate through which everything that has stirred the philosophic world since his time comes and goes." Prof. Caird: "So much has Kant's fertile idea changed the aspect of the intellectual world that there is not a single problem of philosophy that does not meet us with a new face." Müller goes beyond all the others: "The bridge of thought and sight that spans the whole history of the Aryan world has its first arch in the Veda, its last in Kant's 'Kritik.'" "While in the Veda we may study the childhood, we may study in Kant's 'Kritik of Pure Reason' the perfect manhood of the Aryan mind." Surely, we

Scotch and Scotch-Irish and Yankees may feel dismayed as we gaze on this mailed giant on the opposite side. But I verily believe that there will be some ruddy youth who, in the pride and naughtiness of his heart, will cast down this champion by a very simple instrumentality (by a sling and a stone), that is by pressing home a natural and unsophisticated reality, which should determine the forms instead of the forms determining things.

II. TEXT-BOOK TO KANT'S "THE KRITIK OF PURE REASON," BY
JAMES HUTCHISON STIRLING, LL.D.*

This is a volume of 550 pages. It begins with a brief but graphic life of the old bachelor, with his curious ways. We have then what is called a Reproduction. This is original and valuable as showing how a thinking youth may be led into Kant's mode of thought, and follow it throughout. This is followed by a translation which may not always be very literal, but always clearly expresses Kant's meaning. Then he has a Commentary running parallel to his translation, clearing up difficult points and offering important criticisms. He carefully explains the technical terms used by Kant, Erkenntniss, Erkenntnissvermögen, Erfahrung, Gegenstand, Vorstellung, Verstand, Eindrücke, *a priori*, *a posteriori*, Empirisch, Rein (p. 347). He gives a full definition of Anschauung (p. 38). He sees and announces clearly that, according to Kant's system, we cannot reach a knowledge of things. "Not only do we know objects, not as they are but simply as they appear, but even our own subject we know not in any respect differently, this subject, our own ego, we know not as it is, but only as in sense it seems" (p. 416). He is everywhere throwing out remarks which show that he is ready to break away entirely from Kant. "Might not space and time be things in themselves and yet have necessary relations, though it were only *a posteriori* that we could come to know either one or the other" (p. 484). He frankly acknowledges that Kant has not answered Hume.

Dr. Stirling is a stalwart and strong-boned (metaphysically speaking) Scotchman. His style reads as if it were modeled on that of Thomas Carlyle; yet I am not sure that he copies his Scoto-German countryman. The resemblance may arise from both in their youth speaking lowland Scotch, which has more affinities with German than the English tongue has, and from their being led by their admiration of German thinking to adopt the powerful style of Deutschland.

I have often wondered how it is that Dr. Stirling has not been

* *A Text-book of Kant: Reproduction, Commentary, Index.* By J. H. Stirling, LL.D. London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1881.

called to some chair of philosophy in Scotland, England or America. I have an idea that this neglect has been caused by a fear on the part of academic authorities of his leading his pupils into "the woods and wilds" of Hegelianism. With a great admiration of Hamilton, he has given us a sharp criticism of him in "Sir William Hamilton; being the Philosophy of Perception." He shows that, while in certain passages Hamilton "has asserted presentationism and appealed to common sense," in other passages he has asserted German "phenomenalism and appealed to the philosophers." I am glad to find that he has been called to deliver lectures on "Natural Religion," on the foundation of a lately deceased professor in Edinburgh. It is the first recognition of his great abilities by college authorities. I am in hopes that in these lectures he will give us, not criticisms of others, in which he has been so much engaged, but a work of his own, in which what is good both in Reid and Kant may be combined.

Meanwhile I would place his strong denunciations of Kant over against the strong eulogiums of Max Müller. He declares the system of Kant to be "a vast and prodigious failure," and his method as only "a laborious, baseless, inapplicable superfetation" (*Princeton Review*, January, 1870). He announces emphatically that Kant has not answered Hume, and that never has the world been so befooled by a system as it has been befooled by the system of Kant.

III. "KANT'S CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY," BY DR. MAHAFFY AND DR. BERNARD.*

It is a work of two volumes and of about 600 pages. In Volume i, "The Kritik of Pure Reason" is explained and unfolded. In Volume ii "The Prolegomena to any Future Metaphysics," the work in which Kant's theory of knowledge is defended, is translated, with notes and appendices.

In Dublin University, Locke's philosophy, introduced by the statesman, Molyneux, had supreme influence from the date of his essay on "Human Understanding" in 1690, down through the whole of the seventeenth century and the first third of this century. Since that time, Locke has been superseded by his great rival, Immanuel Kant, who has powerful supporters in Mahaffy, Thomas K. Abbott and others.

Dr. Mahaffy is professor of ancient history. He writes much on Greece, ancient and modern, and delights to branch off to other and lighter subjects, such as "The Art of Conversation," and "The

* *Kant's Critical Philosophy for English Readers*. London and New York: Macmillan & Co., 1889.

Decay of Modern Preaching." He visited the United States last year and went to the Chautauqua School, where he had a controversy on an American subject. It is a forgotten circumstance that some years ago I had a sparring with him on philosophy in the pages of the *Princeton Review*. He thought that on my philosophical principles, in which I give a place to induction, not in guaranteeing but in discovering fundamental truth, I was in danger of sinking down into materialism with Bain. I could show that there is a greater risk of the "Critical Philosophy," which begins with appearances and ends with illusions, being led by Herbert Spencer into agnosticism. But I am not to renew the controversy. In this article I am simply to look at what he has done for Kant.

He has a thorough acquaintance with the philosophy of Kant.

His translations are always intelligible and are often easier and more pleasant reading than the original. His occasional explanations often clear up obscure passages in the "Critical Philosophy." He is prepared to defend Kant in almost every particular. He argues that there is no inconsistency between the more ideal First Preface and the less ideal Second Preface. The views which he presents are liable to all the objections which I have been taking to the "Critical Philosophy" generally. They take us away from reality, which is the first truth we should assume. They start with appearances instead of things, and build up a higher philosophy which denies to us all knowledge of the nature of things, and makes all higher ideas to be illusory.

IV. "THE CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF IMMANUEL KANT," BY PROF. EDWARD CAIRD.*

Prof. Caird sits in the Moral Philosophy chair of old Thomas Reid, the true representative of the Scottish philosophy. I have at times pictured Reid as rising from his grave, and all unseen sitting in the class room of his successor, to learn what doctrine is being taught to the students of the college for which he did so much. Shrewd as he was, I believe he would find some difficulty in comprehending the lecturer. But he would have some glimpses of his meaning, and would say of the philosophy taught what he said when living on earth of Samuel Clarke's demonstration of the existence of God that he was not sure whether it was not more sublime than solid.

The work is in two bulky volumes, containing 1400 pages. The exposition is full and able; the style is graceful and dignified. But

* *The Critical Philosophy of Immanuel Kant*. By Prof. Edward Caird, etc. Glasgow: James Maclehose & Sons; New York: Macmillan & Co., 1889.

I confess that, in reading his work, I have often felt wearied traveling over the dead level, which is like an immense expanse of corn and hay fields, without elevations or depressions, without "peaks and passes;" and I have at times wished for the ruggedness of Kant or the precipices of Hegel.

It is the most elaborate work that I have seen on the "Critical Philosophy." It treats of the whole three *Kritiks*, that of the Pure Reason, that of the Practical Reason and that of the Judgment—as also of Religion in relation to Reason. It shows the relation and the connection of these parts of Kant's philosophy.

It is not a translation of Kant. It is not a commentary on Kant. It explains Kant; it defends Kant; it would also amend Kant. It takes up the ideal, rather than the agnostic side of Kant's philosophy, and would carry it up to a higher level. It is a philosophical work on Kant. It is well known that Dr. Caird is to a large extent a follower of Hegel, whom he is defending where Germany is abandoning him. His little work on Hegel is the most sober and plausible that has been written on his philosophy; it avoids all the extravagances and paradoxes of the original, and in particular it is careful to escape pantheism. Perhaps the book before us might best be described as Prof. Edward Caird's philosophy founded on Kant and soaring towards Hegelianism.

I do not propose to state the doctrine expounded in Dr. Caird's work; this would require a volume which might not be so clear as what the professor himself has written. Nor am I to criticise the philosophy which has been so laboriously enunciated; this would require another volume, the reply to which would be that I do not comprehend the system which I am examining. In these circumstances I must content myself with simply indicating the course pursued in these volumes and the fundamental objections which I take to the system.

In the earlier part of Volume i, the professor gives a very careful statement of the historical development of the critical philosophy in the mind of Kant. In his earlier treatises, especially his "Dissertation," Kant had adopted the common dogmatic view of the reality of things. About 1772, he abandons this view, and falls into the ideal method which he afterwards fully developed in his "*Kritik*." He then "ceases to regard the *a priori* conceptions of the mind as determinations of things in themselves, and regards them only as forms by which the data of sense under the forms of sense are determined as phenomena or objects of experience." At this point Kant is taking his first false step; it is in the wrong direction. He has turned his back upon reality, which he should have assumed and started with; and he has now to go on with his ideal forms.

Prof. Caird goes with him in his *Æsthetic* and in his *Analytic*, and in the subjective Forms of Sense and the Categories of the Understanding. As he has not started with reality he cannot have reality in the *Dialectic*; in the Ideas of Pure Reason, in Substance, the Interdependence of Phenomena and God. The human mind can know only phenomena; and "a phenomenon is nothing apart from the perception of it." He allows that we cannot from phenomena or ideas legitimately argue the existence of the living and the true God.

Prof. Caird goes over with care the whole three "Kritiks," the Theoretical Philosophy, the Teleology and *Æsthetic*, and the Practical Philosophy. We have seen what he makes of the Theoretical Philosophy; it ends in illusions. Under Judgment he has some fine remarks on Final Cause and Beauty, but he makes both purely subjective. He evidently appreciates the profound views which Kant expounds as to moral good. When we come to consider the philosophy of Ritschl we may inquire whether he can hold them in consistency with the nescience in which his Theoretical Reason lands us.

Prof. Caird's philosophy throughout is liable to the fundamental objections which I have been taking to Kant's philosophy. At the same time there are passages in his work which show that he is anxious to break out from the narrowness of Kant. From time to time he is telling us that he can bring out to his relief "certain connections of ideas which ruled Kant's thoughts, but which he does not always fully express" (Vol. ii, p. 418). He would thus lead us on, if not to Hegelianism, to a like ideal system.

V. "KANT AND HIS ENGLISH CRITICS," BY PROF. WATSON, OF QUEEN'S UNIVERSITY.*

The Canadian colleges have often been in the way of applying to Glasgow University for their professors of mental philosophy. Prof. Watson has evidently felt the influence of Prof. Caird of Glasgow. He expresses his obligations to him and also to Dr. Green, whose philosophy led to the creed illustrated in "Robert Elsmere." His system is drawn from Prof. Caird and the "*Encyclopædie*" and "*Logik*" of Hegel. His book professes to be a comparison of critical and empirical philosophy. He does not seem to know that better than either the critical or empirical there may be a philosophy of fundamental principles, which have their authority within them-

* *Kant and His English Critics*. A Comparison of Critical and Empirical Philosophy. By John Watson, A. M., LL. D., Professor of Moral Philosophy in Queen's University, Kingston, Canada. London: Macmillan & Co., 1881.

selves, but the nature of which has to be determined by an induction of what passes in the mind. Dr. Watson is evidently a man of ability, and defends Kant from his English critics, such as Balfour, Sidgwick and Stirling. It is curious to find Hegelianism taught in Canada when it has been abandoned largely in Germany, in favor of less extravagant systems. I am not sure that it is the best philosophy in which to instruct young men, in Canada or in any other country.

VI. "KANT'S CRITIQUE OF PRACTICAL REASON," BY PROF. T. K. ABBOTT, OF TRINITY COLLEGE, DUBLIN.*

We may notice the influence which the philosophy of Kant has had of late years, both in Glasgow and in Dublin University. I have before me the third edition of Dr. Abbott's work (1883). In the memoir of Kant prefixed, I have been particularly interested in the account given of the nebular theory of the heavens, in which Kant undoubtedly anticipated Laplace, to whom the credit of the discovery is commonly given. The book, containing 400 pages, contains the whole of Kant's works on the General Theory of Ethics. "The principal questions on the Theory of Morals may, with sufficient accuracy for the present purpose, be said to be these: First, the purely speculative question, 'What is the essential nature of moral rightness?' Secondly, the practical questions, 'What is to man the criterion of his duty?' and, 'What is the foundation of obligation?' The additional question, 'By what faculty do we discern right and wrong?' is properly a psychological one." Those who wish to know Kant's metaphysics of ethics will find them fully expounded in this volume.

VII. "KANT, LOTZE AND RITSCHL." A CRITICAL EXAMINATION BY LEONHARD STÄHLIN.†

The evident design of Stählin in this work is to counteract the teaching of Ritschl, who of late years has had great influence in theology, and also in the style of preaching all over Germany. He maintains that on these points Ritschl has been led by the philosophy of Lotze, who has drawn his system from Kant. He therefore examines the system of Kant more searchingly, I believe, than has been before done by any German. I hope it is the starting of a new

* *Critique of Practical Reason, And other works on the Theory of Ethics.* By T. K. Abbott, B.D., With Memoir and Portrait. London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1873; new edition, 1881; third edition, 1883.

† *Kant, Lotze and Ritschl.* A Critical Examination by Leonhard Stählin. Translated by D. W. Simon, Ph.D. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark; New York: Scribner & Welford, 1889.

era in Germany, which, for the last century, has been looking down with contempt on all philosophic systems of modern times not derived from and founded on Kant. My hope is that these late criticisms of the "Critical Philosophy" will lead thinkers to review the critical method which for the past century has been generating only a succession of criticisms, and make them to look out for a natural system, founded on the fundamental principles of man's mind, as made known by self-consciousness, as the inner sense—which I believe to be the only way of meeting the prevailing agnosticism.

In an earlier part of this article, I have stated the objections which, in various places of my works, I have been taking to the "Critical Philosophy." I have been immensely interested in the objections advanced by Stählin. In some respects they are much the same as those urged by me at an earlier date. Mine are the more fundamental as opposing the very method pursued by Kant, and the principles with which he starts, which I show must end in nescience. But Stählin's objections penetrate more thoroughly into the very structure of Kant's theories, and exhibit more fully the incongruities and contradictions of the system. I hope that the two lines of opposition, being duly pondered, will successfully resist the tendency to make the German systems, Kantian or Neo-Kantian, the main philosophy of America.

The translator in his Preface refers to "the agnosticism which is filtering down into thousands of minds all over Christendom" and "taking the form of aversion to systematic or dogmatic or speculative theology. The question is asked very much in the tone of Pilate's, *What is truth?* 'What's the use? What can we know? Whose theory is the correct one?' . . . A like impatience, too, is largely influencing the Christian laity. The tap-root of all this semi-conscious agnosticism draws its chief nourishment, unknown to itself, from 'Kant's' theory of cognition," which he adds, "it is the aim of Stählin to hoist on its own petard."

"Kant's aim was to vindicate the objectivity of human knowledge in opposition to the skepticism of Hume. This he deemed possible only in one way, namely, by showing that that which gives objective validity and necessity to our knowledge of things is to be found, not in the things themselves, but in the human mind itself." Kant's intention was to establish the reality of our knowledge in opposition to the skepticism of Hume. But what he meant to be a rescue turns out to be rather an entire overthrow of the knowledge of objective truth. For the method which he follows tends to show that what we know is merely the phenomenal appearance, not the truth nor the thing in itself. But what is the phenomenal? The answer is, "Phenomenon in the Kantian sense is not *objective but*

subjective phenomenon, that is, it is not a coming to light or coming forward of the thing itself, but purely a mode in which we represent things, an affection of our sensibility, a modification of our consciousness, which reveals nothing whatever of the nature of the thing as it is in itself."

This is the very objection which I have been taking for years past, namely, that Kant makes the mind start with appearances instead of things, and that we cannot know things except under forms imposed by our own minds. He insists: "Objective knowledge, a knowledge of any thing that has actuality outside and independently of our consciousness, there is not." This is true, not only of things external to ourselves, but of the mind itself, as Kant is constantly asserting that "we do not know even ourselves, but merely as we appear to ourselves" (p. 106).

In his "Refutation of Idealism," directed against Berkeley, in the second edition of the "Kritik," Kant says: "The simple but empirically determined consciousness of my own existence proves the existence of objects in space outside of me" (p. 22). But then he holds that the nature of these things is, and must be, utterly unknown, upon which Stählin remarks: "I have no right or power to say a thing is if I am in entire ignorance how or what it is" (p. 26), an objection which, I may add, I have been constantly taking.

Stählin is obliged to come to the realistic philosophy, which I have been expounding. "The real existence of things outside of us, and independently of our consciousness of them, is an assumption, without which Kant could not have found even a beginning for his philosophy; and he himself gives it as his opinion that, apart from this presupposition, thought would do nothing but revolve round itself as a centre. Yet, as we have seen, the development of his theory of knowledge led to the rejection of the very presupposition on what it is founded. He begins with this realistic assumption, and ends with its denial" (pp. 28, 29).

With the great body of English and American thinkers I have always spoken with admiration of Kant's ethical system as giving a high view of law and moral obligation. But Stählin maintains that his ethical doctrines cannot be held in consistency with his strictures on knowledge in his criticism of the speculative reason. "Unless every thought is to dissolve away, the objects of the moral consciousness must be thinkable, nay, more, thinkable by means of the categories; inasmuch as whatever is to be thought at all must be thought by their means," so the "Critical Philosophy" maintains. But the categories deal only with phenomena and not with things, and thus we have no things to which morality can be

applied. Kant "wished 'to do away with knowledge in order to make room for faith.' Such was his intention. In reality, however, room is no longer left for faith. The realities of the moral and religious consciousness are set aside in advance by the principles of the theoretical reason" (p. 68).

The conclusion which Stählin reaches is: "The edifice of the Kantian philosophy has fallen to ruin before our eyes, crushed beneath the weight of its own contradictions, and even the ruins themselves have disappeared in a bottomless abyss. In so far, therefore, the result of the Critical System is null. We have seen that it cannot possibly be the system of truth; that, on the contrary, its consequences are utter illusion and nihilism." The language is too strong and unqualified. I disagree with the method and the principles of the "Kritik," especially in their overlooking reality and giving us only forms, but in treating these forms Kant has given us profound laws and distinctions, which should be attended to by every student of mental philosophy.

Every student of philosophy knows that the ideal element in Kant was carried up by Fichte, Schelling and Hegel into an absolute idealism from which many shrank as utter logical extravagance. There arose in consequence a strong recoil from this in Germany, and a loud call for a "return to Kant;" and Neo-Kantism was instituted, and has had considerable power for a quarter of a century. I am not to examine this school. All the members of it adopt Kant's erroneous critical method and the most of his fundamental principles, which are all ideal. I could show that they are liable to the objections which Stählin has taken (and which, I may add, I have been urging) against the "Critical Philosophy." I will here simply refer to Stählin's acute criticism of two of the Neo-Kantians, Lotze and Ritschl.

LOTZE has a sort of realism. He assumes "the existence of an infinite multiplicity of simple beings, which constitute the basis of the world of sense; and, after Herbart's example, designates them *the reals*. In Lotze's view, however, these same reals are of the nature of souls, spirits, because of their independent existence." This is evidently a mere fancy. "He followed Kant in taking for granted that the world of sense is purely phenomenal." "What then becomes of the world of sense? It is mere phenomenon; and not even objective phenomenon, but phenomenon in a merely subjective sense." Space and time have merely an ideal existence. "But if," says Stählin, "space is a mere form of subjective intuition, that which we intuite in space is as exclusively in us as space itself; outside of us there is nothing. Time also, in like manner, is a form of intuition; the temporal-spatial world itself is phenomenon," and

all but one mode of existence, namely, "existence as a mode of consciousness." He farther holds that things have no sort of independent existence; there is no other sort of actual existence then but the standing in relations. His philosophy, according to Stählin, ends in personal pantheism. This is a philosophy which, when understood, is not likely to be adopted in America. Stählin says that it reduces the whole world known to us "to mere seeming."

RITSCHL claims to follow Lotze, but Stählin denies that he is entitled to do so. In his philosophy, "Ritschl starts from the position that human knowledge is restricted to phenomena, and that things in themselves are unknowable." "By thing is to be understood a unity, which we, for our minds, constitute out of a sum of phenomena." "Ritschl's theory of cognition, after it has separated the thing-in-itself from the thing-for-us, and declared the former unknowable, has been found, upon more careful examination, to involve the denial of the real existence of things in themselves. The last reality left by his theory of cognition thus *ipso facto* disappears. Phenomenon has no existence; the things given in perception as unities of phenomena have no existence. Things in themselves, too, are simply shadows; they are simply memory images used perversely—memory-images, moreover, of actualities which themselves have no existence save that of phenomena of consciousness." The inference follows "If we can know nothing but the phenomenal, clearly the suprasensual must be unknowable." It is clear that this ideal theory of knowledge must issue in an ideal rather than a real religion. In Ritschl's theology "vicarious atonement is denied, as also original sin; and Christ's sufferings are a mere test of faithfulness." In the end Christ is "nothing but subjective phenomenon; an objectivication of the religious consciousness of the church." The American students in Germany who fall under this spirit are not likely to bring back much good to their own country. As to Stählin's own theology, he seems to favor the views of Baader and Schleiermacher, and believe that we have an immediate intuition of God. For myself, I prefer the brief argument through *the things that are made*. "For the invisible things of Him since the creation of the world are clearly seen, being perceived through the things that are made, even his everlasting power and divinity."

An American college youth, after being taught a commonplace philosophy at home, if he has any taste for the study, longs for something higher, and sets out for Deutschland. He is there introduced to phrases and distinctions which sound very deep—I am inclined to add hollow—and he adopts them provisionally, meaning

to review them afterwards. But as he advances he finds himself so shut in that he has to go on, and as he has taken no clew with him into the labyrinth, he finds it impossible to escape. After being a year or two under such instruction he returns to his own country with a considerable reputation, and looks out for a chair of philosophy. His old college, or some neighboring one, being in need of a professor of metaphysics, elects him to the office. He proceeds to give a course of lectures which consist of an incongruous mixture of the theories of Kant, Hegel, Lotze, or Wundt, with certain speculations of his own which will not coalesce with the profounder teachings of Germany. His pupils admire, or strive to admire, his imposing nomenclature and his comprehensive theories, which seem to explain all the wonders of the universe. It is almost amusing to find the phraseology of Hegel, who, though still greatly admired, is believed in by no one in Germany, sounding in colleges in Canada or in small colleges in the great west of the United States. At the close of their course the students feel somewhat relieved, and go out into the business life to forget all that they have learned, returning to dim remembrances of it on rare occasions, wondering whether there has been anything in it, and prudently leaving the question unsettled. It is a happy thing when, as the result of the whole, they have not lost their faith in the simple truths of God's Word in favor of some pretentious speculation, which has appeared for a little while, as an illuminated cloud in the sky, but is soon dissipated.

The philosophy which is likely to do the most good in America, and, in the end, to be most acceptable, is one which consists in a careful inductive observation of the human mind in every-day life, which constitutes psychology, and in the exposition of its fundamental principles, which constitutes metaphysics. I have no faith in the common argument in favor of the study of metaphysics that, even though there be no truth in it, it is fitted to brace and discipline the mind. If truth is not aimed at and gained, the tendency will be to bewilder and unsettle the mind, and the end will be a feeling of disappointment, discontent and ennui. There will always be a painful contrast drawn between the solid results reached in physical science and the inanity and emptiness of mere speculation; and the student will feel in his struggles as one that beateth the air. It is a realistic philosophy founded on the facts of our nature that is fitted profitably to exercise the minds of students, to stimulate and cultivate their observing and thinking powers, and to send them forth with important truths incorporated into their very being, fitted to interest and guide them through all their future lives.

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