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ART. I.—ASSYRIAN MONUMENTS AND THE BIBLE.

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The Cuneiform Inscriptions of Western Asia. Vol. I. A selection from the historical inscriptions of Chaldæa, Assyria and Babylonia, prepared for publication by Major-General Sir H. C. Rawlinson, K. C. B., assisted by Edwin Norris, Sec. R. As. Society: London, 1861. Vol. II. and III. A selection from the miscellaneous inscription of Assyria: London, 1866 and 1870. In the third volume George Smith, of the Department of Antiquities, British Museum, takes the place of Edwin Norris as assistant editor. Each volume contains seventy atlas-folio plates of original text.

WHEN Assyria and Egypt were at the height of their power and contending for the mastery of the world, the prophet Isaiah announced, xix. 23, that "the Egyptians shall serve with the Assyrians." Between these mighty rivals lay the land of Palestine, coveted alike by both as the key to further conquests, trampled successively by the armies of each, the helpless prey apparently of either. The kings and people of Israel, hopeless of maintaining their independence, were only divided with uncertain vacillation upon the question, which of these great powers they should look to for support and protection against the other. The inevitable political consequence appeared to be that the chosen people must be ground to powder between these formidable foes. But the dauntless faith of their prophets did not for an instant waver. Jehovah was the omnipotent King. His people could not be crushed. Egypt and Assyria, now doing their worst against them and against each other, would yet be joined together in peaceful alliance, and combined with Israel in the service of the true and living God; and the Lord of hosts would bless them all alike, saying, "Blessed be Egypt my people,

the unwritten expressions of themselves, their scholarly judgments, their high standard of taste, their trained habits of looking at things critically, the opinions that they pass upon the performances of others, will gradually form an everflowing fountain of influence. And that influence will be none the less potent, but all the more pervasive, because it proceeds, not from professor to student, but from student to student.

ART IV.—RHETORICAL ANALYSIS AND SYNTHESIS.

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I. Analysis and synthesis are the most fundamental processes of discursive thinking and expression.

These two intellectual processes are the counterparts and complements of each other, of equal importance in logic and rhetoric—that is to say, in the search for truth, and in the communication of thought. In fact, they are fundamental in all science and art. They underlie and pervade throughout all the other processes of discursive thinking, and of the expression of thought, whether in articulate language or other symbols, even to the original formation of every spoken or written word. A great master, the poet and philosopher, Goethe, has said, “Analysis and Synthesis are the diastole and systole of the mind.” For as by this expansive and contractile action of the heart the life-blood is dispersed through all the other organs and parts of the body, and drawn back again to be purified and renewed, so by these two reciprocal processes of the intellect are the living elements of thought poured forth through all the other forms and modes of mental activity, to quicken and nourish them, and gathered up again for renewed and reinvigorated service.

II. Analysis and synthesis are to all the other processes of rhetoric as the four primary rules to all the subsequent processes of arithmetic.

It seldom happens that any analogy holds good in so many particulars as that between these two fundamental processes of rhetoric, and the first four rules of arithmetic. For as these rules are the foundation of the whole science of numbers, so analysis and synthesis are the foundation of the art of discourse. As in that science it is impossible to take a step in advance without applying those rules, so in this art nothing can be done which does not involve these processes. And as in arithmetic those primary rules must be mastered, and facility in them be attained by study and practice, before any attempt is made to apply them in the more complex operations, so laborious study and practice in these two are indispensable to freedom and power in all the subsequent processes of rhetoric. Without this the speaker or writer has difficulties to overcome similar to those under which a person labors who attempts to calculate without the knowledge of arithmetic.

III. Analysis decomposes thought into its elements.

In this process, thought, representing the objects of knowledge, is regarded as existing in what, for want of a better word, may be called *wholes*. Such wholes of thought are expressed by the following and all similar words: man, woman, color, passion, relation, and, a man, a woman, a color, a passion, a relation. The meanings of all such words are decomposed into their elements by the process of rhetorical analysis.

1. These wholes of thought are immediately presented to the mind in language. Whether they were actually the first objects of the human intellect, or how much thinking may have gone to the making of them up out of their constituent elements, we need not stop here to inquire, since this is rather a logical than a rhetorical question. It is sufficient for our present purpose, that, in the actual state of knowledge and of language, we find a multitude of the objects of thought in this form, and their unity or wholeness thus represented and expressed in defined words or names. In fact, all our common modes of thinking, and of expressing what we think, have been formed under the influence of language in this state, as our physical organs, in all their functions, have been developed under the influence of the air we breathe. The amount of knowledge which is thus already deposited in language is wonderful, and it constitutes the common pabulum of all minds, without which the development

of our faculties to anything like their present degree of strength, activity and precision, were altogether impossible. Thus, in the first place, we have concrete objects in nature, such as a man, a house, a tree, presented to us, each as one thing, and expressed by single names, without reference to the various elements of which they are composed, such as head, body, arms, legs,—foundation, walls, roof,—roots, trunk, branches and leaves. In the second place, we have objects of a purely intellectual or spiritual nature, such as a truth, a virtue, a relation, presented to us in their names, each as one thing. And, in the third place, yet included in intellectual or spiritual objects, we have classes, both of things in nature, and of our mental states, represented to us in their wholeness, under such common names as tree, star, virtue, passion, without immediate reference to the sub-classes, genera, species, or varieties, which severally they may include.

2. These wholes of thought rhetorical analysis decomposes into their component elements. The process corresponds to physical analysis as thought to its physical objects. For as chemical analysis decomposes metals, stones, vegetable fibre and muscular tissues ; as anatomical analysis dissects the animal organism ; as botanical analysis applies a similar process to plants ; so rhetorical analysis decomposes thoughts into the elements of which they are composed. The process, moreover, is precisely the same in logic as in rhetoric ; its object only is different. For in logic it is a process of investigation, whose object is to determine what and how many are the constituent elements of any particular thought, in order to the increase and perfecting of our knowledge ; whilst in rhetoric the sole aim is the communication of this knowledge to other minds. For it is by this process that the thought which is the general subject of discourse is divided up and spread out before the mind, so that it can be viewed in all its several parts and different aspects.

IV. The themes of analysis are conceptions* of individuals and of classes.

The analytic process can be carried much further in rhetoric

* The word, conception, in this article, is not restricted to its logical meaning, but is used to designate the idea, image, notion, or thought of anything which is composed of parts. The word, individual, which is here used to signify anything thing composed of dissimilar parts, is a very poor word, but the language does not afford a better.

than in physics. For even an ultimate particle of matter, which chemistry cannot decompose, may be mentally resolved into substance and qualities, and these qualities again into shape, size, weight, color, taste and smell. In fact, every thought which is composed of more than one element, is a proper subject of analysis. For rhetorical purposes, however, all such thoughts are divided into conceptions of individuals, and conceptions of classes; and it is of the utmost importance to distinguish readily these two kinds of themes from each other because the process is different in the two cases, and yields different results. Yet it is not always an easy matter, especially for beginners, to make this distinction, for the reason that the same form of expression is frequently used as the name both of an individual and of the class to which it belongs. Commonly, however, an individual theme may be known by the indefinite article prefixed, and a class may always be named by a common term. But no absolute rule can be given. Facility comes only by assiduous practice.

V. Classes are analyzed into sub-classes, genera, species, varieties—similar parts which can be designated by the common name of the class.

Thus the classes which are here given as examples may be analyzed in the following, and in many other ways, in all which the parts are sub-classes, or species, or varieties of the class. *Man*—1. White, yellow, red, brown, black man : 2. European, Asiatic, American, African man : 3. Caucasian, Malay, Mongolian, African, American man. *Duty*—1. Duties of primary, and duties of secondary importance : 2. Duties of absolute, and duties of relative obligation : 3. Religious, political and social duties : 4. Duties to God, to our neighbors, and to ourselves. Thus, also, the class of Christian graces is analyzed by St. Paul into faith, hope and charity.* The parts into which a class is

* Supplementary examples. *Animal*—1. Rational and irrational animals : 2. Animals inhabiting the land, water and air : 3. Vertebrate, articulate, radiate and mollusk animals : 4. Beast, bird, fish, reptile and insect. *Tree*—1. Indigenous and exogenous trees : 2. Fruit, shade, ornamental and timber trees. *Fruit-tree*—Apple, pear, peach, plum, cherry trees. *House*—1. Stone, brick, iron and wooden houses : 2. One, two, three, four, five and six story houses : 3. Flat, hip and steep roofed houses : 4. White, yellow, red, blue, green and brown houses. *Art*—1. The useful and the beautiful or fine arts : 2. The liberal and the mechanic arts. *The fine arts*—Poetry, music, sculpture, painting, architecture, the drama and

thus decomposed are similar because they bear a similar relation to the class from which they are derived, and because they resemble each other in all the particulars which are the common properties of the class. And the name of the class is applicable to them all alike because they are species or varieties under it. Thus a European or an African is a man because man is the name of the class to which he belongs; and so poetry is a fine art, and charity is a Christian grace.

VI. Individual themes are analyzed into dissimilar parts to which the name of the individual is not applicable.

Such themes are analyzed as follows: *A man*—into body and soul, or body, soul and spirit. *The body*—1. Solids and fluids: .Skin, flesh and bones: 3. Head, trunk and limbs. *A tree*—1. Roots, trunk, branches, leaves, blossoms and fruit: 2. Bark, wood and pith. *A House*—1. Foundation, walls and roof: 2. Stone, brick, iron and wood. *A government*—Legislature, judiciary and executive. *A human soul*—Intellect, sensibility and will. *A duty*—Its nature, difficulties, motives and the manner in which it is to be performed. *A quality*, paleness, e. g.—Its causes, varieties and significance. *Faith*—Its nature, object, evidence and benefits. *A Proposition*, e. g. Man is mortal—1. Subject, predicate and copula: 2. The causes of mortality, its universality, and its moral lessons. *A text of Scripture*, e. g. "Of his fulness have we all received"—Who are meant by "all we"? Of whose fulness? How have we received of it?* The analysis of individual themes, in all cases, yields parts which are dissimilar to the whole from which they are derived, and to each other, consequently the name of the theme cannot be applied to its parts; the head cannot be called the body, nor the roots the tree, nor the right or left wing the army.

landscape gardening. *The mechanic arts*—House-building, house-painting, cabinet-making, shoe-making, tailoring, book-binding, printing, gilding. *The liberal arts* include the fine arts, together with law, medicine, teaching, engineering and others.

* Supplementary examples. *An army*—Right wing, left wing, centre and reserve corps. *A ship*—Hull, masts and sails. *A chair*—Legs, seat and back. *A day*—Morning, forenoon, afternoon and evening. *A storm*—Wind, clouds, rain, or snow, or hail. *A library*—History, poetry, science, philosophy, art, travels, biography and fiction. *Fear*—Its causes and its effects. *The growth of a plant*—Its favorable and unfavorable conditions, its several stages, and its limitations. *A day*—Its employments, pleasures, disappointments, and memorable incidents. *A proposition*, e. g., Truth is a virtue—The nature of truth, the nature of virtue, and these two are equal to each other.

VII. The principle of analysis, in classes, is some common attribute of the class ; in individuals, some particular view of the theme in relation to space.

In every case of formal analysis a principle is applied with reference to which the theme is decomposed into its parts. This principle is always some particular attribute, quality, aspect, or property of the subject which is to be analyzed ; and in consequence of this every theme admits of being analyzed in as many different ways, yielding as many different sets of parts, as it has properties or aspects which are exclusive of each other. It is by the application of such different principles that several sets of parts have been obtained from the same theme in the foregoing examples.

1. In classes the principle of analysis is always some one attribute which is common to the class. Thus the common attribute of color is the principle upon which the class, man, is analyzed into white, yellow, red, brown and black man. The continent inhabited, or habitat, is the principle which determines the parts of the same class, as European, Asiatic, American and African man. Our duties to God, to our neighbors, and to ourselves, are the parts which are obtained by analyzing the class, duty, upon the principle of the object to whom we are under obligation. And if we apply to the same theme the principle of the causes which influence us to violate our duty, we obtain as the parts, duties which are violated from thoughtlessness, from habit, passion, example, ignorance, and the like. Any other quality, trait, or attribute, which is common to the class, might be applied in every case, and would yield a still different set of parts.

2. In individuals the principle of analysis is some particular view of the theme in reference to space. In all such cases there is some reference to the mode in which we conceive of the object to be analyzed as existing in space. We distinguish the parts of the thought which corresponds to the object, as if they were capable of being spacially separated from each other. But this reference to space is either direct or by way of analogy, according as the object is either concrete—*i. e.*, one which occupies space in one or more of its dimensions, length, breadth and depth*—or abstract, such as a quality, or a truth.

* The word concrete is here defined because it has been found necessary to employ it in a more restricted sense than that which it bears in logic.

(1.) Concrete themes are analyzed with direct reference to space. They are viewed in their relations to some one of its three dimensions. Thus a tree analyzed into roots, trunk, branches and leaves, is viewed in its length, from one extremity of which to the other there is a mental movement in the process. But if it be analyzed into bark, wood and pith, it is viewed in its depth, or horizontally, and the movement of the mind is from the exterior to the interior. These two views of the tree with direct reference to space, are two diverse principles of analysis, yielding entirely different sets of parts. Again, in the analysis of a house into foundation, walls, roof, and into anterior, central and posterior compartments, there is a direct reference to the space which it occupies in two different directions. In all cases of the analysis of concrete themes there is a similar reference to the manner in which the object is conceived of as occupying space.

(2.) Abstract individual themes are analyzed with analogical reference to space. This reference is not so obvious as the former, but it is always implied. For it is impossible to conceive of any such abstract or spiritual object otherwise than under the conditions of space, although it does not actually occupy any portion of it to the exclusion of other things. For example, if the object be a relation, it must be conceived of as subsisting between the things which are connected by it; and there lies in this word, between, a necessary reference to space, though by way of analogy. In like manner, a human soul analyzed into intellect, sensibility, and will, or a moral act, into intelligence, freedom, motives and choice, is viewed as if it occupied space, and these parts as if they were its several compartments. In the analysis of a duty, also, into its relations to God, to our neighbors, and to ourselves, these relations must be conceived of as extending in these three different directions. A clear and strong conception of this analogical reference to space, in the analysis of this class of themes, is of very great importance. Hence the following extended example, which is taken from Professor Day, though introduced by him in a different connection, and for a different purpose.* Dr. Barrow, in his sermon on "Contentedness," analyzes his theme into three

* Day's Elements of the Art of Rhetoric, p. 68.

grand compartments, of which the first contains the beliefs which enter into contentment, namely : 1. That all things are ordered by God. 2. That they are good. 3. And conducive to our own welfare. 4. That our condition, all things considered, is the best for us. The second compartment includes the states of will and sensibility which belong or conduce to this virtue, namely : 1. Submission to the will of God ; 2. Composure ; 3. Cheerfulness ; 4. Hope ; 5. Fortitude ; 6. Resistance to the temptation to become weary of our condition ; 7. Meekness ; 8. Kindness ; 9. Freedom from anxiety. The third compartment is occupied with the outward conduct which springs from contentment, and by which it is cherished, as : 1. Suppression of all unseemly expressions ; 2. And of all complaint or murmuring ; 3. Abstaining from all improper attempts to remove our crosses ; 4. Declarations of satisfaction with the allotments of Providence ; 5. Discharge of our duties with alacrity ; 6. Fair and kind behavior towards the instruments or abettors of our adversity. This analysis is not above criticism, but it presents a picture of contentment through its component elements which seems to occupy or fill a large space.

VIII. In each case of analysis but one principle is applied, in consequence of which unity in the parts is preserved, and they are exclusive of each other.

This statement embodies one of the fundamental laws of thinking, and of the expression of thought in language. It is exemplified in the analysis of man, upon the single principle of color, into white, yellow, red, brown and black man ; and in that of a tree, upon the principle of length, into roots, trunk, branches and leaves ; also in that of a moral act, upon the principle of its mental states, into intelligence, freedom, motives and choice. Where this rule is strictly observed the principle which is applied runs through all the parts, and binds them together in unity, so that they can be comprehended by a single act of the mind, as in each of these examples ; at the same time, they are mutually exclusive, and stand out in clear distinction from each other. The final result is unity, order, light. But, on the contrary, if the class, man, be analyzed into European, Caucasian, civilized, red and Christian, these five parts are obtained by the application of as many diverse principles, *i. e.*, habitat, endowments, civilization, color and religion. The case

is similar if duty be analyzed into duties to God, negative duties, duties of absolute obligation, difficult duties, and duties liable to be violated from levity or passion ; also, in the analysis of a tree into roots, wood, uses and beauty. In these and all similar cases, where more than one principle is applied, the parts overlap or run into each other, and there is no bond of union between them, so that they cannot be comprehended in a single mental view. Thus the laws of thought are violated, and the result is confusion and darkness.

IX. The parts of a primary process may be taken as themes for further analysis ; in which case they may differ in character from the primary theme, and from each other, and different principles may be applied.

Almost any single analysis, however complete in itself, and governed by its own laws, may be taken as the commencement of a more extended process. When this is done the preceding laws apply in their utmost rigor to each subordinate process, but in passing from one such step to another the above variations frequently occur, and require here to be explained.

1. The parts of a primary analysis may themselves be taken as themes and analyzed. In this way, from each of the primary parts a secondary and subordinate set of parts may be obtained ; each of which again may be subjected to the analytic process, with similar results. This process may be carried on until the ultimate constituent elements of the thought are evolved. For example, the class, wind, may be analyzed into north, east, south and west winds ; each of these again, into gales, breezes and breaths ; and each of these again, into steady and wavering winds. Thus, also, the sun may be analyzed into its substance and qualities ; its substance, into all the different solid and gaseous elements of which it is composed ; its qualities, into light, heat, electricity, the chemical ray, and all the various properties of its matter ; its solid elements, into iron, gold, silver, platinum ; and its gaseous elements, into oxygen, hydrogen, carbon, and the like. In the same way, love may be analyzed into its nature, causes and effects ; its causes, into beauty, kind treatment, and the want of something to love ; its effects, into those produced on the lover himself, and those on the beloved object ; and each of these, into the useful and hurtful, and the pleasurable and painful effects of love. In all these cases the process might be carried much further.

2. The parts, taken as themes, may differ in character from their primary, and from each other. The meaning of this is, that the parts of any theme, whether a class or an individual, may be either classes or individuals, or some of them may be one, and some the other. For example, in the case of the individual theme, a tree, analyzed into roots, trunk, branches and leaves, the first and the last two parts are classes, and must be analyzed as such, while the trunk is an individual like its primary. Thus, also, the solar system, an individual theme, analyzed into the sun and the planets, gives us one individual and one class theme for further analysis. So, also, in the nature, difficulties and motives of a duty, the first part is an individual, the last two are classes. Nor is this inconsistent with what has been determined in section V. For when the parts of a class are viewed in their relation to the theme from which they are derived, they are always sub-classes, or species, or varieties under it, as the mouth is a variety of the features, although there is only one such variety in its class. It is only when the parts are taken out of this relation, as themselves themes to be analyzed, that they sometimes differ in character from their primary, and from each other.

3. Different principles may be applied to the parts from that on which their theme was analyzed, and from each other. Thus, in the primary analysis of man into European, Asiatic, American and African, the principle is that of habitat. In the second stage of the process, we may apply the principle of color to African man, which will give us the parts, white, yellow, brown and black Africans; to Asiatic, that of civilization, yielding civilized, semi-civilized and uncivilized Asiatics; to European, the principle of political division, by which we have English, French, Spanish, Prussian, Austrian, Russian, and the rest. In the third stage, we may take any one of these secondary parts, and apply to it the principle of profession or avocation, and thus obtain the parts—statesmen, lawyers, physicians, artists, manufacturers, traders, military men, and the like. In the fourth stage, the traders may be analyzed upon the principle of the kind of goods in which they trade, into hardware and dry goods merchants, provision dealers, booksellers; and each of the other parts in a similar manner. In the same stage of the process, the military class may be taken as equivalent to the army, and analyzed as

an individual theme, upon the principle of its organization, into right wing, left wing, centre and reserve. In the fifth stage, any one or all of these last parts may be analyzed upon the principle of the manner of equipment and fighting, into infantry, cavalry, and artillery, or some of them upon one principle, and some upon another. At each of these several stages many parts are omitted, and the analysis is incomplete in those selected for examples. But no confusion results from such variation in the principles applied; all is in strict accordance with the laws of thinking, and with all the uses of analysis, whether in the search for truth or the communication of thought.

X. The selection of the principle is governed by the object of discourse.

Inasmuch as any theme can be analyzed upon a number of diverse principles, it is a matter of primary importance to know how to select the right one in each case. This depends absolutely upon the object which we have in view in the discussion. Therefore, if the subject of the discourse be honesty, we first determine in our own minds the precise object which we desire to accomplish by the discussion of it. And if this be simply to explain the nature of honesty, so that it shall be understood, we may do this by showing how it acts, what it leads people to do. In this case it must be analyzed upon the principle of its acts, and its parts will be such as the following: abstaining from contracting obligations beyond our ability; punctually meeting those we have contracted; fairly representing the value of the goods we have to sell; duly appreciating those we wish to buy; speaking the truth in all matters of business; and carefully guarding ourselves against the temptation to wrong others for our own profit. Thus the object of our discourse fully appears in all the parts of the analysis; and the discussion of these points will go far towards making people understand what honesty is. But now, if we assume that this is sufficiently known, and our object be simply to enforce the duty, the theme must be analyzed upon an entirely different principle, namely, that of the motives which make men honest. This would give us such parts as the following: the usefulness of honest dealing in society; the command of God that we shall do as we would be done by; the temporal and eternal rewards and penalties respectively of honesty and dishonesty. Thus, again, the object of discourse

is fully represented in all the parts of the analysis. With the same object in view, a different principle, such as that of the difficulty of being honest, would be absurd, because it would give us parts in which the obstacles or hindrances to the duty would be represented, by which it could not be enforced, but by which the feeling of obligation would be weakened. Again, if the subject of discourse be the organization of society, with the special object of explaining its political character, this object will furnish the principle of analysis, and give us the common division into the patriarchal, tribal, monarchical, aristocratic, republican and democratic organizations. Any other principle, such as the influence of organization upon industry and the production of wealth, would be inappropriate, as having no bearing upon the object of discourse. Once more, if the subject be political organization, with the object of explaining its influence upon literature, the analysis must be made on this influence as the principle, which would give us, as the parts, those organizations which have fostered literature, those in which it has been left free, and those which have aimed to discourage or repress it.

It should be observed, however, that sometimes analyses already made have become so deeply imbedded in thought and language that they cannot be disturbed, but must be used, whatever be the object of discourse. Thus the languages of mankind have long been analyzed upon two different principles, namely—1. Their grammatical structure, into polysyllabic, monosyllabic, and agglutinized languages; and 2. the people who speak them, into Indo-European or Sanscritic, the Semitic or Arabic and the Turanean or Tartar families; so that one or the other of these analyses must needs be adopted, even though the object of discourse have little or no relation to either of these principles. Great confusion would result from the attempt to change them. The same is true of the Sanscritic family, analyzed upon the latter of these principles, into Sanscrit, Old Persian or Zend, Old Celtic, Greek, Latin, Slavic and Gothic. But whenever a new analysis is made, that principle must be selected which will best exhibit the object of discourse in all the parts.

XI. The parts must be ranged under the particular theme from which they are derived.

This is a law of discourse which admits of no exception-

Thus, in discoursing upon the Christian graces, analyzed into faith, hope, and charity, these parts must always be arranged and discussed under the head of the Christian graces. Then, if faith be analyzed into personal trust in Christ, and belief of Christian doctrine, these parts must be arranged under the head of faith, and not under charity or hope. A similar remark applies to hope analyzed into its nature and objects, and to charity resolved into love to God, and love to man. For if personal trust be ranged under charity, or belief of doctrine under hope, or love to man under faith, the laws of thought are violated, and confusion is the result. The proper arrangement of this analysis may be exhibited as follows :

The Christian Graces.

Faith,	Hope,	Charity.
Pers. Trust, Belief of Doc-	Nature—Objects.	Love to God—Love to Man.
trine.		

XII. The arrangement of the parts commonly depends upon the degree of their importance or prominence.

The orderly enumeration of the parts, though essentially a synthetic process, is inseparable from analysis, because they necessarily consist of some definite number, and cannot be otherwise expressed than in some particular order. What this order shall be depends upon a variety of considerations, which affect and modify each other, so that no absolute rule can be laid down. If, however, there be no reason for a different procedure, it is proper to begin the enumeration with that part which is most important, or most clearly defined, or best known, or in some other way most prominent, and to follow this principle of order in the subsequent parts. Some consideration of this kind will be found to justify the arrangement in all the preceding examples. In the last of these, the reason why faith is put first is, that it stands in the relation of the root or source to the other two graces; hope comes next as being the first offspring of faith; and charity is put last as the blossom and crown of all. In this respect, faith is regarded as the most important or prominent, though charity be the crowning grace. In like manner, in the analysis of the languages of mankind, we place the Indo-European group first, because it is the most interesting and important, because the affinities of its members

are best known, and because it is, on many other accounts, the most striking and remarkable. The Arabic family comes next, as being far less numerous and extensive, and less known, except to the limited class of Arabic scholars. The Turanean comes last, though the most numerous of all, because it is of least importance, least known, and the affinities of its members, as far as known, the least remarkable. For this rule, however, more specific reasons may be given, and there may be good reasons for departing from it.

XIII. In the analysis of classes, the arrangement commonly depends upon the degree in which the parts represent the principle, or upon their similarity to each other.

There is not much difference between these two ideas, for whichever of them be applied the arrangement will commonly be the same. Both are mentioned because sometimes it is more convenient to employ one, and sometimes the other. The former, however, has this advantage, that it gives us a reason for beginning the enumeration with a particular part, whilst the latter does not. Sometimes the degree in which the principle is represented in the parts determines the order. The principle employed in the analysis is necessarily represented in all the parts, for the reason that the theme is resolved into parts upon this principle. But hardly ever will it be found that it is represented equally in them all; and that part in which it is most fully or prominently represented ought commonly to stand first, and the others to follow in the same order. For example, in the analysis of man into Caucasian, Mongol, Malay, African, and American man, the principle applied is that of the human endowments. Consequently the Caucasian, the most richly endowed of all, comes first; the American Indian, regarded by the authors of this analysis, but erroneously, as the lowest in the scale of endowments, is put last; whilst the Mongol and the Malay, upon the same principle, are placed as intermediate between these two. Thus the arrangement, according to the views of its authors, constitutes a descending scale in the order in which the principle employed is represented in the parts. Again, if the United States be analyzed upon the principle of their mineral wealth, Pennsylvania must be placed first, probably Virginia or California next, and the others in the order in which they represent this principle. But if the principle

applied be that of population, New York must stand first, Pennsylvania next, and the rest in the order of their populations.

Sometimes the order may be determined by the similarity of the parts to each other. After we have fixed upon the parts with which to begin the enumeration, often it will be convenient to arrange the others in the order of their similarity to the first. Thus in the case of man analyzed upon the principle of color, we begin with white man, for the preceding reasons, and follow with the parts, yellow, red, brown, black. For if we should say, white, black, brown, yellow, red, the mind must leap over all the intermediate parts between white and black, and then return upon its movement to pick them up, in consequence of which the mental view would be confused. Thus, also, in arranging the parts of house analyzed upon the principle of the materials of which houses are built, and beginning with stone, we should arrange the other parts in the order of brick or iron, and wood, because there is a stronger resemblance between brick or iron and stone than between stone and wood.

XIV. In the analysis of individual themes, the arrangement of the parts commonly depends upon their contiguity or mutual dependence.

The order required by contiguity and by the mutual dependence of the parts will commonly be the same, but in concrete themes the former is the more easily applied, and in abstract and spiritual themes, the latter. Thus in the analysis of a house into foundation, walls and roof, and of a tree into roots, trunk, branches and leaves, the parts which touch, and those which immediately depend upon each other, are obviously the same. Consequently, in all such cases, it is a matter of indifference which of these ideas be applied. Also in the analysis of a moral act into intelligence, freedom, motive and choice, this order is required alike by the analogy of contiguity in space [VII. 2. (2)] and by the dependence of the parts. But in this and similar cases the latter is the more easily applied, for the immediate dependence of freedom upon intelligence, of motive upon freedom, and of choice upon motive, is more obvious than the analogy of contiguity. Sometimes, however, the order prescribed by these two ideas will not be the same, in which case the analogy is overruled by the dependence. For example, in the analysis of a judgment of the mind, or a

proposition, upon the principle of its logical or grammatical character, into subject, predicate and copula, the principle of contiguity would require that the order should be subject, copula and predicate, because the copula immediately follows the subject, both in the judgment and in the proposition. Yet this arrangement would be incorrect because both the subject and the predicate must necessarily be conceived of before the copula, which, also, is equally dependent upon both the other parts, and consequently the true order is that of subject, predicate and copula. The same principle requires that the parts of an army should be arranged in the order of right wing, left wing, centre and reserve corps. For the conception of the centre is dependent upon that of the two wings, and that of the reserve corps upon all the other parts.

XV. The order of discussion depends ultimately upon the character and object of the discourse.

The order in which the parts obtained by analysis are to be discussed may be entirely different from that of the analysis itself. For the nature or object of the discourse may require that the most important, or prominent, or interesting part should close the discussion, in which case the parts should be taken up and treated in the reverse order of the analysis. Thus, if the special object of a discourse on the languages of mankind be to explain the affinities of the Sanscritic family, having analyzed the theme as above, we should begin with such remarks upon the Turanean group as may seem to be required; next we should take up the Arabic family, and treat them in a similar manner, and come last to the Sanscritic, in order to give their affinities a thorough discussion. If the subject of discourse be a proposition to be proved, whatever arrangement the analysis may require, often it will be indispensable that the closing arguments should be the strongest. If the discourse be upon a duty, with the main object of enforcing it, the motives must come last, wherever they may stand as a part of the analysis. And, in fine, whenever the discussion of any part will save time, or throw light upon, or add force to, or in any way facilitate the discussion of the others, it should always be taken up first, and the other parts in the order prescribed by this principle.

XVI. The tests of analysis are the equality of the parts to the whole, and their exclusiveness of each other.

Since the thought which is analyzed is conceived of as a whole [III.] the parts, taken together, must make up this whole; otherwise the analysis is defective. Thus, the analysis of government into monarchical, aristocratic, republican and democratic, is defective because the parts are not equal to the whole, that sub-class the members of which are made up of a mixture of all these, as was the Spartan government, being omitted. Also, if faith be analyzed into personal trust, belief of doctrine and prudence, the analysis is false, because the parts, taken together, are more than equal to the whole, prudence not being an element of faith. In every case the following test questions should be applied: Is anything included in the theme which does not appear in any of the parts? and, Does anything appear in the parts which is not included in the theme? Moreover, the several parts must be exclusive of each other, which will always be the case if but one principle be applied [VIII.]; otherwise what is called a cross division will be the result, in which the parts include or overlap each other. Thus, the analysis of the arts into the liberal, useful, mechanic and fine arts, is a cross division, for the liberal include the fine arts, and the useful the mechanic. To these tests should be added, in case the analysis is carried beyond the primary process, that it must proceed in regular order; in other words, no subordinate part can properly be reached otherwise than through the analysis of the theme from which it is immediately obtained. When, for example, a tree is analyzed into roots, trunk, branches and leaves, and next the twigs, into those of last year's and those of this year's growth, the analysis is defective, because the branches of which the twigs are a part have not been subjected to the analytic process.

It should be observed, however, that these tests are not to be applied to all enumerations which we find in discourse. For although a great deal of confusion arises from defective and false analysis, in such cases, yet loose analyses are often convenient, and sometimes unavoidable, having become so fixed in language and current forms of expression that they cannot be disturbed. Frequently, also, it is necessary to distinguish, in a general way, thoughts which overlap and shade off into each other. Thus, the expression, prose and poetry, has become unalterably fixed in language, and it marks a distinction which we can never do

without, although these two kinds of discourse are not exclusive of each other, for prose is often poetical, and poetry sufficiently prosaic. Sometimes, moreover, it may be useful to present an enumeration in which each succeeding word includes the preceding and something more, such as sublime and beautiful, for the sublime is properly an element of beauty. A favorite form of expression in the style of Plutarch reverses this order; the more general idea is presented first, and immediately after some special form of it, evidently with the design of giving it point, as in the following examples: "wicked and lawless," "superfluity and delicious fare," "craft and dissimulation," "restrain and curb," "imperfections and freckles." The effect of such expressions in this author is as if he were darting sharp arrows of thought into our minds. Enumerations, in fine, which are altogether irregular are often found in the best writers, as in the following: "My doctrine, manner of life, purpose, faith, long-suffering, charity, patience, persecutions, afflictions." A rigorous style will avoid such expressions whenever it is possible to do so without great inconvenience, but they are not to be severely criticised, except when they occur in a formal analysis.

XVII. Primary analysis is the application of the process to a primary theme; further analysis applies it to some or all of the parts thus obtained; exhaustive analysis extends it until the ultimate elements of the thought are reached; the last analysis is the final stage of the exhaustive; and rigorous analysis, the observance of all the laws of the process.

All these terms are in common use with those who are accustomed to elaborate discourse, yet often in vague and fluctuating senses. Here an attempt is made to fix their meanings in precise and rigorous definitions.

XVIII. Analysis determines the divisions in discourse, and is the chief source of clearness and copiousness in style.

The grand importance and uses of this one of the two most fundamental of all the processes of discourse, should be abundantly evident from the preceding discussion. Here, however, it may be well to exhibit some of these uses in which its importance is most signally illustrated.

1. Analysis determines the primary and subordinate divisions or heads of discourse. In every discourse, of whatever kind, nothing is of greater importance than that it be properly divided.

Without divisions discourse is like the dead level of a marsh or sandy desert, "flat, stale and unprofitable"; but, rightly divided, it is like a landscape agreeably diversified with mountains, rivers, streams, houses, woods, fields and cattle. Each thought, also, requires to be distinctly presented, so as to leave the impression at its close of some progress made in the discussion, that some definite portion of it has been completed. In contemplating any subject, moreover, the mind needs resting-places, where it may return upon itself, and gather up its powers for renewed efforts of attention. At the same time, the unity of the discourse must be rigorously preserved; it must be made to appear at each stage that the particular thought which is under discussion is a part of the general subject, and has a direct bearing upon the object to be accomplished. Now such divisions, which do not mar but exhibit the unity of discourse, in all the variety of its co-ordinate and subordinate parts, are obtained by this process of analysis. Thus, if the subject be National Unity, with the object of explaining wherein such unity consists, we may analyze the theme into unity of race and language, unity of institutions, and unity of country, which will give us three primary divisions or heads for discussion. Under the first of these, we may show that in a national union, as distinguished from that of an empire, 1. there must be one predominant race and language, and 2. if there be other races or languages, these must be tending to assimilation and absorption in that which is predominant. Thus we obtain two subordinate divisions. Applying the same process to the second head, we may show that a national union implies a certain unity in the institutions, 1. political, 2. industrial, 3. educational, 4. religious. (With respect to the second and fourth of these, it may be observed, in order to justify the analysis, that industrial institutions founded on freedom and on slavery, and no less those of two religions, one of which enjoins polygamy, infanticide, and the burning of widows, whilst the other prohibits them, are incompatible with national unity). Thus under this head we obtain four subordinate divisions. Under the last of the three we may show that national unity requires that the country should be one: 1. by its boundaries, 2. by its ranges of mountains, 3. by its rivers or water courses. The whole scheme of the discourse would then stand as follows:

National Unity.	I. U. of Race & Lang.	1. Predominant Race and Language.
		2. Others tending to assimilation and absorption.
	II. U. of Institutions.	1. Political. 2. Industrial.
3. Educational. 4. Religious.		
III. U. of Country.	1. Boundaries.	
	2. Mountains. 3. Rivers.	

2. Analysis is the principal source of clearness in style. This most important of all the qualities or properties of style includes precision, discreetness and articulateness, both of thought and diction. Precision exhibits the several thoughts in sharp and clean-cut definitions. Discreetness presents them thus defined with due regard to their differences, mutual exclusiveness, and degrees of separation from each other. This quality is represented or symbolized in writing by the primary, secondary and lower divisions, heads, topics, paragraphs, and sentences; also in oral discourse, by the pauses and changes of voice which correspond to and express the distinctions, separations and transitions of thought. Articulateness consists in the proper jointing together of the several thoughts in discourse as co-ordinate or subordinate, and as more or less closely connected and interdependent. Now clearness, or perspicuity, which enables the mind to take in without effort and with pleasure, the whole thought in its unity and all its variety, is the result of the combination of these three qualities. Hence it is evident that it is only another name for a thorough and correct analysis.

3. Analysis is the principal source of copiousness. This property of style is that by which the thoughts in discourse are largely or amply developed and expressed. It makes the impression that the writer or speaker has no lack of ideas; they seem to overflow in his utterances as water from a full reservoir. And this is almost wholly the result of the analytic process. The fact that the ancient rhetoricians occupied themselves so much with invention, or the art of finding out what to say upon any subject, shows how much stress they laid upon analysis. We can hardly read a page of St. Augustin, for example, who was for many years a teacher of rhetoric at Carthage, Milan

and Rome, without perceiving that his immense power was due, in great part, to his copiousness, and this to his complete mastery of the process of analysis. For no one can be at a loss for ideas, as the material of discourse, upon any subject of which he has the requisite knowledge, who is capable of analyzing it with promptness and facility. The bare enumeration of the parts thus obtained, in their co-ordinate, subordinate and interdependent relations, supplies abundance of ideas, so that the greater danger to the speaker or writer arises from the difficulty of limiting himself in the discussion of them. For example, the whole universe, material, immaterial and imaginary, is included in the one word, thing, which properly signifies whatever can be thought of. But it would take an indefinite number of volumes simply to enumerate, without discussion, the particular things the names of which would be obtained by analyzing this word. The manner in which this process becomes the source of copiousness is exemplified on almost every page of any well-written book, as in the following passage in which St. Paul exhibits the truth, that love is the fulfilling of the whole law, by analyzing this synthetic proposition, and unfolding it copiously in the particulars which it includes: "He that loveth another hath fulfilled the law. For this, 'Thou shalt not commit adultery; Thou shalt not steal; Thou shalt not covet;' and if there be any other commandment, is simply comprehended in this saying, namely, 'Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself.'"

XIX. Synthesis is the reverse of analysis; it composes wholes of thought.

Synthesis, it is believed, has never before, at least in modern times, been treated separately as a process of discourse. A number of reasons may be suggested to account for this. In the first place, this process is in every respect the reverse counterpart and correlative of analysis. For whilst in analysis the themes are individuals and classes, and the parts are the result of the process, in synthesis we begin with the elements of thought, and form them into classes or individuals. Thus we compose disconnected and scattered thoughts, as they occur to the mind, whether from original perception and consciousness, or chance association, or otherwise, into composite and complex wholes of thought. Now it may have been supposed that the nature and uses of this process would be sufficiently understood

from the discussion, in some books on rhetoric, of its correlative, analysis. In the second place, because such wholes of thought are immediately presented to us in language, ready formed to our hands [III. 1.] it may have seemed that for rhetorical purposes it was unnecessary to exhibit the manner or laws of their formation. In the third place, under the conception of rhetoric which has so generally prevailed, as characterized by the word, invention, there was no place for synthesis, as a distinct process, because it had no bearing upon the discovery or supply of thoughts for the material of discourse. And, in fine, the work of discourse is characteristically a synthetic process. This is implied in such expressions as writing a *composition*, *composing* a book, a treatise, a speech. For it is in the exercise of its synthetical function that the faculty of discourse works over the disjointed and fragmentary materials of discourse, shapes and fits them to each other, and builds them up, as it were, into a house, or palace, or temple, in which the unity, interdependence and uses of all the parts are apparent. Now rhetoric, being thus synthetic in its general character, does not seem to require the treatment of synthesis as a distinct process. We shall find, however, under our conception of this art, as teaching not how to find out what to say, but how to communicate our thoughts to other minds, abundant reasons for treating synthesis by itself, although it will not be necessary in the discussion of it to reverse all the minute processes of analysis.

XX. Classes, both of lower and higher orders, are composed by grouping similar things together upon the principle of their common attributes.

The Synthetic process by which classes are formed is called in logic generalization. It consists in grouping together things which resemble each other. All things, moreover, may be thus generalized, or classified. For whenever several things occur to the mind, resemblances between them, more or less striking, can always be perceived. Thus day and night, though in some respects the opposites of each other, are yet alike in this, that they are both portions of time, and we may analyze time into these two parts :

1. The principle of classification is that of common attributes. The resemblances which constitute the ultimate basis of classi-

fication are simply the qualities, traits, attributes, or properties, which are the same in all the things which are classed together. Upon consideration of any one or more of such common attributes, things which may be as different as possible in other respects are included in one and the same class. For example, seeing, hearing, feeling, tasting and smelling, have this attribute in common, that they are all modes of sensation; therefore, upon this principle, they are all classed together under the common name of sense, or the senses. In like manner, red, orange, yellow, green, blue, indigo and violet, have the common attribute that they are all colors, and because they were regarded by Sir Isaac Newton as incapable of being resolved into each other they were classified by him, upon this principle, as the seven primary colors. The principle of classification, and the method of procedure, in all spiritual objects, are precisely the same. Thus, there are sensibilities, volitions and intellections, having this attribute in common, that they are all acts or affections of the mind, upon which, therefore, taken as the principle, they are classed together as the mental states: and there are truths of history, science, morals and religion, having this common character that they are all truths, and hence, upon this principle, they are all comprehended in one class under the common name of truth.

2. Lower and higher classes are composed by grouping together things which have more, and things which have less resemblance to each other.

The lowest classes which can be formed are composed of individuals, which thus become varieties of their class. The members of such classes have the greatest number of common attributes, or points of resemblance, and the classes so formed include the fewest members or varieties. The reason of this is, that the things which have great resemblance to each other are less numerous than the things which have little. Consequently higher classes are formed of things which have less resemblance to each other, and include a greater number of things under them. They are, in fact, classes of classes, the lower being classified in the higher, precisely as individuals in the lowest of all. In logic, the word extension is used to designate the comprehensiveness of a class, or the number of things included under it, and intension, to express the number of common at-

tributes, or points of resemblance, in its members. Consequently the higher the class, the greater is its extension, and the less its intension; the lower the class, the less is its extension, and the greater its intension; the one increases as the other diminishes. Hence we have the logical formula, extension and intension are in inverse ratio to each other.

In exemplification of all this, the word *mastiff* represents a lowest class, composed of individuals having a great many points of resemblance, such as size, strength, courage and fidelity. The same is true of the co-ordinate classes, greyhound, setter, pointer, terrier, spaniel, poodle, and the like. If now we take all these lowest classes, and group them together upon the principle of their common attributes, we form the higher class, dog, in which the points of resemblance are less numerous than in any of the subordinate classes. For one mastiff resembles another more than a greyhound resembles a mastiff. Again, if we take the class, dog, together with its co-ordinates, formed in the same way, such as fox, wolf, jackall, hyena, tiger and lion, we obtain the still higher class of the carnivora, or flesh-eating animals, between the different members of which there is less resemblance than between those of any of the classes of which it is composed. For a tiger resembles a lion less than one lion does another. In this way are formed the classes of Natural History, rising in order one above another, such as the following, with all their co-ordinates: mastiff, dog, carnivora, mammalia, vertebrate animals. A still higher class than the last of these is that of organized beings; and the highest which it is possible to form is that of being or thing, because this class is co-extensive with the whole field of knowledge, and the members of it have only this one attribute in common, namely, that they exist, or can be the objects of thought. In this way, all things can be, and most things have been, generalized into lower and higher classes.

XXI. Individuals are composed by grouping dissimilar things together as they exist in space, or by other relations between them, under the analogy of space.

The word dissimilar here does not signify things which have no resemblance to each other in any respect, for there are no such things. It is employed in this statement simply to express that it is not similarity but dissimilarity which is recognized and kept in view in this form of synthesis.

1. Concrete individuals are composed with direct reference to the relations of their parts in space. Every space-filling object is composed of parts which bear to each other a multitude of relations, with special reference to any one or more of which these parts may be mentally recomposed in unity, so as to reconstitute their whole. But the relation which presides over all others is that of the parts to each other as the object exists in space; in other words, whatever subordinate relation be immediately regarded, the parts must always be mentally replaced in their spacial relations to each other, as they exist in the object itself. For example, we may synthesize the dissimilar things, roots, trunks, branches and leaves, with immediate reference either to their dependence one upon another, or to the order in which they are developed, but in the mental image which we form of them as a whole they must always stand in their spacial relations to each other, as in the tree itself. Inasmuch, however, as all such objects are immediately presented to our minds already existing we have little to do in the mental re-composition of them, except to recognize distinctly the unity of all their parts, as these constitute, in each case, one individual whole.

2. Individual themes of an abstract or spiritual nature are composed by grouping together dissimilar things according to their special relations, with analogical reference to space. All such objects as a human mind, a duty, a relation, must be conceived of as if they occupied space [VII. 2]. Hence, in recomposing them out of their constituent elements, whatever subordinate relation be immediately regarded, there must always be a reference to this manner in which they are conceived. This is indispensable in order that the several parts, being synthesized and represented in language, may picture, in each case, the abstract or spiritual whole to the imagination. For example, in the synthesis of intellect, sensibility and will, in order to constitute a human mind, or of wisdom, power and fidelity, in forming the conception of trustworthiness, the special relation upon which these several things are thus grouped together may be either that of their vital interdependence, or the diverse modes in which they mutually affect each other, but they must always be composed and symbolized in unity as if they occupied some portion of space, in order that they should present a

distinct and congruous image to the imagination. In each of these cases a sort of triangular conception is formed. If there were four parts, instead of three, the analogical reference might be to an oblong or a square. In this way Christian society is conceived of by St. Paul under the image of the human organism, and all its parts as members or organs of the body. Society at large is represented by Hobbes as a great "Leviathan;" and science, by Mr. Henry Carey, as a tree.

The special relations with reference to which dissimilar things, both abstract and concrete, are thus synthesized, are many and various and more or less close, according to the nature of the whole which they form. In the synthesis of the diverse parts of an organism their organic relations to each other will commonly be regarded. In the parts of a house we naturally regard some or other of their mechanical relations. In synthesizing the parts of a sentence, or speech, or discourse of any kind, the grammatical, logical and rhetorical relations must be kept in view. But if all things that exist be grouped together in one whole, the sole relation which can be regarded is that of a common existence.

XXII. Sythesis corrects the errors of analysis, and is the principal source of condensation in style.

The grand utility of the synthetic process is evident from the preceding discussion. For, as has been said, co-ordinately with analysis it underlies and pervades all the processes of thought and expression. Even in analysis itself the orderly enumeration of the parts is strictly a synthetic process. All single words, sentences, paragraphs, divisions, speeches, treatises, books, are thus composed. Synthesis enters fundamentally into the rhetorical processes of narration, description, exemplification, comparison, induction and deduction. Discourse itself is entirely made up of higher and lower, more or less extensive and intensive wholes of thought, which have been synthetically composed and expressed. It is necessary, however, to exhibit here one or two of the more special uses of this process as examples of the rest.

1. Synthesis corrects the errors of analysis. For by analysis, as we have seen, [XVIII. 1] we obtain the heads, or divisions, captions and topics of discourse, which, even when they do not require to be formally expressed, should always be carried in

mind. But after a theme has been carefully analyzed, not unfrequently it will be found that the heads or captions thus obtained are not the most convenient for the treatment of the subject, or for the attainment of the object in view. When we have noted down the particular thoughts which we wish to discuss under them, we often find that these thoughts can be better arranged. Also in the heat and rapidity of original composition, thoughts which have not before occurred, and often our best thoughts, which ought to stand as the very heart of the passage or discourse, will present themselves and be put down not in their true logical and rhetorical relations. Hence the necessity, in all elaborate discourse, of a careful review of our first efforts, which have been made under the guidance of analysis, in order to secure that the caption of every division and pharagraph shall really contain or cover all that is said under it, and that no thought shall be expressed out of its true place. After such scrutiny of our first efforts, by application of the synthetic process we gather up into strict unity whatever has been hastily expressed under each head. In doing this we often have to modify the original caption, so that it shall fairly include all that comes under it, and still more frequently we have to transfer thoughts which occur out of place, sometimes to another head, and always to the connection in which they properly belong. The mental habit of thus gathering up into the strictest unity, that is to say, the habit of forming individual and class wholes out of the thoughts which are generated and thrown off in the fervor of original composition, is indispensable to a vigorous and luminous style.

2. Synthesis is the principal source of condensation in style. Ascopiousness depends upon analysis, so condensation, or brevity, depends upon synthesis. For when, instead of mentioning the vast number of elements of which almost any single thing is composed, we simply speak of it by its name, we employ a comprehensive synthesis, by which the many expressions which otherwise must be employed are condensed into one. For example, instead of going over the names of all the human beings that have ever lived in the world, and saying of each one separately that he or she died, or must die, we say that man is mortal, the immense number of thoughts included in this proposition are powerfully condensed. Again, in the words, "Fear

God, and keep His commandments, for this is the whole duty of man," are condensed all the moral duties of all human beings, in all the circumstances of their individual lives, from their cradles to their graves. It would require volumes upon volumes of analytic processes to spread out before the mind all the thoughts which are contained in this synthetic statement. Such condensation or brevity in style increases with the extension, or comprehensiveness of the wholes which make up the discourse; and it reaches its utmost limits in such words as the creation, universe, being, and thing for the reason that these are all-comprehensive expressions.

XXIII. The mind of God analyzes and synthesizes in his revelations of himself to man.

A revelation of God in human language, without the employment of these two processes, is inconceivable. Consequently we find them on every page of the Scriptures, from which frequent examples have been adduced in the preceding discussion. But the most perfect and beautiful example which is to be found perhaps in all literature we have in the first chapter of the Bible. It commences with the synthetic statement, "In the beginning God created the heaven and the earth," that is the universe. This immense generalization is then analyzed upon the principle of time into six parts, which constitute the days, or periods, or stages of the creation. Each of these is again analyzed into several parts upon the principle of what was created in it. Thus all the works of creation are unfolded stage by stage, and spread out before the mind. At the conclusion they are all synthesized, or gathered up in unity again, in the words, "Thus the heavens and the earth were finished, and all the host of them." The result is a panorama of infinite variety and perfect unity, of unparalleled sublimity and beauty.