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## THE CAMPAIGN OF THE ALLIES

### THE SURRENDER OF LORD CHARLES CORNWALLIS


WE have little conception of the difficulties that surrounded Washington and his compatriots during the year and a half preceding the capture of Cornwallis. The resources of the country were well-nigh exhausted; many had been drawn to the battle-field and there perished, and so great a number still remained in the army that the mechanical industries of the people were nearly ruined; villages were more or less dilapidated, while innumerable farms were lying waste for the want of cultivation. The influence of the war overshadowed the whole land, blighting its progress, and interfering with the comfort and success of the people. The Continental money was next to worthless, and that issued by the separate States was even of less value. Distrust of the ultimate success of the struggle discouraged many of the people, yet there was a gleam of sunshine in the hearts of the hopeful few; their zeal never flagged, and their intelligence prompted them to make great personal sacrifices in the expectation of securing for their country liberty and independence for all future time.

Another impediment to the success of the patriots was the multitudes who sympathized with the royal cause, some no doubt from pure, and some from sinister motives. Among these disloyalists were many who were unwilling the Colonies should separate from England, which they characterized by the endearing name of "Home." They were proud of her glories in literature and arms, and claimed them as part of their own inheritance. Another class of the more unenlightened among the Tories were often disloyal from an indefinable reverence for the persons of the royal family, and of their shadow, the aristocracy. These clung to the cause of the king for the reason they were unable to comprehend the vast importance to themselves and their children of being separated from England and untrammelled by her restrictions and influence as a sovereign.

The limited means of movement at that time from one portion of the country to another cannot be fully appreciated by the people of to-day, who have so many facilities for easy and rapid communication with each other. Sir Henry Clinton had his main army in New York City, in whose harbor was also a large and effective British fleet; Cornwallis had an army in Virginia three or four hundred miles distant, and other generals commanded troops stationed still further south in the Carolinas and Georgia; between these points were no places occupied by British troops. These armies were all accessible by sea from Sir Henry's headquarters in New York, while for the patriots the only way was by land—a route long and tedious, with bad roads to be passed over on horseback, on foot or by means of cumbersome wagons. The advantage on the part of the British to transport soldiers and military stores, was in comparison almost incalculable; in addition they were supplied with the most approved war material of the time, while the army of the patriots was as indifferently accoutered as their opponents were well armed and drilled. The war vessels of the United States consisted of only two frigates; the others had been either captured or destroyed.

ARRANGEMENTS OF THE PATRIOT TROOPS—In the winter of 1780-81, and spring of the latter year, the troops under Washington were camped so as to threaten New York City, while to repel a movement from Canada, should one be made, a portion of the State forces were stationed at Albany. At West Point and along the Hudson in the Highlands, were troops from New England; at Pompton, New Jersey, were the soldiers belonging to that State, and at Morristown was a portion of the Pennsylvania contingent. The French army, for the most part, was wintering at Newport, Rhode Island, while one legion, that of the Duke de Lauzun, was at Lebanon, Connecticut. Washington had his headquarters in a central position, at Windsor on the Hudson. In different parts of the South were stationed American soldiers—militia and Continentals—under Lafayette, Gen. Greene and the Baron Steuben.

The disposition of troops in the northern division was owing to the fact that the main portion of the British army was located on Staten Island, and in New York on Manhattan Island; in the harbor was moored their fleet—the right arm of their power. Yet they were confined closely to the city, not daring even to make foraging raids very far into the country, because they were liable to be roughly handled by the patriots, who were on the lookout, and their arrangements were such that almost



on the appearance of the marauders, the whole country was immediately roused to repel them. Philadelphia, at that time, had the larger population, but not being so accessible from the ocean as New York, the British commander had his main army in the latter city, in whose harbor he could have his fleet for the purpose of defence, and in readiness to send aid wherever needed.

AFFAIRS IN THE CAROLINAS—When Cornwallis captured Charleston, the capital of the Colony of South Carolina (May 12, 1780), he imagined he had subdued the whole region. Thinking, perhaps, capital cities in the Colonies bore the same relation to the surrounding country that they did in Europe, we may judge his surprise when the numerous patriots under Sumter, Marion and others were continually harrassing his foraging parties whenever they ventured out from his main army. There was, it was true, the quiet of a conquered land, but of one in which the people were waiting only for a favorable opportunity to fly to arms. Since the disastrous defeat of Gates at Camden (August 16, 1780), Cornwallis had better reason to suppose the conflict in that section virtually ended, but in a few months Gen. Nathanael Greene appeared as Commander of the American forces; by his indefatigable exertions, and skillful handling of his men, he kept his lordship busy in warding off attacks, especially in unexpected quarters.

In the South the state of affairs was sad indeed; Whigs and Tories were unrelenting foes; they ravaged in turn the whole region, destroying private property and burning the houses of each other. There is no sadder picture of the horrors of the Revolutionary struggle than the fiendish animosity toward each other that seemed to pervade the souls of the Whigs and Tories of these States. Why it was is hard to define. Under such repeated pillagings and raids, that whole section became almost a desolation. The three States of North Carolina, South Carolina and Georgia, were in the ordinary sense subdued, as their most important points were occupied by the British.

Early in the year (January, 1781) was fought the battle of Cowpens, in which Gen. Daniel Morgan defeated Col. Banastie Tarleton, the noted British cavalry officer. Then commenced the pursuit of Morgan by Cornwallis with a superior and well equipped army; but after a forced march of two hundred miles, the latter found himself completely baffled and forced to fall back, to be in turn closely followed by Gen. Greene, now in command. At length a conflict took place near Guilford Court House, N. C., from which place Greene fell back, after crippling his

adversary so much that really the gain was on his own side; while Cornwallis marched northward, leaving the Carolinas to the care of Lord Rawdon. About a month later (April 25), was fought the battle of Hobkirk's Hill, S. C.—a drawn battle, but the advantage, if any, was on the side of the Americans. Soon after several fortified places fell into the hands of the patriots, and Lord Rawdon retired to within a short distance of Charleston. Both armies remained inactive during the hot weather, except the skirmishing of foraging parties, till the battle of Eutaw Springs (Sept. 8, 1781), which in the main resulted favorably to the Americans, though in none of these engagements were they equal to their enemies, either in numbers of regular soldiers or equipments. In these various conflicts, and in the movements connected with them, Greene displayed remarkable skill in deceiving his enemies, and in striking where he was least expected.

THE MARCH OF CORNWALLIS TOWARD VIRGINIA—After the battle of Guilford Court House, the army of Cornwallis was so much reduced in number that he resolved to fall back by way of Wilmington, N. C., toward the North. He tarried in the vicinity of the former place sometime, to refresh his troops and await reinforcements, intending as soon as prepared to return southward to aid the royal cause in South Carolina. Meantime he learned that Greene, who had been cautiously following him, attacking his foraging parties and cutting off his messengers, had suddenly turned, and was far on his way toward Camden, S. C., where Lord Rawdon was in command. It was useless to attempt to overtake Greene or to make an effort to aid Rawdon; the risk was too great, for if he went in that direction he might be hemmed in by the patriots and distressed for provisions, as that whole region had been swept over more than once by the opposing forces. His army had been on the move for the greater part of a year, having, it was estimated, marched and countermarched more than a thousand miles, through a country in the main bitterly hostile, the roads being few and very difficult to travel. These considerations induced him to move northward from Wilmington to join Gen. Phillips by appointment at Petersburg, Virginia. He commenced his march about the 1st of May, the distance being more than two hundred miles. Phillips had superseded the traitor Benedict Arnold, about one month before (March 26, 1781), in the command in Virginia.

Previous to this time, Arnold had been marauding for some months in that region, though closely watched, and sometimes attacked, by

Baron Steuben ; he was not prevented, however, from effectually pillaging the country along the James and the lower portion of its tributaries, but did not dare to venture far from navigable waters. On one occasion he appeared before Richmond and offered to spare the place if permitted to carry off the tobacco in store; this was refused by the Governor, Thomas Jefferson, and he burned a portion of the village. This part of the State was specially defenceless, as the slaves were numerous and the planters few in comparison. Baron Steuben was in general command in Virginia; he had, however, a small force of only five or six hundred militia, having sent all the men he could spare to aid Gen. Greene in the Carolinas.

There had been a plan laid to capture Arnold, and Washington in the early spring sent Lafayette with troops and artillery to aid in the enterprise. The French also sent, under the command of De Tilly, a sixty-gun ship and two frigates to surprise the British vessels in the Chesapeake, but Arnold learned of the expedition, and withdrawing his shipping up the Elizabeth river into shallow water, the French had to content themselves in lying off in their large ships, while those of the enemy were safely anchored twelve miles distant. Soon after, another French naval force was sent from Newport to cooperate with that in the Bay, and with the army expected under Lafayette, but they were pursued by the British fleet. These fleets met off the Capes, and after a short conflict, without definite result, they parted. The French were so disabled that they returned to Newport, and the English entered Chesapeake Bay. This was the fourth time the French fleet had failed to cooperate effectually with the American land forces. Arnold was now reinforced by two thousand troops under Gen. Phillips, who, as has been stated, assumed command.

We may imagine the disappointment of Lafayette and his wearied soldiers, who had reached Annapolis, when they learned that the fleet reported at anchor in the Roads was the British and not the French, as they had reason to suppose. The object of the expedition was defeated. After some delay, caused by the blockade of the port by the British vessels, the troops were withdrawn to the Head of Elk, and marched early in April to Baltimore, where Lafayette refitted his men. Marching them southward, he joined Steuben in Virginia, and took command of the forces there.

**BRITISH RAIDS AND OUTRAGES**—When Cornwallis joined his forces with those in Virginia and assumed command, he resolved to crush

Lafayette before he should receive the reinforcements said to be on their march from the North, under the command of Gen. Anthony Wayne. He was so confident of success that, in writing to Sir Henry Clinton, he represented himself as having the Marquis within his grasp; in consequence the latter, in a dispatch to the home government, said: "Lafayette, I think, cannot escape him." When Cornwallis moved from Petersburg to unite with the fresh troops sent from New York under Gen. Leslie, Lafayette was at Richmond, but having an inferior force, he retreated towards the north to meet Wayne, who was approaching with a portion of the Pennsylvania line. Cornwallis crossed the James below Richmond, and moved rapidly in pursuit, but finding it impossible to prevent their junction, he fell back toward the lower James.

There has been in the American mind a peculiar odium attached to the traitor Arnold, because of his committing so many outrages in Virginia. As much disgrace should attach to the name of Cornwallis for the ravages committed by his immediate command. His cavalry speedily scoured the country, and seized all the horses they could reach; these were considered at the time to be the finest in the colonies. Gen. Greene, when passing through Virginia on his way to the Carolinas, urged the planters to remove these fine animals into the interior, lest they should be captured to replenish the British cavalry. The advice was disregarded, and ere long about six hundred of Tarleton's men were mounted on horses, great numbers of which had been trained for the races, common in that State. Oftentimes the marauders wantonly cut the throats of colts that were too young to be of service for cavalry. Outrages of this character were not perpetrated elsewhere during the war. Tarleton ravaged the country, destroying stores of provisions and crops; he attempted by a bold dash to capture the members of the Legislature, then in session at Charlottesville, and came near making a prisoner of the Governor himself, Thomas Jefferson, in his home at Monticello. For some reason he would not permit the premises at Monticello to be injured; yet, "under the eye of Cornwallis," another farm of Jefferson was thoroughly plundered, the growing crops destroyed, the horses carried off, and the throats of the colts cut, while the barns and fences were burned.

INDECISIVE CONFLICTS—Lafayette and Wayne, having united their forces, immediately moved, and by a rapid night march presented themselves in front of Cornwallis and, being joined by large numbers of the

militia, their force made so formidable show that the British general thought it prudent to fall back to Richmond, and finally down to Williamsburg (June 25). Lafayette was now joined by Steuben, and his entire army amounted to about 4,000 men, one-half of whom were regulars or Continentals. He sent detachments that interfered materially with the foraging parties of the British army, meanwhile advancing with his main force toward Williamsburg.

About this time Sir Henry Clinton became much alarmed at the demonstrations making against New York. He expected to be attacked by twenty thousand men, and believed that De Grasse, when he learned that Cornwallis was out of reach, would sail to New York to assist in an attempt on that city. This theory seems to have made him afterward unable to give due weight to evidence coming to his knowledge respecting the movement of Washington toward Virginia. He now sent an urgent demand to Cornwallis for reinforcements from the British army in Virginia.

To comply with this requisition, Cornwallis moved all his force toward Portsmouth in order to embark the troops. Lafayette cautiously followed, intending, if opportunity served, to attack the rear-guard of the British army when the main portion had crossed the river, but the wary Cornwallis, suspecting the design, laid plans to deceive his pursuer. Accordingly on the 6th July he sent over his pack-horses and wagons to an island in the James, and of these he made a great display. Meanwhile Tarleton deputed a dragoon—who pretended to be a deserter—and a negro, to throw themselves in the way of the Americans, and announce to them that the main portion of the army had passed over, and only the rear-guard was waiting to cross. The story seemed plausible, and Wayne was sent to make the attack; he was to be supported by the main body. Wayne, moving rapidly forward, apparently surprised a picket, which, in accordance with orders, after a resistance lasting only a few minutes, retreated. Thus encouraged, Wayne dashed on, when presently he found himself confronted with what seemed the whole British army. In a moment he divined the stratagem by which he had been deceived; his fearless spirit suggested his course. He at once sounded a charge, and his Pennsylvanians, nine hundred strong, and three cannon in full play, with shouts of victory, dashed against the enemy. This vigorous attack continued for a few minutes, when, at his command, the men as speedily fell back, losing, however, their cannon, the horses which drew them being killed. Cornwallis was in turn bewildered; the sudden and

vigorous assault, as well as the rapidity with which the Americans retreated, disconcerted him. He refused, as it was growing dark, to permit his men to pursue, lest they should fall into an ambushade. The following day he passed over the river and proceeded to Portsmouth; but, when in the act of sending a detachment on board the ships, he received another message from Clinton, informing him that he had been reinforced by three thousand Hessians from Europe, and he should not need more troops.

According to Stedman, Sir Henry Clinton at first favorably entertained the idea of Cornwallis, when he had joined Phillips, of making a raid north, along the Chesapeake and up the valley of the Susquehannah. He was led to think of such an expedition by the representations of Tories, who assured him if a British army would make its appearance in that region, there would be an uprising of the loyalists. Cornwallis was not so sanguine; he had little faith in promised uprisings of these gentlemen, and in consequence he was opposed to the whole scheme. Perhaps he also called to mind his experience in being harrassed when marching through the thinly settled Carolinas, and reflected that on the shores of the Chesapeake and up the Susquehannah the population was much more numerous. He would only enter upon the movement when ordered; and he intimated his willingness to return to Charleston and take command there.

Sir Henry Clinton also took occasion to inform Cornwallis of the rumors afloat that the Count de Grasse, then in command of a fleet in the West Indies, intended to visit the American coast. Sir Charles Rodney, who was on the West India station with a British squadron, gave it as his opinion that De Grasse would go to the Chesapeake. This information seemed to allay the fears of Clinton, as a French fleet in the bay could not injure the forces under Cornwallis. It appears never to have occurred to him that possibly Washington, by forced marches, might lead his army from the Hudson to the Chesapeake, nor did he avail himself of the suggestion of Rodney, to send a fleet to counteract the plans of the Count. Cornwallis on his part felt equally safe, as he wrote to Sir Henry Clinton he could spare him twelve hundred men to aid in defending New York.

The home government and Clinton were both unwilling to abandon the control of Chesapeake Bay and Virginia; hence an order was sent to Cornwallis to select some place accessible from the sea, and there fortify himself. This order came with the message countermanding the previous one to send a reinforcement of troops to New York. To



comply with this command, on the 26th July, 1781, Cornwallis chose Yorktown and Gloucester Point. These are on opposite sides of York river, which here narrows to about one mile in width, and are accessible from the bay, which is about fifteen miles distant. His army now amounted to nearly eight thousand effective men. He began to throw up strong entrenchments, while a number of ships of war were moored in the river.

**THE FRENCH FLEET, AND DELAYS**—It was long evident to Washington and Congress that if success was to be obtained, the superiority of the British naval force must be overcome. This could be done only by inducing the French government to send a sufficiently large number of men-of-war to the American coast. Hitherto it had seemed fated that the French fleet should fail to cooperate with the American land forces. Congress some time before had commissioned John Laurens of South Carolina, one of Washington's Aids, to France for the special purpose of inducing that government to send a strong fleet and a large number of troops to the United States. Laurens was remarkable for his pleasing manners no less than for his diplomatic ability; he succeeded in obtaining the promise of a large fleet and a body of troops, and also a loan of money, which amounted to more than a million dollars. In accordance with this promise, Count de Grasse sailed (March, 1781) from Brest with twenty-five sail of the line, on board of which were several thousand troops—the greater portion of the latter, however, were designed for the West Indies.

While the operations already referred to were going on in the southern section of the country, nothing special was done in the northern except to watch the enemy's forces in New York, and make preparations to capture the city. To obtain that result was utterly impossible without a sufficient naval force to overcome that of the British in the harbor, and for this assistance Washington was waiting till it could be sent by France, and also for the States, severally, to furnish more soldiers and supplies.

**INSUBORDINATION**—On the first day of this eventful year (1781) a revolt of an alarming character broke out in the Pennsylvania line stationed at Morristown, New Jersey. Their sufferings were great, and what they deemed the indifference of Congress to their wants roused their indignation, and led them to leave their camp and march in an

orderly manner direct to the doors of that body, then in session at Philadelphia, and demand redress in person. These men, though guilty of military insubordination, were every one of them true to their country's cause, but were for the time exercising, in this irregular way, their rights as freemen to ask a redress of grievances. Says Gen. Wayne, their commander, "they were poorly clothed, badly fed, and worse paid; exposed to winter's piercing cold, with no protection but old worn-out coats, and but one blanket between three men." They received relief for the present, and marched back to their camp, after delivering up to their officers the emissaries of the British commander, who had sent them to seduce the mutineers from their duties as patriot soldiers. In less than a month afterward, influenced by the success of the Pennsylvanians, the same spirit was manifested among the Jersey troops stationed at Pompton; they, too, for the same reason, mutinied. Now there was danger lest insubordination should spread throughout the army, and the latter rebellion was put down with some severity. Yet there was evidently great dissatisfaction in the army; the soldiers were intelligent and understood for what purpose they were in arms, and they had received the impression that Congress wasted much precious time in wrangling over questions of minor importance, while some of the States had apparently grown indifferent, and failed to furnish supplies in food and clothing. The soldiers no doubt compared their hard lot with the comfort enjoyed by other able-bodied men at their well furnished homes. We must bear in mind, however, that Congress had not full power to enforce its own decrees, which took more the form of urgent advisory resolutions than of laws to be obeyed; the weariness incident to a seven years' war: the utter prostration of commerce and industry, except to provide the necessaries of life, had almost paralyzed the energies of the people. It was only the hopeful, the intelligent, the persevering, that bore up—meanwhile encouraging their desponding neighbors—and performed as best they could their own duty, to supply the wants of the soldiers. With this state of feeling in the army, we may imagine what would have been the ultimate issue had it not been for the cheering prospect of help from France, both in fleet and land forces.

**THE POSITIONS OF ARMIES**—During the summer and autumn of 1781 the British army held two important positions. The capture of either would have a decisive effect upon the contest. One was New York, in which was their main force, and from which reinforcements of men,

ships and war material were sent as required to other points, especially to sustain operations in the South; the other position was that held by the army of Cornwallis in Virginia, where rumor said it was preparing to winter. It was possible, under favorable circumstances, to capture either of these before aid could come from the other.

It was thought best to make an attempt on New York, as the French army, which had been for nearly eleven months at Newport, was ready to move in aid of the enterprise. Preparatory to making the attack, the available roads leading to the city were repaired and new ones cut, while its fortifications were carefully reconnoitered. Washington's headquarters were at Windsor, a few miles from West Point; his entire force did not amount to five thousand effective men, though he had nominally nearly seven thousand. Owing to the defects of the militia system then in force, the army had not been increased to the full number authorized by Congress, which had *resolved* to have thirty-seven thousand men under arms at the beginning of the year. But the resolutions of Congress or of the State Legislatures were of little avail in rousing the exhausted country. British marauding parties in force were continually pillaging the country for miles around the city; they called it foraging. The most effective of these depredators was a band of Tories under Col. Delancy, whose place of rendezvous and stronghold was in the vicinity of Morrisania, Westchester county. Up the country from that place to near Washington's lines, these marauders made the whole region almost a desolation, driving from the farms the live stock, and carrying off the grain when harvested. These worthies were characterized Cow Boys by the inhabitants, because of their aptness in seizing the patriots' cattle.

PLANS FOR A CAMPAIGN OF THE ALLIES—Word was brought Washington that the Count de Barras had arrived at Boston to take command of the naval force of the French then at Newport, Rhode Island. De Barras also brought intelligence that the Count de Grasse was soon to sail with a large armament to the West Indies; but twelve of his ships were to come to Newport, in order to relieve the French squadron stationed there, and that these ships were to bring an additional number of land forces. This reinforcement was expected to arrive in July or August.

Count de Rochambeau received fresh instructions from his own government, and arrangements were made for an interview between Washington and the Count, at Weathersfield, Connecticut, on the 22d May,

1781. Many plans were discussed; among others to send a land force to aid Greene in the Carolinas. These troops would be compelled to march the entire distance, as the French squadron, which might have carried them, was closely blockaded in Newport harbor by a superior British fleet. The main objections to this plan were the long march, the difficulties of transporting war material, and the season of the year being summer, the heat of which in that climate was dreaded so much as to become an obstruction almost insuperable.

It was therefore thought best to strike a blow at New York. The time seemed propitious, as, owing to the large detachments which had from time to time been sent to the South, the garrison was comparatively weak. To capture this stronghold, with its immense amount of war material, appeared to Washington and the patriots as most important. Here was the British fleet, which had absolute control of the harbor and all the waters accessible to it; its position was central. If once taken, the outposts in the South would succumb, and the struggle, it was thought, must virtually end. Accordingly, to carry out this enterprise, arrangements were made at the council, and soon the French troops were on their march from their quarters at Newport, delighted to be relieved from the irksome monotony they had experienced during the preceding eleven months, and with the hope of seeing active service. Their march through the country was enlivened by the manifestations of welcome made by the inhabitants, who cheered them as friends.

In order to make the capture certain, Washington wrote to the Governors of the New England States and New Jersey, calling upon them to render assistance by filling up their quotas of men. With all these exertions the American army was not materially increased, and his letters written at the time show the mortification caused him by this deficiency. The only apology was the utter prostration of the country, both in respect to its finances and the fewness of the men found to enter the army. The Legislatures passed energetic resolutions, and so did Congress, but neither had the power to enforce them. Meanwhile Rochambeau dispatched a vessel to inform De Grasse of the plan of operations, and urge his cooperation.

ROBERT MORRIS, THE AMERICAN FINANCIER—The efforts of one patriot must here be mentioned. Robert Morris was a successful merchant of Philadelphia, and one of the signers of the Declaration of Independence. He grasped the idea of furnishing the "sinews of war,"

by conducting the money matters of the government on a specie basis (1780). Heretofore the management of the finances had been entrusted to a committee of Congress, no two of whom seemed to have had the same views on the subject. One man of true education knows more than a multitude of the ignorant; and one common sense and thorough practical financier knows more than a regiment of theorists. Morris urged Congress to establish a *bank* as an agent to transact the finances of the government. The Bank of North America—our First National bank—was chartered for ten years, with a capital of \$2,000,000. The fact that it was pledged to redeem its notes in coin, inspired confidence in its success. The public at once looked favorably upon the scheme, and those who had the means invested in the bank, both as a profitable investment and as a patriotic duty. The credit of Congress began at once to revive, and finally attained a point never reached before. By this means Morris was enabled to pay the soldiers to a certain amount, and furnish supplies for the army. He accomplished this by sending as agents discreet men to secure in the way of business, all the coin they could obtain, thus keeping his vaults replenished, and when notes were presented they were promptly redeemed. The result was that soon the notes of the bank were received for all demands, and the Continental money passed out of use. Morris was now of immense service in furnishing provisions for the army on the Hudson.

DEMONSTRATIONS AGAINST THE CITY OF NEW YORK—Now began a series of reconnoiterings in the vicinity of the city. New roads were cut through the woods and others repaired. It was known that a large force of the British was absent foraging in New Jersey, and the opportunity was seized to make a sudden and vigorous attack upon New York during their absence, and meanwhile fall on Delancy's Tories who were stationed at Morrisania. The latter attack was to be made by the French, who were to march from Ridgebury, Connecticut, and Washington himself was to throw his troops between the routed Tories and the upper end of Manhattan Island, then to pass Harlem River, capture the posts or stations near at hand, and work his way down some miles to the north side of the city. But soon after the movement began it was ascertained the British force had returned from Jersey, and their boats were in the Hudson. To surprise the forts was now out of the question, yet the expedition was successful in meeting and attacking a large foraging party of fifteen hundred Tories and others which had set out the same morning to ravage the lower end of Westchester county. The latter made haste

to abandon their stronghold and retire over Harlem River to the island, where they reported that they had been attacked by a large force.

These continued demonstrations convinced Sir Henry that an assault was imminent, and when the plan to move against Cornwallis was conceived and the necessary arrangements were making, he would not credit the surmises of the British officers stationed nearer the American lines, who began to suspect that a movement was about to be made other than upon New York. These officers communicated their suspicions to Clinton, but he seemed to be thoroughly impressed that the apparent change of programme on the part of the patriots was purposely designed to mislead him. One of the most earnest of these officers in persisting that the prospective movement would be against Cornwallis and not New York, was Von Wurmb, a Hessian officer, stationed at Kingsbridge. But Sir Henry was stubbornly predisposed to believe all indications that seemed to foreshadow an attack upon his own position.

**THE ALLIED ARMIES**—To secure unity of action, Congress had conferred full and perfect authority upon Washington in the northern and southern departments, and France, for the same reason, had also placed her troops under his command. The two armies were now encamped—at Dobbs Ferry and on the Greenberg Hills—within striking distance of New York, and were waiting for a French fleet to cooperate. Recruits were coming in slowly, notwithstanding the urgency of the occasion, yet there was no relaxation in reconnoitering and making preparations for the grand attack. Count de Rochambeau sent a swift-sailing vessel to inform De Grasse, who was in the West Indies or on his way thither, of the intended effort to capture the city, and to urge his cooperation with his fleet. Meanwhile (Aug. 14) there came a French frigate from him to Newport, bearing dispatches, saying that he would sail on the 3d August with a fleet of some twenty-five or thirty war vessels, having on board a land force—not to New York, but to the Chesapeake. This announcement necessarily changed the whole programme; the disappointment was very great to Washington and his officers.

**THE OVERRULING HAND**—We at this day can see, in the influences that led to this disappointment, the hand of an overruling Providence, which Washington and the Christian patriots of that day so much delighted to recognize. It is very doubtful if the combined forces could have captured New York at all. The situation was such that only on the north end of Manhattan Island could it be assailed by land forces,

and if a landing were made at this point, the city was still several miles distant, every foot of which was capable of being defended, if not successfully, at least sufficiently to cause a great loss of life to the assailants. The Hudson could be patrolled by the British men-of-war, whose cannon shot could easily sink the transports used in conveying troops across below the Harlem River. The British had also control of the harbor, and with the aid of the forts around its shores and on its islands, could have repelled the French fleet, if it attempted an entrance; but only the smaller vessels could come in, the pilots giving it as their opinion that the large men-of-war belonging to the French could not cross the bar at Sandy Hook. In addition to this, both the British fleet and the garrison had in the latter part of June been strongly reinforced. The sacrifice of life on the part of the combined army would certainly have been very great, and even if successful, much more than in the capture of Cornwallis, while virtually the result in either case would have been the same; the crippling of the British force in the Colonies to such an extent as to lead ultimately to the acknowledgment of the independence of the United States. Moreover, British military affairs had arrived at such a crisis, that the capture of either New York in the North, or of Cornwallis in the South, would have brought about the end of the contest. The English people were becoming inclined to give up the conflict, as they became more conversant with the true state of the case. We can now see how merciful to the Americans was the non-appearance of Count de Grasse at New York with his fleet, for had he come the effort to take the city would certainly have been made.

CHANGED PLAN OF CAMPAIGN OF THE ALLIES—The announcement that De Grasse was about to sail for the Chesapeake led at once to the change of plans; there was no alternative. The attack must be made on Cornwallis, and the army must march nearly four hundred miles to accomplish it. To secure success it must be far on its way before Sir Henry Clinton could discover or suspect the object of the march, and to "misguide and bewilder" him, reconnoissances were ostentatiously made on the north of the city towards Kingsbridge, and on the opposite west side of the Hudson, as if an attempt was to be made to throw a force across that river. The British no doubt learned from spies of the boats built at Albany and originally designed for this purpose. These demonstrations had the desired effect on Sir Henry. After it was decided to march to Virginia, letters were written at Washington's headquarters, as if in relation to an impending attack upon the city. These letters were

purposely sent in such manner as to insure their interception, and when brought to Sir Henry they confirmed him more than ever that he was to be attacked without delay. Nor did this system of misleading end here; in addition, a space was marked out for a camp, as if for a large army in New Jersey opposite Staten Island, and numerous ovens were built and fuel provided for baking bread in immense quantities, while numbers of row-boats were prepared and kept in sight as if to ferry troops across the narrow channel to the island. Spies and Tories were unmolested in conveying to the British headquarters accounts of these preparations.

The wisdom of exercising great caution can be seen in the manifold difficulties in the way of this long march in the heat of summer from the Hudson River to the York. These adverse contingencies were all taken into consideration by the Commander-in-chief, and in no instance during the war did he display more sagacity than in the plan and execution of this movement, and in his complete outgeneraling of Sir Henry Clinton. The passage in ships from New York to the lower Chesapeake could be completed in a few days, while it took almost as many weeks for an army to reach there by land. If Sir Henry, who was proverbial for his tardiness, had been prompt, he might have interfered seriously with the expedition, even after he was assured that the movement was against Cornwallis. He could have sent a large number of ships of war, and of men, and perhaps been able to land strong reinforcements at an available position. Keeping the secret so carefully required the greatest caution; only one or two of the officers of the higher rank knew the destination of the allied armies, much less the ordinary soldiers. The armies commenced their march on the 19th of August, and in little more than a month they came in sight of the British works at Yorktown.

THE MARCH OF THE ALLIES—The movement covered by a final demonstration against New York, the armies, in two divisions, set out on their march toward Yorktown. Not a soldier was aware of their destination. When the American division was first put in motion as if to march toward Kingsbridge over the Harlem River, they were unexpectedly ordered to face about and move north along the east side of the Hudson; the following day they began to cross the river at King's Ferry. Meanwhile the French army was moving from the vicinity of White Plains toward the same river, heartily cheered by the grateful people along their route; two days later they crossed at Stony Point, both armies having with them their artillery and military stores.



Major-Gen. Heath was placed in command of the army left to watch the enemy in New York, to guard the Highland passes, and as far as possible to protect the surrounding country from marauders. The two armies marched across the Jerseys (east and west as then known); the French toward Trenton on the Delaware, and the Americans in the same general direction. To facilitate the rapidity of the march, wagons in great numbers were obtained from the farmers along the two routes, to carry the heavy arms and knapsacks of the soldiers. Both armies had reached the Delaware before Sir Henry became aware that a march had been stolen upon him; to what extent he was still uncertain.

When the Americans found themselves at Philadelphia, they suspected their destination to be Virginia, and demurred to marching south under the broiling sun. They were also dissatisfied with the lack of pay, as the want of money debarred them from purchasing many comforts, to do which they had now an opportunity. Providentially John Laurens had arrived a month before from France, bringing with him a large supply of clothing, of arms and munitions, and what was specially needed, about half a million dollars. Robert Morris was at hand, and with a portion of the money brought by Laurens, the amount raised by himself, and twenty thousand dollars borrowed from De Rochambeau, he was enabled to pay the soldiers a portion of the money due them, and they promptly moved on in the line of duty.

The incidents on this hurried march were few. The American division was the first to pass through Philadelphia, amid the cheers and blessings of the better portion of the inhabitants, who appreciated the labors, the privations, the dangers to which these patriotic men were exposed. In their appearance the two armies were in striking contrast; the one wore coats having little uniformity of style, and showing the effects of hard usage in being somewhat shabby. They were preceded by the music only of the fife and drum, so common. On the following day came the French, who had halted outside the city to burnish their arms and carefully brush the dust off their beautiful uniforms of white broadcloth with colored facings; they were preceded by a complete band of music of many instruments, a novelty to the majority of the spectators. They were admired for their orderly bearing and neat appearance, and they too were warmly received and cheered as friends and allies.

**BRITISH ATTEMPTS AT A DIVERSION**—The combined armies were beyond the Delaware (Sept. 2d) before Sir Henry Clinton began

seriously to suspect their destination. He had heard of movements in the Jerseys, but not sufficiently definite, as he thought, to act upon; at first he took for granted they were a mere ruse designed to draw him from the city into the open country, where the superior numbers of the American and French forces might be made available. The reports of their rapid march, entirely across the Jerseys, he still hesitated to credit. Evidently in accordance with this theory, he hastened to create a diversion, which would compel a portion of the armies to be sent back for the purpose of defending places in the vicinity of New York. He first caused a rumor to be circulated that he intended to make an assault on the posts in the Highlands; of course this was to divert the attention of Gen. Heath, who was in command in that region, lest he should send assistance to those whom Clinton really designed to attack; then Arnold was sent to ravage a portion of Connecticut. The latter, in order to avoid Heath, passed up on the south side of the Sound, and crossing over from Long Island suddenly appeared before New London, the fortifications of which were very imperfect, and after a heroic defence, the main work, fort Griswold, was taken, the town plundered, and many outrages committed. At the fort fell Col. Ledyard, the cousin of the celebrated American traveler, after he had surrendered his sword, which was immediately plunged into his own breast. This was on the 6th September, and Clinton learned definitely on the 10th that Washington had crossed the Delaware. If he really believed at the time of his sending Arnold, that the allied armies were on their march to Yorktown, he never committed a greater blunder than to suppose detachments would be sent back nearly two hundred miles to prevent a raid, which would be ended and the marauders out of harm's way long before the force thus sent could reach the scene of action. It is evident that when Clinton sent Arnold, he thought the movements in Jersey a ruse; in this whole matter he seems to have been unaccountably deaf to reason.

Gen. Washington and Count de Rochambeau hurried on in advance of the army, and arrived at Williamsburg on the 14th September, and a few days later held a council with De Grasse on board of his ship, the *Ville de Paris*, when arrangements were made to prosecute the siege of Yorktown. Meanwhile the combined armies moved on till they arrived at the Head of Elk river, now Elkton, about eighteen miles from the bay (Sept. 6th). Here were found about eighty vessels of various grades sent by Lafayette and De Grasse to transport the soldiers and their war material to Virginia, while the horses were sent round by

land. The transports arrived at the harbor of Jamestown on the 22d. A part of the forces were marched by land to Annapolis, where vessels were in waiting to take them down the Chesapeake.

**CORNWALLIS IN THE TOILS**—Cornwallis was entirely ignorant of the toils that were quietly weaving around him; closing in from the South, from the North, and from the ocean. His surprise may be imagined when suddenly a powerful fleet of French men-of-war appeared in the roads, and when he learned that Lafayette and Steuben were prepared to cut off his retreat to the Carolinas, while an effective army, composed of Americans and French, were on their way floating down the Chesapeake. Though realizing that the plans concerted for his capture were about to be successful, as became a brave commander thrown upon his own resources, he began the more vigorously to fortify his position with the determination to resist to the utmost. Sometime before he had been so confident of maintaining himself, that he wrote Clinton he could spare him twelve hundred men to aid in defending New York.

The French fleet under Count de Barras sailed (Aug. 28) from Newport for the Chesapeake to unite with that under De Grasse; the latter expected De Barras and was on the lookout for him, but when Clinton learned that this squadron was to sail from Newport, he divined its destination was the Chesapeake, perhaps to join another fleet from the West Indies, of which rumors had reached him. He immediately dispatched Admiral Graves with a naval force to intercept De Barras, Graves was surprised to find De Grasse already anchored within the Capes, and the latter equally surprised when he saw that the ships in the offing composed a British fleet instead of the one he expected. De Grasse immediately took measures to decoy the British Admiral away from the mouth of the Bay, by putting to sea in order that De Barras might have an opportunity to slip in, as he knew from the time the latter had probably left Newport that he must arrive shortly. Therefore, avoiding a general engagement, De Grasse commenced to skirmish, meantime slowly receding from the shore, and the Admiral followed so far that De Barras passed in unmolested. This irregular fight lasted about five days, most of the time being taken in manœuvering. When De Grasse thought De Barras had had time to reach the Bay, he returned within the Capes, and there found the latter safely anchored (Sept. 10). Graves had been outmanœuvered and completely deceived as to the motive of De Grasse—whom he perhaps took for De

Barras—in not coming to a close engagement, meanwhile receding from the Capes. He soon, however, learned the result of the stratagem, and was mortified to find both the French fleets within the Capes. Their united strength was now much superior to his own. The expedition had been a failure, and the Admiral returned to New York, giving as a reason, according to Stedman, that he “wished to put his ships in harbor before the equinox.” In this singular action the French lost in killed and wounded two hundred and twenty men; the British ninety killed and two hundred and forty-six wounded, while one of their men-of-war was so disabled as to be abandoned and burned.

When De Grasse first anchored in the Bay, Lafayette sent an officer who gave him information in respect to the situation in Virginia, and made arrangements for landing troops. The French Admiral at once sent a sufficient number of ships of the line and frigates to blockade the mouth of the York River, and by means of other war vessels took possession of the James. When Cornwallis learned of these forces gathering around him, he resolved to cut his way to the Carolinas, but on making the attempt his progress was effectually checked by the foresight of Washington. He found himself confronted by a force of three thousand French troops, who, under the Marquis St. Simon, had already passed up the James, and at a point some eight miles in the rear of Yorktown landed on the south side of the river; Wayne had also crossed to the same side to unite with the French, and both were ready to intercept him. He reconnoitered Williamsburg, twelve miles from Yorktown, where Lafayette had taken position, and was surprised to find it fortified too strongly to be assaulted without great loss of life. He was completely hemmed in; there was no alternative; he must strengthen his defences as best he could, and meanwhile send expresses to Sir Henry Clinton informing him of the situation and to ask for aid. The entire British army went to work with determination, and labored incessantly to strengthen their somewhat advanced works.

The hamlet of Yorktown is on the south side of York River; directly opposite is a projection of land known as Gloucester Point. The river between these places is about one mile wide, and sufficiently deep to float ships of large burdens. Cornwallis took great pains, and his engineers showed much skill in fortifying Yorktown. On the land side were seven redoubts and six batteries; these were connected by intrenchments; in addition were lines of batteries along the river bank. The town was situated between the mouths of creeks, whose beds were deep ravines, and these natural advantages were also skillfully made available.

Gloucester Point was similarly fortified; in the river, out of range of the French fleet, were stationed British ships of war, while the stream below was obstructed by sunken vessels. Only about seven hundred men, under Col. Dundas, composed the garrison of the small fort at Gloucester Point; the main force, nearly seven thousand strong, was within the fortifications of Yorktown.

THE INVESTMENT OF YORK—On the afternoon of September 28, 1781, the French and American armies came in sight, and encamped about two miles from the British lines. They approached cautiously and made no attack on the enemy's outposts. In the evening of the same day came to Cornwallis an express from Clinton, dated four days before, announcing that sufficient naval and land forces would be sent within twelve days to relieve him. Induced by this assurance of aid, during the following night Cornwallis withdrew his troops within the fortifications proper of the town, which, from their limited extent, could be more effectively manned and defended. The outworks thus abandoned were occupied the next morning by the besiegers, and the town was completely invested. The Americans were stationed on the right; the French on the left—each wing resting on York River—in a semicircle, at the distance of more than a mile from the British works. Gloucester Point was also invested by the Duke de Lauzun's Legion, aided by marines from the French Fleet and by Virginia militia. The whole besieging force numbered about twelve thousand men besides the militia, which were drawn from Pennsylvania, Maryland and Virginia. The greater part of the French squadron remained down the Bay at Lynn Haven, a convenient point to intercept aid from the ocean, as it was expected Clinton would send to the rescue a fleet from New York.

A large body of the besiegers during a dark night (Oct. 6), in silence, but working with great energy, constructed their first parallel within six hundred yards of the enemy's works—this parallel was nearly two miles in length. The English were astonished when daylight revealed this formidable approach to their defences. The rapid manner in which the Americans threw up intrenchments had oftentimes surprised the British generals from Bunker Hill onward. The besieged immediately opened with artillery upon the men at work, but, being cautious and well protected, the latter continued their labor, and within a few days placed their guns in position and were ready to open fire upon the defences in front of the town. The cannonade began in the afternoon of the 9th of October, Gen. Washington himself applying the match to the

first gun; this was followed by a general discharge from cannon, mortars and howitzers. The balls and shells even reached the vessels in York River, and several transports, with the *Charon*, a forty-four gun ship, were burned by exploding shells and red-hot balls thrown by the French artillerists. Many of the British guns were dismounted; the heavy ordnance brought by De Barras told tremendously on their defences.

When Cornwallis withdrew his men from the outworks, there still remained in line two well-manned redoubts in an advanced position of three hundred yards; these had withstood the cannonade for four days. The British garrison labored unceasingly during the night to repair breaches, and during the day kept up a spirited fire from what guns they had, as many had been disabled, and a large number of the men had been killed or wounded.

When the besiegers attempted to throw up a second parallel, three hundred yards nearer the enemy's defenses, these redoubts from their position were able by a flanking fire to sweep the line of men when at work. It was found necessary to capture these redoubts; one was assigned to be taken by the French, the other by the Americans. This enterprise was undertaken by both parties in a spirit of generous emulation. The time chosen was eight o'clock, in the evening of the 14th of October; both detachments were promptly ready for the assault, and when the signal—a rocket sent up—was given, they rushed to the attack; the Americans under Alexander Hamilton made short work of the abattis, and scrambling over the parapet captured their redoubt with the bayonet alone, losing nine men killed and thirty-three wounded; the French, under the Baron de Vioménil, made their attack in a more formal manner, even waiting for the sappers to remove the abattis, and when the soldiers rushed in they found the garrison prepared for them; the struggle, though short and sharp, ended in the capture of the redoubt, but at the expense of nearly one hundred men. Men were at once put to work, and before daylight these captured redoubts were also included within the line of the second parallel. Guns were promptly brought forward, and a fire, heavier than before, was opened upon the defences of the besieged.

Two days later the British commander, wishing to retard the approach of his enemy, ordered a sortie to be made. The attacking force was nearly four hundred strong and in two divisions, one under Col. Abercrombie and the other under Major Armstrong. The time chosen was a little before daybreak, and by a spirited assault they carried two redoubts in the French position, and hastily spiked eleven can-

non. The supporting troops in the trenches soon rallied, and as daylight was approaching drove the assailants back to their own quarters. Within twelve hours the spikes were drilled out, and the guns were again doing effective service. The besiegers had now nearly one hundred guns, large and small, to play on the fortifications of the English, while the latter could scarcely show a dozen.

Driven to desperation, but not willing to relax an effort, Cornwallis determined to abandon everything, even his sick and wounded, pass over to Gloucester, overcome the besiegers of that place, seize their horses, and cut his way toward the north. He certainly could not hope to reach New York and unite with Clinton, yet such was his horror of surrendering that he fain would struggle to the last. Boats were collected, and one division crossed over before the middle of the night following the repulse from the redoubts; the second was about to embark when suddenly a storm of wind and rain came on, which drove the boats down the river. By the time they were again collected it was too late; day was dawning, and an effort must be made to bring back the first division, which, when returning, was subjected to a galling fire from the besiegers' batteries.

Cornwallis' command was in a deplorable condition; scarcely could he mount a gun; his works were shattered under an incessant shower of cannon balls and shells; his force was reduced to less than four thousand effective men; the remainder were either killed, wounded or sick; all hope of aid from Clinton was at an end; indeed, some days before he had written to him in a despairing tone, saying: "I cannot recommend that the navy and army should run great risk in endeavoring to save us." To spare the effusion of blood in case of assault by an overwhelming and exultant force, he sent a note to Washington on the 17th of October (the anniversary of the surrender of Burgoyne at Saratoga), asking an armistice of twenty-four hours, that terms of capitulation might be agreed upon. As Clinton might arrive any hour with reinforcements both by sea and land, only two hours were given for his Lordship to put his proposals in writing. These when presented were not found to be satisfactory. Afterward Washington transmitted the terms on which he would accept the surrender.

**THE CAPITULATION AND SURRENDER.**—The Commissioners on the part of the allied forces to conduct the negotiations were Col. John Laurens and the Viscount de Noailles, and on the part of the British, Major Ross and Col. Dundas. The terms of capitulation were as follows: York-

town and Gloucester Point, with their garrisons and all their war material, to be surrendered to Gen. Washington, as Commander-in-Chief of the combined army, and the ships of war and other vessels, with the transports, to Count de Grasse—the land forces were to be prisoners to Congress, and the seamen to France. The officers of the higher rank were dismissed on their parole, and permitted to go to Europe, or to any port in possession of British troops. The private property of both officers and men was to be respected. One sloop-of-war, the *Bonetta*, was allowed to depart unchallenged, with such persons on board as Lord Cornwallis designated. This was designed to give the most obnoxious Tories an opportunity to leave the country. The same expedient had been adopted when Boston was evacuated—a ship, unchallenged, sailed for Halifax, in which many Tories took passage; hence the almost forgotten proverb, “Gone to Halifax.” The *Bonetta* was to return, and, with her crew and armament, given up. The traders within the lines were not counted as prisoners; they were granted a certain length of time to arrange their affairs and leave. During the occupation of Virginia an immense amount of private property had been taken from the inhabitants by British soldiers or their marauding expeditions; this could be reclaimed by its owners.

The terms of capitulation were arranged and signed by eleven on the morning of the 19th October; the British army was to march out at two o'clock the same day and lay down their arms. In the presence of quiet, but rejoicing, thousands who had flocked from the region round about, and of the allied armies, numbering sixteen thousand men, drawn up in becoming silence as for a review, the garrison of York marched to the place designated, and there laid down their arms. Lord Cornwallis, on the plea of indisposition—whether physical or moral is not definitely known—declined to be present, but sent Gen. O'Hara as his deputy to make the surrender. At Charleston, when Gen. Lincoln capitulated, the Americans were not permitted to march out with their colors flying, as had been granted to Burgoyne, but with colors cased. It was thought proper, therefore, on this occasion to deny the courtesy granted at Saratoga, and the British soldiers were directed to march out with their colors cased; and Gen. Lincoln was deputed by Washington to receive the sword of Cornwallis. The garrison of Gloucester was surrendered with similar formality.

Yorktown was now a name to be honored, even beyond those of Bunker Hill and Saratoga. How much was involved in that surrender! The long struggle was virtually ended. It had been a contest, not for



power, not for aggrandizement, but for the establishment of a great principle. Said Lafayette to Napoleon, when he sneered at the smallness of the armies engaged in the American Revolution: "It was the grandest of causes, won by the skirmishes of sentinels and outposts." It is true, the number who fell on the battle-fields of this war was comparatively small. The names of but few of these have come down to us; they were written only on the hearts of friends and relatives who mourned their loss. Scarcely was there a family but had a precious record; the cherished memory of some one who had thus sacrificed his life.

REJOICING AND THANKSGIVING.—The morning following the surrender, Washington, in General Orders, congratulated the combined armies on the success their bravery achieved. He added: "Divine service will be performed to-morrow in the several brigades and divisions," and recommended that the soldiers should attend, "with that seriousness of deportment and gratitude of heart which the recognition of such reiterated and astonishing interpositions of Providence demand of us." Such was the tone of feeling that pervaded the whole land; it burst forth from the household, from the pulpit, from the press. When Congress received the news, it proceeded in a body to a church, and there publicly offered thanks to Almighty God "for the special favor He had manifested to their struggling country." They also appointed a day of National Thanksgiving and prayer, "in acknowledgment of the signal interposition of Divine Providence."

The Congress voted thanks to Washington and to Counts de Rochambeau and to de Grasse and the officers and soldiers of both armies. It likewise passed resolutions to erect a monumental column at Yorktown in commemoration of the union of the American and French armies, and of the victory they had achieved. On the day of the surrender the tardy Sir Henry Clinton left Sandy Hook. Arriving at the Capes on the 24th October, he learned of the result, and found a French fleet far outnumbering his own. After lingering four days off the Capes, as nothing could now be done for the royal cause in Virginia, he returned to New York.

Washington was anxious to prosecute the war in the South vigorously and at once; especially to capture the two most important places held by the British, Charleston and Savannah. To accomplish this, it was necessary to have the cooperation of the French fleet, but Count de Grasse declined to assist, pleading as a reason the orders of the French Government, and that his presence with the fleet was essential

in the West Indies. Had this cooperation been attained, no doubt the enemy would have been forced to surrender those strongholds; instead, Washington could only send a detachment of two thousand Continentals or regulars to reinforce Gen. Greene.

A portion of the French troops, those under the Marquis St. Simon, embarked for home, while with the remainder De Rochambeau went into winter quarters at Williamsburg, in a central position, that, if need be, he could cooperate with Gen. Greene in the South or with the army on the Hudson. Meanwhile the British prisoners, under escort, were sent inland by regiments to Winchester in Virginia, to Frederick in Maryland, and to Lancaster in Pennsylvania. They were supplied, in respect to rations and comforts, in the same manner as the American soldiers.

Washington returned north, lingering for some weeks in Philadelphia to concert measures with the committees of Congress relative to the affairs of the army, and for the energetic prosecution of the next campaign. Meanwhile the victorious patriots moved on to their old quarters in Jersey and on the Hudson.

JACOB HARRIS PATTON

## BE IT REMEMBERED!

THAT on the 17th of October, 1781, Lieutenant-General Earl CORNWALLIS, with above Five thousand British Troops, surrendered themselves Prisoners of War to His Excellency Gen. GEORGE WASHINGTON, Commander in Chief of the allied Forces of France and America.

## LAUS DEO!

FROM LOUDON'S NEW YORK PACKET

(Printed at Fishkill, Nov. 1, 1781)