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Art. I.—AMERICAN METHODISM IN 1876.*

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IN 1776 the whole Methodist Episcopal Church in the United States of America was composed of twenty-five ministers and five thousand members, in eleven circuits, on the Atlantic slope. In 1781 it crossed the Alleghanies, and laid the foundations of the "Old Western Conference," which extended from the Northern lakes to Natchez on the Mississippi. Its first General Conference was held in Baltimore in 1784, at which Francis Asbury was ordained its first bishop at the age of thirty-nine. There were then about eighty preachers and fifteen thousand members. Thirty-two years afterward, when this remarkable man died, in 1816, the church numbered over seven hundred itinerant preachers and more than two hundred and eleven thousand members. Soon after Washington was inaugurated as President of the United States, Bishops Coke and Asbury read to him the congratulatory address of the General Conference, which was then in

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is taken into the human body when brought in contact with it. Thus almost every Indian reservation, under the present inefficient and erroneous policy of our government, is like a great sponge for the absorption of the grosser vices of our imperfect civilization, which have already destroyed two-thirds of the Indian race, and are rapidly exterminating the remainder. Our Indian policy is, therefore, really a policy of extermination, and if not speedily changed for something better, the whole Indian race of our country will become extinct within the next half century.

Art. IV.—ORGANIZATION THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE OF SOCIAL SCIENCE.

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There is not a little prejudice in the minds of many sensible and well-informed people against what is called sociology—that is, the science of human society. This prejudice is due to a variety of causes, of which one is, that this whole department of knowledge has commonly been identified with political economy, though, in fact, this latter is properly only one of, at least, six co-ordinate branches of social science. The influence of this cause has been all the greater from the fact, that the methods and conclusions of political economy, in the hands of its different authors, have hitherto proved anything but harmonious or satisfactory. Besides this, the social forces are so numerous and so complicated with each other, that a complete analysis of them seems to be impossible. But probably the most influential of all these causes is, that the subject has had a peculiar attraction for, and has been most copiously treated by infidel authors, such as Comte, Buckle, John Stuart Mill, and Herbert Spencer. In this article, therefore, we shall endeavor to remove this prejudice, by showing that the science is a possible one, and that it has as strong claims as any other upon the thinkers of our time, inasmuch as it involves a vast

number of most interesting problems, the solution of which may affect the welfare of mankind as deeply and permanently as any which have been agitated since the rise of the Protestant Reformation.

We begin, then, with the observation, that there are two all-sufficient reasons for undertaking a critical examination of the nature and complex structure of human society, of which one is general and the other specific. The first is, that man is essentially rational, and hence, under a necessity of striving to render to himself a rational account of the phenomena of his own life, in which attempt he is immediately struck with the predominance of the social element in all these phenomena. In the interest, therefore, of his own well-being he is constrained to undertake a description and classification of the facts of social life, in order to determine the laws by which they are governed. The other reason is, that such a rational comprehension of these facts is the condition upon which the social instincts come under the government of reason and free-will, apart from which they are like an untrained and unpruned vine, which runs wild, wastes its redundant energies, and frustrates its own ends. For whatsoever is distinctively human is such from its connection with reason and free-will. Everything else in man is either animal or vegetable.

The social instincts, which we have just mentioned, are the primary cause of all association among living creatures. In the lower, as well as in the higher, elements of his complex nature, man is a social being. As birds by nature fly in the air, as fish by nature swim in the water, so man, by that which is common to him with birds and fish, lives in society. As mere animals, human beings would associate together for the same reason that bees live in hives or swarms, and beavers in tribes. Also, the higher elements of human nature are equally social. As rational beings, we have an inborn consciousness, an intuitive perception, of our dependence upon society, whilst the moral nature in man is pre-eminently social, and incapable of being otherwise comprehended or developed and perfected. In fact, man is not man otherwise than in and through association with his kind. Human life is essentially a communion. The idea or perfect type of humanity can never be realized apart from that great principle which is enunciated in the words of

the Apostles' Creed: "I believe in the communion of saints." Accordingly, in all ages and countries, whether in that undeveloped, or degraded condition in which the animal predominates over the rational and moral nature, or in the highest degrees of civilization and enlightenment, in which the spiritual gives the supreme law to human life—men have lived, and must ever live, in society. Solitude is naturally hateful, and an adequate punishment for the worst of crimes. Hence the peculiar form in which the death-penalty was prescribed by Moses: "That soul shall be cut off from his people."

The principle of association, however, in all living creatures, is limited by the boundaries of their several species, by specific unity of life. For among animals, except under artificial conditions, diverse species do not flock, or herd, or swarm together. Even the most closely-allied forms of animal life, such as the dog and the wolf, the bison and the cow, although their faculties, habits, and wants are almost identical, are naturally the bitterest enemies. They seem to be incapable of understanding or sympathizing with each other, and hence of associating together. It is the same with man. We can form hardly any conception of the consciousness or experience of a mere animal, or of an angel, or, indeed, of any creature of a different species from our own. If there were not this unity of life in mankind, if we were not properly all of one species, there could be no mutual understanding or sympathy among us; we could not associate with each other any more than the fox with the dog, or the bee with the beaver.

Notwithstanding, there is a fundamental distinction between man and the lower creatures in this respect, that animal association is inorganic, whilst the most essential characteristic of human society is that of organization. The reason why gregariousness, in default of a better word, is thus inorganic is, that among animals of the same species, which alone can associate together, there is none of that diversity of faculty and function, of special characteristics and adaptations, upon which organization is founded. The individuals of a *grex*, whether a flock or tribe or swarm, are substantially all alike, being little more than mere numerical repetitions of each other. This statement, however, requires to be qualified by the distinction of sex, with which organization in society begins. But the

uniformity among the individuals of a *grex* is so striking that it is marked, in the most widely separated languages, by the use of the singular for the plural, as where we say, a flock of sheep, not sheeps, a herd of deer, a tribe of beaver, a school of fish, not deers, nor beavers, nor fishes.

It is true, however, that in some species of insects we find a striking semblance of organization. In a beehive, *e. g.*, there are several distinct classes of individuals included within the specific unity, each of which is charged with a different set of operations. Here we have, first, the mother or queen bee, and the males or drones; secondly, the nurses; next, the workers in wax; and lastly, the workers in honey. But even in this case, the individuals of each class are mere repetitions of each other, and are engaged in the same operations, to which they are confined by a distinct and peculiar physical constitution. We can discover nothing here of the nature of voluntary division or organization of labor. One bee does not gather wax, and pass it to another, to be worked into a cell; neither does one gather honey, and pass it to another to be stored. Even here, the *grex* offers us nothing beyond that semblance of organization in which, as in so many other cases, the operations of instinct counterfeit those of reason. Among animals in general there is not even this semblance. Those of the same species are all confined to means and operations which are precisely or nearly the same. Birds of the same species build their nests in the same manner, and there is no part in the work of a beaver-dam which one beaver cannot perform as well as another. Mere animals are incapable of specializing their employments, incapable of voluntary division and organization of their labor, and hence their association is properly inorganic.

But whilst the *grex* is thus incapable of organized association, the individuals of which it is composed are abundantly capable of coöperating together for common ends, and thus of increasing their force by massing their numbers. And in this way the principle of animal association enters into human society most largely, as we should anticipate, in its lowest forms, that is, where man is least developed, or most degraded, and his condition approaches most nearly to that of the brute. For it is in such communities that we find the fewest and

least marked divergencies from the common type, the least diversity of special characteristics and adaptations, and hardly any specialization or diversification of employments. Here each wild man builds his own hut, or finds for himself a natural cave, makes his own weapons, does his own hunting and fishing, and gathers with his own hands the spontaneous fruits of nature. Here, also, marriage and the family—the foundation of organized society—are almost or quite unknown. Consequently, whilst all are thus employed in the same operations and pursuits, their human capacity for personal differentiation remains undeveloped. They are almost as much alike as the wild horses of the South American savannahs. We find it so to this day in Africa, Australia, and among the ante-Brahminical tribes of India. Also, the striking resemblance of the American Indians to each other, in color, stature, features, and other numerous particulars, has often been remarked, and various explanations of the fact have been suggested. But the true reason is, that their wild life affords them the least possible diversification of employments. Hence, they have no other way of increasing their force but that of massing their numbers. In these low forms of life human beings and mere animals, in their associations, as in other respects, resemble each other.

This principle of animal association enters, also, as a substratum, into the higher and more developed forms of human society. We see it in a gang of cotton-pickers, in a gang of "loggers" felling timber, in a gang of laborers digging a canal, and wherever the word gang is applied to a company of human beings. These, indeed, are not perfect examples, because some degree of specialization enters into all human employments. But this simple coöperation of numbers, with little diversity of the means employed, is of such importance to the objects of human society, that but little could ever have been accomplished without it. For the units of personal force are so small and feeble that, apart from mutual aid, they could hardly fail to be swallowed up by the hostile forces of nature—those vast and fatal forces which threaten us from every quarter, and which destroy without mercy all the feebler forms of vegetable, animal, and human life; but which man, by his associated and organized energies, subjugates to his own uses

and ends, until, with all the docility of domesticated animals, they grind in his mills, carry his messages with lightning speed, and transport his merchandise and himself, as the bird flies, from continent to continent, from ocean to ocean, and from pole to pole.

These grand results are mainly due to organization, which is the leading characteristic of human society, as distinguished from gregariousness, and the most fundamental principle of social science. It is our light and clue in the exploration of the labyrinths of this department of knowledge. By it alone are we enabled to comprehend the phenomena with which we have to deal. It is to the infinite number and complexity of the social phenomena and forces what the principle of gravitation is to the physical universe. Without it, society is a chaos; with it, a cosmos. Hence, we can make no further progress until we have formed a distinct and precise conception of this principle.

An organism in nature, then, is a body possessed of life and various organs, which organs minister to the support, development, and manifestation of its life. For this purpose, they are in vital union with the body, as also with each other, in consequence of which they are mutually interdependent, and contribute to each other's support and well-being by a system of vital exchanges among themselves. Thus the human body is an organism. It is possessed of life and of organs, such as the hands, feet, stomach, heart, lungs, brain, eyes, nose, and mouth, which are in vital union with the body, and thereby with each other. Also, they are various, or different, and perform different functions in their ministry to the body and to each other; and they are mutually interdependent by a system of vital exchanges among themselves: the hands provide food for the mouth, the mouth prepares it for the stomach, and the stomach distributes it as nourishment to the hands, mouth, brain, and all other organs and parts of the body. Such is an organism in nature, which is the type of organic society.

Equally necessary is a distinct and clear conception of the principal differences between the higher and lower forms of organization in nature, because these represent the more or less advanced stages of organization in society. The higher than an organism is, the more numerous and perfect are its

organs, the more diverse they are from each other, the more special are their functions, the more interdependent they are, the more full and complete is the system of exchanges between them. The highest organism in nature is the human body : and we see how numerous and perfect are its organs : how different they are from each other, as the eye from the ear, the stomach from the brain : how special are their functions, so that by no means can the heart perform the work of the lungs : how dependent they are upon each other, so that a lesion of one will often paralyze them all ; and how full and perfect is the system of vital exchanges between them. On the other hand, the lower an organism is, the fewer and less perfect are its organs, the more do they resemble each other, the less special are their functions, the more independent they are of each other, and the more feeble is the system of vital exchanges between them. The angle-worm is an example of these lower organisms ; and how few are its organs—they are but three or four of them—and these are so much alike, perform so nearly the same functions, and are so independent of each other, that, if it be cut in two, each part, it is said, will continue to live, and will become a perfect worm. Whether this be true or not of the earth-worm, it is certainly true of the polyp, an example of a still lower class of organisms. There are, of course, many other differences between the higher and lower forms of organization, but these are the principal ones, and sufficient for our present purpose.

In further illustration of these differences, we quote from the *Morphologie* of Goethe as follows :

“The more imperfect a creature is, the more do its parts resemble each other, and the whole to which they belong. The more perfect a creature is, the more dissimilar are its parts. In the former case, the parts are more or less a repetition of the whole : in the latter they are unlike the whole. The greater the resemblance between the parts, the less subordination there is of one to another. Subordination indicates a high grade of organization.”

Also Professor Arnold Guyot, in his *Earth and Man*, applies these points to illustrate the nature of human society, as follows ;

“Differences are the condition of development. The mutual exchanges, which are the consequences of these differences, waken and manifest life. The greater the diversity of organs, the more active and superior is the life of the individual : and the greater the variety of individualities and of rela-

tions in a society, the greater also is the sum of life, the more complete, and of the more elevated order."

In all these particulars, and in many others which might be enumerated, do organisms in nature represent human society, especially the differences between its higher and lower, its more and less advanced stages of organization. In fact, this analogy is so complete and obvious that it has always been recognized, until it has become so familiar that the "social organism" seems hardly to involve a figure of speech. Thus, in the model republic of Plato, the citizens are divided into three classes, corresponding to the three general faculties of the human mind. The first is that of the rulers, which represents the intellect or reason of society; the second is the military class, typified by the human will; the third includes all who are engaged in the pursuits of industry, who correspond to the blind passions and appetites of the animal nature. Here, indeed, the analogy is very imperfectly comprehended, and is made to inculcate gross heathen errors, especially that of the essential degradation of the industrial class. Aristotle, also, teaches us, that "a state is composed of dissimilar parts, as an animal is of life, and body . . . of these and many other dissimilar parts." But, unlike Plato, he makes little or no use of this analogy, though he inculcates the same errors which had been drawn from it by his great predecessor. For in another place he says:

"It is impossible for one who is a mechanic, or hired servant, to practice a life of virtue. . . . It is not proper for any man of honor, or any citizen, or any one who engages in public affairs, to learn these servile employments."

In modern times this analogy has been more fully recognized, as in the celebrated work of Hobbes on *Civil and Ecclesiastical Society*, entitled *Leviathan*, which name is applied by the author to society itself, as follows:

"That great leviathan, called a commonwealth, or state, . . . is but an artificial man, though of greater strength and stature than the natural, . . . in which the sovereignty is an artificial soul; . . . reward and punishment the nerves; wealth and riches . . . its strength; *salus populi* . . . its business; . . . concord, health; sedition, sickness; civil war, death."

In all this, as, indeed, in everything else by the same author, there is a great deal that is very "artificial," but the concep-

tion which underlies the whole work, that of society as an organism, is none the less true and profound. In the *Sociology* of Comte this conception is developed and applied with great fulness of detail; it is also the fundamental idea of the *Principles of Social Science*, by Henry C. Carey, and of all his writings upon this subject. In fine, Herbert Spencer lays down the three following points of resemblance between organisms in nature and human societies, though he fails to make any adequate use of them for the solution of social problems :

“The first is, that, commencing as small aggregations, they—that is, both organisms in nature and societies—insensibly augment in mass, some of them reaching eventually perhaps a hundred thousand times what they originally were. The second is, that while at first so simple in structure as to be almost considered structureless, they assume, in the course of their growth, a continually increasing complexity of structure. The third is, that though, in their early undeveloped state, there exists in them scarcely any mutual dependence of parts, these parts gradually acquire a mutual dependence, which becomes at last so great that the activity and life of each part is made possible only by the activity and life of the rest. These parallelisms will appear the more significant the more we contemplate them. . . . The orderly progress from simplicity to complexity displayed by societies, in common with every living body whatever, . . . distinguishes them from inanimate bodies, . . . and this functional dependence of the parts . . . is exhibited by the noblest animals and highest societies in the greatest degree. . . . The lowest types of animals do not increase to anything like the size of the higher ones; and similarly we see, that aboriginal societies are comparatively of limited growth. In complexity, also, our civilized nations as much exceed the primitive savage ones as a vertebrate animal does a zoöphite. In simple communities, moreover, as in simple creatures, the mutual dependence of the parts is so slight, that subdivision or mutilation causes little inconvenience, whilst in complex communities, as in complex creatures, you cannot remove or injure any considerable organ without producing great disturbance, or death, to the rest.”

We conclude these citations with one from St. Paul, which, beyond comparison, contains the most full and significant exhibition of the organic structure of society that has ever been given. In this passage he sets forth the ideal state of society, as first to be realized in the Christian church, and ultimately in all mankind, by comparing it to the human organism. Elsewhere, also, he refers to this analogy, but here he devotes a long chapter to a detailed exposition of the diversity of organs, functions, ministries, and operations, within the organic unity

of the social body, in order to show that the individuals of which it is composed bear to it, and to each other, relations similar to those between the human body and its members, and between the members themselves. The passage is as follows :

“As the body is one, and hath many members, and as all the members of that one body, being many, are one body, so also is Christ [Christian society]. For the body is not one member, but many. If the foot shall say, because I am not the hand I am not of the body, is it therefore not of the body? And if the ear shall say, because I am not the eye I am not of the body, is it therefore not of the body? If the whole body were an eye, where were the hearing? If the whole were hearing, where were the smelling? And if they were all one member, where were the body? But now are they many members, yet one body. And the eye cannot say unto the hand, I have no need of thee; nor, again, the hand to the feet, I have no need of you. Nay, much more, those members of the body which seem to be more feeble are necessary; and those members of the body which we think to be less honorable, upon these we bestow more abundant honor, and our uncomely parts have more abundant comeliness. God hath tempered the body together, having given more abundant honor to that part which lacked, that there should be no schism in the body, but that the members should all have the same care one for another. And whether one member suffer, all the members suffer with it; or one member be honored, all the members rejoice with it. Now ye are the body of Christ and members in particular.”

If now we compare this splendid exhibition of the organic structure of society, and of the relations and duties of the different members of the organism, especially with respect to the honor here given to the lowly and despised members—comparing all this with the feeble grasp of the idea by Plato and Aristotle, who condemn the laboring classes to hopeless degradation, we obtain a glimpse of the immeasurable superiority—intellectual as well as moral—of Christianity to heathenism, even when this latter is thus represented by the greatest minds it ever produced. The view which the Scriptures take of those members of society “which we think to be less honorable,” is altogether different from that which was inculcated by heathen philosophy; and there would be fewer infidels than there are among the laboring masses, if they only knew how much they are indebted to the Christian religion.

Here, then, we may take occasion to lay down a fundamental principle of method in our science, as we may hope that it

will one day come to be exhibited. This consists in the application of the moral laws of Christianity to the solution of the social, but especially of the industrial, problems. For, however skeptical men may be with respect to the supernatural origin of our holy religion, they seldom fail to recognize the excellence of its moral laws; and the scientific value of these laws, as distinguished from their religious obligation, is illustrated by our social science in an entirely new and striking manner. Hence we may anticipate that this line of investigation will develop the crowning argument in the evidences of Christianity. For, in an experience of many years' teaching, we have found it the most effectual antidote to that distressing skepticism which is now so rife, even in the minds of our ingenuous and thoughtful young men. But, however this may be in the application of these laws to the solution of the industrial and all other social problems—problems which agitate and divide the most advanced thinkers of our time—we can feel that we touch bottom; that we have struck the solid rock; and, building upon this foundation, we can foresee that we shall be able in time to establish a science of social life which time itself will never overthrow.

We come now to exhibit the organic structure of society in the relations of its organs to their organism and to each other. Of these organs there are two classes, which we may characterize by the terms *vital* and *teleological*. The vital organs, in a different sense from that which the words have in physiology, are the individuals or living persons of which society is composed. The teleological organs are the institutions which embody and represent the general aims for which society exists.

In the first place, then, we must consider the organic structure of society as depending upon its vital organs. Here we are immediately struck with the fact, that among the innumerable multitudes of the human race, no two persons can be found who are, in all respects, precisely alike. All human beings are either different from each other by nature, or there is in them by nature a wonderful capacity for differentiation. Each person has some peculiar characteristic, or quality, or capacity, or some peculiar faculty, or combination of faculties, or degree of their development, in virtue of which he is adapted

to do something which cannot be so well done, or to fill some place which cannot be so well filled, by any other person. One is endowed with great physical strength, another with superior intellectual power; one has a natural or acquired adaptation for recluse study, another for business and affairs; one is born a poet, another becomes an orator. In so far as society depends upon the rational and moral nature in man, rather than upon animal instinct—in the degree in which it shapes itself to rational and moral aims—that is to say, just so far as it becomes distinctively human, do these individual differences develop themselves.

For the original differences—those which exist by nature—lead to diversity of occupations. It is natural for men and women to employ themselves differently. Those who are possessed of great physical endowments naturally apply themselves to those pursuits in which success depends upon such qualifications. Those of superior intellectual power, but perhaps of feeble health and strength, are naturally guided in their selection of employments by their special adaptations. The natural tendency is for every one to addict himself to that mode of life in which he feels himself to be most capable of achieving success. Also, differences of taste and of outward circumstances have much to do with this diversity of occupations. From some of these causes, no doubt, “Abel became a keeper of sheep, and Cain a tiller of the ground; Jabal was the father of such as dwell in tents, and have cattle; Jubal was the father of all such as handle the harp and organ; and Tubal-Cain was an instructor of every artificer in brass and iron.”

On the other hand, this diversification of employments reacts upon the natural differences in which it originates, and gives them a more copious development. For, as each person occupies himself with some specialty, he becomes more specialized. The sailor and the farmer are thus differenced from each other by their peculiar modes of life, in their physical forms, in the muscles which are most fully developed, in their gait, features, language, mental faculties and habits, and even in their moral characters, to such a degree, that it is almost impossible to mistake one for the other. A similar differentiation takes place by the almost infinite diversification of em-

ployments which exists throughout the whole circle of every highly-organized community, where we have the farmer, the miller, the baker, the grazier, the butcher, the cook, the carpenter, the mason, the blacksmith, the spinner, the weaver, the tailor, the hatter, the shoemaker, the merchant, the shipper, the sailor, the engineer, the conductor, the brakesman, the stoker, the telegraph-operator, the lawyer, the doctor, the teacher, the artist, the clergyman—these, and numberless others engaged in other special employments and pursuits, in their endless subdivisions and branches.

Moreover, these personal differences—partly natural and partly acquired—and these different employments, are the counterparts and complements of each other just as, in the human organism the stomach is of the mouth, the heart of the lungs, and the senses of each other. This counterpart and complementary relation is most conspicuous in the case of the two sexes; but a similar relation, only in a lower degree, subsists between the farmer and the miller, the miller and the baker, the iron-miner and the iron-manufacturer, the merchant and the shipper, and so on throughout the whole circle of organic society; in consequence of which both the individuals and their employments are mutually adapted to, and do fit into each other, like the carpenter's mortises and tenons, or the fans of dovetailing, or the ball and sockets of the animal joints, or the sutures of the human skull. Hence we have one of the main sources of that intense attraction which binds society together, and which constantly increases as organization advances. For it is in virtue of these counterpart differences that individuals are mutually dependent upon each other, and supply each other's wants, by that vast system of exchanges which is inseparable from organization.

Societary attraction from this source has often been illustrated by that association which naturally takes place between two beggars, one of whom is blind and the other lame, in which the blind carries the lame upon his shoulders, and the lame guides the blind, so that the legs of one and the eyes of the other serve for both. Also, it has been illustrated by a beautiful analogue in the inorganic world, as if even here nature were striving upward toward organization. For no two partic'es of matter which are precisely alike—that is, no two

atoms of oxygen, or of hydrogen, manifest any attraction for each other. But as soon as we bring together unlike particles, atoms of oxygen and hydrogen, under the proper conditions, they rush into each other's embrace—into chemical combination. Moreover, as even unlike atoms will not combine in other than definite proportions, so many and no more of oxygen with so many and no more of hydrogen, so must there be a definite proportion or correspondence between these differences, both in human beings and in their employments, in order that societary attraction should act with its full power, and the organization of society attain to its highest development. So many tailors and no more can combine with so many shoemakers and no more in any particular community. Where either of these trades is in excess, a portion of its members will be out of work, and ready to leave their place in search of employment elsewhere. But the more perfectly these differences correspond to each other, the more completely do the deficiencies of each find their supplies in the endowments and productions of the others, the stronger becomes the societary attraction, the more firmly society is dovetailed or sutured together, the higher its organization rises, and the nobler is the life which it develops and sustains.

But the most perfect example of all this we have in marriage, which is itself a beautiful organism. For it is wholly founded upon these counterpart differences in their most pronounced form. The two sexes differ from each other in a greater number of particulars, and these differences are more perfectly the counterparts of each other, than in the case of any two individuals of the same sex. With respect to their physical forms, this is sufficiently obvious; but here, as elsewhere, the outward and material is the type of the inward and spiritual. For in man, the intellect predominates, in woman, the affections; and of the intellect itself, the reasoning or logical faculties are the more active and influential in man, the intuitive in woman. In man strength and courage, in woman patience and fortitude, are the distinguishing traits. Prudence is the stronger in man, whose governing motives arise from consideration of the fruit of actions, from foresight of ends or objects to be attained; faith and spiritual instincts are the stronger in woman,

whose most influential motives arise from inward promptings of the heart.

It is from these counterpart and complementary differences that the two sexes, in the marriage union, are mutually and equally dependent upon each other, that which is lacking in each being supplied from the fullness of the other. Hence arises that beautiful system of vital exchanges, that veritable communion of life, in which, on both sides, it is found more blessed to give than to receive. The woman is supported and defended by the strength and courage of her husband; the man is sustained and comforted by the patience and fortitude of his wife. He imparts to her of his prudence and forethought; she to him of her faith and spiritual insight. Her logical faculties are strengthened, become clear and steady, by communion with his understanding; his intellect is informed and quickened by communion with her more direct and living intuitions, and his heart is warmed by the flame of her affections. These vital exchanges are accompanied by others also, which arise from the different employments which are appropriate to man and woman; and here, if we had space to develop it, we should find the ultimate solution of the whole woman question. From what has been said, however, it is sufficiently evident that the two sexes were created to live in organic relations to each other, as members of one organism—that is to say, in marriage; and that from this source the highest development and welfare of both must proceed.

In fine, the mutual attraction between the sexes is due to the same cause. For apart from these differences, together with the mutual dependence and exchanges to which they give rise, there were no place for love or marriage; but in consequence of them, this union is the closest, the most intimate—that is to say, the most perfectly organic—of all human associations. Here the organic structure of society comes forth and discloses its true nature in its most typical form. For it is not, as is often supposed, those things in which men and women are alike, but those in which they are different from each other, which draw them together. The proverb, that "like seeks its like," refers to more general resemblances than those now under consideration, such as pertain to creatures of the same species, apart from which, as we have seen, no natural association can

exist. But within the specific unity, contrast rather than similarity is the great source of attraction. Accordingly, it has often been observed, that marriages take place more frequently, are more fruitful and happy, and the offspring are more healthy in body and mind, between those who present strong contrasts—physical, intellectual, and moral—than between those who most resemble each other. For where the husband and wife have very similar endowments, temperaments, tastes, and habits, as in the case of very near relatives, the marriage is seldom a happy one, and the proportion of feeble, defective, deformed, and idiotic children is greater than in other marriages. “Breeding in and in” causes animals to degenerate. “Crossing the breed” expresses a physiological law, which is of no less importance for the improvement of mankind than for that of mere animals. This is a sufficient reason, though it is not the only one, for that prohibition of marriage between near relatives which we find in the law of Moses, and in the codes of all civilized nations.

We have treated this example at such length in order to illustrate the great truth, that it is in and through these counterpart differences in persons and their employments that the organization of society develops and perfects itself. For where they are few and feebly marked, there we always find societary attraction feeble, and a low grade of organization. There the people are undeveloped or degraded, and often migratory in their character and habits, ready, on every slight occasion, to abandon country and kindred, in order to form new associations. Hence the migratory tendencies of the Tartar tribes in all ages and countries. Hence, also, those immense migrations of barbarians in the earlier ages of our era, and the great exodus of the Irish in modern times. In the case of the Germans, indeed, we have a similar phenomenon, which has a different explanation. But that of the Irish people is not adequately accounted for by their poverty. For there is as much pauperism in England as in Ireland, but the people do not emigrate in anything like an equal proportion. The true explanation seems to be, that the diversified industries of Ireland have been destroyed by the overshadowing competition of English manufactures, brought to bear upon them through the existing political union between the two countries. From this

cause the Irish are now mostly confined to one form of industry, that of agriculture, in consequence of which their individual differences have merged in one common type of degradation. For the emigrants are so much alike that no one can fail to recognize them wherever they are seen. Hence the decay of the organic structure of society, the loosening of the bonds of societary attraction, and the scattering of the Irish people over the world.

The organization of society perfects and crowns itself by that vast system of mutual exchanges between its interdependent organs which arises out of these counterpart differences. We have the type of this, as we have seen, in the human organism, in which the hands provide for the mouth, the mouth prepares and passes the food over to the stomach, and the stomach distributes it, in the form of nourishment, to all the other organs and parts of the body. Thus, also, the eyes direct the feet, the feet bear the eyes from place to place, the brain supplies intelligence to the body, and the body blood to the brain. The organic law of the whole is mutual interdependence, the supply of the wants of each organ by exchange with all the others. Such, also, is the law of human society, in the degree in which it attains to fullness of organization. For the personal quality, or capacity, or development, in which one individual is deficient, is found in another, and the wants of those who are engaged in the production of one commodity are supplied by other trades. Each person is dependent for the supply of his deficiencies upon all the others, and each contributes something to complete the endowments and productions of the social organism. For as each member of the human body, so each member of the social body, is indispensable to the full and perfect life of the whole. This is limited, however, by the case of a diseased organ, that is, a bad member of society, when, for the welfare of the body, it becomes necessary that he should "be cut off from his people;" but the analogy holds equally good here as elsewhere, for the health of the human body sometimes requires that a diseased member should be amputated. Hence the interest, as represented by St. Paul, which each member of society ought to feel in the safety and welfare of all the others, for "if one member suffer all the other members suffer with it." Hence, also, we might predict, what we always find

as a matter of fact, that only in the more highly organized communities is the life of the individual valued and protected; in those of low and feeble organization it goes for almost nothing. Recklessness of life, therefore—the bowie knife or the revolver ever at hand—is an infallible sign of a low social organization, of an undeveloped or degraded humanity.

In the most highly organized societies we have the exchange of ideas, of sympathy and affection, of services, and of commodities; and social life, in its whole development, depends upon the freedom, promptness, and regularity of these exchanges, as much as the life of the human organism depends upon the circulation of the blood. Moreover, they are always the most free and prompt and regular where the differences in persons, employments, and productions are most numerous, and most perfectly the counterparts and complements of each other. Each of these forms of exchange has its own place for detailed exposition in the vast scheme of social science which the analysis of the teleological organs will give us, but here we can only touch, by way of example, upon the exchange of ideas.

Upon this form of exchange, then, depend, in a degree which cannot be over-estimated, the increase and diffusion of knowledge, the development of the human faculties, and the progress of civilization. Its importance may be indicated by the fact, that it is the chief function of language, of speech, writing and printing, and of all other modes of representing or symbolizing thought. The intellectual, no less than every other form of life in man, is essentially a communion. Thought is begotten by mutual intercourse of mind with mind, and it does not go beyond the embryo state until it is brought forth in words or symbols, so as to communicate itself to the minds of others. No man perfectly understands himself until he has made himself understood by another, nor fully believes in his own ideas until he has persuaded others to believe in them. In the words of Novalis: "It is certain that when I have won another to believe as I do, I believe more strongly than I did before."

By this means the knowledge of each becomes available by all, and that of all by each, with comparatively little expense of time or labor. What I know I can communicate to another in a thousandth part of the time it has taken me to learn it, and

that other, of course, can do the same for me. A bare hint is often enough to possess another mind with the fruitful germs of thought which it has taken the lifetime of the author to originate and develop. Thus both parties to this exchange profit by what they receive, and still more by what they give ; for here, as everywhere else, it is more blessed to give than to receive. Thus both are enriched in a twofold manner, and enter upon a new course of acquisition and development, with all the advantages of an intellectual capital so easily acquired, to bring back again, from time to time, into the social circle, their ever increasing treasures.

It is in this way that the faculties of each member of a highly-organized community receive their richest nourishment and most varied culture, attain to their full growth, put forth their most beautiful bloom, and bear their noblest fruit. For the sum of knowledge in society constitutes a common pabulum upon which the minds of individuals nourish themselves ; or, to change the figure, it is the atmosphere which they breathe, and by which they are invigorated and their vision is extended and purified. From the almost infinite diversification of special studies and employments in every such community, it results that the knowledge possessed by each individual of any particular subject, such as health, agriculture, or maritime affairs, is immeasurably greater than it is where no one has ever made a specialty of medicine, farming, or navigation. This difference, which is just that between civilization and barbarism, applies not only to individuals in a particular society, but also to nations which stand in organic relations to other nations, as compared with those which are insulated from the rest of mankind. For in the degree in which communication between the different nations becomes full and free, the human race becomes one organism, each member of which reaps the harvest of the studies and labors and progress of all the others. These relations, moreover, are not limited to present time, but each succeeding generation inherits the accumulations of intellectual, moral, and material capital which have been stored up by all the past ; and, hence, progress in all the elements of wealth—that is, of well-being—must be recognized as a fundamental law of human nature, than which no physical law is more amply verified by the number of facts which it coördinates and explains.

Thus far we have been chiefly occupied with the organic relations of the individual members of society to each other, although this conception of the social organism is no less fruitful with respect to the relations between society itself and its members. But here we must content ourselves with two or three of the plainest inferences.

The first of these is, that the individual does not exist for himself, but for society—the organ for its organism. Consequently every person is bound to have some higher object of life than a merely selfish one, and this object must be the welfare of the community of which he is a member. This is the only principle that can justify a man in laying down his life for his country; and the fact, that there have been so many and such heroic sacrifices for this object, is abundant evidence that the principle lies deep in human nature, and often determines the actions of men, even where it has never been formally recognized by the intellect. Its practicable application in the industrial world would lead to this result, that every person, whatever be his avocation, would aim to produce that which should best promote the welfare of society, and would account nothing else as honorable or lawful, though it might seem to promote his own selfish interest. For an organ which aims to advance its own interest, to the damage of its organism, deserves to be exterminated. This grand result, however, belongs to the future, although the idea itself is a prophecy that it will some day come to be realized.

The second inference is, that society, as an organism, is clothed with the power of government over its own organs. How far it may be wise to exercise this power is a large question, which we cannot here undertake to discuss. Doubtless, the individual should have all the liberty which is consistent with the welfare of society. But what these limits are it is for society, not for the individual, to determine. Also, this power of government must be conceived of as extending to industrial, as well as to all other matters which are of general interest and concern. For what must we think of a man who should abnegate all control over his own organs as to how they should be employed? Society, therefore, has the rightful authority to influence, by wise legislation and other means, the flow of industry; to protect and cherish any particular branch

of production, such as that of iron or silk, leather or broad-cloth, for which the country affords peculiar resources and facilities, and which would be every way beneficial; as also to prohibit and suppress other occupations, which, though they may seem to promote the interests of individuals, are demoralizing, and every way detrimental to the community, such as gambling, lotteries, the liquor traffic, and houses of ill-fame. That theory of government which maintains that industrial matters must be left to take care of themselves is irreconcilable with any true conception of the social organism. It is one, moreover, which is chiefly advocated by those who seek their own selfish interest at the expense of society, and by the strong in order that they may be left free to break down and destroy the weak.

The third inference is, that society is bound to educate, defend, and provide employment for its members. For what must we think of a man who should neglect to educate his own organs to any useful employment, or who should fail to see that they have work to do, or to defend them in their proper functions when assaulted by hostile organisms, or who should renounce the care of them in sickness or infirmity? We must think the same of every organized community which renounces or neglects these high functions and sacred duties with respect to its members, for which society was instituted of God and exists among men. For the right of the poor to labor is simply the right to live. This idea, moreover, strikes deeply into our present system of general education, which turns out our youth utterly unskilled to do anything with their hands, with which the great body of them must earn their living or starve or steal, instead of teaching them some trade or art, so as to enable them to support themselves by their honest labor. This is one fruitful source of crime, but here we cannot develop the idea.

We come now, in conclusion, to exhibit our whole scheme of social science, as based upon the analysis of the teleological organs of society. These organs, as we have said, are the institutions which embody and represent the special aims of social life, and by means of which these aims are realized.

Now, the most general or comprehensive object of society, for which it was instituted of God, is human welfare. For society originated in the creation of woman, when God said :

“It is not good for man to be alone; I will make a help meet for him.” It is true this was spoken with reference to the primal form of human association, yet manifestly it was intended to apply to marriage, considered not only in itself, but also as the fountain-head of the streams of life and population, which are the elements of all society. Therefore, man’s true well-being, in its most general sense, cannot be realized otherwise than in and through association and communion with his kind. This welfare, moreover, consists in the satisfaction of all the wants, in the gratification of all the lawful and ordinate desires of human nature; and these wants and desires, under a rigorous analysis, resolve themselves into six classes, comprehending six special aims of society, together with six corresponding classes of institutions for the realization of these aims, or the satisfaction of these wants. The first is the want of society itself, which seeks its gratification through the institution of marriage, and the offspring which flows from it; the second is the want of education, which is supplied through the family, and all other educational institutions; the third includes the material wants, for the supply of which we have all the institutions of industry: the fourth is the want of justice and order in society, to satisfy which is the aim of civil government; the fifth comprises all those wants which spring from the love of the beautiful in man, and which seek their gratification through the institutions and appliances of art; the sixth class is that of the religious wants, which are supplied through the institutions of religion. These six classes of institutions, for the reason that they represent the special aims of human society, are here characterized as its teleological organs.

1. The first of these—marriage—of which the great end or aim is the procreation of human beings, for the satisfaction of the want in man of society itself, as it was the first in time, so also is it the first in importance of all the social institutions. For this object God created man male and female, and blessed them, saying: “Be fruitful and multiply, and replenish the earth.” Its paramount importance is abundantly illustrated by the subjects which are included under it in social science, and which are such as the following: The fundamental laws of marriage, as laid down in the Word of God and in the nature of man; its influence upon human well-being, according as

these laws are observed, and the evils which flow from their violation, by promiscuous intercourse, adultery, polygamy, and unlawful divorce; population, the causes, laws, and effects upon human welfare, of its increase and decline; the organic nature of marriage, together with the mutual exchanges to which it gives rise in its relations to the other teleological organs. The true doctrine of marriage is the corner-stone of the whole structure of social science.

2. The second of these teleological organs includes the educational institutions of society, at the head of which stands the family. For the family cannot be comprehended in its true nature and objects otherwise than as an educational institution. This is the object above all others for which "God setteth the solitary in families." But education must be taken here in its most comprehensive sense, as that the object of which is to satisfy the human want of development—the development of all the physical and mental faculties, not only those of children and youth, but also of men and women throughout the whole of life; and not only individuals, but also the race. Consequently, the institutions and appliances of education are not only schools, colleges, and universities, but also learned societies, and whatever is intended to promote the increase and diffusion of knowledge. Under this head in social science we have a vast range of subjects the interest of which is constantly increasing, and which have never yet been treated as a whole, such as the following: The organic nature of the family, and of all other educational institutions, and their organic relations among themselves, to the other teleological organs, and to society itself; the education of children and youth of both sexes, the object of which is general—that is, the development and control of all the faculties of mind and body, together with the methods, means, institutions, and appliances by which this object can best be obtained; the education of adults, the object of which is special—that is, the development and culture of particular faculties and aptitudes for the practice of the different trades, arts, professions, and pursuits, together with the means by which this object can be most effectually realized; the education of society itself, regarded as a self-perpetuating and ever-progressive form of life, the object of which is universal—that is, the development and culture of humanity by means of all the institutions and appliances for the increase and diffusion of

knowledge, such as the public press, popular lectures, lyceums, academies, and learned societies.

3. The third of these organs includes all the institutions of industry, for the satisfaction of the want in man of material well-being. This form of wealth resolves itself at last into human control over the physical forces and the properties of matter. This third special aim of society was divinely prescribed to man, and its relation to his social nature was indicated, when he was created. For God said to the first human pair: "Be fruitful and multiply, and replenish the earth, and subdue it, and have dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the fowl of the air, and over every living thing that moveth upon the earth." Here nature, in its utmost extent, is given to man, and he is commanded to subdue it to his own uses and ends. Thus we are divinely authorized to acquire and possess material wealth, and are directed to the only source from which it can be derived—that is, the subjugation of nature. The subjects included under this head, together with those under the first, constitute nearly the whole of that department of social science which goes by the name of political economy. They are such as the following: The nature of wealth, value and its measures; the distinction between national and individual wealth, the former consisting of utilities, the latter of values; the production of wealth, the wealth producing power or labor, skilled and unskilled, free and slave; division and organization of labor; the industrial arts, capital, and wages; the instruments of production, tools, machinery, and domesticated animals; agriculture, or the production of food and raw materials, the occupation and improvement of the soil, land tenures, rent; mines, forests, and fisheries; manufactures, or the production of finished commodities, the distribution of wealth, commerce, home and foreign trade, free trade, and protection, industrial independence of nations; harbors, rivers, canals, roads; the media of exchange, money, credit, banks; taxation, war, and other checks upon the production and distribution of wealth; the organic relations of all the institutions and branches of industry to each other, to the other teleological organs, and to society.

4. The fourth in order of these organs includes all the institutions and appliances of art, or the fine arts, for the satisfac-

tion of the love of the beautiful. Under this head we have the following and kindred subjects: The importance of art culture to the welfare and happiness of mankind; the influence of poetry, music, sculpture, painting, architecture, the drama, public spectacles and amusements upon individual and national character and development; means for the promotion of art, and for the culture of the æsthetic faculties; the significance of great municipal and national monuments of art; the organic relations of the different arts and art-institutions to each other, to their coördinate organs, and to society.

5. The fifth of these organs includes all the institutions of civil government, the object of which is the realization of justice and order in society. In this department of social science we have the following and kindred subjects: The nature, powers, and functions of government; laws—municipal, constitutional, and international; the history of government, from its origin in tribal associations, through its various forms, patriarchal, monarchical, despotic, aristocratic, republican, democratic, and mixed; the progress of civil liberty, the development of free institutions; the organic relations of governmental institutions to each other, to the other teleological organs, and to society, also of different nations to each other—this last being as yet imperfectly realized.

6. The sixth and last of these organs comprises the institutions of religion. For religion is an essential element of human nature, and the want of communion with God is an original want of the human soul. Never yet was it, nor ever can it be, well with man without the supply of this want. Religion, moreover, is essentially, though not exclusively, a social principle. Pre-eminently the religious life is a communion. Solitary asceticism, in all its forms, is a wretched abuse of the moral and spiritual nature. Hence it is one of the special aims of society to make provision for the supply of this want by institutions for the social worship of God, and for the communion of his worshipers with each other. Under this head, although it has never before been included in any scheme of social science, we have all subjects which pertain to religion, in so far as it is a social principle.

The foregoing analysis of the lawful and ordinate wants of human nature, in the supply of which its welfare consists, of

the corresponding aims of society to supply these wants, and of the organs or institutions which embody and represent these aims, and through which they are realized—this analysis is exhaustive, and furnishes a scheme for the classification, or grouping, and exposition, of all the social phenomena. There is no social fact or interest which does not range itself naturally under one or other of these comprehensive divisions. Of course it does not lie in the power of any man to fill out this vast scheme, for

Art ist lange, und kurtz ist unser leben.

The laborers also are as yet few in this great harvest-field, but they are constantly increasing, and each one who faithfully cultivates any little nook or corner of it contributes something to the crowning result. It is true we have had in this, as in every other new science, a great crop of premature theories, with comparatively little of harvested truth; for this crude theorizing has distorted, perverted and even denied, many of the most simple and obvious facts of social life—the love of system being ever liable to become stronger than the love of truth, than which there is no more copious source of errors. But all this must in time give way to the method of observation and induction, which has already produced the most encouraging results. The time must come when this most comprehensive and most human of all the sciences shall be no less productive of welfare and blessing to mankind than it is now full of promise and of hope.