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I.

THE FATHERHOOD OF GOD VIEWED IN THE LIGHT OF CHRIST'S PERSONAL TEACH- INGS ON THE SUBJECT.

IT is unnecessary to say that the Fatherhood of God, as everywhere taught and in so many ways emphasized by Christ, is a truth of the first moment—Fatherhood, that is, not so much in relation to Himself as the Son, though this also, as in relation to those who in and through Him are likewise sons. This so significant aspect of the divine character was not unknown in Old Testament times (Isa. lxiii. 16, lxiv. 8), but it stands out with a clearness and receives a prominence on Christ's lips formerly unknown. It is set by Him in such new and definite relations to men, to their needs and sorrows, as almost to amount to a new revelation, if indeed His words, "No man knoweth the Father but the Son and he to whom the Son willeth to reveal him" (R. V.), do not assert this claim for it. So far as the term may be regarded as charged with ethical import, its general significance, as applied by Christ to God, seems obvious enough. It presents Him to us, as not remote and inaccessible, no distant and cold divinity, but as at once near and gracious. In the father-heart, love is in the ascendant. The name thus gives a like ascendancy to love in that aspect of the divine character which faces those, whether few, or many, or all, who are sons. It carries with it the assurance that notwithstanding the oft stern and remorseless aspects of physical nature, notwithstanding the prevalence in the world of suffering and of wrong, it is, so far at least as the sphere of sonship extends, love which is on the throne.

VIII.

REVIEWS OF RECENT THEOLOGICAL LITERATURE.

I.—THEOLOGICAL ENCYCLOPÆDIA.

ENCYCLOPÆDIA OF SACRED THEOLOGY: ITS PRINCIPLES. By ABRAHAM KUYPER, D.D., Free University, Amsterdam. Translated from the Dutch by Rev. J. Hendrik de Vries, M.A. With an Introduction by Prof. Benjamin B. Warfield, D.D., LL.D., of Princeton Theological Seminary. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1898. 8vo, pp. xxv, 683.

This full volume comes to the English reader as only a torso of the original work. We are told that in the Dutch there are three volumes as large as this. Except the first fifty-five pages of this translation, in which is presented a general introduction to Theological Encyclopædia taken from the first of the three volumes, we have here only the second. From what we have we are quite ready to believe it when we are told that the original is the *magnum opus* of its illustrious author.

Concerning the great versatility and distinguished career of the author himself, the readers of this REVIEW are not ignorant.* His recent visit in this country, during which he gave the Stone lectures at Princeton, was a notable event in Presbyterian circles. This volume is, however, in no sense a popular work. It presupposes a disciplined mind, theological interest and evangelical sympathy. Although the author's style is exceptionally unstilted and clear, with a singular felicity in elucidating abstract truth by the use of familiar and even homely illustrations, yet the profound themes discussed, the necessity for insisting upon distinctions of the finest sort, and the traditional vocabulary of technical terms which designate the various views and aspects of the subject—all this, together with the evident audacity of thought and keenness of insight which are characteristic of this, one of the foremost of contemporary Dutch theologians, gives the volume a weight and tone equally attractive to the trained student of theology and repulsive to the yawning nibbler of dainties, or the idle gleaner of the gossip columns of the latest newspaper.

It was a remark of M. Renan that a man who would write the history of a religion must have believed it once, but must believe it no longer. It is a favorite notion with some that doubt, and not faith, is indispensable to the competent mind or the judicial frame. However this may, it is interesting to know that Dr. Kuyper has tried both. His stalwart faith is not

* See Vol. ix, No. 36, October, 1893, pp. 561-609.

held except after a bitter struggle. Early trained "in a conservative-supernaturalistic spirit," he broke with faith when a student at Leyden and by and by found himself on the platform of bare radicalism. Shivering in this chilling atmosphere, like the late Prof. Romanes in England he turned, as he tells us, first to bald Determinism and then to the mediating school of thought—the Vermittelungs-theologie—but still he found no rest. Then it was that he came in touch with the loyal descendants of the ancient Calvinists of the Netherlands and here he found that stability of thought and that rational world-and-life view which commanded his cordial and unwavering assent. It adds greatly to the meaning and value of this book to know that it gives us the mature conviction of a doubt-driven but masterful mind; indeed, we may say that, not less than the famous letters of Coleridge, whose views differ so widely from the views here given, this book is also the "Confessions of an Inquiring Spirit."

It is to be feared that the name of the entire book in the original is misleading to some when applied to only the part here presented. It is somewhat suggestive of a dictionary, or of cold alphabetic lists. This is a mistake. In tracing the idea of Encyclopædia, the author finds only the germ among the Greeks who did not coin the word, but left the two words side by side, *Ἐγκύκλιος παιδεία*. Among the Latins, Quintilian caught the essential idea of unity when he wrote of the *orbis doctrinæ*. In Reformation times, the word passed from the "world of science" to the book in which it was contained. Then it came to mean an alphabetic agglomeration of the elements of any science, or of all science. This, however, Dr. Kuyper would call "Lexicon." He would reserve "Encyclopædia" as the name of that science which has science itself as the object of its study. It is neither "Methodology," which gives a rational account of the mode of procedure, nor "Hodegetics," which, presupposing the mode, points it out. Encyclopædia, then, as we gather from Dr. Kuyper, stands for the self-consciousness of scientific thought. He credits Dr. J. G. Fichte with originating the modern idea. His "Das Wissen vom Wissen" is its germinating root.¶ However, it has developed very greatly since Fichte. In short, it is the result of the logical necessity which rules our thinking. As an independent science, it is purely formal and is not a part of the science which it studies; accordingly, he makes it a part of philosophy. It is based upon the *organism* of science. In science, there is nothing arbitrary or hap-hazard. "In its absolute sense, it is the pure and complete reflection of the cosmos in the human consciousness" (p. 39). We soon find that the treasures of our science did not originate with our thinking and, moreover, that they must arrange themselves in an order corresponding to an order in the world of phenomena wholly independent of us.

These early pages are very rich in treating of the organic character of true science. But two objections are anticipated, if we carry this conception over into the field of theology. First, theology is not a science; and, second, even if it were, what is it? The answer to the first requires a careful definition of the two terms "science" and "theology;" and this is the chief task essayed in the body of the book. In answering the second, the author boldly announces his own position. He abhors eclecticism; as for compromises, he will none of them. "The theological Encyclopædist cannot possibly furnish anything but an Encyclopædia of *his* * theology" (p. 49). Though this may be denied in terms, it is necessarily true that any writer claims *universal* validity for *his* theology. Waiving the affectation of neutrality as always dishonest at heart, the author tells us that the Reformed Theology will be presented on every page "as *the* theology, in its very

* In this notice all italics in quotations from the text are Dr. Kuyper's.

purest form." By this he means no disrespect or disparagement toward the Latin or the Lutheran, or any other theology. Neither does he admit that this gives a confessional stamp to his Encyclopædia. Theology used to be linked to the Churches, that is to say, it was ecclesiastical; now it is moulded by systems of philosophy, that is to say, it is philosophical. The present tendency is to rank theology under philosophy or under ethnology or under something else, and so to destroy it as an independent science. This is wrong. It is far better to seek its object "in its native soil."—in the history of the church. Accordingly, theology must claim an integral place in the vast organism of science; and this is but the expression of the Encyclopædic impulse.

So much by way of general introduction; and now falls to be considered, in Division ii, what science is, while, in Division iii, the remaining part of the volume, we have the discussion of the Idea of Theology.

Science is "the knowledge of what is, that it is, and how it is." The subject of it lies in the consciousness not of the individual, but of humanity; the object of it is "*all existing things*," including not only what lies outside of the thinking subject, but also both the subject itself and the consciousness of this subject. Hence there is an organic relation between the subject and object. Before we become cognizant of relations outside of us, "the setting for them" is in our consciousness. The completed organism of human thought would correlate precisely with the completed organism of cognizable relations. Indeed, some dialectic philosophers have erringly staked everything upon this, trusting to a bare subjectivism. The cosmos can be known by us only because it is the product of a knower; that is to say, science is possible because the human mind has an affinity to its object. But if all this is true, why is the ideal correspondence between thought and reality so often absent? Why is not the cosmos before us as an unsealed book, reflecting our own thought? The disturbance is due to *sin*. To be sure the disturbance is most violent in those sciences in which the subjective element is most largely enlisted. In the "sciences exactes," with their objective standards of counting and measuring and weighing, the ideal correlation is best maintained; though, strictly speaking, there is no science so purely objective as to be wholly untouched by the disturbing influence. In the psychological sciences, no exactitude is possible, though there is a great tendency to study objectified historical and social data with the delusion that it is the soul itself which is being studied.

Science then is largely vitiated by the presence of sin in the world. The influence of sin is intellective as well as thelematic. The search for truth is a result of the fact of sin, though unfallen man would not have been omniscient. Neither truth nor wisdom, *Sapientia*, is science, *Scientia*. Faith has its function in science. Faith is not antithetical to knowledge; it is involved in knowledge. Faith "is an immediate act of consciousness." It is the only passport from the ego to the non-ego. Only by faith can any universal law be postulated, for it is a primordial principle of logic: *A particulari ad generale non valet conclusio*. But science is not less sure of itself on account of this pistic element in its work. The harmony between subject and object being broken, the certainty of science is impaired.

But there is a regeneration, *παλιγγενεσία*, going on, which affects both the subject and the object of science, and more and more restores the lost harmony between the two. Some have come under this regenerating force and some have not. Hence there are two kinds of people in the world and two kinds of science. These have entirely different points of view, *πρό σπῶ*. To be sure, there is much common to both, especially where the subjective is very low as in the exact sciences. The formal elements also are little

affected, if indeed at all. "There is but one logic and not two." But there is a deep line of separation between them after all. Children of the palingenesis can appreciate the findings of natural science, but the converse is not true. Theology finds no place in the science of the aliens to the palingenesis. Naturalistic science cancels theology. It studies religion, not God; but that is ethnology, not theology. Men know God not directly, but through a *tertium comparationis*; they make a science of the tertium only. We confess that we are not quite sure of Dr. Kuyper's epistemology here. Sometimes his language suggests Hamilton's theory of "regulative knowledge," and sometimes it points to agnosticism as the inevitable fate of unregenerate intellect.

However, a new sphere of science is found within the palingenesis. Notably, these four phenomena must be studied, namely, (1) Inspiration, as introductory to the psychical palingenesis; (2) the psychical palingenesis itself; (3) miracles, as introductory to the cosmical or somatic palingenesis, and (4) the cosmical palingenesis itself.

In passing on to Division iii, we are prepared to find our author insisting with great emphasis that the Idea of Theology, strictly speaking, is none other than the *knowledge of God*. The Divine Existence is presupposed, and hence, with Kant, the futility of theistic "proofs." Our knowing God at all is dependent upon His voluntarily revealing Himself to us; this is revelation, in its broadest sense. Our knowledge of God is ectypal, while His self-knowledge is archetypal. Here again, we have some question about Dr. Kuyper's doctrine of knowledge. He certainly cannot mean that we shall regard our knowledge of God as a *tertium quid* between God and us. And yet he says, "It is not God Himself, but the *knowledge* He has revealed to us concerning Himself which constitutes the material for theological investigation. Hence *ectypal* Theology" (p. 252). He argues (p. 268) that we may *know* God and yet have no knowledge of God. This last, he conceives, is necessary in order to a Theology.

God reveals Himself for His own sake only; hence it is a mistake to regard the point of departure in all revelation as sin. Revelation is primarily theological, not soteriological. Saving faith is not a new spiritual sense imparted for the first time, for regeneration does not impart anything which does not belong essentially to human nature. Even in special revelation, the standard is theological, and the aim, though secondarily soteriological, is primarily *theodicy*. The subject of this special revelation is the real stem of humanity; the organic whole is saved. "God does not love individual persons but the world" (p. 297). We should amend that statement so as to read thus: "God loves not only individual persons, but the *world* also, and He loves those individual persons *as organic parts of the world*." The race is redeemed. Christ is the second Adam. "There is no organism in hell, but an aggregate." This prepares us for the conception of theology—"The science of Theology is that logical action of the general subject of regenerated humanity by which, in the light of the Holy Spirit, it takes up the revealed knowledge of God into its consciousness and from thence reflects it. If, on the other hand, the science of Theology is not taken in its active sense, but as a product, then Theology is the scientific insight of the regenerated human consciousness into the revealed knowledge of God" (p. 299). Dr. Kuyper is suspicious of the tendency to drop the adjective "sacred" as applied to Theology because it augurs the secularization of that discipline. He urges three reasons for retaining it: its object is the knowledge of the Holy God, its subject is the Spirit-enlightened mind, and its progress is wholly dependent upon the Holy Ghost.

The most important discussion in the book is that of the *Principium*

Theologiæ. By principium is meant, materially, the self-revelation of God to the sinner. "This self-revelation lies at our disposal in Holy Scripture." Protestants find the principium of special revelation in Scripture only. Roman Catholics, here and elsewhere. Mystics, in individual inspiration. Others, in nature or history or reason. We are all mystics if the mystic only believes that God *can* communicate immediately with men. The genuine mystic believes that God *does* do this, individualistically; Christians believe He does it organically. Protestants believe that this process is completed; Roman Catholics, that it is still going on.

The natural principium would have been adequate, except for sin, breaking harmonies and impairing faculties; and so God effects an auxiliary principium with a special revelation suited to men *as sinners*. There is no contradiction between the two principia; they are from the same source. The dispensation of grace is as a "bandage" applied to an injured part of the body; it is in a sense abnormal because the necessity for it is an abnormality. The Bible is not this special principium; it "is nothing but a carrier and vehicle," though elsewhere, in presenting another aspect of the subject, the author contends, with great vigor and firmness, for the identity of the Scripture with this special revelation. It is a strong generalization which declares that the one Logos is in the Christ by incarnation and in the Bible by inscripturation. This special revelation, being for a special purpose, is temporary and will finally merge into the primitive, grand, theological principium of divine self-revelation to the rational and moral creation of God.

Dr. Kuyper, throughout his whole argument, makes much of the organic unity of the race and, accordingly, of the organic unity of Revelation; particularly, of this special Revelation. This auxiliary principium is given to humanity ($\tau\tilde{\omega}$ κόσμῳ), not to individuals only. But if it is for the *homo*, then it must take some form suitable for preservation beyond the limits of the life-time of the *vir*. Conceivably, it might be in some other form, but really no other is so good as that it should be committed to writing. *Littera scripta manet*. We regard that nothing in this division of the book, which is indeed a thesaurus of suggestiveness, is more helpful than the argument that, in this organic process of special revelation, the *onus probandi*, which confessedly lies against the atomistic or isolated miraculous phenomenon, is shifted to the other side, and that, with the postulates and progress of such a world-embracing palingenesis, the harmony-restoring touch is precisely what we should expect. "Every interpretation of the miracle as a magical incident without connection with the palingenesis of the whole cosmos, which Jesus refers to in Matt. xix. 28, and therefore without relation to the entire metamorphosis which awaits the cosmos after the last judgment, does not enhance the glory of God, but debases the Recreator of heaven and earth to a juggler ($\gamma\acute{o}\gamma\eta\varsigma$)" (p. 414).

In discussing the relation of the living Word to the written Word, we are told that the self-consciousness of Scripture expressed itself completely in Christ. His testimony concerning the Scripture is absolute and final. Whoever worships Him as his Lord and his God will confess that he *can* not err. To question His testimony concerning Scripture is "not to attack the Scripture, but the Deity of Jesus and even His moral character" (p. 431). He not only did not oppose the ideas concerning inspiration which existed in His time, He taught them Himself; witness Matt. xvi. 17 and Luke xii. 12. Apostolic testimony is also presented and enforced. Our author finds no difficulty in the somewhat free-handed manner in which the Old Testament is used in the hands of the writers of the New. Their franchise lay in the fact that they were conscious of being under the guiding influence of the

same Spirit that inspired the original writers. In an editorial note of the *Expository Times* (March, 1899), attention is called to Dr. Kuyper's discussion of Heb. x. 5. as a quotation from Ps. xl. 6. Whatever embarrassment is found here arises from the fact that it is admittedly a quotation and yet it is an inaccurate one. It is borrowed from the LXX., but the Septuagint is itself faulty. The Hebrew text reads, לִבִּי קָרַן לְךָ, "Mine ears hast thou opened." The LXX. reads, σῶμα δὲ καταρτίσω μοι, "A body thou hast prepared me." Dr. Kuyper believes that the σῶμα of the LXX. is a corruption for ὤτα, and his view is that the inspired writer of the Epistle to the Hebrews saw that the faulty reading "lent itself easily to express, nevertheless, the original meaning of the first author in Ps. xl. 6;" and hence no change was needed. Though this would have been improper for any other writer, it offers not the least difficulty, since the *auctor primarius* of Ps. xl and Heb. x is *one and the same* (p. 452). The author makes a clear statement of the argument for the inspiration of the New Testament writings—a point, by the bye, upon which it is very easy and perhaps too common to think vaguely and to argue loosely. Dr. Kuyper urges the idea of the physiological unity of Scripture to a point where he finds it legitimate to apply 2 Tim. iii. 16 to Scripture yet unwritten.

Having defended the unity of Scripture, the author proceeds to what he calls the multiplicity of Scripture, and it cannot be denied that he allows free and full range to the individuality of the human writers. He has no mechanical theory of inspiration to give us. So clear is the divine origin and the unity of Scripture that, in one sense, we may say that it "has been given us from heaven;" but if to emphasize this aspect of Scripture "one closes the eye to the many-sidedness and multiformity of the Scripture, and the organic way in which it gradually came into existence as a sum-total of many factors, then nothing remains but a mechanical lifelessness, which destroys the vital, organic unity." He criticises the older theologians in that "they had established themselves too firmly in the idea of a logical theory of inspiration, to allow the animated organism of the Scripture to fully assert itself" (pp. 480, 481). The discussion of the instruments, the factors and the forms of inspiration is full and fair, showing that as a rule the unrepressed personal idiosyncracies of the inspired person were present and active and that, in the cases which were exceptional, we may regard the phenomena as having, in a large degree, their analogues in the strange psychical experiences of which we have some knowledge in our own sphere of life. Though the operation of the *Spiritus inspirans* was not absolutely conditioned by the "affinities" of the subject, yet many elements of affinity for inspiration, historical, local, personal and ethical, are mentioned which, as a matter of fact, in less or greater degree, characterize the persons inspired. The ethical affinity is neither indispensable nor explanatory; inspiration is possible because man is a pneumatic being, not because the individual has certain ethical qualities. It was the ironical Socrates who said to the bombastic Ion, "Was not this the lesson which the God intended to teach when by the mouth of the worst of poets he sang the best of songs?"* No more than Socrates did, does Dr. Kuyper believe in such a strained and anti-psychological theory of inspiration; yet as Socrates believed that every philosopher had his Daimon and every poet his muse, Dr. Kuyper rather believes that the Immanent Spirit of the Living God moved, theopneustically, upon the minds of those whom He would.

Much is made of the conception of graphical inspiration as concerning the production of the canonical Scriptures; it is this which is referred to in 2 Tim. iii. 16. There are degrees of inspiration. In lyric inspiration there is a large natural element; Von Hartmann is quoted with approval as saying

* See Jowett's *Plato*, Vol. i, p. 503, third ed.

that there "is a mode of feeling which transcends the purely anthropological," but if the lyric poet stands outside of the palingenesis, he can only do as Von Hartmann did, "who being depressed by sorrow, through the world-sorrow, reached the supposed God-sorrow and thus falsified the entire world of the emotions" (p. 523). Chokmatic inspiration is not in the feeling, but is wholly in the sphere of the consciousness; while in prophetic inspiration the dualism of consciousness is most clearly marked. The treatment of the psychology of inspiration is very interesting and informing. In Stead's system of telepathy, it is declared that at a distance of twenty miles, without any means of direct communication, one man writes down another man's thought. The essence of inspiration is in the impact of the Divine Spirit upon the human; why is not this just as possible as the social commerce of human spirits with each other? And why may not some of the strange feats of hypnotism, mesmerism and telepathy throw light upon these exceptional phenomena incidental to theopneustic inspiration? All this is crowned and confirmed by the *testimonium Spiritus Sancti* which, as the Reformed Theology has ever held, is indispensable and ultimate; for it is of the very nature of a principium that it is undemonstrable. "Assurance of faith and demonstration are two entirely heterogeneous things." The closing chapters are on the Method, the Organism and the History of Theology; but these, rich as they are, follow as corollaries from the principles already established. The climax of interest is in the treatment of the Special Principium.

The timeliness of this really great book is obvious. It explores a field which is all the more important because it has been so much neglected. Most of the theological activity of the last quarter-century has been expended upon the tasks of Biblical criticism. But there are certain determinative principles that must be sought further back. Of course, given the Bible, what does it say? Was it not President Patton who said that the question is no longer what the Bible says, but whether or not there is a Bible? Even further back, the question has been raised whether there *can* be a Bible. The critics might come to the negative conclusion in their work, but there is a shorter and, many will say, easier route to the same position. Back of all the historical and literary critics of Sacred Scripture, we find the Coleridges and Martineaus, even professing cordial faith in the rational elements of Christianity and yet refusing assent to the evangelical Scriptures as inspired. Their dissent is philosophical, not empirical. They do not believe in our Bible for the reason that they do not believe in inspiration, in special revelation. All the hostile critics in Christendom might be crushed, but this position is still unassailed. Accordingly, an empirical theology, no less than a merely speculative one, as Dr. Kuyper reminds us, is a delusion. Mr. Lindsay has said in substance that to repudiate metaphysics is to renounce Deity; and it is true that from the standpoint of thorough-going thought, the Scripture as the Word of God cannot be retained upon merely empirical grounds; it must be based upon certain deep and assured postulates that root themselves in the nature of man and in the nature of things. It is just here that Dr. Kuyper's book has its place. The whole idea of Inspiration must be enucleated, and if it be unsound, impossible, irrational, then the fierce battle of the critics, whichever way it may go, is a contest for naught; it is a fool's prize when won. We are convinced that to this we are bound to come. Is Revelation possible? Can God make a special revelation to men? How? Must it be atomistic? Or may it be organic, racial? Then how? This may be an appeal from the critic to the despised metaphysician, if you please; it is from the fact to the possibility. If it be possible then we may inquire diligently for

the fact—still an open question; but if it be impossible, then the case is closed and mankind is forever in the dark.

How well Dr. Kuyper has performed this difficult work, it is for the reader to say. It would be wonderful if any man, of such stalwart and pronounced conviction, speaking upon a subject of such vast many-sidedness, concerning which the variable subjective element in the reader is bound to be so influential, should write so large a book and yet write nothing from which the reader, who strongly sympathizes with his thought in the main, should be disposed to withhold his unhesitating assent. We mistake the style of the book if it be not that of a giant-champion whose greatest danger of being unnerved would be in the consciousness that there were none to challenge and oppose him; if this be so, then he need not be apprehensive of a speedy unnerving.

We regard the book as an exceedingly valuable contribution in this, that it reaffirms the truth that if inspiration is to be believed in at all, it must be because it is an integral part, a vital factor, in supernatural religion. It is not a superadditum to evangelical Christianity; it is a part of it. It is not a picket line of the truth; it is of the truth itself. Mr. Coleridge entirely misapprehended this, or at least he entirely misrepresented it. There have been many to follow his lead. But Christianity minus theopneusty is not Christianity. It is an error to regard inspiration as only an extraneous safeguard of the truthfulness of the Christian system, an arbitrary or optional feature of the Christian faith. It is the psychical side, as cosmical miracles are the somatic side, of the one great, organic, historical process of palingenesis which the Christian understands to be the progressive Redemption of the World. It has its reason to be, in the necessity that men should have more light if they are to cope successfully with the pressing, vital problems of their existence. It is God's way of communicating that truth; indeed, we may say it is the only way of communication possible. Principal Fairbairn well says, "The belief in revelation is not a peculiar creation either of Judaism or of Christianity; it is a necessity common to all religions. And the higher the idea of God they embody, the more necessary does the belief become. And a spoken is sure to become a written word, with an authority high in the very degree that it is believed to be really God's. And to believe in a written is as rational as to believe in a spoken revelation."^{*}

Both Inspiration and Revelation have broad and narrow connotations. Dr. Martineau believes in the broad only, but he fails to show why the narrow may not enter in at the door which he thus leaves open. Deism, *pro tempore* atheism, rejects all inspiration. At the other extreme, Mysticism makes every man inspired. Dr. Kuyper's argument is that it is far more philosophical, more psychological, more in accordance with the observed laws of thought and life, to believe in a unity of inspiration, with the race as a unit, conveying impulses, conceptions, knowledge, truth, as the common possession of mankind.

We mention only one more striking thought in the book. It is that of two kinds of people and two kinds of science in the world. The forces of the palingenesis, like a mighty plowshare, divide the minds as well as the hearts of men into two great classes. We have never seen this thought so strongly pressed elsewhere. But is it anything more or less than the second chapter of 1 Corinthians applied in the sphere of scientific thought? We have ventured mildly to demur to some of the incidental phases of the author's theory of knowledge, but whoever quarrels with this great principle must settle with the apostle Paul. Dr. Kuyper, leader of men as well as of

^{*} *The Place of Christ in Modern Theology*, p. 494. We must regard Dr. Fairbairn's conception of the relation between Inspiration and Revelation, however, as altogether confusing. Cf. p. 496.

thought, sees here the key to many tendencies in contemporary educational circles. He perceives its influence in continental universities and, if he had extended his travels in America westward, he would have found not a little of the same sort in this country. A well-known university-president, equally distinguished as a man of science, said in print not long ago, "Theology is a figure of speech." His avowed standpoint is Empiricism—either the bashfulness or the hypocrisy of Agnosticism. But could there be a more striking illustration and confirmation of the bold position taken in this book? The university is ready to endow professorships of ethics or ethnology or even of religion; all well and good, only it thinks thus to pay tribute to the religious needs of men. "The world by wisdom knows not God." *Sapientia* is more than *scientia*; so much the more is it true that the world by science knows not God. The children of the palingenesis can see on both sides of the line, but when they testify of that knowledge which comes in the special principium of Revelation the aliens brand it "foolishness;" neither are the great among them wholly dishonest or insincere when they dismiss the science of the knowledge of God as "a figure of speech."

San Francisco.

HENRY COLLIN MINTON.

II.—EXEGETICAL THEOLOGY.

HANDKOMMENTAR ZUM ALTEN TESTAMENT. In Verbindung mit anderen Fachgelehrten herausgegeben von D. W. NOWACK, o. Prof. d. Theol. in Strassburg in Els. I. Abtheilung, 3. Band: DEUTERON.-JOSUA, von Dr. C. STEUERNAGEL. II. Abth., 3. Band: SPRÜCHE, von LIC. W. FRANKENBERG; PREDIGER UND HOHESLIED, von Dr. C. SIEGFRIED. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1898. 8vo.

This series of commentaries has been noticed before in these pages, and has already won its place in the scholarly world. The writers have all been given and have taken the utmost liberty in the treatment of the various books assigned them, and some have gone to the furthest of radical limits. The first of the two volumes now under review bears the subordinate title of *Das Deuteronomium übersetzt und erklärt von Lic. Dr. Carl Steuernagel*. Whatever may be our estimate of Dr. Steuernagel's results, he has given us an exceedingly able commentary in the departments of both introduction and exegesis. Deuteronomy seems to be a favorite theme with him; he has treated it twice before in works to which he frequently refers. His book has the freshness of novelty; for he departs far from the beaten tracks of criticism and gives us a new theory on nearly every page.

In the first place he discards old schemes of division and attempts to show that the lines of cleavage may be discovered in that peculiar and alternating use of the second person singular and second person plural that is so characteristic of the book. The two documents which he has discovered, he designates by the symbols Sg and Pl respectively. These accordingly must now be added to the list of Hexateuchal *dramatis personæ*, in which P, J and E have hitherto been the chief figures.

Sg and Pl are responsible for the paranetic framework of the laws which they severally introduced to the Hebrew public, but the *corpus juris* in each case is derived from more or less easily distinguishable earlier collections. Like some other writers, Steuernagel finds a double heading in Deut. iv. 44, 45, but the point of view in one is widely different from the other. One addresses the generation which stood at Horeb, the other the generation which was about to cross the Jordan. Pl's law book seems to be a composite