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P R I N C E T O N

R E V I E W .

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By Whom, all things; for Whom, all things.

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THE SCOTTISH PHILOSOPHY, AS CONTRASTED WITH THE GERMAN.

IT is not very difficult to recognize a Scotchman wherever you happen to meet with him. He has stout, bony limbs, and stands well upon his feet; he is canny, that is, cautious, otherwise he would not be a Scotchman; but he is considerably independent, and can resist attack, his motto being "Nemo me impune lacessit;" he is firm, not to say obstinate, especially if he is from the Highlands, whose rocks and mountains he takes as his models; he boasts that his ancestors could not be conquered even by the Romans, when they subdued all other people of Europe and western Asia—except the Arabs. He is naturally quiet and submissive to circumstances, but is capable of being roused, like the Yankee, whom he somewhat resembles, into intense enthusiasm, as has been shown in his contests with England, and generally in his fights for the independence of his country and of his church. He uses a softer, broader speech than the English, coming more from the mouth and less from the throat; and he can make his meaning clear and carry it into practical effect. I mention these things because no man can understand the Scottish philosophy without knowing the Scottish character, of which it is a reflection and a picture.

I am not to dwell on its history, which dates from the second quarter of last century, when it came out of the school of Locke and of Berkeley. It started as a distinct school, with Francis Hutcheson of Glasgow (1694-1746), one of the most successful teachers of his age, and with Turnbull of Aberdeen (the teacher of Reid) (A.D. 1698-1748); but its true representative is Thomas Reid (1710-1796), first of Aberdeen and then of Glasgow, who gave to it its specific character. Adam Smith (1723-1790), the founder of political economy, belongs to the same school. In the succeeding ages we have Beattie the poet (1735-

1802); Campbell, the author of the *Philosophy of Rhetoric* (1719-1796); and more influential than either, Dugald Stewart (1753-1828), who trained so many distinguished pupils, and by his wisdom and the elegance of his style did so much to introduce the philosophy into England. There followed Thomas Brown (1778-1820), who so attracted young men by his rhetoric and his ingenuity, and who sought to bring about a marriage between the Scottish and the French schools. Next to Reid the most powerful member of the school is Sir W. Hamilton (1791-1856), so distinguished as a scholar and a logician, who sought, not always successfully, to unite the forms of Kant with the observations of Reid. The philosophy of Reid and Stewart had a salutary influence in France the end of last century and the beginning of this, where it helped to form the philosophy of Jouffroy and Cousin, and checked the sensationalism of Condillac and Helvetius. It can be shown that the Scottish philosophy has had more influence direct and indirect in America than any other for the past century and a half, both in colleges and in the churches, but is now giving way to other systems partly German, and partly English as led by John S. Mill, Lewes, and Herbert Spencer. In the land of its birth it is not particularly strong at this present moment, being opposed by the materialism of Bain and the Hegelianism of Merton College, Oxford, and of Prof. Edward Caird of Glasgow; but it has two genuine representatives in Prof. Calderwood and Prof. Flint of the University of Edinburgh.

But I do not profess in this paper to give a history of the school; my aim is to sketch its characteristics, which are very marked.

I.

It proceeds throughout by observation. It has all along professed a profound reverence for Bacon, and in its earliest works it attempted to do for metaphysics what Newton had done for physics. It begins with facts and ends with facts. Between, it has analyses, generalizations, and reasonings; but all upon the actual operations of the mind. Its laws are suggested by facts and are verified by facts. It sets out, as Bacon recommends, with the necessary "rejections and exclusions," with what

Whewell calls the "decomposition of facts," but all to get at the exact facts it means to examine. Its generalizations are formed by observing the points in which the operations of the mind agree, and it proceeds gradually,—*gradatim*, as Bacon expresses it,—rising from particulars to generals, and from lower to higher laws. It is afraid of rapid and high speculation, lest it carry us like a balloon, not into the heavens, but a cloud, where it will explode sooner or later. It is suspicious of long and complicated ratiocinations like those of Spinoza and Hegel, for it is sure—such is human fallibility—that there will lurk in them some error or defect in the premise, or some oversight or weak link in the process weakening the whole chain. Thomas Reid was not sure whether Samuel Clarke's demonstration of the existence of God was more distinguished for ingenuity than sublimity. Bacon had said that philosophic speculation needs weights rather than wings. Reid thought that philosophy had been injured rather than promoted by the genius of its investigators. The philosophy of Scotland might take as its motto the doggerel of its great poet, "facts are chields that winna ding." It has to be added that the Scottish school uses deduction, but rather sparingly, and only after it has got its premises by a previous induction; and it refuses all wire-drawn conclusions.

But while the Scottish school held by the principle of induction, in common with Newton and all inquirers into material phenomena, it had other two principles by which it separated from all physicists.

II.

It observes the operations of the mind by the inner sense—that is, consciousness. In this philosophy consciousness, the perception of self in its various states, comes into greater prominence than it had ever done before. Bacon did not appreciate its importance; he recommended in the study of the human mind the gathering of instances, to be arranged in tables, of memory, judgment, and the like. Descartes appealed to consciousness, but only to get a principle such as *cogito*, to be used in deduction, *ergo sum*, arguing that there is an infinite, a perfect. Locke was ever appealing to internal observation, but it was to support a preconceived theory that all our ideas are derived from

sensation and reflection. Turnbull and Hutcheson and Reid were the first to avow and declare that the laws of the human mind were to be discovered only by internal observation, and that mental philosophy consisted solely in the construction of these. They held that consciousness, the internal sense, was as much to be trusted as the external senses; and that as we can form a natural philosophy out of the facts furnished by the one, we can construct a mental philosophy by the facts furnished by the other. They held resolutely that the eye cannot see our thoughts and feelings even when aided by the microscope or telescope. They were sure that no man ever grasped an idea by his muscular power, tasted the beauty of a rose or lily, smelt an emotion, or heard the writhings of the conviction of conscience. But they thought that the mind could observe the world within by consciousness more directly and quite as accurately as it could observe the world without by sight, touch, and the other senses, and could in the one case as in the other make a scientific arrangement of its observations and construct a science.

III.

By observation principles are discovered which are above observation, universal and eternal. All the genuine masters and followers proceed on this principle, and apply it more or less successfully. I am not sure that they have expressly avowed it and explicitly stated it. I am responsible for the form which is given it at the head of this paragraph. No man can understand or appreciate or do justice to the philosophy of Scotland who does not notice it as running through and through their whole investigations and conclusions. It was in this way that Reid opposed Hume. It was in this way that Dugald Stewart, and indeed the whole school, sought to lay a foundation on which all truth might be built. They were fond of representing the principles as fundamental, and they guarded against all erroneous, against all extravagant and defective statements and applications of them, by insisting that they be shown to be in the constitution of the mind, and that their nature be ascertained before they are employed in speculation of any kind. By insisting on this restriction, their mode of procedure has been de-

scribed as timid, and their results as mean and poor, by those speculators who assume a principle without a previous induction, and mount up with it, wishing to reach the sky, but stayed in the clouds. By thus holding that there are truths above and prior to our observation of them, they claim and have a place in the brotherhood of our higher philosophers, such as Plato and Aristotle in ancient times, Descartes, Leibnitz, and Kant in modern times.

They present these principles in the mind under various aspects and in different names. Reid called them principles of common sense in the mind itself, and common to all men. Hamilton defended the use of the phrase common sense. I am not sure it is the best one, as it includes two meanings: one, good sense, of mighty use in the practical affairs of life; and the other, first principles in the minds of all men, in which latter sense alone it can be legitimately employed in philosophy. He also called them, happily, reason in the first degree, which discerns truth at once, as distinguished from reason in the second degree, which discovers truth by arguing. Stewart represented them as "fundamental laws of human thought and belief," and is commended for this by Sir James Mackintosh, who is so far a member of the school. Thomas Brown represented them as intuitions, a phrase I am fond of, as it presents the mind as looking into the nature of things. Perhaps the phrase "intuitive reason," used by Milton when he talks of "reason intuitive and discursive," might be as good a phrase as any by which to designate these primary principles. Hamilton, who sought to add the philosophy of Kant to that of Reid, often without his being able to make them cohere, sometimes uses the Scotch phrases, and at other times the favorite Kantian designation, *a priori*. I remember how Dr. Chalmers, who was truly of the Scottish school, was delighted in his advanced years, on becoming acquainted with the German philosophy through Morell's "History of Philosophy," to find that there was a wonderful correspondence between the *a priori* principles of Kant and the fundamental laws of Stewart.

I may be allowed to add, that having before me the views and the nomenclature of all who hold by these primary principles, I have ventured to specify their characteristics, and this in

the proper order. *First*, they look at things external and internal. They are not forms or laws in the mind apart from things. They are intuitions of things. Under this view they are SELF-EVIDENT, which is their first mark. The truth is perceived at once by looking at things. I perceive self within and body without by barely looking at them. I discover that two straight lines cannot enclose a space, that benevolence is good, that cruelty is evil, by simply contemplating the things. *Secondly*, they are NECESSARY. This I hold with Aristotle, Leibnitz, Kant, and most profound thinkers. Being self-evident, we must hold them, and cannot be made to think or believe otherwise. *Thirdly*, they are UNIVERSAL, being entertained by all men.

But it is asked, How do you reconcile your one element with the other—your observation with your truth anterior to observation? I do hold with the whole genuine Scottish school, that there are principles in the mind called common sense, primary reason, intuition, prior to and independent of our observation of them. But I also hold, and this in perfect consistency, that it is by observation we discover them, that they exist, and what they are. I have found it difficult to make some people understand and fall in with this distinction. Historians and critics of philosophy are apt to divide all philosophies into two grand schools, the *a priori* and *a posteriori*, or in other words, the rational and the experiential. They are utterly averse to call in a third school, which would disturb all their classifications, and thus trouble them, and require the authors among them, especially the followers of Kant or Cousin, to rewrite all they have written. They do not know very well what to make of the Scottish school, and I may add of the great body of American thinkers, who will not just fall into either one or other of their grand trunk-divisions. In particular, when they condescend to notice the author of this paper they feel as if they do not know what to make of him. "Are you," they ask, "of the *a posteriori* or empirical school? You seem as if you are so, you are so constantly appealing to facts and experience. If so, you have no right to appeal to or call in *a priori* principles, which can never be established by a limited observation. But you are inconsistently ever bringing in necessary and universal principles, such as those of cause and effect, and moral good." Or they

attack me by the other horn of the dilemma. "You hold rather by *a priori* principles; you are ever falling back on principles, self-evident, necessary, and universal, on personality, on identity, on substance and quality, causation, on the good and the infinite." I have sometimes felt as if I were placed between two contending armies, exposed to the fire of both. Yet I believe I am able to keep and defend my position. Now I direct a shot at the one side, say at John S. Mill, and at other times a shot at the other side, say at Kant—not venturing to shoot at Hegel, who is in a region which my weapons can never reach. They pay little attention to me, being so engrossed with fighting each other. But I do cherish the hope that when each of the sides finds it impossible to extinguish the other they may become weary of the fight, look for the *juste milieu*, and turn a favorable look toward the independent height which the Scotch and the great body of the Americans who think on these subjects are occupying. We invite you to throw down your arms, and come up to the peaceful height which we occupy. Hither you may bring all the wealth you have laid up in your separate positions, and here it will be safe. You have here primitive rocks strong and deep as the granite on which to rest it, and here you may add to it riches gathered from as wide regions as your ken can reach, and establish a city which can never be moved or shaken.

The late Chauncey Wright, in a paper written in his "Discussions," characterized the distinction I am drawing as very ingenious, so much so that he could not accept it. But it is one easily comprehended by those who are willing to give their attention to it. When Newton established the law of gravitation nobody imagined that he created the law, that he made the law in any sense—he simply discovered it. It existed before he discovered it, and he discovered it because it so existed. So it is with fundamental mental principles. They are in the mind just as gravitation and chemical affinity are in the earth and heavens, whether we take notice of them or not. Being there, we are able to discover them, find how they work, and to generalize their operations, and express them in laws. These fundamental principles being combined, unfolded, and expressed, constitute mental philosophy, which is true so far as these are properly observed and formulated, and are capable of being more fully

and accurately enunciated as they are more carefully investigated.

Under some aspects I like the phrase *a priori* introduced into philosophy by the Stagyrite, used by Hume, and defined as it is now understood by Kant, who designates by it principles in the mind prior to experience and independent of experience. I approve of it, as denoting something in the very nature and constitution of the mind—to use phrases favored by Butler and the Scottish school. But in some connections it is liable to be misunderstood, and may lead into serious error. It may mean that we are entitled to start with a favorite principle without previously inquiring whether it has a place in the mind, and what is its precise place; and then rear upon it or by it a huge superstructure. I use the phrase as one universally adopted, but I employ it only as I explain it. I denote by it those principles, intellectual and moral, which act in the mind naturally and necessarily. But I do not allow that we can use them in constructing systems till we have first carefully inducted them. I believe in *a priori* laws operating spontaneously in the mind, but I do not believe in an *a priori* science constructed by man. There is a sense indeed in which there may be an *a priori* science—that is, a science composed of the *a priori* principles in the mind. But then they have to be discovered in order to form a science, and their precise nature and mode of operation determined by *a posteriori* inspection. Like the Scottish school, I am suspicious of the lofty systems of ancient, mediæval, and modern times, which have been constructed by human ingenuity. Acting on this principle, I reject, with the majority of thinking people, and with metaphysicians themselves, more than half the metaphysics that have been constructed. At times I am grateful when I discover a native principle woven into these webs, only considerably twisted. In rejecting these speculations I am not to be charged with rejecting *a priori* truths in the mind. I am simply sceptical of the use that has been made of them by the ingenuity of man. With me, philosophy consists in a body of first principles in the mind, carefully observed and expressed. This may be as firm and sure as any system of natural science.

IV.

The study of the mind by consciousness may be aided by observation of the action of the nerves and brain. This has always been allowed by the Scottish school. Reid and Adam Smith were well acquainted with optics, and generally with physiology, so far as these sciences had advanced in their day. Dr. Brown was a physician, a colleague of Dr. Gregory's, and well-acquainted with all parts of the anatomy of the body. Hamilton made experiments on innumerable brains, and helped to cast aside phrenology. The Scottish school, in perfect consistency with its principles, welcomes all the researches of the present day into the physiology of the cerebro-spinal mass. Prof. Calderwood has published a very careful work on Mind and Brain. I may be permitted to add, that last winter in Princeton College half a dozen of the younger officers formed a club to study Wundt's work on physiological psychology, and his anatomical experiments were repeated by skilful anatomists with a well-prepared apparatus. I have sought, in correspondence with one of our young professors, Dr. Osborn, to make all my students take an interest in the curious investigations which have been made by Dr. Galton, of London, as to the Visualizing Faculty, as he calls it, or the Phantasy, as I call it, after Aristotle, and we have sent the answers to queries on to Dr. Galton.

The tendency of the psychology of the day is certainly towards physiology. This should not be discouraged, but rather furthered. Physiology has already made many interesting discoveries bearing on mental action. Helmholtz and others have been carefully examining the senses, and have discovered some laws and more mysteries as to the connection of the physical with the psychical action. It has been shown that an action on the nerves of the senses takes a certain time to reach the brain, and that an act of the will takes a certain time to move the members of the body. Wundt is endeavoring to measure the time occupied by each of the ideas in the mind, and has found that about seventy, or so, ideas pass through the mind in the minute. I find that other German investigators say that his observations are delusive. The researches on this subject by Delbeuf and others are commonly reported in the *Revue Philo-*

sophique, edited by M. Ribot. I believe that some light has been thrown on the operations of the mind by men like Carpenter and Maudesley in England, and by Lotze and Wundt in Germany. But their investigations have, after all, thrown more light on the operations of the brain and nerves than on the peculiar operations of the mind, its thoughts, its emotions and volitions. The scalping-knife has laid bare the brain, but has not disclosed to us the judgments, the reasonings, the imaginations, the hopes and fears of the mind. The multiplied microscopes employed have shown us the movements, the changes, in the soft, pulpy substance of the nerves, but have not yet lighted on the perceptions of the mind, on its ideas of the true, the beautiful, the good, the infinite, and our aspirations after perfect excellence. Let us accept and prize the curious and often instructive physiological facts, but let us carefully notice that they have not accounted for any proper mental act, for any conscious act, for any idea, thought, emotion, or resolve. In the study of the mind proper physiology may be a powerful auxiliary, as mathematics are to physics and astronomy, but cannot construct the science of psychology. The eye, the ear, the hearing, the smell, the touch, the taste, aided even by the microscope and blow-pipe, cannot tell us what any special mental act is, what perception is, what memory is, what the imagination is, what comparison is, what reasoning is, what joy and sorrow, what hope and fear are, what the idea of the perfect is, what wish is, what volition is, what the conscience is, what the remorse for evil is, and the dread of merited punishment is, what the approval of and the rejoicing in the good. These can be revealed and studied only in the light of consciousness, which furnishes the beginning and the end of psychology and mental philosophy.

The three first of these principles, with the aid of the fourth, constitute the Method, that is, the mode and manner of investigation, in the Scottish philosophy. In fact they are its specialties, its differentia, separating it from all other systems in ancient or modern times. So far as it adheres to these principles I adhere to it, thus far but no farther, and am quite willing to be regarded as one of its followers. If any professing member of the school does not act on these principles, I separate

from him. I may add, that so far as any other philosophy adopts these principles, I approve of it.

Following the principles I have enunciated, the Scottish school have made a great many psychological investigations. They have taken great pains in classifying the faculties of the mind and observing their laws. They have inquired carefully into the senses and the nature of sense-perception, into the laws of association and habit, into conscience and the will. Alison and Francis Jeffrey have traced the influence of association of ideas on our perception of beauty, erring, however, in imagining that they have thereby explained the whole nature of beauty. Hamilton has discussed profoundly the nature of reasoning, and has thus thrown light on logic. With some of their views on these subjects I concur, from others I wholly dissent. I have endeavored—it is for others to say with what success—to give a more correct analysis than they have done of *The Emotions*. I do not believe that their classification of the faculties is thoroughly scientific or final. Perhaps some of the questions involved cannot be settled till we have a more advanced physiology of the brain. It should be observed of the Scottish metaphysicians, that they never profess to give a full philosophy of the mind. This, they everywhere assert, is to be accomplished only by a succession of inquirers in a succession of ages. All that they claim is that they have contributed to real knowledge, without asserting that what they have done is ultimate and incapable of improvement; that they have gathered a few pebbles (to use a simile usually ascribed to Isaac Newton, but in fact employed in Milton's "*Paradise Regained*"), on the shores of a boundless ocean, rounded by being rolled, but real pebbles, some of them gems.

But what of other systems? "Do you acknowledge no other philosophy than the Scottish?" it is asked. I reply on the instant and without reserve, that I am guilty of no such narrowness. I believe there is more or less of truth in nearly all our philosophies—certainly in all our higher systems. Even the worst of them, pessimism (a name which should not be used of our world, in which there is so much good, but may be applied to the philosophic system, as it is the worst possible), has a truth, as it shows what other philosophies have so much kept

out of sight—that there is evil in the world. Some philosophies, such as that of Plato, of Leibnitz, and others, unfold great truths which have been very much overlooked by the Scottish school because of its caution. All philosophies have truth in so far as they have observed and unfolded to the view the deep principles and high ideas in the soul. Unfortunately, most of them have mixed up error with the truth which they have thus corrupted, and they have really no means of separating the one from the other, unless, indeed, they employ some such tests as those used by the Scottish school. The philosophies deserving the name should certainly be studied by all sincere inquirers, who should be anxious, while they accept the truth, to have some tests by which they may distinguish it from the error with which it is so apt to be associated.

The prevailing philosophies of the day are, first, Materialism (if philosophy it can be called which has and can have no philosophy), and, secondly, the German Philosophy founded by Kant. The former is held by many of the exclusive cultivators of the physical sciences, and those favoring sensualistic views; the latter by the higher minds addicted to speculation. Materialism has ever been opposed by all the higher philosophies. The Scottish philosophy has all along opposed it, and it has done so by arguments as likely as other and more recondite ones to prevail with the great body of thinking people. It shows that we have as good, as clear, and as valid arguments for the existence of mind as we have for the existence of matter. We know body by the external senses, such as touch and sight; we know mind by the internal sense, which, to say the least of it, is as trustworthy as the external senses. We know the two, first by different organs, and secondly we know them as possessing different properties: the one having extension and resistance, and the other thinking and feeling under all their forms.

The true rival of the Scottish philosophy is the German, which, I acknowledge, is at the present day much the more influential. The two, the Scotch and the German, agree and they differ. Each has a fitting representative—the one in Thomas Reid and the other in Immanuel Kant. The one was a careful observer guided by common-sense, with the meaning

of good sense, suspicious of high speculations as sure to have error lurking in them, and shrinking from extreme positions; the other was a powerful logician, a great organizer and systematizer, following his principles to their consequences, which he was ever ready to accept, avow, and proclaim. The two have very important points of agreement, which all men should carefully note. Reid and Kant both lived to oppose Hume, the great sceptic, or, as he would be called in the present day, agnostic. Both met him by calling in great mental principles which reveal and guarantee truth, which can never be set aside, and which have foundations deep as the universe. Both appeal to reason, which the one called reason in the first degree, the other pure reason. The one represents this reason under the name of common sense—that is, the group of powers common to all men; the other as principles necessary and universal. The one had laws fundamental, the other forms in the nature of the mind; both pointing evidently to the same things. The one carefully observed these by consciousness, and sought to express them; the other determines their nature by a criticism, and professes to give an inventory of them in the “*Kritik of Pure Reason*.” All students should note these points of agreement, so far confirmatory of the truth of both philosophies.

The Scotch and German people do so far agree. Both have a considerable amount of broad sense, and I may add, of humor. Both can pronounce the sounds indicated by the letters *ch* and *gh*, which many other people cannot utter—no Englishman can ever take into his mouth the word *Auchtermuchty*, the name of a place famous in the contest of the Scotch Free Church for independence. Scotland and Germany, in the opinion of Americans, are not very far from each other. But between them there roars an ocean often very stormy—as I can testify from having lived for years upon its shores. The philosophies certainly agree, but they also differ.

I may now specify their differences. As I do so, it will be seen that my preferences are for the Scotch.

First, they differ in their Method. The Scotch follows the Inductive Method, as I have already explained it. The German has created and carried out the Critical Method. It maintains that things are not to be accepted as they appear; they are to

be searched and sifted. Pure reason, according to Kant, can criticise itself. But every criticism ought to have some principles on which it proceeds. Kant, a professor of Logic, fortunately adopted the forms of Logic which I can show had been carefully inducted by Aristotle, and hence has reached much truth. Others have adopted other principles, and have reached very different conclusions. The philosophies that have followed that of Kant in Germany have been a series of criticism, each speculator setting out with his own favorite principle,—say with the universal *ego*, or intuition, or identity, or the absolute,—and, carrying it out to its consequences, it has become so inextricably entangled, that the cry among young men is, “Out of this forest, and back to the clearer ground occupied by Kant.” The Scottish philosophy has not been able to form such lofty speculations as the Germans, but the soberer inductions it has made may contain quite as much truth.

Secondly, the one starts with facts, internal and external, revealed by the senses, inner and outer. It does not profess to prove these by mediate reasoning: it assumes them, and shows that it is entitled to assume them; it declares them to be self-evident. The other, the German school, starts with phenomena—not meaning facts to be explained (as physicists understand the phrase), but *appearances*. The phrase was subtly introduced by Hume, and was unfortunately accepted by Kant. Let us, he said, or at least thought, accept what Hume grants phenomena, and guard the truth by mental forms—forms of sense, understanding, and reason. Our knowledge of bodies and their actions, our knowledge even of our minds and their operations, are phenomenal. Having assumed only phenomena, he never could rise to anything else. Having only phenomena in his premises he never could reach realities in his conclusions except by a palpable paralogism, which he himself saw and acknowledged. We human beings are phenomena in a world of phenomena. This doctrine has culminated in the unknown and unknowable of Herbert Spencer, implying no doubt a known, but which never can be known by us. We all know that Locke, tho himself a most determined realist, laid down principles which led logically to the idealism of Berkeley. In like manner, Kant, tho certainly no agnostic, has laid down a principle in his

phenomenal theory which has terminated logically in agnosticism. We meet all this by showing that appearances properly understood are things appearing, and not appearances without things.

Thirdly, the two differ in that the one supposes that our perceptive powers reveal to us things as they are, whereas the other supposes that they add to things. According to Reid and the Scottish school, our consciousness and our senses look at once on real things, not discovering all that is in them, but perceiving them under the aspect in which they are presented—say this table as a colored surface perceived by a perceiving mind. According to Kant and the German school, the mind adds to the things by its own forms. Kant said we perceive things under the forms of space and time superimposed by the mind, and judge by categories, and reach higher truth by ideas of pure reason, all of them subjective. Fichte gave consistency to the whole by making these same forms create things. But the great body of the German philosophers claim merely that the mind colors things out of its own rich stores. This doctrine historically has furnished the germ out of which has sprung the grand ideal poetry of Germany. I rejoice, I revel in their lofty poetry, but I would not have poetry regarded as philosophy. Let us in portrait-painting have, first, the true figure, color, and expression, and then in ideal painting we may have as many ornaments and compositions as our imagination and fancy can supply.

“Back to Kant” is the cry in our day of the younger German school, re-echoed by the speculative youth of America. Yes, I say, back to Kant, who was a wiser man and held more truth than most of those who claim to be descended from him, and who have arrived at conclusions which he would have resolutely repudiated had they been made known to him. Yes, back to Kant; but do not stop there. Back to Reid, back to Locke, back to Descartes, back to Bacon, back to Saint Thomas, back to Augustine, back to Marcus Aurelius, back to Cicero, back to Aristotle, back to Plato. All of these have expounded much truth; let us covet the best gifts, and accept these wherever they are offered—in ancient Greece and Rome, in Germany, in Great Britain, in America. Let us choose what is good in

each, and here the method of the Scotch may guide us in the selection. It may give us the magnet wherewith to draw out the genuine steel from the dross mixture. When we go back to Kant, let it be to criticise his critical method and its results.

Our thinking young men in America, having no very influential philosophy in America, and with no names to rule them, they are taking longing looks towards Germany. When circumstances admit, they go a year or two to a German university—to Berlin or to Leipsic. There they get into a labyrinth of imposing and binding forms, and have to go on in the paths opened to them. They return with an imposing nomenclature, and clothed with an armor formidable as the panoply of the middle ages. They write papers and deliver lectures which are read and listened to with the profoundest reverence—some however doubting whether all these distinctions are as correct as they are subtle, whether these speculations are as sound as they are imposing. All students may get immeasurable good from the study of the German philosophy. I encourage my students to go to Germany for a time to study. But let them meanwhile maintain their independence. They may be the better of a clew to help them out of the labyrinth when they are wandering. The children of Israel got vast good in the wilderness as they wandered; saw wonders in the pillar of cloud and fire, in the waters issuing from the rock, and the bread on the ground: but they longed all the while to get into a land of rest, with green fields and living rivers. We may all get incalculable good from German speculation, but let us bring it all to the standard of consciousness and of fact.

I should be sorry to find our young American thinkers spending their whole time and strength in expounding Kant or Hegel. Depend upon it, the German philosophy will not be transplanted into America and grow healthily till there is a change to suit it to the climate. By all means let us welcome the German philosophy into this country, as we do the German emigrants; but these emigrants when they come have to learn our language and accommodate themselves to our laws and customs. Let us subject its philosophy to a like process. Let it be the same with the Scottish philosophy: let us take all that is good in it and nothing else, and what is good in it is its method.

It is one of the excellences of the Scottish school, that it does not profess, like some of the German systems, to have discovered all truth, all about God and man and nature. It is reckoned by many like the country from which it has sprung, narrow and confined—some of us have had to migrate from the old country, seeking wider openings elsewhere. That philosophy has certainly not yet taken possession of the whole territory of truth, and there are regions open to it wide as the uncultivated land of America, inviting all to enter. The Scottish philosophy, if true to its principles, should welcome truth from whatever quarter it may come, provided it submits to be tried by an inductive entrance examination. For myself, I believe with Plato, and I may add with the Concord school, that there is a grand, indeed a divine idea in the mind, formed after the image of God and pervading all nature; but I wish that idea in the mind carefully examined and its forms or law exactly determined, and it is for inductive science, and not speculation, to tell us what are the laws and types which represent it in nature. I hold with Aristotle that there are formal and final as well as material and efficient causes in nature; but it is for a careful induction to determine the relation of these, and to show how matter and force are made to work for order and end. I am as sure as Descartes was that there is in the mind a germ of the idea of the infinite and the perfect, but I take my own way of showing what is the nature of these ideas so as to keep us from drawing extravagant inferences from them. I see, as Leibnitz did, a pre-established harmony in nature; but it consists mainly, not in things acting independently of each other, but in things being made to act on each other. I attach as much importance to experience as Locke did; but I maintain that observation shows us principles in the mind prior to all experience. I allow to Kant his forms, and his categories and his ideas; but their nature is to be discovered by induction, when it will be found that they do not superinduce qualities on things, but simply enable us to perceive what is in things. I believe with Schelling in intuition (*Anschauung*), but it is an intuition looking at realities. I am constrained to hold with Hegel that there is an absolute; but I believe that our knowledge after all is finite, implying an infinite, and that this doctrine can be so enunciated

as not to issue in pantheism. I reject with the school of Concord a sensationalism which derives all our ideas from the senses, and a materialism which develops mind out of molecules; but I am anxious that the physiology of the nerves and brain should aid us in finding out the mode of operation of the powers of the mind. I turn away with scorn from the pessimism of Schopenhauer and Von Hartmann; but I believe they have done good by calling attention to the existence of evil, to remove which is an end worthy of the labors and sufferings of the Son of God. I believe with Herbert Spencer in a vast unknown, above, beneath, and around us; but I rejoice in a light shining in the darkness. With all unsophisticated men, I see a power above nature in nature; but I reject the doctrine of God many and Lord many as held by the great body of mankind. I am willing to accept the whole body of grand ideas which the Concord school has been holding before the eyes of Americans for the past age; but it is because I believe they have a place in the mind, and I am not always willing to take them in the form in which they have been put. I receive with gratitude the whole casket of gems which Emerson has left us as a rich inheritance; but before they can constitute a philosophy they must be cut and set, and they will require a skilful hand to adjust them; and if they are cut, it must be as carefully as diamonds are, and this only to show forth more fully their true form and beauty.

I have rather been advising our young men not to seek to transplant the German philosophy entire into America. But as little do I wish them to transplant the Scottish philosophy. It is time that America had a philosophy of its own. It is now getting a literature of its own, a poetry of its own, schools of painting of its own; let it also have a philosophy of its own. It should not seek to be independent of European thought. The people, whether they will or not, whether they acknowledge or no, are evidently the descendants of Europeans, to whom they owe much. They have come from various countries, but on coming here they take a character of their own. So let it be with our philosophy. It may be a Scoto-German-American school. It might take the method of the Scotch, the high truths of the German, and combine them by the practical invention of the Americans. But no: let it in fact, in name and pro-

fession, be an independent school. As becometh the country, it may take, not a monarchical form under one leader, like the European systems, let it rather be a republican institution, with separate states and a central unity. To accomplish this, let it not be contented with the streams which have lost their coolness from the long course pursued and become polluted by earthly ingredients, but go at once to the fountain, the mind itself, which is as fresh as it ever was, and as open to us as it was to Plato and Aristotle, to Locke and Reid, to Kant and Hamilton.

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