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the aspiring secretary, an exile, and with the bar of treason on his scutcheon, treason to the king of the Whigs and the king of the Tories, the society pined and at length died out. Prior did not keep up his intimacy with the more professed political followers of St. John, such as Wyndham; but a warm friendship subsisted between him, and, not only Hanmer, a type of the Hanoverian Tories, whose Conservatism was based on a firm acquiescence in the Revolution, as "un fait accompli," but even with that most learned and sagacious of plotters, Bishop Atterbury. The comfort and consideration which attended him at this period of his life, we might have anticipated would have satisfied the vanity and tone of epicureanism in his disposition. It certainly approached what he had himself often represented to his friends as his ideal of happiness. Nevertheless, we can detect, in his correspondence, the shadow of a lingering hope that he might once more rise into political consideration, not through any exertions of his own, or even the agency of the Tory party, but in the train of Lord Oxford. The South Sea bubble, indeed, at one time so endangered the credit of certain of the Whig ministers, that there grew up a vague anticipation of the late Lord Treasurer's restoration to his old authority. Prior hoped to share in his patron's prosperity, though not entertaining the same opinion with the public of that statesman's character. The contrast he draws between the popular explanation of all Lord Oxford's conduct as ruled by the laws of a profound cunning, and the fact known to his friends, that the apparent caution and astuteness was nothing but dilatoriness and indecision, is grotesque but true. The crisis passed by, and the rumoured sagacity had no opportunity for display.

The ex-diplomatist's regrets and longings, his querulousness at straitened means, and determination to enjoy to the full the pleasures within his reach, lasted till his death, which occurred shortly after this final disappointment. He left behind him the brief memory of a very every-day character, most remarkable in its contrast, with the grandeur of the scenes and circumstances in which he had figured as a principal agent. Both parties in turn reckoned him an active ally. He was the favourite, as a negotiator, of two sovereigns; one his own, the other an enemy. Yet, notwithstanding all this, he was no statesman. In the golden age of our literature most eminent among poets, in his own day, confessedly, the first who introduced that more polished rhythm which the Rape of the Lock displays in its highest perfection, reckoned by Pope, who disliked him because of his quarrel with St. John and Atterbury, along with Shakspeare, Spenser, and Dryden, among the eight "authorities for poetical language," vindicated fiercely by the truthful and natural Cowper from Johnson's "rusty fusty" remarks on Henry and Emma, and honoured in having furnished large stores of poetry to the tenacious memory of Scott, his claims to a lofty poetic fame have been disallowed by the popular judgment of posterity, and his most epigramatic love-odes neglected. Without thought or passion, no writer can long keep his rank among poets. He was more regularly engaged in politics than Swift. Some of his bon-mots, Hazlitt says, are the best that are recorded—yet who would dream of comparing the author of Drapier's Letters and Gulliver, with Prior, as a politician, or even as a wit. In poetry, he was no less famous in his own day than Pope; but thousands, it may be said without exaggeration, read and know Pope for one who has glanced through Prior. Even in the brilliant social epoch of Queen Anne's reign, he occupies no special, no individual position among the Dorsets, Montagues, and St. Johns, with whom he familiarly associated. Scarcely an idea has been handed down to us of his very demeanour and general appearance. He did, said, and wrote many things, which are remembered; but he himself is not.

He died in 1721. He was attended to the grave by the cold regret of his once enthusiastic friend, Lord Bolingbroke, at his having been left by his wealthy patrons to comparative poverty, and by Atterbury's excuses for being kept away by a cold. He had himself to remind posterity by a bequest for a sumptuous monument in the Abbey, who he was, and what he was.

ART. IV.—1. *Account of the Life and Writings of Thomas Brown, M.D.* By Rev. D. WELSH. 1825.

2. *Edinburgh University Essays*, 1856. *Art. VII. Sir William Hamilton.* By THOMAS SPENCER BAYNES, LL.B.

IN the edition of the "Encyclopædia Britannica" now in the course of publication, there is a continuation of the Historical Dissertations on the Progress of Natural Philosophy; but, as yet, there has been no continuation of the Dissertations on the Pro-

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gress of Metaphysical and Ethical Philosophy. We are at this moment without an account of the phases which mental science has assumed of late years in Scotland. We are not, in this article, to attempt to supply this defect. We are to content ourselves with a sketch and a criticism of the two men who have exercised the greatest influence in a department in which Scotland has been allowed to excel. We are aware that Dr. Thomas Brown and Sir William Hamilton, whom we place side by side, differ very widely from each other; but their peculiarities will come out more strikingly by the contrast; and it may be interesting, and instructive withal, to observe the one sinking as the other rises above the horizon.

There would be no propriety in giving a history of Dr. Brown, since we have a full and admirable memoir in a work so accessible as his "Life" by Welsh, and an excellent compend of this in the short notice which prefaces the common edition of Brown's "Lectures." In regard to his younger years, it will be enough for us to mention, that he was born at Kirmabreck, in the stewartry of Kirkcudbright, in January 1778; that his father, who was minister of that place, died soon after, when the family removed to Edinburgh; that he there received the rudiments of his education from his mother; that, in his seventh year, he was removed to London, under the protection of a maternal uncle, and attended successively scools at Camberwell, Chiswick, and Kensington, down to the time of the death of his uncle, in 1792, when he returned to Edinburgh, to reside with his mother and sisters, and begin his collegiate course in the University. He is described as a precocious child, and we can believe it. He was precocious all his life, and in everything. We have to regret that he did not take sufficient pains to secure that the flower which blossomed so beautifully should be followed by corresponding fruit. We can credit his biographer, when he tells us that he learned the alphabet at a single lesson; but we suspect that there must have been the prompting of some ministerial friend preceding the reply which he gave, when he was only between four and five, to an inquiring lady, that he was seeking out the differences in the narratives of the evangelists. At school he was distinguished by the gentleness of his nature and the delicacy of his feelings; by the quickness of his parts, and particularly by the readiness of his memory; by his skill in recitation, and his love of miscellaneous reading, especially of works of imagination. Nor is it to be forgotten that he also gave promise of his genius for poetry, by verses which one of his masters got published, perhaps unfortunately for the youth, in a magazine. He read with a pencil in his hand, with which he made marks; and, in the end, he had no pleasure in reading a book which was not his own. He began his collegiate course in Edinburgh by the study of Logic under Finlayson; and having, in the summer of 1793, paid a visit to Liverpool, Currie, the biographer of Burns, introduced him to the first volume of Stewart's "Elements." The following winter he attended Stewart's course of lectures, and had the courage to wait on the Professor, so renowned for his academic dignity, and read to him observations on one of his theories. Mr. Stewart listened patiently, and then read to the youth a letter which he had received from M. Prevots of Geneva, containing the very same objections. This was followed by an invitation to the house of the Professor, who, however, declined on this, as he did on all other occasions, to enter into controversy. It is but justice to Stewart to say, that he continued to take a paternal interest in the progress of his pupil, till the revolt of Brown against the whole school of Reid cooled their friendship, and loosened the bonds which connected them. In 1796 he is studying law, which, however, he soon abandoned for medicine, and attended the medical classes from 1798 till 1803. At college, he received instructions from such eminent professors as Stewart, Robison, Playfair, and Black, and was stimulated by intercourse with college friends, such as Erskine, Brougham, Reddie, Leyden, Horner, Jeffrey, and Sidney Smith—all precocious and ambitious like himself, and who, in the "Academy of Sciences," debated on topics far beyond their years and their knowledge.

It was when Brown was at college, that Dorwin's "Zoonomia" was published, and excited, by its superficial plausibility, an interest resembling that which the "Vestiges" has done in our day. Brown reads it at the age of eighteen, and scribbles notes upon it; these ripen into a volume by the time he is nineteen, and are published by him at the age of twenty. It is a remarkable example of intellectual precocity. In the midst of physiological discussions, most of the metaphysical ideas which he developed in future years are to be found here in the bud. He considers the phenomena of the mind as mental states, speaks of them as "feelings," delights to trace them in their succession, and so dwells much on suggestion, and approaches towards the theory of general notions, and the theory of causation, expounded in his subsequent works. It should be added, that the book committed him prema-

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turely to principles which he was indisposed to review in his riper years. It appears from a letter to Darwin, that, at the age of nineteen, he had a theory of mind which he is systematizing.

Out of the "Academy of Sciences" arose, as is well known, the "Edinburgh Review," in the second number of which there was a review, by Brown, of Viller's "*Philosophie de Kant.*" The article is characterized by acuteness, especially when it points out the inconsistency of Kant, in admitting that matter has a reality, and yet denying this of space and time, in behoof of the existence of which we have the very same kind of evidence. But the whole review is a blunder, quite as much as the reviews of Byron and Wordsworth in the same periodical. He has no appreciation of the profundity of Kant's philosophy, and no anticipation of the effects which it was to produce, not only on German, but on British thinking. Immersed as he was in medical studies, and tending towards a French Sensationalism, he did not relish a system which aimed at showing how much there is in the mind independent of outward impression. The effects likely to be produced on one who had never read Kant, and who took his views of him from that article, are expressed by Dr. Currie, "I shall trouble myself no more with *transcendentalism;* I consider it a philosophical hallucination." It is a curious instance of retribution, that, in the succeeding age, Brown's philosophy declined before systems, which have borrowed their main principles from the philosophy of Kant, and deal as largely with *à priori* "forms," "categories," and "ideas," as Brown did with "sensations," "suggestions," and "feelings."

We feel less interest than he did himself in two volumes of poetry, which he published shortly after taking his medical degree in 1803. His next publication was a more important one. The chair of mathematics in Edinburgh was vacant, and Leslie was a candidate. The city ministers attached to the Court party wished to reserve it for themselves, and urged that Leslie was incapacitated, inasmuch as he had expressed approbation of Hume's doctrine of Causation. It was on this occasion that Brown wrote his "Essay on Cause and Effect"—at first a comparatively small treatise, but swollen, in the third edition (of 1818), into a very ponderous one. It is divided into four parts; —the first, on the Import of the Relation; the second, on the Sources of the Illusion with respect to it; the third, on the Circumstances in which the Belief Arises; and the fourth, a Review of Hume's Theory. The work is full of repetitions, and the style, though always clear, is often cumbrous, and wants that vivacity and eloquence which so distinguish his posthumous lectures. It is characterized by great ingenuity and power of analysis. He has dispelled for ever a large amount of confusion which had collected around the relation; and, in particular, he has shown that there is no link coming between the cause and its effect. He agrees with Hume, in representing the relation as consisting merely in invariable antecedence and consequence. In this he has been guilty of a glaring oversight. It may be all true, that there is nothing coming *between* the cause and its effect, and yet there may be, what he has inexcusably overlooked, a power or property in the substances acting as the cause to produce the effect. It is but justice to Brown to add, that, in one very important particular, he differs from Hume; and that is in regard to the mental principle which leads us to believe in the relation. This, according to Hume, is mere custom; whereas, according to Brown, it is an irresistible intuitive belief. By this doctrine, he attached himself to the school of Reid, and saved his system from a sceptical tendency, with which it cannot be justly charged. This irresistible belief, he shows, constrains us to believe that the universe, as an effect, must have had a cause. It is to be regretted that he did not inquire a little more carefully into the nature of this intuitive belief which he is obliged to call in, when he would have found that it constrains us to believe, not only in the invariability of the relation, but in the potency of the substances operating as causes to produce their effects.

We are not concerned to follow him in his medical career, in which he became the associate of the famous Dr. Gregory in 1806. We are approaching a more momentous epoch in his life. Dugald Stewart being in a declining state of health, Brown lectured for him during a part of sessions 1808–9 and 1809–10; and, in the summer of 1810, Stewart having expressed a desire to this effect, Brown was chosen his colleague, and, from that time, discharged the whole duties of the office of Professor of Moral Philosophy.

Even those who have never seen him can form a pretty lively image of him at this time, when his talents have reached all the maturity of which they are capable, and his reputation is at its height. In person, he is about the middle size; his features are regular, and in the expression of his countenance, and especially of his eye, there is a combination of sweetness and calm reflection. His manner and address are some-

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what too fastidious, not to say finical and feminine, for a philosopher; but the youths who wait on his lectures are disposed to overlook this, when they fall under the influence of his gentleness, so fitted to win, and of the authority which he has to command. Expectation was on the tiptoe, and he fully met and gratified it. His amiable look, his fine elocution, his acuteness and ingenuity, his skill in reducing a complex subject into a few elements, his show of originality and independence, the seeming comprehensiveness of his system, and above all, his fertility of illustration, and the glow, like that of stained glass, in which he set forth his refined speculations, did more than delight his youthful audience—it entranced them; and, in their ecstacies, they declared that he was superior to all the philosophers who had gone before him, and, in particular, that he had completely superseded Reid, and they gave him great credit, in that he generously refrained from attacking and overwhelming Stewart. He had every quality fitted to make him a favourite with students. His eloquence would have been felt to be too elaborate by a younger audience, and regarded as too artificial and sentimental by an older audience, but exactly suited the tastes of youths between sixteen and twenty. A course so eminently popular among students had not, we rather think, been delivered in any previous age in the University of Edinburgh, and has not, in a later age, been surpassed in the fervour excited by Chalmers or Wilson. There are men of sixty, still spared to us, who fall into raptures when they speak of his lectures, and assure the modern student, that, in comparison with him, Wilson was no philosopher, and Hamilton a stiff pedant. It should be added, that, when the students attending him were asked what they had got, not a few could answer only by exclamations of admiration, "How fine!" "How beautiful!" "How ingenious!" In those large classes in the Scottish colleges which are taught exclusive by written lectures, large numbers, including the dull, the idly inclined, and the pleasure-loving, are apt to pass through without receiving much benefit —unless, indeed, the professor be a very systematic examiner and laborious exacter of written exercises; and this, we rather think, Brown was not. As he left the impression on his students, that there was little wisdom in the past, and that his own system was perfect, he did not, we suspect, create a spirit of philosophic reading such as Hamilton evoked in select minds in a later age. But all felt the glow of his spirit, had a fine literary taste awakened by his poetical bursts, had their acuteness sharpened by his fine analysis, went away with a high idea of the spirituality of the soul, and retained through life a lively recollection of his sketches of the operations of the human mind. This, we venture to affirm, is a more wholesome result than is likely to be produced by what some would substitute for psychology in these times, *à priori* discussions derived from Germany, or demonstrated idealisms spun out by an exercise of human ingenuity.

His biographer tells us that, on his appointment to the chair, he had retired into the country in order that fresh air and exercise might strengthen him for his labours, and that, when the session opened, he had only the few lectures of the previous winters; but such was the fervour of his genius and the readiness of his pen, that he generally commenced the composition of a lecture after tea and had it ready for delivery next day by noon, and that nearly the whole of the lectures contained in the first three of the four volumed edition were written the first year of his professorship, and the whole of the remaining next session. Nor does he appear to have re-written any portion of them, or to have been disposed to review his judgments, or make up what was defective in his philosophic reading. He seems to have wasted his life in sending forth volume after volume of poetry, which is, doubtless, beautifully and artistically composed, after the model of the English poets of the eighteenth century, but its pictures are without individuality, and they fail to call forth hearty feeling. Far more genuine poetical power comes out incidentally in certain paragraphs of his philosophic lectures than in whole volumes of his elaborate versification.

The incidents of his remaining life are few, but are sufficient to bring out the lineaments of his character. His chief enjoyments lay in his study, in taking a quiet walk in some solitary place, where he would watch the smoke curling from a cottage chimney, or the dew illuminated with sunshine on the grass, and in the society of his family and a few friends. Never had a mother a more devoted son, or sisters a more affectionate brother. In his disposition there is great gentleness, with a tendency to sentimentality; thus, on the occasion of his last visit to his native place, he is thrown into a flood of sensibility, which, when it is related in future years to Chalmers, on his happening to be in the place, the sturdier Scotch divine is thrown into a fit of merriment. We perceive that he is fond of fame and sensitive of blame, but

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seeking to cherish both as a secret flame; and that he is by no means inclined to allow any one to offer him counsel. In 1819, he prepared his "Physiology of the Mind," as a text-book for his students, and put it into the press the following winter. By the Christmas of that year he was rather unwell; in spring he removed for the benefit of his health to London, and died at Brompton in April 1820. His remains were deposited in the churchyard of his native place, beside those of his father and mother.

His lectures were published shortly after his death, and excited an interest wherever the English language is spoken, quite equal to that awakened by the living lecturer among the students of Edinburgh. They continued for twenty years to have a popularity in the British dominions and in the United States greater than any philosophical work ever enjoyed before. During these years most students were introduced to metaphysics by the perusal of them, and attractive beyond measure did they find them to be. The writer of this article would give much to have revived within him the enthusiasm which he felt when he first read them. They had never, however, a great reputation on the Continent, where the Sensational school thought he had not gone sufficiently far in analysis; where those fighting with the Sensational school did not feel that he was capable of yielding them any aid; and where the Transcendental school, in particular, blamed him for not rendering a sufficiently deep account of some of the profoundest ideas which the mind of man can entertain, such as those of space, time, and infinity. His reputation was at its greatest height from 1830 to 1835, from which date it began to decline, partly because it was seen that his analyses were too ingenious, and his omissions many and great; and partly, because new schools were engaging the philosophic mind; and, in particular, the school of Coleridge, the school of Cousin, and the school of Hamilton. Coleridge was superseding him by views derived from Germany, which he had long been inculcating. regarding the distinction between the Understanding and the Reason; Cousin, by a brilliant Eclectic system, which professedly drew largely from Reid and Kant; and Hamilton, by a searching review of Brown's Theory of Perception, and by his own metaphysical views promulgated in his lectures and his published writings. The result of all this was a recoil of feeling in which Brown was as much undervalued as he had at one time been overrated. In the midst of these laudations and condemnations, Brown's psychological system has never been completely reviewed. Now that he has passed through a period of undeserved popularity, and a period of unmerited disparagement, the public should be prepared to listen with candour to an impartial criticism.

The psychology of Brown may be summarily described as a combination of the Scottish philosophy of Reid and Stewart, and of the analysis of Condillac, Destutt de Tracy, and the higher philosophers of the Sensational school of France, together with views of the association of ideas derived from a prevailing British school. To Reid and Stewart he was indebted more than he was willing to allow, and it would have been better for his ultimate reputation had he imbibed more of their spirit, and adhered more closely to their principles. He admits everywhere with them the existence of principles of irresistible belief; for example, he comes to such a principle when he is discussing the beliefs in our personal identity, and in the invariability of the relation between cause and effect. But acknowledging, as he does, the existence of intuitive principles, he makes no inquiry into their nature and laws and force, or (what has never yet been attempted) the relation in which they stand to the faculties. In this respect, so far from being an advance on Reid and Stewart, he is rather a retrogression. His method is as much that of Condillac and Destutt de Tracy as that of Reid and Stewart. He is infected with the besetting sin of metaphysicians, that of trusting to analyses instead of patient observation; and, like the French school, his analysis is exercised in reducing the phenomena of the mind to as few powers as possible, and this he succeeds in doing by omitting some of the most characteristic peculiarities of the phenomena. His classification of the faculties bears a general resemblance to that of M. de Tracy, the metaphysician of the Sensational school.* The

* Hereby hangs a tale. Professor James Mylne of Glasgow, resolved all the powers of the mind into Sensation, Memory, and Judgment—Emotion being represented as a conception with a sensation attached. There was a correspondence between this division and that of Brown, and yet neither could have borrowed from the other; Mylne, who never published his system, delivered it in lectures years before Brown was a professor. The general correspondence arose from both being influenced by de Tracy. This came out when the posthumous lectures of Prof. Young of Belfast, on "Intellectual Philosophy," were published (1835). The views there given had such a resemblance to those of Brown, that some of Brown's friends were inclined to regard him as having borrowed from Brown without acknowledgment. But the actual state of the case is, that Dr. Young's lectures, written immedi-

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Frenchman's division of the faculties is—Sensibility, Memory, Judgment, and Desire; Brown's is—Sensation, Simple and Relative Suggestion, and Emotion.

In estimating the influences exercised from without on Brown, we must further take into account, that ever since the days of Hartley, there had been a great propensity in Britain to magnify the power and importance of the Association of Ideas. Not only habit, but most of our conceptions and beliefs had been referred to it; Beattie and Alison, followed by Jeffrey, ascribed to it our ideas of beauty; and, in a later age, Sir James Macintosh carried this tendency the greatest length, and helped to bring about a reaction, by tracing our very idea of virtue to this source. It is evident that Brown felt this influence largely. Our intelligence is resolved by him into Simple and Relative Suggestion. There is a flagrant and inexcusable oversight here. All that Association, or, as he designates it, Suggestion, can explain, is the order of the succession of our mental states; it can render no account of the character of the states themselves. It might show, for example, in what circumstances a notion of any kind arises, say our notion of time, or space, or extension, but cannot explain the nature of the notion itself.

But it will be necessary to enter a little more minutely into the system of Brown. From the affection which we bear to his memory, and bearing in mind that his views have never been used by himself or others to undermine any of the great principles of morality, we would begin with his excellencies.

In specifying these, we are inclined to mention, first, his lofty views of man's spiritual being. He everywhere draws the distinction between mind and body very decidedly. In this respect, he is a true follower of the school of Descartes and Reid, and is vastly superior to some who, while blaming Locke and Brown for holding views tending to sensationalism, or even materialism, do yet assure us, as Mr. Morell does ("Elem. of Psychology," p. 78), that the essential distinction between mind and matter is now broken down.

We have already referred to the circumstance, that Brown stands up resolutely for intuitive principles. He calls them by the very name which some prefer as most expressive—"beliefs," and employs the test which Leibnitz and Kant have been so lauded as introducing into philosophy. He everywhere characterizes them as "irresistible"—a phrase pointing to the same quality as "necessary"—the term used by the German metaphysicians. No one—not even Cousin—has demonstrated, in a more effective manner, that our belief in cause and effect is not derived from experience. By this doctrine he has separated himself for ever from Sensationalists, and given great trouble to those classifers of philosophic systems who insist, contrary to the whole history of British philosophy, that all systems must either be sensational or ideal. It is quite obvious that such men as Butler, Brown, and Chalmers, cannot be included in either of the artificial compartments, and hence one ground of their neglect by the system-builders of our age.

His whole account of sensation is characterized by fine analysis; and, in particular, his separation of the muscular sense from the sense of touch proper. About the very time when Sir Charles Bell was demonstrating, by anatomy, the distinction between the nerves of sensation and the nerves of motion, Brown was showing, on psychological grounds, how, by the muscular sense, we get knowledge which cannot be had from mere feeling or touch. No doubt, Sir W. Hamilton has been able, by his vast erudition, to detect anticipations of these views (see note D, appended to Reid); but they were never so clearly stated, nor so acutely elaborated.

Nor must we forget his ingenious and felicitous mode of illustrating the succession of our mental states. In this particular, were it only by his happy illustrations, he has made most important contributions to what he called the physiology of the mind. It is not to be omitted, that, while he illustrates the laws of suggestion under the three Aristotelian heads of Contiguity, Resemblance, and Contrast, he hints at the possibility of resolving the whole to a finer kind of contiguity—a doctrine which is an approach to the law of integration developed by Hamilton. It should be added, that he has a classification—crude enough, we acknowledge—of the secondary laws of suggestion, a subject worthy of being further prosecuted.

ately after his appointment to the Belfast Academical Institution (1815), are largely taken from his preceptor, Mr. Mylne, who was indebted to de Tracy. It is only justice to add, that all three were men of original and independent minds. Mylne was a clear, cool lecturer, and made his students think; but his system of morals was a utilitarian one of a low stamp, and, in his account of the human mind, he overlooked its noblest ideas. Young's lectures, which do not seem to have been carefully re-written, gave no adequate view of one who was a man of fine parts and an orator, but who wasted his talents in "dining out," and unprofitable speechifying. It is a disgrace that there should be no epitaph over his grave but this, put up by some foolish fellow, "Young moulders here."

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His manner of classifying the relations which the mind can discover, though by no means complete and ultimate, is, at least, worthy of being looked at, and is superior to what has, to some extent, the same end in view—the vaunted categories of Kant.

Some place higher than any of his other excellencies, his eloquent exposition of the emotions—an exposition which called forth the laudations both of Stewart and of Chalmers. We are not inclined, indeed, to reckon the principle which he adopts in dividing them—that of time—as the best; and we are sure that he includes under emotion much that should be placed under a higher faculty; still, his lectures on this subject contain much fine exposition, and are radiant all over with poetry, and will repay a careful reading, much better than many scholastic discussions such as it is now the custom to teach in the chairs of mental science. It would be injustice not to add, that he has some very splendid illustrations of Natural Theism, fitted at once to refine and elevate the soul. We have never heard of any youth being inclined towards scepticism or pantheism, or becoming prejudiced against Christian truth, in consequence of attending on, or reading the lectures of Brown.

Over against these excellencies we have to place certain grave deficiencies and errors.

First, we take exception to the account which he gives of the very object and end of mental science. It is, according to him, to analyse the complex into the simple, and discover the laws of the succession of our mental states. There is a grievous oversight in this representation. The grand business of mental science is to observe the nature of our mental states, with the view of classifying them, and rising to the discovery of the laws which they obey, and the faculties from which they proceed. Taking this view, analysis becomes a subordinate, though of course an important, instrument; and we have to seek to discover the faculties which determine the nature of the states, as well as the laws of their succession.

He grants that there are intuitive principles of belief in the mind; but he has never so much as attempted an induction of them, or an exposition of their nature, and of the laws which regulate them. In this respect he must be regarded as falling behind his predecessors among the Scottish metaphysicians, as he is in a still greater degree inferior to Hamilton—who succeeded him—in the estimation of students of mental science. The intelligent reader is greatly disappointed to find him, after he has shown so forcibly that there is an intuition involved in our belief in our personal identity and in causation, immediately dropping these intuitions, and inquiring no more into their nature.

In his analysis he often misses the main element of the concrete or complex phenomenon. In referring so many ideas to sensation, he omits to consider how much is involved in body occupying space, and how much in body exercising property; and, in the account of memory, he fails to discover how much is contained in our idea of time. Often, too, when he has accomplished an analysis of a complex state, does he forget the elements, and reminds us of the boy who imagines that he has annihilated a piece of paper when he has burnt it, forgetting that the elements are to be found in the smoke and in the ashes. Thus, in analysing our belief in personal idenity, he comes to an intuitive belief or instinct, but no account is taken of that instinct in the summary of mental principles. It is by a most deceitful decomposition—it is by missing the very peculiarity of the phenomena, that he is able to derive all our intellectual ideas from sensation, and simple and relative suggestion.

Thus, he looks on consciousness merely as a general term for all the states and affections of mind; and then, in order to account for our belief in the sameness of self, he calls in a special instinct, which he would have seen to be involved in consciousness (always with memory), had he taken the proper view of consciousness—as an attribute revealing to us self and the states of self.

His doctrine of Perception has been severely criticised by Hamilton, and it is not needful to dwell on it. According to Brown, the mind, in perception through the senses, looks immediately on a sensation in the mind, and not on anything out of the mind. This, says Hamilton, is contrary to consciousness. We may add that, by adhering to this doctrine, he finds himself in great difficulties, in attempting to show how the mind can, from a knowledge of a mental state, which is not extended or solid, ever rise to the knowledge of something extended and solid.

In supposing that our conceptions can be referred to suggestion, he is overlooking the characteristic of the conceptions. He takes no separate account of the fantasy, or imagining power of the mind, which pictures and puts in new forms our past experience by the senses and by self-consciousness; nor does he distinguish sufficiently between a conception, considered as a mere image or representation, and the abstract and general notion. Nor can his system admit of his

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giving any account of the genesis of some of the profoundest notions which the mind of man can entertain—such as those of space, and time, and substance, and infinity. In his view of cause, he is obliged to call in an intuitive belief; but he does not see that this belief declares that there is power in the substance, acting as a cause, to produce the effects. His analysis of reasoning has been declared defective, even by Mr. J. S. Mill, and must be held as erroneous by all who maintain that there is need, in every argument, of a major term, explicit or implicit.

But his view of the motive and moral powers of man is still more defective than his view of the intellectual powers. Dr. Chalmers has shown that he has overlooked the great truth brought out by Butler, that conscience is not only a power in the mind, but claims supremacy and authority over all the others. We hold that his account of the moral faculty is altogether erroneous, inasmuch as he represents it as a mere power of emotion, overlooking the necessary conviction and judgment involved in it. He is guilty of an equally fatal mistake, in describing will as the prevailing desire, and desire as a mere emotion. Nor is it to be omitted, that he does not bring out fully that the moral faculty declares man to be a sinner. He thus constructed an ethical system, and delivered it in Edinburgh—which sometimes claims to be the metropolis of evangelical theology—without a reference to redemption or grace. This has been the grand defect of the academic ethical systems, and especially of the systems taught in the Moral Philosophy Chairs of Scotland. No teachers ever inculcated a purer moral system than Reid, Stewart, and Brown; but they do not seem willing to look at the fact, that man falls infinitely beneath the purity of the moral law. They give us lofty views of the moral power in man, but forget to tell us that man's moral faculty condemns him. It is at this place that we may expect important additions to be made to the ethics of Scotland. Taking up the demonstrations of the Scottish metaphysicians in regard to the conscience, an inquiry should be made, how are they affected by the circumstance that man is a sinner? This was the grand topic started by Chalmers, and which will be prosecuted, we trust, by other inquirers.

We are now to turn to a thinker of a different stamp. Brown and Hamilton are alike in the fame which they attained—in the influence which they exercised over young and ardent spirits—in the interest which they exercised in the study of the Human Mind—and in their success in upholding the reputation of the Scottish Colleges for metaphysical pursuits: each had an ambition to be independent, to appear original, and establish a system of his own; both were possessed of large powers of ingenuity and acuteness, and delighted to reduce the compound into elements; and each, we may add, had a considerable acquaintance with the physiology of the senses; but in nearly all other respects they widely diverge, and their points of contrast are more marked than their points of correspondence.

They differed even in their natural disposition. The one was amiable, gentle, somewhat effeminate, and sensitive, and not much addicted to criticism; the other, as became the descendant of a covenanting hero, was manly, intrepid, resolute—at times passionate—and abounding in critical strictures, even on those whom he most admires.

As to their manner of expounding their views, there could not be a stronger contrast. Both have their attractions; but the one pleases by the changing hues of his fancy and the glow of his sentiment, whereas the other stimulates our intellectual activity by the sharpness of his discussions, and the variety and aptness of his erudition. The one abounds in illustrations, and excites himself into eloquence, and his readers into enthusiasm; the other is brief and cool—seldom giving us a concrete example—restraining all emotion, except it be passion at times—never deigning to warm the students by a flash of rhetoric—and presenting only the naked truth, that it may allure by its own charms. If we lose the meaning of the one, it is in a blaze of light, in a cloud of words, or in repeated repetitions: the quickest thinkers are not always sure that they understand the other, because of the curtness of his style, and the compression of his matter; and his admirers are found poring over his notes, as the ancients did over the responses of their oracles. The one helps us up the hill, by many a winding in his path, and allows us many a retrospect, when we might become weary, and where the view is most expanded; whereas the other conducts us straight up the steep ascent, and, though he knows all the paths by which others have mounted, he ever holds directly on; and if there be not a path made for him, he will clear one for himself. Both were eminently successful lecturers: but the one called forth an admiration of himself in the minds of his whole class; whereas the other succeeded in rousing the energies of select minds, in setting them forth on curious research, and in sharpening them for logical dissection. One feels, in reading Brown, as

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if he were filled and satisfied—but sometimes as he finds in the digestion, the food has been far from substantial; whereas we are forced to complain, in regard to Hamilton, that he gives us the condensed essence, which the stomach feels great difficulty in mastering. The one never coins a new technical word, when the phrases in current use among the British and French philosophers of the previous century will serve his purpose; the other delights to stamp his thoughts with a nomenclature of his own, derived from the scholastics or the Germans, or fashioned out of the Greek tongue;—and so the one feels soft as a bird of delicate plumage, whereas the other is bristling all over with sharp points like a porcupine. The works of the one remind us of Versailles, with its paintings, its woods, its fountains, all somewhat artificial, but beautiful withal; those of the other are ruled and squared like the Pyramids, and look as if they were as lofty, and must be as enduring.

Both were extensive readers; but the reading of the one was in the Latin Classics, and the works of the well-known authors of England and France in the last century; whereas the other ranged over all ancient literature, and over the philosophic systems of all ages and countries; and delighted supremely in writings which had never been read since the age in which they were penned; and troubled many a librarian to shake the dust from volumes which no other man had ever asked for; and must, we should think, have gratified the dead, grieving in their graves over neglect, by showing them that they were yet remembered. The one delights to show how superior he is to Reid, to Stewart, to the Schoolmen, to the Stagyrite; the other rejoices to prove his superior learning by claiming for old, forgotten philosophers the doctrines attributed to modern authors, and by demonstrating how much we owe to the scholastic ages and to Aristotle.

Both departed so far from the true Scottish School; but the one went over to France for refinement and sentiment, the other to Germany for abstractions and erudition. If Brown is a mixture of the Scottish and French Schools, Hamilton is a union of the Schools of Reid and Kant. Brown thought that Reid was over-estimated, and had a secret desire to undermine him, and Stewart with him; Hamilton thought that Brown was overrated, and makes no scruple in avowing that he labours to strip him of the false glory in which he was enveloped; and he took up Reid at the time he was being decried in Scotland, and allowed no man,—but himself—to censure the common-sense philosopher. Brown had no sense of the merits of Kant, and did his best (along with Stewart) to keep him unknown for an age in Scotland; Hamilton was smitten with a deep admiration of the great German metaphysician—helped to introduce him to the knowledge of Scottish thinkers—was caught in his logical network, and was never able thoroughly to extricate himself.

As to their method of investigation, both employ analysis as their chief instrument, but the one uses a retort and proceeds by a sort of chemical composition, while the other employs a lens, and works by logical division. In comparison with Reid and Stewart, both erred by excess of decomposition and overlooked essential parts of the phenomenon, but the object of the one was to resolve all mental states into as few powers as possible, whereas the aim of the other was to divide and subdivide a whole into parts, which he again distributes into compartments of a framework provided for them. The one has added to the body of philosophy mainly by his acute analysis of concrete phenomena and by his illuminated illustrations of psychological laws; the other by his vast erudition, which enabled him to dispose under heads the opinions of all philosophers, and by his skill in arranging the facts of consciousness by means of logical division and distribution.

Brown acquired a wide reputation at an early date; but, like those showy members of the female sex who have many admirers but few who make proposals of union, he has had scarcely any professing to follow him throughout. His most distinguished pupil Dr. Welsh, was possessed of a fine philosophic spirit, but abandoned Scotch metaphysics for phrenology and for theological and ecclesiastical studies. Several eminent men, not pupils, have been influenced by Brown. Payne's work on Mental and Moral Science is drawn largely from his lectures. Isaac Taylor, in his "Elements of Thought," has adopted some of his peculiarities. Chalmers had to prepare his lectures on Moral Philosophy when Brown's name was blazing high in Scotland, and feeling an intense admiration of his eloquence and of the purity of his ethical system, has followed him perhaps further than he should have done, but has been kept from following him in several most important points by his attachment to Reid and Butler. John Stuart Mill has got the very defective metaphysics which underlies and weakens much of his logic from his father, James Mill, from Brown, and from Comte. Still, Brown has no school, and few professed disciples. It is different with Hamilton.

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His influence, if not so extensive—to use a favourite distinction of his own—has been more extensive. His articles in the "Edinburgh Review" were above the comprehension, and still further above the tastes of the great body even of metaphysical students in this country when they appeared twenty-five or thirty years ago. But they were translated by M. Peisse into the French language, and there were penetrating minds in Britain, America, and the Continent which speedily discovered the learning and capacity of one who could write such Dissertations. By the force of his genius he raised up a body of pupils ready to defend him and to propagate his influence. He has at this present time a school and disciples, as the Greek philosophers had in ancient times, and as such men as Descartes, Leibnitz, and Kant, have had in modern times. His pupils employ his distinctions and delight in his nomenclature—their speech everywhere bewrayeth them. Some of them, it is true, remind us of a modern soldier in mediæval coat of mail, and move very cumbrously under the ponderous armour of their master, but, as a whole, they constitute an able and influential school of abstract philosophy. Some of them seem incapable of looking on any subject except through the well cut lenses which Hamilton has provided for them; others seem dissatisfied with his negative conclusions, and with his rejection *a la Kant* of final cause as a proof of the Divine existence, but do not seem to have the courage to examine and separate the truth from the error in that doctrine of relativity on which his whole system is founded.

While Hamilton has thus been establishing a school and acquiring an authority, it has not been without protest. In saying so, we do not refer to the criticisms of his attacks on the character and doctrines of Luther, which have been so powerfully repelled by Archdeacon Hare and others, but to opposition offered to his philosophic principles. There has been a general dissent even by disciples from his doctrine of causation, and, if this tenet is undermined, his elaborate scheme of systematised "Conditions of the Thinkable" is laid in ruins. A pupil has opposed his negative doctrine of the Infinite. Others, not pupils, have expressed doubts of his whole theory of relativity. Ubrici, in the leading philosophic journal of Germany, "Zeitschrift für Philosophie" (1855), has charged him with departing in his method from the stand point of Scotland, with giving in to the critical method of Kant, and ploughing with the German heifer, and alleges that he or his school must advance with Germany. As the unkindest cut of all, Mr. Ferrier, who was supported by Hamilton in the competition for the Moral Philosophy Chair in Edinburgh when Professor Wilson retired, and with whom Hamilton (as he assured the writer of this article) was long in the habit of consulting, published the "Institutes of Metaphysic," which is a complete revolt against the whole Scottish Philosophy, and Kant was not more annoyed with the Idealism of Fichte than Hamilton was with the "Object *plus* Subject" of Ferrier.

We are to occupy the remainder of this article with a notice of the Life and Metaphysics (omitting the Logic) of Sir W. Hamilton.

We have an account of the principal external events of Hamilton's life in an article by his pupil Mr. Baynes, in the "Edinburgh University Papers." He was the son of Dr. W. Hamilton, an able professor of anatomy in Glasgow, and established his right to be regarded as the lineal descendant of Sir Robert Hamilton who commanded the Covenanters at Drumclog, and through him to be the representative of the Hamiltons at Preston, who claim to be descended from the second son of the progenitor of the Hamilton family. He was born at Glasgow in March 1788, lost his father in early life, was boarded some time with the Rev. Dr. Summers at Mid-Calder, entered Glasgow College at the age of 12, was afterwards sent to a school at Bromley, and returned to Glasgow College, from which he was sent, on the Snell Foundation in 1809, to Oxford. The profession which he made on going in for his Degree was unprecedented for its extent. It embraced all the classics of mark, and, under the head of science, it took in the whole of Plato, the whole of Aristotle with his early commentators, the Neo-Platonists, and the fragments of the earlier and later Greek schools. His examination in philosophy lasted two days, and six hours each day, and he came forth from it showing that his knowledge was as accurate as it was extensive. In 1812 he went to Edinburgh, where he betook himself to the study of law, and entered the bar the following year. In 1821 he was appointed Professor of Universal History, and, in the discharge of his office, delivered learned lectures to a small but select audience. From 1826 to 1828 he wrote elaborate papers against Phrenology, and Combe, and Spurzheim, and, in preparing for them, he dissected several hundred different brains. In 1829 he wrote his famous article on Cousin and the Philosophy of the Unconditioned; in 1830 his article on Perception and on Reid and Brown; in 1833 that on Whately and

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Logic. In 1836 he was appointed Professor of Logic and Metaphysics. Having begun to prelect on Reid in his class, the effort ripened into his edition of Reid in 1846. In 1852 the "Edinburgh Review" articles were re published with large additions in the "Discussions on Philosophy." By these works, and by his lectures, he has gained an influence in all countries in which philosophy is valued, and has founded a school which is likely to be predominant for several years in Scotland.

The writer of this article has a very vivid recollection of Sir William as he happened to pass into his class-room a year or two after his appointment. There was an evident manliness in his person and his whole manner and address. His features were marked, he had an eye of a very deep lustre, and his expression was eminently intellectual. He read his lecture in a clear emphatic manner, without show, pretension, or affectation of any kind. His nomenclature sounded harsh and uncouth to one unacquainted with it, but his enunciations were all perspicuous and explicit. The class was a large one, numbering we should suppose between 150 and 200. At the opening there was a furious scribbling visible and audible by all the students, in their note-books; but we observed that, as the lecture proceeded, one after another was left behind, and, when it was half through, at least one-third had ceased to take notes, and had evidently lost their interest in, or comprehension of, the subject. Unfortunately for the Scottish Colleges, unfortunately for the youth attending them, students enter the Logic Class in the second year of their course, when the majority are not ripe for it. A course of lectures, like that given in old time by Jardine of Glasgow, might be fit for such a class, but not a rigid course like that of Hamilton, who did, indeed, make his thoughts as clear as such profound thoughts could be made, but could not bring them down to the comprehension of a promiscuous class, of which many are under seventeen, and some under sixteen, or even fifteen years of age. But even among second year students there were every year a larger or less number who rejoiced to find that he first awakened independent thought within them, and who were ready to acknowledge ever afterwards that they owed more to him than to any other professor, or to all the other professors under whom they studied.

In his examinations he expected a sort of recitation of his lectures from the students. He also encouraged his pupils to submit to voluntary examinations on private studies undertaken by them. He prescribed essays on subjects lectured on, and in these essays he allowed great latitude in the expression of opinions, and some of his students, out of a spirit of independence or contradiction, would at times take up the defence of Dr. Brown, and were not discouraged. All students of high intellectual power, and especially those of a metaphysical taste, received a stimulus of a very lofty kind from his lectures, and these examinations and essays. We suspect that some of the duller and idler passed through the class without getting much benefit. In his whole intercourse with young men there was great courtesy and kindness, and a readiness to appreciate talent and independent thinking wherever he found it. For a number of years before his death, Sir William was oppressed with infirmities and had to employ an assistant, and it was characteristic of him that he was in the habit of selecting for the office some one of those who had been his more distinguished students.

Of all thinkers Sir W. Hamilton was least disposed to call any one master, still there were influences operating on him. In estimating the forces which contributed to the formation of the character of such a man, perhaps as much is to be attributed to his antipathies as his predilections. His philosophy is a determined recoil against the method and systems of Mylne and Brown, the two professors, who, in Hamilton's younger years, were exercising the greatest influence on the opinions of Scottish students. So far as he felt attractions, they were towards Reid, the great metaphysician of his native college; Aristotle, the favourite at Oxford, where he completed his education; and Kant, whose sun was rising from the German ocean on Britain, and this, in spite of all opposing clouds, about the time when Hamilton was forming his philosophic creed. Professor Ferrier thinks that the "dedication of his powers to the service of Reid" was the "one mistake in his career;" to us it appears that it must rather have been the means of saving one possessed of so speculative a spirit from numberless aberrations. But, Kant exercised as great an influence over Hamilton as even Reid did. His whole philosophy turns round those topics which are discussed in the "Kritick of Pure Reason," and he can never get out of those "forms" in which Kant sets all our ideas so methodically, nor lose sight of those terrible antinomies, or contradictions of reason, which Kant expounded in order to show that the laws of reason can have no application to objects, and which Hegel gloried in, and was employing as the ground principle of his speculations, at the very time when Hamil-

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ton aspired to be a philosopher. From Kant he got the principle that the mind begins with phenomena and builds thereon by forms or laws of thought; and it was as he pondered on the Sphinx enigmas of Kant and Hegel that he evolved his famous axiom about all positive thought lying in the proper conditioning of one or other of two contradictory propositions, one of which, by the rule of excluded middle, must be true. His pupils have ever since been standing before this Sphinx proposing, under terrible threats, its supposed contradictions, and are wondering whether their master has resolved the riddle. For ourselves, we maintain that the mind begins with the knowledge of things and not of mere phenomena; and that there are faculties which work on this, the laws of which are to be determined by induction; and we acknowledge no contradictions real or even seeming in the judgments of reason. The contradictions dwelt on by Kant and the Hamiltonians are contradictions merely in their mutilated mode of expressing the ideas of reason, and are not in the judgments themselves, which often indeed land us in mystery but never in contradictions.

We have an idea that Hamilton did at times set before him no lower a model to copy than Aristotle himself. We do not ground this opinion on such circumstances as the following:—That he is fond of expressing his admiration of Aristotle, and is in doubts whether Homer had, metaphysically speaking, a greater imagination than the peripatetic; that he had profoundly studied all the writings of Aristotle and has commented on several of them; that he feels a pride in telling us that he had collected a greater number of works illustrative of Aristotle than are to be found in any public library; that he can quote Themistius, Alexander, Ammonius, Simplicius, and Eurustratius, as readily as common men do Locke or Reid; and that he delights to show that the moderns have borrowed or stolen from the Stagyrite—some having so thieved without being suspected, and others having thieved at second hand, without knowing it. We found our conviction on positive resemblances in habit. Both are fond of opening their treatises with historical and critical notices of the opinions of previous philosophers, and, in doing so, are as much inclined to show wherein they differ from, as wherein they agree with, all other men; both usually commence their discussions with the definitions of terms; both proceed largely in the method of logical divisions, dissection, and distinction; both have a peculiar nomenclature, and an underlying system, by which they judge of every topic and of all opinions; and both delight in brevity, giving us but a proposition when we should have liked a paragraph, and a statement when we expect an explanation, and feeling aggrieved, and almost insulted, when they are asked to amplify or illustrate, to suit the capacities of weaker men. But, with their resemblances, there is at least one strong point of difference, and this is in favour of the ancient. Aristotle, considering the age in which he lived, was far in advance of Hamilton in his appreciation of physical science. We can conceive that if Hamilton had lived in ancient instead of modern Athens—that, if he had, like Aristotle, studied under Plato—felt the influence left behind him by Socrates—been stimulated by the gymnastics of the Grecian sects—listened to the orators on Mar's Hill, and to the plays in the theatre—he might have executed much of the logical, metaphysical, grammatical and critical work which Aristotle has done; but we cannot conceive him, in any circumstances, writing the treatises of natural history. We have often thought that Hamilton's mental philosophy would, with less appearance of completeness, have, in fact, been more satisfactory, if, along with his learning, in the technical sense of the term, and power of logical organization, there had been a greater appreciation of the method of induction, as illustrated (not in medicine and mesmerism, which he did know), but in some of the more advanced of the physical sciences.

The intellectual features of Hamilton are very marked and prominent. The first characteristic is his high cognitive ambition. This was strikingly illustrated in the extent of reading which he professed at Oxford—being, in fact, all ancient literature, and the whole of ancient philosophy, from the Pre-Socratic schools down to the Neo-Platonists, Proclus, and Plotinus. He had an appetite for all philosophic works and systems, and his power of digestion was equal to his appetite. Books, which others had overlooked, were apt to be his special favourites. Systems, which most men despised, he studied with peculiar avidity. It was a desire of knowledge, not so much for the sake of dazzling the eyes of men by it—though, perhaps he was not above this "passion of genius," as Erskine calls it—as for the sake of the knowledge itself, and the pleasure of the acquisition, and in order that he might systematize it all. He did much in his span of life;—yet we venture to say, that he meant to do vastly more; and we suspect that no man ever fell further below his own high standard than he did. The

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writer of this article once asked him, some years before his decease, when he meant to complete his Notes to Reid? and he replied, that he must really take it up some day soon, and finish it. He talked of the work as if it were a small one; and it is evident that it was but a small part of what he designed to do. He refers, in foot notes, to projected works, which he had been obliged reluctantly to abandon; and he proposes others, which we suspect, were left unaccomplished when he was summoned from the earthly scene. Often must he have wished that he could only get rid of these terrible "conditions" of time, and press thirty hours, instead of twenty-four, into the day; and not being able to do this, often did he encroach upon the time which, according to a much lower kind of conditions, but not less stringent in their way, ought to have been given to sleep; and by thus straining the bodily organism, he sowed, we expect, the seeds of that weakness which so oppressed him in his declining life.

We must add, that his excellence in this respect is one of his defects. His ambition tempted him to try what is beyond human strength. He would dabble even in theology, therein only to show his weakness and his obstinacy—as in his *brochure* on Non-intrusion, and his attacks on the Reformers. In his philosophy he hastened, by a speedy analysis, to reach a premature synthesis—in this respect being a great contrast to Reid, who aimed at no such pretended completeness. He aimed at nothing less than a complete system, and sought therein to rival Aristotle, Descartes, Kant, and perhaps even Hegel himself. It is no disparagement to the Scottish philosopher to affirm, that he failed where they failed. His "Conditions of the Thinkable," or "Alphabet of Thought," will be ranked with the Categories of Aristotle, Kant, and Cousin: it will take no lower and no higher a place; that is, it will be regarded, by all but his immediate school, as a splendid failure.

The next feature which strikes us, is his profound erudition. We should like, we confess, to know the secret of his capacity of acquisition. There was, no doubt, indomitable industry; but this was but the smallest part. Are we to ascribe his vast stores to a capacious memory, or to art and method? We rather think that, by his unmatched logical power, he was in the habit of drawing out a scheme of all possible views, and then the opinion of any given man fell into its proper place.

He is the most learned of all the Scottish metaphysicians. Not that the Scottish school ought to be described, as it has sometimes been, as ignorant. Hutcheson was a man of learning, as well as of accomplishment, and visibly experienced great delight in quoting the Greek and Roman philosophers, as he walked up and down in his class-room in Glasgow. Adam Smith had vast stores of information; and the ground-plan which he has left of departments of ancient philosophy, and the sketch of the sects which he has given in his "Moral Sentiments," show that he was more competent, had he devoted his attention to the subject, than any man of his age, to write a history of philosophy, Hume had extensive philosophic, as well as historical knowledge; but he was so accustomed to twist it to perverse uses, that we cannot trust his candour or accuracy. Reid was pre-eminently a well-informed man. His first printed paper was on Quantity. He taught, in Aberdeen College, according to the system of rotation which continued even to his day, Natural as well as Moral Philosophy; and continued, even in his old age, to be well read on all topics of general interest. Beattie and Campbell were respectable scholars, as well as elegant writers; and the former was reckoned, at Oxford, and by the English clergy, as the great expounder, in his day, of sound philsophy. Lord Monboddo was deeply versed in the Greek and Roman philosophies, and, in spite of all his paradoxes, has often given excellent accounts of their systems. Dugald Stewart was a mathematician as well as a metaphysician; and, if not of very varied, was of very correct, and, altogether, of very competent, ripe, and trustworthy scholarship. Brown was certainly not widely or extensively read in philosophy; but, besides a knowledge of medicine, he had an accquaintance with Roman and with Modern European literature. Sir James Mackintosh was familiar with men and manners, was learned in all social questions, and had a general, though, certainly, not a very minute or correct, knowledge of philosophic systems. But, for scholarship, in the technical sense of the term, and in particular, for the scholarship of philosophy, they were all inferior to Hamilton, who was equal to any of them in the knowledge of Greek and Roman systems, and of the earlier philosophies of modern Europe; and vastly above them in a comprehensive acquaintance with all schools; and standing alone in his knowledge of the more philosophic fathers, such as Tertullian and Augustine; of the more illustrious schoolmen, such as Thomas Aquinas and Scotus; of the writers of the Revival, such as the Elder Scaliger; and of

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the ponderous systems of Kant, and the schools which have ramified from him in Germany.

When he was alive, he could always be pointed to as redeeming Scotland from the reproach of being without high scholarship. Oxford had no man to put on the same level. Germany had not a profounder scholar, or one whose judgment, in a disputed point, could be so relied on. Nor was his the scholarship of mere words; he knew the history of terms, but it was because he was familiar with the history of opinions. In reading his account, for example, of the different meanings which the word "idea" has had, and of the views taken of sense-perception, one feels that his learning is quite equalled by his power of discrimination. No man has ever done more in clearing the literature of philosophy of common-place mistakes, of thefts, and impostures. He has shown all of us how dangerous it is to quote without consulting the original; to adopt, without examination, the common traditions in philosophy; that those who borrow at second hand will be found out; and that those who steal, without acknowledgment, will, sooner or later, be detected and exposed. He experiences a delight in stripping modern authors of their borrowed feathers, and of pursuing stolen goods from one literary thief to another, and giving them back to their original owner. For years to come, ordinary authors will seem learned, by drawing from his stores. In incidental discussions, in foot notes, and notes on foot notes, he has scattered nuts, which it will take many a scholar many a day to gather and to crack. It will be long before the rays which shine from him will be so scattered and diffused through philosophic literature—as the sunbeams are through the atmosphere—that they shall become common property, and men shall cease to distinguish the focus from which they have come.

The only other decided lineament of his character that we shall mention, is his logical power, including therein all such exercises as abstraction, generalization, division, definition, formal judgment, and deduction. In this respect he may be placed along side of those who have been most distinguished for this faculty, such as Aristotle, Saint Thomas, Descartes, Spinoza, S. Clark, Kant, and Hegel. In directing his thoughts to a subject, he proceeds to divide, distribute, define and arrange, very much in the manner of Aristotle: take, as an example, his masterly analysis of the primary qualities of matter. He pursues much the same method, in giving the history of opinions, as on the subjects of the principles of common sense and perception. No man ever displayed such admirable examples of Porphyry's tree, reaching from the *summum genus* to the *infima species*. It is quite clear that, had he lived in the days of the schoolmen, he would have ranked with the greatest of them—with Albertus Magnus, Abelard, and the Master of the Sentences—and would have been handed down to future generations by such an epithet as Doctor Criticus, Doctor Doctissimus, or Doctor Indomitabilis.

Here, again, his strength is his weakness. He attempts far too much by logical differentiation and formalization. No man purposes now to proceed in physical investigation by logical dissection, as was done by Aristotle and the schoolmen. We have at times looked into the old compends of physical science which were used in the colleges down even to an age after the time of Newton. Ingenious they were beyond measure, and perfect in form far beyond what Herschel or Faraday could produce or would attempt in the present day. We are convinced that logical operations can do nearly as little in the mental as they have done in the material sciences. We admit that Sir W. Hamilton had deeply observed the operations of the mind, and that when his lectures are published they will be found to contribute more largely to psychology than any work published in our day. But his induction is too much subordinated to logical arrangement and critical rules. His system will be found, when wholly unfolded, to have a completeness such as Reid and Stewart did not pretend to, but it is effected by a logical analysis and synthesis, and much that he has built up will require to be taken down.

In reviewing Hamilton, we feel the greatest pleasure in pointing to those doctrines which we look upon him as having established. His doctrine of Perception seems to us to be substantially correct. That Perception is intuitive and immediate is the doctrine most in accordance with consciousness and encompassed with fewest difficulties; we wish he had only added with Reid (who, however, is not very consistent in his language) that our knowledge of the primary qualities of matter is positive and not merely relative. We are inclined, too, to agree with him in thinking that our original cognitions through the senses is simply of our organism and of objects directly in contact with the organism, and that all beyond this is acquired; and we venture to add, that the distinction between our original

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and acquired knowledge might be profitably used by those who defend the doctrine of Natural Realism—it might be maintained that our original perceptions are trustworthy, and that all the apparent deceptions of the senses arise from a wrong application of the rules derived from experience. The distinction which he has drawn between presentative and representative knowledge, is as just as it is important. His view of representative knowledge, as against Reid, seems to be sound, and we may say so without subscribing to all that he maintains in regard to conception. His lectures when published will unfold a most admirable classification of the powers of the mind; at the same time we are convinced that the threefold division which he has sanctioned into the Cognitive, the Conative, and Emotive, will be found imperfect; for, besides that, imagination cannot without straining be described as cognitive, we are sure that the moral faculty cannot be placed under any of the three heads. Under the head of the Cognitive powers will be found in the forthcoming lectures invaluable remarks on the faculties of Memory, Reproduction, Representation, Comparison, and the Regulative Principles, with a revival of curious Leibnitzian disquisitions on latent operations lying beneath consciousness. His exposition of these topics will be found to embrace new facts, and facts lost sight of, fresh quotations from authors of various ages and countries, and admirable divisions, subdivisions, and discriminations. On the subject of the principles of Common Sense, or the Regulative Principles of the Mind, he has done more than any other philosopher, except, perhaps, Reid himself. One in no way given to admiration, and in no way predisposed in behalf of such philosophy, was awed by the famous note A, on Common Sense. "I have been looking," says Lord Jeffrey, "into Sir W. Hamilton's edition of Reid, or rather into one of his own annexed Dissertations 'On the Philosophy of Common Sense,' which, though it frightens one with the immensity of its erudition, has struck me very much by its vigour, completeness, and inexorable march of ratiocination. He is a wonderful fellow, and I hope may yet be spared to astonish and overawe us for years to come." While we look on Hamilton as having vastly advanced this subject, we do not regard him as having completed it. He has no where, so far as we know, pointed out the relation between our necessary and experiential ideas, say our necessary and experiential ideas of space (*for he acknowledges both*), nor the relation between the faculties and these regulative principles. Further, he has not seen that while there are *à priori* principles in the mind, they are not as principles before the consciousness—all that consciousness is cognisant of is the individual act; and so he has not acknowledged fully that *à priori* principles are after all to be discovered by means of *à posteriori* observation and induction. Above all, he has erred in representing some of them as mere *impotencies* of the mind, whereas they are positive, and about the most essential *potencies* of the human understanding.

The time is at hand when the whole philosophy of Hamilton, the philosophy of the Conditioned or the Relative, must be subjected to a rigid review. The followers of one who has so criticised others, surely cannot object to this. But the time for this will not actually arrive till we have his whole posthumous works before us. As we have already, however, in his published works an epitomized statement of most of his favourite ideas, we may be allowed to specify in an equally brief statement the tenets to which we are inclined to take decided objection, and leave the more formal discussion of them till his views are fully unfolded.

First, we object to his method. It is not in fact, it is not even professedly, the inductive. We are convinced that Hamilton never fully appreciated the Baconian method, and in this respect his disciples do not seem an improvement on the master, for, amid all their abstract discussions, we do not remember of an attempt by any one of them to add to inductive mental science. Often, indeed, did Hamilton refer to induction, but it was always with the ambition of reducing it to a form like the syllogism; and this, we venture to say, can no more be done with the grand practical principles of the Novum Organum than with a father's advice to his Son, or the Sermon on the Mount. Hamilton's own method is professedly an analysis in order to a synthesis. It partakes as much of the critical method of Kant as of the inductive method of Bacon. He tells us, "the first problem of philosophy is to seek out, purify and establish by intellectual analysis and criticism the elementary feelings or beliefs, in which are given the elementary truths of which all are in possession."—(Edition of Reid, p. 752.) If he had said that the business of philosophy is to observe with care, to seek out, to analyse, and classify, *in short, to induct* the necessary convictions of the mind, his account would have been correct. But he has gone over to Kantism, and furnishes a foothold to the later aberrations of Ger-

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many, and even to Ferrierism, when he speaks of "purifying" them, and "establishing them by intellectual criticism."

His philosophy is that of the Conditioned or Relative. We acknowledge that he has laid in ruins the philosophy of the Unconditioned. But we may admit this without giving our adherence to his own theory. Instead of the great *realist*, Hamilton should be called the great *relativist.* Surely there may be a Positive theory (not in the Comtian sense), alike removed from the Absolute and the Relative theories. We maintain that the mind is so endowed that it has a positive, though of course limited knowledge of things—not of relations but of things. We acknowledge that there is a true doctrine of relativity, but it must be separated from the Hamiltonian doctrine. We acknowledge that there is a sense in which knowledge is a relation; even the Divine knowledge is a relation, but the relation arises from the knowledge, and not the knowledge from the relation. Again, human knowledge differs in this respect from Divine knowledge in that it is limited; but when we mean this, why not say this? This limited knowledge of man arises from the limited nature of man's faculties—man knows only what he has the capacity to know (thus the blind cannot see colours), and man is incapable of discerning much truth, which God and angels know; but when we mean this let us say this. If this were all that Hamilton meant, we would offer no objection to his doctrine, except to say, that relative is not the word to express his meaning. But when he affirms that man knows only phenomena as contrasted with things, that man's intuitive knowledge may not be pure, and that the "contents of every act of knowledge are made up of elements and regulated by laws proceeding partly from its object and partly from its subject"—(Notes on Reid, p. 808), we feel that we are fast in the fetters of Kantism, and approaching Ferrier's "Object *plus* Subject." Ferrier might claim to be only "purifying" what is acknowledged to be impure, and establishing by intellectual criticism that in all knowledge there is *subject* along with *object.* We hold (with Mansel) that by self-consciousness we know self; the thing self, the ego, and not a mere phenomenon or relation of self to the knowing subject. No doubt, we do not know the substance apart from the quality; even God himself cannot know this, for our intuitive convictions assure us that mind as a substance cannot exist apart from qualities.

Hamilton has been much commended for his view of Consciousness, as so superior to that taken by Reid on the one hand, and Brown on the other. We do not admit this—till his doctrine is fully unfolded. He has ever the word consciousness in his mouth (as Locke has "idea, and Kant, "*à priori*," and Brown, "suggestion,") but does he always mean the same thing by it? It is not only the recognition of the affections of self, co-existing with all the intelligent exercises of the mind, but it is a "comprehensive term for the complement of our cognitive energies"—(Dis. p. 48, 2d ed.); and again, "all our faculties are only consciousnesses" (p. 52); and, again, it is the "universal condition of intelligence" (p. 47); and, once more, "consciousness and immediate knowledge are terms universally convertible" (p. 51). Are all these one and the same? He tells us, that,—"*We know*, and *We know that we know*," while "*logically* distinct, are *really* identical" (Dis. p. 47). Let us expand this statement and view it in a concrete example. *To know this table*, and *to know that we know it*, are, as it appears to us metaphysically, that is, really distinct, and may be logically distinguished, because really different. No doubt they co-exist in the concrete act, but it is as the knowledge of form and colour always co-exist in perception through the eye, they co-exist as cognitions, but we know them to be really different. We are clear, with Reid, that it is desirable to have one word to express our power of immediate cognition through the senses; and another to express our power of knowing of self in all its exercises, whether looking at an object without, or what is equally possible looking at self in a past state, or looking at no separate object at all, as when we are imagining; and it appears to us, that the best word for this latter capacity is consciousness. We are further convinced, that it is of vast consequence with Locke, with Hutcheson, with Reid, with Stewart, to bring out consciousness to the view separately, as a mental attribute, the source of important experiential knowledge, which can be submitted to all kinds of logical processes. The neglect of this truth, degraded the philosophy of Condillac, and passing from him to Kant, has confused the whole philosophy of Germany.

We have not as yet Hamilton's view of Space and Time fully unfolded. He often proclaims, however, his adhesion to Kant's view of them as forms or conditions of the sensibility, but adds, that we have also an empirical knowledge of them.—(See his Edit. of Reid, p. 126, and p. 882.) What relation we wonder do these two notions bear to each other? He has told us ex-

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pressly, that "space is only a law of thought and not a law of things."—(Dis. p. 607.) We maintain, that our intuitive conviction, declares space to be a thing as certainly as the body contained in space. If we regard it with Kant as a mere subjective form, we cannot save ourselves from the consequence drawn by Fichte, that the bodies perceived in space may also be creations of the mind.

We shall not enter on the discussion of his doctrine of Substance and Quality, inasmuch as he has not expanded it. We shall only say of it, that it seems lamentably defective in representing our conviction of substance as a mere impotency.

His doctrine of Causation has been unfolded and has been pretty generally repudiated. If Brown "eviscerates" the idea (to use Hamilton's phrase), Hamilton decapitates it, making it a "Law of Thought (not of Things) and merely subjective" (Dis. p. 613). He leaves out in his Analysis and Intellectual Criticism the main element in the intuitive conviction. The phenomenon is this :—When aware of a new appearance, we are *unable* to conceive that therein has originated any new existence, and are, therefore, *constrained* to think that what now appears to us under a new form had previously an existence under others."—(Dis. p. 609.) This is not the phenomenon. The phænomenon is, that when we meet with a new substance, or a substance in a new state, we are constrained to look for a potency in a substance or substances to produce the new substance or the change of the old. His generalization is founded on a narrow view of material objects. It may be all true that "gunpowder is the effect of the mixture of nitre, charcoal and sulphur, which all existed before;" but this is a mere experiential observation in regard to the material cause. But we can conceive this sulphur, or a soul, or a world, springing into being without any previous matter, and what the mind insists on is, that there must have been an efficiency in some substance to produce it. This belief in Causation is not, as he represents it, a mere *mental impotency* or inability, but is a positive conviction, belief, or judgment, that every effect has a cause; and that when the effect is real, say the world, the cause, that is God, must also have a real existence. It is one of the lamentable consequences of this wretchedly defective view of Causation, that it does not entitle us to argue from the world as an effect to God as the cause.

His doctrine of the Infinite has appeared to not a few to be unsatisfactory. We admit that his criticism of the Theory of Cousin is unanswerable, and those who would succeed in meeting Hamilton, must not take up the ground of the brilliant French Eclectic. The business of the philosopher is here faithfully to interpret and unfold our intuitive conviction on this subject, when it will be found that the mind has something more than a mere negative impotency, that it has a positive belief, that to whatever point we might go in space or in time, there is, and must be, a something beyond.

It is in order to establish a great law of Relativity, that he has resolved our convictions as to Space, Time, Substance, Causalty, Infinity (what makes he of a more important one still, Moral Good?) into mental impotencies. But when it is shown that the individual convictions are not impotencies but potencies, the great Law of Relativity is undermined, and with it the whole Alphabet of Thought.

The defective nature of the whole Hamiltonian system comes out in its results. Comparing his philosophy with that of Germany, he says:—

"Extremes meet. In one respect both coincide, for both agree that the knowledge of Nothing is the principle or the consummation of all true philosophy. "*Scire Nihil,—studium quo nos laetamur utrique.*" But the one doctrine openly maintaining, that the Nothing must yield every thing, is a philosophic omniscience, whereas the other holding, that Nothing can yield nothing, is a philosophic nescience. In other words:—the doctrine of the Unconditioned is a philosophy confessing relative ignorance, but professing absolute knowledge; while the doctrine of the Conditioned, is a philosophy professing relative knowledge, but confessing absolute ignorance."—(Dis. p. 609.)

Surely this is a pitiable enough conclusion to such an elaborate process. A mountain labours, and something infinitely less than the mouse emerges.

We suspect that Sir W. Hamilton was wont to meet all such objections, and try to escape from such a whirlpool as that in which Ferrier would engulph him, by taking refuge in belief—in faith. And we are thoroughly persuaded of the sincerity of his faith, philosophic and religious. But it is unsatisfactory, it is unphilosophic, to allow that cognition and intelligence may lead to nihilism, and then resort to faith to save us from the consequences. Surely there is faith involved in the exercises of intelligence; there is faith (philosophical) involved, when from a seen effect, we look up to an unseen cause. We are sure that human intelligence does not lead to absolute knowledge, but as little does it lead to scepticism or to nothing. Of this we are further sure,

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that the same criticism which pretends to demonstrate that intelligence ends in absolute ignorance, will soon—probably in the immediately succeeding age—go on to show with the same success, that our beliefs are not to be trusted.

The same doctrine of relativity carried out, led him to deny that there could be any valid argument in behalf of the Divine existence, except the moral ones. We acknowledge that the moral argument, properly enunciated, is the most satisfactory of all. We admit that the argument from order and adaptation (the physico-theological) can prove no more, than that there is a living being of vast power and wisdom, presiding over the universe—but this it can do by the aid of the law of cause and effect properly interpreted. The proof that this Being is infinite must be derived from the mental intuition in regard to the infinite. Hamilton has deprived himself of the power of using the arguments from our belief in Causation and Infinity by what we regard as a defective and mutilated account of both these intuitions. He has no where stated the moral arguments which he trusts in. We suspect that the criticism which cuts down the argument from intelligence, needs only to be carried a step further to undermine the argument from our moral nature. This process has actually taken place in Germany, and we have no desire to see it repeated among metaphysical youths in this country. It is on this account, mainly, that we have been so anxious to point out the gross defects in the account given by Hamilton of our necessary convictions.

The question is started at the close of our survey, are we to have for ever nothing but a successions of schools in mental science, —Hutcheson superseded by Reid, and Reid by Brown, and Brown by Hamilton, and Hamilton superseded, as the author of it would wish, by a new and Ideal school, and in this view is Hamilton to be as much disparaged in the next age as Brown is in this? We reply that Reid and Stewart are not superseded, that they stand as high as they ever did: that Brown so far as he has really added to psychology is not superseded, and that Hamilton, inasmuch as he has given us admirable summaries of philosophic systems, and masterly classifications of mental phenomena, will go down through ages, with the brightest names in philosophy.

All that is solid and permanent in mental science has been reached, in fact, by observation and induction. We must here, however, draw a distinction which has often been lost sight of. When we say that observation is needful in order to construct metaphysical science, we do not mean to say that there are no principles in the mind except these derived from observation and experience. Observation shows that there are principles in the mind, native and necessary, and regulating experience. But these principles acting in the mind as regulative principles are not before the consciousness as principles; all that is before the consciousness are the individual acts and exercises. The law of Causation is not written on the surface of the mind to be discovered by consciousness any more than the law of gravitation is written on the sky to be read by the senses. All that is before the senses, in the latter case, is an individual fact, say an apple falling to the ground, and the law is to be discovered by a process of generalization; and all that is before consciousness, in the former, is a particular mental conviction—the principle of which can be detected only by classification. And so it may be quite true that there are *à priori* principles in the mind, and yet a process of careful *à posteriori* induction may be absolutely requisite in order to discover their nature and their rule, and to entitle us to employ them in philosophic speculation.

In regard to systems which are not built upon inductive psychological proof they are to us all alike; they differ only in respect of the peculiar intellectual character and tendencies of those who have constructed them. The man of genius, like Schelling, will form a theory, distinguished for its ingenuity or beauty; the man of vigorous intellect, like Hegel, will erect what looks like a very coherent fabric; but until they can be shown to be founded on the inherent principles of the mind by a rigid induction, we wrap ourselves up in doubt, and refuse to give our consent.* And we cleave

* Professor Ferrier has endeavoured to introduce into this country an ideal system, which may attain the same notoriety as those of Schelling and Hegel in Germany, but in this he will fail. For, in addition to British good sense, he has the transparency of his own style against him. No man can confute Hegel, for no man is sure that he understands him, and to any professed refutation it will always be competent to reply that he has been misunderstood. But Ferrier's style is as clear as it is often fascinating, and the error is very visible. We may remark, however, that onlookers will often be tempted to think that Ferrier is in the right, if he be met by mere logical distinctions. A few stones from a sling will be felt to be far more annoying to this most dexterous of small swordsmen, than a more formidable weapon. He has given us a pretended demonstration without axioms or definitions. He is no sceptic, and has propositions which he assumes. On what ground we ask him? When he specifies the ground, we show on the same ground, that when

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to this principle because of its wisdom, knowing all the while that there are fervent youths (abetted by conceited older men) who, as believing that the next turn in the high *à priori* road which they are pursuing, is to open on the ocean of absolute truth, will feel as if it were turning them back, when the long looked for object were about to burst gloriously on their view.

Nor are we to be seduced into an admiration of these imposing systems, by the plea often urged in their behalf, that they furnish a gymnasium for the exercise of the intellect. We acknowledge that one of the very highest advantages of study of every description is to be found in the vigour imparted to the mind which pursues it. But, whatever may have been the state of things in the days of the schoolmen, it is not necessary now to resort to fruitless *à priori* speculation, in order to find an arena in which to exercise the intellect. Nay, we are convinced that when the research conducts to no solid results, it will weary the mind without strengthening it; the effort will be like that of one who beateth the air; and activity will always be followed by exhaustion, by dissatisfaction, and an unwillingness to make further exertion. Labour it is true, is its own reward; but if there be no other reward there will be the want of the proper incentive,—the vigour imparted is only one of the incidental effects which follow when labour is undertaken in the hope of reaching substantial fruits. Nor is it to be forgotten that these speculations though fruitless of good are not fruitless of evil. In the struggles thus engendered, there are other powers of the mind *tried* as well as the understanding; there are often sad agonisings of the feelings, of the faith, and indeed, of the whole soul, which feels as if the foundation on which it previously stood had been removed and none other supplied, and as if it had in consequence to sink for ever—or as if it were doomed to move for ever onward without reaching a termination, while all retreat has been cut off behind. In these wrestlings, we fear that many wounds are inflicted, which rankle for long, and often terminate in something worse than the dissolution of the bodily organism, for they end in the loss of faith and of peace, in cases in which they do not issue in immorality, or in scepticism and profanity.

These exercises we suspect resemble not so much those of the gymnasium, as those of the ancient gladiatorial shows, in which no doubt there were many brilliant feats performed, but in which also, members were mutilated, and the heart's blood of many a brave man shed. We fear that in not a few cases generous and courageous youth have entered the lists to lose in the contest, all creed, all religious—and in some cases all moral principle, and with these all peace and all stability.

we look on a stone, we know the stone to be an object separate from, and independent of the object. He says (Scott. Phil. pp. 19, 20), that "no man in his senses would require a proof *that* it (that is real existence) is." We are glad of this appeal to man's "senses," but we insist that these same "senses" tell us that the stone has an existence independent of the contemplative mind. This cannot be disproved by any pretended demonstration, for the principles assumed in such cannot be more certain than the truth which they would set aside.

ART. V.—1. *Letters from the Slave States.* By JAMES STIRLING. London: Parker. 1857.

2. *American Slavery and Colour.* By WILLIAM CHAMBERS. London: W. and R. Chambers. 1857.

Two nations, in the present era of the world's history, are exercising almost a paramount influence on the world's progress—Britain and the United States of America. They bear the relationship of sire to son. The one in the full prime of life pursues his habitual avocation, exhibiting no symptoms of decay,—the other having attained to manhood and achieved independence, strides onward in a separate but not altogether dissimilar career. They acknowledge their kindred by terming themselves Anglo-Saxons—a name unknown to the official catalogue of political designations, but one which expresses, in a higher sense than mere political classification, a community of origin, and not the less a community of end, aim, purpose, and destination. Of all races, this Anglo-Saxon race is the most ceaselessly active, the most daring in design, the most indomitable in execution. It is girding the world with its power, from two ends, and carrying into new regions the fruits and labours of civilization more than any, or all other races combined. Geographical considerations have assigned to Britain one course, and to America another course, but the end in view is substantially the same. America, with the same intention as Britain—" to subdue the earth and make it yield its increase "—has obviously a different career from that of Britain, a different destiny over which a different genius presides. Britain departs from a centre, works from a centre, colonizes from a centre, and governs from a centre. Her political action is outward, not less than in-

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