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THE ANABAPTISTS IN SWITZERLAND.

[From the unpublished History of the Reformed Church by the
late Lewis Mayer, D. D.]

From *Germany* the spirit of fanaticism and misrule penetrated into *Switzerland*. There were not wanting in this country combustible materials that needed only a spark to kindle them into a conflagration. The peasantry, who lived upon the lands which belonged to churches and monasteries, had long groaned under the burden of tithes and rents, and of fees that were paid to these institutions for every spiritual function, and for every act to which a religious aspect could be given, besides other oppressive exactions, and in addition to the taxes for the support of the civil government : and they felt their burdens more, and were more impatient under them, when they observed how their hard earnings were consumed, by crowds of priests and monks, in a voluptuous and profligate idleness, and how they were treated by these insolent ecclesiastics with haughtiness and disdain. Like their brethren in *Germany*, they sighed for deliverance, and were ready to rise against their oppressors, as soon as a prospect of success should appear, or the sanctions of religion should give firmness and vigor to their desire. Intelligence of the German insurrections, and of the new prophets

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should take the homiletical part between them. This would be an organic development and improvement of the Reformed worship. To make this more fully appear however, we must enquire more particularly concerning the principles of Evangelical worship, in general.

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BROWNSON'S REVIEW AGAIN.

The last number of *Brownson's Quarterly Review* contains an article of some length, in the way of reply to our January paper on its championship of Romanism. We have no reason to complain of the tone and spirit with which it is written. It gives us full credit for sincerity and honesty of purpose, and takes pains to treat us with manly consideration and respect. It shows itself duly sensible also of the merits of our argument for Protestantism; as far as this could be considered at all possible for a standpoint so thoroughly Roman, as we have already found that to be which is occupied by the respondent. As a whole, of course, our reasoning is set down as fallacious and false; and an effort is made to burden it with consequences which are fatal to the whole idea of Christianity; but care is taken, at the same time, not to charge these consequences upon us directly as part and parcel of our own faith. We are supposed to be entangled in them unconsciously and by implication, rather than with clear logical insight. This is all polemically right and fair. The true consequences of a system have legitimate force against it, whether its advocates have ability to perceive them or not; and it is always proper to drag them into view for this purpose, so far as a superior logic may render it possible. We object not to the severity of some of Dr. Brownson's representations, in this view. If the results he tries to fasten upon us were indeed necessarily involved in our arguments it would deserve much of the censure it is made to receive at his hands. We should ourselves join him heartily in its condemnation. We own no such results as our own. If they belong to our system, they have no place at least in our mind or heart. It is our logic which must be taken to be at fault in this case, and not what we cherish and value as our faith. We are not yet brought, however, to acknowledge any such dualism here between these two orders of thought. Not only do we repudiate the irreligious consequences in ques-

tion, as no part of our faith; we do not allow them either to be fairly deducible from our philosophy or theology. On the other hand, the positions taken by Mr. Brownson, at certain points, seem to us clearly to confirm what we have already urged in the way of objection against the Roman system. It is not necessary to say that he shows himself at once acute and profound, and that the weapons of his warfare are handled with dexterity and power. The argument belongs to a field, where few are so much at home, and has to do with topics which few are so well fitted to manage with effect. But with all this, his dialectics, on the great subject here at stake, are by no means equal to the task he has undertaken, in pretending to vindicate Romanism at the bar of reason. To our mind at least, the plea remains as before defective and unsatisfactory.

The grand aim of Mr. Brownson, in this article, is to run us into *panteism*; such a view of the universe as confounds it with the idea of God, and so resolves itself at last into pure autotheism or nihilism; "to which" he says, "we have shown over and over again, all Protestantism, whatever its form, has an invincible tendency." To this end flows, he tells us, the view we take of the relation between subject and object in the constitution of the world, as well as what we say of the relation of the general to the particular. To affirm that the object without subject is unreal, or a pure abstraction, amounts with him to an affirmation that all reality is subjective, in the sense of Fichte, and that the objective as such has no existence whatever. This, we are told, is to make God himself dependent on the thinking and willing of men. He is reduced at best to the character of infinite void, mere abstract possibility, seeking to become *plenum*, full, or real in the life of the world. But such abstract possibility is a nullity, can do nothing, bring nothing to pass; "then there is no world, and if there is no world, and God is a nullity, nothing is or exists," and so we are landed in pure nullism, or nihilism, as just now said. To the like result is carried out by the Critic our view of the relation between the natural and the supernatural. To affirm an organic or inwardly living correspondence between these different spheres of existence, is to confound and overthrow, he thinks, the distinction by which they stand apart. God must be out of the world, and beyond it altogether, in order to be truly self-existent and independent. So in the sphere of nature; and so also in the sphere of mind or will. The Critic will hear accordingly of no *autonomy* in this latter world. "Nothing can be worse than this," he tells us, "for it supposes the law is created, and in part at least by

man himself." To make man active at all in the constitution of the law, is taken to be tantamount to a claim of self-creation in his favor; which must be regarded of course as a full lapse again into the vortex of pantheism or nullism as before. Our view of the relation between faith and divine truth, is made to plunge headlong over the same awful precipice. To require a real inward union of the two, in such sense that the first shall appear the very form under which the second has its subsistence for men, is to reduce this last to the character of a simple abstract possibility. "It is the object that gives the form or species," the Critic tells us, "and to contend that it is the subject, is simply making man, if creation is supposed, the creator, and God the creature,—that is, man makes God, and not God man!" Such a theory leaves no room, of course, for the idea of revelation, in any true and proper sense. And so, finally, our Christology, the view we take of Christ's person and the mystery of the incarnation, is charged with the same general fault, as tending to break down the distinction that should of right hold perpetually between the order of nature and the order of grace. Christ, we are told, is the author of the new creation, but no part of it in his own person; just as he is the old creation, only *mediante actu creativo*, by the act of creating it, and in no more intimate way. To make him the real fountain of Christianity itself, is gravely represented as a full identification of his life with that of his people, and runs, we are told, into palpable pantheism.

Mr. Brownson, as we have before said, does not mean to lay all this to our charge, as something contemplated and proposed on our part with heresy prepense. He means only, that our premises lead necessarily to such end. We think it well, however, to put in here a formal disavowal of the pantheistic conceptions, one and all, which are supposed thus to lurk in our system. The idea "that God is real being only in that he is creator, and actually creates *ad extra*," is none of ours. We have not the slightest sympathy with the theory of Spinoza. We believe the world to be God's free act, and as such in no sense necessary to the fulness of his own being. We have never dreamed of any such autonomy on the side of the created will, as might make it the source or reason of the law. This we hold to be of absolute and universal necessity, though ten thousand worlds should conspire to set its power aside. We recognize fully the distinction between the natural and the supernatural, and the necessity of revelation for the purposes of religion. Faith never makes the truth it is brought to embrace; it simply makes it to be truly present, and so authenticates its existence,

for the sphere of created intelligence into which it is thus actually introduced. We carefully distinguish Christ from his Church, while yet we hold them to be in a deep sense one, even as the head and members are indissolubly joined together in the living constitution of one and the same body. Most certainly, "we are not made one with him in the sense of identity with him, nor are we *deificated*." The position of Christ, as we have taken occasion often to say, is absolute and central; while that of his people is relative only and peripheral. He is the *only* begotten Son of God; we are sons only through him, by adoption and living insertion into his life, the process of what the Scriptures call eating his flesh and drinking his blood, as the true condition of all righteousness and immortality.

But now, as we take it, the truth, in opposition to these several pantheistic consequences charged upon us by Mr. Brownson, does not stand on the other side in their simple negation and contradiction. There is another class of conceptions in this form, and which the common understanding is always prone to lay hold of as the necessary and only alternative in the case, that go just as directly and surely in the end to exclude God from the world, and to unsettle all the foundations of religion. These are comprehended collectively in the idea of *dualism*, or abstract deism, which may be taken as the immediate reverse of what is properly pantheism in the bad and false sense. It may be said that dualism involves a great truth, the actual distinction of God and the world; and this we are freely willing to admit; but it is just as certain, on the other side, and just as necessary too to be affirmed always, that pantheism also involves a great truth; such a truth indeed as may be said to meet us on almost every page of the Bible, as well as from the inmost and profoundest depths of our own religious nature. That is a poor and cheap orthodoxy, in any case, which stands barely in the rejection of error in some one direction, while it makes no account of the danger, always at hand, of falling under the power of its natural counterpart in a direction just the opposite. We are bound to do justice, in the case before us, to the truth which underlies pantheism, as well as to that which underlies dualism; and we are not more bound to fear and avoid heresy in the first shape, than we are bound to avoid and fear it also in the second shape. It has been our wish at least, and our honest endeavor, to keep clear of both extremes, as well as to acknowledge and honor the great truths out of which both grow. Mr. Brownson, we are sorry to say, in common with a large amount of what we conceive to be bad Protestantism, (the almost universal thinking,

we might say perhaps, of New England,) turns the two phases of thought into the form of a simple syllogistic dilemma, where one horn is the only resting place from the other, and avoids and rejects thus the pantheistic extreme only in such a way as to lay himself open, in our estimation, to the charge of dualism. We distinguish of course, as he also has done in our case, between his theory and himself, and speak of what the first is by necessary consequence, as it strikes our own mind, rather than by open and direct avowal; although at some points, the general consequence itself might seem to be not indistinctly allowed, in the particular propositions by which we find it indirectly affirmed. The facility with which he throws us continually into the wrong, serves only to illustrate, as we take it, the fault and wrong of his own position. It shows this to be itself a dialectical extreme, whose very character it is always to condemn in a wholesale way, as its own opposite, all that is different from itself, or that carries towards it in any way the aspect of negation. No such extreme can ever live by simply killing its opposite; but only by coming to a true inward reconciliation with it in the power of a higher idea, whose province it is, in such case, not to destroy absolutely on either side, but rather as regards both to complete and fulfill.

Abstract deism, as distinguished from the true *theism* of Christianity, it is hardly necessary to say, is not in and of itself an exclusion absolutely of God from the world. It prides itself rather in being an acknowledgment of God, under the character of the great first cause and end of all things. In this view, however, he is taken to be always out of the world, beyond it, over and above it, and in no sense truly immanent in its constitution and life. His relation to the world is that of a mechanician to a machine. It is the product of his mind and hand; it works according to his will; it goes forward under the superintendence of his eye; while he remains himself, whether near at hand or afar off, wholly on the outside of it, abstract and independent altogether as another order of being. Such dualism may refuse the idea of revelation entirely; but it can with equal ease also allow it, after its own fashion. In the first case, it is mere naturalism or rationalism, in the most direct form; teaching that man has no need to go beyond the world as it now stands, for the solution of the problem involved in his existence; and that he must be necessarily inaccessible indeed to the literally supernatural, for the reason simply that it *transcends* his own nature, and so cannot enter it in the way of real knowledge, or appropriation. In the second case, we have abstract

supranaturalism ; which owns and seeks the supernatural, in the Bible or in the Church, as the necessary and at the same time possible complement of the natural, but will not allow still the chasm to be in any way filled that sunders the one from the other. The relation remains at last, what it was at first, extrin-sical and mutually exclusive ; while all conjunction in the case is found to be mechanical only, and thus more or less magical and unfree. A general convenient illustration of both these er-rors, is furnished by the question concerning inspiration. Ra-tionalism reduces it at once to a nullity, by resolving all into the natural activity of the human mind. Abstract supranaturalism asserts on the contrary a higher activity, the moving power of the Holy Ghost ; but in doing so, at the same time, sets the Di-vine wholly on the outside of the human ; in consequence of which, this last sinks into the character of a mere passive organ or instrument, in the service of the first. The error in this form is of course more respectable than the error in the other form ; but in both cases the proper truth of the doctrine is missed, and its rightful authority more or less overthrown. Inspiration tran-scends nature ; but it is on the other hand a real entrance of the supernatural into this lower sphere. The Bible in this respect is just as thoroughly human, as it is found to be also heavenly and divine. The evidence of this meets us from every page and line. Not merely are the words human words ; but the thoughts also are human thoughts, as intimately joined with these words as thoughts are in any other case with their own lan-guage, which we know to be the very intimacy itself of soul and body. No two of the sacred writers think alike or speak alike. On the contrary the individual nature of every one of them is exalted, and so made to be more specifically peculiar and characteristic, through his gift of inspiration, than it would be if presented to us under any other circumstances. *How* all this is accomplished, is not here the question. We have to do only with the fact. This includes two sides ; one natural and the other supernatural ; which however do not stand each on the outside of the other, in such a way that the action of one becomes all and the action of the other nothing ; but are so brought together as to be both truly and really concerned, as joint factors, in the result which is brought to pass. Holy men of old *spake*, as they were *moved* by the Holy Ghost. The speech is *human* speech, in all respects, under Divine motion. Any theory of inspiration which leaves this out of view, or which implies the contrary in any way, is of course radically defective and false.

And so, we say, in the relation which God sustains to the world generally, as its Creator and Preserver, we are required to see neither pantheism nor dualism; neither a necessary self-explication simply of his own being, on the one hand, nor yet such an outwardness and disjunction, on the other hand, as implies in fact two different worlds, two separate and independent spheres of being. Even Nature itself has a constitution and life of its own; it is no mere apparition or shadow; its powers are real powers; its laws are true laws; it is not in this respect a mere system of *occasionalism*, the inefficient show only of what is taking place, while all in truth proceeds by immediate act of God. And still under this form, it can never, for one moment, or at a single point, be sundered from God; it subsists in *Him* continually, as the very ground of its whole constitution; its powers and laws are of no force, save as they flow forth unceasingly from the activity of his will. This activity is just as full, as omnipotent, as universally present, in the preservation of the world from hour to hour, as it was in its original creation. Not a sparrow falls without his hand. In Him, really and truly, we live, and move, and have our being. Of him, through him, and to him, (*ἐξ αὐτοῦ, καὶ δι' αὐτοῦ, καὶ εἰς αὐτόν τὰ πάντα*, Rom. xi. 36,) from him as their beginning, in and by him as their constant cause and medium, and to him again as their absolute and universal end, are all things. *Such* pantheism the Bible teaches, and we are bound to admit. It is the very character of a true childlike religious faith itself, thus to see God in the stars, to hear him in the winds, to mark his stately goings in all the processes of nature. And so when we rise from the world of mere Nature up to the world of Mind, as this meets us in the constitution of man, it is still always the same mystery we are called to admire and adore. God is different from the thinking, and willing, and working of men; and yet all thought and will are conditioned and made possible, only through the universe of life which has its seat in himself. He is the foundation of the moral world. It holds throughout in the presence of his intelligence and the activity of his will. Truth and freedom exist from him, and by him, as their necessary ground. The law which upholds all ethical relations, and by which the organical structure of society subsists, is the utterance continually of his very life. History, unfolding from age to age the progress of humanity, is not something separate from God; full as little certainly, to say the least, as any such thought may be tolerated of the course of dumb blind nature. It moves throughout, though in a free way, in obedience to an all comprehending law or plan,

as truly as this may be said of the planets; and this law resolves itself finally into the intelligence and will of Him, who is at once the beginning, the middle, and the end of all things. The intelligence and will of God are immanent in the process itself; so that it may be said truly to be a revelation of what he is in the world; just as we may say the same thing of the natural heavens, which *declare* his glory and *show forth* his presence in the most direct and real way. This is not Buddhism. History is not necessary to complete God himself; as nature is not necessary either for any such end. It is no process of self-evolution, by which he is to be regarded as coming to be actually what he is otherwise only potentially, the transition of the logical Nothing into the logical Something; God as pure being into God as the living universe. History is not an emanation of the Divine life, in any such sense as to be the necessary form of this life itself. God is complete without it, and lives with absolute fulness beyond it in the way of personal self-consciousness and freedom. He is the free cause even of his own being; and how much more then of all his works. But still in such free view, we have a right to speak of history as the actual presence notwithstanding of his life, as the very form in which he reveals himself so as to show forth in an actual way the sense of what this life contains. By being free, it does not cease still to be God's act, and in this view a process of real self-explication, by which he comes forth from the depths of eternity into the syllabled speech of time, and so makes himself known for the adoration of angels and men. We see no pantheism in this; but only the pure living theism of the Bible, in opposition to the dead mechanical abstractions of that dualistic deism, which converts the world into a grand watch, and sees in the Maker of it the clever artist only who has contrived and set in motion its wheels and springs.

"Following modern philosophy," Mr. Brownson says, "which teaches that God is real only in that he is creator, the Reviewer can assert that God lives, is living God, only by asserting that he lives in the life of the world, that is, as he explains it, 'in the thinking and willing of single minds.' His system seems to us to be based on the supposition, that God comes to reality only in the life of the universe, and that the universe, whether natural or supernatural, is simply the evolution or development, that is, realization, of the abstract potentialities or possibilities of the Divine nature. — Hence the significance and sacredness of history. It is God's realization of his own potentiality, in space and time, or his *coming* to reality."—P. 208. This, it

will be seen, is a wholly false view of what we have wished to say. It makes no distinction between a necessary emanation and a free act, and reduces to the conception of a physical process what we hold always to be the work of intelligence and will in their highest form. Even the necessity by which God himself exists, what is sometimes called his *aseity*, we hold to be a free necessity, and not a blind fate excluding thought and will; for this would shut us up to the everlasting impersonal *substance* of Spinoza. 'The being of God is his own eternal act, resting in nothing and conditioned by nothing beyond the free activity from which it springs. All his works of course are no less free. But for this very reason, on the other hand, they have no subsistence save by the immanent force of his all-producing will at every point. The world has its end no less than its beginning, its *terminus ad quem* full as much as its *terminus a quo*, in God only. It is not in this respect like a plan which an artist projects, and then carries into execution. Plan and execution fall here completely together. To suppose an outward reason or aim of any sort, in the Divine Mind, is in truth to subject his action to a foreign force, and so to overthrow the absolute aseity of his nature. The universe must be taken, from first to last; as wholly and only from himself. The law itself in this view is his work. True, it is eternal, and has its seat in the very nature of God; but it has its seat there, not out of any necessity by which his will may be supposed to be ruled from behind itself, but by the infinite activity of this will itself.

It may now appear in what sense, and in what sense only, we have ever dreamed of allowing man a will or voice in the constitution of the law by which he is required to be governed. "To assert man's authority, or right to be governed only by his own will," according to Mr. Brownson, "is to deny that he is under law, or bound at all to seek God as the Sovereign Good. Does the Reviewer maintain that we are not morally bound to seek God as our ultimate end? Does he deny all morality, and assert that man is free to live as he lists?" Nothing of this sort, we reply; nothing of this sort whatever. All we mean to say is, that mind is not matter; that morality is not nature; that the law of freedom, to be different from the law of blind necessity, must come to its actualization in the world, not in the way of merely outward force under any view, but through the self-moving spontaneity of its own subjects, the thinking and willing of the created minds in which it works and reigns. The planets obey a law which they have no power to accept or not accept; it is in them, but not from them or of them in any way;

and for this very reason their action is blind and unfree. So throughout *Nature*, as such. Its very character is to be without autonomy in its own order of existence. The Moral, on the contrary, as distinguished from the Natural, is self-conscious, self-active, in a certain sense we may say even self-productive, and in such form truly free. It is not made, except as it at the same time makes itself. It is not moved, save as it originates its own motion. It stands, like all created existence, in the power of law; but the law here is not from abroad simply, as in the case of mere nature, not objective and outward only, but inward also and subjective; it is brought to pass, comes to its actualization in the world, only in the form of being apprehended and willed by its subjects. On the outside of such self-conscious life it can have no being in the world whatever. Turn it in any way into mere blind force, simple outward compulsion, and all proper morality is at an end. The necessary medium of its revelation, the very element in which it exists and makes itself felt, is the self-moving activity of the life it is formed to bind; which at the same time has full power to be untrue to itself by refusing the authority of its proper law, and which can be rightly bound by this in the end only as it receives the law freely into its own constitution, and so enacts it into force for its own use. Mind thus, by its very constitution, is required to be autonomic, self-legislative, a true fountain and source of law for itself; while the law notwithstanding has its ultimate ground only in God, and can be of no force whatever as the product merely of any lower intelligence. Objective and subjective here must fall absolutely together. The will without the law is false; denies its own proper nature; falls over to the sphere of bondage and sin. But the law, on the other hand, without the will, has no power either to accomplish its proper work. Only as the law, previously necessary by Divine constitution, is *willed*, freely embraced, affirmed and constituted, by the created intelligence it is ordained to rule, so as to be at the same time the product of this, its own act virtually and deed, can there be any true escape from the idea of slavery, any true entrance into the sphere of freedom, any morality or religion in the full and right sense of these terms. It is this union of law and will, necessity and liberty, not outwardly but inwardly, which brings the life of man emphatically to its proper form. This is what we mean by the autonomy of the human subject, the right of man to be governed by his own will and not simply by a heteronomic force acting upon him from beyond his will, the voice that belongs to him properly in the constitution of the law which he is called to obey.

Our objection to the Roman doctrine, as we understand it to be exhibited by Mr. Brownson, is that the law objectively taken is so far sundered from the activity of the obeying subject, as to be in fact set over against this in the character of another nature altogether, and under a wholly outward form. Objective and subjective are made to fall apart dualistically into two distinct worlds. We do not wish to confound them, to mix them together, or to make one absorb and destroy the other; we recognize their difference; but still we object just as strenuously also to this abstract separation. Allow that we may not be able to show in what way precisely the two interests of authority and freedom flow together, this is no reason still why we should give up the claims of either in favor of the other. We may not subordinate authority to the independence of man, so as to make him his own lord and master, with liberty to follow simply his private pleasure; but just as little have we any right to affirm such separate mastery in favor of the law, to the exclusion of man's mind and voice. Authority on the outside of the will, in no union with it, standing over against it simply as a foreign force, though it should be the authority of God himself, can bring with it no strength, no freedom, no life. The case demands an inward mediation; such an entrance of the law into the sphere of the subject's own life, that it shall seem to be part of his very nature, and to grow forth spontaneously from the activity of his will. It is the "law of the spirit of life in Christ Jesus," the law as the power of self-moving spirit in the soul itself, that makes it free from the law of sin and death. This implies oneness of nature between the power that binds, and the activity which allows itself thus to be bound; and it is only on the ground of such correspondence that the relation requiring them to be so joined can be said to hold from the beginning.

Mr. Brownson charges us with great confusion, as well as fundamental error, for making object and subject dependent on each other in the realization of truth, and for resolving the first separately taken into the general, as distinguished from the particular; which, as he tells us, to make the object the product of the subject, and in the end to overthrow the existence of particular concrete objects altogether. We still say however, that there can be no truth or law in the world of mind under a purely objective form; for the reason that intelligence and will are needed to make room for any such existence, and to bring it actually to pass. Truth exists, *as truth*, only by being known. Blot out all knowledge, all consciousness, all thought, and you blot out all truth at the same time. Intelligence is the light in which it reveals its presence, the very form in which it becomes

real. Will it be said, that is to make God himself dependent on the thinking and willing of men, and so to resolve his being into mere void, or abstract possibility, seeking to become *plenum*, full and real in the life of the world? We reply, by no means. God is at once Object and Subject, in the most universal sense. His existence is the absolute union of both. As object merely, without self-knowledge and self-activity he would not be the God of the Bible, but the very abstraction of Buddhism itself, the infinite Nothing from which it is pretended here so anxiously to fly on the other side. To conceive of God as necessarily existent under a purely objective form, without regard to his own intelligence and will; as though these had to do with the first in a secondary way only, finding the object at hand previously for their use; is a thought in its own nature fatal to all sound theology, full as much as the imagination which allows him no independent personality whatever. Dualism in this shape, is only pantheism back upon us again with a new face. The necessity by which God exists, as we have before said, is a free necessity; it has ground, not from beyond his own will, but in the activity of his will itself. He is eternally self-produced. His being is not merely an object, but an *act*, his own act, going forth always from an exercise of thought and will. In this consists his Personality; which at the same time is *absolute*; carries in itself no reference to any object or thing beyond itself, but affirms itself with illimitable self-sufficiency from within as the Infinite I AM, which is at the same time and must be the everlasting ground of all life and being besides. And so then in the constitution of the universe under God, object and subject can never fall absolutely asunder, but are required to go always together as joint factors in the determination of all proper *reality*, in the world. Nature itself exists only for mind; and in this view, moreover, the proper truth and sense of it are found not at all in the single particular things belonging to it as these may be perceived by the senses merely, but in the ideas rather they reveal and represent, which come from beyond, which are always general or universal in their nature, and which can have no being or presence in the world whatever, save under the form of thought and by the activity of self-apprehending and self-moving intelligence. Truth thus, in the moral world under God, considered as objective merely is always something general. So is law. In such form exclusively, however, they can have no force in the concrete constitution of man's life. For this purpose, they must become subjective, or in other words enter into the sphere of particular thought and will. This is not to

subordinate them in any sense to the power of such thought and will ; as though truth and law might be considered the product simply of men themselves. Men make neither truth nor law. These have an absolute necessity beyond their will, and underlie the very order out of which their whole existence springs. But still truth and law actualize themselves in the world, become concrete and thus real for men, only as they are incorporated with their life, and pass over in this way from a purely objective character to a character which is at the same time subjective and individual.

In this realization of reason and law, however, their character as general is not lost. It is not every man's thinking and willing privately taken that can thus make room for them in the world ; but only such private thinking and willing as are comprehended in the life of the world as a whole. In this way mind collectively taken is more always than mere single thought and will ; not simply as it is the aggregate of individual opinions numerically joined together, but as it brings us nearer also to what may be considered the proper wholeness of truth under its objective form. Reason and law work thus objectively in the constitution of the moral world, as a most real power lodged in the very structure of our collective life ; something which is in such view wholly different from all merely private intelligence, as well as independent of it while it is only by means of this at the same time that it can ever bring itself to pass or make itself felt. This objective revelation forms the medium accordingly, the necessary and only medium we may say, through which mind in its individual capacity is brought to communicate with truth in a truly living way. The communication is not separate and direct, but by the intervention rather of a more general rationality, in the bosom of which the single mind is of necessity born and matured and perpetually carried. Purely private reason is an absurdity ; and so just as much is private will. The absurdity is not relieved, however, by setting authority over against either, in the form of truth or in the form of law, in a purely abstract and outward view. The abstraction here is full as bad as the negation. The case calls for a concrete mediation of the single and the general. This we have in the actual structure of the human world ; where reason and law are found touching men continually, not in an abrupt and isolated way, (what Dr. Bushnell styles the *ictic* method,) but mediationally always, through the organism of the human life itself collectively taken, and by means of relations that bind the single subject indissolubly at all points to the great living, rational and

moral mass, of which he is a part and without which he can be nothing. God does not bring his will nigh to men in a direct way, but through some living constitution more broad and general than themselves, which they are bound, as well as naturally prompted, to regard and reverence for this very end. His authority utters itself through the family; through right public opinion; through art and science; through the civil state; through the course of history; and above all, though in full conformity with the same general law, in the Church catholic as this has stood from the time of the Apostles down to the present day, and is destined to stand also to the end of the world, the pillar and ground of the truth, against which the gates of hell can never prevail.

In this way, we recognize fully the vanity of mere private judgment, in the great business of religion, and the need of authority to assist us in settling rightly the high and solemn questions with which it is concerned. This authority too, we see plainly enough, must be something more than the letter of the Bible, as each man separately taken may have power to read it for his own use; since this necessarily resolves itself at last, under such view, into that very private judgment and will, from which the problem is to find some sufficient escape. It is in truth the essence of rationalism itself, to make the single mind, in such style, the source and measure of Christianity; and it is only a circumstance in the case, that the Bible may happen to be taken as the ostensible platform of such independent thinking, while another sort of rationalism sets this also aside, and falls back fairly and openly on its own resources in the most naked form. We acknowledge the need of something more here than the Bible, thus made the sport and plaything of private judgment. Christianity is a living fact in the world, which as such carries along with it, to the end of time, its own evidence and its own authority. In this form it constitutes the Church. We own and confess the authority of this body, the one holy catholic Church of the Creed, as both legitimate and necessary for the proper constitution of the Christian faith in all ages and lands. When those who would make the Bible *per se* the source of Christianity, refer us at the same time to the influence of the Holy Ghost as going along with it and securing its right use, we see clearly enough that all such illumination must be regarded as fanciful and vain, if it fall not in with the general law of our nature just noticed, by which the presence of truth for the individual mind is conditioned and mediated by its relations to mind in a more comprehensive view. We have no right

to conceive of the Spirit, as working in any such abstract way. It is against philosophy, against experience, and against the clear representations of the New Testament itself. As the Spirit of Christ especially, the medium of the new creation which began to be revealed on the day of Pentecost, he is at the same time the Spirit of his Church, the one and the self-same power that is active in all the saints, as they form collectively his mystical body, and are thus the fulness of him that filleth all in all. The authority of the Spirit then is to be expected and sought, like all other manifestations of God's will in the world, not under an abstract character, but under the form of concrete life; that is, in the bosom of the Church, by which and through which only it comes to such revelation. But now when the Romanists, to meet this acknowledged want, refer us to their Church outwardly considered, or to the Pope as its visible head, for an authority which is declared to be infallible at all points, and always at hand, for the solution of all religious questions, we seem to ourselves at least to encounter, under a slight change of aspect only, the very same difficulty we have wished to escape from on the opposite side. The Church or the Pope here is made to stand mechanically in the place of the Bible, as the organ of the Holy Ghost; whose authority is then supposed to reach over to the single believer, through such outward medium, in a purely abstract quasi-magical way, without any regard whatever to the standing order of our life, which demands in every such case, as we have seen, a concrete living revelation, by the force and power of which objectively the individual mind may be brought to assert a corresponding activity in a truly free way. We object not to the idea of authority in the case; but we wish an authority that may show itself truly moral, answerable to the constitution of humanity, compatible with the idea of freedom. No authority, it seems to us, can be of this character that is absolutely abstract, that comes upon the subject as an abrupt and isolated *mandamus* from a higher sphere. To be really from God, it must legitimate itself by entering the sphere of the life it seeks to rule; it must take concrete form in the world; it must win for itself a living human activity in the social system, which in the case before us becomes the Church, whereby it may have access to individual thought and will in conformity with the general law of our nature. Let it appear that the decisions of the Pope, though taken to be moved by the Holy Ghost, are the product in some way of the general life of Christianity, rationally working out the result through such central organ, according to the law of man's nature as otherwise known; and

we can at least listen patiently to the plea that is put in for his infallibility. But this is not the view that Romanism is willing to allow. The infallibility must be set quite above the standing order of our life. The authority is lifted clear out of the process of humanity, and in this way ceases to be concrete and historical altogether. It has no objective mediation in the actual constitution of the world. It is wholly abstract, transcendent, superhuman; and so in the end it is not moral; leaves no room for freedom; but runs into despotism, spiritual legerdemain, and magic.

We have never meant to deny the supernatural; nor yet to make it the same thing simply with the supersensible, the world of pure thought as distinguished from the world of sense. Our objection to Mr. Brownson is, not that he sets the supernatural out of nature over it and above it, but that this *transcendence*, in his hands is carried to the point of such an absolute disruption of the one world from the other as amounts at last to downright dualism, and leaves no room for the accomplishment of any real conjunction between them in the life of man; which, however, at the same time is the necessary conception of all religion, and the very form especially in which the idea of Christianity becomes complete. We see not how such a real conjunction should imply anything like a full sufficiency on the side of nature, left to itself for the actualization of the supernatural as its own product; but it does seem to us certainly to require a constitutional fitness and capability on the part of the first, for apprehending with some inward connatural grasp, the presence of this last when brought within its reach. We question not the full objectivity of the supernatural, as an order of life above nature; only we ask that a corresponding subjectivity be allowed also on the part of man, whereby he may be able to receive the object which is thus higher than himself into true union with his life, so as to be lifted by the power of it, not magically but rationally, into its own superior sphere. Such directly receptive capacity we take to be inherently at hand in the gift or faculty of faith. Faith carries in it a real inward living and rational correspondence with the truth it is called to embrace; and in this view it belongs to the proper original nature of man, though a divine influence is needed certainly to bring it into exercise. Such drawing out of the subjective capacity of our nature, however, by no means implies that the truth itself is drawn out in this way; just as little as the awakening of sight in a previously blind eye would imply, that the surrounding world was brought to pass by its becoming thus an object of vision. What else does our Saviour mean when he

says: No man can come to me, except the Father draw him; He that is of God, heareth God's words; If any man will do my will, he shall know of the doctrine whether it be of God. For the reception of Christ, all depends on a certain inward sympathy and correspondence with the truth revealed in his person, a real receptivity for the supernatural on the side of the human soul itself, such as all men ought to have, but only some men have in fact.

To affirm such a rational correspondence between faith and its object, is not to affirm by any means the full intelligibility of this last for the human mind. The world of sense is not at once understood, by being apprehended as an object of sense. Still this apprehension carries in it the relation of a real inward connection with the intrinsic nature of what is thus perceived as real and true. So here. The object supernatural, according to the measure of each particular revelation, is substantiated and made to be real, not objectively of course but in the sphere of the human mind, by the power of faith, touching it, falling in with it, embracing it, and so admitting it into union with man's life, though it be still by no means fully comprehended. Faith is not itself the truth it embraces; just as little as the Holy Ghost is the same truth, in making way for it to the believer's soul; but it is nevertheless truly the very form under which truth exists in the soul, as the Holy Ghost also is the real medium by which such result is brought to pass. Supernatural truth is for man no truth at all except as it is "mixed with faith" in them that hear it. The language of St. Paul, Heb. xi. 1, taken in connection with the whole chapter, clearly implies, we think, that faith is such a power of grasping invisible and eternal things, as serves to authenticate them, and to make their reality actually felt, as truly as the things of sense are felt in their own way. By it, for instance, we know that the worlds were framed from nothing by the word of God. We get that by no ratiocination, and by no outward testimony; but in the form rather of a direct response on the part of our religious nature, to the word that addresses faith directly out from the constitution of the world itself.

But this, Mr. Brownson tells us, is to exclude *testimony*, as the necessary medium of faith. "Even Divine testimony is not to be credited, it seems, according to our German Reformed Doctor, till we have examined what it testifies to, and satisfied ourselves by our own light that it is true, and worthy to be believed" p. 204. But this is not a fair representation of our meaning. What we have objected to is the idea of a purely outward evidence in this form, coming between the believer and the truth

to be believed, and engaging his assent to this on grounds wholly extrinsic to the truth itself. Certainly we allow the testimony or word of God to be the true foundation of faith. The question is simply, how this testimony is to be obtained. *Can* it be conclusively ascertained in a purely abstract way, as something sure and full on the *outside* of the revelation to which it requires our assent; according to the view taken of faith, if we understand Mr. Brownson rightly, in the Roman system? We think not. The whole revelation, be it less or more, commencing with the miracle or primary seal and reaching out to all that is spoken, must be regarded as entering into the evidence by which the presence of the Divine Speaker is authenticated and his testimony accredited. This is not to make the word more certain than the Speaker, but only to set the Speaker before us under a form worthy of himself, and sufficient to command faith. When we have, in such circumstances, the Presence of God joined with its proper concrete relations, these serve of course to complete the evidence of the adorable fact; but it is still the Presence itself, as the centre of all, which at the same time legitimates and proves the reality of the whole revelation. So the world of Nature proclaims the being and glory of God; but only as the idea of God himself, discerned by faith, comes into view through Nature, and in the midst of it, to authenticate it as his own spoken handi-work and word. The miracle seals properly a Divine commission; but not abstractly; not magically; otherwise no direction could have been given, (Deut. xiii. 1-5,) to destroy a wonder-worker using such argument in favor of idolatry and falsehood. The miracle, to prove truth, must have a certain moral constitution; must be surrounded with right relations; must proceed from a worthy quarter and look to a worthy end.

So Christ stands commended to faith certainly by evidence *ab extra* as the Son of the living God; only however as he is himself the *Light*, which sheds on all such evidence its full significance and power. The knowledge which Peter had of Christ, (Matt. xvi. 17,) came not of course by mere sense; it was from God, and not in any way from flesh and blood; but still it was not a secret whispered in his ear in this form from beyond Christ's person. The truth was *there* before him, with self-authenticating force in Christ himself; and it was his peculiar privilege to see and feel *in Him* the living glorious SHEKINAH which he was in fact.

But here our limits require us to stop.

J. W. N.