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I. THE NEGRO IN ECCLESIASTICAL RELATIONS.

THE negro question, as it is called, presents one of the most perplexing problems of our age. Every phase of it, social, political, and ecclesiastical, involves difficulties sufficient to tax the wisdom and philanthropy of the most enlightened. The difficulty is increased by the malign influence of sectionalism. Both sections of our common country essay the attempt, and each embarrasses the other. The North would speedily settle it were it not for the South; and the South would have settled it long ago but for the North. The conscientious convictions of each party stand in the way of the best intentions of the other, so that the well meant efforts of both fail, to the scandal of religion and the sorrow of philanthropy. Two opposing policies are presented by the two sections. This want of harmony was at first explained and excused by the heat of passion lingering like smoke around the recent battle fields, and there was confident prophecy of its speedy disappearance. The passions of war, however, have long since subsided, and the hostiles have "shaken hands across the bloody chasm," and the lines of opposition, like those of breastwork and battle-field, have been long ago obliterated, while this conflict still rages. These policies have confronted each other now for a quarter of a century, and they are as unreconciled if not as irreconcilable in 1889 as in 1865. There is something very significant in this.

Moreover, whatever suggestion is offered by either fails of influence on the other, each being discounted—the South by the North upon the allegation of prejudice, the North by the South upon that of ignorance.

II. PROBATION AFTER DEATH.

“MANKIND believe in hell.” It is not a doctrine purely of revelation that the wicked are punished in another world. The belief in such a doom is as universal as the belief in God and in the immortality of the soul. Philosophers who aspire to reach the summits of intelligence, and poets who aspire to sound the depths of the human soul, alike recognize the fearful reality; and the power of both lies in their ability to give expression to what all men think and feel. The philosopher and the poet, as has been well said, are more men than other men; they see more clearly and feel more profoundly than other men; they have greater power of expression; and hence homage is done to them as the hierophants of those mysteries which are enshrined in the recesses of every human soul. This explains the difference, so eloquently expounded by De Quincey, in duration and destiny between what he calls the literature of mere knowledge and the literature of power. “It is the grandeur of all truth which *can* occupy a very high place in human interests that it is never absolutely novel to the meanest of minds; it exists eternally by way of germ or latent principle in the lowest as in the highest, needing to be developed, but never to be planted. . . . It is in relation to the great *moral* capacities of men that the literature of power, as contra-distinguished from that of knowledge, lives and has its field of action.” The “moral capacities” of mankind are the same in all and the same from age to age, like the appetites of hunger and thirst in the human body; and the literature which deals with them, if it springs from genius, is destined to be permanent. The *Principia* of Newton has already been antiquated: *Macbeth* is “triumphant forever, as long as the languages exist in which it speaks or can be taught to speak.” The great subject of *Macbeth* is penal retribution for sin, and its tremendous power lies in the human conscience, which responds to its awful representations. Shakspeare was no theologian, but who can read this

tragedy and not feel that there is a hell, or, if there is not, that there ought to be? Plato, Homer, Virgil, Dante, Shakspeare, Milton, when they present this dreadful topic, only voice the sentiments of the human soul. Mankind believe in hell.

But they do not believe in it as they do in some other things, because it is their pleasure to do so, because the wish is father to the thought. Not at all; they are compelled to believe in it by the operation of the same power which compels them to believe in God, the power of conscience. The fool who says in his heart "no God," of course will also say "no hell." But as God will not allow his Being to be disowned, so he will not allow his moral government, his righteous purpose to punish sin, to be disowned. Either of these convictions may be resisted and even suppressed for a time, but only for a time. Men may deny that there is a God, or that they have souls, or that there is a world external to themselves. The zeal and persistency with which they endeavor to prove that there is no hell is no argument against the reality of it; rather the contrary. "What man," says Dr. Shedd, "would seriously construct an argument to demonstrate that there is no such being as Jupiter Ammon, or such an animal as the centaur? The very denial of endless retribution evinces by its spasmodic eagerness and effort to disprove the tenet, the firmness with which it is intrenched in man's moral constitution."

There are many methods of assault upon the doctrine. One is to admit that the Bible teaches it clearly, and then to make this fact a proof against the Bible's inspiration and authority, the doctrine itself being too absurd and monstrous to be believed. Another is to admit the inspiration and authority of the Bible, and upon this ground to argue that it cannot teach the doctrine, and that the places which seem to teach it must receive some other interpretation. These two methods are the same in principle. In both the reason of man is made the judge as to what a revelation from God ought to contain. A third method, near akin to the last, if it can be called a method, feeling rather than logic being judge, is simply to take one's stand on the *goodness* of God, and say it cannot be. This seems to have been John Foster's position, and was probably Origen's. Thousands have passed through just such

a struggle as Adolphe Monod describes in his own case, though not always with the same result. "There was a time," says he, "when I was unwilling to believe in endless punishment either for any man or even for the devil; and when I wrote these foolish words, 'If one single creature of God must be eternally unhappy there is no happiness possible for me.' But as I believed at the same time that the Bible was the Word of God, and that consequently I could not in peace reject the endlessness of punishment so long as I found it taught in the Bible, I endeavored to persuade myself that it was not taught there. For this purpose I read, I meditated, I commented—attenuating the places which seemed to favor the doctrine—hunting up, exaggerating, forcing those which I hoped to find contrary to it. I did all I could not to find endless punishment in God's Word, but I did not succeed. I was convinced by the irresistible evidence of the testimony of the Scriptures. . . . I yielded, I bowed my head, I put my hand on my mouth; I believed in endless punishment with a conviction all the more profound that I had long fought against it."

These good men knew of course that there was an incalculable amount of suffering in this world, and not only suffering but *penal* suffering. They believed that all this suffering was consistent with God's *infinite* goodness; but they could not believe that such goodness could consist with *endless* suffering. Hence, perhaps, the origin of the notion of a probation after death. Such a notion was a sort of flanking of a doctrine which could not be successfully attacked in front. There can be little doubt that this notion is practically Universalism. It is taken for granted that every man who dies in his sins will avail himself of his chance in the next world, and so no man's punishment will be endless, but all will be saved. The fear of future punishment will practically cease to operate. "The spirit of man," says Monod, "being immortal is so made that that which must have an end cannot appear to him long. A child who had heard it said that the abode of the wicked in hell should be only a thousand years, being threatened for some bad conduct with hell, answered, 'What care I for hell? I shall stay there only a thousand years.' This word was profound as it was artless, and by the mouth of that little child spoke

the whole human race." A very striking confirmation of this is seen in the effect of the pagan and papal doctrine of purgatory. Purgatory, according to the Roman doctors, is not a place of *discipline*, but of true and proper *punishment*, to all intents and purposes a temporary hell. Yet how many thousands and millions prefer the prospect of it to the pains and self-denials of a life of repentance and holiness here!

The notion of a probation after death is, therefore, virtually Universalism; and it is the most dangerous form of that deadly heresy, for the reasons already suggested. It is more dangerous because it is more respectable; more reverent towards God, because it recognizes his moral character and his moral government, and "concedes the force of the biblical and rational arguments respecting the guilt of sin and its intrinsic desert of everlasting punishment;" and more reverent towards man, because it respects and does not outrage the judgments and instincts of his moral constitution. It is further respectable in that it concedes that there is no other way of salvation than through the work of Jesus Christ and the work of the Holy Ghost. At any point in the history of the sinner, whether in this world or the next, if he obtains salvation it must be through regeneration, faith and repentance. It is true that some who hold to probation after death, perhaps the majority of those who so hold, would object to the statement just made of their concessions to "orthodoxy." Their idea of probation *here* is such as to imply a "self-determining power of the will," or at least a synergistic operation of the will in turning to God; and they have the same idea of probation after death. One great inducement to accept the theory of a *post-mortem* probation is the fact that the evidence then will be too overwhelming to be resisted, and that multitudes whose will was proof against all the appeals of the law or the gospel here, will break down under the light of eternity. They are of the same opinion with Dives in the "parable," that the main reason why men do not repent is that they have not evidence enough, or evidence of the right kind.

While it is the purpose of this essay to discuss the question of fact whether there is a probation after death, in the sense simply

of the possibility of a change from a state of sin to a state of salvation, without reference to the *rationale* of that change, yet it may not be amiss to say a few words upon the Pelagian or semi-Pelagian view of the subject.

According to this view, the change from a state of sin to a state of salvation is brought about by "moral suasion." Man was not killed by the fall in Adam. The Pelagian says he was not even hurt; the Low Arminian that he was stunned and seriously hurt; the High Arminian that he was as good as dead, as Euty-chus was after he had fallen from the third story; but that, in consequence of the embrace of God's love, his life was still in him, was not allowed to become extinct, or was immediately restored, as in the case of Euty-chus in the embrace of Paul. No direct, quickening agency of the Spirit, therefore, is necessary to make him alive. He is to be persuaded by argument, expostulation, remonstrance, entreaty, to stir his torpid, slumbering life into activity and to decide for God. To help him in doing this, the most awful pictures of hell and the judgment are presented to him. If he remains undecided in this life, then we may hope that he may be persuaded by the vision and experience of the reality after death.

Now all this speculation falls to the ground at once if it be true, as the Scriptures teach, that the sinner is "dead in trespasses and sins," that he needs to be "quickened," "raised from the dead," "new created" by him "who quickeneth the dead, and calleth the things that are not, as though they were." The sinner in this world *will* not turn to God; *will* not come to the Saviour that he may have life. The very *gravamen* of the difficulty is in his *will*; he is incurably averse to God, hates God, and no power of logic or eloquence can change his mind. A clearer revelation of God is only a clearer revelation of what the sinner hates; and if there is to be a clearer revelation of God in the other world, what other effect can it have than to drive the sinner further off from God? Besides, sin is prevented here from developing itself fully by the kindly restraints of domestic and social life, by public opinion and by human law. There is no reason to believe that those restraints will continue to exist in the future world. The

dead soul is, as it were, embalmed in this world with the sweet spices of charity and compassion; in the other world the natural process of putrefaction will take its course. These considerations harmonize exactly with the "parable" of the Rich Man and Lazarus. Dives makes no prayer for repentance for himself. He does not pray even for deliverance from his torments, but only for a slight alleviation of them. He does not pray for repentance to be *given* to his brethren. He only thinks of repentance in an external way as a condition of escaping torment, not as a hearty turning away from sin unto God. Moreover, he expresses his belief that repentance would be the result of the going to them of one from the dead. But as he himself already has the evidence which he desires for them, and yet does not repent, why should he think that *they* would repent? The only reason is that he knows them to be still in a state of probation and his own probation to be ended. There is a possibility of repentance for them, as they are still living, but there is none for him, even if he desired it, and of such desire there is no trace.

Even on the Pelagian and Arminian view, the probability that a man who has all his life resisted the commands and invitations of the gospel will in the other world be more inclined to faith and repentance, is exceedingly small. Do not these men know, and do they not teach sinners, that the longer the offers of salvation are resisted the less likely it is that they will ever be accepted? Why then annul the force of their exhortations to speedy, to immediate repentance, by teaching that repentance may be postponed to a time even beyond death, and yet be obtained at last?

Let us return now to the question of fact. Is there any proof of a probation after death? It is conceded that the proofs must be obtained from the Scriptures, if there are any proofs at all.

One of the passages—it may be said the fundamental passage, the *locus classicus*—is that of 1 Pet. iii. 18–20. This passage is relied on even by such a man as Professor Godet to prove that "the gospel shall be preached to every human soul before the judgment, either in this life or in the next." (See his Commentary on Rom. ii. 7, 8, Funk & Wagnall's edition, p. 119, with Dr.

Talbot W. Chambers's very clear and able criticism in the Appendix, pp. 517 ff.)

On this passage it may be remarked, first, that the Bible proof of a probation after death must be very scant, when the advocates of that view are compelled to appeal to it for support. Everybody knows that it is one of the most obscure places in the New Testament, and that the ablest interpreters are divided in their views about it. In regard particularly to the act or work of Christ there described interpreters differ. *When* was that work done? In the days of Noah, or in the interval between Christ's death and his resurrection? *What* was the work? Agreed that it was a preaching or making a proclamation; agreed also that it was a proclamation concerning the work of redemption which he had just achieved upon the cross, the question still remains, For what purpose was the proclamation made? For the purpose of affording to the "spirits in prison" another opportunity of salvation, or for the purpose merely of announcing and celebrating in that dark abode the victory of the Redeemer over the powers of darkness? It is contended by Prof. Godet, and those who agree with him, that the time was the interval between the death and the resurrection of Christ, and that the purpose of the proclamation was to offer salvation. It is contended by others that the time was the time of Noah, and the proclamation was the offer of salvation. It is contended by others still, as by Dr. Chambers, that the time was the interval between Christ's death and his resurrection, but that the proclamation was *not* the offer of salvation, or at least that such a purpose is not expressed in the passage, is not necessarily implied in the fact of preaching, and is forbidden by the tenor of Bible teaching. The writer of this paper thinks that the second of the views just mentioned harmonizes best with the scope of the passage and with the reference to Noah and the antediluvian generation, and prefers it for these reasons, while acknowledging the grammatical objections to it. But it is not necessary to arbitrate among these different views. The point here made is that such a passage is too precarious a support for such a notion as that of probation after death, especially as that notion is conceded to be not in har-

mony with the faith of the church or with the seeming tenor of Bible teaching.¹

Dr. Chambers, in the criticism above referred to, has another thought of much weight. It is this: "Even admitting (which is not admitted) that the words do mean or may mean that the Lord proclaimed a gospel to the spirits in prison, this proves nothing in respect to the case of others before or since the time of the proclamation in question, for the simple reason that there the circumstances were peculiar and extraordinary; and what is done on momentous occasions is no precedent for ordinary days. Because the conduits run wine instead of water when the king receives his crown, we are not to expect that they will do the same when the coronation is over." (P. 520.)

Another text is 1 Pet. iv. 6, upon which it is needless to dwell. If it proves a probation after death, it proves also the salvation of *all* the dead; and the boldest Universalism is the result. The apostle evidently refers to what took place in the lifetime of the dead. The gospel was preached to them when they were living, so that they might indeed be condemned by their fellows in "the fiery trial" (verse 12); "but nevertheless their spirits enjoyed immortal life with God" (see Chambers, as above).

Once more, the advocates of a *post-mortem* probation urge the passage in Matt. xii. 32, which seems to imply that some sins may be forgiven in the world to come. Dr. Dorner goes so far as to say (Christian Doctrine, § 83 c, p. 72, of Vol. III., T. & T. Clark's Trans., Edinb., 1882) that the sin against the Holy Ghost is "the only sin which is not forgiven either in this world or the next." All other sins are punishable, but this only will be punished. But of this more in the sequel. Meantime, the point here is that the form of the expression implies that there are sins which if not forgiven in this world may be in the next. The answer is, as Dr. Chambers remarks, that this is turning rhetoric into logic. The

¹ Let it be noted that Prof. Godet, and others who contend for a probation after death only for those who never had the offer of salvation in this life, have no right to this passage in support of their view. The antediluvian sinners *had* the offer of salvation. Noah was a preacher of righteousness to them (2 Pet. ii. 5), and the Spirit of grace strove with them (Gen. vi. 3) while the ark was preparing.

thirty-second verse is merely a rhetorical repetition of the thirty-first. Our Lord was considering not the *time* of forgiveness, but the question whether there was forgiveness at all in the case of a certain sin. In order to make the negation as vivid as possible, and to show that the sin he is speaking of shall never be forgiven, he combines the two periods, this world and the world to come. The same meaning is expressed in the parallel passage in Mark iii. 29: "Whosoever shall blaspheme against the Holy Ghost hath never forgiveness, but is guilty of an eternal sin" (thus in the Revised Version).

So much for the scriptural arguments in favor of probation after death. Whatever force they might seem to have, considered by themselves, and this has been shown to be very small, entirely vanishes in the presence of the scriptural arguments on the other side. Let us look at them:

First, the Bible is profoundly silent about any "intermediate place" in which the people dwell who are still, after death, in a state of probation. It speaks of a Sheol or Hades in the sense of the grave or in the sense of the unseen world, or of the state of the dead; but in this sense *all* the dead are there. It speaks of a Hades in the sense of a place of torment, not distinguishable in effect from Gehenna; but this would not be a proper place for the confinement of those who are not yet condemned, and who *may* be justified. It speaks of a "Gehenna of fire," but this is not for those who are still on trial, but for those who are finally and irrevocably condemned. It speaks of heaven, but this is the residence of those whose probation is past, and who have entered into eternal life. Papists are sagacious enough to find some traces of a Purgatory there; but if there were such a place, it would be, according to those heretics, the abode of *pious* people who have died in the communion of the church, and who are to pay the remnant of the penalty left unpaid by the Redeemer. It would be no place for the wicked, whose final destiny is still undecided. Some find another place called, they say, a "ward" or "place of safe-keeping," as Bishop Horsley renders the word for "prison," in 1 Pet. iii. 19; but this is a place almost the same as the *limbus* of the Papists, a place in which *pious* people are kept, without suf-

fering, in expectation of their future blessedness. It has been shown, however, that this view has no foundation in that text; but even if there were such a place, it would not be suitable for the wicked on probation. There is, then, no place provided for such a class in the next world, and the inference is natural, if not inevitable, that there is no such class.

Again: In that awful passage, the story of the rich man and Lazarus, which was first spoken by our Lord and then recorded for the purpose of revealing something concerning the state of the dead, and which contains the clearest and fullest view of the fate of the wicked, there are only two places mentioned. It matters not whether or not Abraham's bosom be identified with heaven and Hades with Gehenna, the point is that there are only two places, one a place of "comfort" and the other a place of "torment." It is to be noted also, that the entrance into either place follows immediately upon the article of death, and that there is a great gulf fixed between them, so that there can be no passing from one to the other. Further, let it be remembered, what has already been noted, that the rich man seeks no repentance for himself, evidently neither expects nor desires it, and asks for no deliverance from his doom. The conclusion from this passage against a probation after death is so clear and certain that it cannot possibly be evaded, except by a method of interpretation which would reduce the Bible as a rule of faith to an utter nullity.

In other passages death is spoken of as the event which fixes and determines the destiny of the wicked. For example, Prov. xiv. 32: "The wicked is driven away in his wickedness; but the righteous hath hope in his death." This implies that the wicked hath no hope in his death. Prov. xi. 7: "When a wicked man dieth, his expectation shall perish." Heb. ix. 27: "It is appointed unto men once to die, but after this judgment," or, as the revision has it, "cometh judgment." The word "judgment" is without the article, and the reference is rather to the sentence which immediately follows death than to "the day of judgment." The text teaches that prior to death man's destiny is not decided, he being not yet sentenced; but after death his destiny is settled. When he dies, the private judgment, that is, the

immediate personal consciousness either of penitence or impenitence, occurs. . . . The article of death is an event in human existence which strips off all disguises, and shows the person what he really is in moral character. He "knows as he is known," and in this flashing light passes a sentence upon himself that is accurate. (Shedd's Theology, II. p. 694.) In 2. Cor. v. 10, the reference is clear to the final or general judgment, and the teaching is that the sentence which shall be then received will be determined by what was done *in the body*, implying that when the soul left the body the account was closed. If the probation extended beyond the residence in the body, the apostle could not have used this form of speech. Again, our Saviour (Jno. viii.) says more than once to the Pharisees, "If ye believe not that I am he, ye shall die in your sins." To die in their sins can mean nothing else than to die in the state of condemnation and pollution in which they had been living in consequence of their rejection of their Messiah and Redeemer; and if the mention of their death in such a connexion does not signify the decisive crisis beyond which there is no hope of salvation, it is impossible to devise a rational meaning for it. If our Saviour knew that his hearers would have after death another and a better opportunity to weigh his claims, it would have been more natural to say, "If ye believe not now that I am he, ye will no doubt (or probably) believe when death shall have given you more evidence." At all events, if his hearers had known or believed that their probation would be continued beyond death, they would have laughed at his threatening as a mere *brutum fulmen*. And the same would have been the consequence of all the threatenings of the New Testament, of John the Baptist, of his master Christ, and of the apostles.¹

As to Christ, who says more about the destiny of the wicked in the next world than all of his apostles put together, as we might have anticipated he would from his superior compassion, we must either suppose him to have been ignorant of the fact that there was probation after death, or, if he knew the fact, that he deliberately, for his own private ends, used language which im-

¹ See this point well stated and illustrated by Dr. Chambers in the criticism on Godet, above quoted.

plied the contrary, as some preachers who have turned out to be arrant hypocrites and knaves were accustomed to preach the hell and damnation in which they did not themselves believe in order to gratify their lust of gold and of power. But what Christian does not recoil with horror from either supposition as to his divine and immaculate Redeemer?

There are scores of other places in Scripture which would be emptied of their force and meaning by the supposition of a probation after death. There is no space in the limits assigned to this essay, for full citations. Some of them may be found in Gen. vi. 3; Ps. xcix. 12; Prov. i. 24, 28; Eccl. ix. 10; Luke xiii. 24, 25; Matt. xxiv. 42, 50; 2 Cor. vi. 2; Heb. iii. 7; x. 26; Rev. xxii. 11, 12. See Shedd, Dogmatic Theology, II., pp. 698 ff.

The discussion thus far has been one concerning probation after death, without limitation as to any particular class of sinners dying in impenitency. But there are many who are willing to concede that the argument is a good and valid one against a general *post-mortem* probation, and yet hold that there are rational and ethical grounds for believing that a probation will be given to all human beings who have not had the offer of salvation made to them in this life. This is just now the most popular and plausible form in which the doctrine is proposed and defended. It is the form in which it is advocated by the professors of the "New Theology" in New England, and, what is of much greater consequence, by Prof. Dorner and by Julius Müller. It is reported in the public prints that Dorner's Theology has been adopted as a text-book in one of the theological schools of Presbyterian Scotland instead of the system of Dr. Chas. Hodge (which is very like substituting darkness for light, as Dr. Dorner was, in point of style, one of the obscurest writers on this planet, and Dr. Hodge one of the clearest); and if this is the fact, it furnishes a clew to the kind of changes which the would-be revisers of the Westminster Confession in that country propose to make. Dr. Müller is a sounder thinker on the whole subject of sin than Dr. Dorner, which makes it the more to be deplored that he should give his countenance to so grave an error. The soteriology of both these learned men is inconsistent, in this particular, with their Hamar-

tology, as Dr. Shedd says; but the inconsistency is more glaring in the case of Müller, on account of his profounder treatment of the subject of sin.

The fundamental position of Dorner is that, beside the generic character of sinner which belongs to every man by virtue of his connexion with Adam, or, in other words, beside original sin and the actual transgressions which flow from it, something more is necessary to make him damnable, worthy of being damned. "The good must be placed before his eyes, not merely as the voice of conscience or as 'the letter,' but in its most lucid and attractive form, as personal love, in order that decision for or against truth may have decisive significance. This for the condition on the objective side. On the subjective side there must be full freedom of decision from the innermost personality. For good and definitive decision the possibility of evil must still stand open, otherwise it would not be free, so that the knowledge of good cannot yet be absolutely determining for the same. On the other hand, evil decision can only make ripe for the final judgment if it is in nowise naturally necessitated—for example, by generic sin—but if the subject is somehow put into the position to freely strike the decision of himself, and therefore himself to incur the guilt of decided rejection of personal love, which is only possible by means of self-incurred infatuation and falsehood. Now this subjective and objective possibility of free decision is given by God through Christianity as the absolute religion, and therefore Christianity is also the religion of freedom. The manifestation of Christ urges, therefore, irresistibly to decision for or against him, and at the same time, in spite of original sin, makes free decision possible" (*Theology*, III., pp. 69 ff. of T. & T. Clark's Translation).

The sum of all this is, that "no one will be damned merely on account of the common sin and guilt; but every one is definitely brought to guilty personal decision only through the gospel." No man can be considered a full person or fully a free agent until he is confronted with Christ (a new version, by the way, of Christ's words, "the Son shall make you free"). It is only then that the sin against the Holy Ghost becomes possible; and this sin, says Dorner, is "the only sin that is not forgiven either in this world or

in the next." "This is an entirely new position," says Dr. Shedd (Theology, II., p. 701), "not to be found in the past history of eschatology, and invented apparently to furnish a basis for the doctrine of a future offer of redemption." No such absurdity is found in Müller. He founds his hope on Matt. xii. 32. He denies and combats Dorner's position that sin against the gospel is the only damning sin. (See Shedd, *ut supra*.)

Now, if it be true, as Dorner affirms, that prior to Christ, "the incarnate personal love," there was no precise and decided personal character, whether good or evil, no freedom in such a sense as to imply damnable guilt, no "definitive unbelief," and no definitive faith; if this be true, then the larger portion of the Bible is a mass of nonsense and falsehood. One feels the same kind of difficulty in arguing with a man who can hold such a view as he would feel (to borrow an illustration from Henry Rogers) in arguing with an inhabitant of the planet Saturn, where, according to Voltaire's "Micromegas," a crime of enormous turpitude inspires absolute envy, and the three angles of a triangle are *not* equal to two right angles. One feels that he has no common ground on which he stands with Dr. Dorner, no principles accepted on both sides by which any question can be decided. The only possible method of argument is to appeal from Dorner drunk to Dorner sober, to show that he contradicts and stultifies himself. One of the best discussions in his Theology is that on the necessity of Christ's satisfaction to divine justice. He holds that this satisfaction was necessary for the pardon of any man's sins, Jew or Gentile; yet he holds that the only thing which exposes a man to the damnation of hell is the fact that such a satisfaction has been rendered! The penalty would never have been inflicted if Christ had not satisfied God for it. When we are reading Dorner on Christ's Priestly office, we cannot help wondering whether it is the same man who wrote the section on "Personal Free Decision" in the same volume. Here (on the Priestly Office, III., p. 425,) he defines the "wrath of God" (Rom. i. 18,) to be his holy *justice which punishes moral evil*, and then adds: "This justice is not merely directed against the sin of definitive unbelief (the sin against the Holy Ghost), as Ritschl thinks, as if all antecedent guilt and sin needed no expia-

tion. God's wrath is directed against *all* iniquity." (Rom. i. 18.) He also quotes John iii. 36, and says: "The wrath of God abides on sinners even before they despise the gospel." Here he either takes back the pernicious nonsense he had written on "Personal Free Decision," or he must mean that the wrath of God abides upon the sinner because salvation is intended for him and God foresees that he will despise it.

The heathen, according to the great theologian of Germany, are in no danger of eternal death unless they should chance to hear the gospel, and God is obliged to give them the gospel either in this world or in the next. So thought not David: "The wicked shall be turned into Sheol, and all the nations that forget God," (Psa. ix. 17). So thought not Jeremiah: "Pour out thy fury upon the heathen that know thee not, and upon the families that call not on thy name," (Jer. x. 25). So thought not Paul: "They that have sinned without law, shall perish without law," (Rom. ii. 12); and read Rom. i. 18-32, an appalling description of those who, according to Dr. Dorner, have not attained to their majority or full personal freedom, people who have discourse of reason and yet insult their Creator by likening him to corruptible man, to birds and four-footed beasts and creeping things. Dr. Dorner says they are not worthy of death, that is, (as he defines death, III., p. 425,) the "destruction of the soul, misery, all evil." Paul says: "Who knowing the judgment of God, that they which commit such things are worthy of death, not only do the same, but have pleasure in them that do them." Paul says again, (iii. 19,) that every mouth is to be stopped, and the whole world to become guilty before God; and this statement is based upon another appalling description of Dr. Dorner's sinners in their "minority." By no process of "criticism," experts as the Germans are acknowledged to be in all the varieties of that fine art, can the modern professor be reconciled with the ancient apostle. One or the other must be abandoned.

It is very evident that, if Dorner's doctrine be true, the benevolent impulse which has prompted and sustained missions to the heathen is a blind and fatal impulse. There might be other reasons for foreign missions, but there could be no benevolence. "If

no man can be lost," says Dr. Shedd, "without the knowledge of Christ, then none of the past heathen world who died without this knowledge incurred perdition for the 'deeds done in the body,' and none of the existing heathen world who are destitute of this knowledge are liable to perdition from this cause. In this case, it is matter of rejoicing that the past generations of pagans never heard of the Redeemer, and it should be an earnest endeavor of the church to prevent all of the present generation of pagans from hearing of him." (Dogmatic Theology, II., p. 702, note.)

It may be noted, in conclusion, how completely the advocates of after-death probation reverse the positions of Scripture in regard to the justice and mercy of God. These positions are, that while justice and mercy are both of them necessary attributes of God, yet there is this difference between them, that God is always just to all, is unjust to none, but he is not merciful to all. "He has mercy on whom he will have mercy." Mercy, in its exercise, is sovereign; justice is not. The after-death probationists deny that this is so, or ought to be so. Like the Universalists, they insist upon God's treating all men alike. It is natural, therefore, in Dorner to avow expressly the opposition of his doctrine to that of Luther and Calvin; that is, the doctrine of predestination. He is right. If his position is the true one, Calvinism is out and out false, and *tremendously* false.

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