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No. I.

ARTICLE I.—*A Familiar Treatise on Christian Baptism.*
Illustrated with Engravings. Designed for Young Christians
and Baptized Children. By JAMES WOOD, D. D. New
Albany: John B. Anderson.

Plain Words to a Young Communicant. By JAMES W. ALEX-
ANDER, D. D. New York: Anson D. F. Randolph. 1855.

THESE excellent little books, by two of our eminent and judicious divines, are among the pleasing proofs that our Church, while, with all true Protestants, it recoils from "condensing the sacraments into idols," also refuses to join the rationalists in evaporating them into airy nothing. That of Dr. Wood is well fitted to fortify our people against the plausible attacks which our principles, as to the mode and subjects of baptism, suffer from the Baptists, while it affords much valuable instruction to Christian parents and their baptized children, as to the significance and importance of infant baptism, and the privileges and duties which result from it. It maintains and develops the doctrine of our standards as to such children being members of the Church, and under its inspection and government.

Dr. Alexander's little manual is a model of its kind. While it does not undertake to supersede such larger works as Mat-

By Symon
Alexander

library at Constantinople. Repeated investigations, or rather steps toward an investigation, have been made since. In the seventeenth century efforts were made upon the representations of an Italian traveller to obtain thence the lost books of Livy. In the beginning of the last century, an Italian ecclesiastic spent a long time in Constantinople with a view to the manuscripts of the Seraglio. He finally, as he states, gained the desired access, and prepared a catalogue of them. This catalogue is preserved as a curiosity in Milan. But according to it there is not a single Greek manuscript among the mass of oriental. The mystery of the secret chest of Greek documents is as dark, therefore, as before. Among various other accounts, some of which venture even to give the number of certain classes of these manuscripts, such as the Biblical, is that of a French abbé who was sent to the East by his government on a literary expedition about the year 1728, and who affirmed that the manuscripts of the Seraglio had all been burned under Amurat III. Not long since a German artist, who was in favour with the Sultan, expressed a wish to him in relation to the supposed literary treasures concealed in the Seraglio. The Sultan is said to have replied that he did not believe there were any, but he would see. There the matter ended.

ART. III.—*History of Greece*. By GEORGE GROTE, Esq.
Vol. XII.

IT is no unimportant entry in the records of the receding year, that another great history has been added to the treasures of our language. Such an event constitutes an era, from its rarity. Great histories are almost as few as great epics. Considering the number of historical works, in different languages, and the amount of learning and of intellectual force which has been employed in their production, it is remarkable that so few should have attained anything like the perfection of their proper form with completeness of their proper ends. Excepting Rome, which, after all the labour expended upon it,

is, to this day, without a complete history, no subject has presented greater attractions than Greece, and yet it is only within the last few years that the world has seen any treatment of it at all commensurate with its importance. None but writers who use the English tongue have occupied a political position from which they could either justly apprehend, or freely handle such a topic, and they had hitherto lacked the necessary critical discrimination and grasp of thought. Moreover, Mitford and Gillies were both unfavourably prejudiced, the former passionately, and the latter dully; the one yielding so far to the bias of party feelings as to falsify his narrative, and refuse to see anything in the many-sided Greek but what suited the views of an English tory; the other failing to catch warmth from deeds of heroism and genius enough to kindle the enthusiasm of a Quaker. Mitford, however, was the better of the two. For he possessed animation enough to provoke a good scholar into resistance of his manifold misrepresentations. Indeed it is to this very effect that we owe, in some degree, the work, whose concluding volume is now before us.

Greece had no complete history that deserved the honour of her name, until the appearance of that by Bishop Thirlwall, which, had it been published a few years sooner, might have so far satisfied Mr. Grote as to have prevented his entering upon the labour of preparing one himself. Future students of Hellenism have reason to be well pleased therefore, with the lateness of that date. For, upon the whole, a truer idea of the Hellenic people will be obtained from this work, than even from its very excellent predecessor. It is the purpose of Mr. Grote to confine himself to Hellenic times, and aim at scrupulous unity in presenting them. No historian ever before so truly apprehended the distinctive features of their civilization, and no other has presented it so free from all foreign admixture. He refuses to carry his work beyond the time when Hellenic institutions began to be fettered, and compressed by foreign domination. However pleased we should be to see a narrative of the succeeding times by the same hand, we admit the cogent propriety of closing the present work, as he does, with the establishment of Alexander's successors. At the same time, he attaches too little of Hellenic importance to the great Macedo-

nian, when he offers, as he does more than once, a modified sort of apology for following the course of his conquests at all.

In forming our estimate of this matter, we have to keep in view the position occupied by Greece from the sixth century B. C., as well as the state of things which resulted from Macedonian conquest.

The world of civilization had previously been governed by a master. Egyptian, Assyrian, Babylonian, and Persian kings had successively aspired to, and more or less nearly attained, the dominion of all. Even the originally theocratic Israel had rejected her liberty, and thrown herself, like the rest of the world, at the feet of a king. The same type of government was copied in all grades of society. It had the merit of simplicity. The vocation of the monarch was to command, of the people to obey. These fundamental principles were limited only by the disposition of the sovereign, and the bounds of human endurance. Even the nobleman was but the servant of his sovereign; but he was himself a sovereign to his dependents. And so oppression descended through the grades of society, until it fell with accumulated weight upon the lowest, which in all those countries constituted the overwhelming majority of the people. The populace was, consequently, in the most abject state of servitude, the slaves of the underlings of a servile nobility. The source and strength of the system was in the ignorance of the people, who did not know, and could not conceive of anything better. They had been born to unquestioning obedience; so had their fathers. They had never heard of anything else, and did not dream of improvement. A nobleman was such, in their eyes, by divine right, and their monarch a son of God. The idea of resistance was out of the question, except under the leadership of some great noble, who could present his claim to sovereignty as better than that of him upon the throne, and then it was equally without hope of any change in the condition of the people. A numerous semibarbarous populace was made the tool for the execution of the great and frequently beautiful designs of a highly refined nobility. Civilization belonged only to the surface of society. Progress, it is true, had been made in this way, and by the ambition of one dynasty after another, nations formerly barbarous had been added to the

dominion of civilization, and subjected more or less to its influence; but the nations purchased any benefit thus secured, at the expense of their former wild liberty. The whole had latterly come into the hands of the Medes and Persians, whose rule, although as absolute and tyrannical as that of Egypt, was less severely felt by the subject nations, only because it was not practicable to distribute a population, so numerous, and spread over so many countries, under the lash of task-masters, as in the contracted valley of the Nile. Moreover, the Medo-Persian power was new. Its many ramifications had not all succeeded yet in fastening themselves in their places. And leniency had to be exercised in securing the loyalty of nations previously accustomed to serve other masters. In some such cases the Persian king was content with a merely formal act of submission, or the payment of a small tribute; but, wherever his dominion was safely established, it was found to be as unrelentingly crushing as was that of Egypt. It had already extended its grasp farther than any of its predecessors. Under three successive princes, Cyrus, Cambyses, and Darius Hystaspis, it had reached almost the limit of regal ambition. The last named had even carried his arms to the wilds of central Asia on the one hand, and those of Germany on the other.

Europe was still, for the most part, a wilderness, sparsely inhabited by migratory hordes of barbarians. The morning of civilization had just begun to gild its south-eastern shores; but it revealed a scene which must have struck the Asiatic observer as most anomalous and threatening. Over the islands of the Ægæan, and the coasts beyond, far as those of Sicily and Italy, lay a people possessing many of the elements and much of the power of civilization, without submission to a monarch, and divided into an endless number of states, each claiming to be independent; and instead of conforming to any central authority, presenting almost every variety of political structure. It was a portentous innovation, to an Asiatic mind, and must have seemed to threaten the very foundations of regular government. The truth is, Greece had reached that position by a series of steps, few of which had been distinctly foreseen by herself. Originally ruled by hereditary kings, as little limited by legal restrictions as the Asiatic, various circumstances, not always

controlled by the actors in them, enabled the several states to break up the regular succession. Where commerce had quickened the faculties, and taught self-reliance, a civil structure was adopted, which threw the chief power into the hands of the principal citizens. On that subject different states entertained conflicting notions, and unforeseen circumstances shaped some in spite of their wishes. Some contented themselves with very slight modifications upon their monarchical institutions; others followed up these changes from generation to generation, until, without an act abolishing the regal authority, it gradually merged into a liberal government. The colonies, which multiplied rapidly, and extended far, in the eighth, seventh, and sixth centuries B. C., were impeded by fewest embarrassments in their political choice. And the fact that they almost universally preferred some variety of liberal organization demonstrates the tendency of the popular mind.

But Greece was long retarded—perhaps we might better say developed—by internal difficulties, which free countries have seldom escaped. The ambition of gifted men and the excesses of a lawless rabble justified each other. Usurpers arose, who based their claims upon the necessities induced by popular disorder. Though some of them were opportune deliverers, who blessed their country with liberal and prudent administration, many were real tyrants, in the English meaning of the word. It was found necessary to devise a system of law, whereby the occasions for such upstart tyrants might be done away, and their rise prevented. The systems adopted were different in the different states, from causes both extrinsic and intrinsic, as well as from the views of the several legislators. No persuasion could have induced Athens to repose in a constitution like that of Sparta, and however willing Lesbos might have been to receive an oligarchy, Pittacus was not the man to frame it; while the politics of the greater states always affected, more or less, those of their feebler allies. But a liberal government, of one form or another, was successfully established in most of them. Though the machinations of ambitious demagogues did not, of course, come to an end, they were greatly restrained, as the constitutions came to be popularly understood and consistently acted upon. The labours of Periander in Corinth, of

Pittacus in Lesbos, of Solon in Athens, and of others elsewhere, are among the grandest facts that history has to record. By the end of the sixth century before Christ, the principal Greek states had reached the maturity of their constitutional existence, while the vigour of youthful energy had not yet begun to decline.

It was then that the Medo-Persian empire attained the summit of its splendor. From the borders of India had that vast and hitherto irresistible power pushed westward, and southward, and northward. Babylonia, Syria, Phenicia, Egypt, Lydia, and the Greek colonies on the coast of Asia Minor, had successively fallen before it; and now the only governmental order recognized by the older world of civilization stood face to face with the new constitutional forms of Greece. Monarchy had reached its grandest dominion, the completeness and maturity of its type. That universal empire, so long the object of regal ambition, had never before been so nearly attained. Let Greece be added and the work is done. Moreover, it must have appeared to the princes of Asia that good order and the interests of right government demanded the extinction of those upstart commonwealths. The idea of people governing themselves must have seemed to them both preposterous and dangerous to the best interests of refined society. From all that he could comprehend of the matter, the Persian satrap must have felt impelled to resist and put down the new and anomalous states; and all the prestige of the past sustained him.

Though we cannot conceive of any man in that day apprehending the whole breadth of the question, the actual interest on the side of Greece was not merely of her own independence, but of the very existence of the new phase of society which she was decreed to usher in. It was really, Shall the new continent have a character of its own, or be shaped by the old?—shall despotism, which has made slavery and civilization almost synonymous in Asia, do the same in Europe?—shall the progress of human refinement be stayed at the point of Asiatic attainment, and not a step forward be permitted beyond what is consistent with implicit obedience and the shaping of all upon one unchanging model? It was also of the right of men to choose their own civil polity. It was for all Europe and gen-

rations then unborn that Athens stood forward in that contest. Had the battle of Salamis resulted unfortunately, and Grecian nationality been extinguished, nothing would have remained to obstruct the westward progress of Persian arms. For Rome was at that time of very limited resources, and self-divided in the strife with her own recently expelled Tarquins; while the Carthaginians were already in active coöperation with their Asiatic kinsmen. Had Persian, instead of Hellenic civilization, been impressed upon forming Europe, who can estimate the extent of the calamity to distant ages?

Let no one say that European energy would have completely surmounted it. The extent to which absolutism has succeeded in Europe, notwithstanding Greek example and teaching, renders it impossible to say how low Europe might have eringed, if, instead of the stirring and noble pattern of Greece, she had been shaped from the beginning in the mould of Asiatic servility. Greece was the vanguard of the new civil order, and the bulwark of Europe, the representative of the nascent continent. Most fitly, too, was Athens—the most Greek of all Greek states—put, by the arrangements of Providence, at the head of that defence, and lifted by its result to the very summit of power and influence.

Together with the spirit of kindred, which united the Hellenic states, there was inwoven a subject of rivalry, which finally overthrew the whole. What foreign enemies had been unable to effect, was brought about by internal discord.

Without a formally constituted supremacy, there was always a preëminence practically admitted to some one State over the rest. This amounted, primarily, to only the right to the chief command, and the post of danger in war; but inevitably also to the undefined influence of superior resources, abler men and better or stronger government. In some instances, the state possessing that honour, presuming thereupon, attempted coërcion of her neighbours; but the step was invariably met by a coalition of the injured, and the chastisement of the overbearing power. Greece had all along looked for her most dangerous enemies in the direction of Asia, and the prime object of the Hegemony, or leadership, was to unite Hellenic arms in case of war from that quarter. In early times it was held by Argos,

under whom Homer represents the assembled chiefs led forth to Troy. The Dorian conquests in the Peloponnesus, and the military system, which grew up from the legislation of Lycurgus, arrogated to Sparta a superiority which was long acquiesced in by the rest. The distinction forced upon Athens by the Persian war, together with the subsequent measures of Themistocles, attracted towards her that coveted honour. At the same time Persia became the single object against which it was aimed. The Greeks believed that their own safety could not be assured until their Asiatic enemy was utterly overthrown, and funds were contributed by all the states for the prosecution of the war. Under the leadership of Athens, the Persians were driven from nearly all their garrisons on the European continent, on the Hellespont and in the islands. But the jealousy of Sparta, availing itself of some real acts of injustice, roused against the Athenians that allied resistance, which resulted in the overthrow of Athenian supremacy. For a brief period Sparta wielded the recovered leadership, and under the command of her king Agesilaus, carried the Persian war far into Asia Minor; but so unhellenic was Spartan tyranny that the allies soon regretted their act and began to wish Athens restored. In the new coalition which arose out of that discontent, the most forward and powerful was Thebes, who, through the management of Pelopidas and Epaminondas, succeeded in gathering into her own hands the reins which had been wrested from Athens, and which Sparta had been found unworthy to retain. The leadership of Thebes was too brief to achieve anything towards its prime external object. Within the lifetime of Pelopidas, a young Macedonian prince was brought as a hostage, or for protection, to Thebes, where he enjoyed a Greek instruction and the invaluable society of that great statesman. The young barbarian was of quick discernment, readily apprehended the superiority of Hellenic character, and sought to form his own upon it. Together with some of its learning and liberality he caught the full spirit of its peculiar ambition. And when upon returning to his own country, he ascended the throne, as Philip the Second, it was to enter upon that course of policy, whereby he sought to add his nation to the number of Greek States, as holder of the envied leadership. What persuasion

and manœuvering failed to effect, he finally accomplished by force. The battle of Chaeroneia put an end to all effective resistance, and at the subsequent convention of delegates at Corinth, Philip of Macedon was formally recognized as leader of the armies of Greece. The long deferred objects of that leadership he immediately undertook to carry out. His assassination, when all his preparations were complete, threw the weight of the enterprise upon his son Alexander, who had been carefully educated into his father's purposes, and a similar Hellenic learning and ambition. The Persian campaigns of Alexander were therefore the execution of an altogether Hellenic project, long cherished, and delayed only by internal discord. But great was the value of that delay. It gave time fully to mature the fruits of native culture, unimpaired by foreign influences, and with attention undiverted by the excitements of foreign conquest. It turned the energies of Greece upon herself until the productions of her genius were such as to hold the intellectual dominion, for which she was designed. But, even when that process was complete, to have carried the products of it into the world by force of her own arms would have defeated the kindly effects proper to their nature.

Instead of being alien to the true objects of Hellenism, Alexander was the indispensable instrument whereby its external work was done. As in the life of the historian himself, the first period must be that of his own education, the second that in which he produces his work, and the third that of publishing it; the two former, as far as benefit to any mind but his own is concerned, being useless without the last: so with the Greek states, up to the Persian wars, they were only forming themselves; from that time until the death of Philip, was the period in which the works of their matured genius saw the light, and the Macedonian conquest threw the world open to their instruction.

Still less can we agree with Mr. Grote, when he says that the result accomplished by the conquests of Alexander was "substantially the same as would have been brought about if the invasion of Greece by Xerxes had succeeded." (Vol. xii. page 179.) We think that it was entirely different. When Xerxes planned his invasion, Persia was in the full bloom of maturity,

flushed with a long career of distinguished success; haughty, overbearing, and disposed to compress all her conquests into the mould of her own favourite system, which was paralyzing to dependencies. We are not left to conjecture what Greece would have become, if subjected to the dominion of Persia at the beginning of the fifth century before Christ. The Ionian cities, several of which were hardly inferior to the Athens of that day, were actually so reduced. And what was the effect? They not only ceased to rival those which remained independent, but positively dwindled in importance from that date. Some of them were ruined. If such was the effect of Persian domination upon them, even with the still existing example and support of their unsubdued countrymen in their neighbourhood, what must it have been, had all the Greek states been absorbed in the same great empire? Greece had not then secured the means whereby to shape the manners of her conqueror. It was not until after that wonderful half century of Athenian leadership, that Greek civilization was so firmly planted in the earth that it could survive the injuries of military defeat. In the beginning of the fifth century, it was Persia that had the reputation of superior refinement, and was actually then performing for Asiatic views that service which Macedonia afterwards performed for European. Persia, if victorious then, would not, and could not have received from Greece the moral and æsthetic impress which was afterwards made upon the rude Roman conquerors. Asia stood to Greece, at that date, in a relation similar to that in which Greece, at a later time, stood to Rome, as predecessor in the career of development; and, although outstripped, in some respects, yet without decline, and with the additional advantage of being still in the fulness of political and military might. It is beyond conjecture that Hellenism, in that case, must have perished. The smaller and yet immature nationality must have been engulfed in the style and power of the greater.

The victory of Xerxes would have orientalized Greece. Had Athens been left in ruins, the Athenian people abandoned to the dispersion into which Xerxes had driven them, it almost surpasses human ability to conceive what would have been the difference to the world. Had Xerxes triumphed, the Athenians could never have returned to their city; the king's wrath was

implacable against them. And even if they had returned, it must have been as slaves. In that case, the world should have been deprived of the matured productions of Greek art. Even if the epic and lyric poets had been spared, which is not likely, seeing oriental taste has so little appreciation of European poetry, we should have had no Athenian philosophy, no Socrates, no Plato, no Aristotle, no Greek drama, no Greek history, no Herodotus, no Thucydides, no Xenophon, no Greek oratory, no Æschines, no Isocrates, no Demosthenes; we should have had no Pericles, with his unparalleled train of genius, no Ictimis, no Polygnotus, no Pheidias; there would have been no Propylæa, no Parthenon. It is incalculable what the world would have lacked, inconceivable what the world should have been, had Athens been cut off, or *medized* from the battle of Salamis. It would have been to Greece what death in the battle of Monongahela would have been to Washington—what it would have been to the fame of Mr. Grote, to have died after all preparation for his work had been made, and his first volume just begun.

On the other hand, admitting some elements of the barbaric in Alexander, the effect of his victories was to put an end to the rule of the Persians, and dethrone their type of civilization, while that which followed in his train was Greek. Now, the difference between spreading Persia over Greece, and the extending of Greek influences to Persia, appears to us to be very great, no matter by whom it was done. To crush in its vigorous youth a superior style of civilization, is certainly a very different thing from putting down that which, inferior at best, has run its whole course and become effete, and the substitution to some degree of that which is better.

We hold, therefore, that Alexander is an indispensable part of Hellenic history, not only in that all his exploits were performed in the name of Greece, and that they actually accomplished a long cherished object of Greek ambition; but they were the mature triumph of the new civilization over the old. They carried Greek views and the Greek language, literature, and humanity, abroad over all the ancient abode of refined servility, which in later times went to prepare those countries for a still greater change. Though his work was done amid the death throes of Greek independence, and although his own hand

inflicted the fatal blow, still it was Greek work. He was therein the executor of the nationality which he slew.

While maintaining thus the indispensableness of Alexander to the completion of Hellenic work, we have no disposition to vindicate his personal character. Though much might be said in defence of an impetuous boy, conscious at once of intellectual and physical superiority, an enthusiastic admirer of the *Iliad*, whose heroes filled his imagination, and stood as models before him, and to whose Achilles he believed himself genealogically related, elevated at the age of twenty to such a dominion as his father left, more than half of which completely barbarian could be controlled only by intimidation, and, withal, perceiving that those recent conquests despised his youth and were proceeding, in presumption upon his incapacity, to break off their allegiance; though it might be truly said that the Hellenic humanity, with which he is to be compared, never went the length of Christian mercy, that whole Greek states sometimes incurred the guilt of wholesale slaughter, as relentless as any act of his, and that even his military execution of Thebes, afterwards deeply regretted by himself, was only in pursuance of the verdict given by Orchomenians, Plataeans, Phocians, and other Greeks, to whom he submitted the question; though it might also be said, for his later cruelties, that they were needed to sustain his authority, and thereby the safety of his army in a hostile country, we advocate no such plea, inasmuch as acts of that kind were essentially unhellenic in spirit, no matter by whom perpetrated. Alexander was unhellenic in his native ferocity, as well as in his intolerant, domineering disposition. Both were faults, which even had his Greek education succeeded in eradicating, the circumstances of his after life would have reimplanted. His education had been thoroughly Greek, a large part of it under Aristotle; and the grand profession of his life was the cause of Greece. And there can be little doubt that, in the beginning, he was earnestly attached to that cause, next to his own schemes of ambition. In the destruction of Thebes, he spared the house and relatives of Pindar, he visited as a sacred shrine the tombs of the Greek heroes at Troy, and sacrificed to the manes of Neoptolemus. He carried a copy of Homer with him in all his campaigns. He kept up his corres-

pendence with Aristotle for many years. But towards the close of his eastern campaigns these Hellenic features, due to his education, began to give way before the better fostered elements of his barbaric nature. To the uncontrollable ferocity of his mother, Olympias, and the inebriate habits of his father, were now added a determination to despotism taken up from his acquaintance with the East, and a degree of vanity which has seldom been paralleled. That change was the natural effect of his success and the pitch of power, to which he had so suddenly attained. Unvarying prosperity is a severe test to the strongest mind, and when added to absolute dominion, without apparent balance or check, is dangerous to mental sanity. The strongest brain begins to reel when elevated to a pinnacle where no other mortal stands. And when to the self-flattery which is engendered by unchequered success there is added the adulation of society, and no voice reaches the ear save that of applause, he must be more than man who is not morally impaired thereby.

There was in Alexander a singular lack of that generosity which is commonly a redeeming trait of an impetuous nature. Like Napoleon Bonaparte, he was too intensely selfish to form any reasonable estimate of what was due to others, wherever himself was concerned; and, like that same modern hero, together with unquestionable bravery in battle, he possessed the narrow and petty malignity, which is usually connected with cowardice. With all his surpassing genius, he was morally beneath the common standard of his day, a man addicted to the indulgence of low passions, spending his leisure in drunkenness and debauchery, vindictive, cruel, jealous even of the officers whose talents contributed to his own reputation, who, for the sake of magnifying himself by comparison, could traduce the reputation of his father, and, in the frantiness of his vanity, claim to be a son of Jupiter, and not only accept of adoration, but punish with death him, who had the sense and manliness to withhold it; who for a trifling suspicion could sacrifice the life of a friend, and who, over and above his public and official guilt, was repeatedly the perpetrator of crimes, for any one of which, in these days, and in a private capacity, he would have been consigned to prison or the gallows.

In common with the majority of successful generals of all times, Alexander owed much to recent improvements in arms, not yet adopted by the enemy. Dull routine commanders rely chiefly upon established order and the valour of their troops; a man of genius receives the bravery of his men as only a basis of operations, and draws upon it only in the moment of emergency. It is a treasure which he husbands to the utmost, and by his own devices contrives to make the way before it as easy as possible, thereby confirming and augmenting the readiness of his men to peril their lives, while using every means in his power to economize them. Occasionally he may demand a desperate effort of mere hardihood; but it will never be of his free choice, unless he considers that the very daring will be a moral gain. His own proper work is to make victory sure by resources of ingenuity; and the most obvious of such is improvement in the style and use of weapons. By that means has victory frequently been decided over superior valour and not inferior skill. It was thereby that the Greek hoplites defeated at Plataea the equally brave, but inferiorly armed Persian. It was only by the improvements of Iphicrates that a superior was found to the Spartan infantry, and the means were furnished to Epaminondas of overthrowing Peloponnesian supremacy. The structure of the Macedonian phalanx and the long two-handed lance, with which he armed his phalangites, were the means whereby Philip destroyed the liberties of Greece; and Macedonia retained the prize of war, until a military array more effective than the phalanx, and a weapon more serviceable than the lance wrested it from her grasp. The battle of Cynoscephalæ was decided by the greater versatility of Roman arms and Roman maniples. One fundamental cause of Rome's long continued military success lay in the fact, that ancient times produced no other weapon superior to those put into the hands of her soldiers, no other array equal to that admirably firm yet flexible structure of her legion. His heavy spear and steel defence gave the mediæval knight absolute dominion over the populace of his day—a dominion which was not impaired until gunpowder threw the preponderance once more on the side of infantry. The demolition of the feudal system and emancipation of the European commonalty is due, in no little degree, to the inven-

tion of fire-arms. In any protracted conflict between great nations there will be valour on both sides. Greater skill or better weapons must generally decide between them. The latter Alexander inherited. The military genius and energy of his father had effected an entire revolution in arms. At his death the Macedonian army was the best appointed in the world. It was equipped on a new and superior plan. It was in the prime of its discipline, and every provision had been made for the maintenance of its efficiency. Alexander had no part in the creation of that power; he had only to direct it, and consequently, was an illustrious conqueror at an age when otherwise he must have been forming his army.

Though the talents of Alexander were undoubtedly of the highest order, yet the unparalleled combination of extrinsic advantages which rendered his conquest so rapid, so extensive, and so complete, has assigned to him an undue rank among military heroes. Everything in the discipline and equipment of his own forces, in the weakness of his enemy, in the enterprise of the Greek, in the sloth of the Asiatic, in the new military spirit of Macedon, in the extinction of that of Persia, as well as the cowardice and incapacity of Darius, converged to a crisis. The masterly movements and rapidity of Alexander seized the full advantage of it. Equal talents struggling with feebler means against a stronger enemy are eclipsed, to cursory view, by the splendor of such effects. That a Washington, framing his own army, building up his own resources, measuring himself with the most vigorous and enterprising power of his time, with armies as brave and better appointed than his own, and limiting his aims by the dictates of a Christian conscience, should be deemed second to an Alexander, is due to the fact, that it is easier to admire success than to estimate the labour and genius expended to secure it.

Though the dispositions made by Alexander were always equal to the emergency, none of them bear such impress of ingenuity as almost any one of the Italian battles of Hannibal. True, he had no such enemy as a Roman army to face, and perhaps all his resources were never called out; but that consideration, if it is to be allowed in his favour on one side, tells to the advantage of Hannibal on the other. In estimating the

exploits of the latter, we ordinarily allow too much weight to the ultimate failure, without considering whence it arose, and too little to the fact, that he did not contend with a sinking state, but a rising one, and that, too, when it was near the very summit of its strength, commanding forces incomparably more numerous, and as well armed and disciplined as his own, and consisting of men whose valour was never surpassed. The whole difference had to be made by his own intellect. Of Alexander this cannot be said in any of his campaigns. If he often defeated superior numbers, he was always arrayed against inferior arms and inferior discipline. It is impossible to say what resources he might not have evinced in the face of such armies as those of Scmpronius, Flaminius and Varro; but one thing is certain, he never encountered their equals.

The dazzling career of the young king of Macedon excited the ambition of a host of imitators, in his own and the immediately succeeding times. We find would-be-Alexanders springing up in all directions; some of them manifesting very considerable talent, and most of them, like other imitators, making sure to resemble their model in his little, if not his great qualities. While his work was the appropriate juncture of two great epochs of history, and although there resulted therefrom, under Providence, incalculable good to mankind, his personal example was deeply injurious. His unbridled ambition, his pursuit, in his later campaigns, of war without a plea, and his abandoned debauchery, were profusely copied, upon both great and small scales. Such, with the exception of Ptolemy, who was a peaceful ruler, were the principal generals of his own army, and many of their descendants. Such also were Alexander and Pyrrhus of Epirus, Agathocles of Sicily, Mithridates of Pontus, Tigranes of Armenia, and many others of inferior note.

Upon the minds of that class of soldiers, who are ready to fight in any cause where pay is forthcoming, and hopes of plunder are held out, the effect was similar. Large armies were at the command of any successful leader. A plea for war had ceased to be thought necessary. Reckless and unprovoked assault upon peaceful states, for the mere purpose of selfish aggrandizement, was practised on all hands. For not less than

two hundred years was the East embroiled by successive generations of conflicting adventurers, until Rome, by the irresistible march of her legions, and the unrelenting grasp of her legislation, outlawed and suppressed all ambition but her own.

The inordinate vanity of Alexander found its true gratification in oriental obsequiousness. In the course of a few years, the more manly bearing of his own countrymen became distasteful to him. And, latterly, it was his fixed purpose never to return to Europe, but to make his capital in Asia, and bend the stubborn manners of Greek and Macedonian, by forcibly subjecting them to Persian influences, transporting Asiatics by great numbers into Europe, and Europeans into Asia, and promoting intermarriages among them. This undertaking he opened with characteristic energy; but had he lived to carry it out to all the length that was practicable, he must have found the motive with which he conceived it completely defeated. Stronger intellects will always, in the workings of society, dominate over the feebler, and the fresher form of civilization over that which has begun to wane. By mingling the two latter, the older cannot be revived. Accordingly, contrary to the conqueror's design, that took place which was in the order of nature. Persian society lost its former features. Greeks largely occupied Asiatic cities; but, while they parted with some of their European character, did not adopt that of Asia. They spoke their own language, retained their own religion and observances, read their own books, and only endured the Asiatic despotism, which their own princes had assumed. Greek intellect became thinker for the East. Public business over all the Macedonian empire was transacted in the Greek tongue; and to be acquainted with it and its literary stores, constituted the learning of the time. On the other hand, few Persians emigrated to Greece; and while Asia was remodeled, the fountains of Hellenism remained unimpaired, except by spontaneous change. The intellectual activity and restless enterprise of the Greek, and the indolent self-indulgence of the Asiatic, had their corresponding effects upon the resultant state of the world.

For three hundred years after the death of Alexander, the Greek language continued to extend itself over the ancient

dominions of Persia. It consequently underwent some modification to suit this more cosmopolitan existence. Passing out of its pure and native, but more limited Hellenic dialects, it assumed the common Hellenistic form of recognized propriety everywhere, moulding itself thereby to the duty imposed upon it, of being the universal language of civilization. Thus were furnished to the early writings of Christianity not only the most competent forms of expression, but also facilities of publication, which had never, since the confusion of tongues, existed in the world before.

The extension of Greek literature to the cities of the East, furnished them with an amount of information which had not previously existed there. Knowledge ceased to be confined to a learned order and to sacerdotal books, and approached more nearly the condition of a popular possession. The intellectual character of the people was consequently improved by familiarity with such productions of taste, such well balanced argumentation, such just and reliable history, and the better qualified to appreciate truth, power, and beauty. Though the splendor of universal empire was at an end, and peace was often disturbed by the contests among Alexander's successors, the populations of the cities, at least, were in a much better condition than they had been under the Persian.

Attempts were made by some of the Greek kings of Syria, to establish Greek mythology and worship in their dominions, and with some exception successfully; but a still wider diffusion seems to have been given to Greek free thinking. Distrust in their old religion very extensively pervaded the people of those countries, when they were called upon to consider the claims of a better.

These importations from Greece very naturally led also to the adoption, in many cases, if not generally throughout the East, of Greek municipal order. And thus in the cities a greater value came to be attached to the life of the individual man. In orientalism, the monarch was the fountain of all importance, and nearness to him was the measure of other men's value. The priesthood and army were his weapons and throne. The court lived in his favour. The mass of the people were of no repute, save as the sources of his revenue—

tools for the execution of his designs, and the materials of his greatness. In Greece, the grand idea was the state. The constitution and general well being of the state was the central point of patriotism, and individual men were estimated according to their value thereto; but then the recognized object of the state was the good of community. Heathen Greece never rose to the conception, which the Christian entertains of the value of a human being, in himself considered; yet their measure of his importance was incomparably higher than, from patriarchal days, had ever existed in the heathen East. In Greece, to be a citizen was to be on a footing of political equality with all other citizens, and to enjoy the right of a voice in government. But it was only citizenship which attached value to the man, whom neither genius nor wealth favoured. The multitude of noncitizens and slaves were held under a more cruel despotism than Persia was able to wield over all the breadth of her empire. It was man as a citizen, whom Greece delighted to honour. Greek humanity extended no further. But as municipalities after the Greek model increased in number and extended themselves over the former dominions of the great king, they contributed much to the emancipation of human thought, the multiplication of the number of the free, and to a higher valuation of human life.

The Phœnician cities, which alone of all the East had approximated, and even to some extent anticipated, Grecian culture and enterprise, were ruined by the invasion of Alexander. Their fleets were taken bodily into his service and their commerce fell into the hands of the Greeks. Instead of Tyre and Zidon, Alexandria became the great commercial depot of the world. And thus by the same agency which opened their way to the heart of Asia, were the Greeks vested with the whole maritime trade of the eastern seas. The Greeks lost their independence under the Macedonians, but they secured an extent of influence, which, as far as pertained to the world of civilization was almost universal. For Greece to have remained a foreign country to her neighbours would have been an insuperable barrier to her moulding power over them. To have been vanquished by Persia would have been the extinction of her peculiar light. The subjugation of Persia by any

Greek state, and the attempt to force Greek institutions upon the East would most certainly have failed, even if it had not resulted, as most likely it would, in that most oppressive of all despotism, the dominion of a free state over a dependent. Moreover, in that case, the world would have enjoyed only a partial Hellenism. It would have been Spartans, or Athenians, or Thebans, impressing their own peculiar stamp upon their conquest, and jealously excluding their fellow Greeks from participation in their gains. But just as if to avoid all such dangers, and obviate all such difficulties, Greece was providentially protected from extraneous domination until her domestic order was complete, and her own style of refinement matured. The disposal of it was then assumed not by an uneducated barbarian, but by one deeply imbued with Hellenic instruction and identifying himself with the Hellenic cause, and yet of a disposition to prefer oriental views far enough to conciliate oriental feelings, and establish the only form of government which was practicable in the East, while his cosmopolitan design of mingling the different races, whom he ruled, into one nationality, instituted a perfect reciprocity of influence, laying open the world to the whole breadth of Hellenism, while not rejecting anything in oriental views or customs which might be thought worthy of preservation. And, finally, the change was effected with such a startling rapidity as to outrun all attempts at effective organization for resistance.

It is impossible to say what Alexander would have done had he lived; but his reported purposes of further conquest certainly threatened the world with an amount of calamity which no conceivable good to be derived from them could atone for. He died at the right time. His work was done. Providence employed him in the part for which he was qualified, and then withdrew him from the scene. A concentrated empire, which he unequivocally designed, would not have answered the purpose. The Greek element would have thereby been crushed beneath the oriental. The dominion must be divided, and its different portions balanced over against each other.

We do not mean to imply that every change in national history is an improvement, nor that the change then effected upon the eastern world was the very best that could be made,

nor that serious evils were not inflicted thereby upon particular parts of the country; but certainly it will not be denied that it was one not only of advance towards a higher development of humanity, but also of preparation for that Gospel, which was soon to burst upon those regions, and to claim them among the first fruits of its teaching. We may safely say that it was the very best that could be effected by any combination of the materials then and there existing. This work of hellenizing the East, to all the extent that was practicable, was carried out by Alexander's successors, the Seleucidae in Syria and more eminently still by the Ptolemies in Egypt. The method adopted by Alexander, of forcibly interchanging colonies of Greeks and Asiatics, was too violent and vast for any but himself to carry out. By his successors the change was suffered to proceed, for the most part, in the natural way dictated by the interests of commerce, and the promptings of individual taste and enterprise.

By these remarks we do not intend to deny the justness of Mr. Grote's estimate of this period, as the final chapter of pure Greek history. Whoever proposes to himself the narrative of Hellenic independence, must close with the generation which saw the Macedonian conquest. Though *Hellenistic* civilization—that namely which arose from the combination of various elements, among which the Hellenic predominated—long continued to augment its forces and expand its dominion, and there was a freedom of thought, of speech, and of municipal government almost inseparable therefrom; the freedom of the ancient and pure Hellenic states expired in the battle of Kranon. The succeeding contests with the Macedonian princes were really not in the interest of Greece, but of her masters.

In the period to which this volume pertains, events array themselves so distinctly into a few strongly marked classes, that not much discrimination was needed to ascertain actual junctures, or decide upon the place and proportion to be assigned to each series; but the same lucid order which reigns here, we find equally conspicuous throughout the more complex narrative, of which it is the close. The work, as a whole, is also most thorough and critical in dealing with its facts and evidences. But when we add that it is eminently Hellenic in

spirit, it is with an exception, from which we are sorry to say, that the general effect is cold. We miss that genial sympathy with the higher aspirations of human nature, which appears, more or less, in all the great historians of antiquity, and glows upon the pages of Arnold. As it was God who breathed life into the inanimate form of man, so it is that in man which betokens the presence and power of God, which alone can breathe life into any of man's creations. Even in a statue or picture, the master-charm is that which goes out beyond the bounds of colour and form, and takes hold upon our spiritual being, giving us, for the moment, something like the consciousness of a happy immortal. In a much higher degree is such a power within the possession of literature, and above all, of history, which, if well written, is substantially a record of what God has wrought. The chief end of all true art is to remind man of his spiritual affinities, and to keep the idea of the Divine presence alive within him. There is no need that an author should make formal declaration to this effect, any more than a living man needs to inform those with whom he converses that he is alive. Moreover, a history should represent something of that life of God, which is manifested in the ever unfolding scroll of events. Herein this otherwise great work is sadly defective. In form, in proportions, in power of handling, and substantial reality, it approaches the perfection of the scholar's idea of Greece; and yet it is so apathetic towards the purest and loftiest of Greek aims, that we cannot regard it without some of that feeling with which we should look upon a *post mortem* cast of a beautiful face. It is especially to be regretted that such an unhellenic defect should impair a picture of Hellenic times, upon the whole, the fullest and truest that ever was drawn.

A history of Greece, in a truly Greek spirit, has long been a desideratum in general politics as well as in literature. After a protracted period of derangement and reconstruction, civilized life is emerging into the likeness of the Hellenic again. The modern system of Europe, which aims by a balance of power to maintain the separate independence of each state, and leads to hostile coalition against any one whose overgrown pretensions threaten the safety of the weaker, is the genuine offspring

of that which first arose upon the shores of the Ægæan. A fundamental advantage possessed by our own country is the organization whereby that balance of power, which was only partially, in a loose way, and by the frequent intervention of arms, secured among the Greeks, and on a larger scale, and of more declared purpose, attempted, but less successfully, among European states, is effected peacefully and completely by a common constitution and legal restrictions freely adopted by all. It is, in short, the Hellenic system that we have adopted, in opposition to the older Asiatic notion of universal empire. But, if through means of Christianity we enjoy some elements of greater value than ever belonged to autonomous Greeks, and if vaster national resources are now enlisted in the cause, there are other respects in which the history of that ancient people has invaluable lessons for us; and that, both of incitement and warning. We are not yet so purged of the old leaven as to be able to dispense with the aid of such instruction. The conflict is not yet over. Greek independence, long as the world has admired it, has not yet imprinted its likeness on every heart. There are still, even in the freest countries of the modern world, influential parties utterly alien to the style of civil order which prevails among them, and who would extend to the rule of a universal monarch as blind an adoration as ever Persian subject paid—cringing spirits, whose native instincts are to servility, who seek a master to attach themselves to, with all the appetite of a greyhound, and who, in lack of a suitable one at home, bend before the person or reputation of some foreign despot. Instead of sustaining the equality of the feebler, such characters invariably take part with the strongest; and any tolerably respectable attempt at universal dominion is the object of their profoundest admiration. While such an element exists among us, so injurious to multitudes of better disposed, but ill-informed minds, it cannot cease to be profitable to keep before the public the noble and interesting example of Greece.

But, it is when we consider the light thrown thereby upon the arrangements of Providence going to prepare the heathen world for the coming Gospel, and to mature the fulness of time for ushering in the universal revelation, that a complete and

unbiased history of Greece assumes its highest importance. And this end, irrespectively of the feelings and intentions of Mr. Grote, which we do not pretend to know, his faithful presentation of facts and their relations cannot fail to subserve in every reflecting mind.

ART. IV.—*The Doctrine of Baptisms.* Scriptural Examination of the Questions respecting: I. The Translation of Baptizo. II. The Mode of Baptism. III. The subjects of Baptism. By GEORGE D. ARMSTRONG, D. D., Pastor of the Presbyterian Church in Norfolk, Va. New York: Charles Scribner. 1857.

WITH great pleasure do we hail the appearance of "The Doctrine of Baptisms," from the pen of Dr. Armstrong, of Norfolk, Va. In our opinion, this subject of Baptism is one of the most important that can occupy the attention of our divines and scholars. And, indeed, if we understand the signs of the times, it will yet occupy more attention than it has done hitherto. This work of Dr. Armstrong seems to be well calculated to do good in and out of our Church; and with pleasure do we commend it to those who have a desire to examine this subject carefully and thoroughly, as well calculated to aid them in their researches. We are pleased with his mode of discussing the subject, and the general arrangement of the work; the mechanical execution of which is also such as to make it an attractive volume. We hope it will be widely circulated.

But our present object is not to review, or give an outline of, this work of Dr. Armstrong. We take the present as a favourable opportunity for expressing our surprise that, whilst so many writers have, with ability, discussed the mode and subjects of baptism, and the Baptist arguments, comparatively little attention is drawn to the neglect of household baptism, in our own Church, and to the mode of remedying that evil. We are constantly erecting barriers to prevent the inroads of enemies outside of our fortress, and at the same time we give