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ARTICLE I.—*A Discourse commemorative of the History of the Church of Christ in Yale College, during the first Century of its Existence.* Preached in the College Chapel, November 22, 1857. With Notes and an Appendix. By GEORGE P. FISHER, Livingston Professor of Divinity. New Haven: Thomas H. Pease. 1858.

ANY historical review of the course of any department in Yale College for the past century, cannot fail to bring to light facts of great interest and importance. This is peculiarly true of the history of the Christian church and religion in such an institution during a period so extended, so critical, and so formative for all public institutions in our country. Foremost among these is the church, in close relation to which are Christian colleges, which, deriving their sap from the church, seem beyond any other public institutions to partake of its life, vigour, and perpetuity. The history of the church in these seats of learning and culture, serves to illustrate the mutual relation and reciprocal influence of high education and vital Christianity. On these general grounds, therefore, the friends of religion and education will acknowledge their obligations to Professor Fisher for his careful and dispassionate survey of the formation, growth, and vicissitudes of the church of Christ in Yale College, and for the many curious and instructive facts which he has rescued from oblivion in executing the task.

grace as "not every one that saith unto me, Lord, Lord, shall enter into the kingdom of heaven; but he that doeth the will of my Father which is in heaven:" then we may trust that the paragon of languages has attained that state so appropriately designated in the contrast of the motto of the great Bible-publishers of London:

> *Πολλαὶ μὲν θνητοῖς γλῶτται, μία δ' ἀθανάτοισιν.*
>
> Multæ terricolis linguæ, cœlestibus una.
>
> Earth speaks with many tongues, heaven knows but one.

Art. IV.—*A Treatise on the Greek Prepositions, and on the cases of Nouns, with which these are used.* By Gessner Harrison, M. D., Professor of Latin in the University of Virginia. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott & Co. 1858.

It is a remarkable fact, and one, which the public ear may be slow to admit, that modern scholarship has done more for the philosophical exposition of the Greek language, and possesses larger and juster views of its structure, than did the Greeks themselves. With all their acumen, the ancients were poor etymologists. The best of them could derive a primitive word from one of its own derivatives: and although they had juster ideas of syntax, even those were comparatively superficial. Language was to them a practical instrument or the vehicle of art, which the spontaneous, but unanalyzed dictates of their spiritual nature disposed of with the most delicate sense of fitness; but the anatomy of what went to constitute that fitness they never comprehended. Of course, its idiomatic proprieties were felt and understood by those to whom it was native, with a degree of truth and discrimination which can never be recalled; but in as far as pertains to the structure of the language, the philosophy of its syntax, the system of its etymology, its ethnological relations, and the laws which governed its whole development, modern scholarship is instructed to a degree that certainly was never dreamed of by the greatest analyst of ancient times. Moreover, this result, though one of

progressive effort from age to age, has been chiefly effected within our own day. It belongs to the latest achievements of inductive science.

After the revival of Greek learning in the West of Europe, the first two or three generations of scholars depended upon oral instruction of native Greeks, who, themselves, had learned their language at the mouth of tradition. The contemporaries, respectively, of Petrarch and Poggio trod the beaten track of traditionary grammar, only to reach the enjoyments of literary art. For the path itself, they took it as they found it, and did little to remove its difficulties. Not the language, but its literature was their aim. And such was the proper work of their times.

The Grammar of Constantine Lascaris, one of the earliest products of the printing press, issued at Milan in 1476, laid the foundation-stone of a new structure. It was written with the view of improvement by combining the merits of preceding works: and was soon followed by a Greek Lexicon from the same press. The apparatus for study was thus thrown open to the public; and a practical knowledge of Greek having been attained by Western scholars, the treatment of its grammar subsequently passed entirely into their hands.

During the first half of the next century, the language was handled chiefly as an instrument in theological controversy, and grammarians did little more than re-state and re-arrange the precepts of the earlier teachers. Then followed the period which, of all occidental history, may be described most properly as that of erudition. Researches into the literature, antiquities, history, and mythology of the Greeks, compiled materials for a more scientific treatment of their language. And the very men who thus furnished the material, pointed the way to that use of it.

As early as 1557, the Grammar of Peter Ramus presented evidence of enlarged resources. Further improvements were attempted by Sylburgius, Vossius, and the author of the Port Royal Grammar. But this course of progress was stayed. On the continent succeeded a more self-indulgent age, which looked with dismay upon such gigantic compilations as those of the Stephenses, of Turnebus, of Gruter, and of Muretus; while in

England the dangers of a political and ecclesiastical revolution absorbed the energies of the nation. As far as attention was turned to Greek, it was less with a view to comprehend its spirit, than to reproduce the forms of its literature, or copy its treasures in the modern tongues.

Another period of Greek scholarship found its pioneer in Richard Bentley, who, towards the beginning of the eighteenth century, set the example of that independent criticism, which has since, notwithstanding many extravagances, yielded results of the utmost value. It was, however, long employed in editions of the classics before systematic grammar derived much benefit therefrom. Succeeding scholars continued to expend their efforts upon the niceties of classical diction and prosody.

Subsequently, a new auxiliary arose in the science of comparative philology, which conferred unexpected resources and an unprecedented dignity upon the whole subject of grammar. A wider knowledge of the ethnological relations of Greek, added to ripened learning in its own stores, gave occasion to a more complete and scientific exposition of its structure.

The publication, in 1819, of the first volume of Buttmann's large Grammar, and of the first part of Passow's Lexicon, led the way to a method of treating the language, which has been followed up by others, with the most satisfactory results. Facilities are now furnished for the study of Greek unknown in any previous time, and the means provided of drawing from it richer stores of instruction, and of giving to them a breadth of influence upon the world, which it never has enjoyed since it ceased to be spoken by a free people. Its operation upon society, literature, and art, of the present day, is no longer confined to externals, but pertains to their spirit. And the present method pursued in its study, is calculated to promote that tendency, leading ultimately not to a bald imitation of Greek works, but to a following of Greek example, in acquiring a bold yet prudent and reverent intellectual and æsthetical independence.

We are happy to say, that the work before us is in the spirit of its time. Without being able to adopt all the author's conclusions, we have been truly gratified by the examination of his method. Not that we deem it the best for instruction. In that

light it is not to be thought of. A distinction must be made between the method which is good for an amateur of Greek, and for the instruction of a class. According to the former, one may make a nice little volume out of the virtues of a particle, which shall find its well pleased audience, fit, though few; while a class in college, which has yet to learn the radical philosophy of the language, would only be retarded in their progress, and lose their bearing, by having to delay upon matters so minute. The latter, it is our belief, can be better effected by a just and clear statement of general laws, sustained by a few pertinent examples. Profuse illustration, and still more exhaustive pursuit of a subject into all its minutest ramifications, wearies the patience, and deadens the zeal, of a class, by leaving them no room nor spirit for original suggestion. Such, however, we do not understand to be the design of the present work. It is addressed to Greek scholars; to those, who, with a cordial interest in the subject, are pleased to delay upon all the particulars wherein lie its most delicate beauties.

It is the design of this treatise to demonstrate that each preposition in the Greek language has one fundamental meaning, which, though subject to variation, is always present, as well as to show what that meaning is. And in order thereto, the author enters first into a consideration of the respective cases of the noun, and of the relations which they are intended to express. The latter he presents as it stands in connection with the verb, and with the verb and adverb. Consequently, the verb and its attendant preposition are regarded as representing only one notion, and the case of the noun which follows, expresses its own proper relation to that notion: in other words, that the case is not governed by the preposition, as separate from the verb, but by the notion which is contained in both. "Thus, for example, in the phrase *εἰς τὴν πόλιν ἦλθεν*, 'he came into the city,' *πόλιν* is to be regarded as defining more exactly the notion of 'coming in, or within,' expressed by *ἦλθεν*, as qualified by *εἰς*; for the meaning of this example is, 'he came in, or within . . . as regards the city." Having adopted this general principle, the author is careful to add that, notwithstanding there are instances in which the case is employed to mark an object affected by the peculiar sense of the prepo-

sition itself," and alludes to "some examples of the use of ἐπί and σύν with the dative, of which he remarks, that in such instances "alone it may be allowable to say, that the case depends upon, or, as it is sometimes expressed, is governed by the preposition." Thus, the adverb and preposition are regarded as both equally belonging to the verb, with this difference, that the preposition shows its direction and the adverb its other modifications.

As respects the meaning of the different cases, the author holds that the idea of special reference lies at the basis of the genitive, that of limitation, of the accusative, and that of ultimate object, means or place of the dative, while of these relations the prepositions are employed to distinguish the manifold varieties. The second and larger part of the work consists of a detailed treatment of the prepositions one by one with a view to ascertain and classify the various modifications of their meaning.

In the main, Dr. Harrison's generalization is just, yet there is a point where it seems to us to come short. Why was it deemed necessary to subdivide the dative any more than the genitive? The philosophy of the language is as harmonious in one as the other. To make two or three cases out of either of them, after the example of the Latin, Polish or Sanscrit, is to impose upon the Greek the defective generalization of languages, which were the outgrowth of less comprehensive and less subtle thinking. It is also inconsistent with the spirit of Dr. Harrison's own work. We cannot regard the dative as merely a common termination upon which two or three different cases have accidentally fallen. For if that were so in one declension, it would be very strange should it happen in all three. It is beyond a doubt that the Greek mind intended the dative to be one. On this point, it seems to us that Jelf's theory covers the true doctrine of the Greek language. "A sentence expresses a thought or succession of notions, standing in certain relations and order to each other." To the principal notion any other "must stand in one of three relations; it must either have preceded it, or be implied in it as part of it, or must follow it; whence these three relations may be called antecedent, co-inci-

dent, and consequent. Hence, strictly speaking, no language can have more than three cases; but as the development of the original powers of the language kept pace with the requirements of a more civilized state of society, in which the various relations of things and persons were more accurately perceived and distinguished, it followed naturally that in many languages, the original relation of each case was, as it were, split into several, and the parts so separated were expressed in language by a corresponding modification of form. In Greek, however, the original number was retained," "the genitive case expressing the notion, which, in the mind, precedes the principal notion of the thought, that is the antecedent," the accusative, the co-incident, and the dative the consequent. Of course, there is no invariable order, in which those elements of a sentence are necessarily regarded by all minds, and whether an author would use the genitive or dative in certain circumstances would depend greatly upon the order existing in his own mind; but the same exception must be made whichever theory is adopted.

It is not that we reject the distinctions so carefully and justly made; but that we claim for the Greek language the comprehension of them all under a more general principle. True philosophy, at the same time, separates the ramifications of its subject, and more nearly and firmly unites them at their source. The tendency to multiply causes is as unphilosophical as that of confounding effects.

Yet this remark should not be unattended with a full statement, that the very spirit and aim of Dr. Harrison's book, as a whole, are those of the principle now alluded to. It is a genuine product of philosophical scholarship; in style, plain, clear, and unaffected, remarkably free from the hardness almost native to the subject, it spreads out the manifold, and sometimes apparently contradictory particulars, in the light of their common kindred, until the humblest intellect cannot fail to be impressed with both. A calm and sober reliance for determination of meanings upon classical usage, is another commendable feature of the work, and the more commendable where previous practice has indulged so largely in fanciful

speculation, and where even a scholar like Donaldson could lay out his strength in mere splitting of syllables, and torture of the alphabet. Etymology is an indispensable key to classification, as Dr. Harrison uses it, but a very unreliable guide to actual idiom. And without idiom the student gets only the hard machinery of a language. The etymological frame-work, no matter how beautiful in its order, how nice in its adjustments, is but the skeleton. It is the rich and varied meaning associated therewith in the usage of society, and springing from all the endless wants, and thoughts, and emotions of men, that clothes it with life, and makes it at once, history, prophecy, and poetry, as well as philosophy. And yet how often is this fact forgotten by gentlemen into whose hands the interpretation of ancient authors sometimes comes, and who seem to think that, however far an English word may follow the course of suggestion from its etymological home, in ancient languages such a thing was not to be anticipated. Certainly we do meet with renderings of ancient writings, and, we are sorry to say, not unfrequently of the Holy Scriptures, which seem to be constructed on that assumption; as if Greek and Hebrew had never indulged in following the wants of human life, but been imprisoned all their days in the narrow canals of etymology, and a grammar as stiff and invariable as the rules of algebra. And we suppose that nothing short of an occasional stumble into obvious absurdity will ever open the eyes of such persons to their error. For, as you cannot give a rule for every delicate shade of idiom, you can never convince them that it exists. Nothing but a large acquaintance, familiar, thoughtful, and genial, with the literature of the ancient tongues, can entitle any one to the honours of a critic of their idioms. We deem it the highest praise of Dr. Harrison's book, to say that its results are reached through that most scholarlike channel. Much of his material has, it is true, been obtained at second hand, as is obvious upon inspection, but he merits the high praise of having rightly estimated it.

Such scrupulous discrimination of words may appear to many a matter of little value—the trifling exactness of the pedant. It is to be borne in mind that the most beautiful

shades of thought, like those of colouring, are the most delicate, and consist of the most minutely divided elements; and that it is precisely by attention to the smallest things that the highest approaches to truth, in art as well as science, are attained. These nice distinctions are the portals alike of philosophy and poetry. It is thereby that we have access into the most sacred places of thought, and are enabled to behold the great and beautiful conceptions of Plato and of Æschylus in their true magnitude, and something like the brilliancy of their pristine colours. When an astronomer is preparing his lenses, and adjusting his levels, and screws, and pivots, and cobweb lines, an uninstructed observer might say that he is expending a ridiculous amount of attention upon small things. Why not take in the great idea of the heavens, in the gross, without these little cares? Nay, these little things are his only means of grasping true conceptions of the great. It is by the cobweb lines in his telescope, the infinitesimals in his calculations, that he measures the magnitudes of distant worlds, and tells their revolution in their spheres. So in language, the mind, which takes no cognizance of fine distinctions, is necessarily blind to much of the truth which it contains, and to all the world of its beauty.

Although in working out the system presented in this volume, and in demonstrating its correctness and universality, there was needed a nicety and fulness of detail, which is more than practical, yet the final results, thereby attained, are principles of hourly application by the scholar, which, if correct, must throw their light upon every sentence he reads.