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ARTIST AND CRAFTSMAN.

CHAPTER IV.

A LIFT ON THE ROAD—THE BANKER'S PARTY—A STRICKEN STUDENT.

THIS Clara, then, was the grasshopper and butterfly, as he had first called her, whose deep blue eyes would persist in gazing out of the Lake of Garda upon the youth who had likened himself in contrast to a bee or a grub. Some few sunny days by the said lakeside, with long, deep, and earnest conversations upon matters which both had at heart, had forged a stronger link between these two than either of them could by any means have suspected on the first of those days when a chance had thrown them together. At the end of these first few days' acquaintance they seemed to be old friends, and to know a great deal of one another already. Indeed, they did so, though there was very much of which they were in strange ignorance; for though each knew by that time many of the innermost thoughts of the other, their singular contrasts and still more singular agreements, yet it is doubtful whether Clara knew, on the day after their parting, that her new friend's name was Mark Brandling; and beyond a doubt that she could not have told what his calling was, nor on what business he was in Lombardy. As for Mark, he was not a little surprised, the next morning, to learn from snatches of the Oxonians' conversation, who were breakfasting at the upper end of the table at which he

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himself was sitting, how much information those ingenious youths had picked up concerning the young lady, of whom they had enjoyed at best a glimpse at her departure—information partly strange and unexpected to him, her friend and adopted brother.

"I wish Ingram had lost his Catullus," said Digby, pausing in his vigorous onslaught on the breakfast; "he's been hammering all the morning at translating an ode into hendecasyllabics, to judge by his puzzlebrain looks."

"Wrong for once, my boy," answered the first-class man; "I hate all translations, and have given Catullus no thought since last night."

"Well, then, you have been concocting an abstruse refutation of Tre-lawney's theory, concerning the site of the garden of the Hesperides, which he flatters himself to have discovered three miles from his father's park palings in Cornwall."

"None of your jokes upon me, Master Digby," interposed the Cornishman; "you are all abroad about Ingram now; and I'll bet any gentleman a zwanziger that I name what's uppermost in his mind this morning."

"Done," said Ingram, himself; "betting's not much in my way; but I think I'm safe this time."

"Who spied a little boat from be-

9*

dered to him in 1813, when detached from the force under Lord Lynedoch (then Gen. Graham), after the fight of Barrosa.

Chetwynde Digby, on the flaming parapet up there, was wonderfully like that portrait of his father, they said. And though Mark knew no-

thing of that, nor had ever paid the Manor-house a visit, yet one thing he was forced to acknowledge, that the heir of it, hollaoing to the fireman, was a born leader and comrade of men, wheresoever and whensoever manly deeds were to be done.

SIR WILLIAM HAMILTON'S METAPHYSICS.

BY MR. M'COSH.

WHAT are we to make in these times of Metaphysics? It is quite clear that this kind of investigation has lost, we suspect for ever, the position once allowed it, when it stood at the head of all secular knowledge, and claimed to be equal, or all but equal in rank to Theology itself. "Time was," says Kant, "when she was the queen of all the sciences; and if we take the will for the deed, she certainly deserves, so far as regards the high importance of her object-matter, this title of honour. Now it is the fashion to heap contempt and scorn upon her; and the matron mourns forlorn and forsaken like Hecuba." Some seem inclined to treat her very much as they treat those *de jure* sovereigns wandering over Europe whom no country will take as *de facto* sovereigns—that is, they give her all outward honour, but no authority; others are prepared to set aside her claims very summarily. The multitudes who set value on nothing but what can be counted in money never allow themselves to speak of metaphysics except with a sneer. The ever-increasing number of persons who read, but who are indisposed to think, complain that philosophy is not so interesting as the new novel—or the pictorial history, which is quite as exciting and quite as untrue as the novel. The physicist, who has kept a register of the heat of the atmosphere at nine o'clock in the morning for the last five years, and the naturalist, who has discovered a plant or insect, distinguished from all hitherto known species by an additional

spot, cannot conceal their contempt for a department of inquiry which deals with objects which can neither be seen nor handled, nor weighed nor measured.

In the face of all this scorn we boldly affirm that mental philosophy is not exploded, and that it never will be exploded. Whatever men may profess or affect, they cannot, in fact, do without it. It often happens that a profession of contempt for all metaphysics, as being futile and unintelligible, is often an introduction to a discussion which is metaphysical without the parties knowing it (just as the person in the French play had spoken prose all his life without being aware of it); and of such metaphysics it will commonly be found that they are futile and unintelligible enough. Often is Aristotle denounced in language borrowed from himself, and the schoolmen are disparaged by those who are all the while using distinctions which they have cut with sharp chisel in the rock, never to be effaced. There are persons speaking with contempt of Plato, Descartes, Locke, and all the metaphysicians, who are taking advantage of the great truths which they have discovered. Perhaps these individuals are telling you very solemnly that they prefer the *practical* to the *theoretical*, or that they care little for the *form* if they have the *matter*, and are profoundly ignorant that they are all the while using distinctions introduced by the Stagyrte, and elaborated into their present shape by the scholastics. But surely, they will tell you,

the discovery of a new *species* of an old *genus* is a more important event than all your philosophic discoveries; and they will be surprised to learn that we owe the introduction of the phrases *genus* and *species* to Plato or to Socrates. Or perhaps they boast that they can have *ideas* without the aid of the philosophers, forgetting that Plato gave us the word *idea*, while Descartes and Locke brought it to its present signification. "Ah, but," says our novel reader, eager to discover whether the heroine so sad and forlorn in the second volume is to fall in with her lover, and be married to him before the close of the third, "metaphysics are associated in my mind with a dreary desert without and a headache within;" and is quite unaware that he is able so to express himself, because philosophers have explained that ideas are associated. We could easily show that in our very sermons from the pulpit, and orations in the senate, and pleadings at the bar, principles are ever and anon appealed to which have come from the heads of our deepest thinkers in ages long gone by, and who may now be forgotten by all but a few antiquarians in philosophy. Our very natural science, in the hands of such men as Faraday, is ever touching on the borders of metaphysics, and compelling our physicists to rest on certain fundamental convictions as to extension and force. The truth is, in very proportion as material science advances, do thinking minds feel the need of something to go down deeper and mount up higher than the senses can do; of some means of settling those deeper questions which the mind is ever putting in regard to the soul, and the relation of the universe to God; and of a foundation on which the understanding can ultimately and confidently repose.

In the volumes before us a master-spirit has spoken, and will command attention. We see that the circulating libraries in London are placing "Hamilton's Metaphysics" at the head of their advertised list of popular books. The Bampton Lectures, on the Limits of Religious Thought, by Mr. Mansel—one of the editors of these lectures—an avowed application of the philosophy of Hamilton to theology, has reached a third edition quicker than "Adam Bede," "What

will he do with it," or the most fashionable novel of the season. It is a matter of fact, that a well written work on philosophy will command a surer sale in this age than in any previous one in our country; and all this arises from the felt wants of the times, which requires a metaphysics to help it to determine those deeper problems which are beyond physics.

We have a pretty full memoir of the late Sir W. Hamilton, in an article by his pupil, Mr. T. S. Baynes, in the "Edinburgh Essays, by Members of the University." He was born at Glasgow, in March, 1788, and was the son of Dr. W. Hamilton, Professor of Anatomy in the University, who was a lineal descendant of Sir Robert Hamilton, the commander of the Covenanters at Drumclog, and through him of the Hamiltons at Preston, who claim to be descended from the second son of the progenitor of the family of the Duke of Hamilton. Having lost his father in early life he was boarded for some time with the Rev. Dr. Summers, the parish minister at Midcalder; was afterwards at a school at Bromley; entered as a student the University of Glasgow, and was sent from it in 1809, on the Snell Foundation, to Balliol College, Oxford. On going up for his degree he professed every classic author of mark, and in the department of science all the works extant in Greek and Roman philosophy, including "the whole of Aristotle, with the works of his early commentators, and the whole of Plato, with the Neo-Platonists, Proclus and Plotinus; to say nothing of the fragments of both earlier and later philosophic doctrines preserved by Laertius, Stobaeus and other collectors." In 1812 he went to Edinburgh, and in the following year he became a barrister—*Scottice*, an advocate. It does not appear that he was eminently successful at the bar, and so every one rejoiced when in 1821 he was appointed Professor of Universal History in the University of Edinburgh, by the Faculty of Advocates, the patrons of the chair. From 1826 to 1828 he wrote papers against phrenology and its supporters, Spurzheim and Combe. In 1829 he published, in the *Edinburgh Review*, his famous article on Cousin, and on the Philosophy of the Unconditioned; and that was followed in 1830 by an

article on Perception, and on Reid and Brown; and in 1833 by an article on Whately and Logic. In 1836 he was appointed Professor of Logic and Metaphysics in the University of Edinburgh, and proceeded to prepare that course of lectures which he, or his assistants for him, delivered each successive session till his decease. As a professor, he had a large class of students, numbering perhaps from 120 to 150, some of whom scarcely understood him, but others of whom were greatly stimulated by the instructions he gave and by the spirit which he kindled. Having occasion to prelect on Reid in his class his labours led to his edition of Reid's Collected Works, with Notes and Dissertations (unfinished) in 1846. In 1852 the articles in the *Edinburgh Review* were republished, with large additions, in the "Discussions on Philosophy." Some years before his death he had a stroke of paralysis, which partially affected his speech and his power of using his pen, and his lectures had to be read, in whole or in part, by an assistant, while his amiable lady acted as his amanuensis. A second attack carried him off, after a few days' illness, on May 6, 1856.

He has left a body of ardent disciples, who may be said to constitute a school adhering more or less faithfully to his peculiar views—most of them copying his manner and employing his favourite nomenclature—some of them prosecuting topics of curious research, or endeavouring, with but indifferent success, as it appears to us, to throw farther light on those profound metaphysical topics on which their great master was for ever pondering; but none of them, so far as we know, taking up, with Hamilton, an inductive psychology, and seeking to advance it, as he did. In Oxford there are a few choice spirits who have felt his influence, and are turning his metaphysical or his logical speculations to profitable account. His posthumous Lectures on Metaphysics are edited by an Edinburgh pupil—Mr. Veitch—already favourably known as translator of portions of the works of Descartes, and as having completed the beautiful edition of Dugald Stewart's works, which Hamilton had commenced, conjoined with Mr. Mansel, the well-known editor of "Aldrich's Logic," the author of the

"Prolegomena Logica," of the article, "Metaphysics" in the "Encyclopedia Britannica," and of the "Bampton Lectures for 1858." We may expect, in due time, to have his Lectures on Logic unfolding fully his New Analytic of Logical Forms, which his school declare to be the greatest advance made in formal logic since the days of Aristotle, with the exception, perhaps, of the scientific reduction of the science by Kant, who made logic the science of the necessary laws of thought.

The intellectual features of Hamilton stand out very prominently. A discerning eye might have seen from the beginning that his independent and impetuous mind would impel him to follow a course of his own; and that while, probably, destined to lead, he would not be led—certainly would not be driven—by others. He is evidently moved by a strong, internal appetency to master all learning. Along with this he has an unsurpassed capacity of retention and power of arrangement. His skill in seizing the opinions of the men of all ages and countries—the ancient Greeks, the philosophic fathers of the Church, the schoolmen, the thinkers of the age of the Revival of Letters, such as Scaliger, and of the continental metaphysicians, from the days of Descartes to about the year 1830, and in putting them under appropriate heads, so as to bring out their minutest shades of difference, has never been equalled by any British philosopher. His powers of logical analysis, generalization, and distribution, are scarcely surpassed by those of Aristotle, or of the Angelic Doctor of the middle ages, or of Kant. We have to add, that, while he has also great powers of observation, he has, like most metaphysicians, often overridden and overwhelmed them by logical processes, and hastened, by dissection, division, and criticism, to construct, prematurely, a complete system of philosophy—such as is to be built up only as systems of physical science are formed by the careful inductions of successive inquirers continued through successive ages. In this respect he has imbibed the spirit of Kant, and has not followed the examples set him by the more cautious school of Reid and Stewart.

It is not difficult to find out the in-

fluences under which these native powers were made to take the particular direction which they did. We are convinced that a wholesome tone was given to his mind by the philosophy of Reid, the metaphysician of his native college, and who died six years after Hamilton was born. Had he been trained exclusively in Oxford he might have spent his powers in mere notes and comments on others, and we should have been without his profound original observations. Had he been reared in Germany his speculative spirit might have wasted itself in a hopelessly entangled dialectic, like that of Hegel. To Glasgow and to Reid he owes his disposition to appeal, even in the midst of his most abstract disquisitions, to consciousness and to facts. To Oxford we may trace his classical scholarship and his love of Aristotle, the favourite for long ages with technical Oxonian tutors. We only wish that he had been led to drink as deep into Plato as he did into Aristotle; it would have widened his sympathies, and rubbed off some acute angles of his mind, and made his philosophy less cold and negative. A third master mind exercised as great a power over him as either Reid or Aristotle. In prosecuting his researches he was necessarily led beyond the narrow scholarship of Britain into the wide field of German learning, and while ranging there could not but observe that there was a constant reference to the name of Kant. The logical power of the author of the "Critick of Pure Reason" at once seized his kindred mind, and he eagerly took hold of his critical method, and adopted many—we think far too many—of his distinctions. Fortunately he fell in, at the same time, with the less hard and more genial writings of Jacobi, who taught him that there was a faith element as well as a rational element in the human mind; but, unfortunately, Jacobi thought that faith was opposed to reason, and had no distinct views as to the nature of faith, or as to the harmony between faith and reason. To this source we may trace those appeals which Hamilton is ever making to faith, but without specifying what faith is. To his legal studies we may refer somewhat of his dry manner and his disputatious spirit. His reading in connexion with the chair of history enabled him to

realize the precise condition of the ages in which the opinions of philosophers were given forth. The catholic views which his extensive reading led him to adopt set him in determined opposition to the miserably narrow Sensational school of France, and to Professor Mylne, of Glasgow, and Dr. Thomas Brown, who had given way too much to that school. The lofty spiritual views which he had caught from Reid and Kant set him against materialism, and his medical studies, to which his father's profession may have directed him, enabled him to meet phrenology, and to give an admirable account of the physiology of the senses. Such was the course of training which he had gone through when he was asked to write a review of Cousin, and found himself face to face with the philosophy of the Absolute; and when, a few years later, he had to prepare a course of lectures on logic and metaphysics in the University of Edinburgh, a course which he, no doubt, meant to excel those of Brown and even Stewart in the same University, and to rival those of Reid, Smith, or Hutcheson, in the University of Glasgow.

Hamilton may be regarded always, along with M. Cousin, still living, as the most distinguished metaphysician of the age now past or passing away. In contemplating these two eminent philosophers it is difficult to say whether one is most struck with their resemblances or their differences. They are alike in respect of the fulness and the general accuracy of their scholarship. Both are alike distinguished for their historical knowledge and critical power. Even here, however, we may observe a contrast—Cousin being the more universal in his sympathies, and Hamilton being the more discriminating and the more minutely accurate in his acquaintance with rare and obscure authors. Both, perhaps, might have had some of their views expanded, if, along with their scholarship, they had entered more thoroughly into the inductive spirit of modern physical researches. But the age of universal knowledge is past, and it is vain to expect that any human capacity can contain all learning. Both are original, vigorous, and independent thinkers, and both are distinguished by a Catholic spirit in philosophy; but the one is more Platonic,

and the other more Aristotelian in his tastes and habits. The one delights to show wherein he agrees with all others, the other is more addicted to show wherein he differs from all others. Both are clear writers; but the one is distinguished by the eloquence of his composition and the felicity of his illustrations; the other by the accuracy and expressiveness of his (at times) harsh nomenclature. Cousin is, undoubtedly, the man of finest genius and most refined taste; the other appears to us to have been the man of coolest and most penetrating intellect. The one makes every subject of which he treats iridescent by the play of his fancy; the other bands it into a structure of great solidity by the rigidity of his logic. Both are admirers of the German as well as the Scottish schools of philosophy; but Cousin's predilections were at one time more towards the former, and of a later date he has become more attached to the latter; whereas Hamilton started more in the Scottish spirit, and swung latterly towards the German method. The two came into collision when the Scotchman reviewed the Frenchman in the *Edinburgh Review*. But when Hamilton became a candidate for the chair in Edinburgh he received powerful and generous aid from his rival; and when Hamilton published his edition of Reid, he dedicated it to M. Victor Cousin.

The manner and style of Sir W. Hamilton are very decided and very marked. Any man of sharp discernment could easily recognise him at a great distance, and detect him under the most rigid *incognito*. To some ears his nomenclature will sound uncouth or crabbed, being borrowed from the Germans, or coined fresh out of the Greek; but these persons forget that chemistry, and geology, and anatomy, have all been obliged to create a new terminology to set forth the distinctions which have been discovered. Hamilton is certainly without the power of poetical or oratorical amplification, for which Brown and Chalmers of the same University were distinguished; and he is deficient in the aptness of illustration, in which such writers as Paley and Whately excel; still his manner of writing has attractions of its own to many minds. His phraseology, if at times it sounds technical or pedantic, is

always carefully explained and defined, is seldom employed except in one sense, and is ever scholarlike in its derivation, and articulate in its meaning. His style is never loose, never ambiguous, never tedious, never dull; it is always clear, always accurate, always terse, always masculine, and at times it is sententious, clenching, and apothegmatic in the highest degree. The reader of these lectures need entertain no fear of being led into a Scotch mist, or of being met by a fog from the German Ocean. Not unfrequently dogmatic, at times oracular, resolute in holding by his opinions, impetuous in defending them when attacked; and on certain occasions, as in his assaults on Luther, Brown, Whately, and De Morgan, giving way to undue severity and passion, he is yet, at the same time, open, manly, and sincere. He uses a sharp chisel, and strikes his hammer with a decided blow, and his ideas always stand out before us like a clean-cut statue, standing firmly on its pedestal between us and a clear sky. Indeed, we might with justice describe his style as not only accurate, but even beautiful in a sense, from its compression, its compactness, its vigour, and its point. His thoughts, weighty and solid as metal, are ever made to shine with a metallic lustre. At the places at which his speculations are the most abstract and his words the baldest, he often surprises us by some apt quotation from an old forgotten author, or a sudden light is thrown upon the topic by rays coming from a hundred points. If we have not the flowers or the riches, we are, at the same time, without the sultriness of a tropical climate; and in the more arctic region to which he carries us, if the atmosphere feels cold at times, it is always healthy and bracing, and the lights in the sky have a bright and a scintillating lustre.

In comparing this posthumous work with the writings published during his lifetime, we find it in some respects inferior to them, and in others of higher value. It cannot be expected that in lectures written for a promiscuous class, there should be the same condensation of thought and exhaustive scholarship as in the elaborated notes to Reid and the Discussions. The Dissertations appended

to Reid, and especially the famous Note A on Common Sense, will ever be esteemed by scholars as his most perfect work, being unsurpassed in the English language for logical precision, for critical acumen, and a learning which brings a thousand lights to bear on the present topic. It must ever be matter of deepest regret that these Dissertations were not finished; and this regret will be strengthened by the conviction that no man will be able to complete what he commenced. But on the other hand, these lectures will ever be reckoned as the most valuable of all his works by the great majority of students. Here we have at one view his whole system unfolded in clear and not too brief language; here, too, we have the key to explain hints of the most provoking brevity thrown out in his other writings in notes, or notes appended to notes, over which students have been poring for the last twenty years, as admiringly and as doubtfully as ever the heathens did over the responses of their oracles. For years to come these lectures will constitute the best book in our language on mental science, and will be regarded in all coming ages as one of the works which have done most to promote and advance the study of the human mind.

It is but justice to the editors to say that they have shown themselves thoroughly qualified for their work, and performed it in a most admirable manner. The references have been fully and accurately supplied, often by means of a very erudite research, and always by an immense amount of labour. The editors, meanwhile, have kept themselves carefully out of sight, being evidently anxious to give the honour to their great master in philosophy.

The first of these volumes is on philosophy generally and on mental philosophy in particular. He begins by recommending the study, gives the definitions, unfolds the divisions, explains the terms with amazing erudition and unsurpassed logical precision, and dwells largely on consciousness, its laws and conditions. The reading of this volume will prove as bracing to the mind as a run up a hill of a morning on a botanical or geological excursion is to the body. We especially recommend the study

of it to those whose pursuits are usually of a different character, as, for example, to those who are dissipating their minds by light literature, or whose attention has been directed exclusively to physical facts, and who have thus been cultivating one set of the faculties which God has given them, to the neglect of others, and have thus been putting their mental frame out of proper shape and proportion—as the fisher, by strengthening his chest and arms in rowing, leaves his lower extremities thin and slender. There is a fine healthy tone about his defence of the liberal as against the more lucrative sciences, which latter Schelling called *Brod-wissenschaften*, which Hamilton wittily translates, *the bread and butter sciences*. He quotes with approbation the well-known sentiment of Lessing, "Did the Almighty, holding in his right hand *Truth*, and in his left *Search after Truth*, deign to tender me the one I might prefer—in all humility, but without hesitation, I would request *Search after Truth*." But we can concur in such statements as these only with two important explanations or qualifications; the one is that the search be after truth, which we must value when we find it; and the other is, that it be after attainable and useful truth. It has been the great error and sin of speculative philosophy that it has been expending its strength in building in one age ingenious theories which the next age takes down. We maintain that such activity wastes the energy without increasing the strength. He who thus fights is like one beating the air, and his exertion ends, not in satisfaction, but in weariness and restlessness. The admirable test of Bacon here comes in to restrain all such useless speculation, viz.—that we are to try them by their fruits. Had this been the proper place we could have shown that Bacon's doctrine on this subject has often been misunderstood. He does not say that science is to be valued for its fruits, but it is to be tested by its fruits; just as faith, which, however, is of value in itself, is to be tried by the good works to which it leads. Thus limited and thus understood, there is profound wisdom in the caution of Bacon, which will not discourage an inductive inquiry into the human mind, its laws

and fundamental principles, but will lay a restraint on the profitless metaphysical theories which have run to seed prematurely in Germany—where thinkers are sick of them, and are now being blown into our country and scattered over it like the down of thistles.

This volume is full of brief and sententious maxims. Take the following as examples :—

“It is ever the contest that pleases us, and not the victory. Thus it is in play; thus it is in hunting; thus it is in the search after truth; thus it is in life. The past does not interest, the present does not satisfy, the future alone is the object which engages us.” “What man holds of matter does not make up his personality. They are his, not he;

man is not an organism,—he is an intelligence served by organs.” “I do not mean to assert that all materialists deny or actually disbelieve a God. For in very many cases this would be at once an unmerited compliment to their reasoning, and an unmerited reproach to their faith.” “Wonder has been contemptuously called the daughter of ignorance; true, but wonder we should add is the mother of knowledge.” “Woe to the revolutionist who is not himself a creature of the revolution! If he anticipate he is lost, for it requires what no individual can supply, a long and powerful counter-sympathy in a nation to untwine the ties of custom which bind a people to the established and the old.”

The following is his tabular view of the distribution of Philosophy :—

Mind or Con- scious- ness.	{	Facts,—Phaenomenology, Empirical Psychology,	{	Cognitions.	
		{		Laws,—Nomology, Rational Psychology,	Feelings.
				{	{
Results,—Ontology, Inferential Psychology,	Cognitions,—Logic, Feelings,—Aesthetic.				
				Conative Powers, { Moral Philosophy. Political Philosophy.	
				Being of God. Immortality of the Soul, &c.	

We set little value on this division. The same topics would require to be discussed under more than one head. In these lectures Sir William has taken up only one of the three grand general groups, viz. Empirical Psychology, and even this he has discussed only in part. A portion of the second group will be treated of in his Lectures on Logic. On the others he never entered.

It will be seen from the above table that he followed Kant in giving a threefold distribution of the mental faculties into the cognitive, the emotive, and the conative. This is an improvement on the old division by Aristotle into the cognitive and mo-

tive, or of that of the Schoolmen into the understanding and the will. Still it is not complete and exhaustive. He is obliged to include the Imagination in the first head, and yet it can scarcely be called a cognitive power, though, of course, it implies a previous cognition. The Conscience comes in under the conative powers; but, in fact, the conscience partakes of the nature both of a cognitive and conative power. It is one of the defects of the arrangement that it does not allot a clearly separate place to the conscience.

The following is his division of the cognitive powers :—

I. Presentative,	{	External=Perception.
II. Conservative, =		Internal=Self-Consciousness.
III. Reproductive,	{	Memory.
IV. Representative, =		Without Will=Suggestion.
V. Elaborative, =	{	With Will=Reminiscence.
VI. Regulative, =		Imagination.
		Comparison,—Faculty of Relations.
		Reason,—Common Sense.

The account of the cognitive powers in the first 332 pages of the second volume, down to the regulative powers, not included, will be regarded in the end, if we do not mistake, as the most valuable part of Sir William Hamilton's Metaphysics. His pupils

will probably fix on the very part we have designedly excepted, viz.: the regulative faculties, as being the most important. Farther on in this article we mean to show that he has greatly misapprehended the nature of these regulative powers. Mean-

while, we are to take a look at the account which he has given of the other mental faculties!

We need not dwell on his doctrine of Sense-Perception. His views on this subject have long been before the public in his article in the *Edinburgh Review*, re-published in the *Discussions* and in his *Notes to Reid*, and this in a more elaborate and erudite form than in these lectures. He adopts the view of Reid, and states it with greater precision, and defends it with a logical power and an amount of erudition of which Reid was not capable. He maintains that, whatever processes may come between the bodily object and the mental act prior to sense-perception, in the perception itself, the mind looks intuitively and immediately on the object itself, without any idea or image, or any other *tertium quid* coming between. This is the simplest view; it is the natural view, and is the one encompassed with fewest difficulties. The other view that the mind contemplates an impression or idea and not the thing, is, at best, an hypothesis, and an hypothesis which explains nothing. We agree with him, too, as to the nature of our original perceptions, they are, probably, only of our organism, or of objects in immediate contact with it. On one small point, however, we differ from him. Our original perceptions through the eye cannot be of points of light, but of a coloured surface affecting our organism, but at what distance we cannot say, till experience comes to our aid.

Sir William Hamilton has been much lauded for the view which he has given of Consciousness. In this we cannot concur. He avows that he uses consciousness in two distinct senses or applications. First, he has a general consciousness treated of largely in the first volume. This he tells us cannot be defined (vol. i., p. 158). "But it comprehends all the modifications,—all the phenomena of the thinking subject" (p. 183). "Knowledge and belief are both contained under consciousness" (p. 191). Again, "consciousness is co-extensive with our cognitive faculties." "Our special faculties of knowledge are only modifications of consciousness" (p. 207). He shows that consciousness implies discrimination, judgment, and memory (p. 202-206).

This is wide enough; still he imposes a limit, for consciousness "is an immediate not a mediate knowledge" (p. 202). Already, as it seems to us, inconsistencies are beginning to creep in; for he had told us first that consciousness includes "all the phenomena of the thinking subject;" now he so limits it as to exclude "mediate knowledge," which is surely a modification of the thinking subject. Consciousness is represented as including belief; and yet it must exclude all those beliefs in which the object is not immediately before us. He stoutly maintains what no one will deny, that this general consciousness is not a special faculty; but when he comes to draw out a list of faculties in the second volume, he includes among them a special faculty, which he calls consciousness, but to which, for distinction's sake, he prefixes self, and designates it Self-Consciousness. It is the office of this special faculty to "afford us a knowledge of the phenomena of our minds" (vol. ii., p. 192). He justifies himself in drawing a distinction between sense-perception and self-consciousness on the ground that, "though the immediate knowledge of matter and of mind are still only modifications of consciousness, yet that their discrimination as subaltern faculties, is both allowable and convenient.

Such is the doctrine and such the nomenclature of Hamilton on this subject. We confess that we have great doubts of the propriety of applying the phrase consciousness, both in this general and specific way. In the first sense "consciousness constitutes, or is co-extensive with all our faculties of knowledge," and he speaks of us being endowed with a faculty of cognition or consciousness, in general (vol. ii. p. 10), and says that "consciousness may be regarded as the general faculty of knowledge." Now it is certainly desirable to have a word to denote our faculties of knowledge, or of immediate knowledge; but why not call them knowing powers, or cognitive powers, and their exercise or energy, knowledge or cognition, and then the word consciousness would be reserved unambiguously for the cognizance which the mind takes of self in its particular states. The word (from *con scio* to know together with)

seems the appropriate one to denote that knowledge of self which co-exists with all our other knowledge of things material or things spiritual; and indeed with all our other mental exercises, such as feelings and volitions. It is certainly in this sense that the term is employed by Hutcheson, by Reid, by Stewart, by Royer-Collard, and all Hamilton's vehement criticisms of these men are inapplicable and powerless for this very obvious reason, that they use the word consciousness as he uses self-consciousness, acknowledged by him to be a special faculty. It is an inevitable result of using the phrases in two senses, a wider and a straiter, that we are ever in danger of passing inadvertently from the one meaning to the other, and making affirmations in the one sense which are true only in the other. We rather think that Hamilton himself has not escaped this error, and the confusion thence arising. He is ever appealing to consciousness, as Locke did to idea, and Brown did to suggestion; but we are not always sure in which of the senses, whether in both, or in one, or in which one. He is ever ascribing powers to consciousness, which he would have explained, or modified, or limited, if the distinction had been kept steadily in view. Thus he is often announcing that consciousness is the universal condition of intelligence; if this is meant of the general consciousness, it can mean no more than this, that man must have knowing powers in order to know; if meant of the special consciousness, it is not true; it is rather true that there must be some mental exercise as a condition of the knowledge of self. He calls the principles of common sense the facts of consciousness, emphatically, whereas these principles, as principles, are not before the consciousness as principles at all. The individual manifestations are of course before the consciousness (though not more so than any other mental exercise), but not the principles themselves, which are derived from the individual exercises, by a reflex process of abstraction and generalization. He speaks everywhere as if we must ever be conscious at one and the same time of subject and object—meaning external object; whereas we may be conscious of the subject mind thinking about

some state of self present or absent. His *quondam* friend, Professor Ferrier, carried the doctrine a step farther, and maintained that a knowledge of self is a condition of all knowledge of not self, whereas it is merely a fact that the one co-exists with the other in one concrete act, in which we know not self to be different from self, and independent of self.

The Conservative, Reproductive, and Representative faculties might all have been included, we think, under one head, with subdivisions. The account which he gives of this group is upon the whole the best which we have in our language. Still there are oversights in it. Thus, in order to make the analysis complete, we should have had the Recognitive power, or that which recognises the object recalled as having been before the mind *in time past*. Had he given this power a separate place, he would have seen more clearly than he does how the idea of time arises. Along with the mere representative power he should have mentioned the Compounding or grouping power of Imagination, which combines the scattered images into one new whole. He refers at times to man's native power of using signs; why not specify a Symbolic Power, enabling man to think by signs standing for notions.

In explaining the nature of the Conservative or Retentive faculty, and elsewhere, he has unfolded some peculiar views which we consider to be as correct as they are profound, but he carries them to a length which we are not prepared to allow. What is the state of an idea when not falling at the time under consciousness? this is a question which has often been put. Thus having seen the Crystal Palace of 1851, the question is put—what place has that idea in my mind, when I am not precisely thinking about the object? Is it dead or simply dormant? We must of course answer that the idea can have no existence as an idea, when not before the consciousness. Still it must have some sort of existence. There exists in the mind a power to reproduce it according to the laws of association. The writer of this article having had occasion, not long ago, to pass over the plains of Lombardy, is not therefore always imaging them, but he has the power of recalling them, and finds

that they are recalled every time he hears of a new incident in the wars between the Austrians and the Allies. It is a great truth that the mind is ever acquiring potency, is ever laying up power. We have something analogous in the physical world. Thus a power coming from the sun in the geological age of the coal-measures was laid up in the plant, went down into the strata of the ground, and comes up now in our coals ready to supply us with comfortable heat in our rooms, and with tremendous mechanical force for our steam-engines. This is the doctrine of Sir John Herschell, and of all advanced physicists in our day. But there is a similar laying up of power in the mind, of intellectual, and we may add of moral or immoral power. Aristotle had certainly a glimpse of some such doctrine, and spoke of a *Dunamis*, an *Entelechia*, and an *Energiea*; the first denoting the original capacity, the second the capacity in complete readiness to act, and the third the capacity in act or operation. Modern mechanical science is enunciating this doctrine in a more definite form, and distinguishing between capacity and potential energy and actual energy. Sir W. Hamilton, taking the hint from Aristotle, has adopted the views of the German Schmid (who again had certain speculations of Leibnitz before him), who declares that the energy of mind which has once been, cannot readily be conceived as abolished, and that "the problem most difficult of solution is not how a mental activity endures, but how it ever vanishes" (vol. ii. p. 212.)

So far we can concur; but when he maintains that there are in the mind, acts, energies, and operations, of which it is not conscious, we hesitate and draw back. His doctrine on this subject is founded on the views of Leibnitz, as to there being perceptions below consciousness. The class of facts on which he rests his opinion, seem to me to be misapprehended. "When we hear the distant murmur of the sea, what are the constituents of this total perception of which we are conscious?" He answers that the murmur is a sum made up of parts, and that if the noise of each wave made no impression on our sense, the noise of the sea as the result of these impressions could not

be realized. "But the noise of each several wave at the distance, we suppose, is inaudible; we must, however, admit that they produce a certain modification beyond consciousness, on the percipient object" (vol. i. p. 351). He speaks of our perception of a forest as made up of impressions left by each leaf, which impressions are below consciousness. There is an entire misinterpretation of the facts in these statements, and this according to Hamilton's own theory of the object intuitively perceived. The mind is not immediately cognizant of the sound of the sea or of its several waves; nor of the trees of the forest and their several leaves. All that it knows intuitively is an affection of the organism as affected by the sound or sight. The impression made by the distant object is on the organism, and when the impression is sufficiently strong on the organism, the mind is called into exercise, and from the organic affections *argues* or *infers* the external and distant cause. Thus there is no proof of a mental operation of which we are unconscious.

He explains by these supposed unconscious acts a class of mental phenomena with which every one who has ever reflected on the operations of his own mind is familiar. The merchant walks in a brown study from his house to his place of business; there must have been many mental acts performed on the way, but they are now all gone. The question is, were they ever before the consciousness? Hamilton maintains that they never were; Dugald Stewart maintains that they were for the time, but that the mind cannot recall them. Notwithstanding all the acute remarks of Hamilton, we adhere to the theory of Stewart. We do so on the general principle that in devising a theory to explain a phenomena we should never call in a class of facts, of whose existence we have no other proof, when we can account for the whole by an order of facts known to exist on independent evidence. Hamilton says—"When suddenly awakened during sleep, (and to ascertain the fact I have caused myself to be roused at different seasons of the night), I have always been able to observe that I was in the middle of a dream;" but adds, "that he was often scarcely certain of more than the fact that he was not awakened

from an unconscious state, and that we are often not able to recollect our dreams." He gives, as the peculiarity of somnambulism, that we have no recollection when we awake of what has occurred during its continuance (vol. i. p. 320-322). Every one will admit that we are often conscious of states at the time, which we either cannot remember at all, or (what will equally serve our purpose) more probably cannot remember, except for a very brief period after we have experienced them. We have thus an established order of facts competent to explain the whole phenomenon without resorting to a Leibnitzian doctrine, which has been applied by certain later German Pantheists to show how existence may rise gradually from deadness to life, and from unconsciousness to consciousness.

Under the head of the Reproductive Faculties he has two profound lectures on the Association of Ideas. In the close of his edition of Reid there is a learned disquisition on the well-known passage of Aristotle, in which he gives, with his usual brevity, a classification of laws which regulate the train of our thoughts. Hamilton so interprets that passage as to make Aristotle announce one generic law and three special ones. We are unwilling to set our authority against so accurate a scholar as Hamilton; but we have often looked into that passage, and can find no evidence of Aristotle having resolved all into one law. In the same note Hamilton had begun to expound his own theory, but broke off, and closed the book in the middle of a sentence. Most readers will feel that the account given in these lectures, though somewhat fuller, is far too brief, and illustrated by too few examples to be easily understood. His pupils could not be more profitably employed than in fully unfolding the doctrine of their master on this subject, and applying it to explain the well-known phenomena. He thinks that the whole facts can be explained by one great law, which he calls the law of Redintegration, which he finds incidentally expressed by Augustine. This law may be thus enounced—"Those thoughts suggest each other, which had previously constituted parts of the same entire or total act of cognition" (vol. ii. p. 238). He again quotes Schmid:—

"Thus the supreme law of association—that activities excite each other in proportion as they have previously belonged as parts to one whole activity—is explained from the still more universal principle of the unity of all our mental energies in general" (p. 241). We are inclined to look on this as, on the whole, the most philosophical account which has been given of the law of association. It at once explains the cases of simple repetition in which one link of a chain of ideas which had previously passed through the mind, being caught, all the rest come after; as when we have got the first line of a poem committed to memory, and the others follow in order. It easily explains, too, all cases in which we have had a variety of objects before us in one concrete act—thus if we have passed along a particular road, with a certain person, observing the mountain or river in front, and talking on certain objects—we find that when any one of these recurs it is apt to suggest the others. It is thus if we have often heard in youth the cry of a particular animal, goose or grouse, turkey or curlew, the cry will ever bring up afresh the scenes of our childhood. It is more doubtful whether the law can explain a third class of cases, when it is not the same which suggests the same, but an object suggests another object which has never been individually associated with it, but is like it, or is otherwise correlated with it; as when the conqueror Alexander suggests Julius Caesar or Buonaparte. It needs an explanation to show how the law can cover such a case, which, however, we rather think it can, though we are by no means inclined to admit the explanations of the Hamiltonians proceeding on their narrow and peculiar view of correlates. This leads us to refer to the next faculty—the Elaborative, equal to Comparison—that is, the Faculty of Relations. The phrase elaborative is an expressive epithet, but is not a good special denomination, as there is elaboration in other exercises as well as in this. Comparison, or the correlative faculties, or the faculties of relation, is the better epithet. Under this head he has some learned and acute remarks on the abstract and the general notion, and on language, and is terribly severe, as usual, on Dr. Thomas Brown. We are of opinion

that Brown's views on this subject are, in one or two points, more enlarged than those of Hamilton himself, who has overlooked essential elements. "In so far," he says, "as two objects resemble each other, the notion we have of them is identical, and, therefore, to us, the objects may be considered as the same" (vol. ii., p. 294). We cannot give our adherence to this doctrine of the identity of resembling objects. Altogether his account of the relations which the mind can discover is narrow and exclusive. He might have seen a much broader and more comprehensive account of the relations which the mind can perceive in Locke's *Essay* (b. ii. c. 28); in Hume's *Treatise on Human Nature* (b. i. p. i. s. 5); or in Brown's *Lectures* (lecture 45). We are surprised he has never made a reference to such relations—on which the mind so often dwells—as those of Space, Time, Quantity, Properties of Objects, Cause and Effect, and Moral Good; but we shall be in better circumstances to judge of his doctrine when we have his full view of judgment unfolded in his *Lectures on Logic*. All that we at present hint is that there may be found some narrowness or oversight in his view of the relation subsisting between the subject and predicate of a proposition.

We have now only to discuss the *Regulative Faculties* of the mind. We like the phrase *regulative*, only we must dissociate it from the peculiar sense in which it is used by Kant (from whom Hamilton has borrowed it), who supposes that the mind in judging of objects imposes on them a relation not in the objects themselves. The epithet expresses that such principles as substance and quality, cause and effect, are "the laws by which the mind is governed in its operations," (vol. ii. p. 15), which laws we may add—but Hamilton would not—are not before the consciousness as principles when we exercise them. In calling them *faculties* he acknowledges that he uses the word in a peculiar signification (p. 347). The truth is Hamilton does not see the relation in which they stand to the faculties; they are not separate faculties, but are involved in all the faculties, being, in fact, the necessary laws which spontaneously and unconsciously guide their exercise. His

treatment of this subject in a more elaborate manner, in the "Conditions of the Thinkable Systematized, or the Alphabet of Human Thought," appended to the *Discussions*, and in a somewhat more popular manner in these lectures, was probably regarded by himself, and is certainly regarded by his admiring pupils, as the most important contribution made by him to philosophy. We, on the other hand, look on the system as being, on the whole, a failure. In the construction of his philosophy of the relative or conditioned, as he calls it, he has expended an immense amount of logical ability; but he has lost himself in Kantian distinctions, giving in to Kant's theory as to space and time, making them, and also cause and effect, merely subjective laws of thought and not of things; and the system which he has reared is an artificial one, in which the flaws, and oversights, and rents are quite as evident as the great skill which he has shown in its erection. We dispute three of his fundamental and favourite positions.

We dispute his theory of *Relativity*. We acknowledge that there is a sense in which human knowledge is relative. There is a sense in which all thinkers, except those of the extravagant schools of Schelling and Hegel, hold a doctrine of relativity; but this is not the same as that elaborated by Hamilton:—

"From what has been said you will be able to understand what is meant by the proposition that all our knowledge is only relative. It is relative—first, because existence is not cognizable absolutely and in itself, but only in special modes; second, because these modes can be known only if they stand in a certain relation to our faculties; and, thirdly, because the modes thus relative to our faculties are presented to, and known by, the mind only under modifications determined by these faculties themselves" (vol. i., p. 148).

In these three general propositions, and in the several clauses, there are an immense number and variety of assertions wrapped up—to some we assent, from others we as decidedly dissent. We acknowledge—first, that things are known to us only so far as we have the capacity to know them; in this sense, indeed, even the Divine knowledge is relative. We acknow-

ledge—secondly, that we do not know all things—nay, that we do not know all about any one thing. Herein human knowledge differs from the Divine; but the word relative is not the phrase to attach to human knowledge: in order to point out the difference it would be better to say that man's knowledge is partial or finite as distinguished from perfect or absolute. We may admit, thirdly, that man discovers external objects under a relation to himself and his cognitive mind. So much, then, we freely allow. But, on the other hand, we demur—first, to the statement that we do not know existence in itself, or, as he expresses it elsewhere in Kantian phraseology, that we do not know the thing in itself (*Ding an sich*). We do not like the language—it is ambiguous. I doubt whether there be such a thing as “existence in itself;” and, of course, what does not exist cannot be known. If he mean to assert that we do not know things as existing, we deny the statement. Every thing we know we know as existing; not only so, but we know the thing itself—not all about the thing, but so much of the very thing itself. Then we demur—secondly, to the statement, which is thoroughly Kantian, that the mind in cognition adds elements of its own; as he expresses it elsewhere—“Suppose that the total object of consciousness in perception = 12; and suppose that the external reality contributes 6, the material sense 3, and the mind 3; this may enable you to form some rude conjecture of the nature of the object of perception” (vol. ii., p. 129). I allow that sensations, feelings, impressions associate themselves with our knowledge; but every man of sound sense knows how to distinguish between them; and it is surely the business of the philosopher not to confound them, but to point out the essential difference. To suppose that in perception, or cognition proper, the mind adds any thing, is a doctrine fraught with perilous consequences; for, if it adds one thing, why not two things, or ten things, or all things, till we are landed in absolute idealism, or, what is nearly allied to it, in absolute scepticism?

We dispute his doctrine of Causation. It is so lamentably defective in the view taken of the nature of cause, and so perversely mistaken in the

theory grounded on this view, that several of his most distinguished disciples have been obliged to abandon it. The following is his account of effect and cause:—“An effect is nothing more than the sum or complement of all the partial causes, the concurrence of which constitutes its existence.” We remember no eminent philosopher who has given so inadequate a view of what constitutes cause. It leaves out the main element—the power in the substance, or, more frequently, substances, acting as the cause to produce the effect. It leads him to represent the effect as an emanation from previously existing elements, a doctrine which he turns to no pantheistic use, but which has, undoubtedly, a pantheistic tendency. Taking such a view it is no wonder that he should represent creation as inconceivable; for the only creation which he can conceive, according to his theory, is not a creation of a new substance by God, but a creation out of God. Thus defective is his view of cause in itself. His view of the internal principle, which leads us, when we discover an effect to look for a cause, is equally inadequate. According to him it is a mere *impotence* to conceive that there should not be something out of which this effect is formed; and, to complete the insufficiency of his theory, he makes even this a law of thought and not of things. Surely all this is in complete opposition to the consciousness to which he so often appeals. Our conviction as to cause is not a powerlessness, but a power; not an inability, but an ability. It is an intuitive and necessary belief that this effect, and every other effect, must have a cause in something with power to produce it.

We dispute his theory as to our conviction of Infinity. “We are,” he says, “altogether unable to conceive space as bounded—as finite; that is, as a whole beyond which there is no farther space.” “On the other hand, we are equally powerless to realize in thought the possibility of the opposite contradictory—we cannot conceive space infinite or without limits” (vol. ii., p. 369, 370). The seeming contradiction here arises from the double sense in which the word conceive is used. In the second of these counter propositions the word is used

in the sense of imaging or representing in consciousness, as when the mind's eye pictures a fish or a mermaid. In this signification we cannot have an idea or notion of the infinite. But the thinking, judging, believing power of the mind is not the same as the imaging power. The mind can think of the class fish, or even of the imaginary class mermaid, while it cannot picture the class. Now, in the first of the opposed propositions the word conceive is taken in the sense of thinking, deciding, being convinced. We picture space as bounded, but we cannot think, judge, or believe it to be bounded. When thus explained all appearance of contradiction disappears—indeed all the contradictions which the Kantians, Hegelians, and Hamiltonians are so fond of discovering between our intuitive convictions, will vanish if we but carefully inquire into the nature of these convictions. Both propositions, when rightly understood, are true, and there is no contradiction. They stand thus:—“We cannot image space as without bounds;” “we cannot think that it has bounds or believe that it has bounds.” The former may well be represented as a creature impotency; the latter is, most assuredly, a creature potency—is one of the most elevated and elevating convictions of which the mind is possessed—and is a conviction of which it can never be shorn.

It will be seen from these remarks that we refuse our adherence to his peculiar theory of relativity, and to his maxim that “positive thought lies in the limitation or conditioning of one or other of two opposite extremes, neither of which, as unconditioned, can be realized to the mind as possible, and yet of which, as contradictions, one or other must, by the fundamental laws of thought, be recognised as necessary”—(Reid's Works, p. 743). It fails as to causation and as to infinity, and he has left no formal application of it to substance and quality, where, as Kant showed, there is no such infinite *regressus*, as in infinite time and space or cause. He would have found himself in still greater difficulties had he ventured elaborately to apply his theory to moral good. As we believe him to have been on the wrong track, we scarcely regret that he has not completed his system and given us a doctrine of rational

psychology or ontology. Indeed we have no faith whatever in a metaphysics which pretends to do any more than determine, in an inductive manner, the laws and faculties of the mind, and, in doing so, to ascertain, formalize, and express the fundamental principles of cognition, belief, judgment, and moral good. The study of logic began to revive from the time that Archbishop Whately constrained it to keep to a defined province. The study of metaphysics would be greatly promoted if the science would only learn to be a little more humble and less pretending, and confine itself to that which is attainable.

In parting with this great man, now gone from our world, it is most satisfactory to notice what was the professed aim of all his philosophy—it was to point out the limits to human thought, and thereby to teach man the lesson of intellectual humility. It is instructive to find that this has been the aim of not a few of the most profound philosophers with which our world has been honoured. The truth is, it is always the smallest minds which are most apt to be swollen with the wind engendered by their own vanity. The intellects which have gone out with greatest power to the farthest limits are those which feel most keenly the barriers by which man's capacity is bounded. The minds that have set out on the widest excursions, and which have taken the boldest flights, are those which know best that there is a wider region beyond which is altogether inaccessible to man. It was the peculiarly wise man of the Hebrews who said, “No man can find out the work that God maketh from the beginning to the end.” The Greek sage by emphasis declared that if he excelled others it was only in this, that he knew that he knew nothing. It was the avowed object of the sagacious Locke to teach man the length of his tether—which, we may remark, those feel most who attempt to get away from it. Reid laboured to restrain the pride of philosophy, and to bring men back to a common sense in respect of which the peasant and philosopher are alike. It was the design of Kant's great work to show how little the speculative reason can accomplish. And now we have Sir W. Hamilton showing within what narrow limits

the thought of man is restrained; and the metaphysician, *par excellence*, of Oxford has, in the Bampton Lectures of last year, employed this philosophy to lay a restraint on the rational theology of Britain, and the speculative theology which is coming like a fog from the German Ocean. It is pleasant to think that Sir W. Hamilton ever professed to bow with reverence before the revelations of the Bible, and takes delight in stating it to be the result of all his investigations, "that no difficulty emerges in theology which had not previously emerged in

philosophy." In one of the letters which the author of this article has had from him he proceeds on the great Bible doctrines of grace; and from all we know of him personally, we are prepared to believe in the account which we have heard from what we reckon competent authority, that the prayer which came from him at his dying hour was, "God be merciful to me, a sinner." It is most instructive to perceive the publican and the philosopher thus made to stand on the same level before the All Righteous Judge.

OUR FOREIGN POLICY.

MR. STAPLETON'S account of "George Canning and his Times" is a welcome addition to our materials for estimating this great statesman. We believe that if England is ever to take her place at the Council-table of Europe, at the head and not at the tail of the great powers, it must be by reviving the policy of Canning. Thirty years, it is true, have made a great change in our foreign policy. The despotic powers that thwarted us then have either ceased to exist, or have turned their thoughts in other directions; still there is the same ground-plan of policy to be traced. England must hold up her head as the greatest of Constitutional States, not as the weakest of Military Monarchies; and therefore we revert, at this crisis of European affairs, with peculiar pleasure, to the foreign policy of Canning, as teaching our Minister for Foreign Affairs, whoever he be, a lesson which it would be well for him to learn.

We do not purpose to relate the particulars of Canning's life, or even his political opinions in general. It is on his foreign policy alone that we intend to touch, and therefore may dismiss all the preliminary matter, and take up this account of Canning and his times at the year 1822, when he became for the first time Minister of Foreign Affairs.

But to comprehend aright Canning's foreign policy we must glance

back eight or nine years to the Treaty of Vienna, and the rise of the Holy Alliance.

On the 20th of November, 1815, Viscount Castlereagh and the Duke of Wellington, on the part of the King of Great Britain and Ireland, put their signatures to the definitive treaty between France and the Allied Powers. That treaty was "for the object of restoring between France and her neighbours those relations of reciprocal confidence and good-will, which the fatal effects of the Revolution, and the system of conquest had for so long a time disturbed." In this celebrated treaty there was a manifesto, not only against contending nations, but also against contending principles. The great powers that signed the Treaty of Vienna not only allied themselves against the system of conquest pursued by France, but also against the doctrines of the Revolution. The peace between contending nations by no means secured peace between contending principles; on the contrary, the war against Jacobinism, as it was called, was waged all the more vigorously because the war against Napoleonism was over. Hence there grew out of the Treaty of Vienna another treaty, never finally sanctioned by Europe, but which nevertheless became the law of Europe for fifteen years, at least—the Holy Alliance, as it was profanely